Prejudices and Prepossessions are stubborn Things in all Cases; but in none more peculiarly obstinate, than in relinquishing detached Parts of an unwieldy, extended Empire; there not being, I believe, a single Instance in all History, of any Nation surrendering a distant Province voluntarily, and of free Choice, notwithstanding it was greatly their Interest to have done it. The English in particular have given remarkable Proofs of their Unwillingness. For tho’ it was undeniably their Interest to have abandoned all the Provinces which they held in France, yet they never gave up one of them, ’till they were compelled to it by Force of Arms. Now indeed, and at this Distance of Time, we see clearly, that our Fore-Fathers were wretched Politicians in endeavouring to retain any one of the French Provinces, which, if it was a little one, would be a continual Drain, and perhaps an encreasing Expence; and if it was a great one, might grow up to be a Rival, and become the Seat of Empire. I say, we can see these Things clearly enough at present: Yet alas! what Advantages do we derive from this Discovery? And what Application do we make of such historical Mementos to the Business of the present Day? The remotest of our Provinces in France were hardly 300 Miles distant from our own Coasts; the nearest of those in America are about 3000. The Provinces in France were already fully peopled, and peopled for the most Part by Inhabitants extremely well affected at that Time to the English Government: Whereas the Deserts of America require first to be peopled by Draughts either from ourselves, or from our European Customers; and then when these Emigrants have been settled for a Generation or two, they become native Americans, who naturally forget the Supremacy of that Country, with whose Government they have so little Connections, from whose Seat of Empire they are so far distant, whose ruling Power they so seldom feel (and therefore do not regard) and consequently whose Claims they consider as so many audacious Attempts to rob them of their beloved Independence.

But this is not all: And the Absurdity of our present Conduct in not abandoning the rebellious Provinces of North-America, becomes still more glaring, when we consider farther, (what we now find by Experience to be true) that we can live and flourish, even in our commercial Capacity, without the Assistance of these refractory Colonies. For tho’ it doth by no Means follow, that we should be destitute of their Trade, if each American Province was erected into a separate and independent State; nay, tho’ the contrary hath been made to appear by such a Chain of Evidences, as no Man hitherto hath attempted to break or weaken, yet, granting the worst, granting even that these North-Americans traded with us as little after a Separation as they do at present, still it is possible that we may then live, because it is certain we do now live without them; and do not only live, but also enjoy as many of the Comforts and Elegancies, not to mention the Profusions and Luxuries of Life, as any Nation ever did, and more than we ourselves did heretofore.

Therefore (to be more particular on this Head, for surely it is a most important one) we were gravely told, that as soon as ever the Americans should shut their Ports against us, Famine to our Manufacturers, Bankruptcy to our Merchants, Destruction and Desolation to our Seaport Towns must inevitably ensue. Well, the Americans have now shut their Ports for a considerable Time against the Admission of English Manufactures. And what has ensued? Nothing, that I know of, so very dismal, or so very tragical; and none of those black and bitter Days, with which we were threatened, have yet appeared. Nay, according to the Accounts received from the principal manufacturing Places and Districts throughout the Kingdom, it uniformly appears that Trade was never brisker in most Articles; and that it is not remarkably dead in any:—Moreover it is likewise certain, from the same Accounts, that a much greater Stagnation hath been frequently felt, even at Times when every Port in America was open to us, than is felt at present.

However, if these Partizans of America should cavil at these Accounts, and dispute their Authority, we have others yet to produce, which surely must carry Conviction (almost in Spite of Prejudice) as soon as they are perused; [unless indeed it can be imagined, that the present wicked Ministry have entered into a Plot to charge themselves Debtors to the Public for almost Two Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand Pounds Sterling more than they received, merely to plague and confound the poor Patriots.]

The Account I am now going to lay before the Reader, is the gross Produce of the Excise for the Year 1775, ending at the 5th of July last, compared with the like gross Produce of the preceding Year 1774, ending at the like Period.

Now it appears by the Particulars of the Account, that what chiefly caused this great Increase, was the greater Quantity made, consumed, or used of Low Wines and Spirits,—of the London Brewery,—of Malt, Hops, Cyder, and Coaches, in the Year 1775, ending at the 5th of July, than in the preceding Year. For as to several other Articles, there was a remarkable Deficiency, especially in the Excise on Tea, and on Liquors imported into the [11] Out-Ports; both which Branches, if put together, amount to no less than 79,380l. 13s. 9½d.—And yet, notwithstanding this great Loss in two such capital Articles, the Produce of the others before mentioned so much exceeded their usual Income, that the whole Balance of the Year was, as I said before, 254,795l. 19s. 11¾d. Now as our common People, our Artificers, and mechanic Tradesmen, our Journeymen, Day-Labourers, &c. &c. are the principal Consumers of, or Customers for, these Articles (Coaches excepted) we may, and ought to pronounce, that these numerous Bodies of Men were not in that starving Condition, (which it was foretold they should be) when they could so much exceed their usual (and for the most Part unnecessary) Gratifications in Spirituous Liquors, and Porter, Ale, strong Beer, and Cyder, as to raise such a Surplus of Revenue. And in respect to the Increase in the Coach-Tax (which was nearly 2000l.) surely this is a plain Proof likewise, that our Merchants, principal Traders, and Manufacturers (who were all to be infallibly ruined) are not in that melancholly Situation, as hath been foreboded of them by the American false Prophets;—I say, the Proof is plain, seeing that so many new Carriages have been set up, instead of the former being put down. And I think, I may take for granted, that it is the Trading, and not the Landed-Interest, which sets up most new Carriages.

Upon the Whole therefore, and in whatever Light things are considered, it evidently appears that we can have but little, or nothing to lose; but must have a great deal to get, or (which is the same thing) much to save, and many Dangers to escape by a total Separation from the rebellious Provinces of North-America. The History of all Nations, and of all Ages,—our own Experience respecting France,—the melancholly Situation at this Day of the once populous and flourishing Kingdom of Spain,—the present Demands of our Manufactures for Exportation,—the State of Parties among us, and the Growth of republican Principles, all, all conspire to prove, that we ought to get rid of such an onerous, dangerous, and expensive Connection as soon as possible. In one Word, the longer the present System is persevered in, the worse Things will necessarily grow, and the riper for Destruction; it being morally impossible that they should mend; for the Fire, if even smothered for the present, will break out again with fresh Violence; and the sound Parts of our Constitution will be in great Danger of being tainted by the Gangrene of American Republicism.