Arrival of Smith—His march from the Railroad—Why he arrived too late—Our feelings on his arrival—The situation the morning after the battle—What should have been done—Smith starts for St. Joseph—Burying the dead and caring for the wounded—Scott's official report—Comments on the same—Gallantry of Scott and Lakin—Official report of the enemy—Estimate of his force—Account in the Missouri Republican—Account in Pollard's First Year of the War—The necessity and merits of the battle.

Col. Smith's command arrived a little after sunset. He had left Platte City at eight in the morning, and had taken a route so circuitous that his men estimated the distance of the day's march at twenty-six miles; whereas, it could have been accomplished in fifteen. He had left Platte river bridge Sunday at nine in the morning. It was seven miles further from that point to Liberty than from Cameron. He had six hours the start of Colonel Scott in pursuit of the rebels. He had plenty of transportation; we had to impress ours. The roads were no more muddy with him than with us. In fact, they were not muddy to any degree; only a little slippery, and by noon of the next day were completely dry. He had twelve companies of infantry, four pieces of cannon and one company of dragoons of the regular army. He had left three companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio to guard the bridge. With this force he could not hesitate to follow the enemy closely; but at no time did he get within a day's march of his main force. He took a circuitous route, and bore so far to the west that it has even been averred that he retreated from two o'clock of one day till eight o'clock of the next, expecting that the enemy was following him. It seems, however, that his system of scouts was so poor (if indeed he had any at all), that he knew nothing of the movements of the enemy's main body, and that the rebels' rear guard, Childs' battalion of three hundred cavalry, led him around over the country, while their infantry, artillery, and long wagon train of plunder were making their escape. In this movement, Smith displayed neither skill nor decision. No sufficient reason can be given why he did not reach Liberty as soon as we, or, at least, soon enough to co-operate with us.

It is impossible to tell with what feelings we thought of our being compelled to fight the battle alone, and to suffer a defeat, which might entail disgrace, because this officer had been so tardy in his support. In this state of feeling, we clamored loudly and with curses, to be led back against the enemy. But Colonel Smith decided to defer a renewal of the attack till morning, and his exhausted troops in the meantime took quarters in the court house and other buildings.

Early in the morning, Lieut. Call and his men went forward to reconnoiter. The field was abandoned. The enemy had crossed the river and was out of our reach. But would we pursue to Lexington? We understood that Price had besieged the garrison there with all his forces. Smith was now without orders; but reason and duty pointed to but one course; to march down the river and support Sturgis, who was endeavoring to succor Mulligan. Had Smith known or acted upon the simplest principle of defensive warfare, that forces concentrate when threatened, he would not have hesitated at least in placing himself in communication with that officer. But he took precisely the opposite course. After spending most of the following day at Liberty, his men in the meantime plundering and outraging the citizens, he took up the march in the evening for St. Joseph, giving Scott an additional piece of artillery of Schwartz's battery, under command of a lieutenant, and leaving him under orders to return to Liberty as soon as he had made dispositions for his wounded, at the same time refusing him transportation to enable him to do so; thus, as we were willing to believe, placing us between him and the enemy, while he was making his shameful flight. Thus, while the enemy was making an inroad into our territory and threatening all our detachments west of St. Louis, he divided his small force and commenced the occupation of the country from which a portion of the rebels had just retreated. The privates in the ranks saw the stupidity of these movements at the time; and it is a striking illustration of their patriotism that, under such leadership, they were not thoroughly demoralized.

Our regiment spent the day after the battle in taking care of our wounded and burying our dead. Most of the bodies of the dead were brought from the field and buried in the public cemetery with military honors. The building of the William Jewell College was converted into a hospital for the use of our wounded. Dr. Cool, our assistant surgeon, and Dr. ——, assistant surgeon of the Sixteenth, were untiring in their efforts in behalf of the sufferers. The three wounded men left in the hands of the enemy were taken across the river by them, but procured next day by flag of truce. They reported the rebel loss very severe, and the captain of the ferry boat confirmed their statements. Other corroborative statements have since been made, and all the evidence that can be gathered, including the studied silence of the rebel official report on this point, tends to convince us that such was the case.

