Robert Southey

GRANT AND SUBSCRIPTION FOR THE RELIEF OF THE PORTUGUEZE. OPERATIONS ON THE ALENTEJO FRONTIER. BATTLES OF FUENTES D’ONORO AND ALBUHERA. BADAJOZ UNSUCCESSFULLY BESIEGED BY THE ALLIES.

?1811.?

It was now made apparent, as well by the battle of Barrosa, as by the whole conduct of the Cortes, that no successful exertions were to be expected on that side; and that, though the subjugation of the Peninsula could not but appear every day more hopeless to the Intruder’s government, all reasonable hope of its deliverance must rest upon Lord Wellington, and the allied army under his command. Thus far his foresight had been fully approved by the issue of Massena’s invasion; that general had entered Portugal with 72,000 men, and had received reinforcements to the amount of about 15,000 more: ten he had lost at Busaco; about as many more had died while he perseveringly maintained his ground; and what with prisoners, sick and wounded, and the losses on the retreat, about 40,000 only were remaining when he recrossed the frontier. The invaders had lost their horses, carriages, ammunition, and cannon; but for this they cared not; they had the strong hold of Ciudad Rodrigo on which to retire; and even the wreck of their army was more numerous than the force which drove them out of Portugal.

?Opinions of the opposition writers at this time.?

During these events, the opponents of the English ministry improved with more than their wonted infelicity the opportunity afforded them of exhibiting their errors in judgment, their want of that knowledge which is the foundation of political wisdom, and their destitution of that generous feeling which sometimes renders even error respectable. When the first news arrived that the French were breaking up from their position, they cautioned the public against extravagant expectations; “such accounts,” they said, “have come too often to raise enthusiasm in any but simpletons and stock-jobbers; and there seems no reason for altering the opinion which we have so often expressed, that, happen what may partially, the ultimate loss of the Peninsula is as certain as ever it was, and that we are only delaying the catastrophe by needless proofs of a valour, which our enemies admire much more than our allies. In the meantime, Spain does nothing, except calumniate and kill her exiled patriots; and reasonable people have long ceased to look to any place but South America for the resuscitation of Spanish independence.”

When it was known beyond all doubt to those whose belief was not influenced by their wishes, that Massena was in full retreat and Lord Wellington pursuing him, “these retreats and pursuits,” said they, “are fine things for tickling the ears. Most probably the retreat is, as usual, an alteration of position; and the pursuit a little look-out on the occasion, enlivened by the seizure of a few unfortunate stragglers.” At the discovery that this change of position was from the Zezere to the Agueda, ... nothing less than the evacuation of Portugal, ... the despondents were neither abashed nor silenced. “Buonaparte’s honour,” they said, “was pledged to effect his projects in the Peninsula, and unfortunately his power was as monstrous as his ambition. Massena would now throw himself upon his resources both in men and provisions; he was removing from a ravaged and desolate country, to one comparatively uninjured and fertile; and it was to be remarked, that while the French were falling back upon their supplies, the allies were removing from their own. In such a state of things, could Lord Wellington’s army long exist on the frontiers? The war had become one of supplies and expenses; if the enemy could establish large magazines at Almeida, they could again advance, the same scenes would again be repeated, and Lisbon would again become the point of defence. The result must certainly be determined by the success or ill success of the French in Spain. If Spain falls,” said they, “nothing short of a miracle can preserve Portugal; and that Spain will fall, is almost as certain as that her people are self-willed and superstitious, her nobility divided and degraded, and her commanders incapable, arrogant, or treacherous.” We were, moreover, warned by these sapient politicians, to remember, that there were seven marshals in Spain, besides generals, with distinct commands; and that the French, having retired upon their resources, had only abandoned Portugal for the season, that they might return and reap the harvest which they had left the natives to sow. It was not enough to dismay the nation by thus prognosticating what the French would do, they threw out alarming hints of what, even now, it was to be apprehended they might have done. “If,” said they, “Massena had received adequate reinforcements from France, the positions which he took at Guarda and Almeida would have drawn the allies into a most dangerous predicament; and let us imagine what might at this very instant be the perilous situation of Lord Wellington, if a considerable army had really been collected under Bessieres!” Happy was it for England, that the councils of this country were not directed by men who would have verified their own predictions, leaving the enemy unresisted, as far as Great Britain was concerned, because they believed him to be irresistible!

?Address of the Portugueze Government to the people.?

But while the factious part of the British press was thus displaying how far it was possible for men to deaden their hearts against all generous emotions, the Portugueze governors were expressing their gratitude to England for the effectual support which she had given to her old ally. They told the people that their day of glory was at length arrived; they had passed through the fiery ordeal, by which the merits of men were tried and purified; they were become a great nation. “Humbling themselves,” they said, “before the first and sovereign Author of all good, they rendered thanks to their Prince, for establishing, in his wisdom, the basis of their defence; ... to his British majesty, to his enlightened ministry, and to the whole British nation, in whom they had found faithful and liberal allies, constant co-operation, and that honour, probity, and steadiness of principle, which peculiarly distinguished the British character; ... to the illustrious Wellington, whose sagacity and consummate military skill had been so eminently displayed; ... to the zealous and indefatigable Beresford, who had restored discipline and organization to the Portugueze troops; ... to the generals and officers, and their comrades in arms, who had never fought that they did not triumph; ... finally, to the whole Portugueze people, whose loyalty, patriotism, constancy, and humanity, had been so gloriously displayed, during the season of danger and of suffering.” “Portugueze,” said they, “the effects of the invasion of these barbarians; the yet smoking remains of the cottage of the poor, of the mansion of the wealthy, of the cell of the religious, of the hospital which afforded shelter and relief to the indigent and infirm, of the temples dedicated to the worship of the Most High; the innocent blood of so many peaceful citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, with which those heaps of ruins are still tinged; the insults of every kind heaped upon those whom the Vandals did not deprive of life ... insults many times more cruel than death itself; the universal devastation, the robbery and destruction of everything that the unhappy inhabitants of the invaded districts possessed: ... this atrocious scene, which makes humanity shudder, affords a terrible lesson, which you ought deeply to engrave in memory, in order fully to know that degenerate nation, who retain only the figure of men, and who in every respect are worse than beasts, and more blood-thirsty than tigers or lions; who are without faith and without law; who acknowledge neither the rights of humanity, nor respect the sacred tie of an oath.”

They proceeded to speak with becoming feeling and becoming pride of the manner in which the emigrants from the ravaged provinces had been received wherever they had fled. The great expense of subsisting the fugitives at Lisbon had been supported, they said, by the resources which were at the disposal of Government, but still more by the voluntary donations of individuals, among whom they mentioned with particular distinction, the British subjects in Portugal. It remained for completing the work, to restore the fugitives to their homes; to render habitable the towns which the barbarians had left covered with filth and unburied carcases; to relieve with medicine and food the sick, who were perishing for want of such assistance; to revive agriculture, by supplying the husbandman with seed corn, and bread for his consumption for some time, and facilitating his means of purchasing cattle and acquiring the instruments of agriculture. These, they said, were the constant cares of the Government, these were their duties; but their funds were not even sufficient to provide for their defence, and therefore they called upon individuals for further aid.

?Lord Wellington asks relief for the suffering Portugueze.?

Lord Wellington in the preceding autumn, as soon as he fell back to the lines of Torres Vedras, had represented to his own Government the distress to which those districts must be reduced through which the enemy passed, ... a distress which Portugal had no means of relieving. “Upon former occasions,” he said, “the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of London in particular, had stepped forward to relieve foreign nations, whether suffering under the calamities inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy. Portugal had once before experienced such a proof of friendship from her oldest and most faithful ally: but never was there case in which this assistance was required in a greater degree than at present, whether the sufferings of the people, or their loyalty and patriotism, and their attachment to England, were considered. I declare,” said Lord Wellington, “that I have scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal, of any order, has had communication with the enemy, inconsistent with his duty to his own sovereign, or with the orders he had received. There is no instance of the inhabitants of any town or village having remained, or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the enemy, when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes of Government, or of myself, that they should abandon their houses, and carry away their property.” He therefore recommended this brave and suffering people to the British Government, and the British people, whenever the country should be cleared of its barbarous invaders, as he hoped and trusted that it would.

?April 8.
Parliamentary grant for the relief of the Portugueze.?

That hope had now been accomplished: his letter was laid before Parliament, and a message from the Prince Regent was presented, stating, “That, having taken into consideration the distress to which the inhabitants of a part of Portugal had been exposed, in consequence of the invasion of that country, and especially from the wanton and savage barbarity exercised by the French in their recent retreat, which could not fail,” he said, “to affect the hearts of all persons who had any sense of religion or humanity, he desired to be enabled to afford to the suffering subjects of his Majesty’s good and faithful ally, such speedy and effectual relief as might be suitable to this interesting and afflicting occasion.” Accordingly a grant of ?Marquis Wellesley.? 100,000l. was proposed; Marquis Wellesley saying, when he moved an address to this effect, “he hoped he had not lived to see the day, though he had sometimes been surprised by hearing something like it, when it should be said that ancient faith, long-tried attachment, and close connexion with our allies, were circumstances to be discarded from our consideration, and that they should be sacrificed and abandoned to the mere suggestions and calculations of a cold ?Earl Grosvenor.? policy.” Earl Grosvenor was the only person who demurred at this motion. “He felt considerable difficulty in acceding to it,” he said, “particularly when he considered how much had been done already for Portugal, and he would ask whether their lordships were really prepared to take the whole burden upon themselves, and exempt the Portugueze altogether from the charge of relieving their own countrymen? It was a principle as applicable to public as to private affairs, that you should be just to your own people before ?Marquis of Lansdowne.? you were generous to other nations.” The Marquis of Lansdowne spoke in a better mind: “Whatever,” he said, “might have been his opinion regarding the policy of our exertions in Portugal, no doubt existed with him, that the efforts made by the people of Portugal eminently deserved at our hands the aid now asked, to relieve that distress into which they had been plunged by the enemy. Even, therefore, if he believed that Lord Wellington would be again compelled to retreat, still he would vote for the present motion, convinced that it could not fail to make an impression in Europe highly favourable to the British character, by displaying its beneficence, its generosity, and its humanity, as contrasted with the savage barbarity of the enemy. In extending to the people of Portugal that generosity for which they might look through Europe and the world in vain, we placed our national character upon a pinnacle of greatness which nothing could destroy. Even if our army was compelled to evacuate Portugal, and we should be unable to withstand there the progress of the French, still the posterity of the inhabitants of Portugal would remember with gratitude the aid afforded to their ancestors in the hour of their distress. For these reasons, the address should have his hearty concurrence.”

?Mr. Ponsonby.?

