Speech in the Senate on the Proposed Annexion of San Domingo to the United States, December 21, 1870.

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SPEECH.

Mr. Sumner. Yes, Sir.

Mr. Sumner. I said that they became one in 1822, and that they continued one till 1844. To what extent arms played a part I have not said. Suffice it to say that Dominica constituted part of the Government of Hayti, which was administered under the name of Hayti. In 1838, while the two constituted one Government, a treaty was made with France, which I have before me, by which the Haytian Government agreed to pay, in certain annual instalments, the sum of sixty million francs. Since the separation of the two, Hayti has proceeded with those payments, and I think the Senator over the way will not deny that there is at least ground of claim on the part of Hayti against Dominica for contribution to those payments.

Mr. Sumner. Nothing is said in the treaty before me of the consideration for these payments.

Mr. Sumner. History shows, however, that the two Governments were one at this time, and I have to submit that there is at least a question whether Dominica is not liable to Hayti on that account. All will see the question, while Hayti insists upon the liability of Dominica. I mention this that you may see the relation between the two Governments.

But this is not all. Besides the treaty with France, there is another between Hayti and Dominica. I have no copy of it. The resolution which I introduced the other day calls for it. I became acquainted with it through the protest which I hold in my hand, made by the Government of Hayti to Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State, and dated at Washington the 5th of February, 1868, against the sale and purchase of the Bay of Samana. In the course of this protest I find the following allegation:—

Now the point which I present to the Senate, and seek to impress, is, that Hayti, having these claims on Dominica, is interdicted from their pursuit by an American commodore.

But perhaps I may be told—I see my friend, the Senator from Indiana, is taking notes—that the American commodore was justified under the Law of Nations. I meet him on that point. How could he be justified? How could the Law of Nations sanction such a wrong? The only ground would be, that during the pendency of the negotiation, or while the treaty was under consideration, the Government of the United States would protect the territory to be transferred. I have seen that impossible pretension put forth in newspapers. I call it “impossible.” It is unfounded in the Law of Nations. Our ships, during the negotiation of the treaty and during its consideration in the Senate, had no more right or power in those waters than before the negotiation. Only when the treaty was consummated by the act of the Senate giving to it advice and consent, could we exercise any semblance of jurisdiction there. Every effort at jurisdiction until that time was usurpation. I read now from Wheaton’s authoritative work on International Law, page 337,[263] being part of the section entitled, “The treaty-making power dependent on the municipal constitution”:—

The Chief Magistrate can pledge the national faith only according to the Constitution.

Now I turn to another place in this same authoritative work, being page 718,[264] and read as follows:—

Then follows an emphatic note from the very able commentator, Mr. Dana:—

The treaty, therefore, had no effect until ratified by the Senate; and I repeat, every attempt at jurisdiction in those waters was a usurpation and an act of violence; I think I should not go too far, if I said it was an act of war. If a commodore leaves his quarter-deck, pulls ashore, and, with his guns commanding a town, threatens to blow it down, is not this an act of war?

In Great Britain the exclusive prerogative of making treaties is in the Crown, and so in most other countries it is in the Executive; but I need not remind you that in our country it is otherwise. The exclusive prerogative here is not in the Executive; it is in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and until that advice and consent have been given he can exercise no power under that treaty. Those waters were as sacred as the waters about France or about England. He might as well have penetrated the ports of either of those countries and launched his menace there as have penetrated the waters of this weak power and launched his menace.

I have called it an act of war,—war, Sir, made by the Executive without the consent of Congress. If Congress had declared war against this feeble republic, then it would have been the part of the Executive to carry that declaration into effect; but until then what right had our Executive to do this thing? None which can be vindicated by the laws of our country, none except what is found in the law of force.

