Col. Smith with his own regiment and five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio proceeds west to Platte river bridge, and commences repairing it—Col. Scott is ordered to co-operate with him against the rebels in that vicinity—We proceed to Cameron by railroad, impress transportation and march toward Liberty—The first night—Second day's march—Second night at Centerville—Cannonading in the distance—Our feelings—Lieut. Call reconnoiters as far as Liberty—We move at 3 A.M.—At sunrise drive back the enemy's pickets and camp at Liberty—No tidings from Smith—Cannonading in the direction of Independence, and probabilities of an engagement across the river—Col. Scott resolves to attack.

BATTLE OF BLUE MILLS LANDING.

We expected that the troops now under these two generals would be directed in pursuit of Green. In this we were disappointed. There were now far more important movements on foot, but of which we could conjecture nothing. Both the Sixteenth Illinois and the detachment of the Thirty-ninth Ohio were sent west under Smith. This seemed a little strange; but in reality it was not at all so; for we had already learned that the enemy had captured St. Joseph, and we had just received intelligence of the Platte river bridge tragedy with which the country is familiar. The Twenty-seventh Ohio and the additional five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio arrived by way of the North Missouri Railroad, and, under Sturgis, proceeded west as far as Utica, when leaving the railroad, they moved south toward Lexington. I have been unable to ascertain the orders under which these columns moved. There is a chaos about the loss of Lexington, out of which it is scarcely possible to bring any thing tangible or intelligible. It seems, however, that General Pope had control of the movements designed to reinforce that garrison from the north, and that General Sturgis was under his command. Be this as it may, the dispositions were faulty in the extreme. It seems that the Union Guards designed reinforcing Mulligan from the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, and, at the same time, driving out the rebels from the vicinity of St. Joseph. Col. Smith, whom we supposed sent to effect the latter purpose, proceeded as far west as Platte river bridge, nine miles from St. Joseph, and commenced repairing it. Why he did not proceed against the enemy is inexplicable. If his force was insufficient, why was our regiment still lying at Macon? Above all, why were these movements delayed a day when Lexington was in such peril? Such questions will ever recur to us when we remember what an annoyance the operations of the western army received in the surrender of that garrison. The rebels began to retreat from the vicinity of St. Joseph, and what then? Why, it was now time to organize pursuit!

For this purpose, the Third Iowa was to go west and co-operate with Smith. On the morning of September 15th, Colonel Scott received orders to this effect, and, in less than two hours those of the regiment who were able to endure a forced march were aboard a train of cars and proceeding rapidly toward the west. The Colonel compelled many partially ill or convalescent, who wished to join in the movement, to remain behind; because he expected to perform rapid marches, and did not wish to be embarrassed by straggling.

At 1 P.M. we arrived at Cameron, a station about forty miles east of St. Joseph, and got our effects off the train. Here we heard the first rumors of Price's movements, and began to have glimpses of what was before us. Colonel Scott's orders from General Sturgis were to leave the railroad at Cameron, march upon Liberty, act against the rebels and co-operate with Smith. The plan seems to have been that Smith and Scott should unite at Liberty, defeat the St. Joseph rebels and capture their immense train before they could cross the Missouri; and then, following them down the north bank of that stream, unite with Sturgis, who would then be able to appear before Lexington in such force as to raise the siege. It is easy to see wherein this plan was defective. It involved, first, a division of our forces in the presence of an enemy who was numerically our superior; and, secondly, the accomplishing of two objects almost simultaneously when the whole force should have been concentrated for the accomplishment of the main one, the relief of Mulligan. As will be shown in the following pages, the faults in executing were not less than those in planning, and the whole thing was a total and disgraceful failure, relieved only by two bright tints of glory, the heroism of Mulligan at Lexington and of Scott at Blue Mills. In justice to Colonel Smith, however, it is proper to state here, that, as will be seen by the St. Louis Republican's account, given in the next chapter, orders to proceed to Lexington, after cutting off Boyd and Patton, did not reach him at all.

We were not long getting our baggage and effects off the cars. But how were we to move without transportation? Colonel Smith had taken our wagons from us on a previous occasion, and still had them. Colonel Scott, with his characteristic energy, set himself to work to solve this problem. Before the men had got their dinners, he had put into requisition several teams belonging to citizens, on which we loaded our subsistence and the few cooking utensils we took along. We were joined by a detachment of Captain Schwartz's Missouri Battery, fourteen men and a six pounder, under command of a sergeant.

