Arnold censured for the Seizure of Goods at Montreal.—Appointed to the Command of a Fleet on Lake Champlain.—Naval Combat.

It being necessary that General Schuyler should be made acquainted, as soon as possible, with the present condition of the army, and the progress of the enemy, General Arnold consented to go forward for that purpose. His knowledge of all that had passed in Canada, during the last seven months, enabled him to communicate the requisite intelligence in a more satisfactory manner than it could be done in writing, and to add full explanations to the despatches of the commander. He found General Schuyler in Albany, at which place General Gates arrived in a few days, proceeding by order of Congress to take command of the northern army. Meantime General Sullivan retreated to Crown Point. Schuyler, Gates, and Arnold repaired together to that post.

It was expected that Sir Guy Carleton, as soon as he could provide water-craft sufficient, would make all haste up the Lake and commence an attack. A council of general officers was convened, who, after mature deliberation, resolved to abandon Crown Point, retire to Ticonde-roga, strengthen that post, and make it the principal station of defence. This measure was thought extraordinary by General Washington and by Congress. It was looked upon as giving up a position, formidable in itself and by artificial works, which afforded advantages at least for checking the enemy, if not for repelling their farther approach. The members of the council were unanimous; but many of the field-officers partook of the prevailing sentiment, although on the spot, and signed a remonstrance against the decision of their superiors. A proceeding so unmilitary, and so little in accordance with sound discipline, was of course disregarded, but dissatisfaction and ill feelings were excited on both sides. Schuyler and Gates defended the resolve of the council in letters to Washington and Congress, and in the end no one doubted its wisdom. Crown Point had from circumstances acquired a name in former wars, which had magnified it in public opinion much beyond its real importance as a military post. It was moreover impolitic to divide the troops, few in number compared with those of the enemy, by attempting to fortify and defend two positions within fifteen miles of each other.

The army was accordingly withdrawn to Ticonderoga, and every preparation was there begun for meeting the enemy, whenever they should make their appearance.

While these things were going on, General Arnold brought up another matter, which scattered new seeds of dissension in the camp. Colonel Hazen had been his second in command at Montreal, and, from the elements of Arnold's character, this fact might perhaps lead to a natural inference, that a quarrel would not be an unlikely event. The particulars are these. When it became evident that Canada would be evacuated, Arnold seized goods belonging to merchants in Montreal, which he said were intended for the public service. Certificates were given to the owners, who were to be paid according to their invoices by the United States. In many cases, however, they were taken away in such a hurry, that there was no time for making out a list of the articles, and the only form of delivery was the owner's name written on each parcel. Arnold sent the goods across the country to Chamblee, with the intention of having them forwarded to St. John's, and thence by water to Ticonderoga. He instructed Colonel Hazen, who then commanded at Chamblee, to take charge of them, and prevent their being damaged. Hazen, either not liking the manner in which the goods had been obtained, or from personal hostility to Arnold, refused for some time to meddle with them, and left them exposed to the weather, piled in heaps on the bank of the river; and at last, when he took them in charge, they were guarded in so negligent a manner, that the packages were broken open and many of them plundered.

The owners, not contented to part with their goods upon terms so vague and uncertain, followed the army to Crown Point. When they found what ravages had been committed on their property, they presented invoices and claimed pay for the full amount. The blame fell upon General Arnold, as the first mover in the business, and he threw it back upon Hazen, who had refused to obey his order and take care of the goods. The result was a court-martial, by which Colonel Hazen was tried for disobedience of orders. While the trial was in progress, the court declined accepting the testimony of Major Scott, one of Arnold's principal witnesses, on the ground of his being a party concerned, since he was the agent, who received the goods at Montreal and conducted them to Chamblee. This slight was too much for the hot blood of Arnold, and he wrote a disrespectful letter to the court in the form of a protest. To save their honor, the court demanded an apology, which was promptly refused in a tone of insult by their antagonist, with a broad intimation, that he should be ready at a proper time to give any or all of the gentlemen of the court satisfaction on that score; or, in other words, the letter was a sort of challenge to the whole court, either in the corporate or individual capacity of the members. This was so gross a violation of military rule, that the court had now no other resort than an appeal to General Gates, the commander-in-chief. The case presented difficulties which seemed to embarrass him, as Arnold was much in his favor, and he had resolved to appoint him to the command of the fleet then preparing to meet the enemy on the Lake. In short, he dissolved the court-martial, and thus abetted the conduct of Arnold. In explaining this step to Congress, he said that he had been obliged to act "dictatorially" when the court demanded the arrest of General Arnold, adding, "The United States must not be deprived of that excellent officer's services at this important moment." Justice might well complain, when policy could content itself with such a reason for an arbitrary act.

