Reconnaisance of the Fortress.—Skirmish with the Enemy.—Rejoicings of the Garrison at our Supposed Defeat.—Preparation for a Coup de Main.—Engineer Operations.—Storming and Taking of the Fortress.

We debouched on the plain in front of the fort about eight o'clock in the morning, and advanced upon it in three columns—the Cavalry on the right, the Artillery in the centre, and the Infantry on the left. The Commander-in-Chief determined to reconnoitre the place in force, and make the enemy show their strength. On approaching the orchards and walled gardens before described, we found them occupied by the enemy, and the 1st Brigade having been immediately thrown into them, drove the Affghans out of the enclosures in capital style, and forced them to take shelter behind the defences, with a comparatively trifling loss on our side. Our guns were now brought to bear upon the fortress, which had kept up a sharp fire on us from the moment of our appearance, but owing to our having left our heavy battering train behind us at Candahar we did but little or no damage. About eleven o'clock we drew off, and pitched our camp out of range of the fire of the foot. On our skirmishers retiring from the gardens they were immediately occupied by the enemy, who commenced cheering our retreating parties, in the conviction that they had obtained a victory. Under this impression they instantly sent off expresses to Cabul, to announce the fact, and state that if the whole of the surrounding country could be raised, they had little doubt of being able to cut us off to a man. The garrison spent the night in rejoicings, and blue lights were constantly sent up as signals to their friends on the neighbouring hills.

Next morning the Shah's camp was threatened on the left by large bodies of horse and foot who were driven off by the Cavalry and some of his Highness's troops; whilst another force, consisting chiefly of horse, under the command of one of Dost Mahommed's sons; and at a short distance from him a Ghiljie Chief, with about fifteen hundred Cavalry, who had hung upon our flank all the way from Khelat-i-Ghiljie, menaced us to the right. This determined the Commander-in-Chief to expedite matters, and the engineers having made a careful inspection of the fortress, he resolved on carrying it by storm. The whole of the 22nd was consumed in making the necessary preparations, the field hospital being got ready while strong detachments of Cavalry scoured the country around, in order to keep the enemy from our lines.

In order to give my readers a correct idea of the strength of the fortifications, and the difficulties overcome by the intelligence and courage of the officers and men of the British Army, I cannot do better than to copy the official reports made by the principal Engineer officers on the subject. They contain a full detail of the operations up to the moment when the citadel fell into our possession.

Memorandum of the Engineers' operations before Ghuznee, in July, 1839, by Captain George Thompson, Bengal Engineers, Chief Engineer Army of the Indus.

The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave in Candahar the very small battering train then with the Army, there being a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as very weak, and completely commanded from a range of hills to the north.

When we came before it on the morning of the 21st of July we were very much surprised to find a rampart, in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a faussebraye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the "enceinte" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it.

The garrison was variously stated from three to four thousand strong, including five hundred Cavalry, and from subsequent information we found that it had not been overrated.

On the approach of the army, a fire of artillery was opened from the body of the place, and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens. A detachment of Infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery, but the fire from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. A nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which had been cleared. This was not at all satisfactory. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in form, a much larger one would be required than the army ever possessed. The great command of the parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading.

It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole contour of the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. The engineers, with an escort, went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover. The garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers whenever they were obliged to show themselves. However, by keeping the Infantry beyond musket range, and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed, and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place to drive off the reconnoitring party.

The fortifications were found equally strong, all round, the only tangible point observed being the Cabul gateway, which offered the following advantages for a coup-de-main. The road to the Gate was clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the Artillery within three hundred yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the Gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Cabul being expected.

The result of this reconnaisance was a report to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack on Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success was a dash at the Cabul gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder.

His Excellency decided upon the attempt, the camp was moved that evening to the Cabul road, and the next morning, the 22nd, Sir John Keane in person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders for its execution. Preparations were made accordingly, positions for the artillery were carefully examined, which excited the jealousy of the garrison, who opened a smart fire upon the party.

It was arranged that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of Engineers, Captain Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, three Serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers in working dresses, carrying 300?s. of powder in twelve sand bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long, should be ready to move down to the gateway at daybreak.