At three o'clock, we began to move. It had been raining slowly since noon; but, though the roads were slippery, the mud was not deep, and the wagons and artillery proceeded without difficulty. After a steady march of seven miles, we bivouacked on an open meadow. It continued to drizzle slowly till sunset, and finally the wind rose in the northwest, damp and raw, which rendered the night very comfortless. The common ration of food being found insufficient to satisfy our hunger, Colonel Scott humanely and wisely ordered extra issues to be made.

The march was resumed at an early hour. The scenery through which we passed this day was sufficiently pleasing to repay even the toils of the tiresome march. The day was clear and warm, and by noon the roads were quite dry. We halted for dinner and rest at the small town of Hainesville. As will be seen by Colonel Scott's official report, it was from this point that he sent his first messenger to Smith. [What became of these messengers? Were they captured by the enemy? Or were they too timid to go far? To suppose that they were unable to find Colonel Smith would be preposterous.]

After a short rest, we resumed the march, and arrived at Centerville at sunset. We had scarcely stacked arms, when we heard toward the west the firing of cannon. Every pulse beat quicker. There was not a man who did not listen with interest. Every jar seemed an earnest of something to come. Each seemed to tell of human passions broke loose, of men turned demons, of carnage and of death. There was to us a strange romance in those sounds. We rejoiced; for we knew that in that direction were both friends and foes. That the latter were there, gave us a double joy. We would meet them, and wipe out the unjust reproach of Shelbina. We would show the country, that under a brave leader, we were no cowards. We would make good our promises to our friends and loved ones at home. We would earn the right to be called comrades of the gallant men who fought at Springfield. The fact that friends were there, gave us the assurance that we should not meet the enemy alone and without hope of success.

We found Centerville almost entirely deserted. The inhabitants were rebels. They had heard of our approach and fled. Nothing belonging to them, however, was disturbed except their henroosts. It requires no more than the teachings of ordinary experience to show that pilot bread and fat bacon will not support great fatigue. The country through which we passed supplied us in a measure with what our commissariat lacked. No one went beyond the bounds of reason, and the people were surprised that we took so little. Thus every man had plenty of good food; his blood flowed vigorously; and what, under other circumstances, would have cost him great fatigue, he now endured with comparative ease.

Colonel Scott sent another messenger to Smith, and Lieut. Call reconnoitered as far as Liberty. He reported the enemy marching through that place. This was sufficient to determine Scott. The sound of Madison's guns convinced him that the enemy was closely pursued. He was determined, that, if decisive results were not attained, it should not be through any fault of his.

Accordingly the drums beat reveille at two o'clock. We breakfasted hastily, and at three the column was in motion. There was an inspiration in this hurried march which the memory loves to recall. Colonel Scott since said in a private letter, "My impression at this moment of the proudest conduct of the old Third runs me back to the morning of Sept. 17th, '61, driving in the rebel pickets, and, with the eye of an eagle and the tread of a wild stag, closing up that heavy march and advancing upon Liberty, in the expectation of meeting thousands of rebels at any moment." At sunrise we came in sight of Liberty. There were indeed enemies at hand, but no friends. Lieut. Call drove the whole rebel pickets through the town, and we bivouacked on the hill overlooking it from the north. But where was Smith? Colonel Scott could not suppose that his last messenger had not reached him. He accordingly waited with great impatience for his arrival. Nine o'clock—ten—twelve; but no tidings from him.

On the other hand, we heard the firing of cannon in the direction of Independence. This led us to believe that troops from the other side of the Missouri were engaging the enemy while he was attempting to cross. Colonel Scott seems to have been convinced on this point; for it had been his understanding before leaving the railroad, that troops from Kansas City were to co-operate. There was no mistaking the sounds. Six discharges were heard, loud and distinct. Besides, citizens actually reported that a fight was taking place on the other side of the river. This left it impossible for Colonel Scott to doubt that such was the case. He was, then, governed by two considerations: First, our friends were engaging the enemy and needed assistance. To hesitate or delay could not receive too much reproach. Second, if the enemy was not entirely across, he was divided by the river. Thus it was not only an absolute duty to attack at all hazards; but, in doing so, it was probable that he would be able to strike a decisive blow. Nevertheless, it was plain to see, that the undertaking involved great hazard. The lowest reports of the citizens placed the enemy's force at 3,000 men, with three pieces of cannon. Universally hostile to us, and chagrined that their friends had fled before so small a force, it is reasonable to suppose that they represented his numbers less than they really were. But Colonel Scott accepted the hazard and determined to attack without delay. It was a resolution worthy of our old commander, and every soldier rejoiced to join in executing it.