This outrage by our Navy upon a sister republic is aggravated by the issue which the President of the United States in his Annual Message has directly made with the President of Hayti. Of course, Sir, the President of the United States, when he prepared his Message, was familiar with a document like that which I now hold in my hands, entitled “The Monitor, Official Journal of the Republic of Hayti,” under date of Saturday, the 24th of September, 1870, containing the message of the President of Hayti addressed to the National Assembly. This message is divided into sections or chapters, with headings, not unlike a message or document in our own country. And now, Sir, listen to what the President of Hayti in this annual message says of the project of annexion, and then in one moment listen to the issue which the President of the United States has joined with this President: I translate it literally:—

Of course the President of the United States was intimate with this document. He could not have undertaken to hurl his bolt against this feeble republic without knowing at least what its President had said. I will not do him the wrong to suppose him ignorant. His Secretary of State must have informed him. He must have known the precise words that President Saget had employed, when he said that the anxieties caused by this annexion were dissipated before the good sense and wisdom of the Senate at Washington. Our President joins issue with President Saget; he says that the rejection of the treaty was a “folly.” There you have it. The President of the Black Republic calls the rejection an act of “good sense” and “wisdom”; the President of the United States calls it an act of “folly.” Am I wrong? Let me read from the Message of our President:—

So the two stand, President Saget and President Grant,—President Grant speaking with the voice of forty millions, and this other President, who has less than six hundred thousand people, all black.

If the President of the United States had contented himself with thus joining issue with the President of Hayti, I should have left the two face to face; but, not content with making this issue, the President of the United States proceeds to menace the independence of Hayti. Sir, the case is serious. Acting in the spirit of his commodore, he nine times over makes this menace. I have the Message here, and now I substantiate what I say. The part relating to this subject begins,—

Here he speaks of the rejection of the treaty for the annexion of Dominica, calling it “the Republic of San Domingo.” This is distinctive. Then he proceeds to demand the annexion of the whole island. I read as follows:—

I say nothing of the latter part of the proposition; I leave that to the judgment of the Senate; but here you have a proposition for the whole island of San Domingo. The Senate have rejected a treaty for the annexion of the Republic of San Domingo.

Mr. Sumner. The Senator will not interrupt me now. I shall finish this statement presently, and then he may interrupt me.—Having thus laid down his basis proposing the annexion of the whole island, which is called by the geographers sometimes Hayti and sometimes San Domingo, the President then proceeds to his second menace:—

He has already described it as “the island of San Domingo,” and it is desirable because of its geographical position,—an argument as applicable to Hayti as to Dominica.

Then he proceeds to the third:—

Mark the words, “not now upon the island.” It is the island always in view.

Then comes the fourth:—

It is the whole island.

Then the fifth:—

Though nothing in this place is said of the whole island, of course those words are necessarily associated with the previous words, while the argument from the Monroe Doctrine is just as applicable to Hayti as to Dominica.

Then the sixth:—

Referring back, of course, to what he has already said.

Then he proposes,—

Here is the proposition undisguised.

And he winds up with the ninth:—

Thus nine times——

Mr. Sumner. Not quite yet. The Senator will take notice when I have done with this point, and then he shall have the floor.—Nine times in this Message has the President, after joining issue first with the President of Hayti,—nine times has he menaced the independence of the Haytian Republic. Some remarkable propositions at times are received with nine cheers. Here is a menace nine times over; and throughout the whole of that San Domingo column, written with so much intensity, we are called to consider commercial, financial, material advantages, and not one word is lisped of justice or humanity, not one word of what we owe to the neighboring Republic of Hayti, nine times menaced.

Mr. Sumner. I know what my friend from Indiana is about to say,—that all this is accidental. This is hard to believe. Nine accidents in one column! Nine accidents of menace against a sister republic! There is a maxim of law, which I was taught early and have not entirely forgotten, that we are bound to presume that every document is executed solemnly and in conformity with rule. Sir, we are bound to believe that the President’s Message was carefully considered. There can be no accident in a President’s Message. A President’s Message is not a stump speech. It is not a Senate speech. It is a document, every line of which must have been carefully considered, not only by the President himself, but by every member of his Cabinet.

There are Senators here who have been familiar with Messages in other years, and know how they are prepared. I have one in my mind which within my knowledge occupied the consideration of the Cabinet three full days,—I think four, if not five,—every single sentence being carefully considered, read by itself, revised, sounded with the hammer, if I may so express myself, like the wheels of a railroad car, to see that it had the true ring. Of course the Message of a President of the United States must go through such an examination. I will not follow the Senator from Indiana in doing the injustice to the President of supposing that his Message was ill-considered, that it was not carefully read over with his Cabinet, that every sentence was not debated, and that these words were not all finally adopted as expressing the sentiments of the President. At any rate, there they stand in the Message. Now any word in a Message, as in a Queen’s Speech, even loosely or inconsiderately proposing anything adverse to the independence of a country, is in the nature of a menace. My language is not too strong. In such a case a word is a blow.

