  British preparations for the prosecution of the war—Indications at the North—Doubtful position and conduct of General Howe—Embarrassing to the Americans—Intercepted correspondence—General Howe sails to the Chesapeake—Enters Philadelphia in triumph—Burgoyne approaches from the North—Indian policy—Sir Guy Carleton—False estimates of the strength of Ticonderoga—Burgoyne arrives at Crown Point—Feasts the Indians—Invests Ticonderoga—Carries the outworks—Fortifies Sugar Hill—The fortress evacuated by St. Clair—Retreat of the Americans—Battles near Skenesborough and at Fort Ann—Burgoyne enters the valley of the Hudson—Schuyler, without means, retreats from Fort Edward—Terror of the people—Cruelties of the Indians—Story of Miss McCrea—General flight of the population—Mrs. Ann Eliza Bleecker—Heroism of Mrs. Schuyler—Attempted assassination of General Schuyler. Having failed in their efforts to extinguish the rebellion during the preceding year, the government of the parent country-resolved to put forth still greater energies during the present. For this purpose a powerful force was organized in Canada, the command of which was transferred from Sir Guy Carleton—the ablest British General, by the way, at that time or subsequently in America—and conferred upon General Burgoyne—an officer, also, of unquestioned merit—whose spirit of enterprise and thirst for military glory could not be exceeded. It was the aim of this Northern army to open a communication between Canada and New-York—thus cutting off New-England, which the ministry justly considered the hot-bed of the Revolution, from all communication with the Middle States; while Sir William Howe, with an army of 16,000 men, was to withdraw from New Jersey, and move round simultaneously to the Chesapeake, and take possession of the Middle States; and thus, as it was hoped, compel the whole to return to their allegiance. Doubts, however, for several months hung over the intentions of the enemy, whose designs were so skilfully veiled as for a long time almost to paralyze the exertions of the Americans. The retreat of Carleton from Lake Champlain, the preceding Autumn, even after the lake was in his power and Crown Point in his possession, suggested a doubt whether a serious invasion was meditated from that quarter. On the contrary, the impression was general that the expedition of Burgoyne was destined against Boston; and that Sir William Howe, whose movements in New Jersey were enigmatical to perplexity, was to co-operate in an effort to re-subjugate New England. The British government itself, as it is believed, contributed to the distractions of Congress and the American commander, by causing reports to be circulated that Boston was to be the next point of attack. Arthur Lee, being then in Bordeaux, was thus confidentially advised, and he lost no time in communicating such supposed intention to the Secret Committee of Congress, who in turn gave the like information to the Commander-in-chief, and also to the Legislature of Massachusetts. The consequence of these distractions was unfortunate for the Americans. Less attention was paid to preparations for the defence of the North than otherwise would have been given; while Massachusetts, apprehending that all her strength would be required for her own defence, set about raising troops for her own protection, at the expense of the main army, from which its quota of recruits was withheld. [FN] [FN] Letters of Washington, during the months of May, June, and July, 1777. Before the close of June, however, the designs of the enemy in regard to the North became obvious. A person from Canada, arrested as a spy, and brought before General Schuyler, stated on his examination, "that the British forces were approaching St. Johns, and were to advance through Lake Champlain under General Burgoyne; and also that a detachment of British troops, Canadians and Indians, was to penetrate the country by the way of Oswego and the Valley of the Mohawk. He added many particulars, respecting the strength and arrangements of the British army, which turned out in the end to be nearly accurate, but of which no intelligence had before been obtained, or by many anticipated." [FN] [FN] Sparks—Note in Life and Cor. of Washington, vol. iv. The movements of General Howe were still equivocal, even after Burgoyne had commenced his descent upon the North—thus adding to the embarrassments of Washington. And in order the more certainly to mislead the American commander as to his real intentions. General Howe wrote a feigned despatch to Burgoyne, on the subject of ascending the Hudson to join him, the bearer of which fell purposely into the hands of the Americans, while pretending to be on his way to Canada. Unable, therefore, to determine whether such might not be his design, (although the intercepted despatch was regarded with strong suspicion,) or whether, on the other hand, it might not be the purpose of Howe to pass round to the Chesapeake and thence strike at Philadelphia, the