Within the necessarily narrow limits of this survey there has been traced the history of aviation from the earliest days; the tremendous impetus given to it by the war has been described, during the course of which not only did air co-operation become essential to the Navy and Army, but the importance of the Air Force as a separate arm, with its own strategic action, steadily grew; the increasing preponderance which aerial warfare will have in the future, and the horrors which it may bring, have been touched upon; and the possibilities of civil aviation in peace and war have been outlined.

The conclusion has been reached that we cannot dispense with aviation, even if we would. We must consider it as a whole and lay down the broad principles on which it should be developed. The air (I write as one who during the last months of the war held the post of Chief of the Air Staff) materially helped, if it did not actually win, the fight. It has greatly complicated and increased the problems of defence. In future its influence on these problems will be still greater. The air has no boundaries. Great Britain and the Empire are no longer protected by the seas. A correct assessment of their needs will entail a growing ratio of air force to Army and Navy, and air power will in itself depend on the development of civil aviation.

But though air action may be expected with justice to grow in proportion to that of the Army and Navy, and will certainly absorb certain functions of both, it would be unwise, at this early stage of development, for air forces to attempt too much at a time—such as, for instance, to garrison geographically unsuitable countries.

A certain amount of reliance could also be placed on civil machines temporarily borrowed for purely policing measures in uncivilized countries, or for the assistance of Government during civil disturbances; and for such purposes it should not be difficult to devise a scheme, especially when the State exercises a measure of control through the grant of subsidies, for the obligatory enrolment of civil commercial pilots in the reserve, and for periodical refresher courses for pilots, who are not actually in the service of companies, at civil aerodromes. Such systems are in force in France and Canada. In the event of war the independent striking air force could thus count upon a large proportion of civil reserve pilots and machines.

Air, allied to chemistry and the submarine, will be a difficult combination to withstand. The more its potential terrors are grasped, the less likely is war to be loosed upon the world, and it cannot be realized too clearly how much more easily than any other instrument of warfare aircraft and gas can be cheaply and secretly prepared by a would-be belligerent. Meanwhile, if civil aviation can be built up as a productive organization to a position relative to that held by our mercantile marine, we must understand that it will ensure air supremacy better than a large unproductive outlay on armaments. And I am convinced that, with public support, this can, and will, be done. Others will do it if we do not. But air power, although drawing its vitality from the expansion of air commerce and the growth of the civil aircraft industry, must at the same time rely upon the nucleus of a highly trained and technical air force. Service aviation must be the spearhead, civil aviation the shaft, of our air effort.

The present isolation of England in terms of air from the rest of the Empire, and the geographical conditions already described, certainly render the national expansion of aviation, both external and internal, a difficult problem. It is clear that for this reason it must rather develop on an Imperial basis. The Dominions have already started valuable civil air work and have appointed Air Boards. Whatever the political settlement of Egypt may be, it is important that our air interests at this "hub" of Imperial aviation should be safeguarded. Air communication between the various portions of the Empire may prove of inestimable value in a future world war, and Dominion air forces may be able quickly to concentrate against enemy territory which is out of the range of aircraft operating from home. We have seen the value of aircraft operating from land bases for naval patrol, anti-submarine action, and direct attack on enemy shipping. With the increasing radius of action of seaplanes and other naval aircraft, the Army and Navy may be relieved of certain of their duties in coast defence and in protecting Imperial trade routes. For these reasons, aircraft bases are required throughout the Empire, and it is the commercial development of aviation which is the best means of ensuring their establishment. It will be for the Imperial authorities, while attending to local conditions and requirements, to co-ordinate as far as possible the air effort of the Empire, so that in peace communications may be developed and in the event of war its full power may rapidly be utilized on a co-operative basis.

Civil aviation is not, however, merely a method of amplifying service air power. It has a vast potential value of its own. Communications shape human destinies. The evolution of our civilization bears strongly the marks of the systems which at various stages have made the intercourse of men and ideas possible. Its history is one of endeavour to extend the limits imposed upon human living and mobility in each of the great phases through which it has passed.

There was the phase of the coracle and the roller-wheeled vehicle, stretching back into the roadless mists of unrecorded time; of roads which gradually linked the important areas of the Roman Empire; of inland and coastal waterways; of ocean traffic, and its huge advance with the discovery of steam-power, which brought England to the fore.

With each phase the world shrinks smaller and the mists of the unknown recede. The development of human mobility is the greatest marvel of the present age. We can hardly realize that it was only the other day, as these things go—in 1819, just a hundred years before the same feat was accomplished by air-that the first sailing ship fitted with auxiliary steam (and not until 1828 that a real steamship) crossed the Atlantic.