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History is often said to repeat itself. More or less it does. It repeats itself now. This whole measure of annexion, and the spirit with which it is pressed, find a parallel in the Kansas and Nebraska Bill, and in the Lecompton Constitution, by which it was sought to subjugate a distant Territory to Slavery. The Senator from Indiana was not here during those days, although he was acting well his part at home; but he will remember the pressure to which we were then exposed. And now we witness the same things: violence in a distant island, as there was violence in Kansas; also the same Presidential appliances; and shall I add, the same menace of personal assault filling the air? All this naturally flowers in the Presidential proposition that the annexion shall be by joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress; so that we have violence to Dominica, violence to Hayti, violence to Public Law, including violence to the Constitution of Dominica, and also to a Treaty between Dominica and Hayti, crowned by violence to the Constitution of the United States.

In other days, to carry his project, a President tried to change a committee. It was James Buchanan.[265] And now we have been called this session to witness a similar endeavor by our President. He was not satisfied with the Committee on Foreign Relations as constituted for years. He wished a change. He asked first for the removal of the Chairman. Somebody told him that this would not be convenient. He then asked for the removal of the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Schurz]; and he was told that this could not be done without affecting the German vote. He then called for the removal of my friend the Senator from New Hampshire, [Mr. Patterson,] who unhappily had no German votes behind him. It was finally settled that this could not be done.

I allude to these things reluctantly, and only as part of the case. They illustrate the spirit we are called to encounter. They illustrate the extent to which the President has fallen into the line of bad examples.

Sir, I appeal to you, as Vice-President. By official position and by well-known relations of friendship you enjoy opportunities which I entreat you to use for the good of your country, and, may I add, for the benefit of that party which has so justly honored you. Go to the President, I ask you, and address him frankly with the voice of a friend to whom he must hearken. Counsel him to shun all approach to the example of Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Andrew Johnson; tell him not to allow the oppression of a weak and humble people; ask him not to exercise War Powers without authority of Congress; and remind him, kindly, but firmly, that there is a grandeur in Justice and Peace beyond anything in material aggrandizement, beyond anything in war.

Again I return to the pending resolution, which I oppose as a new stage in the long-drawn machination. Am I wrong in holding up this negotiation, which has in it so much of violence,—violence toward Dominica, violence toward Hayti? Of course the proposed treaty assumes and adopts the civil war pending in the territory annexed. This is the terrible incumbrance. No prudent man buys a lawsuit; but we are called to buy a bloody lawsuit. I read now the recent testimony of Mr. Hatch, who, while in favor of annexion, writes as follows, under date of South Norwalk, Connecticut, December 12, 1870:—

Be taught by the experience of Spain, when in 1861 this power, on the invitation of a predecessor of Baez, undertook to play the part we are asked to play. Forts were built and troops were landed. By a document which I now hold in my hand it appears, that, when at last this power withdrew, she had expended forty millions of hard Spanish dollars and “sacrificed sixteen thousand of the flower of her army.” From another source I learn that ten thousand Spanish soldiers were buried there. Are we ready to enter upon this bloody dance? Are we ready to take up this bloody lawsuit?

Vain to set forth, as the Message does, all manner of advantages, “commercially and materially.” What are these, if Right and Humanity are sacrificed? What are these without that priceless blessing, Peace? I am not insensible to the commercial and material prosperity of my country. But there is something above these. It is the honor and good name of the Republic, now darkened by an act of wrong. If this territory, so much coveted by the President, were infinitely more valuable than it is, I hope the Senate would not be tempted to obtain it by trampling on the weak and humble. Admit all that the advocates of the present scheme assert with regard to the resources of this territory, and then imagine its lofty mountains bursting with the precious metals, its streams flowing with amber over silver sands, where every field is a Garden of the Hesperides, blooming with vegetable gold, and all this is not worth the price we are called to pay.