Mr. Ponsonby in like manner, when the vote was moved in the Commons, declared, “that it was not less due to the spirit of Portugal, than to the magnanimity of Great Britain, ... that it was as consistent with our interest, as it was material to our honour. The only regret,” said he, “with which it is accompanied on my part, proceeds from the reflection, that the vast expenditure of this country should render it necessary to limit the vote to so small a sum.” But the liberality of the British people has seldom been more conspicuously displayed, than in the subscriptions which were made on this occasion. About 80,000l. was subscribed. The public grant was to be measured, not by ?Public subscription.? the necessities of the Portugueze sufferers, but by the means of the British Government; and the Prince of Brazil called it “a most ample donation, entirely corresponding to the generosity with which a great nation and its Government had assisted Portugal.” The individual proofs of beneficence were acknowledged in the most honourable manner; the Prince issued an order, that the list of subscribers should be printed at the royal printing-office, and copies sent to the chambers of each of the suffering districts, where, having been publicly read after mass, they should be laid up in the Cartorios, or archives of the respective districts; the original list was to be deposited among the royal archives in the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon, “that the humanity of the one nation,” said the Prince, “and the gratitude of the other may be attested to future generations.”

?Distribution of the grant.?

The dezembargador, Joam Gaudencio Torres, and Mr. Croft (one of a family which had been long established at Porto, and who was subsequently attached to the British legation) accepted the charge of distributing this grant, and for that purpose, of visiting the districts which had been ravaged, and seeing in person to the distribution. It required no common degree of humanity, and no ordinary strength of heart, to undertake so painful an office. The time, it may be hoped, is approaching, when the usages of war will as little be admitted before man, as a plea for having destroyed the innocent and the helpless, as it will before God. Massena had gone to the utmost limits of that dreadful plea before he broke up from his position. Opposite to the house in which he had fixed his own quarters at Santarem were the ruins of a church, into which a number of wretched children, whose parents had perished, and who were themselves perishing for hunger, had crept, that they might lie down and ?Children famished at Santarem.? die. They were found there by the first British troops who entered the town, stretched upon straw and rubbish ... the dying and the dead together, reduced to skeletons before they died. When the officer, who relates this in his journal, saw them, pieces of bread which our soldiers had given these poor orphans were lying untouched before many who were incapable of eating, and some who had breathed their last. Multitudes, indeed, had been famished before he abandoned his hopes of conquest; but for the subsequent conduct of that merciless general and his army no military motives can be assigned ... none but what are purely malignant and devilish. Marshal Massena had formerly declared, that if he could land with an army in England, he would pledge himself, not indeed to effect the conquest of the country, but to reduce it to a desert. In Portugal it was proved that out of the wickedness of his heart his lips had then spoken; for on his retreat, he endeavoured, in perfect conformity with the political system of his emperor, to increase by every possible means the horrors of war and the sum of human suffering. The cruelties which were perpetrated by that retreating army formed but a little part of the evils they inflicted upon the brave nation which had successfully ?State in which the French left the country they had occupied.? resisted them; and in the districts which they devastated, the inhabitants who perished under their hands were less to be compassionated than those who survived. The famine which they intentionally produced, by destroying every thing in the course of their retreat and within reach of their power, continued to depopulate the country long after it was delivered from its enemies. Endemic diseases were produced by want of food and of raiment, by exposure, by grief, and hopeless wretchedness. The hospitals, with which Portugal abounded, had shared the general destruction: many had been burnt, others gutted, the resources of all destroyed; and those of the clergy and of the convents, to which the sufferers would otherwise have looked for aid, and from which they would have found it, were in like manner totally dilapidated. The income of the Bishop of Leyria was reduced from 40,000 cruzados to forty; and others had suffered in a like degree. In that district the population was cut down by the barbarities of the enemy, by famine, and by disease, from 48,000 to 16,000; and in the subdivision ?Pombal.? of Pombal from 7000 to 1800. Two hundred families in the town of Pombal derived before the invasion a comfortable subsistence from husbandry; after the retreat an hundred and sixty-four of those families had totally disappeared; and the few survivors of the remaining thirty-six were suffering under famine and disease. In a principal street of that poor town the commissioners found one dismantled dwelling, standing alone in the midst of ruins, and containing three wretched inhabitants. Such was the desolation which this more than barbarous enemy had left behind them, that in what had been the populous and ?Santarem.? flourishing town of Santarem, the screech owls took possession of a whole street of ruins, where it seemed as if man had been employed in reducing human edifices to a state which rendered them fit receptacles for birds and beasts of prey. The number of these birds, and the boldness with which the havoc everywhere about inspired them, made it frightful to pass that way even in the daytime; insomuch, that a soldier who had been promoted for his personal bravery was known more than once to forego his mess, rather than pass to it through these ruins. Dogs who were now without owners preyed upon the dead. Wolves fed on human ?Leyria.? bodies in the streets of Leyria; and retaining then no longer their fear of man, attacked the living who came in their way. The servant of an English gentleman was pursued one evening by two, in the outskirts of that city; he escaped from them only by climbing a single olive tree, which, happily for him, had been left standing; it was just high enough to afford him security, yet so low that the wolves besieged him in it all night; three or four others joined them in the blockade, and when he was seen and rescued in the morning, the bark as high as they could reach had been scored by their repeated endeavours to spring up and seize him.

There were parts of the country where the people, having no other sustenance, allayed the pain of emptiness without supplying the wants of nature, by eating boiled grass, which they seasoned, such as could, with the brine and scales left in the baskets from which salt fish, or sardinhas had been sold, these being at that time the scarce and almost only remaining articles of food. Among a people in this extreme distress, the commissioners had the painful task of selecting the cases which could bear no deferment of relief, when every case was urgent, when multitudes were perishing for want, and when the whole amount of the means of relief at their disposal, economized as those means were to the utmost, was deplorably inadequate to the just and pressing claims upon it. Eighteen months after the retreat, the price of provisions in the wasted provinces was about six times higher than before the invasion; a fact from which some conception may be formed of the misery endured in the course of those months, and of the state of things when the commissioners entered upon their arduous and painful task. Inadequate to this dreadful necessity as the aid of England was, yet, while it is to be feared a greater number perished for want of human, or of timely help, 43,000 sick and 8000 orphans were saved by it. The relief was not bestowed in food alone, and in the means of removal, but in the means of future subsistence ... cows, oxen, implements of agriculture, and seed of various kinds. The gratitude of the people, to their honour it should be said, was more in proportion to the intention and good-will which were thus manifested, than to the actual relief which was afforded. And if in Portugal, as there would have been in any other country, men were found whose hearts were so hard and their consciences so stupified that they sought only how to make the necessities and miseries of their fellow-creatures an occasion of lucre for themselves, it may safely be asserted, that never in any public calamity was there less of such wicked selfishness displayed than at this time. The commissioners who were employed ten months upon this service, (which was not less hazardous than painful, for it exposed them continually to contagious disease as well as to the constant sight of suffering), performed their office gratuitously, and would not consent to have their personal expenses reimbursed: the secretary and assistants who always accompanied them refused to accept any pecuniary recompense for their time and labour: and the house of the Vanzellers of Porto advanced money for purchasing great part of the cattle, and would receive no commission whatever upon the negociation and payment of the bills. A brother of that house, while the allied army occupied the lines, received under his own roof at Lisbon, and at his own cost maintained more than forty refugees, who were all personally unknown to him before that time: and at his mother’s22 country house near Porto, as many as came daily were fed in her own presence, from seventy to an hundred and upwards being the usual number. It is consolatory to record such examples in a history where so many errors and crimes must be recorded. When the distribution was completed, the Portugueze Regency assured the British Government that there did not appear to have been a single complaint against the justice and regularity with which it had been made, and that this scrupulous and efficient application of the grant to the ends intended was owing to the unwearied exertion of Mr. Croft and his colleagues: they added, that they should lay those high services, as they properly denominated them, before the Prince of Brazil, and expressed their desire that Mr. Croft’s conduct might be made known to the Prince Regent of Great Britain. That gentleman was, in consequence, created a Baronet, and received the royal Portugueze order of the Tower and Sword.

?Political effect of the distribution.?

No measure could have had the effect of inspiring the Portugueze people with so much confidence, as this public distribution of seed corn, and tools, and cattle. They who had been most apprehensive of another invasion, were convinced that Great Britain would not have conferred such a gift, if what was now bestowed upon them were likely to be wrested from them by the enemy; and under that conviction they resumed in hope those labours, from which despair might otherwise have deterred them. But it was far from Lord Wellington’s intention to deceive them into any fallacious opinion of their own security; on the contrary, his first thought, after he had driven the French beyond the frontier, was to warn the Portugueze that the danger might yet be renewed. “Their nation,” he said, “had still riches left, which the tyrant would endeavour to plunder: they were happy under a beneficent sovereign, and this alone would make him exert himself to destroy their happiness: they had successfully resisted him, and therefore he would leave no possible means unemployed for bringing them under his iron yoke.” He appealed to all who had witnessed the successive invasions of Junot, Soult, and Massena, whether the system of the French had not been to confiscate, to plunder, and to commit every outrage which their atrocious dispositions could devise? and whether from the general, to the lowest soldier, they had not delighted in the practice of such excesses? “The Portugueze,” he said, “ought not to relax their preparations for resistance. Every man capable of bearing arms ought to learn the use of them: those who, by their age or sex, were not capable of taking the field, should beforehand look out for places of safety where they might retire in time of need: they should bury their most valuable effects, every one in secret, not trusting the knowledge of the place to those who had no interest in concealing it: and they should take means for effectually concealing, or destroying the food, which, in case of necessity, could not be removed. If,” said Lord Wellington, “these measures are adopted, however superior in number the force may be which the desire of plunder and of vengeance may induce the tyrant to send again for the invasion of this country, the issue will be certain, and the independence of Portugal will be finally established, to the eternal honour of the present generation.” Having issued this proclamation, and made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, Lord Wellington, leaving his army under Sir Brent Spencer, took advantage of the temporary inaction of the enemy to go into Alentejo.

?Marquis Beresford goes to Alentejo.?

Beresford had accompanied the commander-in-chief in pursuit of the retreating enemy, as far as the Ceyra. There Lord Wellington received news as unexpected as it was unwelcome, that Badajoz had been surrendered by its base governor. Another piece of intelligence distressed him; a Spanish officer of rank and ability, who had arranged the correspondence which was carried on with his countrymen in those parts of Spain possessed by the French, had been made prisoner in the route of Mendizabal’s army, and immediately entered the Intruder’s service. Lord Wellington acted with characteristic sagacity on this occasion; neither treating, nor considering this person as wholly reprobate because he had shown a want of principle which proceeded from want of courage to endure adversity, he caused a letter to be written to him, containing a hint, that bad as his conduct was, it would be his own fault if he made it unforgiveable. The hint was taken as it was meant; ... for the motive of ingratiating himself with his new patrons was not strong enough to overpower a natural humanity, a remaining sense of honour, and a prudential consideration of the instability of fortune: the officer kept his secret, and lived to be well rewarded for having done so. The surrender of Badajoz, which left the besieging army at liberty to act against the allies wherever they might deem best, divided Lord Wellington’s attention, and checked him in what else would have been a career of victory: but while he continued the pursuit of the retreating army, he sent the Marshal to his command on the south of the Tagus, to provide against the consequences which might result from Imaz’s baseness.

?Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Campo Mayor taken by the French.?

