To compensate myself for the slights of my fellow-countrymen, and at the same time escape from and retaliate for the annoyances of the Turkish officials, I sent to Corfu for a little cutter-yacht, and until it came sent my family to Syra. All official intercourse had ceased between the Commissioner and myself, and, encouraged by our Secretary of Legation, who maintained a correspondence with the dragoman of the Commission, the Pasha showed his determination to drive me out of the island. It was forbidden to let me a house, the one I had having become untenable from the number of military hospitals gathered round it. I found it almost impossible to be served in the market, which was under official control, and every movement I made was so watched, and locomotion made so dangerous by the random discharges of the muskets of the irregulars, which were fired off on all occasions, and even with none, the balls constantly being heard passing overhead, that I determined on passing the summer on board the Kestrel, which I did, running from port to port in the island, and over to the Greek islands, whenever the fancy took me. In this way I revenged myself most agreeably. My satisfaction was greatly increased by seeing the disgrace of my adversary, the Commissioner, who was recalled, having utterly failed in everything but devastation. He was replaced by Hussein Avni, a cautious and heavy-witted man, a good disciplinarian, but a most fanatical Mussulman, and so forewarned of my dangerous qualities that I found, to my great amusement, that I was considered the head and front of the insurrection. As with all the espionage they could apply, no act of complicity could be discovered, I was credited with superhuman cunning, it never entering the heads of the rusÉs Mussulmans that I had nothing to conceal, and that, while they were watching my house at Kalepa, the insurgent messengers came in at the city gates almost every day. In fact, except as a witness of events, I had ceased to be of any importance to the insurrection; and, entirely unsupported by any moral or diplomatic influence of my own Government, and wearied of a struggle which brought to me but a succession of spectacles of misery and barbarity, I would gladly have left the island, where the extraordinary expense of living was devouring my substance without any recompense, but that I had become in public opinion, both in Greece and Crete, so identified with the existence of the insurrection that my resignation or recall would have been a danger to it in the eyes of its friends. The moral intervention of my own Government amounted to the despatch before quoted, a fustian despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Morris about "the brave and suffering Cretans," and a buncombe resolution of Congress, in view of which the people of the East, having to deal generally with governments whose words have a positive value, supposed that we were the friends of the Cretans, and I determined to avail myself of the delusion, as far as my own position was concerned, and conform to what was really public opinion in America, confident that the Government cared nothing about the matter pro or con. The Porte threatened to revoke my exequatur. Nothing would have pleased me better, for I knew that this would compel my Government to do something, and Ali Pasha seemed to have the same opinion, for the threat was dropped. A strong pressure was then applied at Washington to have me recalled, and Mr. Seward had consented, and decided to call me home, I was informed, under pretext of consultation on some public affairs; but General Ignatieff, getting wind of it, telegraphed to St. Petersburg that I must be retained, and a telegram from there to Washington settled the matter, I conjecture, as nothing more was heard of it. This I believe was the extent of the part performed by the American Government, and, trivial as it was, it seems to me the least creditable played by any government concerned.

Hussein Avni was only the locum tenens of the Serdar Ekrem, Omar Pasha, whom the Porte had decided on sending to Crete as a final and reliable agent, his name being, as was supposed, so formidable as to discourage any protraction of the resistance. In the interregnum, Hussein undertook no measures against the insurrection. Ali Riza Pasha, being beaten at Topolia in an attempt to penetrate into Selinos, where a new gathering of volunteers and insurgents had been made, contented himself with ravaging the plain districts of Kissamos which had hitherto escaped. Whole villages, which had submitted without any resistance, were plundered, the women violated by order of the officers, until in some cases death ensued; and of the men, some were killed, others beaten and tortured in many ways, all who could escape taking refuge in the caves and hiding-places along the shore, where they escaped by small boats to Cerigotto. I ran over later in the Kestrel, and saw several hundred of these miserable wretches, women and children mainly, and saw two row-boats arrive with their lading, so crowded that it was a marvel how they could have made the passage of twenty miles or more of open sea, in any weather. I saw one old blind man of ninety who had been wrapped by the soldiers in cloths on which they poured oil, and then, setting them on fire, left him to his fate. His friends came back in time to save his life, but I saw the broad scar of the burning, covering nearly his whole chest.