American General was compelled to remain inactively watching his motions, strengthening, in the mean time, to the utmost of his power, his positions in the highlands—without being able to detach any large number of troops to the assistance of General Schuyler, then commanding the Northern Department. And even after General Howe had embarked his troops and dropped down to Sandy Hook—having evacuated New Jersey on the 30th of June [FN-1]—Washington was still in doubt whether it might not yet be his intention to return with the tide, and pass up the river in the night. [FN-2] Such, however, was no part of the plan of the British commander. His destination, on leaving the harbor of New-York, was the Chesapeake and Philadelphia; and the latter branch of the campaign indicated in the opening of the present chapter, was so far successful, that after a series of victories over the forces of General Washington, commencing at Brandywine and ending at Germantown, General Howe took possession of, and established himself in, the capital of Pennsylvania. [FN-1] It is a pleasing evidence of the sound religious views of Washington, that he was a firm believer in the immediate interpositions of Providence in directing and controlling the affairs of men. His letters abound in passages that might be cited, showing his quickness to discern the finger of Providence, and his readiness to make the acknowledgment. Thus, in regard to the departure from New Jersey by General Howe, he says:—"The evacuation of Jersey at this time seems to be a peculiar mark of Providence, as the inhabitants have an opportunity of securing their harvests of hay and grain, the latter of which would in all probability have undergone the same fate with many farm-houses, had it been ripe enough to take fire."—Letter of Washington to Maj. Gen. Armstrong, July 4, 1777. [FN-2] "If we were certain Gen. Burgoyne were approaching Ticonderoga with his whole army, I should not hesitate a moment in concluding that it is in consequence of a preconcerted plan with Gen. Howe, and that the latter is to co-operate with him by pushing his whole force up the North River, and aiming a stroke in the first instance and immediately at the Highlands."—Letter of Washington to the President of Congress, July 2. Again, in several successive letters, after the embarkation of General Howe's army from Staten Island, Washington spoke of the perplexity in which he was kept by the shifting manoeuvres of the fleet. On the 22d of July he wrote—"I cannot give you any certain account of General Howe's operations. His conduct is puzzling and embarrassing beyond measure; so are the informations which I get. At one time the ships are standing up toward the North River; in a little while they are going up the Sound; and in one hour after, they are going out of the Hook."—Letter to General Schuyler. The fleet actually sailed for the Capes of Virginia on the 23d of July. But a far different fortune attended the arms of Burgoyne. The regular troops of his command, English and German, amounted to above seven thousand men, added to which were large numbers of American and Canadian loyalists, together with many hundred Indians; a species of force, which, it has been held by British historians, Sir Guy Carleton was reluctant to employ, while General Burgoyne, it has been alleged, entertained no such scruples. It has ever been claimed as a virtue on the part of Carleton, and carried to the credit of his humanity, that, rather than employ the Indians, he submitted to the injustice of having the command of this expedition, properly belonging to him, conferred upon an officer who was not entitled to lead the enterprise. It is perhaps true, from his more intimate knowledge of the Indian character, that he had formed such an estimate of their services as to render him somewhat less sanguine than others as to their value. His experience could not but have taught him the extent of their inutility in war, the capriciousness of their character, their intractableness and inconstancy. He must have known that their ideas of war were totally different from those of civilized nations; by reason of which, notwithstanding their ferocity, and the incredible examples of passive valor which they sometimes afford in cases adapted to their own opinions, they were nevertheless utterly regardless of, and looked with contempt upon, those belligerent usages which are considered as honorable, generous, and fair in the modern service of civilized men. He could not have been ignorant of the fact, that the object and design of most of the wars in which the Indians engage, are not so much to conquer by manly and open battle, as to murder and destroy after their own peculiar fashion. In one word, that accomplished officer very well knew the services of the Indians to be uncertain; their rapacity to be insatiable; their faith at all times doubtful; and their action cruel to barbarity. Still, as we have already shown beyond contradiction, he was among the first to