CHAPTER V.
BULGARIA.

Country and People—The building up of the Bulgarian State—Relations with Russia—German Influence—Alexander of Battenberg—King Ferdinand—Bulgaria’s Immediate Duty.

Although it is asserted on historical grounds that the Bulgarians are a mixed race, and merely “Slavicized” by the influence of neighbouring Slav races, they certainly ought to be included in the great Slav family. In many ways they have always held aloof from the Slav Ideal, and emphatically preferred to stand alone, but, nevertheless, they have done great service to the Slav cause in the past, and often fought for it with true enthusiasm. In the early days of Christianity the Bulgarians also did much for Slav culture through the Bogumili—(a sect of reformers which will be dealt with in the Chapter on the Southern Slavs)—who spread religious enlightenment, and through the old Bulgarian tongue laid the foundation of the other Slav languages. The Bulgarians, who were once masters of a great Empire, and enjoyed worldwide importance under Simeon the Great, had78 to share the age-long tragedy of all the Eastern Slavs, and it speaks volumes for their national character that they emerged from Turkish bondage as a strong, self-reliant people. Whoever knows the Bulgarians well, cannot fail to respect them, even if they do not inspire great affection. I believe as a race they are not affectionate—they prefer to command respect. The gentle, dreamy, love-craving element in the character of the other Slavs is quite absent in them, and even their fire and enthusiasm is not a matter of sentiment, but a practical necessity—almost a matter of mathematical calculation. Industrious and thrifty as no other Slav nation, cold-blooded and calculating, they have justly been called the “Slav Japanese.” Their type is very interesting and differs considerably from that of the other Slavs. Almost without exception the men are handsome and strongly built, whereas the appearance of the women is spoilt by their wide cheek-bones and thick-set build. Like most of the Slav peoples they are mainly farmers and cattle-breeders, and as the country is fertile, they make quite a good income out of their exports of grain, field-produce and cattle.

Although Bulgarian intellectual life springs from the people, and the Bulgarians are essentially a democratic nation, it is necessary to distinguish between the educated classes and the common people. The Bulgarian peasant is an exceedingly good fellow; physically very active, mentally rather stolid, he pursues his calling in a calm deliberate way, and is not easily ruffled. His food is most simple; he takes practically no alcohol and, owing to his temperate mode of life, lives to a very great age. The entire population numbers about four millions and shows a greater percentage of centenarians than any other nation. The Bulgarians are very fond of music and dancing, but they have no music or poetry of their own, and what they do possess has been borrowed from the Turks or other Orientals. The traveller may often come upon the genuine Nautch dance in a Bulgarian village, and will hear songs sung to purely Turkish melodies. If the Bulgarians have any advantage over the other Slavs, it is in the beauty of their unadulterated Orthodox faith. The people are narrowly religious, and up to now their religion represents the zenith of their culture. In this respect they resemble the Russians and all the Slavs who have retained the Slavo-Orthodox faith. It is superfluous to enlarge on the fighting qualities of the Bulgarians—Kirkilisse, Lule Burgas, and Adrianople have given ample proof of these.

The educated classes are distinct from the people in two ways: they are free-thinkers and quarrelsome. Religion is cultivated among them as a fashion, and the churches have become mere rendezvous, as in Paris, Berlin and Vienna. But, in spite of all this, one must admit that the educated classes of Bulgaria are excellent social organizers, though politically and intellectually they are not particularly brilliant. The amount achieved in social matters by these men in the short time that has elapsed since the emancipation is marvellous. Bulgaria in this respect has become a truly modern state. This bright side is, however, eclipsed by the countless blunders they have committed in other respects. The worst of these is their headstrong blindness in the political administration. Bulgarian politics have degenerated into a devastating party-system, and are largely responsible for the tragical happenings of recent years, in which the whole country, and more especially the innocent mass of the people have been involved. The chief characteristic of the educated Bulgarian is his distrust of everyone; he does not confine this distrust to strangers, but extends it even to his King and his own party leader.

Hitherto intellectual Bulgaria has created but little, and that little is quite out of proportion to the achievements of some other much smaller Slav nations. Bulgarian art and literature are merely poor reproductions of foreign originals and by no means express the strength and vitality of the people. Of all their poets Ivan Vasoff, Hristoff, and Aleko Konstantinoff alone have understood anything of the soul of the people, and only their work will live. In art we seek in vain for anything purely Bulgarian. But there is one thing of the greatest value that the educated Bulgarians have done for their nation, and for this they deserve a true crown of laurels. I am referring to the organization of the Macedonian bands during the last half-century. Their perseverance and heroism call for the greatest admiration.

The country owned by the Bulgarians is one of the most beautiful inhabited by Slavs. Only Dalmatia and Bosnia can compare with it, and whoever has once been there will never forget it. It is the land of the great Balkans in all their wild beauty—the land of the Kazanlik Valley with its vast glorious rose-fields; the Vratza Gorge with its romantic cliffs, dark primeval forests, and hills covered with lilac; the Black Sea, and the beautiful shores of Varna and Burgas, and above all tower the snow-capped summits of the Vitosha. Everywhere, and in everything, dwells a throbbing life, full of variety and contrast, beautiful as the men of Bulgaria and rugged as their women.

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Bulgaria was freed from the Turkish yoke in 1878. The work of emancipation was carried out by Russia with the help of Bulgarian bands and many volunteers from all the Slav countries. By the peace of San Stefano Bulgaria was de jure declared mistress of the entire territories from the Black Sea to Silistria, and along the Danube as far as Vidin in the north, from Vidin along the Morava via Ochrida as far as Yanina in the west, from Yanina via Salonika to Kavala in the south, and in a straight line from Kavala to Varna in the east. De facto she was only given independent jurisdiction over such territories as she possessed up to the first Balkan war. The complete liberation of Bulgaria was by no means achieved by the emancipation, and she continued to remain under Turkish suzerainty.

The first task after the emancipation was to reconstruct the country on the lines of a modern European state, and to infuse new life into it after so many centuries of Turkish misrule. Education was represented solely by the priests and the schoolmasters, who had laboured for the enlightenment of the people even before the emancipation. Of course, there were a few Bulgarians who possessed a European education, and had graduated at European universities, and upon these devolved the task of solving the problems of the newly-created state. There were however so few of them that, at the beginning, many men of culture were imported from other Slav countries, chiefly from Russia, Croatia and Bohemia. The military administration was entrusted to Russia, who established garrisons of her own in Bulgaria and undertook to create the Bulgarian army. Considering the transitionary stage of the country at the time, it was inevitable that the Russian military authorities should obtain considerable influence over the civil administration also, and that Bulgarian affairs fell under Russian influence from the very beginning.

Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the first Bulgarian ruler, came to the throne under similar conditions as King Carol to the throne of Roumania. He was confronted with a super-human task, and Bulgarian history can never deny the great service he rendered the country. He came with a definite mission and set to work with the greatest possible zeal. He devoted his attention chiefly to the education of the people and to the army, and he found his most energetic ally in the people themselves. The prompt efficiency of the school system would have done credit to many a more modern state. The Bulgarians are intelligent, persevering, and fond of learning, and popular education made immense strides. At the present day the percentage of adult Bulgarians who cannot read and write is exceedingly small compared to most other countries—it is 2-1/2 per cent. of the adult population. The national system of compulsory education affected the very poorest peasants as well as the better classes. Before the foundation of secondary schools in the country large numbers of young men were sent to foreign secondary schools and universities, and every year yielded its quota of well-equipped youths capable of providing the motive power for the machinery of the State. Similar purposeful energy characterized the military organization, with the intention of forming an independent, purely Bulgarian army. For, in spite of his great admiration for Russia and the Tsar Liberator, Prince Alexander felt that dependence upon Russia—more especially a military dependence—would render his country a vassal de facto of Russia, no less than it was de jure already the vassal of Turkey. He therefore strove to render the Russian military administration superfluous in Bulgaria by building up an efficient home army.

As soon as this was accomplished he sent a letter of thanks to the Tsar, made a public manifesto, gave a big dinner to the Russian generals, and gratefully dismissed the Russian co-operation. Then the Russian generals had to leave Bulgaria. No one can deny that Prince Alexander showed himself manly and self-reliant in taking this decision, which was prompted by a very proper ambition. But he gave mortal offence in Russia, and from that moment he fell completely from Russian favour. The Court circles in St. Petersburg, which had been hostile to him from the beginning, now began to intrigue against him in Bulgaria, their efforts finding a ready response in the pro-Russian party. The first Serbian War in 1885 afforded splendid proof of Alexander’s military organization, but his influence was too far undermined, and even his victories failed to save him. The tide of adverse circumstances was too strong and led to the inevitable but, fortunately, bloodless coup d’État in 1886. Prince Alexander was taken from his palace by night, transported over the frontier and formally deposed.

Prince Alexander left Bulgaria a well-organized State, only disturbed by internal party hatreds. The new ruler, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, was received with divided sympathies. Already in many ways his path had been smoothed for him, but he met with far more opposition from his own people than his predecessor, whom Russia had installed. In spite of all this, the machinery of State continued in the path of progress, the constitution of the country was established on a broad liberal basis, and the army increased in importance from year to year. With iron perseverance Bulgaria steadily advanced to take her place among modern states, and even succeeded in taking the lead in the Balkan question. The proclamation of Ferdinand as King of Bulgaria put an end once and for all to the shadow of Turkish suzerainty, and since then Bulgaria has been frankly acknowledged as a strong, free and independent State.

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In the course of years Bulgarian relations with Russia have passed through many phases, especially during the reign of King Ferdinand. As a rule the will of Russia was decisive, but her general influence always depended on home politics and varied with the party in power. Enthusiasm for Russia and antagonism against Russian influence were alternately the order of the day. Only the people of Bulgaria remained constant in their confidence and affection for Russia; they could never forget whose hand had set them free, and even political changes could not shake them. Certain political circles took the emancipation from Russia as their party cry and hoped to make the country great outside the Russian protectorate. They desired to translate their motto “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians” into an absolute fact. This party was founded by the notorious Stambuloff, and whenever they came into power they insisted on regarding not only Russia as the national enemy, but also the Bulgarian people who were in sympathy with Russia, and they did their utmost to tyrannize the people out of this “disease.” In fighting for this idea they coined the party catchword—“Greater Bulgaria” in the hope of bribing the people by promises of Macedonia, Serbia, Greece, and even Constantinople as future tit-bits. This particular party knew very well that Russia would never allow the Slav equilibrium in the Balkans to be upset, and, as it was not over Slavonic in its sympathies, it waged a bitter opposition against the Russian protectorate, under which all the Balkan Slav nations stand to benefit equally. In opposition to Stambuloff’s party there arose another, founded by Karaveloff, the greatest of Bulgarian patriots, who fought with all the enthusiasm of which grateful hearts are capable. Karaveloff saw clearly that Bulgaria would be too weak to stand alone for a very long time to come, and that the Russian protectorate was a strong guarantee against foreign hostile influence. After Karaveloff’s death his ideas found enthusiastic partisans in Czankoff, Radoslavoff and Daneff in spite of minor tactical party differences. Stambuloff’s violent death—he was assassinated in the open street—put an end to the rÉgime of his party for many years, and brought the moderate pro-Russian parties into power. But Bulgaria was deeply injured by his policy. He bequeathed a legacy of discord and hatred at home and provoked Russia’s displeasure abroad. The new pro-Russian Government did its utmost to heal the breach, and succeeded in improving relations with Russia, but Stambuloff’s partisans agitated in every possible way for the re-instatement of the radical anti-Russian party. In Dushan Petkoff and Evlogij Genadieff they had energetic leaders, who pursued their goal with all the characteristic Bulgarian tenacity and a ruthless persistence that was positively Asiatic. After Ferdinand had established a personal rÉgime in Bulgaria, they realized that the turn of fortune’s wheel no longer depended on the temper of the nation or the strength of a party, but on the will of the ruler, and they were content to bide their time. Among the people they had no following whatsoever. But whichever party is in power by the will of the ruler is assured of a majority in the Parliament. Elections are invariably manipulated by terroristic pressure from the authorities. There is no difference except that, whereas the pro-Russian parties are content to employ demagogic means, the Stambulovists have had recourse to bloodshed. At last the Stambulovists were successful; they came into power in 1902—(in accordance with the wish of the highest power in the land)—and established a reign of terror equal to that of Stambuloff himself in its cruelty, but breaking all previous records as regards corruption. The Stambulovists commanded a crushing majority in the Sobranye (Parliament) and pursued a policy of secret provocations against Russia and the nation. General Ratsho Petroff, a personal favourite of King Ferdinand and an absolute nonentity, was the Premier; but the actual dictator and leader of the Stambulovist party was Dushan Petkoff, Minister of the Interior. Once more the policy of the Government took an anti-Russian trend, but in the meantime the nation had developed and steadfastly pursued a different policy. To be sure, under compulsion they had given the Government a majority but not their heart, and this heart now belonged to Russia more than ever. This sentiment found expression in various violent demonstrations; it culminated in the assassination of Petkoff (likewise in the open street) and in the abuse showered upon King Ferdinand as he drove to the opening of the National Theatre at Sofia. From that point Bulgarian policy took a totally new turn, and for a time it seemed as if the Slav renaissance had really taken root and Bulgaria had at last found herself. The Balkan Alliance before the war certainly seemed strong evidence of it.

