1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more than once).

The third adhyÂya was concerned with the consideration of meditation, together with its means. The SÛtras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in VedÂnta-texts, such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.— Once suffices, the PÛrvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the VedÂnta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is performed once.—This view the SÛtra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating (dhyÂna, upÂsana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs vid, upÂs, dhyÂi are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e. g. 'Let him meditate (upÂsÎta) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on by means of upÂs,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest'—viz. 'the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhyÂsitavya)'—'Then he sees him meditating (dhyÂyamÂna) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8), and others—use the verb dhyÂi to express the meaning of vid. Now dhyÂi means to think of something not in the way of mere representation (smriti), but in the way of continued representation. And upÂs has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyÂi and upÂs, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.

2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter?—The PÛrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). This view the SÛtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul—this is the proper form of meditation.—Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'—But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?—Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;—in that all that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)—all these texts teach that all sentient and non- sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god—I am a man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul constitutes the body of Brahman.—It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)—with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratÎka) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The PÛrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.—This view the SÛtra sets aside. A pratÎka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of Self; for the pratÎka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratÎka only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratÎka we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratÎka—the object of meditation—is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.—But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman may be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.—This objection the next SÛtra disposes of.

5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'

6. And the ideas of Âditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.

'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the UdgÎtha' (Ch. Up. I, 3, 1).—With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of Âditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the UdgÎtha, or vice vers (i. e. whether Âditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the UdgÎtha, or vice versÂ).—The PÛrvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the UdgÎtha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result.—Of this view the SÛtra disposes. The ideas of Âditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i.e. the UdgÎtha and so on, which are constituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established. For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The UdgÎtha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Âditya and so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Âditya and so on.'

7. Sitting; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the VedÂnta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (dhyÂna; upÂsana) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.—There being no special restrictive rule, the PÛrvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.—This view the SÛtra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.

8. And on account of meditation.

Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.

9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things—the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains—may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyÂyati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.

10. And Smriti texts say the same.

Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. GÎ. VI, 11-12).

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one.'

12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death.—The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the SÛtra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death, 'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'

13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the SÛtras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23); 'As the fibres of the IshÎk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).— The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.—It is not possible, the PÛrvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non- clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge—as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'— is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non- clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavÂda passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman.—This view the SÛtra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord—the object of knowledge— and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'

14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.

It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good works—they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pass that bank— neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin' because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.—But even to him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds— such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.—are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?—Of this point the SÛtra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the Devotee).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'

15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun; on account of that being the term.

A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate.—All works alike, the PÛrvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'—declare the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.—This view the SÛtra sets aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the anÂrabdhakÂrya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by—good or evil deeds.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'

16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect only; this being seen.

It might here be said that special works incumbent on the several Âsramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'—This view the SÛtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed, since there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself: 'Him BrÂhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death, the special duties of the Âsrama also, which assist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise.—But if good works such as the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon his good works'?—This point is taken up by the next SÛtra.

17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both kinds.

The text quoted above from one sÂkh ('His friends enter upon his good deeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the only object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those manifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater strength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.—The next SÛtra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.

18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'

The declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that is more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the UdgÎtha has for its result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the result of works actually performed may be obstructed. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the text of the SÂtyÂyanins,' his friends enter upon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they may be transferred to others).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Agnihotra and the rest.'

19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one with Brahman.

There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that is to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman originates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last mentioned, or with another body due to the action of the anÂrabdhakÂrya.— The second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the Self from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2).—This view the SÛtra sets aside. Having destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun to operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several existences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by the PÛrvapakshin means deliverance from those works when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from bodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate—works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity—are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the rise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death, his good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no contradiction.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of the others.'