TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN. SURRENDER OF CORUNA AND FERROL. SITUATION OF ROMANA’S ARMY. BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO FRANCE. PROCEEDINGS AT MADRID. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. ?1809. January. Treaty between Great Britain and Spain.? Happily for the interests of Great Britain, and for its honour, which is paramount to all interests, the British government entertained more generous hopes than its General had done, and acted upon wiser views. At the very time when the Spaniards had sustained the heaviest losses, and our own army was known to be in full retreat, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and the Spanish nation acting in the name of Ferdinand. It proclaimed a christian, stable, and inviolable peace between the two countries, perpetual and sincere amity, and strict alliance during the war with France; and it pronounced an entire and lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done on either side in the course of the late wars wherein they had been engaged against each other. His Britannic Majesty engaged to assist the Spaniards to the utmost of his power, and not to acknowledge any other King of Spain, and of the Indies thereunto appertaining, than Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation should acknowledge; and the Spanish government engaged, on behalf of Ferdinand, never to cede to France any portion of the territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the world. The contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against France, and not to make peace except by common consent. It was agreed by an additional article, that as the existing circumstances did not admit of the regular negotiation of a treaty of commerce with all the care and consideration due to so important a subject, such a negotiation should be effected as soon as it was practicable; and meantime mutual facilities afforded to the commerce of both countries, by temporary regulations, founded on reciprocal utility. Another separate article provided that the Spanish government should take the most effectual measures for preventing the Spanish squadrons, in all their ports, from falling into the power of France. Before the treaty could reach Spain, the mischief against which this latter article was intended to provide had been done in the ports of Galicia. ?Surrender of CoruÑa.? There were Englishmen at CoruÑa, who, when Sir John Moore was preparing to embark, doubted whether the inhabitants would protect his embarkation. In the bitterness of grief and shame they said, “should the Galicians tell us that we came into their country and by the imposing display of our well-equipped army prevented them from defending their native mountains; that they entrusted their passes to us and we abandoned them to the enemy; that disregarding any service which seemed immaterial to our own safety, we let the French occupy the approaches to their city; ... should the volunteers of CoruÑa tell us this (they said), and throw down their arms when they see us flying to our ships, ... we should have little right to complain of desertion or abandonment!” But the Spaniards are a more generous people than these doubts implied. Astonished indeed they were at the manner in which an army that had excited by its proud appearance the highest hopes as well as the highest admiration, had retreated through one of the strongest and most defensible countries in Europe; but severely as these hopes were disappointed, and cruelly as they suffered in consequence, they were not betrayed into one unworthy act or expression of resentment. The Governor of CoruÑa, D. Antonio de Alcedo, had made vigorous preparations as soon as it seemed likely that the enemy might enter Galicia. His name will be remembered as the author of a Geographical Dictionary of Spanish America, much more accurate and copious than any former work relating to those countries. It would be well for him could it be forgotten in the history of his own. While he expected that the British army would make a stand, and maintain CoruÑa and Ferrol at least, even if they abandoned the field, he held brave language, calling upon the inhabitants to supply stakes, beams, fascines and butts for additional works, and exhorting the women to busy themselves in providing sacks to be filled with earth. “If the French come,” said he in his proclamation, “I will take such measures that CoruÑa shall be not less gloriously distinguished than Gerona, Valencia, and Zaragoza. But should fortune prove adverse to us, as a chastisement from God for our sins, I will bury myself in the ruins of this fortress rather than surrender it to the enemy: thus finishing my days with honour, and trusting that all will follow my example.” Wherever in Spain a Governor was found willing to set such an example, the resolution to follow it was not wanting. CoruÑa is a regular fortress, and might long have held out against any means which Marshal Soult could have brought against it. But when an English army with the sea open to them for succours did not think of maintaining it, it is not surprising that the inhabitants should have despaired of making a successful resistance. Their Governor was prepared to play the traitor; he had still however honour enough left not to propose a capitulation till the last transport was beyond the enemy’s power. Terms were then easily agreed on, the one party asking ?Jan. 19.? only what the other would have imposed. Alcedo stipulated for a general amnesty; that all persons in office should retain their appointments on taking an oath to the Intruder; and that the military who took that oath might either continue in the service or receive their dismissal at their own option, such as refused the oath becoming prisoners of war. He himself set the example of swearing allegiance to Joseph Buonaparte; and soon in his own person properly experienced with what fidelity the French kept their engagements, for they presently dismissed him from his government and sent him into France. ?Situation and strength of Ferrol.? CoruÑa and Ferrol are situated on the opposite sides of a spacious bay which receives in four deep inlets the rivers Mero, Mandeu, Eume and Juvia. Ferrol is placed in the deepest and most capacious of these inlets, and nothing which skill and expense could effect had been spared during the last half century for improving the natural advantages of the harbour, and rendering it impregnable. It had thus been rendered one of the strongest naval establishments in the world, being also one of the most commodious. To force the passage is impossible, ships having for the distance of a league to file one by one along a shore defended by forts. Equal care had been taken to protect it on the land side. There were at this time eight ships of the line in the harbour, of which three were of the largest size, ... three frigates, and a considerable number of smaller vessels. From Betanzos to Ferrol was but a march of fourteen miles farther than from Betanzos to CoruÑa; and it was a topic of exultation for the French, that the English in the precipitance of their flight had not marched upon Ferrol instead of CoruÑa, where they might have occupied a fortress strong enough to be called impregnable, and have secured the squadron. It was still fresh in remembrance that when Sir James Pulteney had landed on the coast there with a part of that army by which the French were afterwards expelled from Egypt, he deemed it more prudent to re-embark his troops without attempting any thing, than to hazard an attack against so formidable a place. It is indeed almost impossible to lay regular siege to it: the nature of the ground being such that trenches cannot be opened there. ?Surrender of Ferrol.? Marshal Soult found in CoruÑa a battering train sufficient for making a feint of besieging Ferrol; that it would not be in his power to take it he well knew; ... but he reckoned upon the pusillanimity and treason of the commanders, and upon the fortune of Buonaparte. The population was estimated at 8000, double the number in CoruÑa; but the peasantry from the adjacent country had flocked thither, and there were 8000 men within its walls, burning with hatred and indignation against the French, and requiring only a leader in whom they could confide. The persons in authority they suspected, and with too much reason. One of these, the admiral D. Pedro Obregon, they displaced and threw into prison; it was only removing one traitor to make room for another. D. Francisco Melgarejo, who succeeded to the command of the squadron, opened a correspondence with the enemy by water; and the military commanders, equally ready to betray their country and their trust, sent messengers round by land at the same time. Accordingly General Mermet had no sooner made a demonstration of investing the town, than the Castles of La Palma and San Martin were abandoned to him; and as the disposition of the people was of no avail against the vile purposes of their chiefs civil and military, the town ?Jan. 26.? was delivered up, upon the same terms as CoruÑa; a few additional articles being added, stipulating for the arrears of pay, as also that if resistance were made in any part of Galicia, no inhabitant of Ferrol should be compelled to serve against his countrymen. Obregon was then released from prison, and placed by the French at the head of the arsenal; he and the comrades of his treason took the oath of allegiance to the Intruder; and those persons who had been most active in arresting him and in promoting the national cause were seized and reserved for punishment. ?Exultation of the enemy.? If the Central Junta had at one time dissembled the danger of the country (or rather partaken too much of that unreasoning confidence which was one characteristic of the Spaniards), they never attempted to conceal its disasters, nor to extenuate them. On such occasions their language was frank and dignified, becoming the nation which they represented. In announcing the loss of CoruÑa and Ferrol, they pronounced the surrender of those strong places to have been cowardly and scandalous, and promised to condemn the persons who had thus betrayed their duty, to condign punishment. The enemy meantime failed not to blazon forth their triumphs in this Galician campaign: to represent the battle of CoruÑa as a victory on their part was a falsehood, which all circumstances, except those of the action itself, tended to confirm; ... and the results of the campaign had been so rapid, and apparently so complete, as to excite their own wonder. Three British regiments, they said, the 42d, 50th, and 52d, had been entirely destroyed in the action, and Sir John Moore killed in attempting to charge at their head, with the vain hope of restoring the fortune of the day. The English had lost every thing which constitutes an army, artillery, horses, baggage, ammunition, magazines, and military chests. 80 pieces of cannon they had landed, they had re-embarked no more than 12. 200,000 weight of powder, 16,000 muskets, and 2,000,000 of treasure (about £83,000) had fallen into the hands of the pursuers, and treasure yet more considerable had been thrown down the precipices along the road between Astorga and CoruÑa, where the peasantry and the soldiers were now collecting it. 5000 horses had been counted which they had slaughtered upon the way, ... 