The “crash” diagram is, after all, the most definite and conclusive record of the success or failure of any system of flying instruction. Its facts are incontrovertible.

During the earlier period of the history of the Corps in Canada, there was, of course, in use a constantly broadening system whereby the details of all aerial accidents were instantly forwarded to headquarters. It was not, however, until the Armour Heights method had been in definite operation for some months that it became possible to re-analyse the then existing procedure in the light of new knowledge, and evolve a form of records which completely reflected all the various instrumentalities which required diagnosis.

This statement carries no reflection on either the instructors or the methods of instruction pertaining to the first year’s operation of the unit. As in all its other activities, out of experience came knowledge, the application of which was instantly undertaken. We find, then, that during the summer of 1918 not only were the salient features of the crash carefully investigated, but also all those possibly contributory causes in some one of which will almost certainly be found some vitally important feature.

The first procedure was to classify the crash. The method adopted will be seen in the index of the graph on page 229. Prior, however, to this classification, which of course is only established by means of close technical examination of the damaged machine, the unit to which the machine belonged sent to headquarters by telegraph or telephone, whichever was the faster, the following information:—

The next procedure was to further analyze the accident by establishing as quickly as possible all facts which might tend to elucidate information. Under the nine succeeding headings come also certain crashes from one or more contributory causes—the latter to be further classified in relative proportion, whether primary or secondary.

• i. Aeroplane defect—
• • (a) Breakage.
  • (b) Engine failure.
  • (c) Faulty rigging.
• ii. Error of judgment—
• • (a) Not due to poor instruction.
  • (b) Probably due to poor instruction.
• iii. Loss of head.
• iv. Brain fatigue.
• v. Fear.
• vi. Physical illness.
• vii. Unavoidable.
• viii. Disobeying—
• • (a) Rules of the air.
  • (b) Instructions for that flight.
  • (c) Standing orders.
• ix. Weather (wing visibility, temperature effects).

As some accidents will have one or more contributory causes, they will be shown under two headings:—

• Primary cause.
• Secondary or contributory cause.

It will be seen at a glance that the bringing forth of this information involved reference to records already in existence, and which had been maintained with particular care in order they might be fully available when thus crucially needed. There was sent, furthermore, specified information with regard to certain possible contributory causes, such as “loss of head,” “brain fatigue” or “fear.” Under “loss of head,” for instance, it is pointed out that the pupil in his new occupation of flying, especially for the first time, has every mental faculty on the alert at extremely high tension, and that the sense of danger, although not asserting itself, is also subconsciously present. It follows, therefore, that under the strain of an emergency the power of synchronized decision and act may lapse—this lapse resulting in what is known as “loss of head.” When there is added to this the fact that in flying, not only seconds, but parts of a second count enormously, it will be clear that after an actual loss of head there is seldom time to correct an error.

“Brain fatigue” and “fear” are allied to “loss of head;” when the pupil reaches the stage in which he has neither the power to reason, decide or act. Then supervenes a state of mental inertia due to the swiftly repeated stream of impulses received in rapid succession by his brain. He begins to feel alone, and unable to assume control. Errors occur, and he becomes overwhelmed with the enormousness of the whole thing. Follows a state of brain fatigue and stupor, during which he awaits events and takes little part in the control of his machine. After such an accident, the pupil has generally no recollection of what has happened. His memory seems to be partially stunned. Under these circumstances, it seldom occurs that he resumes flying—his temperament as a general thing proving to be unsuitable.

It is important that “brain fatigue” should be sharply separated from “fear.” The latter is rarely experienced in the air on the first few solo flights, the pilot’s mind being far too much concerned with the details of flying, watching the various instruments, and in checking his position and direction in the air relative to the ground. Many confess to a lurking sense of danger, but all say that it rarely if ever asserts itself.

Turning again to the graph on page 218, and now keeping in mind the classification of crashes, it is interesting to note that, owing to the introduction of the Armour Heights system, crashes in which the machine is totally wrecked were reduced from 53 in the month of June to 21 in part of the month of November. “B” and “C” crashes in which longerons are broken, were reduced from 43 in June to 12 in November. “D” crashes, which are those affecting only the undercarriage or planes, and are usually due to rough ground being insufficiently allowed for, or too late a pull back on the control ere the machine comes into contact with the earth, fell from 107 to 16. While the general reduction is most gratifying, the improvement in the acquirement of a delicate control necessary to make workmanlike landings is remarkable.

It will be observed that although training was continually being intensified, fatalities decreased from 1 in 1,760 hours’ flying in July 1918, to 1 in 5,300 hours’ flying in October, 1918, and this in spite of the fact that pilots were doing all aerial manoeuvres. Official data from other training centres, where work was done on varying types of machines, show 1 fatality for 1,170 hours’ flying.