The following is Colonel Scott's official report:

Head Quarters, 3d Reg. Iowa Volunteers, }
Liberty, Mo., Sept. 18th, 1861. }

S. D. Sturgis, Brig. Gen. U. S. A.—Sir: In relation to an affair of yesterday which occurred near Blue Mills Landing, I have the honor to report:

Agreeably to your orders, I left Cameron at 3 o'clock, P.M. of the 15th instant, and through a heavy rain and bad roads, made but seven miles that afternoon. By a very active march on the 16th I reached Centerville, ten miles north of Liberty, by sunset, when the firing of cannon was distinctly heard in the direction of Platte City, which was surmised to be from Colonel Smith's (Illinois 16th) command. Had sent a messenger to Col. Smith, from Hainesville, and one from Centerville, but got no response. On the 17th instant at 2 A.M. I started from Centerville for Liberty, and at daylight the advance guard fell in with the enemy's pickets which they drove in and closely followed. At 7 A.M. my command bivouacked on the hill north of, and overlooking the town. I dispatched several scouts to examine the position of the enemy, but could gain no definite information. They had passed through Liberty during the afternoon of the 16th to the number of about four thousand; had taken the road to Blue Mills Landing, and were reported as having four pieces of artillery. At 11 A.M., heard firing in the direction of the Landing, which was reported as a conflict between the rebels and forces disputing their passage over the river. At 12 M. moved the command, consisting of five hundred of the 3d Iowa, a squad of German artillerists and about twenty Home Guards, in the direction of Blue Mills Landing. On the route, learned that a body of our scouts had fallen in with the enemy's pickets and lost four killed and one wounded. Before starting, dispatched a courier to Colonel Smith to hasten his command.

About two miles from Liberty the advance guard drove in the enemy's pickets, skirmishers closely examined the dense growth through which our route lay, and at 3 P.M., discovered the enemy in force, concealed on both sides of the wood, and occupying the dry bed of a slough, left resting on the river, and right extending beyond our observation. He opened a heavy fire which drove back our skirmishers, and made simultaneous attacks on our front and right. These were well sustained, and he retired with loss to his position. In the attack on our front the artillery suffered so severely that our only piece, a brass six pounder, was left without sufficient force to man it, and I was only able to have it discharged twice during the action. Some of the gunners abandoned the piece, carrying off the matches and primer, and could not be found.

The enemy kept up a heavy fire from his position—and our artillery useless, and many of the officers and men already disabled—it was deemed advisable to fall back, which was done slowly, returning the enemy's fire and completely checking pursuit.

The six pounder was brought off by hand, through the gallantry of various officers of the Third Iowa, after it had been completely abandoned by the artillerists. The ammunition wagon becoming fastened between a tree and a log in such a manner that it could not be released without serious loss, was abandoned. The engagement lasted one hour, and was sustained by my command with an intrepidity that merits my warmest approbation.

I have to regret the loss of many brave officers and men, who fell gallantly fighting at their posts. I refer to the enclosed list of killed and wounded as a part of this report.

The heaviest loss was sustained by Company I, Third Iowa Volunteers, which lost four killed and twenty wounded, being one-fourth of our total loss. This company deserves especial mention. Captain Trumbull, assisted by Lieut. Crosley of Company E, brought off the gun by hand under a heavy fire. Major Stone, Captains Warren, Willet and O'Niel were severely wounded, and also Lieutenants Hobbs, Anderson and Knight. The latter refused to retire from the field after being three times wounded, and remained with his men till the close of the engagement. Among the great number who deserve my thanks for their gallantry, I mention Sergeant James H. Lakin of Company F, Third Iowa, who bore the colors, and carried them through the fight with all the coolness of a veteran. The loss of the enemy can not be certainly ascertained; but from accounts deemed reliable, it is not less than one hundred and sixty, many of whom were killed. His total force was about four thousand four hundred.

Your most obedient servant,
(Signed)John Scott
Lt. Col. 3d Iowa Volunteers, Comdg.

This report was written the day after the battle, under very harassing circumstances, and before any written reports of subordinates could be received. Leaving out some slight inaccuracies on points which could not be thoroughly investigated then, it reflects very closely the impression of the affair most of us had at the time.

