Napoleon’s two reverses between the Treaty of Tilsit and the Congress of Erfurt—England sends an army to Portugal—Campaign of Vimeiro and Convention of Cintra—The Revolution in Spain—Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain—Victory of Medina del Rio Seco and Capitulation of Baylen—Napoleon in Spain—Sir John Moore’s advance—Battle of Corunna—The Resurrection of Austria—Ministry of Stadion—Campaign of Wagram—Treaty of Vienna—Campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula—Battle of Talavera—Expedition to Walcheren—Napoleon and the Pope—Annexation of Rome—Revolution in Sweden—Revolution in Turkey—Treaty of Bucharest—Greatest Extension of Napoleon’s dominions—Internal Organisation of his Empire—The new Nobility—Internal reforms—Law—Finance—Education—Extension of these reforms through Europe—Disappearance of Serfdom—Religious Toleration—Reorganisation of Prussia—Reforms of Stein and Scharnhorst—Revival of German National feeling—Marriage of Napoleon to the Archduchess Marie Louise—Birth of the King of Rome—Steady opposition of England to Napoleon—Policies of Canning and Castlereagh—Campaigns of 1810 and 1811 in the Peninsula—Signs of the decline of Napoleon’s power between 1808 and 1812.

The Treaty of Tilsit marked the greatest height of Napoleon’s power in Europe; at the Congress of Erfurt he seemed, indeed, to be as powerful as at Tilsit; but during the interval he had experienced two serious mishaps. The first of which was caused by the fact that England, which had hitherto fought the French upon the sea, and had met with only slight success in purely military expeditions, began in 1808 a serious effort to break the tradition of the invincibility of the French army.

The last important campaign upon the Continent in which an English army had taken part, was in 1793–1795. Since that time many English expeditions had been despatched to carry out isolated plans; some of these expeditions had been crowned with success, such as Abercromby’s and Hutchinson’s reconquest of Egypt in 1801, and Stuart’s brilliant little campaign of Maida in 1806; others had been egregious failures, notably the Duke of York’s campaign in Holland in 1799, and Lord Cathcart’s landing in Hanover in 1805. Confident in their naval superiority, the English Ministers, ever since 1795, had paid more attention to the military occupation of islands than to the despatch of armies to the mainland. Acting on this policy, the English had conquered the French West Indies in 1793 and 1795, and again proceeded in 1809 to reoccupy those which had been restored to France at the Peace of Amiens. When Spain declared herself the ally of France, England occupied her chief West Indian possession, the Island of Trinidad; when the subjection of Holland to France became manifest, England conquered the Cape of Good Hope in 1797, and again after the Treaty of Amiens, in 1805. Nor did the English ministers neglect the more distant possessions of her various enemies. Ceylon and Java were taken from the Dutch in 1796 and 1807 respectively; the Mauritius was conquered from France in 1809, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to conquer Spanish South America, Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, in 1806. But England did not confine her policy of attacking islands to distant seas; she also established herself firmly in the Mediterranean. In 1797 Minorca was taken, in 1801 Malta, and eventually in 1805 an English army, as has been said, garrisoned Sicily. The policy of Fox was identical with that of Pitt, and favoured small, detached expeditions; some of these were failures, like the expedition to South America in 1806, and that to Egypt in 1808, but others attained their end. Now, however, a new policy began to make way. Instead of isolated expeditions and the occupation of islands which could be defended by the English fleets, it was resolved once more, as in 1793, to disembark a powerful English army on the Continent, and to try military conclusions with the French.

In order that England should act effectively on the Continent, it was necessary that her army should have a friendly base of operations. The failure of the expedition to Bergen in 1799, and of many similar expeditions, proved that it was impossible to expect complete success when the disembarking army had to fight from the moment of its landing, and had to secure its communications with the sea. An opportunity was afforded for obtaining such a base of operations as was necessary, by an insurrection breaking out in Portugal against the French invaders. It has been said that General Junot occupied the whole of Portugal without much difficulty, except the northern and southern provinces, which were held by Spanish armies. Junot partitioned out the country into military governments under French generals, whose oppressive behaviour exasperated the people. After the outbreak of the revolution against the French in Spain, the Spanish forces in Portugal retired, and Oporto at once declared itself independent of France, and elected a Junta of Government, headed by the Bishop. Isolated risings took place all over the country. Many French officers and soldiers were murdered, and the insurgents were punished with the most rigorous cruelty. The Junta of Oporto was, however, unable to make head against Junot, for the best regular troops of the Portuguese army had been despatched to join the Grand Army in Germany. The Junta had therefore to depend upon undisciplined militia, and feeling the impossibility of combating the French regular troops in the field, applied for help to England. This gave the English ministers their opportunity. A force which had been collected at Cork, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, for an expedition to South America, was ordered instead to proceed to Portugal. He was joined by some other troops, and disembarked at the mouth of the Mondego river. He marched southwards towards Lisbon, and defeated a French division at RoriÇa on the 17th of August 1808. After receiving further reinforcements, he was attacked by Junot at Vimeiro on the 21st of August, and won a decisive victory. On the field of battle Wellesley was superseded by Sir Harry Burrard, and he in his turn by Sir Hew Dalrymple. Instead of following up the victory, the latter general concluded the Convention of Cintra, by which Junot agreed to evacuate Portugal. From a military point of view this was a poor sequel to the victory of Vimeiro; from a political point of view it was a signal success. Portugal was freed from the French as speedily as she had been conquered by them, and England thus secured a friendly base of operations. The three generals were all recalled, and Sir John Moore took command of the English army. A Council of Regency was established, and an English officer, General Beresford, was sent to organise a Portuguese army, partly under the command of English officers, and wholly paid by the English Government.

