MOVEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY UNDER THE DUKE DEL INFANTADO. BATTLE OF UCLES. RETREAT FROM CUENCA. CARTAOJAL APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND. PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH. SIR ROBERT WILSON ENTERS CIUDAD RODRIGO. NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE ADMISSION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO CADIZ.

Sir John Moore’s movements, fatal as they were to his army and himself, and most injurious to public opinion in England, were not without some good effect, though far inadequate to the price at which it was purchased. They drew into Galicia those forces which would otherwise have taken possession of Lisbon and of Seville, and they afforded the Junta time for raising new levies and bringing new armies into the field. The spirit of the nation was in no degree abated; their numerous defeats, the loss of their capital, and the treachery of chiefs in whom they had entirely trusted, seemed rather to exasperate than dismay them; and there would have been no lack of strength had there been arms for the willing people, officers to discipline them, a government which could have provided for their support, and generals capable of directing their zeal and courage. A memorable instance of the national disposition was displayed in the little town of Luzena. According to a decree of the Junta, four men of every hundred were to be drawn for military service; all who were liable to the lot assembled, 400 in number, and when the magistrate was proceeding to ballot for sixteen, the whole 400 volunteered, and marched off that same day to join the troops at Seville.

Had the British army made a stand in Galicia, as there was every reason to expect, the Duke del Infantado was to have advanced from Cuenca upon OcaÑa and Aranjuez, and in conjunction with the army collected at La Carolina, under the Marques del Palacio, to have pushed for Madrid. The retreat of Sir John Moore frustrated this plan; the Duke was then ordered to remain on the defensive, and new levies were sent to reinforce him as fast as they were raised. But in the miserable circumstances of his army, increase of numbers was no increase of strength. Arms, clothing, and provision were wanting; it was alike without resources, discipline, or system; in want of efficient officers of every rank, and those which there were, were divided into cabals and factions. The province of Cuenca was the best point which could have been chosen for deriving supplies from La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia, the two latter provinces as yet unexhausted by the war; but it was not a military position. The city stands upon high ground, where the Huecar falls into the Jucar at the skirts of Monte de S. Christobal, and it is completely commanded by the ?Infantado, Manifiesto, 32–37.? heights. All that the Duke could hope for in case he were attacked was to secure his retreat, and for this purpose he occupied some eminences on the left bank of the Huecar, leaving the road to Valencia by Moya open for his artillery. The van was stationed at Jabaya, four leagues from Cuenca, in the direction of Madrid.

The Duke had acquired some reputation in the former war with France when serving as Colonel of a regiment which he had raised himself. He had now given the highest proof of devotion to his country, in accepting a command under circumstances which rendered success absolutely impossible, and yet where any disaster would compromise his reputation, and expose him to the suspicion and fury of his own soldiers. In endeavouring to restore order among the troops, and to obtain food and clothing for them, he was indefatigable; no man could have exerted himself with greater activity and zeal. The condition of his army indeed, officers as well as men, was pitiable. The military chest having been taken to Zaragoza, they were without pay; and a great proportion of those who had endured the fatigue and sufferings of the retreat were now sinking under the effects. They lay upon straw, half-naked, in that severe season, and in the keen climate of that high country, ... hundreds were perishing thus. The Duke established hospitals, collected beds from the city and from all the places within reach, appointed officers to the sole charge of seeing that the sick were supplied, and ordered the friars to attend upon them. His authority was exerted as far as it would extend, and when that failed, he begged for their support. These exertions were not without effect; the progress of disease was ?Infantado, 42–44.? stopped, men and stores were obtained, subordination was restored, and with little efficient strength there was the appearance as well as the name of an army.

