  One of the many meanings of Analogy is, Resemblance of Relations. The value of an analogical argument in this sense depends on the showing that, on the common circumstance which is the fundamentum relationis, the rest of the circumstances of the case depend. But, generally, to argue from analogy signifies to infer from resemblance in some points (not necessarily in relations) resemblance in others. Induction does the same: but analogy differs from induction in not requiring the previous proof, by comparison of instances, of the invariable conjunction between the known and the unknown properties; though it requires that the latter should not have been ascertained to be unconnected with the common properties. If a fair proportion of the properties of the two cases are known, every resemblance affords ground for expecting an indefinite number of other resemblances, among which the property in question may perhaps be found. On the other hand, every dissimilarity will lead us to expect that the two cases differ in an indefinite number of properties, including, perhaps, the one in question. These dissimilarities may even be such as would, in regard to one of the two cases, imply the absence of that property; and then every resemblance, as showing that the two cases have a similar nature, is even a reason for presuming against the presence of that property. Hence, the value of an analogical argument depends The conclusions of analogy are not of direct use, unless when the case to which we reason is a case adjacent, not, as before, in time or place, but in circumstances. Even then a complete induction should be sought after. But the great value of analogy, even when faint, in science, is that it may suggest observations and experiments, with a view to establishing positive scientific truths, for which, however, the hypotheses based on analogies must never be mistaken. |
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