The loss of Portugal was the first serious reverse which Napoleon had met with from a trained and disciplined army. But at the same time he was made to feel the difficulty of overcoming even an unorganised national rising, with the very best of troops. It has been mentioned that the King of Spain and the Queen’s favourite, Godoy, were partners to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which arranged for the dismemberment of Portugal. Spain had been the consistent ally of France ever since the Treaty of Basle in 1795, and in the cause of France had lost not only the islands of Minorca and Trinidad, but two gallant fleets in the naval battles of Cape St. Vincent and Trafalgar. Nevertheless, Napoleon deliberately determined to dethrone his faithful ally Charles IV. It is said that after the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples, Godoy had made overtures for joining the coalition against France, but after the victory of Jena the Court of Madrid, if it had ever thought of opposing the will of Napoleon, became more obsequious than ever. Court intrigues gave the French Emperor the opportunity he desired for interfering with the affairs of Spain. The heir to the throne, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, hated his mother’s lover, Godoy, and for sharing in a plot against the favourite was thrown into prison. He appealed for help to Napoleon, and Charles IV., his father, on his side also appealed to the French emperor. Napoleon began to move his troops across the Pyrenees, and a French army under the command of Murat approached Madrid. The King of Spain was rumoured to be about to follow the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to leave the country. The population of Madrid rose in insurrection and maltreated Godoy, who fell into their hands. Charles IV. then abdicated in favour of his son, who proceeded to France to obtain the support of Napoleon. Charles IV. and his Queen followed Ferdinand, and when the Spanish royal family was assembled at Bayonne, Charles IV. was induced to cede the crown of Spain to Napoleon, who conferred it on his brother Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples, on the 6th of June 1808. But it was one thing to proclaim Joseph King of Spain and the Indies; it was another to place him in power. The patriotism of the Spanish people was stirred to its depths, and the Spaniards declined to accept a new monarch supported by French troops. In every quarter insurrections broke out and juntos were formed. Appeals were made to England for help, and money, arms, ammunition and English officers were disembarked at all the chief ports of Spain. In the month of May the mob of Madrid drove out the French soldiers of Murat, who had to retire behind the Ebro. But mobs and undisciplined militia can never stand against regular troops. Marshal BessiÈres defeated the best Spanish army under the command of General Cuesta at Medina del Rio Seco on the 14th of July 1808, and on the 20th of July Joseph entered Madrid. Before his arrival at his new capital, flying columns had been sent in every direction, and one of these on its way to Cadiz met with a serious disaster. This was the famous Capitulation of Baylen. The French division of General Dupont was surrounded at that place and forced to capitulate. By the terms of the Capitulation, Dupont engaged that not only the soldiers under his immediate command, but also that two fresh divisions which were coming up should surrender. The Capitulation of Baylen deprived Napoleon of the services of 18,000 men, but the loss of prestige could not be estimated by numbers. The Spanish insurgents were greatly encouraged and rose in every quarter; a guerilla warfare was begun, which was in the end more fatal to the French army than regular defeats, and Napoleon had for the first time to fight a nation in arms. This was an exact reversal of the situation of affairs in the wars of the French Revolution; at that time it was the French nation in arms which defeated the disciplined soldiers of the Continental monarchs; now it was the Spanish nation in arms which counteracted the schemes of Napoleon. It is almost impossible to estimate the losses experienced by the French during the war in the Iberian Peninsula; the defeats inflicted on them by the Anglo-Portuguese army accounted for but a small portion of this loss; it was the harassing duty of maintaining garrisons in every town and almost in every posting-house which exhausted the French army.

It need hardly be said that Napoleon was far from expecting such disasters as the Capitulation of Baylen and the Convention of Cintra. He had been so accustomed to victory that he could not understand the change in his affairs. He looked upon these two events as having only a temporary importance, and proceeded to the Congress at Erfurt with a light heart. Though checked in Spain, he was none the less the master in Germany, and the monarchs of Central Europe did not know that he had reached his zenith and was about to decline. The Emperor Alexander alone seems to have had some suspicion of the truth, for he entered into fresh relations with England by means of the strong English party at his Court, which was headed by the Empress-mother. As soon as the Congress of Erfurt was over, Napoleon proceeded to Spain in person, accompanied by his Guard and his most experienced troops, and surrounded by his most famous generals. After the Capitulation of Baylen, Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid, and with the bulk of the French army had retreated behind the Ebro. He was there joined by Napoleon, who had under his command no less than 135,000 men. He rapidly advanced upon Madrid; Marshal Soult defeated the Spanish Army of the Centre at Burgos on the 10th of November; Marshal Victor the Spanish Army of the Left at Espinosa on the 11th of November; and Marshal Lannes the Army of the Right at Tudela on the 3d of November. In spite of the snow, the Emperor in person forced the pass of the Somo Sierra, and on the 13th of December received the capitulation of Madrid. The victories of his lieutenants and his own rapid and successful advance on the capital, convinced Napoleon that the difficulties of the Spanish war had been exaggerated, and the result of this impression was that he neglected in after years to strengthen his armies in Spain sufficiently, and attributed all failures to the incompetence of his generals, instead of to the obstinate tenacity of his opponents.

After occupying Madrid, the Emperor next determined to turn his strength against the English forces in the Peninsula. Sir John Moore, who was in command of the English army in Portugal, could not believe that the Spanish armies were too weak to face the French; but when he heard that Napoleon was at Madrid, he resolved to make a diversion in order to prevent him from conquering Andalusia, and to give time for the Junta of Seville to organise the defence of that province. Leaving a small division to protect Portugal under Sir John Cradock, Moore, with the bulk of the English army, invaded north-west Spain and advanced as far as Salamanca and Toro. Napoleon, as Moore had expected, put off the invasion of Andalusia and turned against the English. Moore having thus effected his purpose, then fell back into Galicia. In the midst of most terrible weather he effected one of the most famous retreats in history, turning occasionally to face his pursuers, and fighting several brilliant rear-guard actions. Napoleon conducted the pursuit in person for some time, but hearing that Austria was preparing for war, he handed over the command to Soult and suddenly returned to France. Soult did not come up with the English army until it had reached Corunna, and was waiting there to embark. A battle was fought to protect the embarkation of the English, in which Sir John Moore was killed, and Soult, whose losses during the rapid pursuit had been very great, turned southwards to occupy Oporto.

The Treaty of Pressburg had made a very painful impression, not only upon the mind of Francis I. of Austria, but also on the Austrian people. The indignation aroused by the cession of Dalmatia and the loss of Venice, which had been given to the House of Austria as compensation for the Milanese, had exasperated the Austrian people. But, on the other hand, the Hungarians were inclined, like the Poles, to look to Napoleon as the possible restorer of their national independence. The policy of the Emperor Francis had been to treat the Hungarians, whom he had placed under the rule of his brother, the Archduke Joseph, as semi-independent, and to make as little change as possible in the Hungarian Constitution. He regarded his German provinces as the really important portion of his dominions, and gave them his undivided attention. After the Treaty of Pressburg, the Emperor dismissed his chancellor and prime minister Cobenzl, and replaced him by Count Philip Stadion. The new Chancellor was a thorough German, though descended from a Grisons family, and the main point of his policy was to rouse the patriotism of the Germans as a nationality against the French. In fact, from 1805 until the outbreak of war in 1809, Stadion endeavoured to arouse the national spirit which afterwards made Germany successful in the final war of liberation against Napoleon. He circulated patriotic literature, and formulated the idea of German unity, which he saw must take the place of the extinct notion of the Holy Roman Empire. He was successful in rousing the German popular feeling to the greatest height in the German provinces of Austria; but the time was not yet ripe for the expression of a similar sentiment throughout the whole of Germany. The weight of the Continental Blockade was not experienced in its fullest form until after 1809. And the patriotic feeling which was to have so full a development could not be stirred up in a moment. But in the German territories of Austria Stadion was completely successful. The Emperor Francis himself was a thorough German, and during the progress which he made through his states in 1808, with his beautiful second wife, the Empress Ludovica, a princess of Modena, roused the utmost enthusiasm. Ever since the Peace of Pressburg the Archduke Charles, as Commander-in-Chief, had been organising the military power of Austria; regiments of volunteers were formed in Vienna and all the large cities; and the militia for the first time were disciplined and trained for offensive war, and not maintained merely for the preservation of the peace. While the smaller princes of Germany were obsequiously doing honour to Napoleon at Erfurt, the Emperor of Austria was preparing for war. The successful insurrection of the Spaniards, and the Capitulation of Baylen, encouraged Stadion in his belief that if a national feeling could be roused against the French domination, it would be as successful in Germany as in Spain. The English Ministry encouraged the attitude of the Austrian Emperor, and promised not only large subsidies if an Austrian army would take the field, but also that a powerful diversion should be made in the Netherlands by an English army. Napoleon heard of this disposition of Austria in 1808, but at first paid very little heed to it. During his winter campaign in the Peninsula, however, it became obvious that the Austrians were in a hurry to come to conclusions with him, and he therefore hastened back from Spain to make his preparations for this new war, instead of pursuing the English to Corunna.