500 were taken at CoruÑa, and the carcasses of 1200 were infecting the streets when the conquerors entered that town. The English would have occupied Ferrol and seized the squadron there, had it not been for the precipitance of their retreat, and the result of the battle to which they had been brought at last. Thus then had terminated their expedition into Spain! thus, after having fomented the war in that unhappy country, had they abandoned it to its fate! In another season of the year not a man of them would have escaped; now the facility of breaking up the bridges, the rapidity of the winter torrents, shortness of days, and length of nights, had favoured their retreat. But they were driven out of the peninsula, harassed, routed, and disheartened. The kingdom of Leon, the province of Zamora, and all Galicia, which they had been so desirous to cover, were conquered and subdued; and Romana, whom they had brought from the Baltic, was, with the wreck of his army, reduced to less than 2500 men, wandering between Vigo and Santiago, and closely pursued.... This was the most stinging of all the French reproaches. Wounded to the heart as we were that an English army should so have retreated, still we knew that wherever our men had been allowed to face the enemy they had beaten them; and that, however the real history of the battle of CoruÑa might be concealed from the French people, the French army had received a lesson there, which they would remember whenever it might be our fortune to encounter them again. But that we should have drawn such a force in pursuit of Romana, who, if he were taken prisoner, would be put to death with the forms of justice, by a tyrant who made mockery of justice, was of all the mournful reflections which this disastrous expedition excited, the most painful and the most exasperating. ?Pursuit of Romana’s army.? At this time indeed Romana’s situation might have appeared hopeless to any but a Spaniard, and few Spaniards would have regarded it with such equanimity as this high-minded nobleman. In the virtuous determination of doing his duty to the uttermost, whatever might betide, he trusted Providence with the event, and gave way to no despondent or repining thought. A detachment under G. Franceschi had pursued his army after it had separated from Sir J. Moore at Astorga, and according to the French statements taken some 3000 men, and killed a great number before he entered the Val de Orras. The charge of completing its destruction was then transferred by Soult to M. Ney, and he dispatched G. Marchand’s division and a regiment of cavalry as amply sufficient for the intended service. Romana left his vanguard under D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to cover the Val de Orras, and the Riberas del Sil; ... one division was posted at Pueblo de Tribes and Mendoya, to support him if he should be attacked, and defend the bridge over the Bivey; the others were distributed where they could find subsistence, and at the same time afford support to the more advanced. ?Dismay in Galicia.? The country was in a state of the utmost alarm. The Vizconde de Quintanilla, one of the deputies for Leon to the Central Junta, had been sent to Romana’s army, and disagreeing with him before the retreat commenced, had preceded him, in the hope of taking some measures which might be serviceable to the common cause. Manifest as it was that Sir J. Moore had given up that cause in his heart as hopeless, it had never been apprehended that he would retreat with such precipitation, and abandon CoruÑa and Ferrol to their fate; ports the maintenance of which was of so great importance to Great Britain as long as she took any part in the contest. Of all the Spaniards the Galicians had least reason to fear that the war would be brought to their own doors; and their consternation was extreme when they saw the enemy among them. Quintanilla repaired to Santiago, from which city the Archbishop had fled, having been insulted by the people, and dreading farther outrages from the insubordination which these dreadful times produced. As it seemed that nothing could be done for resisting the enemy, Quintanilla endeavoured at least to disappoint them of their expected booty, and proposed that the church plate should be removed. In such treasure that city was peculiarly rich, having been during many centuries more in vogue than any other place of pilgrimage in Europe; but his advice was rejected, upon the ground that the populace, who were suspicious of whatever was done, would not suffer it. ?Romana retreats toward Monterry.? Romana’s was a buoyant spirit, not to be depressed by any dangers. He had read the British General rightly, but his confidence in the British character was unshaken; and in the expectation that something would be attempted upon the coast, he moved one of his divisions from Mazeda to Taboada and other villages near Lugo, for the purpose of observing and harassing the enemy. This movement was ordered the day before the battle of CoruÑa. On the afternoon of the 17th he was apprised that 5000 French were at St. Esteban de Ribas del Sil, three leagues from Orense, and in the night advice came from Mendizabal that he had been attacked by a detachment moving upon that city. Romana reconnoitred this force; they were plainly waiting for reinforcements, but even in their present state he was not strong enough to resist them; for as soon as he entered Galicia, the whole of the new levies had dispersed: they belonged to that province, and feeling themselves within reach of home, believed with some reason that they could provide better for themselves than it was in the power of their general and their government to provide for them. At his last interview with Sir J. Moore it had been arranged that the British army should make its stand at Villafranca, and there defend the entrance into Galicia, while the Marquis should endeavour to collect and reform his troops upon the river Sil. But because this resolution, fatally for Sir J. Moore, had been abandoned, Romana’s left flank and rear were exposed to the enemy. They were at leisure to direct their efforts against him, and he saw that the only way of escape open for him was by Monterry. In that direction therefore he moved, and fixed his head-quarters on the 21st at Villaza, a league from that town, on the side of Portugal. Here, ?Blake leaves the army.? to his surprise and displeasure, he found that Blake, who had continued with the army till this day, had left it without giving him any intimation of his departure, taken with him the officers whom he could trust, and left directions for others to follow him through Portugal. The camp-marshal, D. Rafael Martinengo, was missing also: his conduct, though irregular, was afterwards honourably explained; he had gone to collect stragglers. With regard to General Blake, serving only as an individual after he had been removed from the command, he was at liberty to retire whither and when he pleased, ... but not thus, in a manner derogatory to the commander, subversive of discipline, and injurious to the army. His disappearance, and that of the officers who followed him, increased the distrust and despondency of the troops; and the reports which they spread to excuse themselves for thus withdrawing, contributed still farther to dishearten the people. “I assure your excellency,” said Romana, when he communicated this to the war minister, “that I never gave a more trying proof of patriotism, love to my King, and gratitude to the government which in his name has conferred so many honours upon me, than in taking upon myself the command of this army in such circumstances, and retaining it, though abandoned by those who ought to have assisted me. I know not wherein this patriotism consists which is so loudly vaunted ... any reverse, any mishap, prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice their country, and compromise their commander.” ?The French cease the pursuit.? The next intelligence was of Sir J. Moore’s death in action with M. Soult. The first thought which occurred to Romana was that this would not have happened if they had given battle to that very Soult at SaldaÑa. It was his firm persuasion that if the British force and his ill-fated troops had been united in October, they might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees. The British had now actually embarked. CoruÑa and Ferrol were still points of hope; and if the governors there performed their duty, he could yet render them some service in the field. With this view he moved to cover the province of Tuy; but having reached La Guironda, he learnt in the night that the French with superior forces were at hand. His troops, though well equal to the business of harassing an enemy that should be otherwise employed, would have been lost if brought to action; he returned therefore to Oimbra, with the intention, if he should be pursued, of entering Portugal, and making through Tras-os-Montes for Ciudad Rodrigo, there to refit his army, or reinforce some other with the remnant that was left. A little respite was allowed him, for the French did not think the wreck of this army of sufficient consequence to fatigue themselves by pursuing and hunting it down. Where he and his handful of fugitives were secreting themselves they knew not, and on his part Romana knew as little what was passing in other parts of Spain. ?Buonaparte advised that Austria is arming.? Buonaparte had never appeared so joyous as when he left Madrid with the expectation of surprising Sir John Moore. He had intended ?De Pradt, 211.? to go to Lisbon, and the troops had actually received orders to hold themselves in readiness for beginning their march toward that capital, but the desire of encountering a British army made him change his intention; and Lisbon was thus doubly preserved from a second subjugation, for this movement interposed between the British and Portugal, and if Sir J. Moore had retreated thither, he would have abandoned Lisbon as he did CoruÑa. When there was no longer a hope of overtaking the English, Buonaparte stopped at Astorga; it was more consistent with his dignity that a detachment of his army should hunt them to the coast, than that he should continue the pursuit in person. Beyond that city, therefore, he would not have proceeded, even if dispatches had not reached him there which recalled him into France. He had designs against Austria, concerning which the Emperor Alexander had been deceived at Erfurt: his intention had been to complete the easy subjugation of Spain before he began to execute these further projects of insatiable ambition; but he was informed that Austria, instead of waiting for the blow, was preparing to avail herself of the advantage which the Spanish war afforded her. The news was not unwelcome to him; for he had now entertained a new train of ambitious and perfidious thoughts, which made him desirous of leaving Spain. From Astorga he turned back to Valladolid, and remained there a few days to make his last arrangements before he returned into France. ?Change in his views concerning Spain.? An attachment to his family was almost the only human part of Buonaparte’s character; but when any object of aggrandisement presented itself to his all-grasping desires, that attachment stood as little in his way as the obligations of truth, honour, and justice. He had been sincere in his intention of giving Spain to Joseph, while he thought it an easy gift, and one which in its results would prove beneficial to the giver. The resistance which had been made to the intrusion, and the reverses which his arms had for a time experienced, disturbed and mortified him; and in that temper of mind which escapes self-condemnation by reproaching others, he imputed to Joseph’s flight from Madrid, as a consequence, the very spirit of resistance which had rendered that measure necessary for his own preservation. For this reason there had been no cordiality at their meeting; he had treated Joseph with disrespect, as well as coldness, and leaving him in the rear, had issued edicts by his own authority, and in his own name. This had been resented by Joseph, as far as one who was the receiver of a stolen crown could resent it: having been made King, he represented it was proper he should appear to be such; to debase him was not the way of rendering him more acceptable to a proud and high-minded nation. In addition to this there was another cause of discontent between them. Whatever country Buonaparte entered, that country was made to support his army; war was to him no expense, ... the cost fell always upon his enemies or his allies. Thus he had expected to proceed in Spain; ... but even when he was master of Madrid the intrusive government had no other revenue than the duties which were paid at his gates, and Joseph, instead of paying his brother’s armies, looked to him for the maintenance of his own court. Joseph had represented also the impolicy of continuing to exasperate the people by a system of military exactions; and Napoleon, impatient of any contradiction, instantly perceived that a King of Spain, whether of the Buonaparte or the Bourbon dynasty, must have a Spanish feeling incompatible with that entire subserviency to himself which he expected and required. Having so lately and so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Spain, and proclaimed his brother king, he could not at once subvert his own arrangements; ?De Pradt, 207–225.? but he avowed to