The Spaniards were not sensible how low they had fallen as a military people. Remembering what they had been, no lessons, however severe, could make them see themselves as they were; and this error was not confined to the multitude; it was partaken by all ranks, and seemed, indeed, inherent in the national character. It was an error which exposed their armies always to defeat, and yet as a nation rendered them invincible; ... the French could have invaded no people whom it would have been so easy to rout, none whom it was so impossible to subdue. Infantado had his full share of this delusion; he planned extensive and combined operations, such as required good troops, intelligent officers, and ready means; ... he thought of relieving Zaragoza, ... of recovering Madrid; or of pursuing the left wing of that army which was then employed against the English; ... and this with men and leaders whose incapacity was manifest upon every occasion. Upon intelligence that about 1500 French cavalry were scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering great part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, he concerted a scheme for surprising them at Aranjuez and ?Movement against the French at Tarancon frustrated.? Tarancon, sending Venegas with 4000 foot and 800 horse to attack them in the latter place, while D. Antonio de Senra, with an equal force of foot and 1000 horse, was to fall upon Aranjuez, overcome the enemy there, and intercept those who would retreat thither in their endeavour to escape from Tarancon. The attempt failed, wholly through mismanagement. Senra stopped short at El Horcajo, in fear of a detachment of French cavalry at Villanueva del Cardete, though that force had been calculated upon in the combinations of Infantado. The division with Venegas lost their way in the night and the snow; some went in one direction, some in another, ... the cavalry who were thus separated had no directions how to act; and the infantry, instead of surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised ?Infantado, 45–55.? by them. There were, however, some good troops among them, who stood firm, and the ?Dec. 25.? French, being very inferior in number, retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.

This failure had the ill effect of creating discord among the Spaniards. Infantado blamed the commanders; they reproached the officers under them; and both were willing to excuse themselves by supposing that what had failed in the execution had been planned unskilfully. Yet, as some advantage had been gained, the Duke resolved to pursue it.... The left bank being now cleared as far as Aranjuez, he hoped to take possession of that point and of OcaÑa, and as in that rainy season the Tagus was nowhere fordable, his purpose was to remove the boats, break down the bridges, and place himself at Toledo. Venegas therefore was ordered to canton his troops in Tarancon, Ucles, and the neighbouring villages, preparatory to this movement, and his force was increased to 8000 foot and 1900 horse, ... the commander-in-chief retaining with himself about 10,000, of whom a third part were without arms, and a considerable number otherwise unfit for service. This ?1809.? was their position at the beginning of the year. Of what was passing in other parts they were ill-informed, and the false reports which abound in such times were always on the favourable side. They believed the French in Madrid were in hourly fear that this army would appear before the capital; and that Romana had entirely destroyed the enemy at Guadarama. Some movements, however, on the part of the French about Aranjuez made Venegas resolve to fall back from Tarancon upon Ucles. He apprehended that it was their intention to attack the part of his force which was stationed at this latter place, and he resolved therefore to march his troops thither as a better position than Tarancon, and one where he might cover the army.

Ucles is a decayed town, where the Knights of Santiago had their chief convent in the bright ages of that military order: here their banner was kept which Gregory XI. had blessed, and which the Kings of Spain delivered to every new master on his appointment: hither the knights from all the other provinces resorted when their services were required, and from hence they had set forth for the conquest of Cordoba, and Seville, and Jaen, and Murcia. To a Spaniard of these times it was a melancholy place, for the proud as well as the mournful recollections which it recalled; for here Alonso VI. had lost his only son, in the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever suffered from the Moors since the destruction of the kingdom of the Goths. He fell in battle with the Almoravides; and because seven Counts had died bravely in defending the Infante, the African fanatics, in their insolent triumph, called the spot where they fell the Place of the Seven Swine. This ill-omened ground was now to become the scene of an action disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they were routed, and infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness with which they abused their victory.

Venegas supposed that the French were bringing forces against him across the Tagus, by the ferry at Villamanrique. His danger was from a different quarter. Victor had marched from Toledo against Infantado’s army, knowing as little of the Spaniards’ movements as they did of his, but with such troops, that his only anxiety was to find the enemy, and bring them to action wherever they might be found. Victor himself, with General Ruffin’s division, went by way of Alcazar, and General Villate, taking the direction of Ucles, discovered the Spaniards there on the morning of the 13th. Venegas apprehended an attack on his right, or in the rear; but the French crossed the brook, and fell upon the left wing of the Spaniards, who were stationed upon some high and broken ground, commanding the convent and the town. If the general erred in not strengthening this position, the troops allowed him no time for remedying his error; they retreated precipitately to the town, and when orders came to occupy the convent it was too late; ... the enemy were within the enclosure, and fired from thence, as under cover of a parapet. The panic presently spread, the raw levies disordered those who would have done their duty, and many officers made a brave but vain sacrifice of their own lives in endeavouring to rally and encourage the men. The fugitives in one direction came upon the enemy’s artillery, under General Cenarmont, and were cut down with grape-shot; in another they fell in with Victor and the remaining part of the French army. One body, under D. Pedro Agustin Giron, seeing that all was lost, made their way desperately through the enemy in good order, and got to Carrascosa, where they found the Duke. It was a series of errors on the part of the Spaniards, and the consequences were as disastrous as they could be. The French boasted of having taken 300 officers and 12,000 men, ... the whole force, however, which Venegas had with him did not amount to this, but the loss was very great. The prisoners were marched to ?Rocca, p. 79.? Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and exhaustion were shot by their inhuman captors.

