Prudence and prosperity subsist, with reference to each other, as follows: Prudence indeed is effable and possesses reason; for it is something orderly and definite. But prosperity is ineffable and irrational; for it is something disorderly and indefinite. And prudence, indeed, is prior, but prosperity is posterior in beginning and in power. For the former is naturally adapted to govern and define; but the latter to be governed and defined. Moreover, both prudence and prosperity receive co-adaptation, since they concur in one and the same thing. For it is always necessary that the thing which bounds and co-arranges, should have a nature which is effable and participates of reason; but that the thing which is bounded and co-arranged, should be naturally ineffable and irrational. For the reason of the nature of the infinite and of that which bounds, thus subsists in all things. For infinites are always naturally disposed to be bounded and co-arranged by things which possess reason and prudence, since the former have the order of matter and essence with relation to the latter. But finites are co-arranged and bounded from themselves, since they have the order of cause, and of that which is energetic.

The co-adaptation, however, of these natures in different things, produces a great and various difference of co-adapted substances. For in the comprehension of the whole of things, the co-adaptation of both the natures, i.e. of the nature which is always moved, and of that which is always passive, is the world. For it is not possible for the whole and the universe to be otherwise saved, than by that which is generated being co-adapted to that which is divine, and that which is always passive to that which is always moved.[71] In man, likewise, the co-adaptation of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, is virtue. For it is not possible in these, when there is sedition in both the parts, that virtue should have a subsistence. In a city also, the co-adaptation of the governors to the governed, produces strength and concord. For to govern is the peculiarity of the better nature; but to be governed, is easier to the subordinate [than to the more excellent] nature. And strength and concord are common to both. There is, however, the same mode of adaptation in the universe and in a family: for allurements[72] and erudition concur with reason in one and the same thing; and likewise pains and pleasures, prosperity and adversity. For the life of man requires intension and remission, sorrow and gladness, prosperity and adversity. For some things are able to collect and retain the intellect to industry and wisdom; but others impart relaxation and delight, and thus render the intellect vigorous and prompt to action. If however one of these prevails in life, then the life of man becomes of one part, and verges to one part, tending either to sorrow and difficulty, or to remission and levity. But the co-adaptation of all these ought to subsist with reference to prudence. For this separates and distinguishes[73] bound and infinity in actions. Hence prudence is the leader and mother of the other virtues. For all of them are co-harmonized and co-arranged with reference to the reason and law of this virtue. And now my discussion of this subject is terminated. For the irrational and the effable are in all things. And the latter defines and bounds; but the former is defined and bounded. That, however, which consists of both these, is the apt composition of the whole and the universe.

The following beautiful fragment of Crito on Prudence, is from the Physical Eclogues of StobÆus, p. 198, and is omitted by Gale in his Collection of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments in Opusc. Mythol. &c.

God fashioned man in such a way as to render it manifest, that he is not through the want of power, or of deliberate choice, incapable of being impelled to what is beautiful in conduct. For he implanted in him a principle of such a kind as to comprehend at one and the same time the possible and the pre-eligible; so that man might be the cause of power, and the possession of good, but God of impulse and incitation according to right reason. On this account also, he made him tend to heaven, gave him an intellective power, and implanted in him a sight called intellect, which is capable of beholding God. For it is not possible without God to discover that which is best and most beautiful, nor without intellect to see God, since every mortal nature is established in conjunction with a kindred privation of intellect. This however is not imparted to it by God, but by the essence of generation, and by that impulse of the soul which is without deliberate choice.