M. de Pradt at this time that when he had given that kingdom, he did not understand the value of the present: follies would be committed, he said, which would throw it again into his hands, and he would then divide it into five viceroyalties. ?He returns to France.? He apprehended no difficulty in this: any military opposition which could be attempted he despised, the more entirely because of the ease with which the Spanish armies had been dispersed, ... and the moral obstacles he was still incapable of appreciating. A dispatch reached him from Galicia, and upon reading it he said to those about him, “Every thing proceeds well. Romana cannot resist a fortnight longer. The English will never make another effort; and three months hence the war will be at an end.” One of the marshals hinted at the character of the people and of the country. “It is a La VendÉe,” he replied; “I have tranquillized La VendÉe. Calabria also was in a state of insurrection, ... wherever there are mountains there are insurgents; but the kingdom of Naples is tranquil now. It is not enough to command an army well, ... one must have general views. The continental system is not the same as in the time of Frederick; the great powers must absorb the smaller. The priests have considerable influence here, and they use it to exasperate the people: but the Romans conquered them; the Moors conquered them; and they are not near so fine a people now as they were then. I will settle the government firmly; I will interest the nobles, and I will cut down the people with grape-shot. What do they want? the Prince of Asturias? Half the nation object to him: ... besides he is dead to them. There is no longer any dynasty to oppose to me. They say the population is against us. Why Spain is a perfect solitude, ... there are not five men to a square league. Besides, if it ?Jones’s Account of the War, vol. i. 165.? be a question of numbers, I will pour all Europe into their country. They have to learn what a first-rate power can effect.” With this flagitious determination the remorseless tyrant returned into France. ?Professions to the Spaniards at Madrid.? Before he left Madrid to march against the English, an address framed by the traitors of that city in the name of the magistrates and citizens was presented to him by the Corregidor. They thanked him for his gracious clemency, that in the midst of conquest he had thought of the safety and welfare of the conquered, and forgiven all which had been done during the absence of Joseph, their king: and they entreated that it might please him to grant them the favour of seeing King Joseph once more among them, to the end that under his laws that capital and the whole kingdom might enjoy the happiness which they expected from the benevolence of their new sovereign’s character. The tyrant replied to this in one of his characteristic harangues. “I am pleased,” he said, “with the sentiments of the city of Madrid. I regret the injuries she has suffered, and am particularly happy that, under existing circumstances, I have been able to effect her deliverance, and to protect her from great calamities, and have accomplished what I owed to myself and my nation. Vengeance has had its due: it has fallen upon ten of the principal culprits; ... the rest have entire and absolute forgiveness.” He then touched upon the reforms by which he thought to reconcile the Spaniards to a foreign yoke. “I have preserved the spiritual orders, but with a limitation of the number of monks: they who were influenced by a divine call shall remain in their cloisters; with regard to those whose call was doubtful, or influenced by worldly considerations, I have fixed their condition in the class of secular priests. Out of the surplus of monastic property I have provided for the maintenance of the pastors, that important and useful branch of the clergy. I have suppressed that court which was a subject of complaint to Europe and the present age. Priests may guide the minds of men, but must exercise no temporal or corporal jurisdiction over the citizens. I have annulled those privileges which the grandees usurped during times of civil war. I have abolished feudal rights, and henceforth every one may set up inns, ovens, mills, employ himself in fishing and rabbit-hunting, and give free scope to his industry, provided he respects the laws. The selfishness, wealth, and prosperity of a small number of individuals were more injurious to your agriculture than the heat of the Dog-days. All peculiar jurisdictions were usurpations, and at variance with the rights of the nation. I have abolished them. As there is but one God, so should there be in a state but one judicial power. “There is no obstacle,” he continued, “which can long resist the execution of my resolutions. But what transcends my power is this, to consolidate the Spaniards as one nation, under the sway of the king, should they continue to be affected with those principles of hatred to France which the partizans of England and the enemies of the continent have infused into the bosom of Spain. I can establish no nation, no king, no independence of the Spaniards, if the king be not assured of their attachment and fidelity. The Bourbons can no longer reign in Europe. The divisions of the royal family were contrived by the English. It was not the dethronement of King Charles and of the favourite, that the Duke del Infantado, that tool of England, had in view. The intention was, to establish the predominant influence of England in Spain; a senseless project, the result of which would have been a perpetual continental war. No power under the influence of England can exist on the continent. If there be any that entertain such a wish, the wish is absurd, and will sooner or later occasion their fall. It would be easy for me, should I be compelled to adopt that measure, to govern Spain, by establishing as many viceroys in it as there are provinces. Nevertheless, I do not refuse to abdicate my rights of conquest in favour of the king, and to establish him in Madrid, as soon as the 30,000 citizens which this capital contains, the clergy, nobility, merchants, and lawyers shall have declared their fidelity, set an example to the provinces, enlightened the people, and made the nation sensible that their existence and prosperity essentially depend upon a king and a free constitution, favourable to the people, and hostile only to the selfishness and haughty passions of the grandees. If such be the sentiments of the inhabitants, let the 30,000 citizens assemble in the churches; let them, in the presence of the holy sacrament, take an oath, not only with their mouths, but also with their hearts, and without any jesuitical equivocation, that they promise support, attachment, and fidelity to their king; let the priests in the confessional and the pulpit, the merchants in their correspondence, the lawyers in their writings and speeches, infuse these sentiments into the people: ... then will I surrender my right of conquest, place the king upon the throne, and make it my pleasing task to conduct myself as a true friend of the Spaniards. The present generation may differ in their opinions; the passions have been too much brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their renovator; they will reckon the day when I appeared among you among their memorable festivals; and from that day will the happiness of Spain date its commencement. Thus,” he concluded, addressing himself to the Corregidor, “you are informed of the whole of my determination. Consult with your fellow-citizens, and consider what part you will choose; but whatever it be, make your choice with sincerity, and tell me only your genuine sentiments.” There was something more detestable in this affectation of candour and generosity than in his open and insolent violence. “Consult! and consider what part you will choose, and make your choice with sincerity!”... The Spanish nation had made their choice! They had made it at Baylen and at Reynosa, at Cadiz and at Madrid, at Valencia and at Zaragoza; for life or for death; deliberately, and yet as if with one impulse, ... with enthusiasm, and yet calmly, ... had that noble people nobly, and wisely, and religiously made their heroic choice. They had written it in blood, their own and their oppressors’. Its proofs were to be seen in deserted houses and depopulated towns, in the blackened walls of hamlets which had been laid waste with fire, in the bones which were bleaching upon the mountains of Biscay, and in the bodies, French and Spaniard, which were at that hour floating down the tainted Ebro! Here, in the capital, their choice had been recorded; they who had been swept down by grape-shot in its streets, or bayoneted in the houses, they who had fallen in the heat of battle before its gates, and they who in cold blood had been sent in droves to execution, alike had borne witness to that choice, and confirmed it, and rejoiced in it with their dying breath. And this tyrant called upon the people of Madrid now to tell him their sentiments, ... now when their armies were dispersed, and they themselves, betrayed and disarmed, were surrounded by his legions! ?Registers opened.? Registers were opened in every quarter, and, if French accounts could be believed, 30,000 fathers of families rushed thither in crowds, and signed a supplication to the conqueror, entreating him to put an end to their misfortunes, by granting them his august brother Joseph for their king. If this impossible eagerness had really been manifested, it could admit of no other solution than that the people of Madrid, bitterly as they detested and heartily as they despised Joseph, yet thought it a less evil to be governed by him than by the tyrant himself, ... for this was the alternative allowed them. But a census of this kind, as it is called, like those which coloured Buonaparte’s assumption, first of the consulship for life, and then of an hereditary throne, was easily procured, when neither threats, nor persuasions, nor fraud, nor violence were spared. ?The people of Madrid take the oath of allegiance to Joseph.? The ceremony of voting and taking the oath was delayed till after Buonaparte’s departure, “because,” said the French journalists, “a suspicion of fear might else have attached to it. The act was now more noble, as being entirely free, ... as being confirmed by the weightiest considerations whereby a people can be influenced, their interest, their happiness, and their glory.” With such language the better part of the French nation were insulted, and the unreflecting deceived, while all knowledge of the real state of things was shut out by the vigilance of a government, conscious enough of wickedness to know that it required concealment. The votes were then exacted, the host was exposed in all the churches, and the priests were compelled to receive from their countrymen at the altar, and as they believed in the actual and bodily presence of their Saviour and their God, a compulsory oath of allegiance to the Intruder. The Catholic system has a salvo in such cases; and the same priests who administered the oath were believed by the French themselves to have released those who took it from its obligations. ?Addresses to the Intruder.? The higher ranks in Madrid had shown themselves from the commencement of these troubles as deficient in public spirit as they had long been in private virtues. Scarcely an individual in that capital who was distinguished for rank, or power, or riches, had stood forward in the national cause, so fallacious is the opinion that those persons will be most zealous in the defence of their country, who have what is called the largest stake in it. Addresses from all the councils and corporate bodies of the metropolis were dispatched to Buonaparte while he tarried at Valladolid, ... all alike abject, and all soliciting that they might be indulged with the presence of their king. The Council of state, by a deputy, expressed its homage of thanks for the generous clemency of the conqueror. “What gratitude,” said he, “does it not owe you for having snatched Spain from the influence of those destructive councils which fifty years of misfortune had prepared for it; for having rid it of the English armies, who threatened to fix upon its territories the theatre of continental war! Grateful for these benefits, the Council of state has still another supplication to lay at the feet of your majesty. Deign, sire, to