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Bulgaria’s relations with Serbia have varied quite as much as those with Russia, but with the difference that in these ups and downs the nation has always been undivided. Bulgarian distrust of Serbia dates from the beginning of the political independence of the former. Instead of trying to settle their differences in a brotherly spirit, and to eliminate the Macedonian bone of contention by fixing the spheres of interests, both parties—especially Bulgaria—worked themselves up into a fever of enmity which could only be mutually detrimental. Actual frontier collisions added fuel to the fire, and the situation grew steadily worse. It is safe to say that there was never any love lost between the Serbs and the Bulgarians, even if political opportunism at times dictated a more friendly attitude. Many discerning Bulgarian politicians have often tried to promote a more cordial and neighbourly understanding between the two states for the sake of the Slav cause and the common good, and their Serbian colleagues loyally supported them in this. But their work was always undone by the distrustful attitude of Bulgaria, which was even increased by foreign influence. In 1885 the nation entered into the war with Serbia with unanimous enthusiasm and a bloodthirsty spite almost inconceivable between brother nations. The war was fierce, and fate favoured Bulgaria; but, instead of being content with their success, and exhibiting a victor’s finest quality—humanity, the Bulgarians only grew increasingly bitter in their hatred towards Serbia, and showed it in offensive taunts. After their defeat the Serbs obviously could not feel very friendly towards their neighbours, but I do not believe they hated them in their souls. But from one cause or another it was impossible to find the way to friendship. The Bulgarians declared that their differences with Serbia were by no means settled in this war, and that the Macedonian question would have to be decided beyond dispute. Thus the war was continued, unfortunately not only with the pen, but also with arms, for the Serbian and Bulgarian bands in Macedonia waged war upon each other more fiercely than upon the Turks. Matters went from bad to worse for both nations, and especially for the Slav cause in the Balkans. Russia exerted all her influence to reconcile the two, but with no result beyond promises of amendment. Several influential Slav personages were equally unsuccessful until the youth of the Southern Slavs entered the lists with a new plan of campaign, and attacked the problem from the standpoint of Southern Slav Culture. The authors and artists of Croatia and Slavonia, who had long stood in friendly relations with Serbia, made it their business to include the Bulgarians in the cause of Southern Slav Culture. As the intellectual youth of Bulgaria was at that time passing through a phase of national regeneration and desired to widen their horizon, these efforts fell on fruitful soil. Soon afterwards joint exhibitions of Southern Slav artists were arranged in Belgrade, Sofia, and Zagreb, and in each case an Authors’ Congress was held simultaneously. By these meetings and mutual intercourse many sharp corners were smoothed away, and many points of difference were abolished, chiefly by the help of the Croats. Serbs and Bulgarians meeting eye to eye at last realized that they were brothers, sharing a common future. The Exhibition in Belgrade coincided with the coronation of King Peter, and we witnessed the unexpected spectacle of Bulgarians acclaiming the King with as much enthusiasm as the Serbs. Those were the days of brotherhood and fellowship. The representatives of Bulgarian art and literature took their mission seriously and sincerely, proving true apostles of peace and friendship between the two peoples. They reaped considerable success, for the tide of mutual enmity subsided, and when King Peter came to Sofia on an official visit he met with a reception that expressed not merely the pomp and circumstance of a Court but the heartfelt cordiality of a friendly people. It must not be forgotten that in this rapprochement good service was rendered by those politicians of both countries who persistently did their best to improve mutual relations. Chief among these is the Serbian statesman, Nikola PaŠic. He cultivated this mutual friendship so successfully that it culminated in the Balkan Alliance, which would have proved a lasting blessing to the whole of the Balkans if it had not been broken by the attack of Bregalnica. Yet the collapse of the Alliance was not due to Bulgaria, but to other extraneous influences.

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I have briefly touched upon Bulgarian relations with Russia and Serbia in order to give a brief sketch of the only too frequent mistakes made by Bulgaria’s official Government. The Bulgarians possess many excellent qualities, and, as a nation, have a distinct claim on our respect; but they have one drawback: they are not independent in politics, and their policy is not the outcome of the requirements of the times,—as a rule it is not even suited to them, but is merely the mouthpiece of foreign influences. Whenever these influences were Russian they at least did not clash with the interests of the people or do any particular harm. But, unfortunately, Bulgarian policy has to a great extent followed in Germany’s footsteps, and for a long time German influence—especially in recent years—has made alarming progress in Bulgaria. The first to fall a victim to this influence were Stambuloff and his followers who had made so free with the motto “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians.” And, in proportion to the vehemence with which they pursued their corrupt policy, they imported the German element into Bulgaria. Intellectually it would be quite impossible to Germanize the Bulgarians, but, as regards their political economy and foreign policy they fell more and more under German ascendancy. The Eastern expansive policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary, finding the doors fast closed in Serbia, was content for the moment to ignore an obdurate opponent, and insinuated itself into Bulgaria as being free from the infection of “fantastic Slav ideals.” In King Ferdinand, as a German prince, German propaganda found a distinct well-wisher. The Bulgarian stock market was controlled by German trade, Austria-Hungary and Germany founded branch banks and business houses in Bulgaria. German and Austrian Ambassadors could always command the ear of the Foreign Office. And Germany bestowed her favour or disfavour in proportion to the pro-German or pro-Russian sympathies of the Government. In face of this tide of Germanism all honest Bulgarian politicians are confronted with a herculean task, if the country is to be saved from becoming simply a vassal state to Germany. In the events which preceded the second Balkan War their labours appeared to have borne fruit, and Germany and Austria were suddenly confronted with a fact they had never even contemplated—an alliance between Bulgarians and the detested Serbs, and even a military convention between these two against Austria. But their amazement was only a thing of the moment—German influence redoubled its efforts, and the second Balkan War was due to its machinations.

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Bulgaria’s defeat in the second Balkan War has filled the nation with a burning, unquenchable hatred against Serbia. The realization of their Macedonian ambition, which had been almost within their grasp, had vanished in a bitter disappointment and plunged the heroic victors of Kirkilisse into an agony of sullen despair. When the first stupefying shock was over, the thought of revenge came uppermost, and everyone foresaw that at the next opportunity the brother nations would again fly at each other’s throats.

It would be unreasonable to deny the Bulgarian claim to part of Macedonia. If a great national problem is to be permanently and satisfactorily solved, the principal of nationality cannot be ignored. But Bulgaria exceeded the principles of nationality in her demands and aimed at a position of supremacy in the Balkans. By her acquisition of Thrace it became necessary to revise the stipulations of the Alliance Treaty, and, if the Allies could have arrived at any conclusion, or accepted the arbitration of the Tsar, to-day the position of the Balkans in the present crisis would be more favourable.

The Bulgarian nation cannot be held responsible for the crime of Bregalnica. It merely played a passive part. The official perpetrator, supposed to have remained undiscovered to this day, was guided not by the will of the nation, but by orders from Vienna and Berlin, who desired to be revenged for the affront they had suffered through the Balkan Alliance. Nothing short of a despicably devastating blow aimed at all the Balkan States would suffice, and unfortunately they found a ready tool in the wild ambitions of certain Bulgarian circles. Of course, the blow was aimed at the detested Serbians, but with the relentlessness of fate it fell upon those who had hoped to profit by the Austro-German intrigue. Though Bulgaria alone suffered material loss through the war, the whole of the Balkan States have suffered morally. For their deadly enemy achieved his main object—the breaking up of the Balkan union. Such was the lamentable state of affairs in the Balkans when the present European crisis came to a head. The Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia caused a positively insane joy in Bulgaria. It was balm to the Bulgarian wounds that the great monarchy should devour their small neighbor—their brother nation—and not one of the heroes who had helped in the conquest of Adrianople be left alive! All this time they overlooked the fact that, when Serbia had been disposed of, their own country would have been the next dish in the menu! It was a sordid triumph, neither manly, nor Slav.

In their satisfaction they even forgot Russia. No one dreamt that Russia would raise her mighty hand and cry Halt! to the Austrian devourer. But when the inevitable occurred, Bulgaria suddenly found herself face to face with a problem. Russia’s word—“Serbia’s enemies are my enemies”—staggered the honest Bulgarian people, who are attached to Russia, and they began to ask themselves very seriously, “What next?” The first upshot of this was the perceptible cooling of the anti-Slav agitation; then the nation began to reflect. The people and the patriotic Slavophile circles sent their best wishes, and their finest General—Ratko Dimitrieff—to fight for Russia, and the official Government proclaimed a strict neutrality. Both these facts bode well for the future. But the anti-Slav agitation has by no means lost all its power, and the Stambulovist circles, in conjunction with Austro-German emissaries, have not ceased to stir up the people and the masses against Serbia and against Russia. Which will prevail? It is difficult to make any forecast, especially if one remembers the personal rÉgime of King Ferdinand, who, in spite of the constitution of the country, reigns supreme. At the same time it would be wrong to lose hope and we must trust that in the decisive hour the Slav instinct will dominate all other instincts, and thus not only assist the Slav cause, but also prove of the greatest service to civilized Europe, and above all things to Bulgaria herself.

Among Bulgarian authors we must also mention Pencho Slavejkoff (a native of Macedonia), some of whose work has been rendered into English.

CHAPTER VI.
SERBIA.

I. Serbian Self-reliance—Characteristics of the Serb People—The Power of the Folk-song—Race Consciousness.

II. History of the Southern Slavs.

III. The Birth of a Nation—Prince MiloŠ—“The Great Sower”—Alexander Karagjorgjevic—Michael Obrenovic—King Milan—Fall of the Obrenovic Dynasty—King Peter—The Restoration of Serbia’s Prestige.

IV. Serbia and Austria—A Campaign of Calumny—Annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina—The Balkan Wars—Serbia rehabilitated—The Tragedy of Serajevo.

I.

The free and independent kingdom of Serbia is undoubtedly the most important of the Southern Slav States, although she has only three and a half million inhabitants, and is shut in on all sides by her six neighbours—Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Montenegro. In 1817 she was freed from the Turkish yoke, and in less than 100 years she has developed into a sturdy, self-reliant state, efficient in an intellectual, economic and military sense in99 spite of constant upheavals at home and abroad. For all she is and has achieved Serbia is indebted only to herself, to the capabilities, valour and perseverance of her own children. Russia was her only foreign protector. The Serb is a straight-dealing, industrious man, and, like all the Southern Slavs, essentially poetic. Judged by the standard of modern school education the average Serbian peasant is perhaps not so very far advanced, and usually limits his accomplishments to reading and writing; but he is keenly observant, and his natural gifts and mother-wit are so great as to warrant a very different forecast for his future than exponents of German “Kultur” have so far predicted. Like the Russian and the Croat, the Serb is above all things a farmer, who loves his bit of black earth, and cultivates it with care; and from this love of the soil spring his pleasures, his shrewd philosophy, his large charity towards man and beast, and, above all, his love of truth and justice. Shall not all the world be just, even as the earth is just when she bestows or withholds her gifts? From time immemorial the Serb has had a great feeling for family ties and the bond of the community. The love he bears his own homestead he extends to that of his neighbour, and then in a wider sense to his whole country. Where his love of country is concerned, political and economic considerations take a second place. The Serb loves his country as a bridegroom his bride—100passionately, often unreasonably, but never with calculation. He desires his beloved land for himself—to keep it untouched by strangers. In spite of considerable business capacity he is not aggressive, and does not covet his neighbour’s possessions. But, should his neighbour dare to move his fence even one inch over the boundary, or purposely let his cattle stray into his meadow, then the Serb becomes fierce, wrathful and unforgiving. The Serbian farmer has no need to study history in order to learn where his neighbours have removed his landmarks. His history lives in his songs and ballads, and goes back a thousand years. These poems tell him everything. Every one of his beautiful folk-songs is a piece of history, a bit of the past; and they sink deeper into his heart than any historical education. The dates of his power, past splendour and decline are meaningless to him; but the sad, deeply-moving legends in his folk-songs, telling of his triumphs and his tragedies, plaintively thrilling with love of country, and his tempestuous ballads of heroism and revenge—these have fostered his sense of patriotism, his yearning for his downtrodden brothers, and his thirst for retribution. These folk-songs have been handed down from one generation to another, and to this day they have been preserved in all their pristine purity of text and melody in the souls and memories of the Serbian people. It is not necessary at a time of foreign menace to appeal to the Serb people101 with elaborately-worded proclamations and inflammatory speeches. The refrains of their songs suffice, and they take up arms as one man. But the cause must be in harmony with the traditions of the past. They fight like lions when they go to battle with their ancient songs upon their lips. Thus did they war with the Turks—thus they are warring now against Austria.

To the Serb the love of his language is second only to his love of country. The most beautiful and melodious of all the Slav tongues,8 rich in idiom and soft in modulation, it is specially fitted to be the medium of folk-poesy. This language, which is identical with that of the Croats (thence the name Serbo-Croat tongue), has been the sacred and abiding link between the Serbs and their still enslaved brothers in Turkey and in Austria. The Serbian peasant is in the habit of calling every one who speaks to him in a foreign language a “Schwabo”;9 but should the stranger address him in Serbian, or, indeed, in any of the Slav tongues, he will say: “Pa ti si naŠ” (Thou art one of us). Undoubtedly, apart from their national music, this bond of union has been one of the strongest factors in the preparation of the future, for through it the Serb can freely communicate with his brothers beyond the frontier. Those dear familiar sounds tell him that his brothers still live and share his speech, his songs and his yearnings. This explains the unanimous enthusiasm of the whole nation in the Balkan War, as well as in the present second war of liberation. They are not the soldiers of the king who have gone to war, but the soldiers of an ideal. The miracles of valour these men have performed are not the exploits of a war-machine, but of a great heart, in which hundreds of thousands of hearts beat as one.