Mortier, meantime, not failing to pursue to the utmost the advantage which that misconduct had given him, advanced upon Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Campo Mayor, in order that the troops which he knew would be sent against him might be deprived of those points of support. The first of these places had long ceased to be of any importance as a fortress; it was taken by surprise, and seven brass guns, being the whole of its artillery, were destroyed for want of carriages. Latour Maubourg went against Albuquerque; its fortress, a century ago, had been called impregnable; and might now have made some defence, relief being so near at hand; but the appearance of an enemy and a few cannon-shot sufficed to terrify the garrison; they surrendered without resistance, and were sent prisoners to Badajoz with seventeen brass guns of large calibre: the French then razed the works. While these detachments were thus successfully employed, Mortier himself ?March 22.? opened the trenches before Campo Mayor: this fortress resisted better than its Castilian neighbours had done; a battalion of militia incurred some disgrace by its conduct, but the spirit of the inhabitants and the governor was excellent, and the place held out eleven days.

?Beresford arrives on the frontier.?

The fall of Campo Mayor was regretted, more for the sake of its brave defenders than for any advantage that could accrue to the enemy from a conquest which they could not maintain. Marshal Beresford arrived at Chamusca during the siege, and on the day that it surrendered, assembled his corps at Portalegre, now strengthened by the 4th division, and Colonel de Gray’s brigade of heavy cavalry. On the 24th, everything was collected at and in front of Arronches; and on the following day he moved against the Campo Mayor, meaning, if the enemy should persist in retaining it, to interpose between that town and Badajoz. The main body of the French had by this time returned to the Caya, the whole of their besieging train had re-entered Badajoz, they had removed thither the heavy guns from Campo Mayor, and Soult had ?Affair near Campo Mayor.? given orders to destroy the works there, which were prevented by the appearance of Marshal Beresford’s corps. About a league from the town, the allies fell in and skirmished with the enemy’s advanced horse: and Brigadier-General Long advancing rapidly with the cavalry, came up with their whole force, which, upon perceiving his movements, had evacuated the place, and was retiring towards Badajoz. It consisted of eight squadrons of cavalry, and two battalions of infantry, commanded by General Latour Maubourg; the latter were retreating in column with two troops of hussars at their head and two closing their rear, the rest manoeuvring so as at once to cover the retreat of the foot, and secure to themselves its support: upon the approach of the allies, the French infantry formed an oblong square, and the horse took up a position en potence. Long’s first object was to dispose of their cavalry; he ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Head, with the 13th dragoons, to attack in flank the three squadrons which were on the same line with the infantry; while he, with three Portugueze squadrons, attacked in front the three which formed the angle to the right of the others: Colonel Elder, with two squadrons of Portugueze, was to cover his left, and turn the enemy’s right; and eight squadrons of heavy dragoons to support the attack. As soon as Head advanced, the enemy changed their position, brought forward their right, and met the charge; they were immediately broken, and in their flight carried away with them the other squadrons, which, from the change of position, had in some measure become a second line. From Campo Mayor to Badajoz is an open plain without tree or bush; over this ground the French retreated rapidly, skirmishing the whole way. The 13th pursued with ungovernable eagerness, and the two squadrons of Portugueze which were sent to their support caught the same spirit, and dispersed in the heat of pursuit. In this affair, there were many opportunities for the display of individual courage and dexterity. Colonel Chamorin, of the 26th French dragoons, was encountered by a corporal of the 13th, whose comrade he had just before shot through the head; each was a master of his horse and weapon, but at length the corporal, striking off the helmet of his enemy with one blow, cleft his head down to the ears with another.

The heavy cavalry, meantime, had been halted two miles off, and there only remained with General Long three squadrons of Portugueze with which to harass and impede the French infantry, till it could be brought up: these Portugueze did not stand the fire of the column and the appearance of the hussars; and though they were soon rallied, the retreating column gained ground considerably before the heavy cavalry could overtake them. The 13th and the two Portugueze squadrons were then perceived returning from the pursuit which they had followed with such heedless precipitation, as to have given the enemy the superiority of numbers, and to have lost twenty-four killed, seventy wounded, and seventy-seven prisoners: some of them had pushed on to the very gate of Badajoz, and were taken on the bridge. Marshal Beresford would not risk the loss of more cavalry, and the enemy’s column therefore retired unmolested, retaking fifteen out of sixteen guns which our 13th had taken. The loss of the French was very considerable; in one of their regiments only six officers out of sixteen remained for duty. The next morning a French captain of dragoons came with a trumpet, demanding permission to search the field for his colonel. Several of our officers went out with him. The peasants had stripped the dead during the night; and more than six hundred naked bodies were lying on the ground, mostly slain with sabre wounds. It was long before they could find Chamorin, lying on his face in his clotted blood: as soon as the body was turned up, the French captain gave a sort of scream, sprung off his horse, threw off his brazen helmet, and kneeling by the body, took the lifeless hand, and kissed it repeatedly with a passionate grief which affected all the beholders.

?Measures concerted with the Spaniards.?

After this affair Beresford cantoned his troops at Campo Mayor, Elvas, Borba, and Villa-ViÇosa: they were equally in need of rest and of refitment, great part of the British infantry having made forced marches from Condeixa, and being in want of shoes. General Ballasteros, who was seldom at any time in force without suffering defeat, and never defeated without presently obtaining some success, after experiencing some of these customary alternations, and incurring some severe losses in the Condado de Niebla, had fallen back upon Gibraleon, hoping to effect a junction with Zayas, who had been sent from Cadiz with 6000 men, of whom 400 were cavalry. Something was always to be expected from Ballasteros’s remarkable activity; but there was equal reason for dreading the effect of his incaution: by Beresford’s request, therefore, CastaÑos wrote to desire that he and Zayas would not commit themselves, but reserve their force entire for co-operating with him. Beresford’s objects at this time were, to throw a bridge across the Guadiana at Jurumenha, ... to recover OlivenÇa, drive Mortier out of Extremadura, and form as soon as possible the siege of Badajoz. Foreseeing the want of a bridge, Lord Wellington had frequently, before the fall of that place, urged the Spanish general officers to remove the bridge-boats, and other ?April.? materials which were in store there, to Elvas. They began to follow this advice, but so late and so slowly, that only five of the twenty boats had been removed, when Mendizabal’s defeat rendered any further removal impossible: these, when laid down, left 160 yards of the river uncovered. Nor was this the only difficulty. It had been supposed that ample supplies had been collected at Estremoz and Villa ViÇosa; but owing to the poverty of the Government, and to that mismanagement which, from the highest to the lowest of its departments, prevailed and was maintained, as if by prescriptive right, throughout, not enough were found to ensure the subsistence of the troops from day to day. Moreover, there were no shoes in store for an army which had marched itself barefoot. And had there been no deficiency of stores, and no previous difficulties to overcome, Beresford’s force, consisting of 20,000 effective men, British and Portugueze, was inadequate to the operations which he was to undertake with it, though it was the utmost that Lord Wellington could spare from the more immediately important scene of action on the frontier of Beira.

?Bridge constructed at Jurumenha.?

Nothing, however, that could be done by diligence and exertion was omitted. The Guadiana was in such a state that it seemed feasible to construct a bridge by fixing trestles across the shallow part of the river, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats in the deeper stream; or those boats might be used as a floating bridge for the artillery and heavy stores, and the interval filled with some half dozen tin pontoons, which had been sent from Lisbon to Elvas, and which, though weak and bad of their kind, might bear the weight of infantry, there being a practicable ford for the horse. This latter plan was preferred: materials were collected not without great difficulty, and delays which that difficulty occasioned: trees were to be felled for the purpose, and the trestles were made only seven feet in height, because no timber for making larger was found near the spot. On the 2nd of April the engineers reported that the passage was ready for the following day, and three squadrons passed that evening, and stretched their piquets along the advanced hills; thus making a show which imposed upon the enemy. The troops marched from their cantonments, and arrived at daybreak in a wood within a mile of the bridge. No apprehensions of the river had been entertained, for there had been no rain in those parts; but heavy rains had fallen far off, in the high regions where the Guadiana has its sources. When day broke it was seen that the water had risen three feet seven inches in the course of the night: planks, trestles, and pontoons were swept away by the current, and the ford also had become impassable. Beresford still determined to cross, not losing the opportunity which the enemy by their want of vigilance allowed him. Enough of the trestles were collected from the river to form, with two of the pontoons, two landing-places, and two floating bridges were made of the ?Passage of the Guadiana.? Spanish boats. This was completed by the afternoon of the 5th. The army immediately began to cross; and continued crossing, without an hour’s intermission, from three that afternoon till after midnight on the 8th. Only one man and horse were lost in the operation. Some country boats meantime carried across the three days’ reserve of biscuit; and the same proportion of slaughter-cattle swam over. The troops bivouacked in succession as they passed, forming a position in a small semicircle, from Villa Real on the right to the Guadiana on the left. Severely as the French had suffered in the affair before Campo Mayor, they acted at this time with as much disregard of their enemies, as if they had no abler general than Mendizabal to contend with, and no better troops than those which they had so easily routed. They had 12,000 men within three hours’ march, who might have effectually disputed the passage, or cut off the advanced guard. But so ill were they informed of Beresford’s movements, and so negligent in ascertaining them, that they made no endeavour to interrupt him till the morning of the 8th, when they advanced in some force, and surprised before daybreak a piquet of the 13th dragoons; but they were driven back by the 37th, which closed the right of the position; and finding the allies too strong for them, desisted from any further attempt.

?OlivenÇa retaken.?

