Leave Mexico for St. Louis—Conduct of some of the men and officers—Journey from St. Louis to Savannah, Tenn.—Scenes on the passage described—Captain Albert Hobbs—Loyalty of the people on the Tennessee river—Move to Pittsburg Landing—The situation—Criticism, etc.

The day of preparation for an important movement, is always among soldiers a busy and a jolly day. It is a day of work and play. Boxing up camp utensils, packing knapsacks, loading wagons and cooking rations constitutes the work. Drinking, carousing and building bonfires constitutes the play. I need not say that those who do the least work generally do the most play. For this time I can only speak of the two companies at Mexico. During the day the order was work. Every thing passed off quietly and in order. By nightfall everything was ready and we only waited the cars. The troops who relieved us, a detachment of the Third Iowa Cavalry, had already ensconced themselves in our quarters.

It was now time to play. Some of my comrades had this failing, that in an hour of great glee like this, they would drink. There are a class of soldiers who never drink except on such occasions. The "riotons" commenced. Bonfires were kindled, bottles emptied, while cries and cheers and songs and peals of laughter rent the air. I would not wish to be compelled to swear to all the unmilitary proceedings that I saw that night, nor to what I think might have taken place, had Colonel Williams been less vigilant and some of his men more sober. The Colonel used every exertion, and with partial success, to keep those who were disposed to be noisy within proper bounds.

At 11 P.M., we went aboard a train of box cars, and having disposed ourselves for sleep as best we could, awaited the dawn of day. To our surprise the bottoms of some of the cars were covered thickly with sawdust. We raked it up and made our beds upon it, and many were careful to get their full share. When we woke up in the morning, we found that we had been sleeping upon—well, the cars had been last used to transport Government horses.

This train carried but five companies, the remaining portion of the regiment coming upon another.

Morning found us at St. Charles, where we halted for breakfast, and smoked ourselves awhile around some ugly fires. The wind blew cold and raw from the northwest, and made us wish ourselves again in our moving quarters. We soon crossed the Missouri river and got aboard a train of passenger cars which brought us to St. Louis. After a long delay at the depot, we formed battalion, and marched through the city with all the pomp of which we were capable. At the levee we went aboard the Crescent City, a boat which was waiting to convey troops. One that has not seen it can scarcely imagine the scene attendant upon a regiment of volunteers getting aboard a transport. The violent scrambling for the best places; the shouts of soldiers for messmates, and the grumbling of malcontents generally, make up a hubbub which never can be adequately described.

The remainder of the regiment arrived the next day, and the whole was transferred to the Iatan. It was not without the greatest difficulty that the officers were able to keep the men together. A number got into the guard-house of the provost guard; many straggled through the city, and some officers set the example; many became intoxicated, and before night, I am compelled to state, the scene in the vicinity of the boat was disgraceful in the extreme. A strong chain of sentries had to be stationed to keep the men from straggling.

Colonel Williams having procured the release of those in the guard-house and got the command aboard, the boat moved out at 8 P.M. The boat was heavily loaded with Government wagons and animals besides its human freight, and the river being heavy with floating ice, we moved slowly. In the morning we passed St. Genevieve by a channel which left it four or five miles to our right. It was a lovely sight as we viewed it in the distance, its windows throwing back the red blaze of the rising sun. I will say nothing of the unwearying beauty of the scenes through which we passed this day. We arrived at Cairo at 8 P.M., and consumed part of the next day in getting coal and subsistence on board. Commodore Foote's iron-clad fleet was lying here at this time, some of the boats undergoing repairs.

At 3 P.M., March 9th, we moved up the Ohio. It was swollen, sweeping over its banks, and through the forests on the Kentucky shore. We went to sleep upon its waters, and in the morning were steaming up the beautiful Tennessee. We arrived at Fort Henry at ten o'clock, and spent some time in viewing the work. Most of the troops in this vicinity were leaving or had left. General Grant was still here. Since arriving at Cairo, we had had vague rumors that we were to join an expedition which was to push up the Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama. We now learned that the expedition was to be under Major General C. F. Smith, and that our regiment was to be assigned to the division of Brigadier General Hurlbut. This latter information displeased us exceedingly, as we had lost all confidence in that officer in Missouri.