Never indeed did any men heap upon themselves more guilt and infamy than those by whom this easy conquest was obtained. The inhabitants of Ucles had taken no part in the action; from necessity they could only be passive spectators of the scene. But they had soon cause to lament that they had not rather immolated their wives and children with their own hands, like the Numantians of old, and then rushed upon the invaders to sweeten death with vengeance, instead of submitting to the mercy of such enemies. Plunder was the first object of the French, and in order to make the townspeople discover where their valuables were secreted, they tortured them. When they had thus obtained all the portable wealth of the place, they yoked the inhabitants like beasts, choosing especially the clergy for this outrage, loaded them with their own furniture, and made them carry it to the Castle Hill, and pile it in heaps, where they set fire to it, and consumed the whole. They then in mere wantonness murdered above threescore persons, dragging them to the shambles, that this butchery might be committed in its proper scene. Several women were among these sufferers, and they might be regarded as happy in being thus delivered from the worse horrors that ensued: for the French laid hands on the surviving women of the place, amounting to some three hundred, ... they tore the nun from the altar, the wife from her husband’s corpse, the virgin from her mother’s arms, and they abused these victims of the foulest brutality, till many of them expired on the spot. This was not all, ... but the farther atrocities which these monsters perpetrated cannot even be hinted at without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is due to humanity. These unutterable things were committed in open day, and the officers made not the slightest attempt at restraining the wretches under their command; they were employed in securing the best part of the plunder for themselves. The Spanish government published the details of this wickedness, in order ?Gazeta del Gobierno, April 24, 1809.? that if the criminals escaped earthly punishment, they might not escape perpetual infamy.

Infantado was severely censured for exposing his advanced guard fourteen leagues from his head-quarters, so that support was impossible; and an equal want of judgement had been shown by Venegas in not falling back upon the main body, which he knew was actually on the way to join him. The Duke left Cuenca on the morning preceding the action, and took up his quarters that night at Horcajada. Desirous to know for what reason Venegas had retreated from Tarancon, he rode forward on the 13th with his aides-de-camp, and when he reached Carrascosa, which is a league and half from Ucles, some carriers informed him that as they were leaving that town they heard firing at the outposts. Part of his troops were at Carrascosa; they had heard nothing; and the Duke was preparing to sit down to table with their general, the Conde de Orgaz, when news came that horse and foot were approaching in disorder. Immediately he mounted and rode forward; the first person whom he met was the commandant of the light troops, D. Francisco Copons y Navia, an officer in whom he had great confidence: seeing him without his battalion, he knew that some fatal blow must have been sustained, and asking what had happened, was told that the troops at Ucles were all either killed or taken. His first impulse was to rush forward, and throw himself upon the enemy’s bayonets. A timely thought of duty withheld him from this act of desperation. The troops under Giron, who had fought their way through the French, came up now in good order; with these and with such fugitives as could be brought together, he made dispositions which checked the pursuit in this direction, and retired when the evening was ?Infantado, 119–132.? closing to Horcajada. They rested there during the early part of the night, and setting forward at three in the morning, reached the Venta de las Cabrejas before daybreak.