court the alliance and obtain the services of Brant and his Mohawks, on their descent to Montreal in 1775. The commendations, therefore, that have been bestowed upon Sir Guy Carleton upon this subject, at the expense of Burgoyne, were as undeserved by the one as unjust toward the other. True, the march of Burgoyne was tracked with blood, which a high-souled officer should scorn in such manner to shed; [FN] but the footsteps of Carleton might have been equally sanguine had the command been entrusted to him. [FN] It is but just to this gallant but unfortunate officer, however, to state, that he did all in his power to restrain the excesses and barbarities of the Indians. At the council and war-feast, which he gave them near Crown Point, he endeavored to explain to them the laws of civilized war; and charged them that they must only kill those opposing them in arms; that old men, women, children, and prisoners, must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the heat of battle. But it did no good. Never, probably, at the time, had there been an army of equal numbers better appointed than that of Burgoyne. The train of brass artillery, in particular, was perhaps the finest that had ever been allotted to an army not far exceeding the present in numerical strength, and for a time victory seemed to perch upon his ensigns. General Carleton, it will be remembered, had made himself master of Lake Champlain, and the fortifications at Crown Point the Autumn before. The first object for attack presenting itself to General Burgoyne, therefore, was Ticonderoga—situated in the mountain gap through which the waters of Lake George fall into Lake Champlain. This fortress was then in command of General St. Clair, and was supposed by the Americans to be a post of great security. The principal fortress, the ruins of which are yet standing in frowning and rugged strength, was situated on an angle of land which is surrounded on three sides by water filled with rocks. A great part of the south side was covered by a deep morass; and where that failed, in the north-west quarter, the old French lines served as a defence. These lines had been strengthened by additional works and a block-house. The Americans had other defences and block-houses in the direction of Lake George, together with two new block-houses and some other works to the right of the French lines. Still greater pains had been taken in fortifying the high circular hill on the eastern shore of the inlet opposite, known as Mount Independence. On the summit of this mountain, which is table-land, the Americans had erected a star-fort, enclosing a large square of barracks, well fortified, and supplied with artillery. The foot of the mountain, on the west side projecting into the water, was strongly entrenched to its edge, and the entrenchment lined with heavy artillery. These lower works were sustained and covered by a battery, about half-way up the side of the mountain, and were connected by a bridge across the inlet, which had been constructed at great labor and expense. [FN-1] These, and other works of defence, had been judged sufficient to render the post secure. The Commander-in-chief himself, although indeed the works had not fallen under his own inspection, had formed a very erroneous opinion of their strength, or perhaps, to speak more correctly, of the natural advantages of the position, and of the defensibility of the works. [FN-2] Such, in fact, was his confidence in the post, that the idea of its loss seems from his correspondence scarce to have entered his mind. [FN-1] London Universal Magazine, April, 1782. [FN-2] "I am pleased to find, by your letter to Congress, that a strong supply of provisions has been thrown into Ticonderoga. Since that is the case, I see no reason for apprehending that it can possibly fall into the hands of the enemy in a short time, even were they to bring their whole force to a point; but if they have divided it to make the different attacks that you mention, General St. Clair will, in all probability, have an opportunity of acting on the defensive; and should he not be quite successful, he may damage them so considerably, that they will not be able to attack him in his works; to which, I dare say, he will always secure a retreat in case of accident."