Leaving Fort Henry, we soon came up with a large fleet of transports loaded with troops, and at the railroad bridge twelve miles above were a number more. This river, like the Ohio, was very high, and swept through the bottoms on either side. The boat did not halt for night; but when we awoke in the morning, it was tied up and taking on wood in the shape of a rail fence and a pile of staves. All day we steamed up the river. The day was bright and beautiful, and the canebrakes and cedars along the banks had a greenness that reminded us of spring, and a soft breeze enhanced the pleasure of the ride. And when we saw all along the shore the citizens greet us with demonstrations of gladness and applause, we felt that we belonged to an army of liberation indeed. The way was lined with boats loaded with troops, we passing them, and they passing us in turn. Before night, we found ourselves in a mighty transport fleet, numbering from eighty to ninety vessels, loaded to the water's edge with infantry, cavalry and artillery, and crowding up the river at full steam. Sometimes several boats would ride abreast and try their speed in the strong current, while the applause of thousands of voices would rend the woods. We will live long without seeing such a sight again. A grand army, equipped in splendor and exulting in success, moving far into the enemy's country with the speed of steam. A grand army of sixty thousand men, moving upon the waters. It was a glorious sight, and we could not tire of gazing. From it every soldier seemed to catch a sense of the great moment of the enterprise, and of his own dignity as an agent in it. As the sun went down, the bands struck up martial airs, and, in the obscurity of darkness, the scene grew more sublime. For every boat seemed a monster, its fierce eyes gleaming through the darkness, one of green and one of red, its dark breath rolling up against the sky, and the hoarse breathing of its great labor astonishing the still woods, as it hurried on, bent on some great purpose of justice or of vengeance. It was a great purpose indeed!—the preservation of the Republic whose foundation was the beginning of the "new series of ages."

Was there ever such an assemblage of patriots?—so much unity, so much courage, so much hope?

But when we retired to our quarters, a far different scene presented itself. Soldiers crowded together like hogs in a pen; breathing an atmosphere contaminated by the breath of hundreds of men; sleeping, sitting and eating upon filthy decks; by day continually jostled and crowded about; kicked, jammed and trodden upon by night; getting by day no exercise, by night no rest; living on raw meat and tasteless pilot bread; and in all this many suffering from sickness;—such was our condition on these transports.

With our officers, however, the case was different. They ate at the cabin table and had good fare. They slept in state rooms. They had the ladies' cabin to themselves, and guards were stationed to keep the soldiers out of it. This was just. They had a right to what they paid for. But such a contrast of comfort and misery looked decidedly bad, especially among men who at home were equals, and whom mutual hardship and peril should have made friends. To us, the soldiers, it was a convincing proof that our officers were selfish and cared little for us. We could not see where they had merited so much more than we. Had they been braver in battle, or had they exposed themselves to greater danger? They were superior to us in rank and emoluments; but this superiority we had conferred with our votes. Was this sharing the hardships of war as they had promised to do, while we were yet citizens? Moreover, rank and emolument do not always answer the question of merit. Allowing that they had always done their duty in the places assigned them, had they done it better than we? Had they been more exemplary in morals, or more attentive to duty, or more patient under suffering? Had they been so diligent in the acquisition of military knowledge as to be worthy of exemption from hardship? We could not see it. There was nothing peculiarly hard in their duties which should create this disparity. They did no fatigue duty. They did not carry a gun, a cartridge-box or a knapsack on a march. They did not have to walk the sentinel's beat in storm. The surgeon did not abuse them when they were sick. When they said they were not able to do duty, they were believed. But the Government had conferred on them these privileges. It was just. We had no right to complain. No, it was not just, for humanity is no more than justice; and there were men suffering from sickness who needed these comforts more than they. Generosity at least would have prompted them to deny themselves some comforts for the sake of alleviating the distress of others. It would certainly go far to prevent demoralization in the ranks.

There was an officer who seemed to be actuated by these motives. Let his name be printed in capitals, CAPTAIN ALBERT HOBBS. He ate with his men, and, in consequence of this, many of his brother officers made merry of him, calling him in his absence, "Mother Hobbs." He merited their opprobrium, simply by being a comrade to his men. This brave and good man was mortally wounded in the battle of Shiloh, and was buried near the spot where he fell. His memory will always be cherished by those who served under him.

