  Now, partial truth, as has been affirmed already, is not, in its proportion, less true than the full orb of truth. To act a lie is as base and wicked as to tell a lie, and often more unmanly and contemptible besides: else might the deaf and dumb be unjustly deceived with impunity. A knowledge of casuistry, that is, of the principles of moral science scientifically applied to the living facts of the living present, will be of primal necessity to British statesmen in the twentieth century, which will be a century of few, but strong, principles, and of few, but strong, men to apply those principles. Efficiency, and efficiency through scientific exactitude, will be the characteristic aim of all the great Imperial Powers of the world in the near future. Here, in England, with all our intellectual, moral, and physical virtues (which indeed are neither few nor contemptible), we have been too apt to allow a number of persons to speak for us, able in their way, no doubt, but of limited mental vision, and hopelessly incapable of grappling with the problems that confront a world-wide Empire, embracing a fifth (some say a fourth) of the human race. A democratic Empire must choose leaders that are wise, just, self-controlled, courageous; and then that Empire must entrust freely and fearlessly their destinies with such leaders, who must not be afraid faithfully to go “full tilt” against ignorant prejudice or short-sighted prepossession. Now, wisdom (or prudence) is the cardinal virtue which presides over all the other three virtues. And wisdom (or prudence) tells us that strategy in war, that sometimes necessary evil; diplomacy betwixt the representatives of nations; and above and beyond all the imparting to the general body of the people only so much knowledge of the tendencies of current events as is for the common good, can have intellectual and moral justification on this one fundamental ethical principle only, namely, that partial truth is not less true, in its measure and in its degree, than the full orb of truth. Again; where a sound intellectual and moral basis is not consciously held, man, by the rules that govern his rational nature, will not “walk sure-footedly.” Moreover, it is impossible for a self-respecting free people to allow that essential unity does not prevail betwixt the fundamental principles of both private action and public action. For just wars and politics are not the pawns of a game that has been devised and patented by the devil. Just wars and politics are ethics working in the living present, in the wider field of human conduct. And, properly understood, they are, after their kind, and must be, if they are lawful to rational creatures, as noble and as much under the reign, rule, and governance of the Ideal Man as are those solemn acts of life which have been (amongst other purposes) devised to remind man of the transcendental nature of his origin and destiny. Just as on some wild, tempestuous night, the full orb of the silvery moon is obscured to the eye of the gazer by a dark, driving cloud. Now, it has been said that, partly, because Oldcorne inferred insincerity of heart in Humphrey Littleton, and, partly, because Oldcorne inferred in his questioner pernicious purposes in propounding the question he did propound respecting the moral lawfulness, or otherwise, of the Gunpowder Plot, therefore Oldcorne gave Littleton an answer sounding in partial— that is, in this case, in abstract, in speculative— truth alone. Oldcorne’s own expressed words are as follow:— “In this warie sort I spake to him bycause I doubted he came to entrap me, and that he should take no advantage of my words whither he reported them to Catholics or to Protestants.” Unquestionably, this must have been a reason— one reason, that is— for Father Oldcorne’s flanking, evasive reply, sounding in partial— that is, in this case, in abstract, in speculative— truth alone. For otherwise a man of such approved goodness and established character would have never declared it to be a reason. The contrary supposal it is impossible to entertain. But because Oldcorne’s declared reason was undoubtedly a reason, it does not follow— regard being had to persons, times, and circumstances— either from the demands of universal reason or moral fitness, that it was his only and sole reason, nor (still less) that it was his paramount and predominant reason for his action in question, that is, for his mode of couching the aforesaid Declaration in partial truth alone. What leads to the conclusion with resistless force that Oldcorne’s alleged reason cannot have been his paramount, his predominant, reason is the simple, indisputable fact that such an aim so egregiously miscarried. Therefore, in the case of so astute and clever a man, as all the evidence we have concerning Oldcorne to demonstration proves him to have been, it is rendered probable, to the degree of moral certainty, that the great casuist had some far stronger reason latent within him than the reason he chose to put forth for couching an answer to Humphrey Littleton, sounding in partial truth alone. Besides the sufficient, indeed, yet inferior reason, Yea, Father Oldcorne, I maintain, gave Humphrey Littleton the flanking, evasive answer that he did give him, notwithstanding the inevitable, possible, and even probable dangers attendant thereon, because he (Oldcorne) felt within himself, “to the finest fibre of his being,” a freedom, a three-fold freedom, which warranted, justified, and vindicated him in so answering. Now this freedom was a three-fold freedom, because it was a thrice-purchased freedom. And it was a thrice-purchased freedom because it had been purchased by the merits:— (1) Of the personal, actual repentance of the revealing plotter himself. By the merits (2) Of the imputed (or constructive) repentance of that penitent’s co-plotters. And by the merits (3) Of the laudable action of Oldcorne himself. |
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