—Letter of Washington to General Schuyler, July 2, 1777. But in all their labors, the American engineers had overlooked the high peak, or mountain, called Sugar Hill, situated south of the bridge, on the point of land at the confluence of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain. Originally it had been supposed, and taken for granted, that the crest of Sugar Hill was not only inaccessible, but too distant to be of any avail in covering the main fortress. This opinion was an error, to which the attention of the officers had been called the preceding year by Colonel John Trumbull, then Adjutant-General for the Northern Department. When Colonel Trumbull made the suggestion, he was laughed at by the mess; but he soon proved the greater accuracy of his own vision, by throwing a cannon shot to the summit; and subsequently clambered up to the top, accompanied by Colonels Wayne and Arnold. [FN] It was a criminal neglect, on the part of the Americans, that the oversight was not at once corrected, by the construction of a work upon that point, which would have commanded the whole post. [FN] Conversations of the author with Colonel John Trumbull, and also his unpublished memoirs, to which the author has had access. General Burgoyne arrived at Crown Point on the 21st of June; and after meeting and feasting the Indians, and attempting to instruct them in the rules and principles of civilized war, and making other necessary preparations—not forgetting to send forth a manifesto which he supposed would spread terror through the Northern Colonies—he advanced with great caution to the investment of Ticonderoga, where he arrived on the 2d of July. Most unaccountably, the Americans immediately abandoned all their works in the direction of Lake George—setting fire to the block-houses and saw-mills; and without sally or other interruption, permitted the enemy, under Major General Phillips, to take possession of the very advantageous post of Mount Hope, which, besides commanding their lines in a dangerous degree, totally cut off their communication with Lake George. The only excuse for such an early abandonment of this important point, was found in the fact that General St. Clair had not force enough to man all his defences. One of the first objects that attracted the attention of the British commander, was the unoccupied point of Sugar Hill. It was forthwith examined, and its advantages were found to be so great, that immediate dispositions were made for its occupation. A winding road was cut to its summit, a battery commenced, and cannon to serve it transported thither. Under these circumstances, finding himself invested on all sides, and batteries ready to be opened upon him not only from around, but above, and having, moreover, not half troops enough to man his works—St. Clair hastily convened a council of war on the 5th of July, and an evacuation was unanimously decided upon as the only alternative for the emergency. [FN] [FN] "The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence is an event of chagrin and surprise, not apprehended nor within the compass of my reasoning. I know not upon what principle it was founded, and I should suppose it still more difficult to be accounted for, if the garrison amounted to five thousand men, in high spirits, healthy, well supplied with provisions and ammunition, and the Eastern militia marching to their succor, as you mentioned in your letter of the 9th to the Council of Safety of New-York."—Letter of Washington to General Schuyler, July 15, 1777. The truth, however, is, that the actual force and condition of St. Clair's army had been universally over-estimated—as well by the officers at a distance as by the public. The eyes of the nation were turned upon that post; and when the news of the retreat went abroad, the disappointment was extreme; and the loud voice of complaint and censure, against the unfortunate General, was reiterated from one end of the continent to the other. But, notwithstanding the "chagrin" and "surprise," so keenly felt by the Commander-in-chief at the loss of this important post, his strong sense of justice interposed to shield the unfortunate commander from condemnation unheard. He wrote to General Schuyler on the 13th of July, that General St. Clair owed it to himself to insist upon an opportunity of giving his reasons for evacuating Ticonderoga, but he at the same time said—"I will not condemn, or even pass censure upon, an officer unheard." Time, however, proved that he had acted the part of a judicious and skillful officer; but the excitement of the moment was so great, caused by chagrin on the one hand and alarm on the other, that all eyes were blind, and all ears deaf, to the true reasons of the case, and even to the palliating circumstances.—Sparks's Life of Gonverneur Morris. Following up such a promising advantage, the British commander pushed forward upon the retiring army, with such a degree of vigor that the retreat became almost a rout. The Americans, however, made a stand between Skenesborough and Fort Anne in a well-contested battle; but after much hard fighting, were again compelled to retreat. Another engagement ensued at Fort Anne, with a like result; and the victorious Briton entered the valley of the Hudson, and took possession of Fort Edward, which, weak and unprovided, had likewise been evacuated on his approach by General Schuyler. These movements by the British commander had been made with equal vigor and celerity; and such was the confusion of the Americans in their flight, that no advices of the disaster were forwarded by express to General Schuyler, to prepare him for the approach of the victors. Indeed, that officer was suffered to remain several