From both the political and the military point of view, Napoleon was justified in believing in 1809 that he had little to fear from the intervention of Austria. The South German princes, like the Kings of Bavaria and WÜrtemberg, had been too much favoured by him to desire to oppose him, and willingly sent their contingents to serve in his ranks. From the population of his new creation, the kingdom of Westphalia, he looked for assistance, not opposition, and what remained of Prussia was occupied by French armies. The Emperor Alexander of Russia, still under the glamour of the interview at Erfurt, and the grand promises for the division of the world repeated to him there, showed no inclination to assist Austria. Indeed, the feeling of opposition between Austria and Russia, which had shown itself in 1799 and 1800, had been augmented by the unfortunate campaign of Austerlitz. Each ally blamed the other for that disaster; the Austrian officers openly declared that they hated a Russian more than a Frenchman, and the Russians reciprocated this feeling. Austria’s only ally, therefore, was England. From a military point of view, the Austrian army had not yet been sufficiently reorganised, in spite of the efforts of Stadion and the Archduke Charles, to make a successful resistance to the French; but, as the event of the campaign showed, it was able to make a better stand than it had ever made before.

In April 1809 the Archduke Charles, amid the greatest enthusiasm of the Austrian people, issued a manifesto to the German race, and at the head of 170,000 men advanced into Bavaria. At the same time another army, under the Archduke John, invaded Italy. At that moment Napoleon had only two corps d’armÉe in Southern Germany, one under the command of Marshal Davout at Ratisbon, and the other under Marshal MassÉna at Augsburg. The Archduke Charles intended to get between the two marshals and defeat them separately. But Napoleon arrived in person, with some of the finest troops he had been employing in Spain, before the Archduke could complete his operations. On the 20th of April he defeated the Austrian left at Abensberg, and on the 22d he routed the Austrian right under the Archduke in person at EckmÜhl. In the five days’ fighting, which included these battles, the Austrians lost 7000 men in killed and wounded, and 23,000 prisoners. In the result it was the Austrians, not the French, who were cut in two, and Napoleon rapidly followed the Austrian left to Vienna. The capital surrendered on the 12th of May, and Napoleon then resolved to cross the Danube and attack the main body of the Austrian army under the Archduke Charles. He attempted to pass the river at the point where is situated midway the island of Lobau. When the greater part of his army had reached the island he pushed across to the other bank, and on the 21st and 22nd of May stormed the villages of Aspern and Essling. But on the evening of the second fight he found it necessary to withdraw into the island of Lobau, for his bridges of boats which connected the island with the right bank of the river had been swept away, and his ammunition had fallen short. The Tyrolese, too, had risen under Hofer, and Napoleon’s position was most critical. Nevertheless he determined not to retreat; the island of Lobau became an entrenched camp; stronger bridges were thrown from it to the right bank of the Danube; and reinforcements were summoned from different quarters.

The most important of these reinforcements were supplied by the French Army of Italy, which reached Napoleon in the island of Lobau on the 2nd of July. This army was commanded by the Viceroy of Italy, EugÈne de Beauharnais, whose military adviser and principal subordinate was General Macdonald. The Viceroy had, before Macdonald reached him, been checked at Sacilio by the Archduke John, but after Macdonald’s arrival he pushed on rapidly. A decisive victory, which prevented the Archduke John from pursuing, was won over the Hungarians at Raab on the 14th of June, after which EugÈne de Beauharnais was enabled safely to join the Emperor in the island of Lobau. With his army thus increased, Napoleon crossed to the left bank of the Danube on the morning of the 5th of July, at the head of 180,000 men, many of whom were Westphalians, Bavarians, and Italians. On the following day he completely defeated the Archduke Charles at the battle of Wagram, at which the Austrians lost more than 30,000 men. Though defeated, the Austrian army was not disgraced, and Napoleon himself said, when blamed for not following up his victory, ‘If I had had my veterans of Austerlitz I should have carried out a manoeuvre which, with my present troops, I dare not execute.’ Had the Archduke John come up in time and placed himself under his brother’s command, the battle might have had a different result, and as it was, the Austrian Emperor need not have considered himself forced to conclude peace.

The Emperor Francis, however, did not dare to risk the further event of war, and on the 14th of October 1809 he signed the Treaty of Vienna. By this treaty Austria ceded Trieste, Carniola, Istria, and a large part of Croatia to Napoleon, who added them to Dalmatia, which he had acquired at the Treaty of Pressburg, and made out of them the Government of the Illyrian Provinces. Francis also abandoned the Tyrolese, and ceded the greater part of Salzburg to the King of Bavaria, whose army, along with the Saxon contingent under Bernadotte, had played a great part in winning the victory of Wagram. He had to give up the whole of Western Galicia; the greater part of this province was added to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but certain districts were ceded to the Emperor Alexander, who in reply to the demands of Napoleon had despatched an army to act in that quarter against the Austrians. This action had still further incensed the Emperor of Austria against the Emperor of Russia, while it did not satisfy Napoleon, who complained that the Russians had not acted with sufficient vigour, and had been waiting to hear the result of the main campaign in the neighbourhood of Vienna. In Austria itself the most important result of the war was the retirement of Count Philip Stadion, who was succeeded as Chancellor of State by Count Metternich.

During the campaign of Wagram the French armies left in Spain had been continuing their operations. Before the actual outbreak of war with Austria, Saragossa had been captured on the 21st of February 1809, after an obstinate siege, which proved to the French the mettle of their new opponents. The most important operations had been carried out in three quarters of the Peninsula. In Arragon and Catalonia, General Gouvion-Saint-Cyr acted with considerable skill in a campaign of which the main feature was the reduction of small fortresses, and his successor, General Suchet, steadily pursued the same policy. Both of these generals invariably defeated any Spanish army which met them in the field. From Madrid King Joseph had acted in two different directions. Marshal Moncey took Valencia; Marshal Victor defeated the Spanish army of the South, which was under the command of Cuesta, at Medellin; and General Sebastiani approached the frontiers of Andalusia. But in Portugal the French had again to meet the English, who had in the previous year defeated them at Vimeiro, and drawn them away to Corunna. After the departure of Sir John Moore’s army, Marshal Soult had invaded Portugal from the north and occupied Oporto. There is no doubt that if he had acted boldly he might have captured Lisbon, which was only guarded by a feeble division under Sir John Cradock. But Soult wasted his time in intriguing, it is said, for the throne of Portugal, until the English Ministry had time to reinforce Cradock, and to send Sir Arthur Wellesley to command the army in Portugal. Wellesley speedily dislodged Soult from Oporto, and drove his army in disorder back into Galicia. He then, following the example of Moore, invaded Spain, in the expectation of saving Andalusia. He met the French army in Spain, under the command of Marshal Victor, at Talavera. He repulsed the French attack on his position on the 28th of July, and had he been efficiently assisted by the Spaniards under Cuesta he might have won a great victory. As it was, his success prevented the French from invading Portugal, but it was not sufficiently decisive to save Andalusia. The French army was reorganised; the Spaniards were routed at the battle of Ocana, on the 12th of November, and the whole of the fertile province of Andalusia, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz, fell into the hands of the French.