commit to our loyalty your august brother, our lord and King. Permit him to re-enter Madrid, and to take into his hands the reins of government; that under the benevolent sway of this august prince, whose mildness, wisdom, and justice, are known to all Europe, our widowed and desolate monarchy may find a father in the best of Kings.” D. Bernardo Yriarte spoke for the Council of the Indies. “It entirely submits itself,” he said, “to the decrees of your Majesty, and to those of your august brother, the King our master, who is to create the happiness of Spain, as well by the wisdom and the assemblage of the lofty virtues which he possesses, as by the powerful support of the hero of Europe, upon whom the Council of the Indies founds its hopes of seeing those ties reunited, which ought always to unite the American possessions with the mother country.” The Council of finance requested that it might behold in Madrid the august and beloved brother of the Emperor, expecting from his presence the felicity and repose of the kingdom. The Council of war supplicated him, through an effect of his august beneficence, to confer upon the capital the felicity of the presence of their sovereign, Joseph I. This was the theme upon which all the deputations rung their changes. The Council of marine alone adding an appropriate flattery to the same request, expressed its hope of contributing to the liberty of the seas. ?Edicts of the Intruder before his return to Madrid.? Joseph meantime had exercised his nominal sovereignty in passing decrees. By one the circulation of French money was permitted till farther measures concerning it should be announced; by another all persons entitled to any salary or pension from the government were deprived of it till they should have taken the oath of allegiance to him. He made an attempt also in the autumn, before reinforcements entered Spain, to place the persons belonging to his army under civil protection: and for this purpose required that in every district occupied by the army, from eight to thirty stand of arms should be deposited in every town-house, and an equal number of the respectable inhabitants registered to serve as an escort therewith for any officer or serjeant either on his road as an invalid, or in the execution of any commission. They were also to act as a patrol, for the purpose of preventing any insults or outrages which might be offered to the military, and if men did not volunteer for this service, which would entitle them to pay and rewards, the magistracy were to fix upon those whom they deemed fit to discharge it. He created also a new military order by the name of the Orden Militar de EspaÑa. The Grand Mastership was reserved to himself and his successors; and the two oldest Captains General of the Army and the Fleet were always to be Grand Chancellor and Grand Treasurer: but the order itself was open to soldiers of every rank who should deserve it. A pension of 1000 reales vellon was attached to the order, and the device was a crimson star, bearing on one side the Lion of Leon with this motto ... Virtute et Fide; on the other the Castle of Castille with Joseph Napoleo, Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex, instituit. Decrees were also issued for raising new regiments, one to be called the Royal Foreign, and the other the first of the Irish Brigade. ?Joseph’s entrance into Madrid.? On the 22d of January the Intruder re-entered that city, from which he had been driven by the indignation of a whole people. At break of day his approach was announced by the discharge of an hundred cannon; a fit symphony, announcing at once to the people by what right he claimed the throne, and by what means he must sustain himself upon it. From the gate of Atocha to the church of St. Isidro, and from thence to the palace, the streets were lined with French troops, and detachments were stationed in every part of the city, more for the purpose of overawing the inhabitants than of doing honour to this wretched puppet of majesty, who, while he submitted to be the instrument of tyranny over the Spaniards, was himself a slave. The cavalry advanced to the Plaza de las Delicias to meet him; there he mounted on horseback, and a procession was formed of his aides-de-camp and equerries, the grand major domo, the grand master of the ceremonies, the grand master of the hounds, with all the other personages of the drama of royalty, the members of the different councils, and those grandees who, deserting the cause of their country, stained now with infamy names which had once been illustrious in the Spanish annals. At the gate of Atocha the governor of Madrid was ready to present him with the keys. As soon as he entered another discharge of an hundred cannon proclaimed his presence, and all the bells struck up. He proceeded through the city to the church of St. Isidro, where the suffragan Bishop, in his pontificals, the canons, vicars, and rectors, the vicar-general, and the prelates of the religious orders, received him at the gate, and six of the most ancient canons conducted him to the throne. Then the suffragan Bishop addressed him in the only language which might that day be used, the language of servility, adulation, impiety, and treason. The Intruder’s reply was in that strain of hypocrisy which marked the usurpation of the Buonapartes with new and peculiar guilt. This was his speech: “Before rendering thanks to the Supreme Arbiter of Destinies, for my return to the capital of this kingdom entrusted to my care, I wish to reply to the affectionate reception of its inhabitants, by declaring my secret thoughts in the presence of the living God, who has just received your oath of fidelity to my person. I protest, then, before God, who knows the hearts of all, that it is my duty and conscience only which induce me to mount the throne, and not my own private inclination. I am willing to sacrifice my own happiness, because I think you have need of me for the establishment of yours. The unity of our holy religion, the independence of the monarchy, the integrity of its territory, and the liberty of its citizens, are the conditions of the oath which I have taken on receiving the crown. It will not be disgraced upon my head; and if, as I have no doubt, the desires of the nation support the efforts of its king, I shall soon be the most happy of all, because you through me will all be happy.” ?Edicts against the Patriots.? Two rows of banqueting tables were laid out in the nave of the church, where the civil and military officers of the intruder, and the members of the councils, were seated according to their respective ranks. High mass was performed by the chapel-royal, and a solemn Te Deum concluded the mockery. That done, Joseph proceeded with the same form to the palace, and a third discharge of an hundred guns proclaimed his arrival there. On the day which followed this triumphal entry, its ostentatious joy, and the affected humanity and philanthropy of his professions, he issued a decree for the formation of special military tribunals, which should punish all persons with death who took arms against him, or enlisted others for the patriotic cause: the gallows was to be the mode of punishment, and over the door of the sufferer’s house a shield was to be placed, for infamy, recording the cause and manner of his ignominious death. Any innkeeper or householder in whose dwelling a man should be enlisted for the Junta’s service should undergo the same fate; but if they gave information, 400 reales were promised them, or an equivalent reward. The very day that this decree was issued, mingling, like his flagitious brother, words of blasphemy with deeds of blood, he addressed a circular epistle to the Archbishops and Bishops of the realm, commanding them to ?Circular epistle to the clergy.? order a Te Deum in all the churches of their respective dioceses. “In returning to the capital (this was his language), our first care, as well as first duty, has been to prostrate ourselves at the feet of that God who disposes of crowns, and to devote to him our whole existence for the felicity of the brave nation which he has entrusted to our care. For this only object of our thoughts we have addressed to him our humble prayers. What is an individual amid the generations who cover the earth? What is he in the eyes of the Eternal, who alone penetrates the intentions of men, and according to them determines their elevation? He who sincerely wishes the welfare of his fellows serves God, and omnipotent goodness protects him. We desire that, in conformity with these dispositions, you direct the prayers of the faithful whom Providence has entrusted to you. Ask of God, that his spirit of peace and wisdom may descend upon us, that the voice of passion may be stifled in meditating upon such sentiments as ought to animate us, and which the general interests of this monarchy inspire: that religion, tranquillity, and happiness may succeed to the discords to which we are now exposed. Let us return thanks to God for the success which he has been pleased to grant to the arms of our august brother and powerful ally the Emperor of the French, who has had no other end in supporting our rights by his power than to procure to Spain a long peace, founded on her independence.” A heavy load of national guilt lay upon the nations of the Peninsula; and those persons, who, with well-founded faith, could see and understand that the moral government of the world is neither less perfect, nor less certain in its course, than that material order which science has demonstrated, ... they perceived in this dreadful visitation the work of retribution. The bloody conquests of the Portugueze in India were yet unexpiated; the Spaniards had to atone for extirpated nations in Cuba and Hayti, and their other islands, and on the continent of America for cruelties and excesses not less atrocious than those which they were appointed to punish. Vengeance had not been exacted for the enormities perpetrated in the Netherlands, nor for that accursed tribunal which, during more than two centuries, triumphed both in Spain and Portugal, to the ineffaceable and eternal infamy of the Romish church. But the crimes of a nation, like the vices of an individual, bring on their punishment in necessary consequence, ... so righteously have all things been ordained. From the spoils of India and America the two governments drew treasures which rendered them independent of the people for supplies; and the war which their priesthood waged against knowledge and reformation succeeded in shutting them out from these devoted countries. A double despotism, of the throne and of the altar, was thus established, and the result was a state of degradation, which nothing less than the overthrow of both, by some moral and political earthquake, loosening the very foundations of society, could remove. Such a convulsion had taken place, and the sins of the fathers were visited upon the ?Condition of Madrid.? children. Madrid, the seat of Philip II., “that sad intelligencing tyrant,” who from thence, as our great Milton said, “mischieved the world with his mines of Ophir,” that city which once aspired to be the mistress of the world, and had actually tyrannized over so large a part of it, was now itself in thraldom. The Spanish cloak, which was the universal dress of all ranks, was prohibited in the metropolis of Spain, and no Spaniard was allowed to walk abroad in the evening, unless he carried a light. All communication between the capital and the southern provinces, the most fertile and wealthiest of the kingdom, was cut off. Of the trading part of the community, therefore, those who were connected with the great commercial cities of the south coast were at once ruined, and they whose dealings lay with the provinces which were the seat of war were hardly more fortunate. The public creditors experienced that breach of public faith which always results from a violent revolution. The intrusive government acknowledged the debt, and gave notice of its intention to pay them by bills upon Spanish America: for this there was a double motive, the shame of confessing that the Intruder was unable to discharge the obligations of the government to whose rights and duties he affected to succeed, and the hope of interesting the holders of these bills in his cause: but so little possibility was there of his becoming master of the Indies, that the mention of such bills only provoked