Here, while the troops were receiving their rations, the generals held a council whether they should retreat to the borders of Valencia, and take up a position for the defence of that kingdom, which was threatened on the side of Daroca; or join the Marques del Palacio in La Mancha, and if compelled, fall back to La Carolina or DespeÑa-Perros; or march for Zaragoza, to attack the besiegers, and raise the siege. This was gravely proposed; but the madness of making such an attempt with an unprovided, undisciplined, routed army, dispirited by a long series of disasters, and above all, by the scandalous defeat of the preceding day, was universally acknowledged. The scheme of joining Palacio, and making for the Sierra Morena, was likewise rejected, because in the plains of La Mancha they would be exposed to the enemy’s cavalry; and it was resolved without a dissentient voice to retreat into Valencia, where there were great resources for refitting and increasing the troops. This being determined, the army reached Cuenca that night, and continued its retreat on the following morning, the artillery being sent off in the middle of the night by a better road, to join them at Almodovar del Pinar. But four-and-twenty hours of the heaviest rain rendered this road also impassable; and in spite of every exertion the greater number of the guns could not be got farther than Olmedilla, one league from Cuenca, by the following midnight, and there the escort left them. The Duke, who was with the artillery himself, in hope of expediting the most difficult part of their movements, had preceded them to Tortola, where a few of the guns had arrived, and whither the rest were to be brought next day, the worst part of the road being past. He sent orders therefore that one regiment of horse and another of foot should be dispatched to Tortola, for the purpose of escorting the artillery when it should be thus brought together, and went himself to join the army at ?Loss of the artillery.? Valera de arriba. On his arrival there on the evening of the 16th he found that no infantry had been sent; being barefooted and exhausted by marching in such weather, they had been deemed actually incapable of the service. Presently advice arrived that a company of the Ordenes Militares, which he had left at Tortola, had thought proper to leave the place immediately after his departure: that a party of enemy’s cavalry had come up, and that the regiment of dragoons at the very sound of the French trumpets had taken flight, abandoning the guns to them. He now ordered a battalion of infantry and the Farnese regiment of dragoons to hasten and retake them: the night was dark, the distance considerable, the roads in the worst imaginable state; and when at daybreak they came to Tortola, scarcely an hundred infantry could be mustered, the rest having lost the way, or dispersed. The dragoons behaved well, and twice made themselves masters of the guns, but to no purpose; they were embedded in the soil too deeply to be removed at once; and while they were vainly labouring there, reinforcements came up to the enemy, and many brave men were sacrificed before the regiment desisted from the attempt at saving these guns, which with such exertions had been brought thither from Tudela. Infantado knew that any farther effort, considering the state of his army, must be hopeless, and would moreover expose him to the imminent danger of having his retreat cut off, for one column of the enemy appeared to be taking the direction of Almodovar; and in fact when the Duke reached that place, it was ascertained that they were within three leagues of it. After a few hours’ rest therefore he ordered the retreat to be continued to La Motilla del Palancar, near Alarcon; and being, however unfortunate as a commander, willing to perform a soldier’s part to the last, took his station with his own family and his orderly dragoons, as an outpost, within three miles of the enemy. This had an excellent effect upon the troops; so many indeed had deserted since the rout at Ucles, that few perhaps remained except those who acted upon a sense of duty, and their movements were now conducted with more composure. Infantado remained at La Motilla till he was assured that the French had turned aside from the pursuit; removing then to Albacete and Chinchilla, he gave his troops a few days’ necessary ?Infantado, 133–141.? rest, and issued directions for the better observance of discipline and order.

On the 25th the army moved to Hellin and Tobarra, the object being to cover Murcia, call off the attention of the enemy from Valencia, and receive reinforcements from both those kingdoms and from Andalusia. Infantado was more enterprising and more hopeful than some of the generals under his command, who would have had him retreat to the city of Murcia, there to refit his troops, or take shelter even at Carthagena. The minister at war submitted to his consideration whether it would not be advisable to take up a position between the PeÑas de S. Pedro and Carcelen, for the purpose of communicating with the Sierra Morena by the Sierra de Alcaraz. This the Duke thought a bad position in itself, even if it were not in a desert, and without water; and as he had ascertained that Victor was moving upon Villarrobledo with the intention of cutting off the vanguard of the Carolina army at Villarta, he took measures for averting a blow, which, if it had succeeded, would have left the passes of the Sierra Morena open to the enemy. It had been intended that this detachment, consisting of 5000 men, should have co-operated with him in his projected movement upon Toledo, which had been so fatally frustrated at Ucles; they were therefore under his command. He now ?1809.
February.? sent orders that they should instantly retire to S. Cruz de Mudela, or to El Viso; and while he hastened thither himself to join them, sent off 500 horse, divided into four parties, to act as guerillas in the rear of the French. They did this with great success, imposing upon them by their rapidity and boldness: and the Duke by forced marches reached S. Cruz de Mudela in time to save the Carolina troops, the enemy having just arrived in front of them. The French, seeing a force which they had not expected, and were not in strength to attack, retired toward Toledo, leaving the open country to the Spaniards: and Infantado then communicated ?Infantado, 180–189.? with General Cuesta, that he might act in concert with the army of Extremadura.

