(a) The Interpretation of Lk. i. 34 f

In the text as it stands, in answer to the angel's words in Lk. i. 30-3, Mary says: “How shall this be, seeing I know not (?? ????s??) a man?” The interpretation of this verse depends upon the force we give to the word ????s??. Schmiedel (EB., col. 2956) thinks that ????s?? in this verse “cannot mean the act of concubitus for which the word is often employed”, because it is here used in the present tense. On the other hand, the quite general sense of knowledge in the way of acquaintanceship, is also, in his view, “equally precluded”, since it would be “quite meaningless in the present context”. Accordingly, he finds the true interpretation to be “the intermediate one; I have no such acquaintanceship with any man as might lead to the fulfilment of this prophecy”. In other words, Mary's objection or difficulty is that she is not even betrothed. Schmiedel is not daunted by the fact that this interpretation is in conflict with Lk. i. 27 (“a virgin betrothed to a man whose name was Joseph”). Indeed, the contradiction is given as one reason for regarding Lk. i. 34 f. as a later insertion. In this respect Schmiedel's view will probably not command much support. He gives no example of ????s?? used in the special sense in which he interprets it, and fails to justify his rejection of the common use of the verb. (See Th-Gr., p. 117; VGT., p. 127.) It is altogether preferable to follow Dr. Plummer (op. cit., p. 24), whose view is indicated in the references which he gives to the OT. passages, Gen. xix. 8; Judg. xi. 39; Num. xxxi. 17. “The words”, says Dr. Plummer, “are the avowal of a maiden conscious of her own purity”. According to this view the phrase “seeing I know not a man” must be interpreted of the marital relationship. Mary's perplexity is that she, an unmarried woman, is promised an immediate conception. It is impossible to accept Schmiedel's view, when he says: “Mary takes the words of the angel as referring to a fulfilment in the way of nature”. This explanation is, of course, consistent on the interpretation which Schmiedel gives to Mary's question, but not on that which we have found [pg 036] reason to prefer. Had Mary understood the angelic message to mean a natural human birth after marriage, there would have been no cause for perplexity. Her words, “How shall this be, seeing I know not a man?”, are clearly a reply to what is understood as the announcement of an immediate conception, and not of a birth within the marriage tie.

If this view is taken of Mary's words, it follows that verse 35 must be explained as the yet clearer announcement of a virgin birth, supernaturally caused. If the verse is treated in itself, it is possible to interpret it of an ordinary human birth, and there is much that is attractive in the interpretation. The words may be said to speak of the Holy Ghost who should come upon Mary to inspire and preserve the purity of her soul in the act of conception. They may speak, that is to say, of God's use of His own appointed agencies. But, to accept this view, it would be necessary to regard the words “seeing I know not a man” as a later insertion, and, though this opinion has been held by some (including Kattenbusch, Weinel, J. M. Thompson), it does not on the whole commend itself as a satisfactory solution of the problem (see further pp. 69 ff.). We are compelled therefore to accept the ordinary interpretation of verse 35, as implying the Miraculous Conception.

(b) The Purport of the Angelic Announcement in Lk. i. 30-3

In treating Mary's question in Lk. i. 34. we have concluded that it reflects the point of view of one who has received the announcement of a miraculous birth. But this conclusion does not compel us to interpret the words of Lk. i. 30-3 as containing such an announcement. We have to examine the passage so as to determine whether as a matter of fact it is susceptible of that interpretation. That its present context requires this view of Lk. i. 30-3 is a fact not lightly to be regarded; nevertheless, it must find justification within the passage itself before it can be accepted.

In the Revised Version, the angelic message reads as follows: “Fear not, Mary: for thou hast found favour with God. (31) And behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus. (32) He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High: and the Lord God shall give [pg 037]unto him the throne of his father David: (33) and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end.”