Daylight of March 12th, found the great flotilla at anchor opposite Savannah, Tennessee, a dilapidated village about twenty-five miles from the Alabama line.

The citizens of Savannah were for the most part favorable to our cause. The town was full of refugees from rebel conscription, to whom our presence was really a deliverance. Their stories of sufferings under the rebel rule would fill volumes. Their patriotism was genuine and unfeigned. Many of them enlisted on the gunboat Tyler, and in the 46th Ohio regiment.

The morning after our arrival at Savannah, we heard cannonading above us. We could only conjecture the cause of it then; but learned afterwards that it was the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which convoyed the fleet, engaging the enemy's batteries at Eastport, Miss. The same day most of the fleet moved up the river, and our regiment went ashore to allow our boats to be cleansed, and before we were allowed to go aboard again, we enjoyed the luxury of being out in a drizzling rain.

We found at Savannah another illustration of the fact, that the farther an army gets from railroads and telegraphs, the more news the country affords. The citizens informed us that a battle had been fought near Manasses, resulting disastrously to the rebels; that though losing 10,000 men in killed and wounded, McClellan had taken 60,000 prisoners! We also learned that Beauregard was concentrating a hundred thousand men a few miles above us,—a report in which there was more truth than we were willing to believe.

Here, pausing and looking around us, the movements of the enemy and the designs of our generals began, if possible, to assume a more tangible shape in our ideas. The army of General Albert Sidney Johnston had been driven from its defensive line, which stretched from Columbus to Bowling Green; and now, its right wing in full retreat before Buell, its left assailed by Pope, and its center pierced by Grant ascending the Tennessee, it was endeavoring to concentrate on a new line of defense, that of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, at the strategic point of Corinth, having at that time communication with all parts of the south, east and west, including the force which was blockading the Mississippi at Island No. Ten. With this purpose General Beauregard had probably already arrived at Corinth with a small portion of his troops, whither General Bragg was hurrying with a division from Mobile and Pensacola; and if we may credit a letter written about this time from Decatur, Alabama, by General Johnston to Jeff. Davis, the advance guard of his army had already reached that point, while the main body was crossing the Tennessee at Decatur,—a movement which he was executing contrary to the advice of his staff, and in which he had great apprehensions of being thwarted by General Grant.

Nothing would have been easier than this, had our fleet pushed on and landed the troops at a point from which they could have disembarked and seized the Memphis & Charleston Railroad east of Corinth. We could have then moved against Corinth, pushing Beauregard toward the Mississippi and preventing his junction with Johnston; or, in the event of his retreating southward, isolating him from his troops at Island No. Ten, as well as from a large portion of his forces hastening from that direction. Thus it is seen how easily a little vigor on our part would have disorganized the plans of the rebel leaders, prevented their concentration on any practicable line of defense, thrown confusion into their councils and demoralization into their ranks, disheartened their people just as they were called upon to furnish new levies, flanked the Mississippi river as far as Memphis, seized the strategic point of the West from which the armies of Grant and Buell united could have commenced a new march of victory, and, in one word, secured without bloodshed or hazard, fruits which a year of suffering and carnage scarcely sufficed to gain. These were golden hours of victory to the army of the West. All that was necessary was to march on. But just as we had reached the decisive moment, when the events of a year could have been accomplished in a week, we faltered. Just at the hour when to wait should have been our farthest thought, we halted.

The enemy had placed batteries at Eastport, Miss., to blockade the river and cover the movement of General Johnston's troops over the railroad from Decatur to Corinth. It is also probable that he had a small land force at that point. The wooden gunboats engaged the batteries unsuccessfully. But it can not be claimed that they amounted to an obstacle in the way of General Smith. They could easily have been captured or driven off by our infantry. This Gen. Smith did not attempt; whether it was that his orders restricted his movements, or whether he was unequal to the occasion, is yet to be made known.

Toward night, March 4th, three days' rations were issued to our regiment with orders to divide, cook and be ready to march at daylight. The kitchen furnaces of the boat were taken possession of for this purpose; and notwithstanding the work was crowded vigorously, but three companies could get their rations cooked during the night.