Unfortunately the English Ministers failed to understand immediately the greatness of the opportunity given to them by Napoleon’s behaviour in the Peninsula, and instead of concentrating all their military strength for the support of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was made Viscount Wellington for his victory of Talavera, they despatched one of the finest armies that ever left England on the Walcheren Expedition. They had promised to assist the Emperor of Austria by making a diversion in the north of Europe. The object of this diversion was Antwerp, on which city Napoleon was spending vast sums of money in the hope of making it the commercial rival of London. This expedition, which was placed under the command of the Earl of Chatham, the elder brother of the younger Pitt, never reached Antwerp. It was landed in the island of Walcheren, and took Flushing in August 1809. It met no French army worthy of the name, but was destroyed as a fighting machine by the pestilences and fevers of the unhealthy island in which it was quartered. The expedition took place too late to be of any service to Austria, for the English army did not disembark until a month after the battle of Wagram had been fought, and in the want of energy with which it was conducted, it may almost be classed with the disastrous expedition to Bergen in 1799. At sea, however, the English fleet maintained its pre-eminence. In this year Guadeloupe, Martinique, and the Mauritius were conquered, and an attempt was made to burn the French fleet in the Basque Roads by Lord Cochrane, which might have been completely successful if he had not been thwarted by the admiral in command, Lord Gambier.

It has been said that one of the measures by which Napoleon secured his ascendency over the minds of the French people was the conclusion of the Concordat by which the schism which had divided the French Church was closed. He had at the commencement of his tenure of power treated the new Pope, Pius VII., with much respect, and the Pope had in return made the Emperor’s uncle, Fesch, a Cardinal, and had come to Paris to crown him Emperor. But troubles soon arose between Napoleon and Pius VII. The Emperor proclaimed himself the successor of Charlemagne, and wished to restrict the Pope entirely to spiritual affairs. The terms of the Concordat were not thoroughly carried out. The Pope would not give Napoleon the supreme authority over the French bishops, which he desired, and His Holiness looked on the transformation of the priesthood in France from an independent body into salaried officials with extreme disfavour. On the Pope’s return to Rome in 1805, he requested that the French troops should evacuate the whole of the former States of the Church. Napoleon did not comply with this request, and not satisfied with ordaining the cession of the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara to the Kingdom of Italy, he occupied Ancona, and confiscated the principalities of Ponte Corvo and Benevento, which he bestowed on Bernadotte and Talleyrand. The declaration of the Continental Blockade increased the dissatisfaction of the Pope, who declined to obey it, as he also did a further order in 1806 to expel from Rome all English, Russian, Swedish, and Sardinian subjects. After some months of perpetual bickering Napoleon directed General Miollis to occupy Rome on the 2nd of February 1808. Pius VII., in the cause of peace, dismissed Cardinal Consalvi, his Secretary of State, but he could not satisfy the demands of the Emperor, and on the 17th of May 1809 the States of the Church in Italy were declared united to the French Empire, and Rome was officially decreed to be the Second City of that Empire. Exasperated by this open insult, Pius VII. excommunicated the French Emperor. Napoleon, who was at that time in his camp in the island of Lobau, ordered that the Pope should be removed from Rome. He was arrested by General Radet on the 6th of July, the day of the victory of Wagram, and forcibly removed to Savona, near Genoa, where he was kept as a State prisoner. Pius VII. in his exile consistently protested against the usurpations of Napoleon, and refused from this time to give canonical institution to the bishops nominated by the Emperor. In 1811 Napoleon attempted to put ecclesiastical affairs in France on a new footing, and summoned a national council or synod of bishops to meet at Paris. But the Pope refused to negotiate with the synod, and he was accordingly removed to Fontainebleau in 1812. While there Napoleon pretended that His Holiness agreed to a new and revised Concordat which was promulgated as a law on the 13th of February 1813. Pius VII. always denied that he had given his consent to the new arrangement, which would have deprived him of his most valued prerogatives, and stated that he had always regarded himself as a prisoner since his removal from Rome. By his conduct towards the Pope Napoleon committed a great mistake. He lost the support of the faithful body of Catholics in France whom he had conciliated in 1801, and he gave a pretext for his enemies to declare him the enemy of religion. The Caesarism which had infected his imagination after his great victories in 1806 and 1807 appeared in his behaviour towards Pius VII. as well as in his intervention with the affairs of Spain.

The year 1809, which witnessed the campaign of Wagram and the overthrow of the Pope, was also signalised by a revolution in Sweden, which was followed by very important results. It has been said that Gustavus IV. remained faithful to the coalition against Napoleon even after the Peace of Tilsit. By that peace it was arranged that the Emperor of Russia should annex Finland. This was carried out in 1808, after a very weak opposition on the part of the Swedes, and in the same year Swedish Pomerania was occupied by the French. In spite of these losses the King of Sweden declared war against Denmark, and then quarrelled with the general of the English army sent to his assistance. For this conduct, which seemed conclusive as to the loss of sanity by the King, the Swedes resolved to dethrone him. At the commencement of 1809 the Baron Adlersparre, the commander-in-chief of the army sent to invade Norway, concluded a secret armistice with the Danes, and marched on Stockholm. On the 13th of March 1809 the King was arrested, and on the 29th he was forced to sign a deed of abdication. This act was ratified by the States of Sweden on the 10th of May, and the King’s uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, was elected King as Charles XIII. A new constitution of an aristocratic type, restoring the power of the Swedish nobles which had been severely curtailed by Gustavus III., was promulgated, and on the 18th of January 1810 the States elected as heir to the throne, since the new King had no sons, the Prince Christian of Holstein-Augustenberg. This young prince died in May of the same year, and the question then arose as to his successor. There was no possible prince of the reigning family, and the king was old and in bad health. It happened that in 1806 the Swedish officers employed in Hanover had made the acquaintance of Marshal Bernadotte, who commanded in that quarter, and it was suggested that he should be elected as Prince Royal. This choice was dictated by a hope that it would please the French Emperor, for Bernadotte was not only one of his most distinguished marshals, but was connected with his family, for both he and Joseph Bonaparte had married daughters of Monsieur Clary, a tradesman of Marseilles. Bernadotte received the consent of Napoleon; on the 19th of October 1810 he abjured Catholicism; and on the 5th of November he was elected Prince Royal by the Swedish Diet. He was at once charged with the direction of foreign affairs and with the reorganisation of the Swedish army, and he played an important part in the overthrow of the French Emperor.