I think it was nearly two o'clock when we moved from Liberty to the attack, and that the action did not commence before four. The manner in which he mentions the officers is both truthful and just. Captain Trumbull and Lieutenants Knight and Crosley attracted the attention of all by their gallantry. Major Stone returned to the field as soon as his wound was dressed, and kept with us during the remainder of the action. I think the report should also have mentioned Sergeant Abernethy, who commanded the twelve skirmishers that commenced the battle, four of whom were wounded, and who was one of the first to follow Captain Trumbull in dragging off the cannon. I am personally knowing to the fact, that the German sergeant who commanded the gun assisted in dragging it off. I do not believe that any of the published accounts of this action do justice to those German artillerists. They were almost recruits, they and their horses untrained. They were ordered to take the position so far in advance that they were within buckshot range of the enemy. The road was so narrow, that with their untamed and fractious horses, it was almost impossible to get their gun in position at all. It was stated by men who say they saw it, that the man who had the primer was shot, and staggering fell dead several yards in advance of the piece. Their post was in the road where they could not seek shelter. Here they stood till many of their horses and half their number were shot down. Who could expect more, or be surprised if, under these circumstances, some of them were appalled. I only blame some of them, including their sergeant, for drinking whisky several times out of a pint bottle on their way from Liberty.

Colonel Scott refrained from mentioning more fully the gallantry of the enlisted men, from a sense of delicacy in saying too much on a subject in which he might be supposed to be personally interested.

When the battle was well over, and we began to distribute, comrade to comrade, his proper meed of praise or blame, two names were mentioned by every tongue, and with an enthusiasm which amounted almost to idolatry; Scott, who led his men into the fight and followed them out, and upon whom, riding nearest the enemy, all eyes were turned so often with the expectation of seeing him fall; and Lakin, who bore the colors so bravely; totally heedless of his own safety, but thinking only of duty; keeping the flag all the while near the Colonel, and calling upon his comrades to stand by it. Scott's horse was hit several times, and several balls went through his clothes. Eight balls went through the flag in the hands of Lakin, and a ninth one struck the staff. It seemed half a miracle that, while so many fell in places less exposed, these two, all the while in sight of the enemy, escaped unhurt.

The following is the official report of the enemy:—

Lexington, Sept. 21st, 1861.

General Price,—Sir: In pursuance of your orders I left this place on the 15th inst., and proceeded forthwith to Liberty, Clay county, Missouri, where I met the State Guard on the march from the northwest, one regiment of infantry under command of Colonel Saunders, and one regiment of cavalry under command of Colonel Wilfley of the Fifth District, and one regiment of infantry under command of Colonel Jeff Patton, and one battalion of cavalry under command of Colonel Childs of the Fourth District. I delivered your orders to the above commands to hasten to this point (Lexington) with as much dispatch as possible. They marched forthwith and reached the Missouri river about four o'clock in the evening, when Colonel Boyd's artillery and battalion and baggage were crossed to the south side, where he took position, Captain Kelly planting his artillery so as completely to command the river. The crossing continued all night without interruption, every officer and man using his best exertions. We received news during the night that the enemy would be in the town of Liberty, about six miles from Blue Mills Ferry, at an early hour the ensuing morning. We were crossing in three small flats, and much time was necessary to move the large train of a hundred wagons. Colonel Childs with his command had taken post for the night about two miles from Liberty on the road to the ferry. Here he engaged the enemy's advance or pickets, killing four and wounding one, with no loss on our side. The enemy then fled, and we heard no more of them until three or four o'clock, when their approach was announced in large force, supposed to be nine hundred men with one piece of artillery, a six pounder. The men of our command immediately formed, Colonel Jeff Patton leading the advance, to meet the enemy. After proceeding about three miles from the river, they met the advance guard of the enemy and the fight commenced. But the Federal troops almost immediately fled, our men pursuing rapidly, shooting them down until they annihilated the rear of their army, taking one caisson, killing about sixty men, and wounding, it is said, about seventy. The Federal troops attempted two or three times to make a stand, but ran after delivering one fire. Our men followed them like hounds in a wolf chase, strewing the road with dead and wounded, until compelled to give over the chase from exhaustion, the evening being very warm.

Colonel Saunders, Colonel Patton, Colonel Childs, Colonel Caudiff, Colonel Wilfley, Major Grease, Adjutant Shackleford, and all other officers and men so far as I know or could learn, behaved gallantly.