This was between the hours of one and two. Colonel Scott started a messenger to Smith, and ordered the men to fall in. In a few minutes the regiment was marching through the town, keeping a buoyant tread to martial notes that had never sounded so sweetly before. The people, mostly ladies—for there were few men to be seen—gathered upon the street corners and watched us as we passed. We were marching to attack their sons and brothers, and yet in our enthusiasm, we thought we could see a gleam of admiration in their eyes. We subsequently learned that we were not deceived. We almost fancied we heard them murmur; "Those are five thousand; these, five hundred. Ah, how great the odds! Brave men! with what a tread they march forward to slaughter and defeat! But they are enemies, and it must be so."

I can imagine, too, the feelings of Colonel Scott, as he rode at the head of these devoted men. I believe he recognized in the coming hour not only duty but glory. There are moments in men's lives when a vigorous blow seems to revolutionize their destiny. The man who watches for these moments, who hails them in the distance, who recognizes them when they arrive, and who then strikes, may almost be said to be master of his fortune. It is given to few men to command a force, acting independently against an enemy, when there is an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Colonel Scott, then, doubtless recognized this as his hour of destiny. And such it was; for though success might not attend the blow, a failure to strike quickly would bring upon him the imputation of cowardice, and consign his name to irreparable disgrace. His force was small; but to each man the hazard was no less, than if they were a hundred thousand. Besides, it was at a period of the war when we had not begun to fight great battles; but when small successes made generals, and gave opportunity for greater ones. It must have been an anxious hour to Scott. But he was equal to it, and rode on, cool and firm as a Roman.

Lieut. Call with his mounted Missourians had the advance. They encountered the enemy's pickets about two miles from Liberty, drove them in and closely followed them. Anticipating this, his rearguard, a battalion of cavalry under Colonel Childs, ambushed themselves in a ravine behind a dense thicket, having previously picketed their horses in the rear, and awaited their approach. The Lieutenant and his party rode almost on to the muzzles of their guns, when the rebels discovered themselves by a simultaneous volley, which emptied five saddles, killing four men instantly and wounding a fifth. What was to be done? The enemy was dismounted and posted. The Home Guards had no sabers, only muskets, and could not charge. It was a trying moment; but they fully vindicated their courage. Not a man drew rein to retreat. They returned the fire, and only retired at the command of Lieut. Call. In this encounter, Capt. Cupp of the Home Guards was killed. Capt. Hawk was also wounded in such a manner that it seemed half a miracle that it did not kill him. A ball struck him full on the corner of the forehead, but by some means glanced, and spared the gallant Captain's life. This affair won for Lieut. Call's Home Guards our highest respect; for it taught us that they were brave men.

The four ghastly bodies, as we passed them, were visible presages of what was to come. Near the scene of this occurrence, Colonel Scott halted the battalion, and brought it to a front. He ordered us to inspect our ammunition, and untie the bunches in the lower partition of our boxes. He then gave the command to load, and rode along the line cautioning the men to be steady and fire low. He caused the artillery to take position in the center of the column, and a company of infantry to be deployed forward as skirmishers. He ordered the mounted men to bring up the rear as a reserve.

These dispositions being made, the column continued to advance. It will be remembered that, at this point, we were perhaps half way between Liberty and Blue Mills Landing; two miles from either place. We were in a wooded bottom which continued to the river, interrupted by one or two small corn-fields. The timber was very dense, and the fallen trees and tangled vines rendered it almost impenetrable. It would be impossible for a battalion deployed in line to advance through it with any degree of rapidity or order. This induced Colonel Scott to keep the battalion marching by the flank in the road, and to trust to the skirmishers to discover the enemy in time to allow him to make dispositions to attack him. Thus, making frequent halts to relieve the skirmishers with fresh companies, we felt our slow way forward.

That the character of the ground in a manner compelled us to advance thus, proved to be the chief misfortune of the day. We however reached a point before finding the enemy, that presented a favorable opportunity for preventing this. The road on which we advanced led north and south. We came to a square corn field lying to the left of the road and bordering upon it. On the south side of this field came a heavily traveled road from the east, entering the one on which we were marching at right angles. On the right of the north and south road and about three rods from it, ran parallel to it a slough several rods in width, unobstructed save by occasional logs, and, at this time, dry. We were now not more than a mile from the river, General Atchison's report to the contrary, notwithstanding. The enemy was between us and the river, if he had not crossed; and being so near, it was time to begin to proceed with greater caution. I have always believed that the Colonel's greatest mistake was in not forming line here, where the ground presented so favorable an opportunity, and advancing cautiously thus, the cannon in the road, and the skirmishers well in advance. But this is only the opinion of a soldier, given after the battle is over. Probably no one knew what to do then better than Colonel Scott; and when it was over, no one knew what should have been done better than he.