At midnight the first battery left camp, followed by the other four, at intervals of half an hour. Those to the right of the road were conducted to their positions by Lieutenant Stuart, those to the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground for the guns was prepared by the Sappers and Pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground to the right, and of some old garden walls to the left.

The Artillery was all in position, and ready by 3 A. M. of the 23rd, and shortly after, at the first dawn, the party under Captain Peat moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same regiment, which extended to the right and left of the road; when they arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep down the fire from the ramparts, which became heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been remarkably slack during the previous operations; blue lights were shown, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible, but luckily they were buried on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below.

The explosion party marched steadily on, headed by Lieutenant Durand; the powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover in less than two minutes. The Artillery opened when the blue lights appeared, and the musketry from the covering party at the same time. So quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt.

As soon as the explosion took place, Captain Peat, although hurt by the concussion, his anxiety preventing him from keeping sufficiently under cover, ran up to the gate, accompanied by a small party of her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and ascertained that it was completely destroyed. There was some delay in getting a bugler to sound at the advance, the signal agreed on for the assaulting column to push on, and this was the only mistake in the operation.

The assaulting column, consisting of four European Regiments (her Majesty's 2nd regiment, Bengal European regiment, her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and her Majesty's 17th regiment) commanded by Brigadier Sale, the advance under Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, accompanied by Lieutenant Sturt, Engineers, moved steadily through the gateway, through a passage inside the gateway, in a domed building, in which the opening on one side rendered everything very obscure, and making it difficult to find the outlet into the town. They met with little opposition; but the party of the enemy seeing a peak in the column, owing to the difficulty in scrambling over the rubbish in the gateway, made a rush, sword in hand, and cut down a good many men, wounding the Brigadier and several other officers. These swordsmen were repulsed, and there was no more regular opposition; the surprise and alarm of the Governor and Sirdars being so great when they saw the column occupying the open space inside the gate, and firing upon them, that they fled, accompanied by their men, even the garrison of the Citadel following their example. Parties of the Affghans took refuge in the houses, firing on the column as it made its way through the streets, and a good deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence, by which some loss was sustained. The Citadel was occupied as soon as daylight showed that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and the whole of the works were in our possession before 5 A. M.

We lost seventeen men, six European and eleven Natives killed—eighteen officers, and one hundred and seventeen Europeans, and thirty Natives wounded—total one hundred and eighty-two. Of the Affghans more than five hundred and fourteen were killed in the town, that number of bodies having been buried, and about one thousand outside by the Cavalry, one thousand six hundred prisoners were taken, but I have no means of estimating the number of wounded.

There were nine guns of different calibres found in the place, a large quantity of good powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c., &c., and a large supply of attar and other provisions.

GEO. THOMSON, Capt. Engrs.
Chief Engineer Army of the Indus.

The following report by Captain Peat, of the Bombay Civil Engineers, gives a more detailed account of the operations for blowing up the gate, which, it will be seen, were attended with difficulties of no ordinary nature.

"During the reconnaissance the wall pieces were particularly troublesome. This weapon is almost unknown in our service, but it is a very efficient one, especially in the defence of works, and its use should not be neglected. Every fortified post should be supplied with a proportion of them, and a certain number of men in every regiment practised in firing them.

The charge recommended by Colonel Pasley, for blowing open gates is from sixty to one hundred and twenty pounds, and this is, doubtless, sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this instance we were apprehensive that the enemy might have taken alarm at our being so much on that side of the place, and in consequence, partially or wholly, built up the gateway. It was afterwards found that some attempts of the kind had been made by propping up the gate with beams.

The charge was so heavy, that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the roof of the square building in which it was placed, which proved a very considerable obstacle to the assaulting column, and the concussion acted as far as the tower, under which an officer's party of her Majesty's 13th regiment were standing at the time, but without occasioning any casualties. In cases of this nature it is of course the first object to guard against any chance of failure; and it is impossible, even now, to say how much the charge might have been reduced with safety.