Many people, and especially Germans, have said that the Serbs are dirty, lazy and dull. As regards the last of these accusations I am ready to admit that such Germans as have come in contact with the people may be excused for this impression. The Serbian peasant regards the “Schwabo” with extreme distrust. His natural shrewdness teaches him the wisdom of appearing as dull as possible before the unscrupulous exploiter he knows so well. It would be no advantage to him to inspire confidence in that quarter, and, as a matter of fact, the Serbian peasant has often got the better of the apostles of “Kultur” by this little deception. English and French travellers, who have had dealings with the Serbs, have spoken of them in most flattering terms. As regards the other two indictments, they are only absurd. The Serbian peasant works very hard indeed. If we consider the results of his labours, which can be gauged by the considerable export of farm-produce and cattle, and remember that in so poor a country as Serbia the farmer has not all the latest agricultural improvements at his disposal, it becomes obvious that he has achieved marvels by the industry of his bare hands. The dirt commented upon by his critics is nothing more than the honest dirt of the soil on his hands and clothes; but if the immaculate “Michels” had taken the trouble to glance round his house they could not have failed to notice that in cleanliness and neatness most Serbian farm-houses compare very well with the average farm-house of Western Europe. A guest of gentle birth receiving hospitality in a Serbian farm-house will certainly find nothing to complain of in the way in which he is fed and accommodated, and his wants considered. Of course there are cases of dirt and idleness in Serbia, but then where shall we find a country quite free from these...?

A prominent characteristic of the Serb is his race-consciousness. Russians, Poles, Csechs, and Bulgars are Russians, etc., first and only Slavs in a general sense. But the Serbs and Croats are as much Slavs as they are Serbs and Croats. Possibly this has not always been so. Perhaps, from being more oppressed and beset by foes than any of the other Slavs, these nations have come to look upon their sense of race as a sheet-anchor to which they clung, at first with hope, and then with heart-felt love. To a Russian, Slavdom is the symbol of his protectorate, but to a Serbo-Croat it is the breath of life.

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II.

10 In prehistoric times, the south-eastern tracts of the Balkan Peninsula were inhabited by Armenians, who were eventually compelled to retreat to Asia Minor, about 700 B.C. The next inhabitants were the Phrygians, who possessed a well-developed civilization, and penetrated very far westward; but with the invasion of the Thracians from the north, the Phrygians were likewise forced to migrate to Asia Minor and only a few scattered groups were left between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, where they remained until the Roman invasion. Unlike the above-mentioned Semitic races, the Pelasgians and Lepese, who formed the aboriginal population of Greece, were of pure Indo-European stock. They were eventually conquered by the Hellenes, and the illustrious Greek nation sprang from the intermingling of these three tribes.

The dawn of history shows the great Peninsula of Eastern Europe divided between three tribes. The Greeks dwelt south of Heliakmon and Olympus, the Thracians west of the Tekton valley in the eastern portion of the Peninsula, and the Illyrians west of the Pindus. Their territory extended north as far as the site of modern Vienna, and south to the Gulf of Corinth. Of these three peoples the Greeks alone attained to a high degree of civilization and culture. They founded several colonies on the narrow coast-line of Macedonia, but the greater part of the Peninsula to the west of the Vardar remained Illyrian, and, to the east of the Vardar, Thracian. Only the wealthier classes and the royal family from which Alexander the Great traced his descent migrated into these countries from Grecian Thessaly in search of conquest.

The Roman invasion was followed by considerable colonial development. Under the sound administrative policy of the Romans a certain level of civilization penetrated to the greater part of the Peninsula, and a Latinized dialect became the general language. The Thracians very speedily became Romanized, as did most of the Illyrians; the Hellenes alone retained their national distinction. The Illyrians eventually disappeared from Macedonia; but their kindred tribe, the Albanians (Skipetars, Arnauts) remain there to this day, although they show a strong admixture of ancient Roman and Slav blood. The Roumanians are the product of a lingual and racial mixture of Thracian, Roman and Slav elements.

The Great Migration broke up the Roman Empire (476 A.D.) and Europe was re-distributed—the resulting racial boundaries having for the most part persisted to this day. The Germanic tribes set their mark on the North and West, and the Slavs on the East of Europe. In 525 A.D. the Slavs under the name of “???a?e??” are mentioned as dwelling on the lower Danube. From that time, and for a century, they waged fierce warfare against the Eastern Empire, until the latter became exhausted, and the Balkan Peninsula was left open to the invaders from the north.

In the first half of the seventh century, during the reigns of the Emperors Phokas (602-610) and Heraklies (610-642) the Slav hordes over-ran the countries of the upper and lower Danube like a flood from Venice to Constantinople, sweeping southward as far as Cape Matapan. The aboriginal inhabitants fled before them and took refuge in mountain fastnesses, islands, and walled towns. Christianity eventually tamed these wild hordes, and peaceful intercourse was once more established. Constantinople, Adrianople, Seres, Salonika, Larissa and Patras were the centres whence the light of Christendom and Greek culture penetrated to the Slavs.

Who and what manner of people were the Slavs? The Roman historian Jordanis (551 A.D.) already distinguishes the “Sloveni,” as he calls them, from the rest of the Slavs, whom he calls “Veniti.” He speaks of an innumerable Slav people (“Venetharum natio populosa”) divided into many tribes, of which the chief were the “Russi,” (“Anti”) between the Dniestr and Dniepr, and the “Sloveni” on the lower Danube. It is true that a number of different tribes were included under this name, just as to-day it is used to designate the whole Slav race (“Slavyane” in Russian, “Slovane” in Csech). Strictly speaking only the Southern Slavs have a right to this name, and until well into the nineteenth century they styled themselves “Sloveni” in addition to their local appellations of Croat, Serb, Bulgar, etc. With the formation of local states, the local names came more into use, but in literature and folk-poesy the name “Sloveni” is invariably adopted. As a matter of fact, the local names arose from the political and historical distribution of the race.

The geographical position of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as the two currents of civilization which flowed in upon the Southern Slavs from either side, prevented the formation of a United Southern Slav State. They split up into several lesser states, which soon lost their freedom, and submitted to foreign rule. Carniola was the first to fall a victim, for she passed under German rule as early as the eighth century.

Towards the end of the seventh century the Finnish tribe of the Bulgars conquered the Slav tribes north and south of the Balkan range and incidentally adopted the Slav language as their own. They merely retained their original name, and their distinctive, coldly methodical genius for organization—a racial characteristic which is totally absent in the other Southern Slavs. In a short time the Bulgars also conquered the Slav tribes in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly, and subjugated the whole country as far as the Morava. In the ninth century the Bulgarian Empire reached from the Carpathians in Hungary to the Pannonian Valley, and, as a matter of fact, Budapest, the capital of Hungary, was founded by the Bulgars. The Bulgarian Tsar Boris was baptized by the apostles Cyril and Method, who also introduced the Slav liturgy in Bulgaria. The Slav dialect spoken between Constantinople and Salonika was adopted as the literary language, and the Glagolitza (Glagolithic alphabet) and eventually the Cyrillitza (Cyrillic alphabet) were introduced. This fact is of world-wide importance, for on this foundation rests the whole subsequent intellectual development of Russia and the Balkan Peninsula—in fact, of Eastern Europe. Under Simeon the Great (893-927) Slav literature reached its zenith—its golden age. The Moravian monks, who were driven out by Svatopluk, found a hospitable welcome in the monasteries around the Lake of Ochrida, and developed great literary activity. The Southern Slav monasteries sent monks and books to Russia, and thus they became the first instructors of their mighty brothers in the North. Still later, the Macedonian Empire was founded and the Emperor Samoilo resided in Ochrida. He, however, was soon overthrown by the Byzantine Emperor Basil II. in the Battle of Belassitza (1018). But the Bulgarian Empire recovered again under Tsar Ivan Asen II. (1218-1271) and had reached the zenith of its power when it was shattered for centuries by the invading Turks (1391).

The central Southern Slav (Serbian) countries—Illyria, Moesia, and Dalmatia—for a long time remained broken up into separate counties. Not before the twelfth century did Rasa become the centre of a Serbian state, founded by Stefan Nemanya (1165), to whom the Serbs owe the famous Nemanya dynasty. After their victory over the Byzantines at Kossovo the Serbs penetrated further and further south towards Macedonia. Under DuŠan Silni (1331-1355) Serbian power reached its meridian. He organized the nation into a state and gave the people good laws. In his time Serbia reached from the Save and the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth, and from the Adriatic to Mesta on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia. After the battle of Belbushde (1330) even the Bulgars had to acknowledge the supremacy of Serbia. The Serbian Metropolitan of Petcha was made Patriarch, the National Serb Church was founded, and, in the Macedonian town of Skoplye, DuŠan Silni proclaimed himself Tsar of the Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks. With an army of 100,000 men he marched on Constantinople in order to establish his throne there, and to be revenged upon the Greeks who had a few years previously called the Ottoman Turks to Europe.11 But he died on the way,—it is said that he was poisoned by a Greek.

Architectural and literary monuments from the age of the Serbian rulers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries still clearly show traces of the high degree of culture that had spread from Byzantium, Venice and Florence. But these are merely sparks which the Serbian discriminative genius and natural ability would doubtless have kindled into a bright flame had not the advent of the Turks frustrated the great plans of DuŠan Silni. Constantinople would have remained in the hands of a Christian people who love art and progress. No other nation was so well fitted as the Serbs to infuse new life into the culture of the ancients. The presence of this sane and strong young nation would have saved the humanists their flight from Byzantium.

After the death of DuŠan Silni the great Serbian Empire crumbled into a large number of small states, whose rulers played a dangerous game, and intrigued one against the other, whilst the Turks were conquering Thrace. The Macedonian despots became vassals to the Turks, and only a few countries like Zeta, Bosnia, and the empire of Prince Lazar (the Serbia of to-day) maintained their independence. So long as these countries were free, the Ottoman invasion of Europe was delayed, because in the Kossovo polje (the field of Kossovo) Serbia held the key of Europe. The Turks knew this and constantly prepared their attacks accordingly. On Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day, 1387) 100,000 Serbs and 300,000 Turks met in battle on the Kossovo. The battle was fierce and the losses on both sides were enormous. The Serbs lost their Prince Lazar and all their nobility; the Turks the greater part of their army and their Sultan Murat I. In Europe the report spread that the Serbs had been victorious; in Florence and Paris all the bells were rung for joy, and a service of thanksgiving was held in Notre Dame, which was attended by Charles VI. with all his Court.

Murat’s successor, Bayazit did not penetrate further; he permitted the Serbs to retain their own laws, but they had to acknowledge him as their suzerain. In 1459 Serbia was finally crushed and fell completely under Turkish rule. Soon after (1463) the same fate befell Bosnia and Hercegovina. Only the mountain fastnesses of Montenegro remained unconquered.

III.

When Serbia began her life as an independent State, she was still bleeding from the many wounds inflicted upon her through centuries of slavery, and first of all these wounds had to be tended. The Serbian nation, intellectually and economically bankrupt from long Turkish misrule, was in the position of a merchant—an honest fellow, but robbed to his last farthing, whose ruined shop is being restored to him, and who is expected to work up the old business to its former prosperity out of these ruins. Years had to elapse ere the people got accustomed to the new order of things, and, out of the welter of beginnings, found the way to sound civic development. In those days Serbia fell a victim to every political infantile disease, but on the other hand she was inspired with a poetic, truly Slav patriotism. Their golden freedom, which they had so long yearned and fought for, and had now at last won, affected the nation not as a political event but as a great family festival, in which all the members were united in love and joy. They revelled in their new-found freedom; the sordid considerations of the day were put off till the morrow, or left to the care of a small body of “cold-blooded” men. Civic law and order, and regularity in the administration—unheard of under Turkish rule—were first looked upon as purely miraculous, and then tacitly accepted as the inevitable consequences of freedom. The idea of a free State is only of theoretical value to the Serbs, the main thing for them is that they should be a free people. As a free people they followed their leaders—not as superiors, but as children obey their fathers. With childlike simplicity they gathered round their rural magistrate to hear his instructions, and in the same spirit they assembled under the ancient plane-tree in the Topchider Park to hear MiloŠ, their first Gospodar and Prince, dispense wise counsel and even-handed justice. But in these council-meetings between ruler and people was sown the seed of the true constitution of the State, and, like the empire of DuŠan Silni in days gone by, modern Serbia has grown up out of her own people. And this is why Serbia is an eminently nationalistic state, free and independent of foreign influence. Perhaps in some ways this has been a drawback, but it has also been a great source of strength to Serbia. The intimate connection between the reigning house and the people proved a bulwark against foreign attempts at denationalization, and gave Serbia the necessary strength to keep herself free from Germany’s corroding influence to this day.

In every way the patriarchal state of Prince MiloŠ proved the best possible preparation for Serbia’s political future. She matured slowly, like an apple in the sun, and fortunately was not compelled to ripen unnaturally. Moreover, the inborn gifts of the Serbian people, which I have already mentioned, proved a great help to this process. They began to see that poetry has its limitations, that a free people must become an organized state, and that political order, though it cannot be set in verse, is the only guarantee of prosperity to the nation. Of course, legal decisions and taxes were vexatious matters, but their good effect on the community was recognized. The law expressed the will of the people and was no longer resented as an imposition.