Omar Pasha arrived on the 9th of April, and on the 11th a body of 2,000 insurgents came down to the heights of Boutzounaria, and attacked the guard of the aqueduct, to show his Highness, apparently, that they were not discouraged. They were driven back with the loss of three killed, the plan of attack having been betrayed by a miller in the neighborhood, and the troops been reinforced in the night before the appointed day. At the same time, a more decidedly offensive strategy seemed to be adopted by the whole insurrection, owing to the new material brought over by the Arkadi, and in several places combats of comparative importance took place. The insurgent chiefs made no concealment of their satisfaction at the change in the command, fearing the wiles and personal influence of Mustapha more than all the artillery and discipline of the Generalissimo. Omar had landed with great pomp and circumstance—horses and guns, cavalry and a staff, new and splendid uniforms. Amongst the others I paid my respects to the new victim, and found him, to my surprise, a weak, conceited, bombastic old man. He assured me that his plan and appliances were so complete and irresistible that within two weeks from the time he set out the insurrection would be crushed. I ventured to suggest that he would find on getting into the interior that the work was much more difficult than he imagined, and that the neglect of the Porte to construct good roads when they had command of the island made their work very difficult. He replied that it could not be more difficult than Montenegro, and he had conquered that, etc. I left him with much less apprehension for the success of the campaign than I had previously entertained. He was a strong contrast to the quiet, concentrated, rusÉ Mustapha.

The political intervention of Russia commenced at this juncture by the negotiation of a secret arrangement with the Viceroy, by which he engaged to withdraw his troops from Crete, and a division was actually embarked for Egypt before the Serdar Ekrem succeeded in arresting the defection, which was completed on his return from the campaign, seven months later, when a number, which, with the previous departure, amounted to about 10,000 men, the remainder of a total of 24,000 Egyptians landed in Crete, returned to Egypt. The change in French policy was also marked by the recall of the slavishly pro-Turkish consul DerchÉ, incapable either of honesty or good policy, and whose demoralization had made him worthless even to his own government, and the replacing of him by M. Tricou, a clever, quick-witted Parisian, but long in the service, and lately stationed at Alexandria. There seems to be little doubt that he was authorized to use his eyes to the disadvantage of Omar Pasha if possible. [Tricou arrived just too late to be received by Omar before setting out, and followed him to Candia with the intention, if not the order, to follow him through his campaign; a surveillance which Omar bluntly declined, to his cost, as events proved.]

He occupied about two weeks in organizing his troops, receiving heavy reinforcements from Turkey, including some splendid-looking regiments with full ranks, and then, with about 15,000 men, set out for the conquest of Sphakia. The Cretans, as if to reply to the new manifesto of the Porte, formed a provisional government, and chose Mavrocordato, an able Greek administrator, and most trustworthy and patriotic man, as president, decreeing at the same time that all authority should be exercised in the name of the King of the Hellenes. But the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of reconciling the claims of the rival chieftains, and of enforcing any kind of administrative system in the island, deterred Mavrocordato from assuming his post, though the brutum fulmen of proclamation on both sides still continued, the only practical question being which side would stand most killing. Strategy on either side was of trivial importance, tactics of none. The Cretans rolled stones and felled trees into the passes, already nearly impassable, and Omar and his staff planned, on the chart, a campaign for a country none of them had ever seen, and with the greatest contempt for the judgment of those who knew it. Mehmet Pasha, who still retained command in the Apokorona, though he had been obliged to retreat to the seaside, advanced anew, and formed an entrenched camp near Vrysses, while Omar, with the bulk of the army, moved on to Episkopi, and waited there the arrival of the troops at Retimo. When all were ready, a joint attack was made, by Mehmet on Krapi and the Serdar Ekrem on Kallikrati, a much longer but less precipitous pass, which led into AskyfÓ from the east.

Zimbrakaki, with Veloudaki and other Cretan chiefs, and Soliotis of the Greeks, commanded at Krapi, and Coroneos at Kallikrati, and the affair ended as had all the former attacks, Mehmet being driven back to his camp, and Omar to Episkopi. These were affairs of sharpshooters entirely, where no opportunity of employing discipline for the attack offered, and the troops exposed themselves to a fusillade which they could not reply to. But, with the irritation of defeat, the Ottoman Generalissimo gave way to the most brutal impulses of revenge. Villages which had just submitted, and whose people had remained within the Turkish lines, were put to sack, and the last outrages of war perpetrated on the inhabitants.

The rumor which accompanied the Serdar Ekrem, that in spite of his professions of moderation and legality (as opposed to Mustapha's policy) he had secret orders to stamp out the disaffection by the severest rigor, found now clear confirmation. What under the Commissioner, subsequent to Arkadi, was variable and overlooked barbarity in the subordinates, was, under the Generalissimo, the law and order of things, and he himself partook of the plunder of the defenceless, and rejuvenated the lusts of his old age with the pick of the captive Cretan maidens. The testimony of several of the European officers in the army was offered me, proving that Omar Pasha dishonored even his adopted country by his violation of his word, by his depravity and his cruelty, and himself set the example to his army of everything which could add to the misery and despair of unhappy Crete.