The troops had now recovered heart; the advanced guard, under the Duque del Alburquerque, gained some advantage at Mora, where, ?Feb. 18.? by a well-planned expedition, he surprised the French; and Infantado thought that he had performed no inconsiderable service to his country, in having gathered up the wreck of the central army, and brought it into an efficient state, when he received an order from the Supreme Junta to give up the command to the ?Feb. 6.? Conde de Cartaojal. He obeyed reluctantly, and with the feelings of an injured man. The government at that time perhaps, like the people, attributed too large a part of their disasters to the generals, and therefore appointed and displaced them upon no better ground than that of complying with public opinion. The soldiers appear to have been well satisfied with the Duke; they indeed had seen the incessant exertions which he had made for supporting them when the government could send them no supplies: but the officers were divided into cabals, and there was a strong party against him. His offended pride did not however abate his desire of continuing to serve his country in the field, and he requested permission to remain with the army as Colonel of the Royal Spanish Guards; but he was informed that this was incompatible with his elevated rank, and therefore he was ?Feb. 12.? called to Seville. No inquiry concerning the rout at Ucles was instituted; the opinion prevailed that it was imputable to his error in exposing the advanced guard at such a distance from the body of his army; but the faults with which he charged Venegas were overlooked, and the government continued to place a confidence in that General, to which, in any other capacity than that of a commander, his honourable character and personal qualities entitled him.

The French, at the commencement of their revolutionary war, sent every unsuccessful general to the scaffold, the Convention in its bloody acts keeping pace with the bloodiest desires of a deceived and infuriated populace. The Central Junta contracted no such guilt, though humanity is not the characteristic of the Spaniards, and justice in state affairs had in that country for centuries been unknown. They gave ?1809.? no ear to vulgar or malignant accusations; but, on the other hand, they allowed their generals no opportunity of vindicating themselves. Upon this ground CastaÑos, as well as Infantado, had cause to complain. The order which called him from the command of the central army during its retreat intimated no dissatisfaction at his conduct; on the contrary, it summoned him to take the presidency of the Military Junta, saying that the fate of armies depended upon the plans which were laid down for them. That restless intriguer, the Conde de Montijo, who had visited him at his head-quarters at Tudela, professed the warmest friendship towards him, and spoken of him in the language of unbounded admiration, left the army suddenly two days before the battle, and wherever he went reported that CastaÑos was a traitor, and had sold the country to the French. This nearly proved fatal to the General, when, in obedience to his summons, he set out to join the Central Junta, taking with him merely such an escort as his rank required: for he soon found that fifteen horse and thirty foot were not sufficient to protect him from imminent danger; the clamour which Montijo raised had spread far and wide, and they could not enter a village without preparations as serious as if they were about to engage in action. At Miguel-turra, in La Mancha, the Junta exerted themselves ineffectually to restrain the populace, who were crying out, Kill him! kill him! The members of that body, the better to secure him, gathered round his person, and accompanied him on foot; the rabble pressed upon them with blind fury, and their lives, as well as that of CastaÑos, would have been sacrificed, if his cavalry had not charged the multitude sword in hand, and opened the way. But the danger was not over when he had been housed; the house was beset, and it was only by the exertions of the better classes, and especially of a priest, that he was enabled to leave the place before daybreak the following morning. It became necessary for them to avoid all populous places, and take up their lodging in the smallest and most retired hamlets; and yet with these precautions his life was frequently threatened. In addition to this evil there was the uncertainty of knowing whither to direct his course: three times on his journey he found that the Central Junta had changed their place of residence; and when he finally made for Seville, it was with a belief that they had removed to Puerto de Santa Maria. Upon approaching Seville, he was ordered to take up his abode in the monastery of S. Geronimo de Buenavista, and there await the farther determination of the government. Montijo had accused him as an instrument of Tilly, engaged with him in treasonable designs, and also in a scheme for rendering Andalusia independent, and making it the head of a confederacy of ?CastaÑos, Representacion, 15–18.? provinces. This was the mere fabrication of a man who scrupled at no means for promoting his own insane ambition, and as such the Junta received it; but they deemed it expedient to treat the general as if he were under their displeasure, lest a suspicion, which in its consequences might be most fatal to the country, should be raised against themselves.