It was fortunate for the young State that Dositij Obradovic, the greatest educational genius of Serbia, had lived before this critical time. He laid the foundations of a national educational system—that most necessary discipline for a young nation—and was beyond doubt one of the greatest men the Southern Slavs have produced in modern times. In Serbia he is called “the great sower.” He truly sowed the seed of enlightenment, not only in Serbia but wherever Serbs and Croats live. Dositij Obradovic has not educated individuals, but whole generations, and through them the entire nation. And if the modern State is synonymous with civilization, then Dositij Obradovic was the true founder of Serbia. He sowed the seed, all others have only been reapers.

Prince MiloŠ, who abdicated in 1839, was succeeded by his son Milan Obrenovic II. He died, however, within a month of his accession. His successor and younger brother, Michael, was soon involved in serious differences with the Senate, and had to quit the country in 1842. Serbia now elected Alexander Karagjorgjevic, son of the Black Kara-Gjorgje, who headed the insurrection against Turkey in 1804. In spite of his great gifts as a statesman, he failed to maintain himself on the throne on account of his leanings towards Austria. The nation, who instinctively scented their ancient enemy, mistrusted him, and matters finally came to a crisis in 1858. The Serbian Skuptchina (Parliament) formally deposed Alexander and again elected an Obrenovic to the throne of Serbia. This was MiloŠ Obrenovic, whose short reign was not remarkable for any striking events. His son Michael succeeded him in 1860.

Michael Obrenovic was a brilliant, broad-minded, noble-hearted man. He found the national harvest already well grown, and courageously continued the work of his early predecessors. He thoroughly understood his people, with all their gifts and limitations, and, above all, he realized that the moment had arrived for Serbia to become “westernized” without sacrificing her national qualities. He “Europeanized” the State and made it respected at home and abroad. The educational system made great strides and was modernized in his reign. The finances of the country were placed on a sound basis, agriculture was developed on modern, rational lines, and industrial enterprise and foreign trade made their first appearance. Under the strong guiding hand of their prince, the organization of the army kept pace with the economic development of the nation. He initiated Serbian foreign policy12 and was the best and wisest diplomat of his country. His policy towards Russia resulted in the Russian protectorate, which has proved so powerful to this very day, but it also aroused the jealousy of Austria. Above all things Michael Obrenovic was a Serb, and his Slav policy was not only carried on in the interests of the nation, but dictated by his heart. He evolved the idea of a Serbia with a seaboard on the Ægean as well as the Adriatic. He knew that the future of his country will never be secure until all Serbs and Croats are united, and the ways open which will permit of a corresponding economic prosperity. Serbia’s demand for a seaboard is not mere aggression, but the recognition of a vital problem which will be disposed of as soon as her minimum requirements are satisfied.

Under the next Obrenovic, the jovial Prince Milan (subsequently King Milan), Serbian policy occasionally deviated from the lines laid down by Prince Michael. Unfortunately, the good services which King Milan undoubtedly rendered his country are overshadowed by his many serious mistakes. At first his genial personality and great popularity seemed to fit him very well for the continuation and completion of the work Prince Milan had begun. But apparently his ambitions did not lie that way, for his reign presents a long record of discord at home and abroad. The party-spirit in civil and military affairs assumed formidable dimensions, and the State repeatedly barely escaped shipwreck. Milan was a spoilt man of the world. He preferred to live abroad and often left the administration for long periods wholly in the hands of the Cabinet of the moment, who, in the absence of the ruler, often found it most difficult to maintain their authority in the face of opposing factions. Abroad the king became acquainted with eminent foreign nobles and statesmen, and, as in most cases these were Austrians, he fell under the influence of the Monarchy. The tide of German pressure towards the East began to filter through into Serbia, and at times the official policy was frankly pro-Austrian. The King was still popular, but the people gradually lost confidence in him, and on several critical occasions he was fain to “save” himself by brilliant addresses to the people.13 But the Royal blunders became increasingly frequent, and were further aggravated by intolerable domestic dissensions which finally led to the divorce of Queen Natalie. Fortunately Serbia possessed singularly able statesmen during the reign of King Milan, and it is solely due to their efforts that the country escaped public disaster. The present Serbian Premier, Nikola PaŠic, already played a prominent part in those days, and repeatedly saved his King and country in times of imminent danger. But presently matters became intolerable, and King Milan abdicated in favour of his son Alexander, who was still under age. The reign of Alexander is the darkest period in the history of modern Serbia. During his minority the country was governed by a regency, and all went well; but when Alexander assumed the sceptre himself, the state began to crumble in its very foundations. Mentally deficient, and therefore dangerous in all his actions, he inaugurated a rule of autocracy, tolerated no opposition, and endowed every one of his mistakes with the distinction of a “supreme command.” The rift between King and people grew wider and more impassable, and finally became an abyss when he insisted on raising his mistress Draga Maschin to the position of legal wife and Queen of Serbia. But even this was not all. The new queen, with all the blind conceit of a parvenue, introduced the worst type of petticoat government at court and in politics, which showed itself in graft, corruption, unblushing exhibitions of contempt for the people, and insults to statesmen, scholars and especially to the officers of the army. When the scandal about the supposititious birth of an heir occurred, the wrath of the people turned to fury, and, in the night of May 28th, 1903, the garrison of Belgrade carried out the sentence of the nation upon the King and Queen.

******

The accession of the Karagjorgjevic dynasty, who were really entitled to the crown, opens a new national and political era for Serbia. An old man was called to the throne, but a grand seigneur of the best French school—a school which did not produce debauchees and Boulevard-trotters, but soldiers and statesmen of the first order. King Peter was a Western European in the best sense of the word. He was not only of the blood of the black Karagjorgje, the scion of a house of heroes, but an experienced soldier and statesman. During the long years of his exile he was an officer in the French army, and in virtue of his social position had every opportunity of garnering valuable experience both in peace and in war. All this time he was emphatically the “one who looked on” and watched the development of his country from afar—her struggles and her trials. Although he never resigned his pretendership to the Serbian throne he was often, surely very often, convinced that he himself would never be called to ascend it. But his heart and his love ruled with the Serbian people, and probably he felt the misfortunes of his country more keenly than any other Serbian. It is absurd to hold King Peter responsible for the murder of his predecessor. Any one privileged to know him would indignantly repudiate the thought. His accession to the throne was merely a consequence and in no way a cause of the Obrenovic tragedy. But Europe was too horrified at the murder to discriminate at the time, and would accept neither reasons nor explanations proving the necessity of making a fresh start—and this quite apart from the circumstance of the murder. Europe regarded the deed and not the causes of the deed; and refused to search her own histories for similar deeds provoked by similar causes. Thus King Peter was confronted with a two-fold difficulty. On the one hand both he and his country had forfeited the sympathies of Europe, and on the other he succeeded to the government of a country demoralized by the previous reign, and torn by party dissensions. It was a most difficult situation, so many conflicting interests had to be reconciled! Truly a very weighty task for an elderly and perhaps already world-weary man.

But King Peter did not come to Serbia as a pretender who has at last gained the crown he has coveted; he came as the champion of the Serb ideal of the past—whose last representative had been Michael Obrenovic,—the ideal of national expansion, of a Serbian future. He recognized his difficulties but attacked them without flinching. For the Serb nation—impulsive, tempestuous and sensitive—it was a blessing to pass under the guidance of a calm, wisely deliberate king. He went his way step by step, firmly, and without illusions. Amid the tumult of acclamations that greeted him in Belgrade his was probably the only heart heavy with care. He knew only too well that the violent coup d’État was not the solution but merely the beginning of the problem. This consciousness and his patriotic ideal have been the ruling motives of his reign from the very first. One of King Peter’s first tasks was the rehabilitation of Serbia in the eyes of Europe. Unjustly enough the entire responsibility for the loss of Serbia’s prestige was laid to his charge, and it was uphill work to alter the opinion of Europe, but he refrained from protestations and excuses. He realized that Serbia must be regenerated in such a fashion as to win back the full confidence of Europe. By the wisdom of his policy and with the help of able statesmen—principally Nikola PaŠic—he steered Serbia’s foreign policy back into a healthy, normal channel, and within a few years the country once more took her position as a well-ordered European State—apart from the calumnies and enmity of Germany and Austria. In fact, this successful reconstruction was proof in the eyes of Europe that the dynastic change was a necessity for Serbia, and that in the solution of the Balkan problem she might certainly be trusted to take her part of the burden as a civilized State. She proved her mettle soon afterwards in the first Balkan War, for in this war the ideal of the King—which he shares with his people—scored its first great success, when the hard-pressed nation displayed a high degree of valour, statesmanship and true nobility.

In his ten years’ reign King Peter has gone far to restore to Serbia her ancient glories. During his reign her politics have become more settled at home and abroad. Agriculture, trade and industry have improved and expanded. Literature and art have made miraculous strides, so that Serbia may fairly consider herself the equal of the Western nations; and the Serbian army has now demonstrated its excellent organization and great military value in three successive wars.

King Peter, whose short reign became so stormy towards the end, may look back on the results of his labours with the same calm assurance with which he took up the sceptre. He has quickened the new soul of Serbia, and although he retired shortly before the outbreak of the present war, and entrusted the sceptre to his son, his spirit still lives in his people and army and—please God—will lead them both to victory. IV.

Serbian relations with Austria have been an important, and indeed the decisive, factor in recent Serb history; and the events which are the outcome of these relations will either bring about the territorial consolidation of Serbia or her final ruin. Austria-Hungary was never a well-wisher of Serbia, although she has often brazenly posed as her benefactor. It has always been Austria’s aim to detach Serbia from Russian influence, and to bring her under the soul-saving protectorate of the Monarchy. The nearest road to Salonika lies through Serbia, and at all costs this route had to be secured. If only Serbia could be made dependent upon Austria-Hungary, it would be much better for the aims of Germanistic expansive policy; it would also paralyse the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy. Knowing that the Great Powers, especially Russia, would never permit an effective occupation of Serbia, Austria sought by intrigues in the spirit of Metternich to make her influence predominant in Serbia, also economically to weaken her as a state, by vexatious commercial treaties in the hope of rendering her more amenable towards the Monarchy. Serbia bravely resisted all these attempts and suffered considerable material loss; but she stood firm in the knowledge that she is the first and strongest fortress in the way of German pressure towards the East, and staunchly believed in the ultimate success of her cause. The brave little country had a mission to fulfil, not only in her own interest, but in that of the Slav race and the whole of Europe. Vienna and Berlin knew that Serbia was a very hard nut, but they felt confident of cracking it in the end. When open aggression failed, they put a good face on the matter, and assured the hard-pressed Serbs of their kind intentions. The occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was the first tangible proof of these kind intentions, for on that occasion Austria “delivered” two million Serbs and Croats from Turkish bondage. Unfortunately Serbia did not in the least appreciate this “benefit,” whereby a large number of her kindred were handed over to the tender mercies of Austria, whose solicitous care of her Southern Slav subjects was only too well known—in fact, instead of being grateful, Serbia never ceased to point out her own national and territorial claims upon Bosnia and Hercegovina. Naturally this insolent attitude on the part of Serbia provoked the animosity, and presently the official disfavour, of Austria. This disfavour was displayed on every possible occasion although it always wore a sanctimonious garb. Serbia was too weak and unprepared to retort aggressively upon this animosity; her defence was limited to diplomatic measures and the moral support of Russia. It was a marvellous achievement on the part of her statesmen that in the face of strong popular feeling they so long staved off an open rupture; and that they did not let the thirty-five years of misgovernment in Bosnia and Hercegovina, or the oppression of the Southern Slavs, drive them to a desperate decision. The influence of European diplomacy was doubtless very helpful; still, the Serbian people displayed admirable restraint under constant provocation. Germany and Austria, who are able to corrupt the greater part of their own Press, and even many foreign newspapers, and can command a whole staff of political agitators, never relaxed their campaign of abuse and calumny against Serbia, and everywhere represented her as an incapable, barbarous, and dangerous State. In this they were only too successful. Unfortunately the condition of Serbian home politics has often been deplorable, and in addition to this the murder of the King and Queen in 1903 provided ample material for biassing public opinion in Europe. On the whole Europe endorsed these calumnies and refused to listen to the counter-protestations of Russia and other Slavs, because the testimony of barbarians and troglodytes was obviously valueless. Serbia was frequently reduced to desperate straits. She was really defending the cause of civilization by stemming the tide of Germanism in the East—she was preparing a great world-work, and her reward was merely contempt or a pitying smile. Without Russia’s moral support she must have been swamped by Austria long ago.

With the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1909 and the disgraceful circumstances that preceded it (which I shall touch upon in a later chapter), the mutual enmity between Austria and Serbia reached its height. War between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Russia and Serbia on the other, seemed imminent, and was only averted by the intervention of European diplomacy, especially by the efforts of Sir Edward Grey. In a declaration dated March 31st, 1909, Serbia acknowledged the annexation as an accomplished fact, and promised henceforth to conduct her policy in a neighbourly and friendly spirit towards Austria. This was the last act of self-abasement extorted from the unhappy country, but by no means the end of hostile agitations. On the contrary, these only became more virulent, because Austria considered the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina merely a prelude to the invasion of Serbia. Hence the necessity of representing Serbia as a menace to the peace of Europe, and especially to the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power. Serbia’s prestige declined still further. But suddenly a new contingency arose, and the Balkan War of 1912 brought to light a series of glorious proofs of heroism, self-control, statesmanship, and military and national ability on the part of Serbia. The contempt of Europe was transformed into admiration, and Serbia suddenly found herself appreciated at her true value. This was a blow Austria could not forgive, and still less the fact that the criminal blunder of the second Balkan War, whereby she fondly hoped that Serbia would be crushed, proved unsuccessful. A strong and respected Serbia was a thorn in the flesh to Austria and a disquieting influence among her Southern Slav subjects. Henceforth the Viennese Foreign Office concentrated its efforts on the destruction of Serbia at all costs. First of all Serbia was confronted with a demand for such trade concessions as would render her economically dependent upon Austria, and the next commercial treaty was to have placed Austria in the position of a “most favoured nation.” In politics Austria had recourse to the invention of the spectre of a “Greater Serbia,”—an idea which hitherto had merely possessed intellectual significance, and whose representatives were a few hot-heads quite unconnected with Serbian official policy. To make this new propaganda convincing Austria employed a large number of agents provocateurs, whose masterpiece appears to have been the attempt upon the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo, June 28th, 1914. Truly, when all the side-issues are taken into account, it seems more than likely that the attempt at least was staged by Austrian agents. Was the assassination merely an accident?14 It is to be feared that this is one of the unhappy mysteries which will never be fully cleared up.