The court passed judgment before they separated, although informally, and acquitted Colonel Hazen with honor. This was an implied censure upon Arnold; but, protected as he was by his superior, the affair received no further investigation. His military popularity sustained him as an officer, but his character suffered essentially in the public estimation. It was more than suspected, that his private interest was chiefly consulted in seizing the goods, and it seems to have been supposed, that the seizure was upon his own authority. In these respects it is probable he was too harshly judged. He wrote a letter to General Schuyler from Montreal, while in the act of taking the goods, acquainting him with the fact, and adding that he was thus directed by the commissioners from Congress. He also wrote to General Sullivan from Chamblee, informing him of the damaged condition in which he found the packages at that place, and complaining of the disobedience and neglect of Colonel Hazen. These letters are now extant, and evidently prove, that he was not practising any secret manouvre in the removal of the goods, or for retaining them in his own possession.

It must nevertheless be conceded, that his mode of taking the property without leaving in the owner's hands invoices of the different articles, and certificates of having received them, could not be justified, nor could it have been intended by the commissioners. They could mean nothing more, than such things as would serve to Supply the army either with provisions or clothing, and these upon a fair security to the owners; for, by the articles of capitulation entered into with General Montgomery, the citizens were to be maintained in a free possession of their goods and effects of every kind, whereas packages containing silks, and other articles equally inapplicable to the object in view, were carried off indiscriminately. These circumstances, and his conduct to the court-martial, produced impressions, which the subsequent developements of his character contributed nothing to efface or diminish; and, viewed in the most favorable light, his honesty can be screened only at the expense of his judgment and delicacy.

I have dwelt the longer on this transaction, because it was the first important link in the chain of incidents, which led to his final ruin. Another, somewhat akin to it, occurred nearly at the same time. There had been a quarrel at Quebec between Arnold and Major Brown, who had marched to that place with General Montgomery. This enmity had its origin as early as the capture of Ticonderoga by Ethan Allen, when Brown was an officer under Colonel Easton, and of course opposed to the pretensions of Arnold on that occasion. From Quebec letters were written by Arnold to some of the members of Congress, containing severe reflections on his conduct, and open charges against him of having plundered the baggage and property of prisoners taken in Canada. When these particulars were made known to Brown by his friends, he demanded from General Wooster, and afterwards from General Thomas, a court of inquiry; but through the machinations of Arnold he was defeated in his purpose, till after the evacuation of Canada. He then applied in person to Congress for redress, and directions were sent to the commander in the northern department to grant a court of inquiry. Colonel Brown, for such was now his title, renewed his application to General Gates at Ticonderoga, but with no better success than before. As in the case of the court-martial, Gates chose to exercise a dictatorial authority, and protect his favorite.

Nothing more was done till the end of the campaign, when Colonel Brown presented his application in another form, demanding an arrest of General Arnold on a series of charges, in which he was accused of numerous misdemeanors and criminal acts during the course of his command. General Gates replied, that he would lay the petition before Congress. Being thus baffled in his attempts to obtain justice through the proper channel, Colonel Brown published a narrative of the whole affair, introducing his charges against Arnold, and commenting upon his conduct with much severity, and indeed with a warmth that indicated too great a degree of excited feeling. The result will be seen hereafter. It is a little remarkable, that, in the midst of all these censures, Arnold never solicited a court of inquiry on his own part, by which, if they were unjust and without foundation, he might at once have silenced his enemies, and which it would be natural to expect under such circumstances from a man, possessing a quick sense of honor, who was conscious of his innocence.

As soon as the army had retreated to Crown Point and Ticonderoga, no time was lost and no efforts were spared in pressing forward preparations for defence, both by land and water. The British would of course pursue their way over the Lake, the moment they could construct or collect at St. John's suitable vessels for the purpose. To baffle such a movement, or at least to embarrass it as much as possible, it was extremely important that the marine force should be put on the most respectable footing, and increased to the utmost limit, which the resources in hand would admit. Great inconveniences were to be encountered in effecting this object; few materials for ship-building were in readiness; shipwrights, carpenters, and many essential articles for fitting out the vessels were to be obtained from the seaports. Such was the promptness and energy, however, with which the work was prosecuted, that by the middle of August a little squadron was prepared to sail, consisting of one sloop, three schooners, and five gondolas. The sloop carried twelve guns, one schooner the same number, the others eight, and the gondolas three each. These vessels rendezvoused at Crown Point under the the command of Arnold, and before the end of the month he sailed with his whole armament down the Lake.