CastaÑos was not aware of the accusation which had been thus preferred; least indeed of all men could he have supposed that a charge of federalism would have been brought against him, who had with so much decision and effect opposed the dangerous disposition of the provincial authorities to consult their own security alone. But he complained of the injurious restraint in which he was placed, and in an able and temperate memorial appealed to his past services, showed that the defeat at Tudela was not imputable to any error or indiscretion on his part (his opinion having been over-ruled by their representative, D. Francisco Palafox), and required that his conduct might be judged of by the circumstances in which he was placed, and the actual condition of his army, not as if he had commanded 80,000 effective men. An army in the field, he said, was like a musical instrument with many keys and many registers: if these did not answer to the touch, if many strings were wanting, and the others not in tune, the best musician would be deemed a sorry performer by those who heard the broken and jarring sounds which he produced, and knew not the state of the instrument. Still, he maintained, the French were far from being able to subdue Spain. CastaÑos was not unsupported while he thus defended himself with the confidence of an innocent and injured man. The Junta of Seville honourably espoused his cause, and the government allowed him to remove to his own house at Algeciras, there to remain while the inquiry into his conduct which he demanded should be carried on.

Montijo was one of those men who in disordered times are intoxicated with ambition and vanity. His object in seeking the ruin of CastaÑos was to obtain a command for himself. He represented to the Junta that the resources by which the miracle of restoring the country might be effected could only be drawn from Andalusia; but that to call them forth activity, energy, patriotism, and above all the confidence of the public were required. Under any other circumstances he should have blushed to designate himself as the person in whom these qualifications were united, and unhappily the only person who possessed the last; but in such an emergency a good Spaniard must sacrifice even his modesty. Spain might still be saved if he were commissioned to take what cavalry he could raise, put himself at the head of the forces in La Mancha, and march upon Madrid; and he pledged his sacred word of honour that he would resign the command as soon as the French should be driven back to the Ebro. ?1809.
January.? This proposal met with as little attention as it deserved; and Montijo then joined the army of Carolina, there to sow fresh intrigues, and meet with deserved humiliation.

The French themselves were at this time in such a situation, that the desultory and harassing warfare which the Junta of Seville advised at the commencement of the struggle might now have been pursued against them with great effect. A disposition in some of the marshals to disregard Joseph, and act without any deference to his wishes or commands, had shown itself before Buonaparte left Spain; the attention of the French cabinet was directed toward Austria, and the affairs of Spain were left to the intrusive government, which had in fact no control over the armies by whom alone it was to be supported. But as there was no enemy in the field alert and able enough to take advantage of the fair occasions which offered, the French commanders believed the struggle was at an end, and that they had only to march over the country and receive the submission of the inhabitants. While Victor occupied Toledo, waiting only a convenient season to disperse the hasty levies which were brought together for the defence of Andalusia, General Dorneau marched against Zamora, scaled the walls of that ancient city, and put to death those inhabitants who, in the flagitious language of the French bulletin, were called the most guilty. Castille and Leon were overrun, and wherever they went those scenes of profanation, violence, and murder were exhibited, in which Buonaparte’s soldiers were systematically allowed to glut the worst passions of corrupted and brutalized humanity.

Yet while the country was thus at the mercy of the French, the panic which their appearance every where excited extended nowhere beyond their immediate presence. In all places which were not actually occupied by the enemy, the local authorities acted as if no enemy had been at hand, and their own government had been as efficient as it was legitimate. The enlisting went on, and promises of speedy triumph and sure deliverance were held forth with a confidence which no reverses could shake. The fugitives from the different armies no sooner reached their own homes than they were again enrolled to be embodied, and exposed again to privations and sufferings such as those from which they had so hardly escaped. Before their strength was recruited, they were sent off to form new armies, neither better disciplined, better commanded, nor better provided than those which had been routed and dispersed. They went hungered, half naked, and cursing their fortune, without confidence in their officers, each other, or themselves, yet believing fully that the deliverance of Spain would be effected with a faith which seemed to require and perhaps very generally expected miracles for its fulfilment. Human means indeed seem to have been provided as little as if they had not been taken into the account.