CHAPTER VII.
MONTENEGRO.

The Country of the Black Mountain—Women Warriors—King, Poet and Farmer—Historical Sketch of Montenegro—Petar I., Petrovic—Petar II.—Pro-Russian Policy—A Royal Poet—Nikola I.

All I have said about Serbia applies equally to Montenegro. The nations are one and the same: they are identical in every respect and only geographically divided. Montenegro is the Serbian advance guard on the Adriatic. It is the eagle’s nest of Europe, the loftiest symbol of freedom and independence. Nature herself has given this people an impregnable fortress, and placed in their hands the keys of Southern Slav liberty. From the height of their barren Black Mountains the valiant high-spirited Montenegrin has looked down for centuries on the rise and fall of his kinsmen all around him. In all the tragedies that have passed in the shadow of his eyrie he has played his part, both as dauntless warrior, and the bard of freedom who from his mountain heights sang the song of the future to his enslaved brothers. The Montenegrin has always been the same. In war-time130 he is a warrior, in times of peace a shepherd armed to the teeth. He is inseparable from his weapons, but only uses them against his enemies. Though his aspect is martial and his glance fierce, he bears a kindly, loveable heart. Comparing his outward appearance with his soul, one might call him a lion with the heart of a dove. A friend, whoever he may be, is welcomed with open arms, and his rough, powerful hand can be gently caressing as a child’s. But an enemy will be crushed by its weight; for the Montenegrin hates his foe, hates him passionately, fiercely and implacably, and he is ever on the watch for him. Even at tender age the children are decked with weapons and have to learn the use of them under the eyes of their elders. And the enemy is always the “Schwabo.” The women are just as efficiently trained to arms as the men, and it has often happened that the Montenegrin Amazons played a decisive part in warfare; and, when weapons were scarce, the women rolled mighty rocks from the heights down upon their enemies. Fighting is a grim pleasure to the Montenegrin in war-time, and his recreation in times of peace. Whoever has travelled in the Montenegrin mountains cannot fail often to have noticed two goatherds in the midst of their herds, fencing with their “Handzars” (the sheathless scimitar of the Montenegrins) and not far off two goat-girls similarly engaged.

The Montenegrin is not a great farmer. The soil is poor and barren; yet every patch of fertile ground is utilized to the utmost of its resources, and good soil is often carried from a great distance and deposited in the stony corries for the cultivation of a little maize and corn. But the Montenegrin cares less for a full stomach than for a light heart. It is a people that is for ever singing, and the wealth of Serbo-Croat folk-songs provides them with ample material.

The relations between the Montenegrins and their rulers is without parallel in Europe. Certainly the King is the “Gospodar” (ruler), but he is really only the chief warrior, the chief farmer, and the chief poet of his country. The dynasty is descended from Montenegrin farmers and is deep-rooted in the people themselves. The Montenegrin does not consider his King so much the head of the State, as the leader of the nation, and relations between them are familiar and fraternal. The King is the father, and the people are his children in a perfectly patriarchal sense. There is no trace of Western European formality in their intercourse. The familiar “thou” is used on either side, and the simplest peasant shakes hands with the King as a matter of course. But in war time the King’s word is law, and the unquestioning discipline of the people is founded on their mutual relations in times of peace—founded on the love of the people for their ruler.

The Montenegrins are Serbs by nationality, and their Royal House, like that of Serbia, has sprung from the people. Neither country has ever been ruled by a foreign prince.

In olden times it was the custom that the elders of the nation, without special regard to diplomatic qualifications, should guide the fate of their country by the rules of ancient custom. Chief among them was the Vladika,15 who possessed no special privileges as ruler but merely took precedence in virtue of his ecclesiastical dignity. His education was limited to what was necessary for his clerical duties, and he knew little or nothing of state-craft. The character of a given reign depended mainly on the prevailing relations with the Turks, and Montenegrin affairs prospered in proportion to the peaceable or aggressive attitude of these neighbours. A well-ordered state, enlightenment, and education were luxuries no one desired or required, and the people lived and fought merely for the needs of the day. But, although they are naturally gifted, the nation could not develop without any means of education; and, apart from the art of war they were simple and unlettered as children. Mere adventurers have several times taken advantage of this simplicity. The most flagrant instance was that of Stjepan Mali, a Russian swindler, who gave himself out to be a scion of the Vojevode family Petrovic and proclaimed himself lord of Montenegro.

Affairs improved when Vladikas of Crnojevic family were succeeded by Vladikas of the true Petrovic stock in the leadership of the country. The first of these, Petar I., Petrovic, was still content to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, and influenced the education of his people only in so far as he himself was cultured. His immediate successor Petar II., Petrovic NjegoŠ, earned undying fame in the history of Montenegro.

Petar II. became Vladika and Gospodar of Montenegro at the age of seventeen. At the time of his accession he was scarcely more than a Montenegrin peasant lad, accustomed to dealing with attacks from the Turks, but otherwise without education. The young ruler knew nothing whatever of system or the deeper meaning of learning and education, when he took the helm. Times were troubled and difficult, for, even in Montenegro opinions were divided. There were several other pretenders—not so much because of internal dissensions as in consequence of foreign intrigue. It was not a matter of indifference for the neighbouring states whether the ruler of Montenegro was their friend and tool, or whether he was a man of independent personality and inclined to follow Montenegrin tradition in considering Russia. The Sandjaks of Skutari and Hercegovina (at that time still the Sandjak Novipazar) were Montenegro’s vulnerable point. For nearly a century Montenegro had already sought ways and means of extending her territory as far as the frontier of modern Serbia. Moreover, from the days of Peter the Great an idea had existed that, with the help of the Serbs of Old Serbia, and the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro should prepare the way for the emancipation of her kindred from the Turkish yoke. Poverty, however, lack of numbers on the part of Montenegro, and the vacillations of Russian diplomacy frustrated these plans, and Vladika Petar I. did not feel strong enough to embark on this enterprise. Petar II. realized that, before Montenegro could hope to attempt this task, she would have to strengthen her hands—and those of her brothers awaiting liberation—by a thorough-going pro-Russian policy, which would secure them the protection of the Russian Empire. She must also provide her children with the means of education. He knew well that nothing can be done with an unlettered people. The lines laid down by him were quite correct. Russian society understood the Prince’s aims and gave him sufficient financial assistance for the foundation of schools, etc., and Russian diplomacy supported him strongly in his politics. Petar II. set about his educational mission with devotion and perseverance, and even found time to complete his own studies. When he attained to man’s estate he was already famous as one of the finest of the Southern Slav poets, and as one of the patrons of culture among the oppressed Slav peoples.16 But his path was by no means strewn with roses. The very strength of his independent personality laid him open to insidious intrigues. True, he followed Russia’s advice, but, while he was still a youth, full of the healthy, impetuous ardour of his mountain home, he often transgressed the rules of European diplomacy. Diplomacy failed to understand his actions, and he, being a true Montenegrin, could not wait with his hands folded to see what diplomacy might achieve, while the Turks were harrying his borders. Even the Russian Consul in Dubrovnik (Ragusa) often complained to his Government that the Prince “was better fitted for a grenadier than for a Vladika” (Bishop). And, of course, Vienna always stirred up enmity against him. But Petar II. remained a staunch Montenegrin warrior, and the older he grew the less he was able to adapt himself to the wiles of diplomacy. He devoted himself to his people, who loved, honoured, and revered him. But foreign intrigue began to tell upon him. Disappointments increased with advancing years, and he found little but bitterness in the onerous duties of a prince; this bitterness and disappointment find eloquent expression in his poems. At last circumstances became so unendurable to him that he thought of abdicating, and was probably only deterred from his purpose by his ardent love for his people. For, despite all vexations, he cannot have failed to see that his presence was not useless and that his work and activities were bringing a blessing to his people and laying the foundations of the future.

His nephew and successor, Danilo I., was the last “Vladika” on the Montenegrin throne. He was far better versed in the arts of diplomacy, but his reign will never rival that of his uncle in importance. He fell a victim to assassination in 1860 at Kotor (Cattaro) and was succeeded by his nephew Nikola I., the first secular prince of Montenegro.

In Nikola I. fate bestowed upon Montenegro a ruler with a remarkably strong character and first-rate diplomatic talent. The country was re-organized from within, without giving offence to any of the sacred traditions of the Montenegrins. In Nikola’s foreign policy veritable masterpieces were achieved from time to time. Without departing from the traditional pro-Russian policy Nikola established excellent relations with all non-Slav states, especially with Austria, and made the utmost use of every opportunity whereby his country and people might benefit. A man of great personal charm, highly cultured and refined, Nikola I. has enthusiastic friends and admirers in every part of the world. The unity of the Southern Slavs is one of his favourite ideals, and he has laboured unceasingly to promote this cause. His personal relationship to several of the Royal Houses of Europe made it possible for him to work effectively and win friends for the Slav cause where another might have failed to do so.

What Nikola I. has done for Montenegro during the fifty years of his reign is more or less generally known. The education of the people, which began under Petar II., has made splendid progress under Nikola I., and to-day Montenegro can boast a large number of statesmen, poets, scholars and men of letters for so small a country. When the Balkan crisis arrived, Nikola, then already King of Montenegro, true to the spirit of his fathers, unhesitatingly and enthusiastically placed himself and his people at the disposal of Serbia and won glorious victories, in consequence of which his territories were considerably enlarged. After the Balkan War, King Nikola surely looked forward to a time of peace and prosperity. But his hopes were doomed to disappointment, for recent events have called him to another and more important task.

CHAPTER VIII.
THE SOUTHERN SLAVS OF THE DUAL MONARCHY.

I. A Homogeneous People—A Militant Past—The Bogumili—National Bondage—Napoleon—Illyrism—Agreement with Hungary—Count Khuen-Hedervary.

II. The greatest representative of the Southern Slavs—Strossmayer’s generosity and courage—Fall of Count Khuen-Hedervary—Death of Strossmayer.

III. False Dawn—Conference of Fiume—Ban Paul Rauch—Monster Trial in Zagreb—The Friedjung Case—Cuvaj—Frano Supilo.

IV. Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola—The Italian Element—Bosnia-Hercegovina—Conclusion.

I.

The whole south of the Dual Monarchy is inhabited by Slavs. The Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, with the Duchy of Carniola, Istria, and Bosnia-Hercegovina—these, comprising a population of about seven millions, belong almost exclusively to one race. Whereas in all other countries of the Monarchy (especially in Hungary and Bohemia) the different races are represented in varying percentages, the non-Slav population in Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina amounts only to about 5-1/2 per cent., in Carniola and Istria to 4 per cent., and in Dalmatia only to 2 per cent. The considerable number of Croats and Slovenes (750,000) living in Southern Hungary (in Torontal, Bacs-Bodrog and Temes) must be added to the above-mentioned seven millions.

Ethnologically speaking, the inhabitants of all these countries form one people, and are a brother nation to the Serbs in the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. Their language, customs, historical past and achievements in art, science and literature, are identical. The sole difference between them is that the Croats and Slovenes are Catholics, while part of the inhabitants of Bosnia are Mohammedans. Those confessing the Serbo-Orthodox faith (more than a third of the population) also own to the national name and call themselves Serbs. This compact and homogeneous national body would certainly have become a most important factor in the Monarchy had they not been cut in two by administrative policy. Here as elsewhere throughout all her dominions Austria has applied her principle of dividing and dismembering, and the Southern Slav provinces were shared between two spheres of power. Croatia and Slavonia were allotted to the Hungarian; Carniola, Dalmatia and Istria to the Austrian sphere, and a mixed Austrian and Hungarian administration was introduced in Bosnia and Hercegovina. This system made a unanimous political rally of the Southern Slavs quite impossible, and provided German and Magyar propaganda with a more manageable field of operations. In both spheres unremitting efforts were devoted to the task of eliminating the Southern Slav element, stifling Slav thought, and transforming the Slavs into slaves. But the Southern Slav is endowed with unusual tenacity; the most zealous efforts on the part of the Government were frustrated by his dogged resistance, and they merely defeated their own ends. German “kultur” and Magyar lack of culture were held in equal abomination by the Slav nations upon whom they were to be inflicted, and the ruthless spoliation to which they were likewise subjected engendered a deep-seated animosity. The Northern Slavs, who possess more practical business capacity than the Southern, did not allow themselves to be economically strangled, and even contrived to hold their own in this respect; whereas the Southern Slavs, being mainly an agricultural people, found themselves the helpless victims of Austrian and Hungarian rapacity. Dalmatia, one of the loveliest spots in Europe, has for the last century known no privilege except that of paying taxes, and Austria’s mal-administration of that country has become proverbial. Croatia and Slavonia fare little better. They have to pay 56 per cent. of their revenues to Hungary. This tax figures under the head of “contributions to mutual interests,” chiefly represented by the railways and the postal system. The net annual income from these two sources amounts to 250 million Kr., but of this Croatia never receives a penny! The net profit all goes to Hungary who brazenly employs it to subvention the Magyar propaganda in Croatia. The condition of Carniola and Istria is almost as deplorable as that of Dalmatia, and in Bosnia and Hercegovina the Austro-Hungarian Government has for thirty-five years built villages “after the pattern of Potemkin,” for the edification of foreign journalists, while the people have been left to starve, or sink into poverty and ignorance. The numerous foreign tourists who have travelled in these beautiful countries have seen nothing of Austria’s “work of civilization,” as they are kept to the beaten tracks specially prepared for them, and they only see the country like a carefully staged panorama on the films of the Royal and Imperial State Cinematograph! But had these travellers caught a glimpse of the abject misery of the people, their pleasure in these beautiful countries would have been spoilt, and they would have better understood why the inhabitants are rebelling against the “blessing” of Austro-Hungarian rule.