We have already expressed the view that this prophecy moves strictly within Jewish limits (p. 29). Detailed study of the passage only serves to confirm this opinion. The Sonship mentioned in verse 32 bears a purely Messianic character. Dr. Plummer justly remarks: “The title ???? ????st?? expresses some very close relation between Jesus and Jehovah, but not the Divine Sonship in the Trinity” (op. cit., p. 23). Nothing is either said or implied in this announcement of a miraculous birth. The terms of the promise to Mary would be perfectly fulfilled by an ordinary birth within the marriage tie, so far, that is to say, as the mode of birth is concerned. We must therefore reject the view which speaks of “the strange declaration that she is to bear a son before she is married” (Plummer). We look in vain for this declaration. We agree that Mary's question in verse 34 demands such a declaration in order to make it rational. In fact, we ourselves have argued that verse 34 is “a reply to what is understood as the announcement of an immediate conception”. Nevertheless, even on the most generous interpretation of Lk. i. 30-3, it is impossible to find in the passage any such announcement.35 There is thus a radical difference of point of view between the angelic announcement of Lk. i. 30-3 and Mary's question in Lk. i. 34. This difference of standpoint will be urged as one, though not the only reason for regarding Lk. i. 34 f. as a later insertion. But before we examine these reasons, we need to consider whether after all the angelic announcement may not contain some implication (which does not lie upon the surface of the passage) that a Miraculous Conception is promised.

We find it impossible to rest satisfied in the suggestion of W. C. Allen, that there may have been some unrecorded indication of something unique in the conception (Interpreter, 1905, p. 121 f.). A suggestion of this kind can neither be justified [pg 038] nor gainsaid, and is valuable only as a confirmation of the view that there is nothing “recorded” in Lk. i. 30-3 of a unique conception. To launch upon the waters of what is unrecorded would seem to be a policy of despair. There is much more to be said for an extremely interesting suggestion of Canon Box in his article on the Virgin Birth in Hastings's Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels (see vol. ii, p. 806 a). Box argues that in the angelic announcement of Lk. i. 30-3 “an immediate conception is meant”. Accepting the view that a Hebrew original underlies the nativity-narratives of Lk. i, ii, he thinks that this original has been incorrectly translated in Lk. i. 31, where, in the Greek, we have the future tense s??????, “thou shalt conceive”. “The Hebrew original of s?????? would be a participle”, he says, “and the exact rendering would be, ‘Behold, thou art conceiving now’ ”. There can be no doubt that, if this view can be allowed, the angelic announcement really does speak of a miraculous birth, and thus an adequate explanation is given of Mary's surprise in Lk. i. 34. There are, however, certain objections which, in the judgement of the present writer, appear to be fatal to this theory. We need not press the objection that it rests upon an initial assumption, the existence of the supposed Hebrew original, since this theory of a Hebrew (or Aramaic) documentary source is accepted by most British scholars. Nor is it more than a formal objection if we question if the word s?????? would necessarily be represented in the supposed Hebrew original by a participle. In the Hebrew NT. published by the British and Foreign Bible Society, the adjective ????? is used, and this is the case in similar passages in the Hebrew OT., viz. Gen. xvi. 11, xxxviii. 24; Judg. xiii. 7 (verse 3, perf.); 1 Sam. iv. 19; 2 Sam. xi. 5; Isa. vii. 14. A more serious objection arises from Lk. ii. 21, where it is said that the name Jesus was so called by the angel “before he was conceived in the womb” (p?? t?? s????f???a? a?t?? ?? t? ??????). On the theory we are considering, this must be held to be either a second mistranslation of the Hebrew original, or a departure from it. In either case we must conclude that a promised conception, and not an immediate one, was the considered view of the translator of the Hebrew document. A second and conclusive objection to the theory of Canon Box rests upon [pg 039] questions of grammatical syntax. Is it correct to say that “the exact rendering” of the participle (or adj.) would be, “Behold, thou art conceiving now”? It is true that the active participle is “mainly descriptive of something present” (Davidson, Hebrew Syntax, p. 134), but it is also true, to quote the same authority, that “the participle does not indicate time, its colour in this respect being taken from the connexion in which it stands”. The same consideration also applies to ????? in all the OT. instances referred to above. Where it is made clear in the context that conception has already taken place, ????? is translated in the RV. by the present (cf. Gen. xvi. 11, xxxviii. 24; 2 Sam. xi. 5). Where, however, there is no such indication, it is rendered by the future, and the announcement is treated as a promise (cf. Judg. xiii. 7).