Strain and competition are increasing. Trains vie with ships; motor transport with trains. Telephones, wireless, cables, and flying are speeding up communications to a degree undreamed of a few years ago. If the air is to be a prime factor in the world-phase to come, how will the British Empire be affected? Stretching from Great Britain to Australia and the Pacific Ocean, the Empire depends more than any other political and commercial organization on the most modern and speedy communications, and as each of its portions assumes greater responsibility there is greater need for co-operation, the distribution of information, and the personal contact of statesmen and business men. "The old order changeth, yielding place to new"; and in communications the new order is air transport.

Equally important is the international aspect. To-day we are deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace, and this can be achieved, not so much by the action of Governments, or the efforts of the League of Nations, as by the personal association of individuals of one nation with those of another, and an increasing recognition of common interests. I conceive that civil aviation, by reducing the time factor of intercommunication, will tend to bring peoples into closer touch with each other and will make for mutual understanding. The Peace Treaty provided for an Air Convention for the international control of civil aviation. The Convention has been signed by all the Allied nations which took part in the war, and I hope other countries will shortly be included. As soon as the Convention has been ratified, the International Commission of Air Navigation will be established, and for the first time the world will see the international control of a great transport service. I believe this will prove an important practical step towards international co-operation and goodwill.

We have no excuse for ignorance of the effects of Imperial and international co-operation. The war gave us an example of what the British Empire can do, provided its combined knowledge and effort is brought to bear for one great purpose; and in no respect was this better exemplified than in the utilization and scientific development of aviation. The world-position of the Empire as a whole is still the best. Commerce and communications are its bonds, and, if we are so determined, it is in our power to shape the destinies of the future.

A definite advance has been made since the Armistice and, if all goes well, a very much greater one will be made during the next two or three years, and in ten years mercantile air services will be operating on a self-supporting basis. The science and concentration employed in the war must be made to serve the requirements of peace. Readiness for, and success in, war are vital when war is unavoidable, but in peace it is civil and commercial activity which is vital.

As in its infancy it seemed incredible to those responsible for the direction of the older services that the air would be their most valuable partner; as, during the war, they grudged its logical development to strike widely where they could not reach, and tried to tether it closely to them, so now in peace the air is struggling to attain the apotheosis of communication.

In the phase of world commerce of which we are on the threshold, science, brain-power, energy, and faith must, and increasingly will, be harnessed to the work of perfecting air communication so that human mobility can be increased, knowledge interchanged, and the fruits of production distributed throughout the world.

As a soldier I have of course dwelt on the possibility of war in the future and of the part which aviation would play in it, but it would be a great mistake—though I think that mistake is constantly made—to suppose that soldiers look forward with equanimity to the prospect of war. On the contrary, soldiers, more even than civilians, if this be possible, realize the horrors of war and recognize that the great task rests upon the statesmen of all nations, and upon humanity itself, of taking whatever steps can be taken to prevent its recurrence.

We may at least assume that another great war will not be allowed in our generation. But war, in spite of its horrors, in spite of its bereavements, is only too quickly forgotten. A comparatively few years, and those who have passed through its fire are no more. New wealth is created; new antagonisms arise; and a new generation remembers only the romantic stories and the martial deeds of its fathers, or, more fatally, organizes itself to avenge defeat. Then, once again, forgetful of the terrible lesson we have learned, the great nations of the world may unsheathe the sword as the only solution to their problems. Our only hope lies in using the ensuing years to educate mankind to the principle that war brings misery and impoverishment to all engaged in it, that in the final victory it is not a question of which is left the strongest, but which is the least exhausted, and that national are as susceptible as personal differences to discussion and arbitration. Above all, let us guard against the old mistake of competitive armaments. There is no reason, for instance, why, because France, our friend and ally, is adopting a policy of air armaments, we should blindly pile up aeroplane against aeroplane, pilot against pilot, and thus provoke mutual suspicion.

The possibility of war remains, however, and I wish in conclusion to emphasize the fact that in my belief the security of this country in the event of war will depend upon our strength in the air. The development of the offensive powers of aviation have already destroyed "the silver streak" on which we relied in the past. When we remember that it is less than twenty years since the first successful aeroplane was flown, when we recall the almost miraculous development of the fighting powers of aircraft during the four and a half years of war, and also the further developments which were on the point of being utilized when the war ended, it seems certain that from the point of view of war Britain has ceased to be an island. The "silver streak" would have been little protection but for our naval supremacy, and in the future our security will depend as much upon superiority in the air as it has depended in the past upon our superiority at sea. And this superiority in the air can only be attained in the same way in which we secured our supremacy at sea. That supremacy was not really gained by developing great navies. It was gained by our mercantile marine, which made the great navies possible. Our future security can only be gained by the development of commercial aviation.