With Sweden and Poland, Turkey had for a long time been considered as the third barrier against the advance of Russia. Bonaparte, like earlier French statesmen, had held this view, but after the Peace of Tilsit he expressed himself as ready and willing to abandon all three countries to the encroachments of Russia. The loss of Finland and Pomerania had reduced Sweden to a minor state; the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was a poor substitute for the Kingdom of Poland, and it is now necessary to observe the effects upon Turkey of her abandonment by France. The Sultan, Selim III., had been thrown into a close alliance with England by Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt when he was but a general of the French Republic, and still more by his daring march into Syria. When he became First Consul, Napoleon endeavoured to destroy the unfavourable opinion entertained of him at Constantinople, and sent thither as his ambassador one of the ablest of the French diplomatists, General Sebastiani, who managed to ingratiate himself with the Porte. The English monopoly of the commerce of the Levant was displeasing to the Porte, and Pitt failed to induce the Sultan to enter into the coalition against France in 1805. In 1807 an English fleet under Sir John Duckworth was sent to compel the Sultan to give up his friendship with the French. After forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, it had to retire without achieving its object, and suffered great loss while sailing down the Straits. This behaviour of England threw the Turks entirely on the side of France. French officers were employed to reorganise the Turkish army, and a regular militia was established. Sultan Selim was a monarch in advance of his times, and endeavoured to introduce certain reforms, but he roused against him both the Muhammadan Ulemas and the Janissaries. The former disliked his civil reforms, the latter his establishment of the militia. Selim was dethroned, and replaced by Mustapha IV. on the 21st of July 1807. But the reign of Mustapha was but of short duration. The Pasha of Rustchuk marched to Constantinople, and when he found that the Sultan Selim had been assassinated, he dethroned Mustapha and placed his nephew, Mahmoud II., on the throne of Turkey. The first event of the new reign was a violent battle between the Janissaries and the freshly organised militia in the streets of Constantinople, after which Mahmoud executed his own brother and most of his relations, and established himself firmly on the throne. The new Sultan, who was a man of extraordinary vigour, was at once attacked by the Russians, as had been arranged by the Treaty of Tilsit. Napoleon had pointed out to Alexander that he could easily annex the Danubian principalities, and he hoped that the Turks would afford enough occupation to the Russian army to prevent it from interfering with his projects in Europe. The Russian attack on Turkey was followed by a treaty of peace between England and the Porte, in spite of the efforts of the French diplomatists; but the English, as usual, considered it enough to send subsidies in money without supplying troops. In 1809 the Turks were defeated at Braila and Silistria, and by the close of 1810 the Russian army under the command of Prince Bagration occupied the whole of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. In 1811 the Russian general Kutuzov crossed the Danube, and occupied both Silistria and Shumla, and the way was opened to Constantinople. But, fortunately for the existence of the Turkish power, Napoleon in 1812 was preparing to invade Russia; the efforts of the French diplomatists to induce the Sultan Mahmoud to continue the war were fruitless; the Porte said that it had too often proved the worthlessness of the French offers of help, and on the 28th of May 1812 a treaty of peace was signed between Russia and Turkey at Bucharest. By this treaty the Turks ceded part of Bessarabia and Moldavia to Russia, and acknowledged the Principality of Servia, but its chief importance in European history is that it relieved the Emperor Alexander from an important enemy at a moment of crisis, and allowed him to turn all his strength against the French invaders.

The period from 1809 to 1812, that is, from the Peace of Vienna to the invasion of Russia, witnessed the greatest extension of the dominions of Napoleon. But this enormous increase of territory did not strengthen France; new difficulties appeared with each fresh advance; and although in 1811 the boundaries of the French power were far more distended than they were in 1808, the Empire was not so strong. By his annexations Napoleon abandoned the principle which he had formerly set before himself. He had declared that the natural boundaries of France were the Rhine and the Alps, and every annexation beyond those natural limits was a distinct act of defiance to Europe. From 1806 to 1808 his policy was to surround France with a belt of subject kingdoms; by his annexations from 1809 to 1812 his borders touched those of the great Continental powers. In the north Napoleon accepted the abdication of his brother Louis, who had protested against the measures taken for maintaining the Continental Blockade, and on the 9th of July 1810 he declared Holland an integral part of the Empire. Holland was divided into eight departments, and lost its existence as an independent nation. Then in pursuance of the Continental Blockade, Napoleon, on the 13th of December 1810, annexed the districts in North Germany from the borders of Holland to the mouth of the Weser. By this step he united the whole coast-line from Friesland to Denmark, and hoped to close entirely the English trade with North Germany. The districts annexed were the Duchy of Oldenburg, the sea-coast of Hanover, the territories of the Princes of Salm and Aremberg, and the free cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and LÜbeck. These districts were divided into four departments, the Ems-SupÉrieur, the Lippe, the Bouches-du-Weser, and the Bouches-de-l’Elbe, with their capitals at OsnabrÜck, MÜnster, Bremen, and Hamburg. These annexations showed what persistent opposition Napoleon met in Germany to the Continental Blockade, when his own brother Louis could not maintain it in Holland, and he was afraid to trust the coast-line of Westphalia to his brother Jerome. Turning further south, Napoleon in 1810 annexed the Valais, which he had declared independent of Switzerland, under the name of the Department of the Simplon. In Italy the most flagrant breach of the former French system was committed. When the kingdom of Italy was formed in 1805, the Emperor had kept Piedmont under his own control in order to command both sides of the Alps, and in 1810 he preferred to amalgamate the Ligurian Republic, Parma, the Kingdom of Etruria, and the States of the Church with his directly-governed departments in Piedmont, rather than to unite them to the Kingdom of Italy. These districts were divided into nine departments, and it is curious to notice such cities as Rome, Genoa, Parma, Florence, Siena, and Leghorn as capitals of French departments. In all, the French Empire at its greatest consisted of one hundred and thirty departments directly administered from Paris, excluding from consideration the Illyrian provinces and the Ionian Islands, which were not treated as departments. Mention has already been made of the subject kingdoms, and it is only to be noted here that Murat, the famous cavalry general and brother-in-law of Napoleon, was made King of Naples when Joseph Bonaparte was promoted to the throne of Spain, and that the infant son of Louis Bonaparte, the former King of Holland, received Murat’s Grand Duchy of Berg. Napoleon also made his favourite sister, Elisa, Grand Duchess of Tuscany and Princess of Lucca and Piombino; his second sister, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla; and his Chief of the Staff and most trusted subordinate, Marshal Berthier, independent Prince of NeufchÂtel.

The administration of this vast empire was purely bureaucratic. Napoleon endeavoured to establish a hierarchy of civil officials, who should be as completely under his direct control as the officers of his army. He ruled the Empire like a general. Implicit obedience to orders was the only means to promotion in his civil, as well as in his military, organisation. He delighted in insisting on this comparison. The Legion of Honour was not a military order, but was conferred with equal freedom on civil officials, and in all matters the Emperor’s will could be consulted and was supreme. No subjects were too minute for his supervision. He reorganised the ancient theatrical company of the ComÉdie FranÇaise with the same attention to detail as a matter of State administration. The development of a bureaucracy dependent on absolutism was in curious contrast to the Constitution of 1791, and the theories which had prevailed at the beginning of the French Revolution. Freedom of petition, freedom of the press, individual liberty, representative institutions, and all the liberties won by the French people were entirely abolished. The censorship of the press was re-established, and carried out with more rigour than it had been even under the Bourbon monarchy. All manuscripts had to be revised before being sent to the printer, and perfectly innocent allusions, which might be interpreted into applying condemnation of the existing order of things, brought upon their authors immediate imprisonment, and the destruction of their books. Individual liberty ceased to exist; for the Emperor exiled and imprisoned at his will. The secret police, which had been organised by FouchÉ, exercised a minute inquisition into the most private affairs, and a crowd of spies kept the Emperor informed of every current of opinion in Paris and throughout the Empire. The arbitrariness of his government was greatly due to his sensitiveness to public opinion, and it is narrated that during his enforced residence in the island of Lobau he was far more exercised in mind by his spies’ reports of the conversations on the subject in the Faubourg St. Germain than by the movements of the Austrians. Representative institutions had been practically superseded by the Constitution of the Year VIII., but the last vestige of a power which could criticise the Emperor’s will, the Tribunate, was suppressed in 1808. The Senate became merely a dignified body to congratulate the Emperor on his victories, and the Legislative Body registered, without murmuring, all his decrees. It is a curious fact that, in 1811, Napoleon imitated the most arbitrary measure of the Committee of Public Safety, and, when the price of corn rose, he fixed a maximum price for its sale in Paris.