days without intelligence from St. Clair of any description, excepting some vague flying rumors of the evacuation. [FN-1] During this suspense, General Schuyler wrote to the Commander-in-chief upon the subject, who, in turn, expressed his amazement at the mystery which seemed to hang over the affairs of the fortress. At one moment Washington was led to believe that St. Clair and the whole garrison had been made prisoners, and at another that the rumor of the evacuation was wholly untrue; and that the silence, for which it baffled conjecture to account, arose from the circumstance that the Americans were shut up in their works. [FN-2] But this doubt did not continue long. Notwithstanding that the advance of the enemy was repulsed at Fort Anne, Colonel Long, who was in command of that post, immediately evacuated it, contrary to the express orders of General Schuyler; and Schuyler himself, at the head of only fifteen hundred men at Fort Edward, "without provision, with little ammunition, not above five rounds to a man, having neither balls, nor lead to make any—and the country in the deepest consternation," [FN-3] was obliged also to fall back in the direction of Albany. The blow was a severe one; but the Commander-in-chief possessed a soul equal to every crisis. No undue elevation of spirit followed his successes; neither did the clouds of adverse fortune, so frequently darkening the prospect of the American arms, sink him into despondency. [FN-4] Indeed, each succeeding calamity was but another test of his moral greatness, for he rose above them all. [FN-1] Letter from General Schuyler to General Washington, July 9, 1777. [FN-2] Letter from General Washington in reply. [FN-3] Letter of Schuyler to Washington. [FN-4] "This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much. But, notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's army, and that the confidence derived from his success, will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable to us. We should never despair. Our situation has before been unpromising, and has changed for the better; so, I trust, it will again. If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times."—Letterr of Washington to General Schuyler, July 15, 1777. Nothing, however, could exceed the terror which these events diffused among the inhabitants, not only of Northern New-York, but of the New England States. The consternation was, moreover, increased by the reported murders and the cruelties of the savages—since all the efforts of General Burgoyne to dissuade them from the perpetration of their cruel enormities were ineffectual. Restrain them he could not; and it was admitted by the British writers of that day, that the friends of the Royal cause, as well as its enemies, were equally victims to their indiscriminate rage. It was even ascertained that the British officers were deceived by their treacherous allies, into the purchase of the scalps of their own comrades. Among other instances of cruelty, the well-known murder of Miss Jane McCrea, which happened in the early part of the campaign, filled the public mind with horror. Every circumstance of this unnatural and bloody transaction—around which there lingers a melancholy interest to this day—served to heighten alike its interest and its enormity. Many have been the versions of this bloody tale. General Gates, who had at this juncture been most unjustly directed to supersede General Schuyler in the command of the Northern Department, assailed General Burgoyne in the newspapers with great virulence upon the subject of these outrages. After charging the British commander with encouraging the murder of prisoners, and the massacre of women and children, by paying the Indians a stipulated price for scalps, Gates, in a letter addressed to General Burgoyne, thus spoke of the case now specially under consideration:—"Miss McCrea, a young lady, lovely to the sight, of virtuous character and amiable disposition, engaged to an officer of your army, was, with other women and children, taken out of a house near Fort Edward, carried into the woods, and there scalped and mangled in the most horrid manner. Two parents, with their six children, were treated with the same inhumanity, while quietly resting in their own happy and peaceful dwelling. The miserable fate of Miss McCrea was particularly aggravated, by being dressed to receive her promised husband; but met her murderer, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, women, and children, have perished by the hands of the ruffians to whom, it is asserted, you have paid the price of blood." General Burgoyne replied, and repelled with indignation the charge of encouraging, in any respect, the outrages of the Indians. He asserted that from the first he had refused to pay for scalps, and had so informed the Indians at their council. The only rewards he gave them were for prisoners brought in, and by the adoption of this course he hoped to encourage a more humane mode of warfare on their