R. D. Atchison.

This report is doubtless a second-hand affair. Prisoners since captured informed us that General Atchison was not in the battle at all—but on the south side of the river; that the battle was fought by Colonel Saunders against his orders, for which this officer was court martialed, but acquitted. If we accept certain assertions known to be false, and make due allowance for the bombastic style of this report, and the border ruffian proclivities of its author, it speaks louder for us than anything else can. It confesses the rebel force to have been three regiments, two of infantry under Saunders and Patton, and one of cavalry under Wilfley; and two battalions, one of cavalry under Childs, and one (the arm not given) under Boyd, and one battery under Kelly; which being just recruited and with full ranks, could not have fallen far short of four thousand men.

The following account of Blue Mills is from the St. Louis Republican:

"The rebel forces under Patton, numbering some four thousand five hundred, evacuated St. Joseph on the 12th September, and retreated in the direction of Lexington. On the succeeding Monday, an expedition under Lieut. Col. Scott, left Cameron on the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad with orders to co-operate with Col. Smith in the pursuit of the secession soldiers.

"The column of Lieut. Col. Scott was composed of five hundred men of the Iowa Third Regiment, a small detachment of Home Guards, and artillerists to work one gun, making five hundred and seventy in the aggregate. Simultaneously with the movements of these troops from Cameron, Colonel Smith of the Illinois Sixteenth, with two companies of Colonel Groesbeck's Thirty-ninth Ohio and four pieces, left St. Joseph. Both columns were ordered to Liberty, there to effect a junction and combine their forces. Lieut. Col. Scott, it appears, reached Liberty on the 17th inst., at 7 o'clock in the morning, and waited for the arrival of Colonel Smith until one o'clock in the afternoon. The latter not having got up, Colonel Scott sent back a messenger, stating that he would push forward after the enemy, whose camp was about five miles distant, which was accordingly done. Boyd and Patton with, as we stated, about four thousand five hundred men, were occupying a position in a thicket near Blue Mills Landing. The following statement is furnished of what transpired:

"Our skirmishers received a galling fire and slowly retired to the main body, when the action became general. Our six pounder was brought to bear on the enemy, and two shots fired which proved destructive. At this time a heavy fire was opened upon our single gun, killing one gunner and wounding two others. On this, several of the remaining gunners (Germans), abandoned their gun, carrying off the primer and fuses, rendering the piece useless. The action continued for an hour, when the column was slowly withdrawn, bringing off the wounded and dragging away the gun by hand—all the horses having been killed or badly wounded. In addition to the loss of the Third Iowa, there were six Home Guards and one artillery man killed. Four of these Home Guards were killed in a skirmish about two hours before the battle. Three of the missing are supposed to be in the hands of the enemy and the balance killed.

"It seems that Colonel Smith, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad roads, had been greatly delayed on the route, and his failure to join Lieut. Col. Scott is attributable to these causes. On the receipt, however, of Col. Scott's message, he immediately ordered his cavalry and mounted men to the front, and took them forward at a rapid pace. On his arrival at Liberty after dark, he found Scott there after having been repulsed by overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The men were exhausted, and as the enemy were reported strongly intrenched, it was resolved to postpone an attack until morning. Lieut. Col. Wilson reached Liberty with the infantry two hours after Colonel Smith.

"Early on the following morning, the 18th, the combined forces moved forward; but, on reaching Blue Mills Landing, found that the rebels had crossed the river and eluded them, the last detachment having gone over at two o'clock in the morning. They had been two days taking their baggage and stores across, and with a ferry boat and three flats found it comparatively easy to take their men over, especially as the Missouri is quite narrow at that point. Thus Boyd, Patton, and their army escaped. The loss of the rebels in the engagement of the 17th is not known. But from the desperation with which the Iowa boys fought, it must have been considerable. It seems that these soldiers had been somewhat chagrined at what was termed their flight at Shelbina, although that retreat was reluctant and under orders. They determined on the first opportunity to show that they were not cowards, and this feeling it was, doubtless, that actuated Lieut. Col. Scott to push forward without waiting for Col. Smith's column. It was not of course intended that either command was to attack the vastly superior force of the enemy unsupported; and in this respect the conduct of Lieut. Col. Scott was unauthorized, though we do not hear of any disposition to attach any blame to him. His object, seeing that the enemy was making preparations to cross the river, was probably to draw him out and retreat before him in expectation of meeting a timely reinforcement from Col. Smith. It appears that Col. Smith left St. Joseph previous to the receipt of the full orders which were for him, after the contemplated cutting off of Boyd and Patton from Lexington, to move on himself to the latter place. These directions reaching St. Joseph subsequent to Col. Smith's departure, were sent after him by a mounted officer, who returned without having overtaken Col. Smith, and consequently without having delivered his orders. The reader, therefore, who has supposed that Col. Smith had moved to join Col. Mulligan, at Lexington, will be disappointed to learn that in his report to General Pope, he speaks of being about to return to St. Joseph."