On the morning of the 9th, as soon as the fog cleared, the army marched in three columns upon OlivenÇa: it was thought not unlikely that the enemy would wait for them there, or on the opposite bank of the Valverde river, where the ground was favourable: they had, however, fallen back to Albuhera, leaving a garrison in OlivenÇa. The place was summoned, and refused to surrender; guns and stores, therefore, were ordered from Elvas; the fourth division remained to besiege it; and the rest of the army moved by Valverde, and bivouacked in the wood of Albuhera, the enemy’s rear-guard retiring before their advance, which entered S. Martha on the 12th. Here the army halted till the 15th, to get up provisions which were still brought from the rear; and on that day OlivenÇa surrendered at discretion, before the breach was practicable. The garrison consisted of about 480 men, in a place where Mendizabal had thrown away 3000. The French had committed a fault of the same kind, though not to an equal extent; the force they left there being totally inadequate to the defence of so large a fortress. The recapture of this place would have produced an angry contention between the Spanish and Portugueze Governments, if Portugal had not been rendered, by English influence, patient in this instance under a galling sense of injustice. The territory on the left of the Guadiana, in which OlivenÇa stands, was part of the dowry given with his daughter to Affonso III. by the Castillian king, Alfonso the Wise; a grant which, though deemed at the time to have been an arbitrary, ?Claim of the Portugueze to that place.? and therefore an illegal cession of national rights, was subsequently confirmed to Portugal with due form by the treaty between kings Dinez and Ferdinand IV. But as the Guadiana might seem to form a natural boundary between the two kingdoms on this part of the frontier, Spain has ever looked with an evil eye upon this cession. Five centuries had not reconciled a people peculiarly tenacious of what they deem national rights, to this dismemberment, as they considered it, though in itself of little importance to Spain, and though what had been ceded to Portugal was in reality the right of winning it from the Moors, and keeping it when won. In times of international war, therefore, the possession of OlivenÇa had been contested not less as a point of honour than for its own value, when it was a place of great strength; and so strong was the border spirit which prevailed there that, when the Spaniards captured it in 1658, the whole of the inhabitants chose rather to leave the town, and lose whatever they could not carry with them, than become subjects to the King of Spain, though the property of those who should remove was offered to any who would remain. It was restored at the end of that war, and Portugal continued to hold it till its cession was extorted in 1801, in the treaty of Badajoz. But the war which was terminated by that treaty had been entirely unprovoked by Portugal: Spain was then acting as the deceived and degraded instrument of French policy; and the Portugueze felt, as they well might do, that the surrender, though made to Spain, had been compelled by France; and that so long as Spain retained OlivenÇa by virtue of that treaty, they were an injured people. The Prince of Brazil, in the proclamation which he issued on his arrival in Brazil, declaring war against France, and against Spain as then the ally and instrument of French oppression, had protested against the injustice which was done him in that treaty, and declared his intention of recovering when he could whatever he had then been compelled to abandon: and the Spaniards were themselves so conscious of this injustice, that the local authorities, with the sanction of the Junta of Extremadura, had, at the commencement of the war against Buonaparte and the Intruder, proposed to restore OlivenÇa and its district to Portugal for a certain sum of money. The Central Government had not authorised this proposal; and OlivenÇa was not to be thought of in times when the independence of both nations was at stake. But fortune had now put it in the power of the Portugueze to right themselves: OlivenÇa had been taken by the French, and retaken from them by an allied force of Portugueze and British: and one of the Portugueze Regents proposed to his colleague the British ambassador that the Portugueze standards should be displayed there, without previous explanation, or subsequent justification of the measure. There prevailed at that time a strong feeling of irritation in the Portugueze Government against the Spaniards, occasioned by the conduct of the Spanish officers on the frontier, and the unrestrained irregularities of the Spanish troops wherever they passed: they had even sacked a townlet near Badajoz; an act for which the Portugueze meditated reprisals, and had actually proposed so insane a measure to the British ministry, when the Spanish regency allayed their resentment by disavowing the act, and issuing orders for the punishment of the parties concerned. Having thus been in some degree mollified, they were persuaded not to injure the common cause by asserting their own claim, just and reasonable as that claim was, but to wait the effect of a treaty then pendant with Spain, in which the restoration of OlivenÇa was stipulated and not disputed. It is discreditable to Spain that the restitution which Portugal was then contented to wait for has not yet been made.

OlivenÇa having been taken, the allied army marched upon Zafra and Los Santos; this movement being designed to secure themselves from interruption in the intended siege, and to protect Ballasteros, who, after failing to effect a junction with Zayas, was pressed by a French division under General Maransin, and compelled to retire successively on the 13th and 14th from Fregenal and Xeres de los Cavalleros. The French, upon discovering Beresford’s advance, on the following day retired hastily toward Llerena, which Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded to Mortier in the command, occupied with about 6000 horse and foot: the division which now joined him consisted of 4000 infantry and 500 cavalry. At Los Santos the allied cavalry fell in with the 2nd and 10th of the enemy’s hussars, about 600 in number, who were apparently sent on reconnoissance: they charged our 13th dragoons weakly, and were repulsed; then retreated from the force which was moving against them; and presently quickening that retreat, fled to Villa Garcia, and were followed for nearly ten miles at a gallop. In this they lost a chef d’escadron, killed, and about 160 men and horses prisoners: the British eleven horses of the 4th dragoons, who died of fatigue after the chase. The enemy remained one day longer at Llerena, and on the following, when a movement against them had been ordered for the next morning, retired to Guadalcanal; thus for the time abandoning Extremadura. Beresford then cantoned his infantry at Valverde, Azenchal, Villa Alva, and Almendralejo, the cavalry remaining at Zafra, Los Santos, Usagre, and Bienvenida: here the resources of the country were sufficient for their plentiful supply. A Spanish corps of about 1500 men, under the Conde de Penne Villamur, belonging to CastaÑos’s army, occupied Llerena. Ballasteros, with about an equal force, was at Monasterio; and Blake, who had sailed from Cadiz for the Guadiana on the 15th, with 6000 foot and 400 horse, had reached Ayamonte, with 5000 of his men and 200 of his cavalry; the others had been compelled by weather to put back. Soult was at this time uniting his disposable force near Seville: nearly the whole corps from the Condado de Niebla had joined him there, and he had also drawn a detachment from Sebastiani’s corps, ?April 20.? and some regiments from Puerto S. Maria. This was the situation of the respective armies when Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas, and was met there by Marshal Beresford.

Thus far in this memorable campaign the war had been conducted by the British commander as a game of skill: it was now to become a game of hazard. The base surrender of Badajoz distracted his attention as much as it had disappointed his reasonable hopes: that the place should be recovered was of the greatest importance to his future operations: to the enemy, it was of equal importance to maintain it. Soult could bring into the field a force sufficient for its relief. It was well garrisoned: whatever injury had been done to the works was thoroughly repaired: it had sufficient artillery, and was well supplied. Lord Wellington and Beresford reconnoitred it: three battalions ?March 22.? came out to skirmish with the reconnoitring party, and were driven back, but with the loss on our side of three officers and about forty men killed and wounded. The siege, to be successful, must be vigorously pursued, so that there might not be time enough allowed for relieving the place: no plan, therefore, could be adopted which would require more than sixteen days’ open trenches: but at least twenty-two, and this too, if the means were fully equal to the undertaking, would be required, if either of the south fronts were attacked, which yet it was plainly seen would have been the preferable points of attack, had time permitted; and means as well as time were wanting. The plan which was adopted therefore as the only one in these circumstances feasible, was to breach and assault Fort Christoval, and having reduced it, to attack the castle from thence: three or four days’ battering might, it was thought, form a practicable breach in the castle wall, which on that side was entirely exposed, as well as apparently weak; and if the castle were carried, Badajoz could make no farther resistance.

During the night of the 23rd the Guadiana rose nearly eight feet and a half in the course of twelve hours: the bridge which had been thrown across it at Jurumenha since the army passed was swept away, and the whole of its materials carried down the stream and lost. The communication was restored by another bridge of casks at the end of the month; but Lord Wellington, seeing the danger of such a river in the rear of the army, immediately changed the cantonment of the troops, and directed Beresford to occupy and rest his rear upon Merida, where the old Roman bridge rendered his passage at any ?Lord Wellington recalled to Beira.? time sure. No sooner had these instructions been given than he was recalled to Beira by intelligence that Massena was approaching the Agueda in force, and seemed to threaten an attempt for the relief of Almeida.

It was owing in great measure to the inactivity of the Spanish commander in Galicia that Massena felt himself in safety as soon as he was out of Portugal, was enabled to rest the remains of his army, and to draw reinforcements from Castille, which enabled him to resume offensive operations only fifteen days after the last of his troops had crossed the frontier in their retreat. The enemy had received great annoyance in Old Castille and Leon from D. Julian Sanchez, and other guerrilla parties, but none from the nominal army of Galicia, whose general, D. Nicolas Mahy, had suffered Massena’s dÉpÔts to be protected by from 5000 to 6000 men dispersed between Burgos and Ciudad Rodrigo. The Galicians cried out against him, complaining that, when he had filled the prisons with his own countrymen, he seemed to think any other operations unnecessary. He was displaced in consequence of their representations, and General Abadia appointed, (after Albuquerque’s death,) to succeed him; but Abadia had lingered at Lisbon instead of hastening to take the command. Massena, as soon as the pursuit ceased upon the frontier, had no danger to apprehend from any other quarter, and his army was re-equipped and reinforced in no longer time than would have been necessary to recruit it after its fatigues. The Intruder having gone to Paris, the force which would otherwise have been required for his personal security was disposable for this service, so that with the cavalry and artillery of the imperial guard, and the troops which were collected from Castille and Leon, he mustered not less than 40,000 effective infantry and 5000 horse. Lord Wellington had not supposed it possible that, after such a retreat, Massena could in so short a time have been at the head of such a force. He arrived at Villa Fermosa on the 28th, and at once perceived that a formidable attempt would be made for relieving Almeida: his own force consisted of 34,000 men, 2000 horse, including those who were engaged in the blockade.

The country between the Agueda and the Coa is a high open tract, which falls in a gradual slope from the mountains on the south in which those rivers have their sources, to the Douro: here and there are woods of cork and ilex, and the whole tract is intersected and divided into ridges by streams which run parallel to the larger rivers during the greater part of their course, and fall most of them into the Agueda. An army advancing into Portugal might, by moving upon the ridge of Fuentes Guinaldo, turn the right of all the positions that can be taken upon these smaller streams; or if it advanced in a direct line, the ?May.? parallel ridges and woods covering any movement without interrupting it, would favour it in manoeuvring and directing its principal strength against either flank. The allies were cantoned along the Duas Casas, and toward the sources of the Azava, the light division being at Gallegos and Espeja, upon the latter. But the ridge between the Duas Casas and the Turon offered the most advantageous position, because on the left it was of difficult access in front, and on the right it connected with the high country about Navedeaver, from whence the communications were easy in the direction of Alfayates and Sabugal.

Before Massena took the field, he addressed his troops in another bootless boast. “Soldiers of the army of Portugal,” said he in his general orders, “after six months of glorious and tranquil operations, you have returned to the first scene of your triumphs; but the enemies of Napoleon the Great have the audacity to blockade a fortress which they dared not previously attempt to defend. Soldiers, if your valour then intimidated their columns, will it not now punish them for their temerity? Will not you bring to their recollection that you are still the same brave men who drove them to their trenches at Lisbon? Some regiments of cavalry, and reinforcements from his majesty’s guards, conducted by the marshal of the district, assist in your efforts and your duties. Forget not that it is your courage which must maintain that superiority of heroism and intrepidity which forms the subject of the admiration and the envy of other nations. Through you, the honour of the French armies will render renowned the hitherto unknown banks of the Coa, as you have made the rivers of Italy and of the North for ever memorable. Soldiers, a victory is necessary, in order to procure you that repose which the equipment and administration of the regiments require. You will obtain it; and you will prepare yourselves in the leisure that will result from it of marching to new triumphs.”

