Bavaria had escaped comparatively easily from the war of 1866. Bismarck had had good reasons for this end: that astute statesman foresaw the approaching war with France, and it was of the utmost importance for him to win Bavaria to his side for the furtherance of his plans for the future.

No sooner was peace concluded than he confided to the Bavarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Napoleon III., who in 1866 had wished to play the part of self-appointed arbitrator, had demanded payment for this in the shape of a portion of Bavarian land. The Minister told this on confidence to Ludwig, with the result that the King made up his mind to enter into a treaty of defence with Prussia. A few days afterwards he sent King Wilhelm an autograph communication, in which, while referring to other topics, he observed that “a firm and lasting friendship was established between their houses and states.”

This alliance between two countries which had so recently carried arms against one another, was not at first made known to the public. Soon, however, reports began to circulate that Ludwig was about to make a change of front in his foreign policy. That these rumours influenced public opinion, he was destined to receive unmistakable evidence. In the autumn of 1866 he opened the Bavarian Chambers. From the Palace to the Landtag he drove in a sumptuous coach drawn by six thoroughbred horses, a stately cavalry guard in brilliant uniforms escorting him. The young ruler had hitherto been used to storms of ovations when he showed himself to the sight-loving and loyal inhabitants of Munich. The police had orders not to prevent the shouting crowds from pressing forward. On this occasion the order was unnecessary. The attitude of the populace was different from its usual one; no shouts of hurrah were to be heard; no hand was raised to doff the cap. His Majesty drove through the streets amid oppressive silence. The whole occurrence was a party demonstration, called forth by the violent agitation of the Clerical party, which was endeavouring to play on the national strings. The behaviour of the populace deeply affronted the King. He was so much annoyed at the cool attitude of the capital, that he swore that after this day he would not show himself in the streets of Munich oftener than was absolutely necessary.

The demonstration defeated its own end; it did not succeed in inducing him to swerve from the course he had entered upon in his foreign policy. Shortly afterwards his friendly relations with Prussia became an acknowledged fact.

On the last day of the year 1866 he formed a new Ministry. The soul of this was the celebrated statesman, Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-SchillingsfÜrst, who in his younger days had been in the Prussian service, and who already in 1849 had raised his voice for a German confederation under the leadership of Prussia. By family tradition, by education, and political sympathies he was an out-and-out adherent of the policy of that country; and he was an enthusiastic admirer of Bismarck. With the exception of Ludwig himself, nearly the whole of the royal house strongly opposed the Premier and his views. At the head of the court opposition was the old ex-King, Ludwig I. To this party were united, moreover, almost the whole of the nobility, and a preponderating majority of the Catholic clergy. The nobility mistrusted Hohenlohe not only for his Bismarckian foreign policy, but also, and this perhaps chiefly and primarily, on account of his liberal views. The Catholic clergy hated him because he showed the will and the ability to maintain the ascendancy of the state in ecclesiastical questions, and combated the arrogant claims of the Catholic prelates. Among a large majority of the population in general he was also unpopular. The working classes looked upon him as the “Prussian” and hatred of Prussia was during those years extended and intense within the Bavarian people.1

In August, 1867, Hohenlohe announced formally in the Landtag that an alliance of war had been concluded with Prussia. The declaration aroused violent embitterment. One of the deputies, Dr Ruland, fulminated against the “links of slavery” with which the Prince desired to forge Bavaria fast to the aforesaid country. When another speaker mentioned the “brotherly hand” held out by Prussia, Ruland pulled out a shell, which he had picked up from the field of battle in 1866, and had kept: “See here,” he shouted, “here is the brotherly hand which Prussia holds out to us!”

Great as was the irritation he had excited, Hohenlohe went calmly on with his preparations to enable Bavaria to take part in the Bismarckian scheme for the future. In the foremost rank of these was the reorganisation of the Bavarian army, which had shown itself during the war of 1866 to be on a very inefficient footing. One of his first and most important works of legislation was also a new modern system of conscription, after the Prussian model. Immediately after this he placed before the Chamber a Bill by which it was intended to make the schools independent of the Church. As Prime Minister of the largest Catholic state in Germany he, moreover, regarded it as his duty to step forward when Pius IX. announced his intention of declaring the Infallibility of the Pope.

