Another step of the moral intervention which the Russian Government had been so long and so skilfully engineering came at this juncture to make the cause of the Porte more hopeless. The negotiations with France had resulted in a kind of entente on the Eastern question, by which the French emperor had agreed, under certain contingencies, to unite with the Russians in deporting the families of the Christian combatants. The new French agent, Tricou, had from the beginning shown a tendency to criticise Omar Pasha unfavorably, which the latter had increased by his contemptuous treatment of the new consul. Tricou had, consequently, set his agents to find out all the instances of Turkish barbarity obtainable—a ghastly roll, obtained from easily read records. It happened during the operations against Sphakia, which Omar nominally directed from on board the flag-ship of the squadron off the coast, that news came in of his having blockaded a number of families in a cave on the sea-side and having attempted unsuccessfully to stifle them out (or in), and the active Murray went at once to make his Highness a visit, and ascertain if the catastrophe were avertible. He obtained from the Generalissimo a promise that the prisoners should not be attacked by any inhuman appliances, and should be guaranteed honorable treatment on surrendering.[J] In the course of the conversation, Omar animadverted on Tricou in terms which Murray, in narrating his visit to me, declined to repeat, and which, in all their vagueness and possible malignity, I at once applied as a caustic to Tricou's already wounded pride, in accordance with a systematic policy to make all the bad blood possible between the Pasha and my colleagues. The ruse succeeded to my best hopes, and thenceforward the irritated Frenchman sought every opportunity to punish the illustrious renegade, and his activity resulted in the following despatch, sent while Omar was still engaged in the Sphakian raid:

(Translation.)

Canea, July 21, 1867.

M. le ChargÉ d'Affaires:

The situation grows daily worse. I have had the honor of notifying to you the deplorable excesses which have been committed in the district of Kissamos; to-day I learn that massacres have broken out in the eastern part of the country.

For the last month, isolated murders took place daily in the neighborhood of the town of Candia; the native Mussulmans overran the country and abandoned themselves to the saddest iniquities in the Christian villages. These barbarous expeditions over, they would return to the town, and the gates opened before them to give passage to their bloody trophies. I had made strong complaints to the local authorities, but all my representations had remained without effect. Emboldened by impunity, the bashi-bazouks on the 12th and 13th of this month spread themselves over the district of Rhizo and massacred women and children. To revenge themselves, the insurgents carried off a young Turkish girl and killed her father. The Canadian Government, which has for a long time forbidden Christians to enter the town, doubtless counted upon these atrocities remaining buried in silence. They let them go on, and the irregulars could glut their ferocity entirely as they pleased.

On the 17th, they invaded the villages of HumÉri, Alcolohuri, Aghias Paraskevi, Shilus, and a great number of the villages of the district of Pediada, murdering the peaceable and defenceless villagers, old men, women, and children. The consular agents of Candia unite, and wish to send their dragomans to the places; but the Governor opposes this, and the carnage continues.

These sad tidings have deeply moved the consular body. As soon as I had been informed of them I went to the Imperial Commissioner, whom I found, I must say, deeply afflicted, but overwhelmed with the feeling of his impotence. He no longer attempts to deny the evil, but he feels himself incapable of staying its progress. From all parts of the island the most sinister reports reach us. Women and children wander along the shore, dying of hunger and exposed to the most horrible treatment. I am in a position to inform you, M. le ChargÉ d'Affaires, that three young Turkish officers, witnesses of the barbarities which have taken place at Kissamos, have given in their resignation, to avoid presiding over such butcheries.

In so serious a situation, my English colleague and I thought it our duty to inform our respective governments in the promptest manner. We consequently drew up the following telegraphic despatch, which we sent this day to the PeirÆus to be transmitted to Constantinople, as well as to the Cabinets of London and Paris:

"Massacres of women and children have broken out in the interior of the island. The authorities can neither put down the insurrection nor stay the course of these atrocities. Humanity would imperatively demand the immediate suspension of hostilities, or the transportation to Greece of the women and children."

The Russian and Italian consuls address an identical telegram to St. Petersburg and Florence.

We cannot, M. le ChargÉ d'Affaires, remain blind to the fact that from impotence the Turks passed to fury, and from fury to extermination. I do not hesitate to say that, if this useless struggle were to be prolonged, the women and children would have no refuge but exile or death.