At daylight the boats conveying General Hurlbut's division moved up the river a few miles under convoy of a gunboat, and halted opposite the bluffs of Pittsburg Landing, which the enemy had occupied a few days before. Nine boats tied up on the western bank and two on the eastern, one of which was our own. We built fires on shore and proceeded to cook the rations we had not been able to do the previous evening. The whole expedition was almost at a halt. Most of the fleet was above us, probably endeavoring to effect a landing at Hamburg, six miles above. We, the soldiers, knew little of the whereabouts of the enemy. It was not fair to conjecture that our generals knew much more. A general generally knows much less of his antagonist than those who are not generals think he ought to. A few days before, the enemy had a force with some artillery on Pittsburg Bluffs. A gunboat had engaged them and driven off their artillery, but they in turn had repulsed our infantry which landed and attempted to pursue.

Who knew now that the enemy was not in force beyond our observation ready to dispute our landing? The honor of first setting foot on this historic soil belongs to the fourth division. To land at all in the face of the intervening bottom overflowed with water, presented no ordinary difficulties. The 41st Illinois regiment disembarked in light order, ascended the bluff and advanced into the woods to cover the movement. General Sherman at the same time began preparations to debark. Roads were cut up the sides of the bluffs on which the wagons and artillery could ascend. These dispositions being made, General Hurlbut announced the details of the disembarking of his division in the following order:

Head Quarters, Fourth Division, }
March 17, 1862. }

General Orders,
No. 4.

The 1st and 3d Brigades of this Division, now at Pittsburg Landing, will disembark as rapidly as possible and form camps by brigades, the 1st Brigade with the left resting on the road, and the 3d with the right. In order to establish the lines without confusion, the 1st Brigade will commence the movement forming in brigade line right in front on the road. On reaching the point designated by a staff officer detailed for that purpose, the brigade will file right into line perpendicular to the road. Regiments taking positions according to the rank of their Colonels, from right to left. The 3d Brigade will be formed on the same road, left in front, and on reaching their line will file left into brigade line on the extension of the line of the 1st Brigade. Full room to the front will be taken by these brigades so as to permit the other troops to establish camps in their rear.

Tents will be pitched by the single file by the companies. After the above line is established, the brigades will stack arms and break by right of companies for the 1st Brigade, and by left of companies for the 3d Brigade to the rear, leaving an interval of twenty-five paces from the color line to the first company tent.

Proper details will then be made to bring up the baggage and trains of the Regiments, and have but the details allowed to leave the regimental grounds. The transportation of each brigade will be used for this purpose without reference to the Regiments under the orders of the Brigade Quarter Master.

Thirty paces will be allowed between regiments, unless the nature of the ground compels a wider interval. Police and Regimental guards will be established before the Brigades stack arms. Commanding officers will see that sinks are established for their officers and men at once.

Burrow's Battery will occupy ground between the two Brigades, one-half with the 1st, and the other with the 3d. Mann's Battery, on the Key West will drop over to this side of the river as soon as the landing is opened, and be assigned to cover the flank of the 3d Brigade.

As fast as a boat is cleared of troops and baggage, it will be reported to these Head Quarters and sent to Savannah. The orders are to hold Pittsburg Landing and the honorable post of exterior line in front is given to this Division.

All officers are enjoined to give their strict personal attention to discipline and drill in their respective commands. Their attention is especially called to the 49th and 50th Articles of War, and they are notified that they will be strictly enforced. Each Regiment will clear its regimental ground for parade and drill, and as soon as possible a rigid inspection will be made by Brigade commanders.

The 3d Iowa will establish camp perpendicularly to the line of the 1st Brigade, the right toward the river along the brush. The Empress and Emerald, having commissary stores on board, will fix themselves at some convenient points as soon as the rest of the transportation is drawn off. The General commanding will take Head-Quarters on shore as soon as the line is established.

By order of Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut,
Smith D. Atkins, A. A. A. G.

While the work preparatory to disembarking was going on, the men were allowed to go ashore to cook their rations and wash their clothes. Much curiosity was exhibited in examining the field of the recent engagement. The bodies left on the field had been but slightly buried by the enemy, and the graves were covered over with rails. While an Illinois regiment was exhuming and reburying the bodies of their fallen comrades, many soldiers crowded around to get a view of the marred faces of the dead. And so great was the curiosity of some young soldiers to see the bodies of men who had been slain in battle, that a guard had to be placed over the graves of the enemy's dead to prevent them from being again torn open.