By this attitude he irritated the Clerical-Conservative party to the uttermost. In the year 1868 violent dissensions took place between the Particularists and the Ultramontanes, on the one side, and the National Liberals on the other. The hatred towards Prussia and the new school laws drove Particularists, Democrats, and Ultramontanes to conclude a league which placed immense difficulties in the way of the Ministry. The assault of the opposition did not, however, shake the King’s confidence in his adviser, and in his relations with Prussia, as well as in the ecclesiastical conflict, he placed himself unreservedly on the side of Prince Hohenlohe.

At the elections of 1869 the Ultramontanes succeeded in gaining a decided majority; and according to parliamentary procedure the Ministry resigned. Ludwig, however, would not accept the resignation, and a violent struggle took place between the Government and the representatives of labour. The opposition majority resolved upon a vote of censure against Hohenlohe, who was as much hated as he was feared. It was the earnest wish of the King that this might be thrown out in the chamber of “ReichsrÄthe.” Through his Minister of Ceremonies he requested the Princes of the royal house to refrain from voting against the Ministry, and he himself worked upon his young brother with the same view. The Princes were present in full force at the meeting. The King’s cousin, Duke Carl Theodor, entered the lists on behalf of Hohenlohe. But the others—even Otto—voted with the majority.

Ludwig was incensed. He was particularly embittered by his brother’s vote. He knew that his uncles had influenced the Prince; as the head of the family, and in virtue of his royal authority, he forbade him the entrÉe for some months to the court.

A deputation requested an audience for the purpose of handing him the aforesaid address of censure, but admittance was not granted to the presence. The Master of the Ceremonies received the Deputies, and informed them that they must be pleased to let the address reach his Majesty through the hands of his Ministers. The reason for this unparliamentary attitude on Ludwig’s side is said to have arisen from the discovery of a correspondence between two personages high in authority, which advocated no less than the dethronement of the Monarch should he persevere in the agreement with Prussia.2

For the time being Hohenlohe remained at the helm of office. But the fermentation continued, and the embitterment against the Government increased.

The fateful year of 1870 was entered upon. On the 19th of January Hohenlohe declared in the Chamber that a state of the second rank, like Bavaria, could only exist as allied to another kingdom, and that that kingdom could only be Prussia, under whose leadership the people of Bavaria must be prepared to fight in the event of war. His open declaration called forth a storm. The Vaterland newspaper wrote: “Down with Hohenlohe, who is pushing himself between the King and the people!... An evil spirit is making its insidious way through Bavaria.” The same journal assured the French that the fall of the Ministry would be synonymous with the neutrality of Bavaria. It continued in a threatening tone: “Is the country again to be subjected to the storms of an election on account of a single Hohenlohe? The Prussians are perhaps counted upon. It is hoped that riots will break out, which will offer the former a welcome opportunity of penetrating into the country as rescuers. Traitors! The enemies of Bavaria and its people! As soon as a Prussian sets foot across the frontier of our country, six hundred thousand French and four hundred thousand Austrians will put themselves in motion to eject him. Bavaria shall belong to the Bavarians!”

In the Austrian press, and in the newspapers which were under the influence of the Bavarian Jesuits, it was repeatedly said that the King was incapable of governing; he was covered with lÈse-majestÉ. “Ludwig II. by his conduct has brought the country into a state of the utmost disquiet! If he will not turn and listen to wiser counsels he will hazard his crown,” wrote the Unica cattolica. At the beginning of February, 1870, Hohenlohe himself announced that it was his wish to retire. Although the young Monarch still desired to retain him, the Minister found it impossible, after due consideration, to alter the decision he had taken. With great reluctance Ludwig then accepted his resignation. He did it in a manner which showed the utmost appreciation of the Prince; and the marks of distinction which he conferred upon the latter bore witness to his gratitude and confidence.