It is much easier to understand why the political horizon in the Southern Slav corner of Europe is always clouded if one is given a clearer view of the Chartered rights, as opposed to the actual position, held by the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy; but this view is not usually obtained through the official channels of Vienna and Budapest. According to these, all ancient charters of liberty are so many “scraps of paper,” and the actual law merely the right of the strongest. The Hapsburgs did not come as victors with the rights of a conqueror to the Southern Slav provinces. They became rulers of these countries in virtue of voluntary treaties, and they themselves issued manifestos and bulls, in which the integrity and independence of the Southern Slav countries are incontestably guaranteed. Centuries ago, while the Hapsburg dynasty was endangered by constant wars, and especially during the Turkish invasion, these guarantees were faithfully observed. But with the altered conditions of affairs the Southern Slavs had to wage a bitter struggle for their rights.

Of all this group Croatia-Slavonia alone still retains the slightest degree of autonomy, while the countries belonging to Austria have been deprived of every vestige of self-government, and only appear to be distinct dominions in the State by their mock Landtags, whose decisions are almost invariably disregarded. Croatia-Slavonia, which belongs to Hungary, has to this day at least theoretically maintained her political independence. Croatia was once more guaranteed this independence by the agreement between herself and Hungary in 1868. When the Hapsburg Empire was reconstructed in 1867 the constitutional independence of Croatia could not be set aside, especially as this reconstruction was founded on the Pragmatic Sanction, which provided for the separate constitutional independence of Croatia under guarantee of the Royal Oath. Moreover, the events of the revolution of 1848 were still too fresh in the memories of the Hungarian statesmen who had laboured for the establishment of Hungary’s State Constitution from 1861 till 1867, and in their dealings with Croatia they did not dare to repeat the mistakes they had made in 1847 and 1848. Francis Deak, the chief of these statesmen, knew very well that the catastrophe that overtook Hungary in 1848 would never have been so great, if the Croatian national forces had fought side by side with Hungary. Thus it was his wish to conclude a lasting peace with Croatia on a just basis. Under Deak’s influence, and with the co-operation of Croatia’s leading representatives, an agreement was concluded which assured Croatia the position of a State enjoying equal rights with Hungary, with complete self-government as regards her internal affairs, a separate legislative parliament, and her own army; only the railways and the postal and financial systems were to be under mutual control, and Croatia was guaranteed a proportionate share of the revenues from these sources. The Croatian tongue was to be the official language in the Landwehr, and in all courts of law, whether joint or autonomous. The important Croatian seaport Fiume was declared a “corpus separatum adnexÆ rex,” and thus constituted a joint open port. I shall presently show how Hungary kept her side of the bargain.

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A Southern Slav patriot has said that no greater misfortune has befallen the Southern Slavs, than to pass under the dominion of civilized Austria. Had they been obliged to share the fate of their brothers, the Serbs and Bulgarians, they would certainly have tasted all the misery of the Turkish yoke, but to-day they would be free, as an independent State with a right to their own national and intellectual development. The one thing Turkey has left untouched in the Serbs and Bulgars—the heart of the people—is the very thing that Austria has sought to destroy in her Southern Slav subjects. Turkish captivity has steeled the hearts of the Slavs she oppressed, but Austrian captivity has cankered them and made them effete.

In many respects this pessimistic view is justified. The struggle of the Southern Slavs for national life has passed through many phases, and has exhausted itself in many more. For centuries the Southern Slav stood under the protection of “Heaven militant,” and his motto was “For Faith and Freedom,” for with him faith was always first. All his culture consisted in imaging the Christ as the “Otac i voyskovodya illyrskyh Kralyeva” (Father and leader of the armies of the Kings of Illyria). The Holy Cross was transformed into a standard of war, and his enthusiasm for this false ideal led him so far astray, that the baptized arch-enemy was nearer to him than his own unbaptized brother, and the Church dearer to him than his country. But these traits do not originate in the character of the Southern Slav. He was educated into them and impregnated with them from without, and always by his greatest enemies, the Germans or the Turks. The Germans made a national mission of the Crusades, and the Turks usually went to war on religious grounds and called their armies the Hosts of the Prophet. Following the example of the Turks, and imitating the Germans in their appropriation of the Deity, Slav Christianity was infected by the fanaticism of the Church of Rome, and became synonymous with militancy and the spirit of the condottieri. The heart of the nation grew vitiated, and the Illyrians callously neglected their lovely land, which ought to have been a Garden of Eden. And those who were so liberal with their promises of Heaven and constantly cried, “Thy Kingdom is not of this world!” were well pleased that these things should be so, for they coveted the lost Empire of the Southern Slavs for an earthly paradise of their own.

Unfortunately this dark page in the history of Southern Slavdom followed directly upon one of the most brilliant periods in the intellectual development of Southern Slav culture. It was a period when the national culture of the Southern Slavs put forth some of its most vigorous, fairest and sanest blossoms—the time of the Bogumili (“beloved of God”) whose work of enlightenment spread from Bulgaria over the whole of the Slav South. The Bogumili were strongly opposed to the poetic glorification of the Crusades, because they grasped the fact that the extolling of such an ideal can never open the mind to heretic culture—the culture based on free choice according to conscience—which was eventually to undermine the foundations of the sacrosanct Roman Empire and lay the first solid foundations of true culture. The Bogumili taught that true culture is not spread by crusades, but springs from Christian, human contemplation. They deprecated personal worship, and replaced it by a worship of ideals, of spirit, and of thought. Wyclif, Huss and Luther are always quoted as the foremost apostles of the heretical culture. But in the Hungarian Crusaders the Bogumili found bitter enemies. Bogumilist activity in Bosnia and Croatia was stifled in blood, and the people, who were beginning to protest against the lying cult of CÆsarism wedded to Papistry, were simply butchered in the name of the Cross. The blood-baths on the fields of Bosnia filled the people with consternation, but could not stifle Bogumilism. True, its progress was checked in the Southern Slav region, but it secretly penetrated westward, whence the Patarenes in Italy and the Catharists, Albigenses and Waldenses in France spread it all over the world. It is interesting to note that at the very moment when Bogumilist culture was destroyed among the Slavs themselves, they bequeathed this very Bogumilism to the rest of Europe—the first and only gift from the Southern Slav race as a whole to the spiritual life of Europe. It was the true “antemurale Christianitatis”—the outworks of Christianity—purified from Byzantine and Roman elements. What they gave was perhaps not so very much their own as the vigour with which they transplanted the ideal and the doctrine of a spiritual life, from the mountains of Asia Minor to the West. Theirs was the work of emissaries and outposts.

To resume, during the time of Turkish power, the Southern Slavs had ceased to be the “outworks of Christianity” and had become merely a soldatesca in the service of the foreigner, fighting indifferently for Cross or Crescent. It was a terrible time of national abasement, more especially because it followed so closely upon the great era of spiritual exaltation. The gradual loss of Southern Slav independence likewise dates from this period, and from that time until quite recently they were unable, as a race, to produce a truly Southern Slav culture. Only those among them who travelled westward, where Bogumilism continued to thrive and flourish, found the way of true culture. Among these exceptions were Marko Marulic (Marcus Marulus), a Spalatine noble, whose works were translated from the Latin into all the principal European tongues, and Flavius Illyricus, whom, after Luther, Germany considers one of her greatest teachers. In their souls these men were merely Bogumili and nothing more. With them we may also class John of Ragusa, who led the whole Council of BÂle against the Pope and proposed to negotiate calmly and justly with the Hussites and Manichees. Just such a man was Bishop Strossmayer in our own day, a man of whom I shall presently speak further.

Their liberation from the Crescent put an end to the period of religious militancy among the Southern Slav people. The warlike element is perhaps of great historic moment. It certainly fended the Southern Slavs over the abysses of Turkish barbarism to freedom in the Christian sense of the word, but by no means to national freedom. When the Turkish invasion was rolled back and the everlasting wars were over, the symbol of the sword was exchanged for that of the plough, and God as God was no longer adorned with weapons, but imaged in a nobler spirit as the highest conception of peace. And, as the people accustomed themselves to peace, and once more came in touch with the soil, a new spirit grew up within them, or rather it was the re-awakening of an old spirit that for a while had been silenced by the clamour of weapons—the spirit of love for the homestead and the community. Nationalism still slumbered but, like a guardian angel, the national tongue watched over its slumbers. Through storm and stress, in spite of travels and intercourse with foreign-speaking mercenaries, this language has remained pure and unalloyed. This was the seed of the future from which sprang the great awakening; for so long as a people preserves its language it possesses a Nationality.

Liberty of conscience, and the transformation of the warrior into a husbandman, were also the beginning of a change in the souls of the people, which, while groping its way back towards its own essential beauty, began to feel the hidden wounds within, and strove to rid itself of the canker. The old beautiful mode of life, the patriarchal family feeling and the bond of union in the community were restored, and the gentle, plaintive melodies echoed once more in farm and field. And this regeneration grew and expanded until it brought the revelation of national union, patriotism, and finally the love for all that belongs to the Slav race.

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The Napoleonic era found this people already fully developed. They had found their soul and knew what they wanted. Napoleon, who treated most of the people he conquered without much consideration, was filled with unusual admiration for the Southern Slavs that came under his rule. By the peace of SchÖnbrunn (October 14th, 1809) he acquired Triest, GÖrz, Carniola, part of Carinthia, Austrian Istria, the Croat seaboard with Fiume, and all Croatia south of the Save. Napoleon united all these countries with French Istria, Dalmatia and Ragusa into one “Province of Illyria,” and thus for one short moment fulfilled the dearest wish of all the Southern Slavs. Illyria was organized as one military province divided into six civil provinces; MarÉchal Marmont was appointed Governor and in the name of Napoleon carried out sweeping reforms throughout the country. Trade and industry were signally improved and the people were granted far-reaching national liberties. The use of German as the official language was abolished in the schools and law courts and Serbo-Croatian introduced in its place. Special attention was devoted to road-making and education, and the Croats were permitted to edit their own newspapers in the Croat tongue, which would have been considered high treason under Austria. Although the French rule was only of short duration (till 1817) it did more for the Southern Slav lands in three years than Austria did during the century that followed. But the main thing was that this rule aroused the national thought so effectively that henceforth it ceased to be a dream and became a factor to be reckoned with. From that time dates the unremitting struggle against Germanism and Magyarism, and the agitation for a national union of all the Southern Slavs.

The first-fruits of the complete national regeneration were seen in the great movement started in 1835 and known by the name of Illyrism. Illyrism began with a small group of patriots and poets whose leaders were Ljndevit Gaj and Count Janko DraŠkovic. They founded newspapers and periodicals, published patriotic books and poems, and roused the national enthusiasm of the people to the highest pitch. In this mission they successfully sought help and advice from other Slavs, especially the Csechs and Serbs; they were also the first to come into touch with Russia. Austria-Hungary tried sharply to repress this movement, and for the first time found herself confronted by a united nation bent on going its own way. The Illyrist movement cannot point to any positive political results, but it laid a foundation for future political and national activity and did an incalculable amount of pioneer work which would have been most difficult to carry out under the conditions that followed. In 1843 the name of Illyrism was prohibited by an Imperial edict, and it was hoped by the Austrian authorities that this would be the end of the patriotic movement. But their labour was lost. In fact, under the spur of persecution the patriots passed from their idealistic literary campaign to more tangible activities. By the prohibition of the Illyrian name the motto of the poetic propaganda was lost, and it became the duty of the patriots to lead their politics into less sentimental paths, and enter upon a campaign of cold reasoning in place of poetic sentiment. This was all the more necessary as the national cause was greatly endangered by several new regulations. Following closely upon the prohibition of the Illyrian name came an order for the introduction of the Magyar tongue in the Croatian law courts. When the Croatian counties protested in Vienna that Croatia was privileged to choose her own official language, and that no one had the right to interfere with this privilege, they met with a brusque rebuff. Up to now the Government had hardly dared to attempt the Magyarization of Croatia, but now they decided to enforce it in spite of the newly-awakened national consciousness. The Croats now realized that it was a case of war to the knife. The Hungarian Government proclaimed that all countries and nationalities subjected to the crown of St. Stephen must be made one people, one state, and be taught to speak one language—in short, they were to become Magyars. They were determined to break the national resistance of the Serbs and Croats by force, or preferably, by corruption. In this enterprise Hungary found an able assistant in Ban Haller. A “Magyar party” was organized in Croatia with a view to reconciling the people to Magyar demands, but, unfortunately, it consisted chiefly of adventurers and social riff-raff; the work of Magyarization made no progress, but only further incensed the Southern Slavs. One of the consequences of this hatred was that in 1848 the Croats and Serbs enthusiastically followed Ban Jellacic in the campaign against Hungary.