contempt. While commercial and funded property was thus destroyed, landed property was of as little immediate value to its owner. No remittances could be made to the capital from that part of Spain which was not yet overrun; and the devastations had been so extensive every where as to leave the tenant little means of paying the proprietor. These were the first-fruits of that prosperity which the Buonapartes promised to the Spaniards, ... these were the blessings which Joseph brought with him to Madrid! He, meantime, was affecting to participate in rejoicings, and receiving the incense of adulation, in that city where the middle classes were reduced to poverty by his usurpation, and where the wives whom he had widowed, and the mothers whom he had made childless, mingled with their prayers for the dead, supplications for vengeance upon him as the author of their miseries. The theatre was fitted up to receive him, the boxes were lined with silk, the municipality attended him to his seat, he was presented with a congratulatory poem upon his entrance, and the stage curtain represented the ?1809. February.? Genius of Peace with an olive-branch in his left hand, and a torch in his right, setting fire to the attributes of war. Underneath was written, ?Feb. 18.? “Live happy, Sire! reign and pardon!” At the very time when this precious specimen of French taste complimented the Intruder upon his clemency, an extraordinary criminal Junta was formed, even the military tribunals not being found sufficiently extensive in their powers for the work of extermination which was begun. It was “for trial of assassins, robbers, recruiters in favour of the insurgents, those who maintained correspondence with them, and who spread false reports.” Persons apprehended upon these charges were to be tried within twenty-four hours, and sentenced to the gallows, and the sentence executed without appeal. Another of the Intruder’s decrees enjoined that the Madrid Gazette should be under the immediate inspection of the Minister of Police, and copies of it regularly sent to every Bishop, parochial priest, and municipality, that the people might be informed of the acts of government, and of public events. Joseph’s ministers, under whatever self-practised delusion they entered his service, conformed themselves in all things now to the spirit of Buonaparte’s policy, and employed force and falsehood with as little scruple as if they had been trained in the revolutionary school. While they affected to inform the people of what was passing, they concealed whatever was unfavourable, distorted what they ?1809. January.? told, and feigned intelligence suited to their views. They affirmed that the English goods taken at Bilbao, S. Andero, and the ports of Asturias, would defray the expenses of the war; and that England itself was on the point of bankruptcy. Such multitudes, it was affirmed, had repaired to Westminster Hall to give bail for their debts, that it seemed as if all London had been there; numbers were thrown down by the press, and trodden under foot, ... many almost suffocated, and some were killed. Such falsehoods were not too gross for the government where it could exclude all truer information; where this was not in its power, it resorted to the more feasible scheme of exciting suspicions against England; and here the Buonapartes had a willing agent in Morla. ?Unwillingness of the Spaniards to believe that Morla was a traitor.? Prone as the Spaniards were in these unhappy times to suspect any person, and to act upon the slightest suspicion, they were slow in believing that Morla had proved false. The people of Cadiz would hardly be convinced that their governor, whose patriotic addresses were still circulating among them, could possibly have gone over to the Intruder. So many measures of utility, so many acts of patriotism and of disinterested vigilance in his administration, were remembered, that the first reports of his perfidy were indignantly received; a fact so contrary to all their experience was not to be credited, and they felt as if they injured him in listening to such an accusation. He had established among them a reputation like that which a Cadi sometimes enjoys in Mahommedan countries, where his individual uprightness supplies the defects of law, and resists the general corruption of manners. A peasant, whom he had acquitted upon some criminal charge, brought him a number of turkeys, as a present in gratitude for his acquittal. Morla put him in prison, consigned the turkeys to the gaoler for his food, and set him at liberty when he had eaten them all. There was neither law, equity, nor humanity in this, ... yet it had an extravagant, oriental ostentation of justice, well calculated to impress the people with an opinion of his nice honour and scrupulous integrity. But this man, who in all his public writings boasted of his frankness and of his honourable intentions, was in reality destitute both of truth and honour; and the revolution, which developed some characters and corrupted others, only unmasked his. Early in these troubles Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple had discovered ?Proofs of his prior treachery.? his duplicity. He had signed, and was believed to have written, Solano’s ill-timed and worse-intended proclamation, in which the English were spoken of with unqualified reprobation, and as the real enemies against whom all true Spaniards ought to unite; and when warned by Solano’s fate, he joined in the national cause, the desire of injuring that cause by every possible means seems to have been the main object of his crooked policy. When CastaÑos wanted the assistance of General Spencer’s corps, he threw out hints to that General that it would be required for the defence of Cadiz; though, from jealousy of the English, at that very time he prevented the Junta from bringing the garrison of Ceuta into the field, and had given it as his decided opinion that no English troops should be admitted into any Spanish fortress. And while he endeavoured to make the Junta of Seville suspicious of English interference, he recommended to the accredited agents of England, that they should interfere early and decidedly in forming a central government, and appointing a commander-in-chief, and that their influence should be strengthened by marching an army into Spain. ?Morla’s letter to the Central Junta;? But the most prominent feature of Morla’s sophisticated character was his odious hypocrisy. In the letter which announced to the Central Junta the capitulation of Madrid he bestowed the highest eulogiums upon the Intruder and himself. “Yesterday,” said he, “as a Counsellor of State I saw Prince Joseph, our appointed King, and the object of the rabble’s contumely. I assure you, with all that ingenuousness which belongs to me, that I found him an enlightened philosopher, full even to enthusiasm of the soundest principles of morality, humanity, and affection to the people whom his lot has called him to command. My eulogies might appear suspicious to those who do not know me well; I suppress them therefore, and only say thus much, that the Junta, according to circumstances, may regulate its own conduct and resolutions upon this information. My whole aim and endeavour will always be for the honour and integrity of my country. I will not do myself the injustice to suppose that any of the nation can suspect me of perfidy; my probity is known and accredited, and therefore I continue to speak with that candour and ingenuousness which I have always used.” He also delivered his opinion as an individual who was most anxious for the good of the nation, that the governor of Cadiz should be instructed not to let the English assemble either in or near that city in any force; but that, under pretext of securing himself from the French, he should throw up works against them, reinforce the garrison, and secretly strengthen the batteries toward the sea. And that advices should be dispatched to the Indies, for the purpose of preventing treasure or goods from being sent, lest they should fall into the hands of these allies, who having no longer any hope of defending the cause, would seek to indemnify themselves at the expense of the Spaniards. The Junta published this letter as containing in itself sufficient proofs of perfidiousness and treason in the writer. And they observed that at the very time when this hypocrite was advising them to distrust the English, and arm against them, large sums had been remitted them from England, farther pecuniary aids were on the way, their treasures from America had been secured from the French, by being brought home in British ships, and Great Britain had given the most authentic proof of its true friendship with Spain, by refusing to negotiate with Buonaparte. ?and to the governor of Cadiz.? Shortly afterwards a letter of Morla’s was intercepted, written in the same strain to D. Josef Virues, the provisional governor of Cadiz. The thorough hypocrite talked of the good which he had done in surrendering Madrid, and the consolation which he derived from that reflection; he lamented over his beloved Cadiz and its estimable inhabitants, who had given him so many proofs of their confidence and affection, and wished that he could avert the dangers that impended over them with the sacrifice of his own blood. “If it became an English garrison,” he said, “it would be more burdensome to the nation than Gibraltar, and the commerce of the natives would be ruined: much policy as well as courage would be required to prevent this. I need not,” he concluded, “exhort your excellency to defend Cadiz with the honour and patriotism which become you; but when you have fulfilled this obligation, honourable terms may save the city, and secure its worthy inhabitants.” In consequence of this letter it became necessary to remove Virues from the command, more for his own sake than for any distrust of his principles, though he had at one time been Godoy’s secretary, and though Morla had been his friend and patron. Unwilling, and perhaps unable to believe that one whom he had so long been accustomed to regard with respect and gratitude was the consummate hypocrite and traitor which he now appeared to be, Virues attempted to excuse Morla as having acted under compulsion, an excuse more likely to alleviate for the time his own feelings than to satisfy his judgement. But he felt that under these circumstances it was no longer proper for him to remain in possession of an important post: high as he stood in the opinion of his countrymen, the slightest accident might now render him suspected; and at this crisis it was most essential that the people should have entire confidence in their chiefs. He therefore gladly accepted a mission to England, and D. Felix Jones, who had distinguished himself in the operations against Dupont, was appointed governor. Instead of additional defences toward the sea, new works were begun on the land side, to protect the city against its real enemies, and Colonel Hallowell came from Gibraltar to direct them. Ammunition and stores in abundance were sent from Seville. The new governor began by taking measures of rigorous precaution. No person whatever, not even an Englishman, was permitted to go a mile beyond the city without a passport. Every Frenchman ?Arrest and cruel imprisonment of the French at Cadiz.? in the place was arrested and sent on board the ships. This was intended for their own security as well as the safety of the city; for so highly were the people incensed against that perfidious nation, and such was their fear of treachery in every person belonging to it, that they purposed putting all whom they should find at large to death; and it was said that three hundred knives had been purchased at one shop, to be thus employed. Had there been leisure, or had the Spaniards been in a temper for humane considerations, these persons ought to have been supplied with means of transport to their own country; instead of which they were consigned to a most inhuman state of confinement. The property also of all French subjects, under which term the natives of all countries in subjection to France were included, was confiscated; ... and in consequence above three hundred shops were shut up, and more than as many families reduced to ruin. Thus it is, that in such times injustice provokes retaliation, wrongs lead to wrongs, and evil produces evil in miserable series. ?Death of Florida Blanca.? At