Omar Pasha continues his expedition of Sphakia. It is asserted that he has effected his junction with the corps of Mehmet Pasha, which is said to be entirely free. It would be very desirable that the Serdar should make himself master of this position as soon as possible; it is true that the insurrection would be scarcely weakened by it, but this success might perhaps induce the Porte to order a suspension of hostilities.

The aviso of the Imperial navy, the Prometheus, which has come to relieve the Salamander, anchored on the 17th in the harbor of CanÉa.—Accept, etc.

(Signed) Tricou.

The consequence of the Russo-Frankish accord was that, on the receipt of the above despatch at Constantinople, the French and Russian squadrons at PeirÆus proceeded to Crete, and there commenced to embark the families gathered along the coast. This undertaking, which had probably as little as possible to do with humanity in its secret springs, was evidently concerted, and waited only the arrival of some signal like Tricou's telegram, followed accordingly by this preconcerted rejoinder from the French representative at Constantinople:

M. Outrey to A'ali Pasha.

"Therapia, July 26, 1867.

"Highness: The consul of France at CanÉa sends me the following telegram [given above].

"In view of such acts, which the Porte can but reprove, and in virtue of orders which I have received from my Government, I hasten to inform your highness that I have ordered Admiral Simon to repair to the Cretan coast with the ships under his orders, to receive and transport to Greece all the women and children who wander on the shores, dying of hunger, and exposed to frightful treatment. The mission of Admiral Simon, having no political character, cannot, I imagine, meet any difficulty from the Ottoman authorities, and I beg your highness to have the goodness to instruct his Highness Omar Pasha to lend all his sympathy to a work of humanity."

Which is made clearer by the extract from the despatch of the English chargÉ to Lord Stanley:

(Extract.)

Mr. Barron to Lord Stanley (Received August 6).

Constantinople, July 23, 1867.

"The French chargÉ d'affaires has called to inform me that, having received instructions from his Government to despatch vessels to Crete for the purpose of removing homeless victims of the war, whenever it should be advisable, he deemed the last advices from the French consul at CanÉa (enclosed herewith in copy) to be such as to oblige him to use the discretionary power placed in his hands. On the receipt of this despatch he immediately concerted measures with the Russian Ambassador, who was provided in advance with corresponding instructions, and they both sent late on the 26th identical instructions by telegraph to their respective naval officers in the Mediterranean."

The number of relieving ships sent to Crete in obedience to this accord was four French, three Russian, followed by two Italian; and, lest isolation should seem intervention, three Austrian, not over well-willed, and one small Prussian gunboat, that the now great Power might not be left out of the new question.

This movement had, in my opinion, no direct effect on the military question, the Sphakian expedition having already done its worst, and begun to recoil, before the arrival of Admiral Simon with his ships; but it did, no doubt, prevent the success of the conciliatory movement which followed. The Generalissimo, after his return to CanÉa, about the middle of September, issued a proclamation prepared at Constantinople, offering a general amnesty and an armistice of six weeks, preparatory to measures of a softer and more persuasive character. The Turkish officials, in their intercourse with the consuls, frankly admitted that force had failed, and that no hope of its more successful appliance remained. The depleted army could only with great difficulty, and slowly, be refilled. Reinforcements were obtained, but not enough to keep the cadres at their full condition, and a despatch of the English consul at Beyrout[K] attests the dread of this service which had infected the troops in other sections of the Ottoman empire, while battalions in Crete mutinied and refused to labor any longer.

Early in October, A'ali Pasha arrived, to put in effect the sober second thought of the head of Islam. The manner and views of the Grand Vizier impressed me with profound respect and sympathy—his proffers seemed to me reasonable, and likely to assure to the Cretans a substantial liberty and reform. But they were too shrewd not to see that the ablest man in the Turkish empire had only come to Crete to try the last resort of his persuasion, because his case was nearly hopeless, and simultaneously with his arrival came stimulating despatches from the Russian agents, encouraging the Cretans to hold out and strike now the final blow at the Turkish domination. They were assured by these despatches in the most positive terms that if they withstood this temptation, and refused all the conciliatory propositions of A'ali Pasha, their independence and annexation to Greece were certain. I feel confident that but for these assurances the scheme of A'ali Pasha would have been accepted, for the island was harrowed and ravaged and miserable to the last degree. The campaign of Omar Pasha had destroyed, according to the declaration of a European officer engaged, six hundred villages. Except in Sitia, the extreme eastern peninsula, there was hardly a house with its roof on, and the people had no means to provide new rafters. The discouragement was great, and required as counterpoise all the confident promises of Russia and the means and appliances of Greece to induce the people to decide to keep up the resistance.