This unreasoning confidence brought with it evil as well as good. Many of those who had something to lose, and hoped that part at least might be saved by submission, took either side according as the scale inclined. When the enemy was absent, they joined the national voice, which expressed what were their real feelings: if the French appeared, they were ready to take the oaths, and act under them, as far as was necessary for their own safety or advantage, longing at the same time and looking for the day of deliverance and vengeance. In many places, the magistracy acted with no other view than that of averting from themselves and their immediate jurisdiction as much of the common misery as they could. This was particularly the case in those parts of Leon and Castille which lay most open to the enemy. The enrolment was rigorously enforced there, and men were hurried off: but any means of local defence were rather dreaded than desired. Offers of assistance were made from Ciudad Rodrigo to Ledesma and Salamanca, and both cities declined the proffered aid, as unnecessary; but in truth, because they believed it to be unavailing, and had determined not to provoke the enemy by resistance.

Ciudad Rodrigo had at that time become a point of great interest, owing to a well-timed movement of Sir Robert Wilson’s with a small body of Portugueze volunteers. This adventurous officer had been rewarded by the Emperor of Germany with the order of Maria Theresa, for a brilliant affair in which the 15th regiment of dragoons was engaged during the siege of Landrecy. He served afterwards in Egypt, and published a history of the British expedition to that country, in which work he charged Buonaparte with the massacre of his prisoners at Jaffa, and the empoisonment of his own sick and wounded. The facts were boldly denied at the time, and willingly disbelieved by Buonaparte’s admirers; they have since been substantiated by ample evidence, and by his own avowal; but the merit of having first proclaimed them was Sir Robert Wilson’s, and it marked him for an object of especial vengeance should he ever fall into the hands of the tyrant, whose true character he had been the first to expose. This rendered him more conspicuous than he would have been for his rank, which was that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Having, in pursuance of the convention, superintended the embarkation of the French at Porto, and by great exertions contributed to save them from the just fury of the populace, he applied himself with ?He raises a Portugueze legion at Porto.? characteristic activity and enterprise to raising and disciplining a Portugueze legion in that city. The plan was entirely approved by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and zealously forwarded by the Bishop. Two thousand men presently presented themselves, and that number might have been increased five-fold could he have relied upon resources for them; for the alertness with which they learned our discipline, the confidence which they acquired, the pride which they felt at being displayed, and which their officers partook in displaying them, excited the emulation of their countrymen. Some jealousy was felt at Lisbon, and some obstacles were thrown in his way, upon the pretext that an invidious distinction would be occasioned between these and the other Portugueze troops. Sir John Cradock, however, when the command in that capital devolved upon him, authorised Sir Robert to act according to his own judgement. His first thought had been to embark for Carthagena, and march from thence to Catalonia. Afterwards, Asturias seemed a nearer and more important point. But after Blake’s army had been dispersed, and before Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird had formed a junction, he resolved to march toward the frontiers, thinking that he might move from Miranda or Braganza, and so to facilitate the communication between them, and cover, as far as his means permitted, the approach to the northern provinces. With this intent he marched the first division of his legion, consisting of 700 men with six pieces of cannon; they were to be followed by the second, under Baron Eben, an Hanoverian officer in the British service; and this by the third. And Sir J. Cradock had ordered a battalion of Portugueze infantry and a regiment of cavalry to join him.

When Sir Robert reached Lamego, he there found information, that a small British detachment which had been stationed in Ciudad Rodrigo, had, in consequence of the approaching danger, forsaken it. Always hopeful himself, and well aware of what importance it was that that position should be maintained, he left his troops, and hastened thither to consult with the Junta. It was a point from which he could act upon that division of the enemy who were then forcing their way into Extremadura, ... or, co-operate with any Spanish force that might take the field from Salamanca. The people, on their part, declared their determination to defend the place resolutely; his aid, therefore, was accepted as frankly as it was offered, and the legion accordingly advanced from Lamego through a country almost impracticable at that season. By dint of human exertion, carts and artillery were drawn up steeps which hitherto had been deemed inaccessible for carriages. Sometimes men and officers, breast-deep in the water, dragged the guns through torrents so formidable, that cattle could not be trusted to perform that service. Sometimes, where the carriages would have floated and have been swept away, the wheels were taken off, and they were slidden over on the foot-bridges. Sometimes they were hauled along causeways and connecting bridges so narrow, that the wheels rested on half their fellies upon the stones which were set edge upwards on the verge of the road. It was the first march these troops had ever made, but notwithstanding the severity of such labour, performed at such a season, and during incessant rain, not a man deserted, and there was no straggling, no murmuring amid all their difficulties: they sung as they went along, and reached their resting-place at night with unabated cheerfulness.