Next to his own absolutism Napoleon believed in the principle of heredity. He showed this primarily in the treatment of his own family. He not only brought his mother to Paris, and under the title of Madame MÈre endowed her with a large income, but bestowed on his brothers and sisters, in spite of the marked incapacity of many of them, the most important posts. The kingdoms given to Joseph, Louis, and Jerome Bonaparte were accompanied by the intimation that they were to rule subject to his will, and he exercised an autocratic power over all the members of his family. For instance, he insisted that Jerome should divorce his wife, an American lady named Patterson, because his own consent had not been obtained, and forced him to marry a WÜrtemberg princess. His own lack of children greatly grieved him, and he made various arrangements as to his successor. At one time it was thought he would nominate his step-son, EugÈne de Beauharnais; at another he selected an infant son of his brother Louis to be his heir, and had him baptized by the Pope just after his own coronation in 1805; and when the infant died, he issued a decree, arranging the succession among his brothers and their children in order of seniority. He created his brothers, sisters, and step-children Princes of the Empire, and gave them honorary seats in the Senate and Council of State, and he insisted upon his wife Josephine surrounding herself with all the pomp of a monarchical Court. The desire of creating a Court which should outshine that of the Bourbons caused Napoleon to bid high for the support of the ancient noble families of France. By bestowing large incomes, rapid promotion, and repeated favours he was able to get men and women bearing the oldest names in France to accept office as chamberlains and lords and ladies-in-waiting, while many scions of former sovereign families in Germany and the Netherlands did not hesitate to request admission to such Court offices. But he did not trust solely to the old nobility to form the splendour of his Court; he always suspected that they were sneering at him, and endeavoured to counterbalance them by creating a new nobility. This new nobility was formed entirely from the men who did him good service, whether in military or civil departments. By the side of his marshals, most of whom he created dukes, he ranked his chief diplomatists and ministers, and the example was followed into inferior ranks. Good service as the prÉfet of a department led to a barony as certainly as gallant service in the field at the head of a regiment, and former members of the Convention, who, as Deputies on Mission, had exerted unlimited authority, were content to accept the title of Chevalier of the Empire, the lowest in his new peerage. The peerage of the Empire was strictly hereditary, though in many instances the Emperor assumed the right exercised by former kings of granting permission to adopt an heir. But the new peerage was purely ornamental; it conferred no political power whatever. Napoleon never dreamt of creating a House of Lords; he only conceived the notion of balancing the influence of the old aristocracy by the creation of one dependent entirely on himself. In his desire to maintain the dignity of his new nobles, he granted many of them large incomes and vast estates; his marshals were encouraged to live in the most extravagant fashion by the repeated payment of their debts; and the grant of a peerage was in many cases accompanied by what he called a dotation, which supplied an income sufficient to maintain the dignity. Some of these ‘dotations’ were of princely magnificence. They were largely situated in Italy and Poland, and were intended to make the new possessors independent barons, like the famous paladins of Charlemagne. Among the most important of these grants, after the Principality of NeufchÂtel, which was a semi-independent sovereignty, may be noted the Principalities of Benevento, Ponte Corvo, Parma, Piacenza, and Gaeta, which were conferred upon Talleyrand, Bernadotte, CambacÉrÈs, Le Brun, and Gaudin. By these means Napoleon hoped to keep his subordinates faithful to him, while their influence on opinion would rival that exercised by the old nobility.

But while wielding an undisputed absolutism, Napoleon looked on his position in a spirit similar to that of the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century. Though he would do nothing by the people, he was ready to do much for them. In the path of legal reform he followed up the measure taken by the formation of the Civil Code. He had plenty of learned jurists to carry out his instructions, and the Civil Code was succeeded, in 1806, by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in 1808 by the Commercial Code, and finally by the Penal Code. These great codes form an epoch in the legal history of Europe, and have earned for Napoleon the title of the modern Justinian, though they were only carried out by his directions, and based on the principles laid down, and the work done, by the Constituent Assembly and the Convention. Their great advantage was their simplicity and universality, which checked the tedious delays inherent in all systems of common or uncodified law. In jurisdiction Napoleon also followed the example of the statesmen of the Revolution. He encouraged rapidity in procedure and in the execution of judgments, and he greatly extended the powers of the commercial tribunals in which practical men of business had a voice. In financial matters, as in his legal reforms, Napoleon’s great aim was to attain simplicity, and he reduced the loss in the passage of taxes from the taxpayer to the Treasury to a minimum. His creation of the Bank of France has been mentioned, and by its side he established the Caisse d’Amortissement, which consisted of the pecuniary guarantees of all the collectors of the taxes merged into one fund. These guarantees formed an important sum of money for immediate use as well as a valuable security. Napoleon further managed to pay off that portion of the debt left to him by the Republic, which represented the sums due for the suppression of the old courts of judicature, etc. With regard to the ordinary debt, he preserved Cambon’s great creation of the Grand Livre, which enabled every creditor to become a fund-holder, while the Emperor knew the exact extent of the public debt. The Emperor’s first steps towards the formation of a national system of education have been described, but it was not until after the campaign of Wagram that the system was completed. In 1806 he had organised the Imperial University, but it did not take its final form until 1811. This university was not a university in the English sense. It consisted of the chief professors and teachers, and was intended to include all the professors and teachers throughout France. It was placed under the superintendence of a Grand Master, a celebrated man of letters, Fontanes, and its duty was to superintend the whole course of higher education. In the Emperor’s own words, he wished to create a teaching profession organised like the judicial or the military profession, of which all the professors scattered throughout the country might feel themselves an integral part. In 1808 he granted the university an income of 400,000 livres, in addition to the fees, etc., and declared in favour of the irremovability of its members. To recruit this new teaching profession, Napoleon established the Normal School of Paris for the instruction of those who desired to become professors or teachers.

These great reforms in law, in finance, and in education outlasted Napoleon’s reconstitution of Europe. Their effect spread far beyond the actual limits of France. As a direct result of the French Revolution serfdom disappeared in Switzerland, in Belgium, and in Northern Italy. Napoleon carried on the work further to the east. In the Kingdom of Westphalia, and in all the states of Germany which he created or enlarged, serfdom was entirely abolished. The feudal system was suppressed wherever the influence of the French extended. Maximilian Joseph, King of Bavaria, and his minister, Montgelas, carried out the principles of the French Revolution by abolishing the privileges of the nobility and the clergy. In every direction the French codes were either adopted or imitated; the course of justice was made simple and cheap; education was organised; and the economical rules of the French administration introduced. In more distant countries the same reforms were carried out. By the constitution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the Polish serfs, perhaps the most miserable of all serfs, were freed from their bondage, and absolute equality before the law decreed. In Naples Joseph Bonaparte and Murat, and in Spain Joseph Bonaparte by himself, carried out the same great reforms; and though the reaction after 1815 tended to replace matters on their former footing, it proved to be impossible to restore the old evils in their entirety. Not less admirable was Napoleon’s vindication of the great principle of religious toleration. In Catholic states such as Bavaria Protestants received the priceless boon of religious liberty; in Protestant states like Saxony it was the Catholics who profited by the broad-mindedness of the French Emperor; and in every country the Jews were relieved from the degrading position in which they had been kept. In military organisation the reforms which had made the French army master of the world were introduced by Napoleon. With the disappearance of the petty German states disappeared also the feudal armies. Conscription may, indeed, appear a heavy burden on a state, but in Germany, at any rate, it created for the first time national armies to take the place of the ill-disciplined mercenaries who had hitherto been hired by the petty princes.