By his instructions from General Gates, he was to take his station at the Isle-aux-TÊtes, where there was a narrow pass in the Lake, and beyond that point he was ordered in positive terms not to advance. The order stated, that, as the present operations were designed to be wholly on the defensive, the business of the fleet was to prevent or repel a hostile invasion, but not to run any wanton risks or seek an encounter within the enemy's territory. In all other respects the discretion of the commander was to be his guide. On his arrival at Windmill Point, four miles from Isle-aux-TÊtes, he discovered the island to be occupied by the enemy, numbers of whom were likewise encamped on the shores of the Lake. This induced him to stop at Windmill Point, and moor his vessels in a line across the Lake, so as to prevent any of the enemy's boats from passing * Crown Point. Hence he charges Arnold with disobedience of orders at the outset, in having gone beyond that place. But the actual site of Isle-aux-TÊtes was at the lower end of the Lake, almost in contact with the Canada line, and in the vicinity of what is now called Rouse's Point. It was intended that the fleet should be stationed as near the line as prudence would admit, and the orders were strictly obeyed.—Wilkinson's Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 81.

* General Wilkinson, by mistaking the position of Isle-aux-TÊtes, has bestowed much unmerited censure upon Arnold. He supposes it to be at a place called Split Rock, which is but about twenty-five miles from Crown Point

The decks of his vessels were so low, that he thought it necessary to erect around them barricades of fascines, which should protect them from being boarded by superior numbers in small craft. While his men were on shore cutting fascines, they were attacked by a party of British and Indians, and before they could reach their boat three were killed and six wounded. This circumstance proved to him the inexpediency of remaining in a position, where he was exposed to perpetual annoyance from the enemy, without having an adequate force to act by land. In a few days he returned eight or ten miles to Isle-la-Motte, and took a station more advantageous and secure, as the island was beyond the reach of an attack from the main land, and his guard-boats would discover any approach by water.

Small scouting parties were sent down on each side of the Lake, from whom intelligence was from time to time obtained, but not with such accuracy as to enable Arnold to judge of the extent of the enemy's naval preparations at St. John's. Being so well informed, nevertheless, as to deem it unadvisable to hazard an action in a part of the Lake, where he would be obliged to engage a superior force in an open encounter, he withdrew his fleet still farther back, and anchored it in a line between Valcour Island and the western shore of the Lake.

Since leaving Crown Point his armament had been reinforced, so that it now consisted of three schooners, two sloops, three galleys and eight gondolas. Early in the morning of the 11th of October, the guard-boats gave notice, that the enemy's fleet was in sight, off Cumberland Head, moving up the Lake. It soon appeared advancing around the southern point of Valcour Island, and presented a formidable aspect, there being one ship with three masts, two schooners, a radeau, one gondola, twenty gunboats, four longboats, and forty-four boats with provisions and troops. The armed vessels were manned by seven hundred chosen seamen. Such an array was enough to convince the Americans, that they must rely mainly on their bravery and the advantages of their position. The wind was likewise in their favor, as some of the larger vessels could not beat up sufficiently near to engage in the attack. While the enemy's fleet was coming round the island, Arnold had ordered his three galleys, and a schooner called the Royal Savage, to get under way and advance upon the enemy. On their return to the line the schooner grounded and was afterwards destroyed, but the men were saved. At half past twelve the action became general and very warm, the British having brought all their gunboats and one schooner within musket-shot of the American line. They kept up a heavy fire of round and grape shot, till five o'clock, when they withdrew from the contest and joined the ship and schooner, which a head wind had prevented from coming into action.

During the contest Arnold was on board the Congress galley, which suffered severely. It received seven shot between wind and water, was hulled twelve times, the main mast was wounded in two places, the rigging cut in pieces, and the proportion of killed and wounded was unusually great. So deficient was the fleet in gunners, that Arnold himself pointed almost every gun that was fired from his vessel. The Washington galley was equally shattered; the first lieutenant was killed, and the captain and master wounded. All the officers of one of the gondolas, except the captain, were lost; and another gondola sunk soon after the engagement. The whole number of killed and wounded was about sixty. The enemy landed a large body of Indians, who kept up an incessant fire of musketry from the island and the opposite shore, but without effecting much injury.

A consultation was held by the officers as soon as the engagement was over; and they agreed, that, considering the exhausted state of their ammunition, and the great superiority of the enemy's force both in ships and men, prudence required them to return to Crown Point, and if possible without risking another attack. The British had anchored their vessels in a line within a few hundred yards of the Americans, stretching from the island to the main, apparently to frustrate any such design. The night was dark, but a favoring breeze blew from the north, and before morning Arnold had passed with his whole fleet through the British line entirely undiscovered. This manoeuvre was not less bold in its execution, than extraordinary in its success. Arnold himself brought up the rear in his crippled galley, and, before their departure was known to the enemy, they had ascended the Lake ten or twelve miles to Schuyler's Island. Here they were obliged to cast anchor for half a day, in order to stop the leaks and repair their sails. Two of the gondolas were abandoned and sunk. In the afternoon they set sail again, but the wind had died away in the morning, and it now sprung up from the south, equally retarding the pursuit of the enemy and their own progress.