part. In this letter Burgoyne said:—"I would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to me, for the whole continent of America, though the wealth of worlds was in its bowels and a paradise upon its surface." [FN-1] In regard to the hapless fate of Miss McCrea, General Burgoyne remarked:—"Her fall wanted not the tragic display you have labored to give it, to make it as sincerely abhorred and lamented by me as it can be by the tenderest of her friends. The act was no premeditated barbarity. On the contrary, two chiefs, who had brought her off for the purpose of security, not of violence to her person, disputed which should be her guard, and in a fit of savage passion in one, from whose hands she was snatched, the unhappy woman became the victim. Upon the first intelligence of this event, I obliged the Indians to deliver the murderer into my hands; and though to have punished him by our laws, or principles of justice, would have been perhaps unprecedented, he certainly should have suffered an ignominious death, had I not been convinced, from my circumstances and observations, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that a pardon under the terms which I presented and they accepted, would be more efficacious than an execution, to prevent similar mischiefs. The above instance excepted, your intelligence respecting the cruelty of the Indians, is false." [FN-2] [FN-1] While these pages are passing through the press, the author has fallen upon a letter written from Montreal, and published in the Remembrancer for 1777, in which it was stated that a party of the Indians had returned to Montreal in a high state of dissatisfaction, because of the severity of Burgoyne's discipline toward them, and his refusal to tolerate their mode of warfare, or pay them their accustomed bounty for scalps. It was further stated that they waited upon Sir Guy Carleton with their complaints—liking their old "Father" much better than their new. [FN-2] Vide Marshall's Life of Washington, Vol. I, Appendix. The British commander doubtless labored to make the best of his case, and in respect to Miss McCrea, his statement was much nearer to the truth than that of General Gates. The actual circumstances of the case, stripped of its romance, were these:—Miss McCrea belonged to a family of loyalists, and had engaged her hand in marriage to a young refugee named Jones, a subordinate officer in the British service, who was advancing with Burgoyne. Anxious to possess himself of his bride, he despatched a small party of Indians to bring her to the British camp. Her family and friends were strongly opposed to her going with such an escort; but her affection overcame her prudence, and she determined upon the hazardous adventure. She set forward with her dusky attendants on horseback. The family resided at the village of Fort Edward, from whence they had not proceeded more than half a mile before her conductors stopped to drink at a spring. Meantime the impatient lover, who deserved not her embrace for confiding her protection to such hands, instead of going himself, had despatched a second party of Indians upon the same errand. The Indians met at the spring; and before the march was resumed, they were attacked by a party of the Provincials. At the close of the skirmish the body of Miss McCrea was found among the slain—tomahawked, scalped, and tied to a pine tree, yet standing by the side of the spring, as a monument of the bloody transaction. The name of the young lady is inscribed on the tree, the trunk of which is thickly scarred with the bullets it received in the skirmish. It also bears the date 1777. "Tradition reports that the Indians divided the scalp, and that each party carried half of it to the agonized lover." [FN] The ascertained cause of her murder was this. The promised reward for bringing her in safety to her betrothed, was a barrel of rum. The chiefs of the two parties sent for her by Mr. Jones, quarreled respecting the anticipated compensation. Each claimed it; and, in a moment of passion, to end the controversy, one of them struck her down with his hatchet. [FN] Silliman's Tour from Hartford to Quebec. Vide, also, Marshall, Gordon, and others. The tale was sufficiently painful according to the simple facts of the case, and its recital produced a thrill of horror wherever it came—enlarged and embellished, as it was sure to be in its progress, by every writer who could add to the eloquence of the narrative or the pathos of its catastrophe. As the invader advanced, the inhabitants fled in the wildest consternation. The horrors of war, however mitigated by the laws and usages of civilization, are at all times sufficiently terrific; but when to these the fierce cruelties of a cloud of savages are superadded, those only who have been familiar with an American border warfare can form an adequate opinion of its atrocities. Among the fugitives driven from their peaceful abodes on the present occasion, was Mrs. Ann Eliza Bleecker, a lady who has