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After the conclusion of peace between Hungary and the Crown the Croats were rewarded in a truly Austrian fashion for their assistance in putting down the rebellion: once more they were handed over to the tender mercies of Hungary. This ingratitude roused a perfect tempest of indignation, but at the same time the Southern Slavs finally learnt their lesson. Henceforth they would look for help to no one but themselves, and they resolved that the coming struggle must be fought to a finish. The Southern Slav leaders knew very well that nothing could be done by revolutionary propaganda, but that their first task must be to establish a footing from which they could conduct a constitutional campaign. They formed a strong Nationalist party in Croatia, which co-operated with the Dalmatine and Slovene parties, laid down their programme on a broad national basis, and organized a campaign of passive resistance among the people. Of course the success of these labours was largely due to the fact that Hungary was weakened by the revolution and inclined to be somewhat less aggressive. Croatia, on the other hand, was fresh, strong, and self-reliant. Of course the results were not apparent at once, but the agreement of 1867 was a consequence of Croatia’s united stand. This agreement by no means satisfied all the aspirations of the Southern Slavs, but it gave them the required footing against Magyar oligarchy. Upon the conclusion of the agreement, Croatia received her first constitutional Ban, who was henceforth to be responsible to the Croatian Parliament. Unfortunately the King made this appointment upon the recommendation of Hungary, who saw to it that the first Ban, Baron Levin Rauch, should be a mere exponent of the Hungarian Government. Contempt of the constitution, and corruption, were the first-fruits of the agreement under Hungarian influence in Croatia, with the result that all Croatian patriots—including those who had helped to conclude the agreement—passed over to the Opposition. This Opposition worked on rigidly constitutional lines, and, as more radical parties arose, they formed the constitutionally correct, though barren, Croatian Constitutional party. Space forbids me to enumerate all the means by which the first “constitutional Ban” strove to carry out his orders from Budapest. By suddenly imposing a new election law he secured a large and obsequious majority in Parliament, which effectively barred the co-operation of the Opposition in national affairs. But the Opposition attacked the Government outside Parliament, through the press. When this systematic corruption and disregard of the agreement had gone too far, M. Mrazovic, the leader of the Opposition, published a sensational indictment against Baron Rauch, accusing him of underhand dealings. Baron Rauch took proceedings against Mrazovic for libel in the military courts, but Mrazovic substantiated his accusations and was acquitted. Baron Rauch resigned, and the Nationalist Party scored its first victory. He was succeeded by Ban Bedekovic, another Hungarian nominee, who was, however, unable to prevent a triumphant Nationalist victory in the election of 1871. The Hungarians asserted that this victory had been subsidized by funds from Russia and Serbia, and this accusation contains the substance of all subsequent charges of high treason. The Opposition replied with a manifesto, in which they clearly set forth the gravity of the numerous infringements of the constitution. Because of this manifesto, the Government wished to take proceedings against the leaders of the Opposition for high treason, but they refrained through fear of offending European public opinion. At this time the Constitutionalist Kvaternik, a good patriot but wholly unpractical, started an armed rebellion among the peasantry in the Rakovica district. It was put down by a strong military force, and Kvaternik lost his life. The October manifesto, in conjunction with the rebellion in Rakovica, afforded Andrassy (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) a pretext for opposing every form of Slavophile policy and ascribing both the manifesto and the rebellion to Russian influence.

The policy then inaugurated remains in force to this day. Brutal Imperialism is rampant in Croatia, and the Agreement has become a mere “scrap of paper.” But oppression begets opposition, and during these critical times the Southern Slavs found not only their greatest tyrant but their greatest patriot. From 1883 to 1903 Count Carl Khuen-Hedervary was Ban of Croatia, and the twenty years of his administration have been the blackest period as regards political, economic and personal thraldom. Countless Magyar schools were scattered throughout the country to promote the denationalization of the people; espionage and Secret Police flourished as in Darkest Russia. The archives of the State, with the Constitutional Charters of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, were incorporated with the State archives in Budapest, and, last but not least, the Agreement itself was falsified by the pasting of a slip of paper over the specification of Fiume as a “Corpus separatum adnexÆ rex” converting it into a “corpus separatum adnexÆ Hungariam,” whereby this important Croatian seaport became exclusively Hungarian property. But this same period also witnessed the labours of the greatest of all Southern Slavs, the benefactor and father of his people, Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer.

II.

Bishop Strossmayer (1815-1905) was the most generous benefactor of his people, their greatest patron of science and art, and the very incarnation of their political programme. He was the first to break down the local artificial barriers between Serb and Croat—the first to preach the gospel of united Yougoslavia. Labouring in a period when all national effort was suppressed in every possible way, when Slav sympathies were accounted high treason, he rose to a position of unassailable eminence, which enabled him to set the mark of his powerful personality like a leitmotive on the whole nineteenth-century history of the Southern Slavs. Born of peasant stock and, like all gifted Slav boys, destined for the church, Strossmayer began his patriotic activity, while he was still a student and youthful priest, by joining the Illyrist movement. His exceptional abilities were soon noticed in connection with the national movement, and Vienna and Budapest awoke to the dangerous possibilities of his personality. Determined to put an end to his patriotic labours they appointed him court chaplain, and trusted that the society of the court with all its splendour and gaiety would dazzle the handsome young priest, and wile him away from the service of his country. But Strossmayer made a most unexpected and highly diplomatic use of his position. He brilliantly succeeded in deceiving his surroundings as to his sympathies, and when barely over thirty he secured his appointment to the Episcopal See of Djakovo. Hereby he also became Vladika of Bosnia and Syrmia, and shortly afterwards was created governor of the Virovitica district.

At this point Strossmayer’s life-work for his people began in earnest. Holding a most distinguished position, and with the vast revenues of his bishopric at his disposal, he opened the flood-gates of his activities, and Vienna and Budapest saw with horror and amazement the mistake they had made. Strossmayer assumed the leadership of the Nationalist party; and in Parliament, where he took his seat in the double capacity of bishop and elected deputy, he showed himself a brilliant orator, a subtle politician, and an astute diplomat. He was the incarnation of a keen, but determined and wise Opposition. He also became an intellectual leader of his people and accomplished more than anyone else before him. He founded the Southern Slav Academy of Science and Art, which in the very terms of its foundation embodies the intellectual unity of the Southern Slavs. He also founded the Croatian University; and, being a great art connoisseur, he spent years in accumulating an exceedingly fine private collection, which he presented to the nation. He built the Cathedral at Djakovo, and at his own expense sent hundreds of young Serbs and Croats to foreign art schools and universities. Every intellectual enterprise, whether literary, artistic or scientific, found in him a munificent patron. His entire income was devoted to the welfare of the nation, and the sums that Strossmayer spent in adding to the greatness and fame of his country amounted to many millions during the long years of his office. But his dearest wish was the realization of the Yougoslav ideal, the breaking down of all local barriers between Serbs and Croats, and the creation of a united people. With this end in view, and in spite of his position in the Roman Catholic Church, Strossmayer went so far as to advocate that the Serbian GrÆco-Orthodox, and the Croatian Catholic, Churches should unite and become one National Church. He knew that the future of his people could never be realized within the confines of the Monarchy, but that it must be identified with that of all the other Southern Slav nations, and founded upon a purely Slav basis. Strossmayer did not confine his efforts to winning converts among his own people for this idea. He knew too well, that at the decisive moment the nation would require strong support from without, and, at the risk of being accused of high treason, he entered into friendly relations with Russia, which should bring the big and powerful brother of the North nearer to his down-trodden little brother in the South. He succeeded in finding influential friends in Russia as in other countries, and his nation is still proud of his friendship with the Tsar Alexander III., Leo XIII., Gladstone, Crispi and Gambetta. Before Strossmayer entered the lists no one in Europe had taken the slightest interest in the Southern Slav problem. The slippery diplomacy of Vienna—which is only equalled in duplicity by that of Turkey—had for centuries successfully diverted the attention of Europe from the Southern Slav peoples in the Monarchy, and the general assumption about them was that they were a horde of uncivilized semi-barbarians, fed by Austria at great sacrifice and treated by her with the utmost forbearance. The spectacles through which Europe viewed these nations were made in Vienna and Budapest, and no one took the trouble to bring an independent, unbiassed mind to bear upon the problem. Many Southern Slav patriots made desperate though vain efforts to bring even a grain of truth before the European public; a Jesuit Vienna and a Judaized Budapest were too strong for them. The world thought more of the colourless anational Austrian culture, and the borrowed pseudo-culture of the Magyars than of the culture of the Slavs, which for a thousand years has been the spontaneous expression of their national individuality, with a literature worthy of the lyre of Homer. Not only Austro-Hungarian politics, but the age itself was unpropitious to the Southern Slavs. They possessed no importance for the European balance of power; and it is one of the bitterest ironies of history, that for a very long time the Southern Slavs fought less for their own advantage than for the interests of Europe. For, even as the Southern Slavs were for centuries the bulwark against the tide of Ottoman invasion from the East, they subsequently became an equally strong bulwark against the rising tide of Germanism towards the East. With every fibre of their being they kept the gate of the East fast closed against either foe—not only for themselves, but in the interests of European civilization.

Strossmayer was the first who succeeded in re-awakening the interest of Europe in this struggle, and, even if his efforts were not crowned with immediate practical success, he at least contrived to cast a doubt on the complacent assurances of Vienna and Budapest. Strossmayer was a man with a tremendous personality, and his word was invariably accepted. He was also past-master in the art of not saying too much—thus avoiding the appearance of exaggeration. Even in his world-famous speech in the Council of the Vatican (1871, under Pius IX.), when he spoke in Latin for sixteen consecutive hours against the doctrine of Papal infallibility, he left some things unsaid, for he was interrupted in “the midst of his speech” by the Archbishop of Paris, who embraced and kissed him, and assured him that what he had already said was amply convincing.

Strossmayer’s activity was pursued with ruthless enmity in Vienna and Budapest, and, even as he was the best-loved man among his own people, he was the best-hated enemy of the Germans and the Magyars. They tried by every possible means to minimize his power, and agitated in the Vatican for his recall to Rome. But Leo XIII. was not only the personal friend of Strossmayer, but also the friend of the Slavs, and Viennese diplomacy failed in its object. Then followed disgraceful intrigues, and endeavours to represent Strossmayer as a traitor. Among other accusations, it was alleged that he had exchanged incriminating telegrams with the Tsar, in which he was said to have advocated the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from Austria. Strossmayer’s reply to these insinuations was truly characteristic. Several years after this alleged exchange of telegrams the Emperor Francis Joseph came to Croatia for the grand manoeuvres, and Bishop Strossmayer was one of the guests at the great reception in Belovar, where the Emperor had his headquarters. The Emperor took the opportunity to sharply reprimand the Bishop for his conduct. Strossmayer retorted with equal sharpness “My conscience is clear, your Majesty,” then brusquely turned his back and ostentatiously walked out of the hall. Circumstances made it impossible to celebrate Strossmayer’s courage, but the people rejoiced in this new proof that their champion feared no risk when it was a case of defending the freedom and interests of his people.

Strossmayer was no dreamer, but above all things a practical statesman. He knew that whoever hopes to win a final success must first carefully prepare the ground. Any attempt to detach the Southern Slav Kingdoms from the Monarchy by force would have been unadvisable, and moreover, a dangerous and futile enterprise. Therefore, the political party of which Strossmayer was the leader made it their business to see that the stipulations of the Agreement were scrupulously observed, knowing well that a strict observance of the Agreement—if only for a time—would give the nation the much-needed chance of economic improvement, and thus pave the way to future independence. In this policy they were supported by the entire nation, who by their very unanimity proved their political fitness. Twenty years’ martyrdom under Count Khuen-Hedervary had not enervated the nation; on the contrary, they grew strong through adversity; and, with their eyes fixed upon their spiritual guide and protector, they steadfastly went forward towards their goal. Khuen-Hedervary’s bribery, intimidation, everlasting trials for high treason, prison and the gallows, all these had only incited them to further resistance. When, bowed with age, Strossmayer finally had to resign his active part in politics, we saw the people whom his spirit had inspired suddenly turn upon their oppressors. In 1903, the whole country rose in rebellion as one man, and Khuen-Hedervary’s power was broken. Even he had to admit that his twenty years’ rule of ruthless oppression had merely defeated its own object, that it had united the people whom he had sought to weaken, and strengthened that which he had hoped to destroy.

Strossmayer lived to see Khuen’s resignation, and his last days were cheered by a gleam of light—which alas! proved only illusory—shed upon the path of his country; yet as he closed his eyes for ever, he realized that he had not given his all to Croatia in vain, and that the hour was not far off when his ideals should become realities.

He died in 1905, but his spirit lives on in his people and his memory shines among them like a guiding star to point the way.

III.