The most curious feature in the creation of a new Germany, which was the result of Napoleon’s reforms as much as of his victories, was the formation of new Prussia. In Germany proper, that is, in Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe, reforms were introduced under French supervision, if not always by French agents. In Prussia the reforms came on the initiative of a great minister. The speedy overthrow of the famed Prussian army in the campaign of Jena convinced Prussian statesmen of the necessity for sweeping changes. By the Treaty of Tilsit Prussia was shorn of all the acquisitions in Central Germany which she had received as the price of her consistent neutrality, and was thrust behind the Elbe. On the other side she lost her Polish provinces. Even the small Prussia thus left was occupied by French troops, and was forced to pay a war contribution of a hundred and forty millions as well as to maintain an army of 42,000 men for the service of Napoleon. It would seem that Prussia was to be driven back into the position of a second-rate state, but at this juncture Frederick William III. summoned to his ministry two remarkable men—the Freiherr vom Stein, a Knight of the Holy Roman Empire and a native of Nassau, and Scharnhorst, a Hanoverian officer. Neither of these men were Prussians, but they were both enthusiastic Germans. They believed that Prussia would yet form the key-stone on which German emancipation from the power of Napoleon could be reared. They understood that Prussia must be entirely reconstituted, and that an old-fashioned Prussia could neither combat Napoleon nor lead the new Germany which he had created. Stein, therefore, as Minister of the Interior, adapted the reforms of the French Revolution and of Napoleon to Prussia. He established equality before the law by the abolition of serfdom, he suppressed the territorial privileges of the nobility, and he gave permission to the bourgeois and the peasants to purchase land. He encouraged municipal life by introducing a system of election to municipal offices, and, as far as he could, abolished the social privileges of the nobility. Scharnhorst, as War Minister, reorganised the Prussian army on the French model. He changed it from an entity independent of the people into a national army. Since Prussia was only permitted to maintain an army of 42,000 men, he arranged that as many as possible should obtain a military training by passing through the ranks for a short period. He went further than Napoleon. He did not adopt a system of conscription by which a portion of the population designed by lot should enter the ranks, but insisted that every citizen was bound to military service. Between 1807 and 1810, and the system was continued after his retirement until 1813, Scharnhorst passed a large proportion of the youth of Prussia through the ranks of the army, and thus formed—what Napoleon so greatly needed at the crisis of his career—an effective reserve. It is interesting to observe that it was in the country most maltreated by Napoleon that the French reforms were most successfully initiated. Napoleon perceived the danger, and in 1808 he insisted on the dismissal of Stein, and in 1810 on that of Scharnhorst.

It is a curious sequel to the benefits conferred upon Germany by Napoleon directly and by the influence of French principles that their result was to rouse in Germany, for the first time for many centuries, a truly national feeling. This was caused chiefly by the suppression of the Holy Roman Empire, and its being replaced by states large enough to arouse national patriotism; but it was partly due also to a sense of national degradation inspired by the presence of French armies, and to the fact that the benefits conferred were the gift of a foreign sovereign and not the result of national progress. A universal feeling of opposition to the French grew up in the hearts of the German people. The individualist doctrines, which found favour in the eighteenth century and reached their highest expression in philosophers and poets, such as Herder and Goethe, gave way to a new national sentiment, inspired by a new school of poets and political thinkers represented by KÖrner and Arndt, by Jahn and Friedrich von Gentz. The new spirit was mainly developed among the German youth. Secret societies and clubs were formed to obtain by force the freedom of Germany from the French, and the dissatisfied souls forgot the benefits they had received individually in their resentment at their being granted by France. Austria under the administration of Count Philip Stadion, who was largely inspired by Gentz, endeavoured, in 1809, to take advantage of the revival of German national feeling. But Austria was universally considered as a foreign power whose military prowess was derived from Hungary, and the Emperor Francis in taking the new title of Emperor of Austria gave countenance to this idea. The House of Hapsburg was not regarded as thoroughly German; it was looked on as a foreign dynasty, whose dominions were mainly inhabited by non-German races; its loyalty to the Roman Catholic religion caused it to be suspected by the Protestants; it was blamed for the disorganisation of past centuries; and contemned for its repeated defeats by the French and its selfish policy at the time of the treaties of Campo-Formio and LunÉville.

Prussia, on the other hand, though, like Austria, it was not a truly German state, seemed fitted by history and tradition to embody the idea of German nationality. Even after the defeat of Jena, Frederick the Great and his victory over the French at Rossbach were recalled as distinctively German glories, and the eyes of patriotic Germans were turned to the diminished power of Prussia as the natural lever for the creation of a free Germany. The administrative system of Prussia and its strongly concentrated political theory of the essential unity of the State, as opposed to the new French idea of the omnipotence of the people, which was condemned in German eyes as having led to the absolutism of an adventurer, had always exercised a peculiar fascination over the best intellects of Germany. It was by means of statesmen of foreign birth that Prussia was reorganised and prepared to cope successfully with the power of Napoleon. Stein and Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, York and Lombard were none of them native Prussians; yet they were all in turn attracted into the Prussian service, and were instrumental in bringing about her resurrection as a German power. The war of 1809 first showed Napoleon that he was soon to have a national feeling to deal with in Germany as well as in Spain. While Napoleon was in the neighbourhood of Vienna a Prussian lieutenant of the name of Katt attempted to seize Magdeburg; a Prussian major named Schill pillaged the arsenal and treasury of the Duke of Anhalt, who had often expressed his outspoken admiration for the French Emperor, and invaded Saxony; and the fourth son of the Duke of Brunswick, the heir to the duchy which had been absorbed in the kingdom of Westphalia, raised his Black Legion, which he termed the Army of Vengeance, and carried on a partisan war. Even the person of Napoleon was not safe in Germany. A lad named Staps was shot for imagining an attack on his life at SchÖnbrunn in 1809, and many other conspiracies were discovered by the French police. Napoleon despised this ebullition of popular feeling in Germany, just as he did in Spain, and the measures which he took against it, such as arbitrary arrests, and the shooting of the bookseller Palm, only exasperated the new national patriotism.