As this book is intended to be an amusement to my comrades, I give the version of our first battle which I find in a book entitled The First Year of the War, written by one of the most distinguished men of the South, Edward A. Pollard, of Richmond, author of Black Diamonds, and editor of the Richmond Examiner. I give it out of curiosity, and to illustrate what complete falsehood and nonsense may sometimes be dignified by the name of history:

"Gen. Price was informed that four thousand men under Lane and Montgomery were advancing from the direction of St. Joseph on the north side of the Missouri river, and Gen. Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry was also advancing from the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad for the purpose of relieving the forces under Mulligan. About twenty-five hundred Missourians under the immediate command of Colonel Saunders, were, at the same time hurrying to the aid of Gen. Price from the same direction with the Lane and Montgomery jayhawks; and having reached Blue Mills, thirty miles above Lexington, on the 17th of September, crossed over their force, except some five hundred men, in a ferry-boat. While the remainder were waiting to cross over, the jayhawkers attacked the five hundred Missourians on the north bank of the river. The battle raged fiercely for one hour on the river bottom, which was heavily timbered and in many places covered with water. The Missourians were armed with only shotguns and rifles, and taken by surprise: no time was given them to call back any portion of their force on the south side of the river; but they were from the counties contiguous to Kansas, accustomed in the border wars since 1854 to almost monthly fights with the Kansas jayhawkers under Lane, and were fired with the most intense hatred of him and of them. Gen. D. R. Atchison, former President of the United States Senate, and well known as one of the boldest leaders of the State Rights party in Missouri, had been sent from Lexington to hasten them on to his camp. He was with the five hundred, on the north side of the river when they were attacked, and by his presence and example cheered them on in the conflict. Charging the jayhawkers with shouts of almost savage ferocity, and fighting with reckless valor, the Missourians drove the enemy back ten miles, the conflict becoming a hand to hand fight between detached parties on both sides. At length, being unable to support the fearful fire of the Missourians at the short distance of forty yards, the enemy broke into open flight. The loss of the jayhawkers was very considerable. Their official report admitted one hundred and fifty killed and some two hundred wounded. The entire loss of the Missourians was five killed and twenty wounded. The intelligence of this brilliant victory of the 'five hundred' was received with shouts of acclamation by Price's army at Lexington."

And now, should we approve Blue Mills? I answer unhesitatingly, yes. Some have pronounced it a piece of unpardonable rashness. But one more glance at the situation; the enemy crossing the river; every reason for believing there was a diversion on the other side; the absolute duty of co-operating with it; the certainty that in this event his forces would be divided by the river; the almost certain nearness of support; the consciousness that to attack, though defeated by overwhelming numbers, would be honorable, and that to fail to do so on any pretext would be a disgrace; these were the motives which decided Scott. Who but a coward would have done differently? But what is more, Scott well knew, as most of his officers and men afterwards confessed, that, after Kirksville and Shelbina, to allow this opportunity of a battle to pass, would have thrown the regiment into a state of demoralization. But I will not seek further to justify an act of which scarcely a man complained. All felt that the battle was a necessity, and that the only one to blame was the hesitating, halting commander who had left us to fight it without support.

I am not disposed to attempt criticism on the tactical mistakes committed on our side. It is easy to criticise the best dispositions when the battle is over. The mistake which drew us into the enemy's ambuscade in column was owing as much to his skill in removing early his rear guard and pickets, and posting his men completely out of observation, as to the fault of Col. Scott in not sooner deploying the column and keeping his skirmishers farther in advance. When once there, the situation called forth the highest powers of a commander. All that Scott could do by word or example, he did. Nothing less than the conduct he displayed could have induced his men to bear the disaster so bravely. It is no exaggeration to say that his resolution, in making the attack, and his conduct during the action, won for him the devoted admiration of the regiment.

Such was our first battle; undertaken through a lofty sense of honor and a loftier sense of duty, against eight times our number; beginning in mistake, sustained with desperation, ending in retreat; a martyrdom to public opinion, and vindication of character, a victory under the name of defeat.