At daybreak on the 2nd of May the main body of the French crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, and moved in two columns toward the Azava, which they crossed that evening: our light division fell back from its cantonments on that river, the enemy being very superior in cavalry, and the horses of the allies in bad condition, by reason of hard service and wretched fodder: so great, indeed, was the want of food for them, that it had been necessary to cut the green rye, to the harvest of which the unfortunate peasants had looked for their next year’s subsistence. ?May 3.? On the following morning the French continued to advance, two columns moving towards Alameda and Fort Conception, and one, with the whole of the cavalry, upon Fuentes d’Onoro, a little village upon the Duas Casas. Lord Wellington had assembled his first, third, and seventh divisions on the heights, between that river and the Turon, in front of Villa Fermosa: the 3rd was posted on a ridge crossing the road from that townlet to Fuentes d’Onoro, which village was occupied by its light companies, and by three companies of the 5th battalion of the 60th under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams: the first division was formed on the right of the third, and the seventh moved from Navedeaver towards the first, throwing our flanking parties toward PoÇo Velho. This division incurred some danger in the movement: they were in the wood of PoÇo Velho, and the enemy’s cavalry got in their rear; but though they had ground to pass on which cavalry could act, they made good their retreat, notwithstanding the superiority of the French in that arm. Major-General Campbell, with the sixth, observed the bridge over the Duas Casas at Alameda, and Sir W. Erskine the passages of the same stream at Fort Conception and Aldea do Bispo. Brigadier-General Pack, with his brigade of Portugueze and the Queen’s regiment from the sixth division, kept up the blockade of Almeida; and Julian Sanchez occupied Navedeaver with his little party of horse and foot, ... men more experienced in desultory warfare than in regular battles, but of approved courage. The extent of this position was not less than six miles from flank to flank, the left being supported by the ruins of Fort Conception, the right at Navedeaver: the village of Fuentes d’Onoro was in the right of the centre, close to the Duas Casas, situated on a slope, and concealed by the ground: a great part of the line from that village to the ruined fort was in a certain degree secured by the rocky and intricate channel of the Duas Casas, and its steep and rugged bank on the side of the allies, ... the passage being very difficult for cavalry and artillery, and defensible by a comparatively small force: on the other side the position was not so strong, being nearly on a flat, save that there was a small eminence with a tower on its summit, on which the right rested. Head-quarters were at Villa Fermosa, behind the Turon, about two miles from Fuentes d’Onoro. The heights which the troops occupied are of a very gradual ascent, accessible to cavalry in every part, except here and there, where there are masses of rock. The ground upon which the French formed was a plain, with woods behind it; and immediately in the neighbourhood of Fuentes d’Onoro there were groves of ilex on the right bank of the Duas Casas, which they occupied in force throughout.

The position which Lord Wellington had taken appeared to Massena a fine line of battle, but he thought it was not without danger to the troops that held it; for they had the wild Coa behind them, and only a single carriage communication, in itself sufficiently difficult, by the little town of Castello Bom. This communication it was his intention to seize; and for that purpose, while with a part of his army he kept the centre of the allies in check, he proceeded in force against their right, and endeavoured to obtain possession of Fuentes d’Onoro. Having brought up his artillery, he commenced the attack at two in the afternoon, by a cannonade upon the village, under cover of which fire a strong column of infantry moved against it. Lord Wellington perceived his intention, and reinforced the village as occasion required with the 71st, the 79th, and the second battalion of the 24th. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams was wounded, and the command then devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 79th. Repeated and vigorous efforts were made against this post; and the enemy at one time obtained possession of it in part, but they were driven out before night put a stop to the action.

The French did not renew the attack on the following day, but confined themselves to reconnoitring the British position, particularly the right, toward which they moved part of their troops, chiefly cavalry, in the direction of Navedeaver, Massena thinking that he had found accessible ground between that village and PoÇo Velho. Lord Wellington, from the course of his reconnoissance, inferred what was his purpose, and in the evening moved the 7th division, under Major-General Houston, to protect, if possible, the passage of the Duas Casas at PoÇo Velho, where the enemy intended to cross in hopes of gaining possession of Fuentes d’Onoro from that side, and of the ground ?May 5.? behind the village. As soon as it was daylight on the 5th, this intention on their part became evident. The allied cavalry was then moved to the left of the 7th division, somewhat more forward; the light division was in march from Alameda towards the same station; the 3rd had bivouacked in a line parallel to the ridge of the hill toward Fuentes d’Onoro; and the 1st upon its right: these divisions were connected with each other, and the village was occupied by part of the troops of both, both being ready to support it. There was a distance of about one mile from the right of the 1st division to the ground on which the light division had arrived, and about half a mile from thence to the 7th. The cavalry covered this last interval; the former was protected by piquets and light infantry in the wood between Fuentes d’Onoro and PoÇo Velho. This would have been a critical situation for a commander less reasonably confident in himself and in his troops. There was no appui for the right of the British army, and it had the Coa in its rear with only one passage for artillery. The French were superior in numbers, and what was of far greater importance here, greatly so in cavalry: their horses were fresh, whereas ours had been of necessity overworked and insufficiently fed: moreover, the ground favoured their preparations for attack, a large extent of wood, within little more than a mile of the British line concealing their movements.

Early in the morning one of the enemy’s corps appeared in two columns in the valley of the Duas Casas, opposite PoÇo Velho, having the whole of their cavalry under General Montbrun on the left. The infantry directed itself against the village; the cavalry moved through the open country between it and Navedeaver, a part circling about, under favour of the ground, to turn the right flank of the allies. Julian Sanchez was compelled to retire; and so, with some loss, were two battalions of the 7th division from PoÇo Velho. Houston moved with that division to protect their retreat and that of the cavalry, with which view he placed himself on a rocky height, and there formed the Chasseurs Britanniques. The first attack of their advanced cavalry was met by a few squadrons of British, who obtained a partial advantage, and took a colonel and some other prisoners; but their eagerness, and still more their inferiority, occasioned some confusion: they were in their turn pressed, and the enemy for a short time had possession of two guns belonging to our horse artillery. The main body of the French cavalry advanced rapidly, charged through the piquets of the 85th, and followed our horse up the hill: but the attack thus gallantly begun was not maintained with equal gallantry. The ground was intersected with stone walls, which protected part of our troops; those who had not that advantage stood firm. The chasseurs under Lieutenant-Colonel Eustace, and a detachment of the Brunswick corps, were somewhat concealed by a rising ground, where in many parts the rocks stood several feet above the surface: availing themselves of this, they waited till the main body of the enemy’s cavalry came in a line with their front, within threescore paces, and then rising up threw in a well-directed volley, which checked them and made them retire in disorder; yet the charge had appeared so formidable, that, it is said, Lord Wellington feared the Brunswickers were lost. Their loss was trifling; but they narrowly escaped afterward from the Portugueze, who, because of their caps, mistook them for enemies. The attack was renewed, but in vain, though some of the French dismounted and acted as light infantry to assist in it.

Lord Wellington had occupied PoÇo Velho and the adjoining ground for the sake of maintaining his communication across the Coa by Sabugal, while he provided at the same time for maintaining the blockade of Almeida. The danger of attempting both was now evident, and looking with just confidence rather to victory than to any likelihood of retreating, he drew in the right of the army. Placing, therefore, the light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st, he ordered the 7th to cross the Turon and take post on some commanding ground, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st, covered the communication with the Coa on that side, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Coa and the Turon. The 7th division thus covered the rear of the right, which was formed by the 1st in two lines. Colonel Ashworth’s brigade, in two lines, was in the centre, and the 3rd division, in two lines also, on the left. D. Julian’s infantry joined the 7th in Fresneda; his horse were sent to interrupt the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. Fuentes d’Onoro was in front of the left. The right of the French infantry was opposite that village, the left and centre between it and PoÇo Velho, in the wood, and within 2000 yards of the British position. A part of their cavalry was on the right flank of their right; a few squadrons were with artillery opposite the 1st division, and the main body was in the open country, from whence the right wing of the allies had withdrawn.

The great object of the enemy now was to gain possession of Fuentes d’Onoro, which was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 78th; and these regiments were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 1st and 3rd divisions, and some Portugueze corps. They directed against this post several columns of their infantry supported by artillery; succeeded in turning it by the wood toward PoÇo Velho; gained possession by superior numbers of the point of land where the chain of piquets passed, and from thence penetrated into the village. They even advanced some little way on the road toward Villa Fermosa: but here the 21st Portugueze regiment checked them; the 74th and 78th were detached by General Picton, charged them, and retook the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, by an enemy who stepped out of the ranks to aim at him. His countrymen, the Highlanders at whose head he fell, set up a shriek, and attacked the French with a spirit not to be resisted: the man who had slain their commander was pierced by many bayonets at once: the leader of the French, a person remarkable for his stature and fine form was killed, and the Highlanders in their vengeance drove the enemy before them. More than once Fuentes d’Onoro was won and lost; the contest in the streets was so severe that several of the openings were blocked up with the dead and the wounded, but they were finally driven through it by Colonel Mackinnon: they kept up a fire upon it till night closed, at which time 400 of their dead were lying there. The command of the village devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan.

Meantime, the enemy from the wood in front of the British line brought fifteen pieces of cannon to bear upon it, and with those above the village established a severe cross fire, under cover of which, a column of infantry attempted to penetrate down the ravine of the Turon, to the right of the 1st division: but they were repulsed by the light infantry of the guards, and some companies of the 95th. Their cavalry also charged and cut through the piquets of the guards, but were checked by the fire of the 42nd. During the night and the succeeding day, Lord Wellington strengthened his position by throwing up breast-works and batteries; and this, after the lesson he had received, deterred Massena from attempting any farther attack. He made no movement till the 8th, nor did Lord Wellington provoke an action: he had succeeded in keeping his ground, and thereby maintaining the blockade; and nothing was to be gained by attempting more with inferior numbers, and a weak and exhausted ?The French retire.? cavalry. On the 8th and 9th, the French collected their whole army in the woods between the Duas Casas and the Azava, recrossed the latter river on the evening of the 9th, and retired the next day across the Agueda, having failed entirely in the object for which the movement had been undertaken, and the battle fought. The loss of the allies on both days amounted to 1378 killed and wounded, 317 prisoners. That of the French was not ascertained: they acknowledged only 400: but that number was counted in the village of Fuentes d’Onoro, and 500 of their horses were left dead on the field. Under the government of Buonaparte, truth was never to be found in any public statement, unless it was favourable to himself; and none of his generals exercised to a greater extent than M. Massena the license which all took of representing their defeats as victories. This action had severely mortified that general; he had been beaten by an army numerically inferior to his own, and weak in cavalry, upon ground which was favourable for that arm, and which Lord Wellington would not have chosen, had circumstances permitted a choice; it was an action in which the skill and promptitude of the British commander, and the gallantry and steadiness of the allied troops, had been evinced throughout.

Defeated in the field, and disappointed in his intention of saving Almeida, Massena sent orders to the Governor, General Brenier, to blow up the works, and retire with the garrison upon Barba de Puerco. Brenier having previously received instructions from Bessieres and from Berthier to prepare for thus evacuating the place, should it be necessary, had made 140 cavities ready to be charged before the end of April; but knowing that Massena would make every effort to retain possession of this fortress, which was the only fruit of his six months’ campaign in Portugal, he had prepared also for a vigorous defence, hoping to hold out till the first of June. The battle of Fuentes d’Onoro put an end to his hopes; for the firing was heard in Almeida, and proved that it was a serious action; and as the communication which he every moment expected did not arrive, Brenier could be in no doubt concerning the event. Massena’s orders reached him on the 7th. Immediately the cavities were filled, the balls and cartridges thrown into the ditch, and the artillery destroyed by discharging cannon into the mouths of the pieces. Two days were thus employed; on the morning of the 10th he assembled the officers, and having read to them his instructions, told them, that when the place was once demolished, the intentions of their sovereign would be perfectly fulfilled; that that single object ought to animate them; that they were Frenchmen and must now prove to the universe that they were worthy of being so. They continued to work in destroying stores and artillery, and completing the mines till the moment of their departure; and at ten at night, all being assembled with the greatest silence, Brenier gave as a watchword, Buonaparte and Bayard, and set off (in his own words) under the auspices of glory and honour. In coupling these names, he seems not to have felt how cutting a reproach they conveyed to every honourable Frenchman.