Sir Robert had plainly stated to the Junta that his legion was not to form part of the garrison, but that in every operation without the walls he should think it his duty to aid, and even in defence of the suburbs before the Salamanca gate, as long as his return over the bridge was assured. The Junta and the people of that city displayed a hearty willingness to co-operate with their allies in any manner that might appear most conducive to the common cause; and from that generous spirit they never departed during all the vicissitudes of the war. At first there was a fair prospect of acting offensively; but when the authorities at Ledesma and Salamanca declined the assistance which was offered them from this quarter, Sir Robert, instead of maintaining the line of the Tormes, as he had hoped to do, formed on the Agueda, having his head-quarters at San Felices. When he had marched from the coast, it was with the hope of facilitating the plans and contributing to the success of a British army perfectly equipped and disciplined, strong in itself, and confident in its commanders and its cause. He now learnt that that army was retreating with a speed which the most utter defeat could hardly have precipitated: at the same time he was privately advised to fall back on Porto. But though weak himself, he ?Effect of his movements.? had already ascertained that the French in that part of Spain were not strong, that the activity and appearance of his little corps had imposed upon them a salutary opinion of his strength, and that his continuance there was of no trifling importance, not merely as covering the removal of the British stores from Almeida, but as checking the enemy’s advance in that direction, counteracting the report which they busily spread and indeed believed themselves, that the English had entirely abandoned Spain, encouraging the Spaniards, and gaining time for them to strengthen the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, and for training a brave and well-disposed people.

This became of more consequence when the Junta of that city had, in their own language, “the melancholy honour of being the only one which held out in all Castille,” Ledesma and Salamanca having, without a show of resistance, admitted the enemy. For him to obtain intelligence was as easy, owing to the disposition of the people, as it was difficult for the French. Having ascertained that they had few cavalry and only 1500 foot in Salamanca, that they were proportionally weak in the country about Zamora and Villalpando, and that they had not occupied Ledesma for want of men, he entered Ledesma, carried off, in Ferdinand’s name for the Junta of Rodrigo, the treasure and money which had been raised there for the French in obedience to requisition, and compelled them to seek and convoy what provisions they extorted from the country. They had given public notice that every person who disobeyed their requisitions should be punished with death. Sir Robert sent forth a counter-proclamation, declaring, that if this threat were effected, he would hang a Frenchman for every Spaniard. By incessant activity, attacking their posts in open day, he kept them perpetually on the alarm, and made them apprehend a serious attack on Salamanca itself. Upon that score their apprehensions would have been realized, if the whole force which Sir Robert had raised had been then at his command; or if even with such poor means as he possessed he had not been withheld by orders from Lisbon. But the ?Part of the legion detained at Porto.? remaining corps of his legion had been detained at Porto, and when he had applied for them, and for clothing and military stores, he had been answered that the men were wanted for the defence of Porto itself, and that, even if stores might have been spared, they could not be sent without imminent danger from the people. It was in vain for him to represent that the measures which he had taken were those which were best adapted for the protection of Portugal, by covering her weakest side; that Portugal must be defended beyond her frontiers; that the service in which he was engaged was of all others that in which the troops might soonest acquire the discipline and experience in which the Portugueze soldiers were so notoriously deficient; that he wanted the men only; not provisions, those he could assure to them; not money, for if what had been received from England for the express use of the legion were withheld from it, he would apply elsewhere. ?Displeasure of the authorities there.? Reasoning was of no avail when the danger from the side of Galicia appeared to be so near as in reality it was; and the Bishop of Porto, though he had warmly encouraged the formation of the legion, as an important measure towards restoring the military character of his countrymen, and though Sir Robert had succeeded in gaining his good opinion to a high degree, was nevertheless offended at the disrespect which seemed to be shown to him and the other Portugueze authorities, by the manner in which that officer was now acting as if wholly independent of them. From the Spanish government, however, ?Rank given him by the Spanish government.? Sir Robert received as much encouragement as he could have desired in his most sanguine hopes. They gave him the rank of Brigade-General, and placed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and the troops in the province at his disposal. And this proof of confidence was given at a time when a misunderstanding had arisen between the two cabinets, which might have been fatal to the common cause, if each party had not rendered full justice to the upright intention of the other.