It is as natural for the Turkish authorities to deny as for the Christians to exaggerate the atrocities committed, but evidence of a nature not to be rejected, or even questioned in its general import, establishes that the policy adopted was one of subduing Crete by terror, and to this end full license was given to the soldiery. One entry in a memorandum book kept by Geissler (Dilaver Pasha), Omar's chief of artillery, and which I had the chance to read, said, noting the entry into one of the villages near GoÏdaropolis: "O. Pasha ordered the division to ravage and rape." All villages were burned, and all prisoners murdered or worse. The chiefs of four villages who came to make their submission were at once beheaded. The population invariably fled to the high mountains on the approach of the troops.

It will hardly be edifying to follow further in detail this barbarity; and with the general statement that the policy here indicated was followed throughout Omar's campaign unflinchingly, and that the French consul was refused permission to accompany Omar in his movements, that no civilized witness might bring his deeds to light, I shall drop the theme, which sickens me to recall even at this long interval. My duty then compelled me to investigate, as now to declare, these things, but I spare the civilized world and myself any further recital of the deeds of the Croat Pasha.

The 6th of May a force of volunteers, commanded by Dimitrikarakos, landed in the eastern provinces, where up to that time hostilities had been very unimportant. A large body of insurgents quickly rallied round the volunteers, and, establishing their headquarters at Lasithe, they swept the country up to the walls of Candia. This compelled a new concentration of forces to meet the new emergency, and Omar set out, via Retimo, through Mylopotamo to Candia, sending word to Reschid Effendi to come to meet him en route. Coroneos, meanwhile, had not been idle, and while Zimbrakaki and Costa Veloudaki, with the Apokoroniotes, some volunteers, and most of the Sphakiotes, remained to keep Mehmet in check, and profit by an unguarded moment to attack him, Coroneos and his followers kept near the army of Omar Pasha, waiting until he should be entangled in the ravines of Mylopotamo to attack him, and when he had reached Margaritas, he was beset furiously by the whole body of the men of Agios Basilios and the Amariotes, with the volunteers who accompanied Coroneos. The Turks, shut into narrow ravines overlooked by bold heights, defended themselves with difficulty, and were soon entirely hemmed in, unable to advance or retreat. The fire of the Cretan rifles penetrated into every part of the Turkish encampment, Omar's tent being several times pierced. At a council of war, called on the emergency, the opinion was general that the position was critical, and some considered it as next to hopeless. There was nothing to do but take shelter and wait for Reschid and his irregulars, who, well acquainted with the mountains and the Cretan method of fighting, would be able to form an advance-guard, and, by skirmishing vigorously, protect the march of the regulars, utterly helpless in this kind of warfare.

The passage of the troops through this section was described to me by several eye-witnesses as anything but military. They cowered at the first attack, and refused to move forward in the ravines except when preceded by a cloud of irregulars to drive back the Christians, every onslaught of whom produced a panic; but, as they were behind as well as before, retreat was impossible, and there was no alternative to the Turks but to take to such defences as the ground permitted and defend themselves as they best could. The Albanians and Circassians were not sufficiently acquainted with the country, cut up with interminable ravines, covered with olive groves, and defended by men who knew every inch of the ground. The wretched Turks lost all courage, even that of despair, and a European officer in the Egyptian service who was present said to me that most of his comrades entertained no hope of escape, and Coroneos has since assured me that if the other chiefs had responded to his call for help, the total destruction of the army, including the Serdar Ekrem and his staff, was practicable.

As has generally been the case in Greek wars, the jealousies of the chiefs were the safety of the Turks. Petropoulaki, a Mainote palikari of the old war, who commanded in Malavisi and Temenos, and watched Candia from the eastern slopes of Ida, refused to come to the aid of Coroneos; and when Reschid moved from the east, entered the defiles of Mylopotamo at Damasta, instead of throwing himself before the Turkish division and delaying their advance, he attacked them in the rear after they had gone through, and, though he inflicted severe losses on them and took much of the baggage, he rather facilitated than otherwise the junction of the two Turkish corps, and, after a short pursuit, abandoned him, instead of following up and uniting with Coroneos. Skoulas, chief of Mylopotamo, alone kept up the chase, and Coroneos, warned in time of the advance of Reschid, despatched a small body of men to oppose his junction with Omar. Reschid, however, with the greatest obstinacy and gallantry, hammered away regardless of loss, and, fighting all night long, effected his junction, with which Coroneos's hope of bottling up Omar was lost. The Generalissimo embraced Reschid as his saviour, and promoted him on the spot. What made the matter still worse for the Cretans was that their ammunition was exhausted, and supplies did not arrive in time, so Coroneos reluctantly fell back, leaving the way open. The next day his ammunition arrived.