The Emperor, as has been said, was a great believer in the hereditary idea, and his not having children to succeed him was more than a personal, it was a political subject of grief to him. The campaign of Wagram had raised him to the height of his power, and he wished to establish his dynasty on a firm foundation. It was therefore for personal, for political, and for European motives, that he resolved on his return from Vienna in 1809 to divorce his wife, the Empress Josephine. It was from no dislike for his wife, but from a stern conviction of political necessity that he took this step. He insisted, that Josephine should preserve her title of Empress, he granted her Malmaison as her palace, with a large income, and he continued his favours to his step-children, EugÈne de Beauharnais, and Hortense, the wife of his brother Louis Bonaparte. On the 15th of December 1809 the divorce was pronounced on the ground that the religious marriage, which had taken place on the day before his coronation as Emperor, was not valid because of the absence of witnesses. The Emperor’s first intention was to wed a Russian grand duchess. He was still enamoured of his idea of dividing the world with the Emperor Alexander, and considered that a relationship with that monarch would best ensure his power. But the Emperor Alexander was beginning to throw off his infatuation for Napoleon. He now perceived, that in the alliance he had made, he gave more than he got, and various causes of discontent were sedulously fomented by his Court and his family. It was further the custom of the Russian Court for the mothers to have the chief choice in the disposing of their daughters’ hands. Now the Empress-mother was a princess of the House of WÜrtemburg, and had imbibed a profound hatred for the French Emperor. She persuaded her son to throw various delays in the path of the Emperor’s desires without actually rejecting his offer. Under these circumstances, Napoleon abruptly changed his mind, and at the suggestion, it is said, of Prince Schwartzenberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, demanded the hand of an Austrian archduchess. The Emperor Francis thought it necessary to yield, and on the 2nd of April 1810, the marriage took place between the French Emperor and the young Archduchess Marie Louise. The ceremony was of the utmost magnificence, and a new Court was formed for the new Empress, which contained many French nobles who had refused to wait on Josephine. On the 20th of March 1811, a son was born to the French Emperor who was created in his cradle King of Rome, and this birth was regarded by Napoleon as finally cementing his power, both in France and in Europe.

During the period from the Treaty of Vienna in 1809 to the invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon had but one declared enemy. The English Ministers, despite the overthrow of Austria and Prussia, and the alliance between France and Russia, persisted in opposing France. Just as Pitt and Grenville could not believe in the stability of the various French revolutionary governments, and therefore maintained the impossibility of concluding permanent peace with France, so their successors, Wellesley and Castlereagh, also declined to believe in the stability of Napoleon’s Empire, and argued that no permanent peace could be made with him. It is just possible, that while Fox was in office in 1806, a peace might have been concluded, but the succession of his victories had inspired Napoleon with a belief in his own invincibility, and he had no idea of negotiating on any basis but the complete recognition of his reconstitution of Europe. Finding it impossible to break the naval power of England, he endeavoured to ruin her commerce by the Continental Blockade, with the result of increasing England’s prosperity, and turning the people of the Continent against him.

Two methods of carrying on the war were supported by Castlereagh and Canning, who were Secretaries of State in the Portland administration from 1807 to 1809. Canning believed in rousing the national feeling of invaded states against the universal conqueror, and for this purpose sent large sums of money to Spain; Castlereagh, on the other hand, thought that as France could no longer meet England at sea, England must meet France on the land. This was the theory which lay at the bottom of the despatch of the first Portuguese and of the Walcheren Expeditions, and in spite of the failure of the latter, it has since been recognised as a correct theory. The victory of Wellington at Talavera, though it had but little actual result on the course of the war in Spain, kept Portugal free from French invasion during the year 1809. But it did more, it inspired the English governing class with the belief that they had at last discovered the right way of fighting Napoleon, and that they had also found a general. Lord Wellesley, the elder brother of Wellington, who was Foreign Secretary from 1809 to 1812, supported the new system with all his might, and under his encouragement Wellington slowly formed the Anglo-Portuguese army by a series of campaigns into a magnificent fighting machine, which, though smaller in numbers than the Grand Army of France, equalled it in discipline and military efficiency.

Napoleon, after his successes in 1808, despised the Spanish levies and the English army. He therefore declined to go in person to the Peninsula, and sent his greatest marshal, MassÉna, to drive the English out of Portugal. A plan of campaign was formed, by which MassÉna was to penetrate Portugal from the north-east, while Soult was to advance from Andalusia in the south-east. The two marshals were to meet at Lisbon. Fortunately for Wellington, not only did Soult not agree with MassÉna, but the latter marshal found it impossible to control his subordinates, Ney, Junot, and Reynier. MassÉna nevertheless marched in the summer of 1810, and Wellington had to fall back before him. On September 27th, MassÉna was repulsed in an attack upon the Anglo-Portuguese position at Busaco, but the English general felt it necessary to retreat further, to the lines which he had fortified in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which are known as the lines of Torres Vedras. As Wellington retired, the Portuguese devastated their country, and when MassÉna came to a halt in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, he found it most difficult to maintain himself on account of the scarcity of provisions. Soult did not come to his help as he had expected, but only advanced as far as the city of Badajoz, which he captured. Throughout the winter of 1810–11, MassÉna remained in front of Wellington, but, in spite of reinforcements, he was unable to attack the Anglo-Portuguese lines, and in the spring of 1811, had to retreat into Spain.

Wellington then divided his army; with one portion he followed MassÉna, and laid siege to Almeida, the other he despatched under Marshal Beresford to form the siege of Badajoz. In the south of Spain, the only city which held for the Junta was Cadiz, which was defended by an Anglo-Spanish army. Marshal Victor was in charge of the besieging force, which was defeated at Barrosa on the 5th of March 1811. In spite of this diversion, Wellington had to meet fresh advances by the main armies of Soult and MassÉna. On the 5th of May 1811, he repulsed MassÉna at Fuentes de Onor after a hard-fought battle, which MassÉna might have won had he been properly supported by Marshal BessiÈres. In the south, Soult was repulsed by Beresford at the battle of Albuera on May 16th. After having thus once more freed Portugal from French invasions, Wellington laid siege successively to Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Though these border fortresses remained in French hands, the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese army surprised Napoleon, who recalled MassÉna in disgrace. But in the east of Spain his generals met with some success. Suchet in 1810 and 1811 reduced Arragon and Valencia, took many fortresses, and destroyed the Spanish army in that quarter, under the command of General Blake, at the battle of Albufera. Throughout central Spain, though no regular Spanish armies took the field, the French were harassed by the Spanish guerillas. These patriotic brigands destroyed the morale of the French troops in Spain and sapped the strength of Napoleon. All the benefits conferred by Joseph Bonaparte, the abolition of feudalism and of the Inquisition, religious tolerance and good laws, counted for nothing. The Spaniards would receive no benefits from a French monarch imposed on them by Napoleon, and it was in Spain that Napoleon first felt the effect of a national opposition, which was at a later date in Russia and in Germany to destroy his power.

The period from the Conference of Erfurt to the invasion of Russia seemed to mark the height of Napoleon’s power, but during it are to be perceived the symptoms of the changes which led to his fall. At Erfurt, Alexander of Russia was still his firm ally. His power was bounded by subject kingdoms, and divided by them from the great states of Europe. In France he was still regarded as the restorer of order and the supporter of religion. By 1812 the situation had changed. The Emperor Alexander was no longer his admirer and faithful ally. The vast extension of the Empire had weakened his power, and the French people were beginning to discover how dearly they were paying in the sacrifice of their individual liberty for the glory of one man. His wanton interference in Spain had raised a new force against him in the shape of the resistance of a nation, and had afforded the English an opportunity to meet him on land. In Germany, too, a national spirit was rising, and Prussia, which he had maltreated, was reorganised, and ready to set itself at the head of Germany. But there was one cause yet more significant which was developed during this period—the character of his soldiers was altered. The Grand Army, which had consisted of veterans trained in the wars of the Revolution, had wasted away at Austerlitz and Jena, Eylau and Friedland, and in the Spanish campaigns. At Wagram he felt how different were the men under his command, and was forced to depend largely on foreign contingents, of whose fidelity he could not be certain; and he was to find in 1812 that the conscripts of the Empire, though full of military ardour and desirous of rivalling the fame of their predecessors, had not the physical strength, the solidity, and the experience of the veterans who had made him Emperor of the French and Master of Europe.

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