To convict the translator of the Hebrew document of an error in translation, it is clearly necessary to show from the context of Lk. i. 31 that conception has already taken place. In other words, the translation preferred by Canon Box, if it is to be accepted, must be justified by some statement, either previously made, or made within the angelic announcement itself; it must be required, that is to say, by something in the narrative previous to Mary's question in Lk. i. 34.36 But these conditions, which are by no means arbitrary, cannot be met. We must, therefore, conclude that the translator was quite justified, when he used the future (s??????), and so represented the announcement as a prophecy; and we must draw this conclusion, irrespective altogether of the difference of point of view which thus stands revealed between this announcement and verse 34 in the connexion in which it now appears. Indeed, the argument of Canon Box seems capable of being employed in a direction the very reverse of that intended. It could be argued that since, in point of fact, the translator has used the future in verse 31, there was nothing in the Hebrew original to suggest to his mind the idea of an [pg 040] immediate conception; not even the statement of verse 34, which might have suggested, though it does not justify, the rendering, “Behold, thou art conceiving now”. Thus we might enlist the considered view of the translator, that a promised conception is meant, in support of the contention that Lk. i. 34 f. is a later insertion. Without pressing this view, we may fairly say that there is much more to be said for it than for the theory we have discussed. The latter theory, in spite of all that can be urged in its favour, fails to justify itself. In that case its failure seems to illustrate the somewhat desperate expedients to which we must have recourse, in order to find in the angelic announcement the thought of an immediate conception. On the question as a whole, we can only conclude that such a view is neither stated nor implied in the announcement, but that, on the contrary, its reference is to the future.

(c) Reasons for regarding Lk. i. 34 f. as a Later Insertion

Having sought to give their full force and proper meaning to the two passages, Lk. i. 30-3 and Lk. i. 34 f., we may now consider the arguments which can be advanced in favour of regarding the latter passage as an interpolation. In respect of these arguments, there is far from general agreement among those who are at one in the conclusion reached. But the significant fact is not the diversity of opinion as regards the mode of proof, but the agreement of so many scholars in holding the passage to be a later insertion.37 The arguments we shall examine are not equally cogent, and, as in the first part of the present chapter, we shall call attention to their limitations as well as to the points in which they are strong. We shall also treat the case entirely apart from the results suggested in the first half of our inquiry. Those results, if valid, set up a presupposition against Lk. i. 34 f. But it seems much the best not to avail ourselves of such an argument, but rather to consider the passage in itself and in relation to its context. If in this way we find reasonable grounds for considering Lk. i. 34 f. to be [pg 041] a later insertion, we have then a double series of arguments converging on one conclusion.

(1) The first point to be considered is that verse 36 follows naturally after verse 33. As we have seen, in verses 30-3 we have an angelic announcement to Mary to the effect that she is to give birth to a son who is destined to become the Messiah. He will be called “the Son of the Most High”, and to him the Lord God will give “the throne of his father David”. To this message, it may be said, verses 36 and 37 form a fitting sequel. They add the assurance that “no word from God shall be void of power”, in proof of which it is declared that Mary's kinswoman, Elisabeth, is shortly to bear a son in her old age. The whole speech (Lk. i. 30-3, 36, 37) is a consistent passage, and in relation to it the words of Mary in verse 38—“Behold, the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word”—are a natural and fitting reply. Canon Box, in the article already cited, questions this view. “There would be nothing extraordinary”, he says “in Mary's conceiving a son as Joseph's wife”—nothing, that is to say, to require the sign offered. But surely it is not a question of “conceiving a son”, but of conceiving such a son, the long-promised Messiah; and, moreover, the ratification of so great a promise by means of a miracle is a commonplace of OT. thought. It is not suggested, of course, that this argument proves Lk. i. 34 f. to be an interpolation. That a section runs smoothly when a particular passage within it is excised, is no proof that that passage is not original. This last conclusion must be established on the ground of other arguments. If, however, in the present instance, other arguments carry weight, then the fact that verse 36 can be connected easily and naturally with verse 33 becomes of very great importance, and it is for that reason that we introduce it here.

