The battle of the Somme in the latter half of 1916 was the principal factor leading to the formation of the Royal Flying Corps, Canada. Aerial conditions on the Western Front were at this period of so tense a nature that they may well be noted before proceeding to the actual history of the Canadian brigade.

The following sketch makes no pretence of absolute accuracy. The data available at the moment are not official, but are compiled from the memories of several flying officers serving on the Western front at the time. They may, however, be taken as fairly presenting not only the development of the Royal Flying Corps, but also that of opposing enemy aircraft at the period under consideration.

The British Expeditionary Force commenced operations in 1914 with a flying arm of four squadrons or some fifty machines, of which no less than thirty were destroyed during a severe storm at Christmas time by the collapse of a large hangar at St. Omer, leaving on the following day approximately 14 serviceable machines. At this time all aeroplanes in both forces were unarmed.

It is difficult to say whether British or German made the first aerial attack on an opposing machine, but it is undoubted that this type of combat, coming how it may, found both sides unequipped with the exception of such offensive power as might be secured with rifle or revolver. British machines had been thus armed for months, probably in anticipation of forced landings behind the German lines and, without question, enemy aircraft were similarly provided. There ensued a series of sporting encounters out of which grew the necessity of arming aeroplanes with rapid-fire guns mounted mostly on the top of the centre section so that bullets might clear the propeller blade. This gun was operated by the pilot, who supplied the sole method of forward shooting, while the observer, who was at that time placed in the front seat, fired to the rear. A year and a half afterwards, the method of shooting practically through the propeller was evolved, which, gradually developing, has long since reached mechanical perfection.

In the early summer of 1916, the British strength had grown to some 28 or 30 squadrons in France. These numbered approximately 450 machines, distributed fairly equally along the entire front. A view of our aerial equipment as contrasted with enemy aircraft in the battle of the Somme gives the following data, but it must be understood that this was a period during which every effort was strained on either side and type followed type in rapid succession.

In addition the British had a squadron or so of Sopwith 1½ Strutters, very fast and handy 2-seater tractors with observer in rear. Also some Bristol Scouts, Vickers pushers and Martynsydes.

The German was in 1916 provided with a gun which did fire through the propeller. This was on the Fokker. The advantage thus held by the enemy was also increased by the fact that their two-seaters carried pilots in front, thus affording the observer a better opportunity of firing to the rear. Our BE2C, for instance, found itself under a handicap in this respect. The downfall of the Fokker rests with the DH2, a pusher machine, which gave the forward-seated pilot a clear field of fire to the front. The DH2, in turn, yielded supremacy to the German Albatross Scout, a fast and efficient fighting machine. Thus went the battle, till in December, 1916, the Nieuport, Spad and Sopwith Scouts were our kings of the air.

In April of this year began a concentration of British aerial force on the Somme, where artillery observation was for the next three months carried to the utmost in preparation for the great offensive staged to commence in July. At first it seemed as though our machines had the air to themselves, for up till the first week in June our registration proceeded with practically no counter-battery work. So quiet was this front, that one pilot reports that he cannot remember seeing more than two German aeroplanes for six weeks.

In June came greater activity on the part of the enemy, but it is without question that we held superiority until September, if at considerable cost. From September, however, to the middle of October, the Royal Flying Corps had its work cut out to cope with the increase in numbers and efficiency of German pilots, and the introduction of two fast and improved fighting scouts, the Halberstadt and Albatross D3 and D5.

On the Somme front, approximating twenty-five miles, we had about twenty squadrons, equalling about 300 machines; these constituting the majority of our aerial force in France. Twelve were disposed for artillery work, the remainder for photography, reconnaissance and fighting.

The battle proceeded with unprecedented intensity, and with it a never-ending aerial warfare. Pilots were rushed from England with a few hours’ solo work and absolutely no gunnery practice, to find themselves instantly in the thick of the combat. It is, therefore, not astonishing that the wastage of our fighting men ran up to twenty-five per cent. per month.

The filling up of the Royal Flying Corps combatant strength was made additionally difficult, as the Corps could no longer draw from regimental officers now needed for the coming offensive by which it was proposed to relieve the tremendous pressure on the French at Verdun.

It is true that the strength of the Force was, in anticipation, more than doubled during the three weeks which preceded the Somme, but this largely exhausted the available supplies of fighting personnel.

How reasonable, therefore, that the established success of Canadian pilots, and the fact that in Canada lay an almost untapped reservoir of future strength, should turn the eyes of the War Office to that Dominion. Double operations were planned for the Spring of 1917. The need was instant and imperative.