The enemy appeared so much on the alert, and the faussebraye was so much in advance of the gate that we never contemplated being able to effect our object by surprise. The only question was, whether it ought to be done by day or night. It was argued in favor of the former, that the Artillery would be able to make so much more correct practice that the defences would be in a considerable degree destroyed, and the fire so completely kept under as to enable the explosion party to advance with but little loss, and with the advantage of being able to see exactly what they were about. Captain Thompson, however, adhered to the latter, and we were afterwards convinced it was the most judicious plan; for although the fire of the Artillery was necessarily more general than it would have been in daylight, still it was so well directed as to take up a good deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw upon their batteries a portion of the fire, which in daylight would have been thrown down upon the explosion party and assaulting columns. It would also, even in daylight, have been difficult, with our Light Artillery, to have kept down the fire so completely but that a few matchlock men might have kept their position near the gateway; and in that narrow space a smart fire from a few pieces might have obliged the party to retire. The obscurity of the night, to say nothing of the confusion which it must occasion among undisciplined troops, is certainly the best protection to a body of men engaged in an enterprise of this nature. Blue lights certainly render objects distinctly visible, but their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to men firing through loopholes.

The party consisted of eighteen officers, twenty-eight sergeants, seven buglers, and two hundred and seventy-six rank and file.

It was made of this strength, not only to keep up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby divert attention from the party at the gateway, but also because we were not aware whether the faussebraye was occupied or not, and as it extends so much in advance as to take the gate completely in reverse, it would have been necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have carried it by assault before the party with the bags could have advanced. The party with Lieutenant Durand was accompanied by six men of the 13th, without their belts, the better to secure them from observation, to protect them from any sortie that might be made from the postern of the faussebraye on the right, or even from the gate itself, while another party under an officer, Lieutenant Jennings, accompanied me as far as the tower so as to check any attempts that might have been made from the faussebraye on the left, and at the same time keeping up a fire on such of the enemy as showed their heads above the parapet; of this party one man was killed and a few wounded.

Nothing could have been more gallant than the conduct of Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, and the men under their command; or more efficient than the manner in which they executed their duty.

The powder being in sand bags of a very coarse open texture, a long hose and port fire was thought to be the safest method of firing it. The end of the hose fortunately just reached the small postern. The casualties, however, during this operation were much fewer than was expected, being in all one private killed, two sergeants, and twenty-three rank and file wounded.

The heaviest fire was certainly outside the bridge, for the enemy near the gateway being marked, whenever they attempted to shew their heads above the parapet, were obliged to confine themselves to the loop-holes, the range from which is very uncertain and limited against men moving about. A high loop-holed wall, although imposing in appearance, is a profile but ill adapted to resist attacks of this nature.

The enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of our operations. Had they been so they might easily have rendered it impossible to place the powder bags, by throwing over blue lights, of which they had a large quantity in store. The powder pots and other fire works so much used by the natives of Hindoostan would certainly have rendered the confined space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation; but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated upon, the result shows how justly.

Their attempts at resistance were confined to the fire from the loopholes and throwing over large pieces of earth, some of which appeared to be intended to knock off the port fire.

I on this occasion received an excellent lesson on the necessity of not allowing preconceived opinions to lead to any carelessness, in accurately ascertaining the result of any operation of this nature. The gateway appeared, from what I had seen from the hills to the north, to lead straight into the town, and on running in to examine it after the explosion I was so much impressed with this idea and so much convinced of the probability of the gateway having been blocked up during the day, that I was led to believe that it had actually been done, from seeing, in front of the gate that had been destroyed, the outline of an arch filled up with brick masonry. The true entrance turned to the right and would have been discovered by advancing a few paces, and that in perfect safety, for the interior was secure from all fire. Lieutenant Durand on first going up saw from through the chinks of the gate that there was a light and a guard immediately behind it, and from that circumstance was convinced that no interior obstacles of importance existed.

My mistake therefore was luckily immediately corrected without any bad consequence resulting.

A party of sappers with felling axes, and commanded by Lieutenant Wemyss, and two scaling ladders in charge of Lieutenant Pigan, accompanied the assaulting column.

Of ten Engineer Officers engaged in this attack, only one, Lieutenant Marriot, was slightly wounded. Captain Thompson however had a very narrow escape, having been thrown down by a rush of some swordsmen into the gateway, and nearly sabred while upon the ground."