been somewhat celebrated as one of the early poets of our country. She was the daughter of Mr. Brandt Schuyler of the city of New-York, and the wife of John J. Bleecker, Esq., of New Rochelle, whose enterprise, together with his lady's love for the wild scenery of the forest, had induced him to exchange a residence among the busy haunts of men for a solitary plantation in the vale of the Tomhanic—a mountain stream flowing into the Hoosic river, about twenty miles from Albany. Mr. Bleecker's residence lay directly in the march of Burgoyne, on whose approach he hastened to Albany to provide accommodations for his family. But a few hours after his departure, Mrs. Bleecker, as she sat at table received intelligence that the enemy, with tomahawk and brand, was within two miles of her residence. Instant flight was the only alternative. Taking one of her children in her arms and seizing the other by the hand, she started off on foot attended only by a young mulatto girl, and leaving her house and all its contents a prey to the Indians. The roads were encumbered by carriages, loaded with women and children, each intent upon his or her own safety; so that no assistance could be obtained, and her only recourse was to mingle in the fugitive throng, and participate in the common panic and common distress. Having traveled about five miles on foot, however, she succeeded in obtaining a seat for the children in a wagon which served to facilitate her march. On the following morning she was met by her husband, who conducted her to Albany, and from thence down the Hudson as far as Red Hook one of her children dying by the way. [FN] [FN] The facts of this incident in the life of Mrs. Bleeker are taken from Kettel's biographical sketches of American poets. The memoirs of Mrs. B. together with her poems, were published many years ago, but I sought in vain among the libraries and the Bleekers to obtain a copy.—Author. Amid this scene of desolation and affright, there was yet one woman whose proud spirit was undaunted. It was the lady of General Schuyler. The General's country-seat was upon his estate in Saratoga, standing upon the margin of the river. On the approach of Burgoyne, Mrs. Schuyler went up to Saratoga, in order to remove their furniture. Her carriage was attended by only a single armed man on horseback. When within two miles of her house, she encountered a crowd of panic-stricken people, who recited to her the tragic fate of Miss McCrea, and representing to her the danger of proceeding farther in the face of the enemy, urged her to return. She had yet to pass through a dense forest, within which even then some of the savage troops might be lurking for prey. But to these prudential councils she would not listen. "The General's wife," she exclaimed, "must not be afraid!" And pushing forward, she accomplished her purpose. [FN] [FN] I have derived this incident, and also that respecting the General, which follows in the text, from Mrs. James Cochran of Oswego, who was the youngest daughter of General Schuyler.—Author. Before the mansion was evacuated, however, the General himself had a narrow escape from assassination by the hand of a savage, who had insinuated himself into the house for that purpose. It was at the hour of bed-time, in the evening, and while the General was preparing to retire for the night, that a female servant, in coming in from the hall, saw a gleam of light reflected from the blade of a knife, in the hand of some person whose dark outline she discerned behind the door. The servant was a black slave, who had sufficient presence of mind not to appear to have made the discovery. Passing directly through the door into the apartment where the General was yet standing near the fire-place, with an air of unconcern she pretended to arrange such articles as were disposed upon the mantel-piece, while in an undertone she informed her master of her discovery, and said, aloud, "I will call the guard." The General instantly seized his arms, while the faithful servant hurried out by another door into a long hall, upon the floor of which lay a loose board which creaked beneath the tread. By the noise she made in trampling rapidly upon the board, the Indian—for such he proved—was led to suppose that the Philistines were upon him in numbers, sprang from his concealment and fled. He was pursued, however, by the guard and a few friendly Indians attached to the person of General Schuyler, overtaken, and made prisoner. Exasperated at his treachery, the friendly Indians were resolved to put him to death, and it was with much difficulty that they were diverted from their purpose by the General. The effect of the incidents we have been detailing, and other recitals of savage cruelties, not all, as General Burgoyne represented, without foundation, was extensive and powerful. The cry of vengeance was universal; and a spirit was aroused which proved of speedy and great advantage to the American arms. |
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