About one, the mines exploded; at the same time the garrison attacked the piquets which observed the place, and forced their way through them. They marched in two columns, fired as little as possible, and passed between the bodies of troops which had been posted to support the piquets. Brenier had studied the ground so well that he would not take a guide; a guide, he thought, would only make him hesitate and perhaps confuse him; the moon served as his compass, the different brooks and rivers which he crossed were so many points which insured his direction, and he placed his baggage at the tail of each column, in order that it might serve as a lure to the enemy, for to save it he knew was impossible. On the part of the blockading troops there was a culpable negligence; for as the garrison had frequently attacked the nearest piquets, and fired cannon in the night during the whole blockade, but more particularly while Massena was between the Duas Casas and the Azava, they thought this attack was nothing more than one of the ordinary sallies, and did not even move at the sound of the explosion, till its cause was ascertained. General Pack, however, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets upon the first alarm with his wonted alacrity, and continued to follow and fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops. The 4th regiment, which was ordered to occupy Barba del Puerco, missed the way, and to this Brenier was chiefly indebted for his escape. Regnier was at the bridge of San Felices to receive him, and there he effected his junction, having lost, in this hazardous and well-executed escape, by the French official account, only sixty men. But the loss had been tenfold of what was there stated. For though the lure of the baggage was not thrown out in vain, and too many of his pursuers stopped or turned aside to secure their booty when the horses and mules were cast loose, he was followed and fired upon by General Pack’s party, and by a part of the 36th regiment, the whole way to the Agueda, 490 of his men were brought in prisoners, and the number of killed and wounded could not have been inconsiderable.

The English and their general did full justice to the ability with which Brenier performed his difficult attempt. Massena made use of it to colour over his defeat, and represented the evacuation and not the relief of Almeida as the object for which the battle of Fuentes d’Onoro was fought. “The operation,” he said, “which had put the army in motion was thus terminated.” Shortly afterwards he returned to France, with Ney, Junot, and Loison, leaving behind them names, ever to be execrated in Portugal, and to be held in everlasting infamy. Marmont succeeded him in the command. The army, which still called itself the army of Portugal, went into its cantonments upon the Tormes, having, in Massena’s curious language, advanced into Spain that it might rest; and Lord Wellington set out for the south summoned by intelligence from Marshal Beresford that Soult, notwithstanding previous rumours, which described him as fortifying Seville, and preparing to stand on the defensive in Andalusia, was advancing into Extremadura. ?Lord Wellington recalled to Alentejo.? These tidings reached him on the night of the 15th; and he set out on the following morning.

When the British commander had been recalled from Badajoz to secure the recovery of Almeida, Beresford was left waiting till the Guadiana should fall sufficiently for him to re-establish the bridge. The French under Latour Maubourg, when they had been forced to retire from Llerena, fell back to GuadalcaÑal; it was of importance to push them as far off as possible during the intended siege; and a combined movement of Colonel Colborne, Ballasteros, and the Conde de Penne Villamur, who commanded the cavalry of the Spanish army in Extremadura, made them, though far superior in force, retire to Constantino. This service having been performed, the investment of Badajoz was commenced on the 4th of May. But the enterprise was undertaken ?Badajoz besieged.? under every possible disadvantage. For Marshal Beresford had not force enough to carry on the siege, and at the same time hold a position which should cover it from interruption. He was as inadequately supplied with other means as with men: ample stores, indeed, had been ordered from Lisbon to Elvas, and on the part of the governor at Elvas, General Leite, nothing was wanting which his zeal and activity could effect: but these could do little in an exhausted country, where carriage was not to be procured, and all that could be brought up was miserably insufficient. At that time also, the French were perfectly skilled both in the attack and defence of fortified places, while we had every thing to learn: there was not even a corps of sappers and miners attached to the army, so that all those preliminary operations to which men may be trained at home, at leisure, and in perfect safety, were here to be learnt under the fire of an enemy as well skilled in all the arts of defence as we were deficient in those of attack. In this branch of war they were as superior to us as our troops were uniformly found to theirs in the field; and it is a superiority against which courage, though carried to the highest point, can be of no avail. On the part of the besieged, courage and the high sense of duty may suffice, though outworks have fallen, walls are weak, and science wanting; this had been proved at Zaragoza and Gerona. But it is one thing to assail ramparts, and another to defend them; and the braver the assailants, the greater must be their loss, if they are not directed by the necessary skill.

On the 8th the investment of the town on the northern side was effected, and that same evening the siege commenced. The soil was hard and rocky; the men unaccustomed to such work and not numerous enough for it, for which causes, and the want also of intrenching tools, a sufficient extent of ground could not be opened the first night. The enemy, who allowed no opportunity to escape them, took advantage of this, made a sortie on the morning of the 10th, gained possession of a battery, and when driven back were pursued with such rash ardour to the very walls of Fort Christoval and the tÊte-de-pont that the besiegers lost more than 400 men. A breaching battery, armed with three guns and two howitzers, was completed during the next night, and on the morrow the garrison’s well-directed fire disabled one of the howitzers and all the guns. That same day intelligence was received from the Regent, General Blake, that Soult had left Seville with the declared intention of relieving Badajoz, and that Latour Maubourg, returning upon GuadalcaÑal and Llerena, had forced Penne Villamur to fall back. Orders therefore were given to hold every man in readiness to retire. But other accounts, on the 12th, seemed to make it probable that Soult’s movements were only intended against Blake, who had come to Fregenal, and against Ballasteros, who from Monasterio had pushed his advances toward Seville; and on that probability Beresford ordered ground to be broken against the castle. Fresh dispatches in the middle of the night from various quarters, made it beyond all doubt that Soult was rapidly advancing; immediate orders, therefore, were given to raise the siege, for Beresford deemed it better to meet the French marshal, and give him battle with all the force that could be collected, Spanish, Portugueze, and British, than by looking at two objects to risk the loss of one. General Cole’s division was left with some 2000 Spaniards to cover the removal of the guns and stores; and Beresford met Blake and CastaÑos at Valverde on the 14th. Any jealousy which might have arisen concerning the command had been obviated by a previous arrangement between CastaÑos and Lord ?Arrangement between Lord Wellington and CastaÑos concerning the command.? Wellington. The latter in a written memorial concerning the operations which ought to be pursued in Extremadura, had proposed that whenever different corps of the allied armies should be united to give battle, the general who was possessed of the highest military rank, and of the longest standing, should take the command of the whole. This would have given it to CastaÑos; but he, with that wise and disinterested spirit which always distinguished him, proposed, as a more equitable arrangement, that the general who had the greatest force under his orders should have the chief command, and that the others should be considered as auxiliaries. Lord Wellington perfectly approved of the alteration. “It was my duty,” said he, “in a point so delicate as that of the allied troops acting in concert, to submit a proposition so reasonable in itself as to obtain universal assent; but it was becoming the manly understanding, candour, and knowledge of existing circumstances which characterise your excellency to make an alteration in it, substituting another proposal better calculated to please those of the allies who have most to lose in the battle, for which we must prepare ourselves.”

Lord Wellington had left it at Beresford’s discretion to fight a battle or retire, if circumstances should render one or other alternative necessary. But the effect of a retreat would, as he saw, have been most disastrous: it would have deprived the Spaniards of all hope for any efficient exertion on the part of Great Britain; it would have exposed Blake and CastaÑos to destruction: the British army would have suffered a second time in reputation; the Portugueze troops would have lost their confidence in their allies and in themselves; and in the retreat itself, ... with an army so dispirited, through an exhausted country, and before such troops as the French under such a commander, ... the numerical loss might have been greater than in a well-fought though unsuccessful engagement, and the consequences worse.

Our cavalry, with that of CastaÑos, under the Conde de Penne Villamur, falling back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Martha by Blake’s. The British and Portugueze infantry, except the division which was left to cover the removal of the stores to Elvas, occupied a position in front of Valverde; but as this, though stronger than any which could be taken up elsewhere in those parts, would have left Badajoz entirely open, Beresford determined to take up such as he could get directly between that city and the enemy. He therefore assembled his force on the 15th at the village of Albuhera, where the roads meet which lead to Badajoz and to Jurumenha by Valverde and OlivenÇa. A little above the village a brook called Ferdia falls into the Albuhera, one of the lesser tributary streams of the Guadiana; between these rivulets, and beyond them, is one of the open and scattered woods of ilex, which are common in this part of the country. There is a bridge over the Albuhera in front of the village. The village had been so completely destroyed by the enemy, that there was not an inhabitant in it, nor one house with a roof standing. The cavalry which had been forced in the morning to retire from Santa Martha joined here, and in the afternoon the enemy appeared. Blake’s corps making a forced march, arrived during the night; Cole with his division, and the Spanish brigade under D. Carlos d’EspaÑa, not till the following morning. The 15th had been a day of heavy rain; and both these divisions, from forced marches, and the latter also from fatigue in dismantling the works before Badajoz, were not in the best state for action.

The whole face of this country is passable everywhere for horse and foot; Beresford formed his army in two lines nearly parallel to the Albuhera, and on the ridge of the gradual ascent from its banks, covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde; Blake’s corps was on the right in two lines; its left on the Valverde road joined the right of Major-General Stewart’s division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, and there Major-General Hamilton’s division closed the left of the line. Cole’s division, with one brigade of Hamilton’s, formed the second line. The allied force consisted of 8000 British, 7000 Portugueze, and 10,000 Spaniards; hardly two thousand of these were cavalry. Soult had drawn troops from the armies of Victor and Sebastiani, and left Seville with 16,000 men; Latour Maubourg joined him with five or six thousand; but he had a very superior cavalry, not less then 4000, and his artillery also was superior, he having forty-two field-pieces of which several were twelve-pounders, the allies only thirty. He had the greater advantage of commanding soldiers who were all in the highest possible state of discipline, and whom, though they were of many countries, long habit had formed into one army; whereas the allied force consisted of three different nations; the Portugueze indeed disciplined by British officers, but the Spaniards in their usual state of indiscipline; and one third of the army not understanding, or understanding imperfectly, the language of the other two.