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There is one other consideration, vast in importance and conclusive in character, to which I allude only. The island of San Domingo, situated in tropical waters, and occupied by another race, of another color, never can become a permanent possession of the United States. You may seize it by force of arms or by diplomacy, where a naval squadron does more than the minister; but the enforced jurisdiction cannot endure. Already by a higher statute is that island set apart to the colored race. It is theirs by right of possession, by their sweat and blood mingling with the soil, by tropical position, by its burning sun, and by unalterable laws of climate. Such is the ordinance of Nature, which I am not the first to recognize. San Domingo is the earliest of that independent group destined to occupy the Caribbean Sea, toward which our duty is plain as the Ten Commandments. Kindness, beneficence, assistance, aid, help, protection, all that is implied in good neighborhood,—these we must give, freely, bountifully; but their independence is as precious to them as is ours to us, and it is placed under the safeguard of natural laws which we cannot violate with impunity.

Long ago it was evident that the Great Republic might fitly extend the shelter of its protection to the governments formed in these tropical islands, dealing with them graciously, generously, and in a Christian spirit,—helping them in their weakness, encouraging them in their trials, and being to them always a friend; but we take counsel of our supposed interests rather than theirs, when we seek to remove them from the sphere in which they have been placed by Providence.

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I conclude as I began. I protest against this legislation as another stage in a drama of blood. I protest against it in the name of Justice outraged by violence, in the name of Humanity insulted, in the name of the weak trodden down, in the name of Peace imperilled, and in the name of the African race, whose first effort at Independence is rudely assailed.

Mr. President,—So far as the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Chandler] arraigns me as a member of the Republican party I have no reply. He knows that I am as good a Republican as himself; he knows that I have had as much to do with the making and support of the party as himself; and when Charles Sumner finds the Senators over the way ranging under his banner, as the Senator predicts, this country will be regenerated,—for the Democratic party will be Republican.

But I do reply to the questions of fact. And now, Sir, I am obliged to make a statement—the Senator compels me—which I had hoped not to make. The President of the United States did me the honor to call at my house,—it was nearly a year ago, during the recess. Shortly after coming into the room he alluded to certain new treaties already negotiated, with regard to which I had no information. Sir, you must expect me to speak frankly. The President addressed me four times as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,—adding, that the treaties would come before the Judiciary Committee, and on this account he wished to speak with me.

He proceeded with an explanation, which I very soon interrupted, saying: “By the way, Mr. President, it is very hard to turn out Governor Ashley; I have just received a letter from the Governor, and I hope I shall not take too great a liberty, Mr. President, if I read it. I find it excellent and eloquent, and written with a feeling which interests me much.” I commenced the letter and read two pages or more, when I thought the President was uneasy, and I felt that perhaps I was taking too great a liberty with him in my own house; but I was irresistibly impelled by loyalty to an absent friend, while I was glad of this opportunity of diverting attention from the treaties. As conversation about Governor Ashley subsided the President returned to the treaties, leaving on my mind no very strong idea of what they proposed, and absolutely nothing with regard to the character of the negotiation. My reply was precise. The language is fixed absolutely in my memory. “Mr. President,” I said, “I am an Administration man, and whatever you do will always find in me the most careful and candid consideration.” Those were my words.

I have heard it said that I assured the President that I would support his Administration in this measure. Never! He may have formed this opinion, but never did I say anything to justify it; nor did I suppose he could have failed to appreciate the reserve with which I spoke. My language, I repeat, was precise, well-considered, and chosen in advance: “I am an Administration man, and whatever you do will always find in me the most careful and candid consideration.” In this statement I am positive. It was early fixed in my mind, and I know that I am right.

And, Sir, did I not give to the treaties the most careful and candid consideration? They were referred to the committee with which I am connected. I appeal to my colleagues on that committee if I did not do all that I promised. When I first laid them before the committee, it was very evident that there was a large majority against them. Indeed, there was only one member of the committee who said anything in their favor. I then stated that I hoped our conversation would be regarded as informal, and that there would be no immediate vote, or any course which could be interpreted otherwise than friendly to the Administration. Too prompt action might be misconstrued.

My desire was to proceed with utmost delicacy. I did not know then, what I have learned since, how the President had set his heart upon the project of annexion. With my experience of treaties, familiar as I have been with them in the Senate, I supposed that I was pursuing the course most agreeable to him, and, should the report be adverse, most respectful and considerate. This I state, Sir, on my conscience, as my solemn judgment at the time, and my motive of conduct. I wished to be careful and candid. It was easy to see from the beginning that annexion had small chance in the committee, whatever might be its fate in the Senate; but I was determined to say and do nothing by which the result should in any way be aggravated. Again I appeal to every one of my colleagues on that committee for their testimony in this behalf. I know that I am above criticism. I know that I have pursued a patriotic course, always just and considerate to the President; and I tell the Senator from Michigan, who has served with me so long in this Chamber, that he does me great injustice. Some time or other he will see it so. He may not see it now; but he ought to rise in his place and at once correct the wrong.