this juncture, when every hour brought tidings of new calamities and nearer danger, Florida Blanca, the venerable president of the Central Junta, died, at the great age of eighty-one; fatigue, and care, and anxiety having accelerated his death. When the order of the Jesuits was abolished, he was ambassador at Rome, and is believed to have been materially instrumental in bringing about that iniquitous measure; and it was under his ministry that Spain joined the confederacy against Great Britain during the American war. These are acts of which he had abundant reason to repent; but there were specious motives for both; and this must be said of Florida Blanca, that of all the ministers who have exercised despotic authority in Spain, no other ever projected or accomplished half so much for the improvement of the people and the country. Whatever tended to the general good received his efficient support, and twenty years of subsequent misrule had not been sufficient to undo the beneficial effects of his administration. It was Godoy’s intention that his exile from the court should be felt as a disgrace and a punishment; but the retirement to which it sent him suited the disposition and declining years of the injured man, and he passed his time chiefly in those religious meditations which are the natural support and solace of old age. Many rulers and statesmen have retired into convents when they have been wearied or disgusted with the vanities and vexations of the world; few have been called upon, like Florida Blanca, in extreme old age, to forsake their retirement, their tranquillity, and their habits of religious life, for the higher duty of serving their country in its hour of danger. The Central Junta manifested their sense of his worth by conferring a grandee-ship upon his heir, and all his legitimate descendants who should succeed him in ?Marques de Astorga president of the Junta.? the title. He was succeeded as president by the Marques de Astorga, a grandee of the highest ?1808.? class, and the representative of some of the proudest names in Spanish history. The education of this nobleman had been defective, as was generally the case with Spanish nobles, and his person excited contempt in those who are presumptuous and injurious enough to judge only by appearances. But he had not degenerated from the better qualities of his illustrious ancestry: they who knew him best, knew that he possessed what ought to be the distinctive marks of old nobility: he was generous, magnanimous, and high-spirited, without the least apparent consciousness of being so. ?Catalonia, 1808.? After the fall of Madrid there was yet one quarter to which the Junta might look with reasonable hope, amid the disasters that crowded upon them. If Barcelona could be recovered, the acquisition of that most important place would balance the worst reverses which they had yet sustained. But ill fortune every where pursued them, and there was this to aggravate the disappointment, that their losses in Catalonia were more imputable to misconduct than to any want of strength. A force had been collected there fully equal both in numbers and discipline (had it been directed with common prudence) to the services expected from it. After the arrival of the troops from Portugal and Majorca, and the Granadan army, it consisted of about 28,000 regular troops, and 1600 cavalry, besides the garrisons of Rosas, Hostalrich, and Gerona, who were nearly 6000. The sea being commanded by their allies, was open to them along the whole line of coast, except at Barcelona; and the people, who have always been eminently distinguished for their activity, industry, hardihood, and invincible spirit of independence, were ready to make any sacrifices and any exertions for the deliverance of their native land. The province too was full of fortified places, and even in so defensible a country as Spain peculiarly strong by nature. But to counterbalance these advantages, there were the confusion and perplexity, as well as the distance of the Central Junta; the inexperience and rashness of those who had taken upon themselves the local government; want of science, of decision, and of ability in the generals; want of authority every where; the fearful spirit of insubordination, which on the slightest occasion was ready to break out; ... and, above all, that reckless and unreasonable confidence which had now become part of the Spanish character. ?Siege of Barcelona.? There was some excuse for this confidence in the Catalans; they knew their own temper and the strength of their country; and they had obtained some signal successes before any regular troops came to their assistance. But this remembrance, and the knowledge that so large a regular force was in the field, induced a fatal belief that the difficulties of the struggle were over, and that nothing remained to complete their triumph but the recovery of Barcelona. And this, they said, might easily be effected: the enemy there were weak, in want of provisions, sickly, dispirited by defeat and desertion; the English squadron at hand to assist in an attack upon Monjuich and the citadel; and the inhabitants ready upon the first appearance of success to rise upon their invaders and open the gates. Among the French and Italians themselves, there were some, they affirmed, who would gladly forsake the wicked cause wherein they were engaged, and by contributing to deliver up these places atone for the treachery in which they had been compelled to bear a part. This was the cry of the people; and these representations were strengthened by some of the citizens, who were perpetually proposing plans contradictory to each other, and alike impracticable: the Supreme Junta represented the people but too faithfully, partaking their inexperience, their impatience, and their errors; and General Vives, surrounded by ignorant advisers, controlled if not intimidated by popular opinion, and himself altogether incompetent to the station which he filled, wasted the precious weeks in a vain display before Barcelona; not perceiving or not regarding that the possession of the city would have been useless to him while the French possessed the citadel and Montjuich; that he had no means for besieging those strong places; ... and above all, that if the French were prevented from relieving them, they must inevitably soon fall into his hands without a blow. ?St. Cyr appointed to command the French in Catalonia.? Duhesme, in fact, had announced to his government that his provisions would not hold out beyond the month of December; and to throw in supplies by sea was impossible. Buonaparte was well aware of the danger, and saw in part what consequences might be apprehended from it. He knew how Barcelona had been defended in the Succession war, and had calculated that if it were now to be recovered by the Spaniards it would cost him not less than fourscore thousand lives to regain possession of it. Such a sacrifice he would have made without one compunctious feeling; but that blood might have been expended without effecting the purchase, ... for if such a siege had been undertaken, England must and would have made exertions commensurate to the occasion. That these consequences did not follow was owing to the errors and incapacity of his opponents, not to his own measures. In other cases the force which he prepared was always fully equal to the service for which it was designed; in the present, it was so inadequate, as to excite in the General, Gouvion Saint Cyr, a suspicion that failure on his part would be more agreeable to the Emperor than success. That General had belonged to the army of the Rhine, which was an original sin in Buonaparte’s eyes; and having a command in Naples he had refused to obtain addresses from the troops soliciting the First Consul to take upon himself the imperial dignity; ... an irremissible offence. Moreover, great commander as Buonaparte was, he was jealous of any victories which were not obtained when he was in the field, so that the renown might redound to himself. Indulging at once this littleness of mind, and his personal or political dislike, it was his wish that Gouvion St. Cyr should not distinguish himself by any brilliant success; at the same time he knew the miserable state of the Spanish armies, and still more of the counsels by which they were directed, well enough to rely upon his relieving Barcelona. His instructions were to effect that object, to collect considerable magazines in Figueras at the enemy’s expense; to subdue the valleys, making ?St. Cyr, 26. 42. Do. PiÈces Justificatives, No. 7.? them feel the whole weight of the war, and in fine to crush the enemy: having these objects in view, every thing was left to his own discretion. When St. Cyr arrived at Perpignan, at the end of August, the town was full of sick and wounded, for whose relief no preparation had been made, so little had any reverses been expected. He found there some Tuscan regiments, the poor Queen of Etruria’s guards, and a battalion from the Valais ... for even that country was called upon to contribute from its recesses to this insatiable tyrant’s demand for human life. These troops had been sent back from Figueras by General Reille as being quite unable to take the field, not for want of discipline only, but of equipments, arms, and even necessary clothing. So miserable was their condition, that it was deemed prudent to quarter them in remote places, and train them out of sight, lest they should excite indignation as well as commiseration in the people, who in the south of France had always been ill affected toward Buonaparte, and suffering at this time from the loss of their trade with Spain, detested the injustice of the war, and were in a temper which might have ?St. Cyr, 19. 34.? produced formidable consequences if any serious invasion had been attempted on that side. During the autumn troops continued to arrive there, mostly consisting of conscripts from Genoa, Naples, and other parts of Italy: under good training they soon became good soldiers, and only less to be trusted than the French because they were more inclined to desert. These forces when collected amounted to 18,000 men. Reille had 4000 at Figueras, and 8000 were with Duhesme in Barcelona. ?He determines upon besieging Rosas.? Early in November St. Cyr received orders to enter Spain, and he determined to commence his operations with the siege of Rosas. While the fine roadstead which that fortress commands was open to the English, there was scarcely a chance of throwing supplies into Barcelona by sea; to escort them by land was not possible while Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards; and if those places had been taken they could not be provisioned unless Rosas also were held by the French. Rosas is situated four leagues east of Figueras, in the bottom of the bay, where the plain of Ampurdan touches ?1808. November.? the skirts of the Pyrenees. The town, containing then about 1200 inhabitants, is built along the shore, and completely commanded by the fortress; the fortress, which is an irregular pentangle, the town, and a smaller fort, called, after a custom too prevalent in Catholic countries, Fuerte de la Trinidad, forming a semi-circle round the bay. This place had sustained a most gallant siege of ten weeks in 1795 after Figueras, strong as it was, had been surrendered without defence; and when the commander, D. Domingo Yzquierdo, could maintain the almost demolished works no longer, he succeeded in embarking the remains of his garrison. ?Marcillac. 