My own opinion was that the Cretans had better accept A'ali Pasha's propositions, but our minister at Constantinople wrote me to urge their rejection with all my influence, as the certain condition of independence. I do not believe that our Government had any part in these instructions or policy. Mr. Seward had at one time given me the fullest endorsement of my pro-Cretan views, and at another was ready, on the remonstrance of the Turkish minister, to recall me for having done what he approved both in myself and Mr. Morris, and abstained only on another application being made by the Russian Government. Being on the spot, and as well able to judge as any one, it seemed to me wisest for the Cretans to accept autonomy and peace, but I obeyed the instructions sent me against my own feelings. I communicated the advices of my minister to those whose business it was to advise the insurgents. I felt a confidence in A'ali Pasha which no other Turkish official had ever inspired me with, and a certainty that he would act in good faith. Humanity demanded peace in defiance of all politics.

Dissensions had arisen between the volunteers and Cretans; and the chiefs of the former, wearied of a pointless and resultless guerilla warfare, and sure that the question was only to be settled on the continent, in order to hasten the preparation of movements on Epirus and Thessaly, one by one returned to Greece, followed by most of their retinues. The Cretan combatants, relieved of their families, were quite sufficient for all the needs of the situation, and, well armed and provided, could have kept up the struggle for years, if disposed.

But the fatal blow to the insurrection was being prepared by its own friends. The Russian Government had, during the nuptial visit of the King of Greece to St. Petersburg, secured a complete ascendency over him, and immediately on his return to Greece it became evident that the dismissal of the Comoundouros ministry had been decided in that conclave with the execution of whose plans no motive of humanity ever interferes, whose deliberations no curious House of Commons pries into or clamoring journal opposes. The Russian Government had decided to take the direction of the insurrection, and to that end, to get rid of Comoundouros and his friends, whose anti-Russian tendencies were too strong to be bent to the desired course, the king, when the moment had arrived, made a difference with the ministry on some trivial point, and peremptorily dismissed it. But the chamber, with an unexpected constancy, refused to sanction any change in the administration, and the Russian minister in Athens then made overtures to the dismissed president of the council, offering to bring him back to power if he accepted the programme of St. Petersburg. He refused, and the chamber, unyielding, was also dissolved, and in the new election, in which the whole influence of the court and throne was exerted against the Comoundouros party, by the most violent and illegal measures the deposed chief and his principal adherents were kept out of the new chamber, which was, to a sufficient degree, subservient; and Bulgaris, the evil genius of Greece since her independence, under whose auspices at all times disorder and dishonesty, brigandage and peculation, had especially thriven, became the arbiter of the destinies of Crete.

At this time all means and supplies for the war came directly from the Hellenic treasury. Private contributions had never been great, and were almost exclusively confined to Greeks abroad—a comparatively trivial supply of food and clothing from America being the exception. Nearly 50,000 refugees from Crete were dependent on the Hellenic Government, which, with the means supplied to the war committee for military operations, constituted a drain on the resources of Greece sufficiently alarming, yet popular opinion was so strong in favor of continuing the insurrection that no government dared seem even to be lukewarm towards it; and with excellent opportunities for observing, I am able to assert confidently that the Hellenic people were ready to run all the risks of war with Turkey, rather than allow the Cretans to be reconquered, and that no government could have lived a day which did not proclaim, as the chief condition of its existence, the vigorous support of the Cretan insurrection.

What the views of Russia were in regard to the insurrection no outsider can, of course, say; but they seemed to be in favor of only making the Greek agitation a part of a great scheme, having its direction at St. Petersburg. The only immediate change, however, in the direction of the insurrection was the gradual suppression of the powers of the Cretan committee at Athens, and an occasional relaxation in the vigor of support, as if to try the condition of public feeling. I judge that Russia had made other combinations, which made the success of the insurrection as a Hellenic movement undesirable, and that she was gradually getting it in hand, to be able to suppress it when the proper moment came. To do this without sacrificing that influence over the Hellenes which would be so useful in certain contingencies, it was necessary to have a Hellenic instrument to do the work—hence the position of Mr. Bulgaris.