(2) We take a really decisive step when we instance what already has been found, namely that verse 34 follows quite unnaturally upon Lk. i. 30-3. We have seen that Mary's question implies the announcement of an immediate conception, and we have failed to find any such announcement in the angel's words. There is thus a complete difference of point of view in the two passages. No possible ground is provided in the [pg 042] angelic announcement for the objection raised in verse 34. It is difficult, therefore, to deny the suggestion that Mary's question already implies a knowledge of what is told for the first time in verse 35. But this view, if we accept it, is to say that Mary's question could not possibly have been present to the mind of Mary in the connexion in which it stands; it was the last question she would have thought of asking. The question can only have been put into her mouth by one who already knew of the Virgin Birth, and wished to introduce that doctrine into a context in which originally it did not appear. On the interpretation which we have given to Lk. i. 30-3 and Lk. i. 34 f., this conclusion is inevitable, unless we prefer to find in St. Luke an utter inconsecutiveness of thought which does him no credit as writer, and which neither of his works justify us in attributing to him.

(3) We are unable to attach the same force to the contention that verse 35 is followed unnaturally by verses 36 and 37 (so Schmiedel), though this view has something to be said for it. Verse 35 announces the virgin birth of the promised Messiah, a doctrine which is not found in Jewish literature and tradition, and for which, therefore, the mind of Mary must have been utterly unprepared.38 As the section now stands, the statement of verses 36 and 37 is added as a sign that what has just been promised will surely come to pass. This sign, we have already argued, would be quite natural, according to OT. modes of thought, as authenticating such a message as that given in Lk. i. 30-3. But can we say this in reference to the promise of a virgin birth? To the modern mind at least the argument seems faulty and unconvincing. Mary is bidden to accept as the divine promise what is so remarkable as to be otherwise unknown to her, on the ground of what is certainly remarkable but familiar to her mind and outlook. In truth, this seems a remarkable argument with which to credit an angel! At the same time, it has to be admitted that such an objection may be too stringent, and that it may not allow sufficiently for ancient modes of thought, according to which the argument from the less to the greater is by no means uncommon. For [pg 043] this reason the present writer would not feel confident in pressing the argument sketched above.39

(4) A much stronger argument calls attention to the similarity between Mary's question and that of Zacharias (Lk. i. 18), and the difference with which they are treated by the angel. “Mary's speech expresses doubt of the truth of the angel's message, and yet she is not so much as blamed, whilst Zacharias is actually punished for a like doubt (i. 20)”.40 The presumption is that the two cases do not emanate from the same cycle of tradition. The force of this argument depends, of course, upon the way in which we interpret Lk. i. 34. It is true that we have no indication of the tone in which the question is asked, beyond the words themselves and the sentences which follow; but quite sufficient is given to indicate the presence of doubt. The point is not merely one of subjective valuation. This will appear if we consider Plummer's view, which is quite different from Schmiedel's. “She does not ask for proof, as Zacharias did (ver. 18); and only in the form of the words does she ask as to the mode of accomplishment. Her utterance is little more than an involuntary expression of amazement.... It is clear that she does not doubt the fact promised, nor for a moment suppose that her child is to be the child of Joseph” (op. cit., p. 24). In weighing this opinion, it should be noticed that it refers only to the words, ??? ?sta? t??t?? We may readily agree that if all that Mary had said were, “How shall this be?”, we should be unable to contest this view. But to divide Mary's question in this way is not permissible. The second part, “seeing I know not a man”, clearly determines the first, and debars us from viewing it as merely “an involuntary expression of amazement”. The presence of doubt, we think, must be conceded, though it is less marked than in the case of Zacharias.