The Fourth Division landed on the 17th, agreeably to General Hurlbut's order, and the 3d Iowa took position on the bluff in rear of the line. We drew new Sibley tents, and six were allowed to the company. The ground was full of water; but our quarters were commodious and contrasted delightfully with the filthy decks of the Iatan. But sickness was already becoming alarmingly prevalent among us. The confinement, bad diet, and bad air to which we had been subject, had thinned our ranks and filled the hospital as much as a hard fought battle. The water which we now had to drink was brackish and sickening. It was furnished by surface springs, and was the soakings of the roots of all the vegetation of the forest. Camp diarrhoea was the prevailing malady. We had not been in camp a week before there was scarcely a man who did not have it.

The Third Iowa was assigned by direction of Major General Grant, to the 1st Brigade, Fourth Division, and Col. Williams, as ranking officer, assumed command. The Brigade was composed of the Third Iowa, the 32d Illinois, Col. John Logan, the 41st Illinois, Col. I. C. Pugh, the 28th Illinois, Col. E. K. Johnson, and Burrow's Battery of light guns. It was very fortunate for Col. Williams to be thus placed in command of a brigade of such excellent troops, and his friends are confident that if he had not been disabled early in the battle of Shiloh, he would have silenced the accusations against him. Major Stone was left in command of our regiment, Col. Scott being absent on account of sickness. We twice changed our camp previous to the battle, and when that event occurred, the 1st Brigade was camped in proper order, the 3d Iowa on the extreme right. Beyond us were the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss, and to our right those of McClernand and Smith.

In the confusion of hills, ravines, and cross-roads, it was scarcely possible for a casual observer to come to a definite conclusion as to the topography of our camps. But he did not have to look twice at that city of white tents in the solemn forest to be impressed with the grandeur of the sight. As far as the eye could reach the hills were covered with them. By day the roads were choked with baggage wagons coming and going; the woods teemed with armed men; the air was full of martial sounds. The noise of artillery firing on drill with blank cartridges, joined to that of soldiers discharging their pieces in the woods, at times almost counterfeited a battle. The field music, bugles and bands were continually playing, and a steam calliope on one of the transports seemed to catch up their notes and repeat them to the distant hills.

Our spare tent was mostly occupied with drills and reviews. The weather was much of the time rainy, and sickness and despondency continued to increase. We had tidings that our arms were everywhere successful, and yet we were in gloom. It almost seemed to us that we were suffering to no purpose. In a week or ten days after our arrival at Pittsburg Landing, the roads had dried up so as to be quite passable. Why, then, did we not advance? The reason is obvious now. Our delay had given the enemy time to concentrate at Corinth, and we must now wait the arrival of Buell before resuming the offensive. Ah! how nearly fatal was the delay! Our blunder in failing to deal the enemy a a decisive blow when we had the opportunity is equaled by that of allowing him the opportunity of dealing a decisive blow against us. He was concentrating a large army within a few days' march of us, with what design we were ignorant, whether merely to arrest our further advance, or to march upon us and give us battle. In the latter event our situation was a highly dangerous one. With an impassable river immediately in our rear, and an impenetrable forest on either flank, defeat would amount to no less than destruction and capture. The soldiers themselves were not so stupid as not to discern the peril to which we were exposed. Nevertheless, not even the ordinary precautions were taken against it. The troops were not camped in proper line of battle; reconnoissances were unfrequent and unsatisfactory; picketing at the time of the attack was done only by the infantry; and the picket line was but a short distance in front of the line of advanced camps; and what was well nigh as bad, the headquarters of the commanding general were at Savannah, eight miles away. We had rumors that the enemy were evacuating Corinth, and again that he was marching against us. Whatever we believed, we could not deny that if the enemy expected to give us a decisive blow, he would attempt it now. The evening before the battle, I observed a captain talking with one of his men as they viewed from an eminence near the Landing the camps of the army. Their observations on the danger of our situation were very similar to those I have just made. Their words were almost prophetic. For in twenty-four hours that army whose camps they saw extending so widely and so beautifully, was rolled back a broken mass upon the bluff, half of its artillery and most of its material in the hands of the enemy, and with two hours more of such disaster, would have been utterly destroyed or captured.