As it was, the column halted and the skirmishers now in advance were relieved by Company B, Captain Long, which was deployed forward on the left of the road, and by twelve men of Company F, under First Sergeant Abernethy, who were deployed forward on the right of the road in the dry slough. Company I was now in the lead of the battalion, next the artillery, and then Company F, followed by the other companies. In this order the column again advanced, with no signs of the enemy until Captain Long is said to have reported from the line of skirmishers that he could hear the enemy advancing, their officers giving commands, and the ground shaking with their tread. For some reason, the Colonel paid no heed to this report, but rode very coolly on, cautioning the skirmishers not to get too far ahead. The enemy was indeed advancing, and the skirmishers were not more than twelve rods beyond the head of the column.

All at once, we heard a few sharp reports, and then a deafening crash of musketry. It was on the right in front of Sergeant Abernethy's skirmishers. They had unmasked the enemy and opened fire upon him, and with what fury he was returning it! Brave comrades! we knew that they were suffering, but we had scarcely time to think of them before the firing became general, and the enemy's balls flew thick and fast along the entire length of the column. The situation was disastrous in the extreme. It did not require a second thought to comprehend it. While marching to attack the enemy, he had ambushed us and attacked us in column. All that we could now do was to make the best of a desperate situation. The men moved quickly to the right and left without regard to their positions in ranks, concealed themselves as best they could, and began to return the enemy's fire.

Colonel Scott immediately ordered the cannon forward. It was brought forward a short distance, got into position and fired two discharges of canister, which are said to have done great execution. This is doubtless the case; for the rebels were almost under its muzzle. But they opened upon the artillerists with rifles and shot guns—for they were within buckshot range—and in a few moments disabled several of their horses and killed and wounded half the squad. Soon after this, the Colonel is said to have given the order to "fall back a little." If such an order was given, it was intended only for those who had got too far in advance, and was heard by few and heeded by none. The enemy began to push a column past our right; but this proved a disastrous attempt; for, being exposed to the fire of our entire column across the slough, it was soon scattered and beaten back. Company I was particularly prominent in this. Colonel Scott put forth every effort to bring the companies into line parallel with that of the enemy; but the men could not be brought out of the confusion, and in the noise, the commands could not be heard. But he himself resolutely kept the extreme advance, and his example was almost worth a battalion of reinforcements.

Every moment matters grew worse. Out of sixteen commissioned officers ten had fallen. The cannon was totally disabled. The enemy, though he had been checked in his charges on our front, and in his attempt to flank our right, had fallen back to his cover, and his bullets rained as thickly as at first. We began to give back slowly, keeping up an unabated fire, and carrying off our wounded. Only three wounded men were left on the field. We, the men, evidently thought that it was "advisable to fall back." But we had no orders to this effect,—at least, none that many of us heard, though a dozen might have been given. We were simply repulsed; driven out of the woods perforce; compelled to get out of the enemy's ambuscade or stand where we were and be shot down to no purpose. If orders to retreat were not given, they should have been. The enemy's long line, masked in a dry ravine, extended around us in the shape of a crescent, and we were exposed to a concentrated fire from its center and both flanks. Under the circumstances, we did the bravest thing possible; we retired slowly, disputing the enemy's advance. Our caisson had got clogged between two trees, and, as most of its horses were shot down, and the enemy pressing upon it, we were compelled to abandon it. But the cannon must be saved. Captain Trumbull waved his sword, and called on the men around him to help drag it off. As many seized hold of it as could, including Lieut. Crosley, Sergeant Abernethy, and the sergeant who commanded the artillery squad. It was with great difficulty that it was got away, and three men were shot while hold of it.

Colonel Scott who had been in the advance during the fight, was still nearest the enemy in the retreat. Two or three times he endeavored, but without success, to re-form the regiment before getting out of the timber. These efforts sadly demonstrated the advantages accruing in battle from good discipline among troops. We had been too little accustomed to implicit obedience of orders, and the tyrannical conduct of Colonel Williams had exerted a bad influence on us in this respect. Under the Colonel's direction, however, a number of men, mostly members of Companies E and F, rallied; these to the flag, their Company's colors, presented to them by the ladies of Fayette county, Iowa, and now borne by the gallant Lakin, one of their number; those to their former captain, Scott, who lingered near the enemy, so loth was he to give up the field. They formed a platoon across the road and drove back the enemy's cavalry which attempted to charge our rear in pursuit.

As soon as we reached the open ground, the battalion was again formed. It was now nearly night. The enemy would not attack us on open ground, and we would not venture to attack him again in his ambuscade. Accordingly we began to retire toward Liberty. We soon met Colonel Smith's advance of mounted men. A brief consultation ensued, and then the march was resumed, and we soon reached our camp on the hill, where we had bivouacked in the morning.