Soult did not know that Blake had joined during the night, and he thought to anticipate his junction by attacking the right of the allies, thus throwing himself upon their line of communication, when the possession of the rising ground would decide the battle. At eight in the morning his troops were observed in motion; his horse crossed the Ferdia, and formed under cover of the wood in the fork between the two rivulets. A strong force of cavalry, with two heavy columns of infantry, then marched out of the wood, pointing toward the front of the allied position, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuhera; while, at the same time, under protection of that superior cavalry which in such a country gave them command of the field, their infantry filed over the river beyond the right of the allies. Their intention to turn the allies by that flank, and cut them off from Valverde, was now apparent; upon which Beresford ordered Cole’s division to form an oblique line to the rear of the right, with his own right thrown back, and requested Blake to form part of his first line and all his second to that front.

While the French General Godinot made a false attack upon Albuhera, Soult, with the rest of the army, bore on the right wing of the allies. The attack began at nine o’clock; a heavy storm of rain came on about the same time, as favourable to the French, who had formed their plan, and consequently arranged their movements, as it was disadvantageous for the allies, whose measures were to be adapted for meeting those of the enemy. After a gallant resistance, the Spaniards were forced from the heights, and the enemy set up a shout of triumph which was heard from one end of the line to the other; their exultation was not without good cause, for the heights which they had gained raked and entirely commanded the whole position. The Spaniards to a man displayed the utmost courage; but their want of discipline was felt, and the danger of throwing them into confusion whenever change of position was necessary; yet the station which had been entrusted to them was precisely that upon which the fate of the whole army depended. They rallied at the bottom of the hill, turned upon the enemy, and withstood them, while Lieutenant-Colonel Colbourne brought up the right brigade of Stewart’s division, and endeavoured to retake the ground which had been lost.

These troops had been hurried as soon as the intention of the French was perceived: they arrived too late; instead of being the defendants of the strongest ground, they had to assail the enemy already established there, and the more they advanced the more their flank became exposed. Finding that they could not shake the enemy’s column by their fire, they proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; but in the act of charging, they were themselves suddenly turned and attacked in the rear by a body of Polish lancers: these men carried long lances with a red flag suspended at the end, which, while so borne by the rider as to prevent his own horse from seeing any other object, frightens those horses who are opposed to it. Never was any charge more unexpected, or more destructive; the rain, which thickened the whole atmosphere, partly concealed them; and those of the brigade who saw them approaching mistook them for Spaniards, and therefore did not fire. A tremendous slaughter was made upon the troops who were thus surprised; and the loss would have been greater, if the Poles, instead of pursuing their advantage, had not ridden about the field to spear the wounded. The three regiments of Colbourne’s brigade lost their colours at this time; those of the Buffs were recovered, after signal heroism had been displayed in their defence. Ensign Thomas, who bore one of the flags, was surrounded, and asked to give it up. Not but with my life! was his answer, and his life was the instant forfeit; but the standard thus taken was regained, and the manner in which it had been defended will not be forgotten when it shall be borne again to battle. English Walsh, who carried the other colours, had the staff broken in his hand by a cannon ball, and fell severely wounded; but, more anxious about his precious charge than himself, he separated the flag from the shattered staff, and secured it in his bosom, from whence it was taken when his wounds were dressed after the battle.

The 31st regiment, being the left of the brigade, was the only one which escaped this charge, and it kept its ground under Major L’Estrange. The issue of the day seemed at this time worse than doubtful, and nothing but the most determined and devoted courage saved the allies from a defeat, of which the consequences would have been worse than the immediate slaughter. The third brigade under Major-General Houghton, with the fusileers and Portugueze brigade under Major-General Cole, advanced to recover the heights, their officers declaring that they would win the field or die. Houghton and Sir William Myers fell, each leading on his brigade. The fusileers, and the Lusitanian legion, 3000 when they advanced, could not muster 1000 after they had gained the rising ground, ... for they did gain it after all this carnage; 2000 men, and sixty officers, including every lieutenant-colonel, and field officer, were either killed or wounded. But the enemy in their turn suffered greater slaughter when they were forced down into the low ground toward the river; our musketry and shrapnells then mowed them down. The attack upon the village was continued somewhat longer; but the enemy were never able to make any impression there.

Soult made a vigorous effort to rally his men in this part of the field: he rode forward with an eagle in his hand, and for a moment checked their flight; but it was only for a moment: they saw their left retreating in confusion, and they followed the example. Only two battalions could be collected at first, and afterwards four, in any order: these formed behind the first rivulet at the foot of the ridge; the rest of their force was dispersed like a swarm of bees, and could not be brought up till they reached the wood. Still the superiority of the enemy in horse was such that it was impossible for the allies to pursue their victory. Soult therefore retired to his bivouac in the wood, and his reserve with a powerful artillery occupied the hill, under cover of which he had formed his columns of attack. The rain which had fallen heavily during the action became more severe at evening, and continued so that night and the following day. The rivulets, swoln now to torrents as they poured from the heights, were reddened with blood; and exposed to that weather the wounded lay where they had fallen, for there was no possibility of removing them; not a house which could have afforded shelter was near ... not a carriage or beast of burden could be found for transporting them to the rear. But wickedness is ever on the alert, and many of the wounded in this condition were stripped to the skin, by those miscreants who attend upon the movements of an army like birds and beasts of prey.

The allies made fresh dispositions immediately after the battle, in case the enemy should re-advance: they improved their position by moving toward the right flank; their freshest troops were placed in the first line; and the flags taken from the Polish lancers, some hundreds in number, were planted in defiance upon the crest of the position, singular trophies of a most well-deserved victory. Kemmis’s brigade came up the next morning, and reinforced them with 1500 men; but all continued quiet on both sides. On the night of the 17th, Soult moved off his wounded under cover of the wood, and prepared for his retreat, which he commenced the ensuing day. Our cavalry followed to hang upon his rear, and in a very gallant affair with the rear-guard at Usagre, about 150 of their horse were killed, wounded, or taken, without loss on our part, though they had then 3000 men in the field, and the allies not more than half that number. Hamilton’s division was sent back to re-invest Badajoz: that place had remained free between the 16th and 19th, in which interval it had received no relief, and the garrison had only time loosely to fill up the approaches which had been made. Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas on the 20th; rode over the field the next day, and expressed himself highly pleased with Marshal Beresford, upon whom so arduous a responsibility had rested, and with the army which had demeaned itself so gallantly.

The battle of Albuhera was one of the most murderous in modern times. The British loss consisted of nearly 900 killed, 2732 wounded, 544 missing; the Portugueze, of whom only a small part were brought into action, lost about 400; the Spaniards above 2000. The French left 2000 dead on the field; about 1000 were made prisoners; Generals Werle and Pepin were killed. Soult, in his official dispatch, declared, that his whole loss amounted only to 2800 men; but a letter from General Gazan was intercepted, wherein he stated that he had more than 4000 wounded under his charge. The heat, he said, would prove very injurious to them, especially as there were only five surgeons to attend them, and many had died upon the road. This letter was written three days after the action, and as the bad cases die in numbers in the first few days, and the mortality must have been greatly increased by want of rest, of accommodation, and of surgical aid, it was inferred, that the total loss of the enemy could not have been less than 8000 men. Soult is said to have acknowledged, that, in the whole course of his long service, he had never before seen so desperate and bloody a conflict. He is said, also, to have observed, “there is no beating those troops, in spite of their generals! I always thought them bad soldiers, and now I am sure of it; for I turned their right, and penetrated their centre; they were completely beaten; the day was mine, and yet they did not know it, and would not run.” About 300 of his prisoners were put into a convent which had been converted into a prison: they undermined the wall, and escaped with their officers at their head. The peasantry guided them, and supplied them with food on their way, and they rejoined the army in a body on the thirteenth day after the battle.

The official dispatch of the French general was, as usual, falsified for the public. Soult there asserted that, having gained the height, he was surprised to see so great a number of troops, and that he then first learned from a prisoner how Blake with 9000 Spaniards had effected a junction during the night. This discovery, he said, made him resolve not to pursue his victory, but content himself with keeping the position which had been taken from the enemy, and that position he23 retained, ... the enemy, after the carnage which was made among them by Latour Maubourg and the Polish lancers, not having dared to attack him again.

Few battles have ever given the contending powers so high an opinion of each other. The French exhibited the highest possible state of discipline that day: nothing could be more perfect than they were in all their movements; no general could have wished for more excellent instruments, and no soldiers were ever directed by more consummate skill. This was more than counterbalanced by the incomparable bravery of their opponents. The chief loss fell upon the Buffs and the 57th. The first of these regiments went into action with twenty-four officers and 750 rank and file; ... there only remained five officers and thirty-four men to draw rations on the following day. Within the little space where the stress of the battle lay, not less than 7000 men were found lying on the ground, literally reddening the rivulets with blood. Our dead lay in ranks as they had fought, and every wound was in front. A captain of the 57th, who was severely wounded, directed his men to lay him on the ground at the head of his company, and thus continued to give his orders. Marshal Beresford saved his life by his dexterity and personal strength: as he was encouraging his troops after the charge of the Polish lancers, one of these men attacked him; avoiding the thrust, he seized him by the throat, and threw him off his horse; the lancer recovered from his fall to aim a second thrust, but at the moment was shot by one of the general’s orderlies. Sir William Meyers, leading on that brigade which recovered the fortune of the field, exclaimed it would be a glorious day for the fusileers. In ascending the ground his horse was wounded; another was brought, which he had hardly mounted, when a ball struck him under the hip, and passed upward obliquely through the intestines. He did not fall, and attempted to proceed; but this was impossible, and when he was carried off the field he seemed to forget his own sufferings in exultation at beholding the conduct of his brave companions. A heavy rain was falling; there was no shelter near, and Valverde, whither it was thought proper to convey him, was ten miles distant. He would rather have had a tent erected over him; but his servants hoping that he might recover, insisted upon removing him to a place where a bed might be procured. The body of General Houghton was borne past him, on a mule, to be interred at Elvas. Upon seeing it, Sir William desired, that if he should die they would bury him on the spot. He lived, however, to reach Valverde, and till the following day. When his dissolution drew near, he desired that his ring might be taken to his sister, and that she might be told he had died like a soldier. Six of his own men bore him to the grave, and laid him under an olive tree near Valverde. It is to be hoped that a monument will be placed there to mark the spot.

Blake, CastaÑos, Mendizabal, Ballasteros, Zayas, and Carlos d’EspaÑa, were in the field, and all distinguished themselves. Blake and CastaÑos had each an arm grazed. EspaÑa was run through the hand by a lance. In the heat of the action, when the issue of the battle appeared most hopeless, many of the Spaniards were heard exclaiming to each other, “What will the Conciso say?” ... thus stimulating themselves to new exertion by remembering the honour or dishonour which a free press would bestow, according to their deserts. Of three stand of colours which were taken from the enemy, one was presented to the Cortes. Del Monte moved, that it should be deposited in some church dedicated to the Virgin-Mother, the patroness of the Spains; but Garcia Herreros observed, that the hall in which they met would, after the dissolution of the Cortes, again be used as a church, and it was therefore resolved that the colours should remain there. It was proposed also, that a pillar should be erected in the plains of Albuhera; and that the little town of that name which had been entirely destroyed, should be rebuilt by the nation, and exempted from all rates and taxes for ten years.

