In order to understand more clearly the predicament in which the two young soldiers found themselves at the close of the preceding chapter, it is necessary for us to review briefly the events which led up to that time after the second battle of Bull Run when the Union forces again were defeated. The failure of General Jackson to strike the troops of General Pope on their line of retreat had enabled the latter with his men to regain the shelter of the fortifications at Washington.

Meanwhile the Confederate commander, Lee, gave his troops rest only for a day. As has been said, he was aware that it was impossible for him at this time either to invest or to attack the lines of Washington. In spite of his success he was convinced that only two courses of action were open to him. One of these was to remain in Virginia and try to defend the capital of the Confederate States from possible attacks by his enemies, and the other plan was to cross the Potomac and enter Maryland. There he might strike, or at least threaten to strike, some of the Northern cities that were not far from the border, and prevent General McClellan from carrying out his cherished desire to attack Richmond.

Besides, General Lee was aware that, if he merely tried to defend the capital of the rebellion, it would leave his enemy with full power to assume the offensive and make attacks wherever it was decided, after the spirits of his army had been restored and the ranks once more had been filled.

There were many who believed that General Lee displayed great keenness of vision when he decided to enter Maryland with his army. Such an act on his part would enable the distressed farmers of the South to gather their crops and harvests. Especially was this true in the beautiful and fertile Valley of the Shenandoah.

In addition to these advantages, the presence of the Confederate army in Maryland would bring many recruits, it was believed, and at the same time would confuse the Northern army by the possibility of the trouble that might be created there. And every day of delay was of especial advantage to the Confederates, who were working zealously to erect and complete the fortifications of their capital.

Another thought that is said to have been in the mind of Lee was that the people of the North, if the war should be transferred to their territory, would thus obtain a more intimate knowledge of its horrors, and this personal experience would arouse a desire to bring the contest to a close. Indeed, it is said that General Lee was confident at this time that he could accomplish the end of the struggle, which now had been fiercely fought for nearly a year and a half.

General Lee's first plan was to move rapidly into southern Pennsylvania, and by compelling his enemies to follow him, as he was confident they would do, he would draw them so far away from any defenses such as Pope had recently secured in Washington after the second battle of Bull Run, that if he should then plan for a battle it would be impossible for McClellan's troops to escape surrender as well as defeat. So confident were the Southern leaders now that they were filled with the thought that if the desire for peace could be strengthened in the North by a battle fought on Northern soil, and at the same time if the powers of Europe should agree to secure their cotton from the Southland, the results at the same time would put added pressure upon the Government at Washington and terminate the bloody struggle.

Keen as was the plan of General Lee, he was aware that his army was in no condition for an enlarged or energetic campaign. No small part of his men, as they marched over the sandy soil, were leaving bloody marks of their bare feet. It had been impossible to provide many of his soldiers with shoes. The provisions, too, were not sufficient, and in the days that had followed the battle many had been suffering from disease. As a consequence it is said, by those who are competent to judge, that not more than fifty-five thousand men were in the army of the brilliant Southern general when he crossed the Potomac River.

Much as the men were suffering, the animals of the camp were in no better condition. The horses were weakened by lack of food and by the hardships of the recent days. As if these facts were not sufficient to make the general hesitate, it is said that his supplies of ammunition also were deficient, and that he was as seriously troubled by this last fact as by both of the others combined.

But, like every successful man, General Lee decided not to think so much of what he did not have as of what he did have. Whatever might befall his attempt, he was confident that he would be able to make the Northern armies remain so long and so far from the protection of their defenses that he could draw out the campaign and there would be no fresh attempt to take Richmond before the following spring. This opportunity, as we know, would be seized by the defenders of Richmond to strengthen their defenses.

At this time Lee was not expecting to receive any reinforcements, as the campaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky demanded all the men that could be spared.

Between the 4th and 7th of September (1862) the Confederate troops were crossing the Potomac. On the last-named day General Jackson occupied Frederick city and speedily was followed by another division. Then the dashing cavalry of Stuart spread out in the State in such a manner that most of the attempts of the Union generals to gain information concerning the plans of their enemies were frustrated.

Meanwhile, as we know, the Federal soldiers were holding three fortified places in or near the Shenandoah Valley which was the chief reliance of General Lee for his supplies. About eight thousand men had been stationed at Harper's Ferry, and there also were small garrisons at Martinsburg and at Winchester.

As has been said, General McClellan urged General Halleck to recall these men and attach them to the Army of the Potomac. This is exactly what General Lee believed would be done, because it was what he himself would have decided upon if he had been in his opponent's position.

When General Halleck decided to leave these garrisons in the Valley, Lee instantly decided that they must be taken, and he believed also that they could be captured easily.

It was essential for the plans he had formed that his own communications with his base of supplies should not be threatened by such a large garrison as had been placed in Harper's Ferry.

Acting promptly, as he usually did, General Lee now decided to divide his army and reunite the divisions west of the mountains before a decisive battle could be fought.

With this purpose in his mind the commander of the Confederate troops issued his orders on the 9th of September, and on the following day General Jackson, in command of three divisions, after he had crossed the mountains, was to ford the Potomac at some place west of Harper's Ferry and then move upon the little garrison at Martinsburg.

His companion, General McLaws, with two divisions was to take possession of the heights which overlooked Harper's Ferry and the Potomac, while another division under General Walker was to cross the Potomac east of Harper's Ferry, and secure the Loudon Heights. This last-named position would enable the Confederate soldiers to command Harper's Ferry from the east bank of the Shenandoah. By this plan the little body of troops in Harper's Ferry would be surrounded and absolutely cut off from every hope of escape because General Jackson, just as soon as he had obtained possession of Martinsburg, was to march swiftly toward Harper's Ferry and block every road that led westward.