Perhaps I need not say more, and yet there has been so much criticism upon me to-night that I proceed a little further. Here was my friend at my right, [Mr. Nye,] who, having shot his shaft, has left. I wish that he had praised me less and been more candid. His praise was generous, but his candor certainly less marked than his praise. I might take up every point of his speech and show you the wrong that he did me. He is not in his seat. I wish he were. [Mr. Nye entered the Chamber from one of the cloak-rooms.] Oh, there he comes. He said that I was against inquiry. No such thing. I am for inquiry. I wish all the documents now on the files of the State Department and of the Navy Department spread before Congress and before the country. To this end I have introduced a resolution which is now on your table; I wish this information before any other step is taken in this business. Instead of being against inquiry, I am for it, and in that way which will be most effective. But the resolution which I introduced, asking for the most important testimony, all documentary in character, is left on the table, while a different proposition, legislative in character and in no respect a resolution of inquiry, but an act creating three new officers under the Constitution, is pressed on the Senate, and, as I demonstrated to-day, for the obvious purpose of associating Congress with this scheme of annexion. The whole question of annexion was opened, and I felt it my duty to show at what cost to the good name of this Republic the scheme has been pursued down to this day. I entered upon this exposure with a reluctance which I cannot express; but it was with me a duty.

My friend at my right [Mr. Nye] says—I took down his words, I think—that I saw nothing in the President’s Message except what he said about San Domingo. I was speaking of San Domingo, and not of the other topics; nor was I speaking of the President. There again my friend did me injustice. I was speaking of annexion; and it is my habit, I think you will do me the justice to say, Mr. President, to speak directly to the questions on which I undertake to address the Senate. At any rate, I try to confine myself to the point; and the point to-day was annexion, and nothing else. I was not called to go to the right or to the left, to enter upon all the various topics of the Message, whether for praise or censure. The Message was not under discussion, except in one single point. Nor was I considering the merits of the Administration, or the merits, whether civil or military, of the President, but the annexion of San Domingo, on which I felt it my duty to express myself with the freedom which belongs to a Senator of the United States.

The Senator here [Mr. Nye] says, and the Senator over the way, [Mr. Morton,] I think, said the same thing, that I have assailed the President. I have done no such thing. I alluded to the President as little as possible, and never except in strict subordination to the main question. On this question of annexion I feel strongly,—not as the Senator [Mr. Nye] has most uncandidly suggested, from any pride of opinion, or because I have already expressed myself one way and the President another, but because for long years I have felt strongly always when human rights were assailed. I cannot see the humble crushed without my best endeavor against the wrong. Long ago I read those proud words by which Rome in her glory was described as making it her business to spare the humble, but to war down the proud.[266] I felt that we had before us a case where the rule was reversed, and in an unhappy hour our Government was warring down the humble. So it seemed to me on the evidence.

Do I err? Then set the facts before the people, that they may judge; but, as I understand those facts, whether from official documents or from the testimony of officers or citizens who have been in that island latterly, Baez has been maintained in power by the arms of the United States. So I understand it. Correct me, if I am wrong; but if the facts be as I believe, you must leave me to my judgment upon them.

Both my honorable friends, the Senator on my right [Mr. Nye] and the Senator over the way [Mr. Morton], have said that I sought to present an unfavorable comparison between the President of Hayti and the President of the United States; and the Senator over the way went into an elaborate arraignment of the Haytian President. Sir, I had no word of praise for that President. The Senator is mistaken. From his Message, which I now hold in my hand, I read his congratulation that the project of annexion had been defeated by “the good sense and the wisdom” of the Senate at Washington; and I then read from the Message of the President of the United States what I supposed was the issue he intended to join with the Haytian President, characterizing this very rejection of annexion on the part of the Senate as “folly”; and I put the two Messages on that point face to face, and there I left them. I said nothing to praise Saget or to arraign Grant. Sir, I have no disposition to do either. I only wish to do my duty simply and humbly, pained and sorry that I am called to differ from so many valued friends, but then still feeling that for me there is no other course to pursue.

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