The popular rising in 1903 opened new channels for the national struggle; it was also the prelude to the hardest and bitterest time that the Southern Slav people have yet been called upon to face. Khuen’s successor was Count Theodore Pejacsevic, a Croatian noble, who was no great statesman, but at least a good administrative official. He gave the distracted country a brief time of quiet, equitable government, and deserves great credit for abolishing Khuen’s system of corruption. Meantime the strongly Nationalist parties in Croatia had formed a block,—the Serbo-Croat Coalition,—and Count Pejacsevic found it impossible to raise a pro-Hungarian majority in Parliament. Shortly afterwards the Hungarian Opposition also rose into conflict with the Crown, and the situation became involved both in Hungary and Croatia. The Hungarian Opposition applied to the Serbo-Croat Coalition for support in their struggle and promised that, if their party were returned, they would grant all Croatia’s demands as embodied in the Agreement of 1867. Negotiations were carried on by Francis Kossuth and Geza Polonyi on behalf of Hungary, and by Frano Supilo as delegate of the Serbo-Croat Coalition. These negotiations resulted in the Resolution of Fiume (October, 1905), which stipulated for the political co-operation between the Hungarian and Serbo-Croat parties, and secured considerable advantages to Croatia in the event of success. The Resolution of Fiume was in every way a masterpiece of policy and diplomacy, and was in all its details the achievement of Frano Supilo, who was the popular leader in Croatia at the time. In the election of 1905 the Coalition won a brilliant victory. Not one Government candidate was returned, and the small Opposition consisted of partizans of Ante Starcevic’s one-time idealist, patriotic constitutionalist party, which however, since his death, had passed under the control of Jewish solicitors, and was so committed to a purely Austrian Christian-Socialist policy. As the Hungarian Opposition had likewise scored a victory, the Croatian Cabinet was composed of representatives of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, with Count Pejacsevic retained in office as “ut conditio sine qua non.” Croatia enjoyed a short respite and began to look forward to better times. But her hopes were once more doomed to disappointment. The perfidious Magyars once more failed to keep their word. So long as they needed the Serbs and Croats they were full of love and brotherliness, but when they had gained their point, they discarded the mask of false friendship. Francis Kossuth, having become Handelsminister (Minister of Trade) in the Hungarian Cabinet in 1907, introduced a bill on the control of the Railways which was the most flagrant and outrageous infringement of the Agreement as yet attempted. It provided that thenceforth the language used on the railway-system, even in Croatian territory, was to be Hungarian, although it had been specially stipulated in the Agreement—which stands in the place of a fundamental constitutional law—that Croatian was to be official tongue in all joint offices within Croatian territory. The Serbo-Croat Coalition, which is represented by forty members in the Hungarian Parliament, rose in wrath against the Bill, and declared war to the knife upon the Hungarian Government. The conflict in the Hungarian Parliament is known all over Europe. The Croats and Serbs pursued a policy of obstruction, which fairly paralyzed the House and made parliamentary discussion of the Railway Bill quite impossible. To get it passed Kossuth so worded his Bill that it was contained in one paragraph, empowering the Government to deal with the Pragmatic (administrative business of the country) at their discretion as part of the Order of the Day.

The rupture with Hungary was now complete. The Serbo-Croat Coalition transferred the conflict to Croatia, and the nation began to agitate for detachment from Hungary. The Parliament was dissolved, but the Coalition was again victorious in the election. On the resignation of the Croatian Government, Alexander v. Rakodczay was appointed Ban, but failing to raise a party friendly to the Government he was forced to resign his office in two months. The next Ban to be appointed was Baron Paul Rauch, who boldly entered his capital town of Zagreb, but was received with hostile demonstrations and showers of stones. It speaks well for his courage that he was not affected by this reception, and even introduced himself to the Parliament with great pomp. His reception in Parliament was one great demonstration of hostility, so that he could not even read the Royal message. He had to fly the building with his Ministerial staff, and Parliament was officially dissolved the same day. Baron Rauch formed a Government party of venal upstarts and discredited characters, secured the support of the now thoroughly demoralized “constitutionalist party,” and ordered a new election. Everything was done to intimidate the electorate, with the result that not one of Rauch’s candidates was returned. This Parliament was dissolved without even having been summoned, and Rauch embarked on a reign of terror which can only be compared to that of Germany in the Cameroons. He organized the Jewish-constitutionalist party into bands which went by the name of the “Black Hand.” Their motto was “For the Emperor, and for Croatia,” and their weapons were murder and assault, which they were allowed to use with impunity against their opponents. At the same time an organized judicial persecution of the Serbs was set on foot. But even this tyranny could not break the national resistance.

At this juncture a new contingency arose. The Monarchy was preparing to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina, and a suitable pretext had to be found. The Government accordingly invented the “Greater Serbian agitation.” The heroic struggle of the Serbo-Croat Coalition was represented as being the outcome of a Greater Serbian agitation, and Baron Rauch was commissioned to unmask this “widespread criminal conspiracy.” In the summer of 1908, to the amazement and consternation of the people, large numbers of Serbs, chiefly priests, school-masters and business men, were arrested, and the official Press triumphantly announced that a horrible, widespread and highly treasonable propaganda had been discovered! The preliminary investigations lasted a long time, and March 3rd, 1909, saw the opening of the proceedings against the “traitors” who had conspired with Serbia for the detachment of all the Slavonic South from the Monarchy. The trial lasted till October 5th, when all the accused parties received very heavy sentences. Immediately afterwards the Austrian historian Dr. Heinrich Friedjung stated in the Viennese Neue Freie Presse, that the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Coalition were also implicated in this conspiracy, especially Frano Supilo, Grga TuŠkan and Boidar Vinkovic, and that his accusation was founded on documentary evidence. Hereupon the whole Serbo-Croat Coalition took proceedings against Dr. Friedjung for libel. The result of this case, which was fought in Vienna, caused a European sensation. It was conclusively proved that all the documentary evidence against the Coalition, both in the Zagreb and the Viennese trials, had been forged by order of Baron Aehrenthal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count Forgach, the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade. Friedjung himself confessed as much in court. The consequence of this unparalleled exposÉ was, that the King-Emperor had to rescind the sentences already passed in the Zagreb trial.17 Meantime, however, the desired object had been gained, and Bosnia-Hercegovina was annexed contrary to the will of all the Slavs.

But, with scandalous details incidental to the annexation, Baron Rauch’s mission had been brilliantly fulfilled. Soon afterwards Kossuth’s perfidious Government was turned out and Croatia’s old oppressor, Count Khuen Hedervary, became Premier. Khuen, however, was a personal enemy of Rauch, and occasioned his recall. In his place Nikolaus von TomaŠic was appointed Ban of Croatia—a most eminent and highly-respected Croatian scholar, but politically a satellite of Khuen. He did his best to restore order, and to this end negotiated with the Serbo-Croat Coalition. Frano Supilo protested most emphatically against this. He had already had exhaustive experience of Magyar perfidy, and had no desire to see his people once again walk into the trap. But the Coalition was perhaps weary of the struggle—perhaps they still hoped for fair dealing, and accordingly entered into a compact with TomaŠic which made peaceful government possible so long as the rights of the nation were respected. On the strength of this compact several Government candidates were returned at the next election; after which TomaŠic promptly ignored the Coalition and governed only with his own party. Supilo’s prophecy was fulfilled, and the Coalition had once more to join the Opposition. TomaŠic was overthrown but the Austro-Hungarian Government replied by sending Herr von Cuvaj, the Terrorist Commissioner, and suspending the Constitution. These were the days of bitterest misery and unscrupulous tyranny in Croatia. Cuvaj ruled with the knout, and the knout only. Police espionage flourished, and all personal, political and civil liberty was set at naught. All this time the Balkan War was raging, and woe to the Serb or Croat who dared to rejoice at his brother’s victories. But, when the Balkan Alliance was victorious, the Southern Slavs knew that from henceforth they could rely on a measure of support from their kinsmen. Vienna and Budapest were equally perspicacious and realized the advisability of changing their tactics. Cuvaj was recalled and Count Stephen Tisza, one of the most inveterate enemies of the Slavs, sent Baron Skerlecz to Croatia with instructions to conciliate the Croats. The effete Serbo-Croat Coalition was once more cajoled, and, for the third time, it entered into a disastrous compact with Hungary. This time one of the consequences was the expropriation of the Croatian sea-board in favour of Hungary. Moreover, the present crisis found the Coalition helplessly committed to the Government.

But the people had stood firm. The dire sufferings of recent years have begotten a new and healthy movement, which includes the entire youth of Croatia. The younger generation has lost faith in political parties, and begun to go its own way along the path which leads away from Hungary and away from Austria, back to union with their scattered kindred. Their aim is the establishment of a great, free and independent Southern Slav State. At the head of this younger generation stands a man of magnetic personality—Frano Supilo.

IV.

The Southern Slavs in Dalmatia, Carniola and Istria fared little better than their brothers in Croatia and Slavonia. I have already alluded to the economic neglect of Dalmatia. In politics, Germanization was practised in much the same way as Magyarization in Croatia. Dalmatia unfortunately does not enjoy independence, even on paper, and thus her oppression could wear a perfectly constitutional guise. The Dalmatian “Sabor,” like that of Istria and Carniola, is an assembly quite at the mercy of the viceroy for the time being, who would never dream of convoking it, unless he had made quite sure that no inconvenient resolutions would be passed. As a rule these “Sabors” enjoy prolonged periods of rest, and the people are only represented by their delegates in the Viennese Reichstrat. There these delegates certainly make a brave fight, but they are too few, and their voice is drowned by the huge German majority. Because of this and also through the fault of the Slovene Roman Catholic party, Carniola has become strongly Germanized, especially as regards the administration of the schools. But the Dalmatians and Istrians are a sturdy, progressive people, Slav to the backbone, and all attempts at Germanizing them have proved as futile as the beating of waves upon the shore. Beside the German danger, this people also has the Italian danger to contend with. For opportunist reasons the Austrian Government has always favoured the Italian element (4 per cent. in Istria and 2 per cent. in Dalmatia) and granted them concessions, which have given rise to the most absurd anomalies. For instance, the election law in Istria is so framed, that 96 per cent. Slovenes and Croats send fewer delegates to Vienna than 4 per cent. Italians. The same injustice prevails in the Parish Council election law, but in spite of this the Italians would never secure their majority, if special Government regulations did not compel all officials and State employees to vote Italian. If to-day Italy is apparently able to claim a sphere of interest in Istria, this is the outcome of a chance state of affairs, arbitrarily created by the Austrian Government. As an instance of this policy, I will state that shortly before the outbreak of the war the Government seriously contemplated the foundation of an Italian University for a population of 700,000 souls, while strenuously opposing the foundation of a Slovene University for 1,400,000 Slovenes and Croats in Carniola and Istria. Of course this policy made the Italians aggressive, and they continued to extend their sphere of interest until it actually included the Quarnero Islands, although these islands do not possess one single Italian inhabitant, and these very islands are the most sacred possession of the Southern Slavs. They are the only spot in Slav territory where the old Slav tongue is still spoken by the people. This fact is amply borne out by publications of the Southern Slav Academy, and also of the Russian Academy, which sends its scholars year by year to these islands to study the language. In the province of Dalmatia the populace have themselves dismissed the Italian question from the order of the day, and the local government of Zadar (Zara) is the only possession—and a very problematical one at that—which the Italians might claim, and that only because of the truly mediÆval election laws. For, as soon as vote by ballot for the Parliamentary elections was introduced in the Austrian Crown lands, the Croatian candidate was returned by a majority of 7,000 votes over his Italian colleague.

The pro-Italian attitude of Austria was and is as insincere as the rest of her policy. It is simply dictated by the “divide-et-impera” principle, because an alliance between Slavs and Italians would have been fatal to the Government. One nationality was played off against the other, and the Italians proved willing tools in the hands of Austria. The influence of Italian culture, which has for centuries been received with love and admiration by the Southern Slavs, has created an Italian-speaking zone of culture in the coast-lands of the Adriatic; and the Italians, assisted by the Austrian Government, have made the most of this zone until they have actually had the audacity to include it in their sphere of national aspirations. Thus Austria created an enemy both for herself and the Slav peoples, an enemy with whom the Southern Slavs have never before had any real quarrel. Antagonism led to bitter conflicts, and if the Slav population in Dalmatia and Istria have begun to detest the Italian zone of culture it has been purely in self-defence and for fear of having to pay with their national existence for the amity and admiration of centuries. Nowadays, the Italians themselves admit that Dalmatia and Istria are indigenously pure Slav countries. Probably the present struggle has also revealed to them the true value of Austria’s favours.

In Bosnia and Hercegovina, Austria pursued the same heartless policy. Out of the three religions of one people she made three nationalities, and then fostered dissensions between them. Her policy was especially bitter against the Serbs, who are in the majority and also the more highly-educated element of the population and therefore more able to give effective support to the just claims of Serbia. Austria was not in the least interested in the prosperity of the country, and merely created an intolerable chaos by her political intrigue in a land that had already suffered beyond endurance. Her evidences of civilization exhibited before Europe were pure humbug, and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina one of the most flagrant acts of injustice ever perpetrated on a nation.

If the present war is decided in favour of the Allies—and this is the prayer of all the Slavs—it will become necessary to settle the Southern Slav problem once and for all. This can only be done satisfactorily by respecting the principle of nationality, and by a just delimitation of the various national zones. In disputed territories, such as Istria or the Quarnero Islands, a referendum ought to decide.

The Slavs have been tortured long enough. For centuries they have guarded European civilization against the inroads of Ottoman Islam, which has always been synonymous with bigotry, barbarism and sloth, and should never be confounded with Arab Islam, or Hindu Islam, to whom the whole world of science, art and philosophy is eternally indebted. Austria and Prussia are the natural heirs of Ottoman Islam, and the Southern Slavs have made a heroic stand against this latter-day Prussian Islam.

Civilization owes them a debt of honour, and it is only their due that Europe should give them justice.