CHAPTER VI. TERMINOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE.

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Not only must words have a fixed and knowable meaning; but also, no important meaning should be without its word: that is, there should be a name for everything which we have often to make assertions about. There should be, therefore, first, names suited to describe all the individual facts; secondly, a name for every important common property detected by comparing those facts; and, thirdly, a name for every kind.

First, it conduces to brevity and clearness to have separate names for the oft-recurring combinations of feelings; but, as these can be defined without reference back to the feelings themselves, it is enough for a descriptive terminology, if there be a name for every variety of elementary feeling, since none of these can be defined, or indicated to a person, except either by his having the sensation itself, or being referred through a known mark to his remembrance of it. The meaning of the name when given to a feeling is fixed, in the first instance, by convention, and must be associated immediately, not through the usage of ordinary language, with the feeling, so that it may at once recall the latter. But even among the elementary feelings, those purely mental, and also sensations, such as those from disease, the identity of which in different persons cannot be determined, cannot be exactly described. It is only the impressions on the outward senses, or those inward feelings connected uniformly with outward objects (and, consequently, sciences, such as botany, conversant with outward objects), which are susceptible of an exact descriptive language.

Secondly, there must also be a separate name for every important common property recognised through that comparison of observed instances which is preparatory to induction (including names for the classes which we artificially construct in virtue of those properties). For, although a definition would often convey the meaning, both time and space are saved, perspicuity promoted, and the attention excited and concentrated, by giving a brief and compact name to each of the new general conceptions, as Dr. Whewell calls them, that is, the new results of abstraction. Thenceforward the name nails down and clenches the unfamiliar combination of ideas, and suggests its own definition.

Thirdly, as, besides the artificial classes which are marked out from neighbouring classes by definite properties to be arrived at by abstraction, there are classes, viz. kinds, distinguished severally by an unknown multitude of independent properties (and about which classes therefore many assertions will be made), there must be a name for every kind. That is, besides a terminology, there must be a nomenclature, i.e. a collection of the names of all the lowest kinds, or infimÆ species. The LinnÆan arrangements of plants and animals, and the French of chemistry, are nomenclatures. The peculiarity of a name which belongs to a nomenclature is, not that its meaning resides in its denotation instead of its connotation (for it resides in its connotation, like that of other concrete general names); but that, besides connoting certain attributes which its definition explains, it also connotes that these attributes are distinctive of a kind; and this fact its definition cannot explain.

A philosophical language, then, must possess, first, precision, and next (the subject of the present chapter), completeness. Some have argued that, in addition, names are fitted for the purposes of thought in proportion as they approximate to mere symbols in compactness, through meaninglessness, and capability of use as counters without reference to the various objects which, though utterly different, they may thus at different times equally well represent. Such are, indeed, the qualities enabling us to employ the figures of arithmetic and the symbols of algebra perfectly mechanically according to general technical rules. But, in the first place, in our direct inductions, at all events, depending as they do on our perception of the particulars of the agreement and difference of the phenomena, we could never dispense with a distinct mental image of the latter. Further, even in deduction, though a syllogism is conclusive from its mere form, if the terms are unambiguous, yet the practical validity of the reasoning depends on the hypothesis that no counteracting cause has interfered with the truth of the premisses. We can assure ourselves of this only by studying the phenomena at every step. For it is only in geometry and algebra that there is no danger from the Composition of Causes, or the superseding of one set of laws by another; and that, therefore, the propositions are categorically true. In sciences in general, then, the object should be, so far from keeping individualising peculiarities out of sight, to contrive the greatest possible obstacles to a merely mechanical use of language: we should carefully keep alive a consciousness of its meaning, by referring, by aid of derivation and the analogies between the ideas of the roots and the derivatives, to the origin of words; and as words, however philosophically constructed, are always tending, like coins, to have their inscription worn off, we should be ever stamping them afresh. This we shall effect, if we contemplate habitually, not the formulas which record the laws of the phenomena (for, if so, the formulas will themselves progressively lose their meaning), but the phenomena whence the laws were collected; and we must conceive these phenomena in the concrete, and clothe them in circumstances.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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