By this time the 3rd and 7th divisions arrived from Beira. Lord Wellington re-invested Badajoz on the 25th, and broke ground four days afterward. It was well that the former siege had been interrupted; there would otherwise have been a great sacrifice of men in attempts which, for want of adequate means, must have been unsuccessful. The means, though somewhat increased both in men and materials, were still inadequate; time pressed also; for where Lord Wellington’s efforts were directed, thither would those of the enemy be directed also; Marmont would move from the Tormes toward the Tagus to co-operate with Soult against him, and the disposable force which they might bring together far exceeded all that he could command. Rapid measures, therefore, were necessary, and it was determined to pursue the original plan, but to commence the attacks upon Fort Christoval and the castle at the same time, that the enemy’s attention might be divided. Guns were brought from Elvas, and the officers and gunners of a company of British artillery were distributed among the Portugueze, to supply as far as their numbers went the want of skill in their allies: but the guns were of a soft composition of metal, false in their bore, without any of the modern improvements; the shot were of all shapes and sizes; the howitzers which were used for mortars were not better in their kind than the guns, nor did the shells fit them better; and these wretched brass pieces failed so fast under the heavy firing which was required, that iron guns were ordered from Lisbon.

On the 6th of June the breach in Fort Christoval was reported practicable; it appeared to be so from the trenches; and at the following midnight a storming party of 180 men, conducted by Lieutenant Forster of the Royal Engineers, who had examined the breach the preceding night, moved towards it. The palisades had been destroyed by the battery; the counterscarp at that spot was only four feet deep; the advance, therefore, easily descended into the ditch and reached the foot of the breach, where they discovered that since evening closed the enemy had removed the rubbish, and that the escarp was standing clear nearly seven feet high. The advance, after it had in vain endeavoured to get over this obstacle, might have retired with little loss: but the main body had now entered the ditch; and in that spirit of mad courage which attempts impossible things, they tried with ladders fifteen feet long, which had been sent for mounting the breach with, to escalade the front scarp of the fort where it was twenty feet high; in this they persisted for an hour, while the garrison showered down upon them shells, stones, hand-grenades and combustibles at pleasure, and almost as a sport; nor did they retire till they had lost twelve killed and ninety wounded, more than two-thirds of their number, Forster being among the slain. Not disheartened by this, the besiegers renewed the attempt three nights after: they were provided with ladders of sufficient length; but the enemy were now on the alert, and had strongly garrisoned the fort: the officer who conducted the advance was killed on the glacis, and the officer in command immediately on descending into the ditch: and it could not be ascertained, from the report of the survivors, whether they had attempted a breach which, having, as on the former occasion, been cleared, had been rendered impracticable, or whether their efforts had been misdirected against the face of a demibastion which had been much injured, and might in the night easily be mistaken for a breach: but in one or other of these blind endeavours they persisted desperately under a tremendous shower of the most destructive missiles, till after an hour’s perseverance, when forty had been killed and an hundred wounded, the remainder were ordered to retire.

That night’s failure determined Lord Wellington to raise the siege. It had manifestly become hopeless for want of means; and the next morning an intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont was brought in, dated the 5th, and saying that he was ready to begin his march, effect a junction, and complete the object of their wishes. “If they lost no time,” he said, “they might reach the scene of action before the English reinforcements arrived, and Badajoz would be saved.” By other communications, Lord Wellington knew that Drouet’s corps had marched from Toledo, and would probably join Soult that very day, and that Marmont might be expected at Merida in a few days; for this general, after having patroled on the 6th to Fuentes d’Onoro and Navedeaver, as a reconnoissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, began his march the next day to the south, by way of the Puerto de BaÑos and Placencia: he crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, an important point, where the French, having re-established the bridge, had covered it by strong batteries. In consequence of this information Lord Wellington began to move the stores to the rear, as soon as darkness had closed. The whole loss had been nine officers and 109 men killed, twenty-five officers and 342 men wounded and prisoners: but the numerical inadequately represents the real loss in those operations for which men are either selected for their skill, or adventure in the hope of distinguishing themselves. On the 12th the siege was finally raised; but the blockade was still maintained, and Lord Wellington posted his army near Albuhera to cover it and to hold in check an enemy who would not again venture upon giving battle, ?Junction of Soult and Marmont.? unless with an overpowering force. The French, however, had now collected all their troops from the two Castilles, except a small garrison at Madrid, all the remains of Massena’s army, and all their force from Andalusia, except what was sufficient for Sebastiani and Victor to keep up a show of inactive strength within positions where experience had now fully shown that no vigorous attack was to be apprehended. Thus they brought together a greater force than the allies could oppose to them; and though Lord Wellington was not so inferior in numbers as to have felt fear, or even doubt, concerning the issue of an action, the relative resources of the allies in men, as those resources were then managed, were not such that they could afford to win a second battle of Albuhera. The blockade therefore was raised after Marmont and Soult had effected their junction: the enemy entered Badajoz, and the allies, recrossing the Guadiana, took up a line within the Portugueze frontier. There the corps from the north, under Sir Brent Spencer, joined them. It had crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha by a floating bridge, carrying about twenty horses at a time. The spirit of our light division at this time was such that the men would suffer any thing on a march rather than be seen straggling; and in this movement two men, when ascending the hills to Niza, carried that spirit so far that they actually died of heat in the ranks. ?The allies take a position within the Portugueze frontier.? The whole army being thus united, a position was chosen in which battle would have been given if the French had attempted to enter Portugal: it was on the heights behind Campo Mayor, and the troops were bivouacked on the Caya in readiness to occupy it: their line extended from Arronches to Jurumenha, that of the enemy from Merida to Badajoz. But though the French had brought together not less than 70,000 men including 8000 cavalry, while the cavalry opposed to them were only 3500, and the whole force not more than 56,000, they contented themselves with making a reconnoisance in considerable strength. One body of their horse got in the rear of a piquet of the 11th light dragoons: the situation was ill chosen; the regiment had arrived from England but a few days before; the men, therefore, were inexperienced in such service, and ignorant of the ground: they mistook the enemy for Portugueze; and every man, sixty-nine in number, except the lieutenant in the advance, was taken. This was the only advantage they could obtain. Another body at the same time failed in an endeavour to ascertain the position and number of the allies: their intention was perceived; the main body of the troops was concealed from them behind the hills; and after some hours’ manoeuvring, some skirmishing, and some firing from Campo Mayor, the guns of which fortress flanked the front of Lord Wellington’s position, they desisted from their baffled attempt.

Soult affected to regret that a general action had not been brought on. He magnified the merit of the defence of Badajoz, saying, that it would be cited in military history as one of the most memorable exploits of its kind; and he magnified the importance of the junction of the two armies on the Guadiana, calling it one of the most marked events of the war in Spain. This general had a more than common interest in blazoning forth a success which covered his late defeat. “Thus,” said he, “the signal victory which was gained at Albuhera has been ascertained in favour of the imperial army: the main object which I had in view was then accomplished, that of making a diversion in favour of Badajoz, and enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance. It is now evident that the battle of Albuhera gained us at least twenty days, during which we were enabled to make arrangements for bringing up new reinforcements, and the army of Portugal was able to take part in the operations: thus the second object which I had in view in making my first movement has been also accomplished; and the troops which fought at Albuhera have not ceased a single day to act upon the offensive against the enemy.” Beyond all doubt Marshal Soult was one of the ablest generals of his age: his operations at this time were ultimately successful, but his earnestness to prove that he had gained a victory at Albuhera only shows how deeply he felt the defeat.

The French government were elated with an advantage which came seasonably after the various disgraces that the French arms had suffered in the Peninsula. “The English,” said they, “are again to learn, and by a mighty thunderbolt ... (the raising of the siege of Badajoz is a presage of it), that they cannot with impunity leave the element of which they have usurped the empire.” The English, however, had long been accustomed to hear of these thunderbolts, and to defy the more tangible weapons of the enemy. Soult said, in his official account, “that they appeared to have given us Spain entirely, and to be concentrating themselves for the defence of Lisbon: they felt their inability to support the contest; and every thing,” he added, “induced him to think that when the army of reserve should have arrived upon Almeida, they would feel the impossibility even of maintaining themselves at Lisbon.” While the enemy threw out these boastful anticipations, Lord Wellington remained in his position, watching their movements, and certain that they could not long subsist the force which they had brought together.

Before the allies retreated across the Guadiana, a plan had been arranged between General Blake and Lord Wellington, that the former should make a movement into the country of Niebla, distract the enemy’s attention by threatening their rear, and take advantage of whatever favourable opportunity this concentration of the French forces might give him. Accordingly the Spaniards set out on the 18th from Jurumenha, and on the 22nd reached Mertola, ... the distance is about 110 miles, ... but it was a most exhausting march in the midst of summer, through a dry country, for troops half of whom were barefoot, and whose commissariat was in the most deplorable state. The provisions were never sufficient to allow full rations; and though the Spaniards supported fatigue and hunger with their characteristic patience, men will not continue to undergo such privations without a strong hope that some adequate success will recompense them; and Blake had unhappily acquired the character of being an unfortunate leader.

From Mertola, he embarked his artillery for Ayamonte. The horse swam the Guadiana, the men crossed it by a temporary bridge of boats; and after resting two days to refresh the troops, he marched ?June 30.
He fails at Niebla and returns to Cadiz.? against Niebla. Niebla is an old town, which had fallen to such decay, that its population at this time did not exceed an hundred persons: its walls, however, were less dilapidated than its houses, and the French had repaired its castle so as to render it a post of respectable strength, from whence they domineered over the surrounding country. Blake found it stronger than he expected: he attempted an escalade in the night with ladders, which were too short, as well as too few, for the success of the enterprise; consequently the attempt failed, though the garrison did not consist of more than 300 men. He remained three days before the place, which gave the French governor of Seville time to take the field against him, and make some prisoners before his army could reach the mouth of the Guadiana, and re-embark for Cadiz. Great numbers of his men deserted during this ill-conducted expedition. Blake possessed considerable talents, but the good which those talents might have produced, when he was called to the Regency, was in great measure frustrated by his jealousy of the English. At Albuhera he seemed to have overcome this unworthy feeling; but it returned upon him, and Lord Wellington remarked, in his public dispatches, that neither General CastaÑos nor himself had received any intelligence from him since he began his march from Jurumenha.

This movement, therefore, which might have greatly annoyed the enemy, and of which such expectations had been raised, that it was at one time reported and believed Blake had actually entered Seville, ended only in the diminution of the army and of the general’s reputation. But Lord Wellington had taken his measures too wisely to suffer any other evil than that of disappointed hope from this failure. He knew that the enemy could not possibly long continue to subsist their forces when thus concentrated; and accordingly, as he expected, they broke up from the Guadiana about the middle of July, having fortified the old castles of Medellin and Truxillo to strengthen their hold upon Extremadura. Soult returned to Seville; and Marmont, recrossing the Tagus at Almaraz, went again to his command in the north. Lord Wellington then moved his whole army to the left, and cantoned them in Lower Beira, where he remained, waiting till time and opportunity should offer for the blow which he was preparing to strike.