On the morning of the second day the scene was changed. The Congress and Washington galleys, with four gondolas, had fallen in the rear, all being too much disabled to sail freely. The advanced ships of the enemy's fleet, in one of which was General Carleton, were found to be gaining upon them, under a press of sail, and in a short time were along-side. After receiving a few broadsides the Washington struck, having been extremely weakened by the loss of men and injury received in the first engagement. The whole force of the attack now fell upon Arnold in the Congress galley. A ship of eighteen guns, a schooner of fourteen, and another of twelve, poured forth an unceasing fire within musket shot. The contest was kept up with unparalleled resolution for four hours, when the gal-? ley was reduced almost to a wreck, and was surrounded by seven sail of the enemy. In this situation Arnold ran the galley and the four gondolas into a small creek, on the east side of the Lake, about ten miles from Crown Point; and as soon as they were aground, and were set on fire, he ordered the marines to leap into the water armed with muskets, wade to the beach, and station themselves in such a manner on the bank, as to prevent the approach of the enemy's small boats. He was the last man, that remained on board, nor did he leave his galley, till the fire had made such progress, that it could not be extinguished. The flags were kept flying, and he maintained his attitude of defence on the shore, till he saw them consumed, and the whole of his flotilla enveloped in flames. There are few instances on record of more deliberate courage and gallantry, than were displayed by him from the beginning to the end of this action.

Being no longer in a condition to oppose the enemy, he proceeded immediately through the woods with his men to Crown Point, and fortunately escaped an attack from the Indians, who waylaid the path two hours after he had passed. The same night he arrived at Ticonderoga. All his clothes, papers, and baggage had been burnt in the Royal Savage at Valcour Island. He found at Ticonderoga the remnant of his fleet, being two schooners, two galleys, one sloop, and one gondola. General Waterbury, who commanded the Washington galley, and one hundred and ten prisoners were returned on parole by General Carleton the day after the last action. The whole American loss in killed and wounded was between eighty and ninety. The enemy reported theirs to be about forty.

Notwithstanding the signal failure of this enterprise, the valor and good conduct of the commander and his officers were themes of applause throughout the country. Arnold's popularity was prodigiously increased by it; and, although he was disliked in the army, as well from the spirit of jealousy commonly excited by an aspiring rival, as from the innate and irredeemable defects of his character, yet with the people at large these motives, if they existed at all, were swallowed up in an admiration of those imposing qualities and daring achievements, which are so apt to captivate the multitude, and which indeed in every stage of society are found to produce so strong an influence upon the mind. Some writers have commented on the execution of this enterprise in a tone of captious criticism, which can by no means be sustained on an impartial view of the subject. It is perhaps difficult to speak of the deeds of such a man as Arnold, without remembering the deplorable issue to which he was finally brought by his folly and wickedness; yet the historian should never forget, that he commits a crime little less flagrant in its nature, if inferior in its magnitude, when he allows himself to be so far moved by his feelings, as to depart from the strict line of truth and justice, or, by such an obliquity, to lead his readers to form a false and harsh judgment.

Arnold was sent out to meet the enemy. Whether he should fight or not, it is true, was left to his discretion. He chose the former and was beaten, but not till he had maintained a combat for half a day against a force nearly double his own, and caused the enemy to retire. This fact is enough to prove, that his position was judiciously chosen, and that the action on his part was skilfully fought. With consummate address he then penetrated the enemy's line, and brought off his whole fleet, shattered and disabled as it was, and succeeded at last in saving six of his vessels. Let it be supposed, that he had retreated before the British fleet, and left it to proceed unmolested. What would have been the consequence? There was a chance, at least, that he would be overtaken somewhere, and perhaps under circumstances of greater disadvantage. Even if he had escaped and moored his vessels under the guns of the fort at Ticonderoga, would the public have been satisfied with such a measure? Would not murmurs of complaint have been heard, that such expensive preparations should be made without any effect, or an attempt to repel the invaders? And would not a corresponding depression of public enthusiasm and spirit have followed? Whereas the event, as it turned out, was so gallant a demonstration of the courage and resolute ardor of the American troops, that it inspired universal confidence and hope at a very gloomy crisis of the revolution. It needs only be added, as a guide to a correct historical estimate of the transaction, that the conduct of Arnold was at the time approved by his military superiors, by Congress, and by the whole nation.