299–313.? During the peace nothing had been done to repair the works, as if no future war was to be apprehended. Even after the present struggle had commenced, six months, in that supineness which belongs to the Spanish character, had been suffered to elapse without taking any measures for strengthening and securing a place of such evident importance. There were many persons, and even some members of the nearest Juntas, who were acquainted with the details of the last siege, and knew what repairs were necessary, and also what the points were which it was most material to strengthen. But their attention was wholly engrossed by local and immediate interests, and the pressing representations which the commandant of engineers repeatedly addressed to the higher authorities produced no effect. Nothing could rouse them from their dream of recovering Barcelona by force of arms. ?Dilapidated state of that fortress.? The Governor, however, D. Pedro O’Daly, Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment of Ulster, as soon as he apprehended an attack had made some preparations; he ordered all strangers who had taken refuge there to depart, and sent away by sea such of the garrison as were incapable of service. The ditches were cleared, parapets formed, and guns mounted. The north angle of the fort had been demolished by the explosion of a magazine; a wall of stones without mortar was run up by the peasants; it closed the breach, but that part of the works remained useless. The stores were as incomplete as the works: there were neither measures for the powder, nor saws for the fusees, ... hats and axes were used instead. The buildings within the fort were in ruins, an old church and one other edifice being all that were serviceable. Before the former siege a line nearly half a mile in length, with some redoubts, had been formed from the citadel to that part of the mountain range which is called Puig-rom, for the purpose of covering the town; but it was now in all parts so dilapidated, that though the garrison as well as the inhabitants were aware how much they needed this additional ?CabaÑes, c. 10.? protection, any attempt at re-establishing it was deemed hopeless. ?Preparations for the siege.? Preparations for the siege had been made at Figueras, and in order to deceive the Spaniards a report had been encouraged that the design was against Gerona. St. Cyr established his head-quarters at Figueras, and General Reille, to whom the conduct of the siege had been entrusted, encamped before Rosas with his own division and that of the Italian General Pino. General ?Nov. 6.? Souham took a position between Figueras and the Fluvia, to protect the besiegers on that side against any attempt which might be made from Gerona; and Chabot was stationed nearer the frontier, the General being well aware that the opposition which he had to apprehend was not so much from regular troops as from the whole population of the country. But the measures of the Catalans were so ill-directed at this time, that the invaders suffered more from the weather, and from the gross neglect of their own government in sending them supplies, than from all the efforts of their enemies. St. Cyr was obliged to send his cavalry back into France to the neighbourhood of Beziers, that the horses might not perish for want of fodder during the siege; and when he wrote pressingly for supplies for his men, directions were sent him in return to collect and convoy provisions to Barcelona. He ?St. Cyr, 34–41? was desired not to regard any reports concerning the rabble opposed to him, for it was nothing more, and the time was fixed within which the Emperor expected that he would be master of Barcelona and of the country ten leagues round. In reply to this he stated that he would not break up the siege of Rosas without positive orders; that it was sufficiently hazardous to advance leaving Gerona behind him; but if Rosas were left also, Figueras would be again blockaded by the Spaniards, and must fall, because it was not possible to store it: so that the ?Do. PiÈces Justif. 45–16.? only way to secure that most important fortress was to take Rosas. ?British squadron in the Bay of Rosas.? However much St. Cyr and the government under which he acted differed in other points, they both knew the incapacity of the forces opposed to them, and relied upon it. They knew that there would be no difficulty in routing the Spaniards whenever they were brought to action, that nothing was to be apprehended from any combined operations, and that neither by sea or land was any such exertion as the time required to be expected from the English, ... the siege of Rosas would otherwise have been a more perilous undertaking than the march to Barcelona. The English had just force enough in the Bay to give the French an opportunity of boasting that the siege was effected in spite of them, and to show what might have been done if a flying squadron with troops on board had been on the coast ready to act wherever it might be most serviceable. Captain West was in the bay in the Excellent, with the Lucifer and Meteor, bomb-vessels; and when the enemy, having taken possession of the heights which encompass the whole bay, had driven the troops in, and the peasants from the nearest villages with them, and entered the town, these vessels bore a part in the action, and assisted in dislodging them. Five-and-twenty marines were then sent to reinforce Fort Trinidad, and the rest of the marines, with fifty seamen, went cheerfully to assist in defending the citadel. Upon this a report was spread by the enemy, who were always endeavouring to make the Spaniards jealous of their allies, that the English had taken possession of the place; and as while this report was circulated they succeeded in intercepting all communications from Rosas to Gerona, the Junta of that city wrote to Captain West, requesting an explanation of his conduct. The artifice was then discovered; but not till the end had been answered of deceiving the Junta for a time, and thus preventing them from taking such measures for the relief of the place as might have been in their power. Reille had expected to take Rosas by a sudden attack. The commandant of the engineers had served in that same capacity at the last siege, and was therefore well acquainted with the place and with its weakness. On the evening of the 9th a breach was made in the ramparts of the citadel sufficient for twenty men abreast; but it was so dark that the enemy did not discover the extent of the mischief. Immediate intelligence was sent to the ships; one of the bomb-vessels was then stationed where it could flank the breach, and the boats appointed to enfilade the shore with carronades, while more seamen were landed to repair the damage. British seamen are made of such materials, that it is indifferent to them on what service they are employed; whether at sea or ashore, whatever is to be done by courage, activity, intelligence, and strenuous exertion, they can accomplish. The Spaniards exerted themselves with emulous alacrity, and this, against which the enemy had directed their fire as the weakest part of the works, was by their united labour placed in a respectable state of defence. ?Disposition of the Italian troops to desert.? Reille now found that neglected as Rosas had been, with its feeble works, its unsupported garrison, and its insufficient stores, it was necessary to proceed against it by regular siege. Some difficulties he encountered from the state of the weather, some from the sallies which were made to interrupt him; but his greatest uneasiness arose from the desertion of the Italians, which was so frequent as to leave no doubt that in case ?St. Cyr, 38.? of any serious reverse the whole division would go over to the Spaniards. The state of durance in which the Pope was held had probably offended their religious feelings, and the Tuscans perhaps in their indignation for the treatment of the Queen of Etruria felt some sympathy with the Spaniards. But Buonaparte cared not for the hearts of men, so their hands were at his service and their lives at his disposal. And such are the effects of discipline, that the Italians, who when left to themselves are the worst troops in the world, became as efficient as the best soldiers in his army. One regiment at this siege was composed of subjects turned out from others, the refuse of the whole Italian army: example, encouragement, and restraint, made them behave well in the field, ... and how they behaved out of it was a matter of indifference to their officers and the government which employed them. Two companies of Italians having been surrounded and made prisoners by the Somatenes, under an old man of seventy, (who had been a captain of Miquelets in the last war, and now acted under the orders of the Spanish commander, D. Juan Claros), St. Cyr gave orders to seize an equal number of the inhabitants, and send them into France; there to be confined till an exchange should take place; and this he did to give a humaner character to the war, upon so brutal a system had it been carried on by his predecessors. His plea was that the peasantry had entrapped his troops by leading them astray; but the Catalans did not understand upon what principle he acted, and were more exasperated than if he had pursued the old system of burning their villages, because they believed that their countrymen were thus carried off as recruits for Buonaparte’s armies in the north. Among the Italian prisoners was the wife of an officer who accompanied her husband in man’s attire. ?Attack upon Fort Trinidad repulsed.? On the 16th the French attempted to carry Fort Trinidad by assault. They were repulsed; returning in greater strength, they forced the outer gate, and endeavoured to force the second; but here such a steady fire of musquetry and hand-grenades was kept up against them, that they retired a second time, leaving many of their men under the walls. Captain West expecting a third attack, reinforced the fort with a party of marines, who entered by means of a rope-ladder under an incessant fire. Nothing could be more cordial than the co-operation of the Spaniards and English at this time; but they were not strong enough to prevent the enemy from erecting batteries, which compelled the ships to keep at a distance, and a brave but unsuccessful attack from Gerona upon Souham’s division on the Fluvia was the only effort made to relieve them: on that side the Spaniards would have done more had it not been for want of cavalry. There were two regiments in Tarragona with excellent horses, but so miserably in want of equipments, that it was impossible for them to take the field; there was no money to equip them, and while they were thus remaining inactive the enemy were overrunning the Ampurdan, and carrying on the siege of Rosas at their will, because the Spaniards had no cavalry to keep them in check. The French acted with a full knowledge of the Spaniards’ embarrassments, and in full reliance upon the paralysing imbecility which such difficulties must needs produce; nevertheless St. Cyr was far from feeling at ease, knowing that Barcelona must fall unless it were speedily succoured, and that if the force which was now idly besieging it were brought to the relief of Rosas, Catalonia might speedily be cleared of its invaders, and Rousillon become in its turn the scene of invasion. It was therefore necessary to press the siege, the farthest day which had been appointed for his reaching ?The French establish themselves in the town.? Barcelona being past. During the night of the 27th an attack was made upon the town; the helpless part of the inhabitants had been removed by sea at the first approach of danger; there were about 500 men stationed there, some of whom were peasants, the others part of the garrison: they defended themselves with a courage to which the French, who are seldom just to their enemies, bore witness; but they were overpowered; about 300 fell, and hardly fifty escaped into the citadel. The conquerors immediately established batteries under cover of the houses, then set fire to the houses, and cut off the communication between the citadel and the fort. They rendered it also impossible for the English to communicate with the citadel. Captain West had at this time been superseded by Captain Bennett of the Fame; and when an officer from the Marques de Lazan came on board his ship with dispatches for the governor, some lives were lost in an unsuccessful attempt at landing him. ?Lord Cochrane throws himself into Fort Trinidad.? The citadel was soon in a desperate state, and the fort might have been considered so; for it was at this time battered in breach, and a passage to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected, the marines of the Fame were withdrawn. At this juncture Lord Cochrane arrived in the Imperieuse. During the month of September this gallant officer with his single ship had kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm, destroyed the newly-constructed semaphoric telegraphs (which were of the utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French) at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan, Canet, and Foy; demolished fourteen barracks of the gens-d’armes; blown up a battery and the strong tower upon the lake of Frontignan; and not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into Spain, but excited such dismay there, that 2000 men were drawn from Figueras to oppose him. The coasting trade was entirely suspended during this alarm; and with such consummate prudence were all his enterprises planned and executed, that not one of his men was either killed or hurt, except one, who was singed in blowing up the battery. ?Gallant defence of the fort.? Lord Collingwood, with his wonted prudence, had entrusted Cochrane with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards wherever it could be done with most probability of success, and he hastened to the Bay of Rosas as soon as he knew of the siege, ... too late, and yet in time to signalize himself. Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, did not alter Lord Collingwood’s orders, and Cochrane threw himself into Fort Trinidad with eighty seamen and marines, at a time when the garrison, amounting to the same number, would else have surrendered, perceiving that further resistance had been thought unavailing by the English themselves. ?1808. December.? This garrison was changed, and the new men brought with them fresh hope and unexhausted strength. Cochrane formed a rampart within the breach of palisadoes and barrels, ships’ hammock-cloths, awning, &c. filled with sand and rubbish; these supplied the place of walls and ditches. Sanson, the commandant of the engineers, pronounced the breach practicable. His opinion was relied on with the more confidence because he was well acquainted with the place; but the Captain who was ordered to lead the assault thought otherwise; he had been in the Spanish service, and in garrison at that very fort, and he said that it was not possible to enter there; nevertheless he would make the attempt if he were ordered, with the certainty of perishing in it, and leading his party to destruction. Under such circumstances it requires more firmness to give the order than to obey, ... but it is of a different kind. The order was given, and the officer perished as he had foreseen and foretold. Two of his companions escaped by the humanity of the English, who, instead of killing four men whose lives were at their mercy, suffered two to retire, while they drew up the others by a rope, to secure them as prisoners. When the breach had been rendered practicable, a more formidable assault was made. Lord Cochrane had prepared for it with that sportiveness by which English sailors are as much characterised as schoolboys. He not only stationed men with bayonets immediately within the breach, to give the assailants an immediate greeting, but he laid well-greased planks across the breach, upon which many of the French slipped and fell in endeavouring to pass; and he hung ropes there with fish-hooks fastened to them, by which not a few were caught in their retreat. The enemy suffered a severe loss on this occasion. There was in Lord Cochrane’s conduct here, and in all places, that contempt of danger which in former ages would have been imputed to a reliance upon charms, and which never fails to inspire confidence. Once, while the besiegers were battering the fort, the Spanish flag fell into the ditch: he let himself down by a rope through a shower of balls to recover it, returned unhurt, and planted it again upon the ?The citadel captured, and the fort evacuated.? walls. The citadel at length having been battered in breach till it was no longer tenable, capitulated, and the garrison, marching out with the honours of war, were sent prisoners1 into France. Two thousand men, who had given proof of steadiness and courage, were thus lost to Spain. Lord Cochrane then saw that any farther resistance in Fort Trinidad was impossible; and having maintained its shattered walls twelve days after they had been deemed untenable, he embarked all the men, and blew up the magazine. ?St. Cyr marches to relieve Barcelona.? The French had thus been detained a whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress. But the men who so often during this war heroically defended half-ruined works, had too much reason to feel how little it availed by their exertions to gain time for generals who knew not how to use it. By the French commanders every thing was calculated, ... by the Spanish, nothing. On the day after the capitulation the conquerors marched from Rosas; on the next day the whole army was collected on the Fluvia, the cavalry having returned from France. The force disposable for the relief of Barcelona consisted of 15,000 foot and 1500 horse: more than twice their number might have been brought against them, besides the Miquelets, who were esteemed by the French themselves as the best light troops in Europe, and the whole peasantry, always remarkable for their hardihood, and now animated with a hatred of their invaders as intense as it was well-founded. To deceive an enemy who was easily deceived, St. Cyr manoeuvred as if he intended to besiege Gerona. One precaution, and one only, had been effectually taken by the Spaniards: they had broken up the road along the coast, so as to render it impracticable, and any attempt at repairing it must have been made under the guns of the English squadron. Hostalrich commanded the other road, but this was not passable for artillery. He sent back his guns and his ammunition waggons to Figueras, and having reached La Bisbal, distributed to every soldier four days’ biscuit and fifty cartridges, and with ?Dec. 12.? no farther ammunition than ten rounds per man more, which were carried upon mules, set off to force his way to Barcelona, sure of well storing it when he arrived there from the magazines of the besiegers. ?He discovers a mountain path near Hostalrich.? Claros, who saw the enemy debouche from La Bisbal, dispatched immediate intelligence to General Vives, and taking a position with his Miquelets and a party of Somatenes at Col de la Grange, opposed their march. If this system had been well followed up, the French must soon have expended their cartridges; but every thing had been concerted on their part, and with the Spaniards in their multitude of counsellors there was neither concert nor wisdom; and so ?CabaÑes, p. ii. p. 92.? well were the French prepared, that they were better acquainted with the country than the Spaniards themselves. In passing near Palamos they received some shot from the English ships; it was the only part of the route they had chosen which exposed them to this danger. They encamped that night in the Val de Aro. The destination of the army could then no longer be concealed; still it was of importance to keep the Spaniards in doubt concerning its course, and St. Cyr profited by every hour which they passed in indecision. The next day he arrived at Vidreras. Lazan’s troops were seen behind them, to the right, on the heights of Casa de la Selva; and on the 14th some skirmishing took place near Mallorquinas between these troops and the rear of the French. This gave them little interruption, and no alarm: what St. Cyr apprehended was, that he should find Vives upon the Tordera, a strong position, where some bodies of Miquelets and peasantry, well posted, might have made him expend his ammunition, and easily have frustrated his design; but it was the fate of the Spaniards now never to profit by the opportunities which were offered them. Passing by Masanet and Martorell de la Selva, upon the heights which command Hostalrich, he halted his right at Grions and his left at Masanes, while search was made for a mountain path, which leading out of reach of shot from the fortress, comes into the Barcelona road beyond it. A man who had formerly kept sheep in these parts had assured him that such a path existed, in opposition to the statement of all the smugglers whom St. Cyr consulted before he left Perpignan, and it was in reliance upon his single but sure testimony that this course was taken. The officers of the staff went to look for it, and returned exhausted with fatigue, declaring that no such path was there. St. Cyr then, who had full reliance upon his informant, set out himself, and after two hours’ search discovered it, but in the attempt he had nearly fallen into the hands of a party of Somatenes. By this path, on the 15th, the French succeeded in passing Hostalrich; they started at daybreak, and had just regained the high road when the garrison, having discovered the way which they had taken, came out and annoyed their rear. In the course of the day they lost about two hundred men by repeated attacks of the Miquelets: and the troops, harassed by these skirmishes and by a fatiguing march, in which they had to cross many torrents, would fain have halted for the night when they arrived at Puente de la Tordera. The defile of Treinta-pasos was before them six miles in length, and St. Cyr knew that if they did not pass it that night, they must fight their way through on the morrow. He urged them forward therefore, leaving a handful of men at the entrance, to keep the Miquelets in check. The Spaniards had endeavoured to impede the way by breaking up the road and felling trees across it: but they had neglected to occupy this important pass, and by eleven o’clock the whole of the French ?St. Cyr, 52–63.? army bivouacqued on the plain a league from Llinas. General Vives, during the whole time that the French were before Rosas, had been occupied with the insane purpose of laying regular siege to Barcelona. From this dream he was disturbed by advices from Gerona that the firing at Rosas had ceased; and any hope which might have remained was soon put an end to by certain intelligence of its surrender from the British squadron. The Spanish Commander had taken none of the ordinary means for obtaining information of the enemy’s movements; he knew as little of their strength as of their plans: he was ill acquainted with the country, and the persons by whom he was surrounded were utterly ignorant of military affairs, and might have perplexed a firmer spirit and a clearer understanding, by their contrarious and vacillating counsels. It was a moment at which a blow might have been struck not less momentous than the battle of Baylen; for the destruction of St. Cyr’s army (and destruction must have been the consequence of defeat) would have drawn after it the recovery of Barcelona and Figueras, and effectual assistance might then have been afforded to Zaragoza. But the unreasonable hopes which he had long indulged were followed by an ominous prostration of mind. Fretted as well as embarrassed by want of money; alarmed by tidings of the rout at Tudela, and of the appearance of the enemy again before Zaragoza; still more alarmed by receiving no advices from the side of Madrid, and therefore with too much reason apprehending the worst, he had no government to look to for orders, no reliance upon others, and none ?Dec. 11.? upon himself. Four days were wasted in hopeless indecision; then came intelligence at midnight from the Junta at Gerona that St. Cyr was on his march, and, having sent his artillery to Figueras, it was evident that Barcelona was his object. Immediately General Reding was dispatched with his division, consisting of about 4000 men, to oppose him. Succeeding advices left no doubt of the direction of the French; a council of war was held; Caldagues was of ?He marches against the French.? opinion that the General should march against the enemy with the greater part of his force, leaving only enough to keep up the blockade: he took however not more than 5000 with him, and, having dispatched instructions to the Marques de Lazan, followed Reding, and having ?Dec. 15. CabaÑes, p. 9. c. II.? joined him at Granollers, set out from that place at midnight just when the French had passed without opposition through the defile of Treinta-pasos: the Spaniards as they left Granollers saw the fires of the enemy’s bivouac. ?Rout of the Spaniards at Llinas.? The intention was to occupy an advantageous position between Villalba and Llinas: the artillery and the want of order in some of the raw troops impeded their march; it was morning when the head of the column arrived at Cardedeu, and before Vives could reach the ground which he had intended to take he came in sight of the enemy, and his men, after a night march of eight hours, had to draw up for battle. The French were refreshed by rest: but they had consumed their biscuit, and so much of their ammunition had been expended in skirmishing with the Miquelets, that what remained would not have been sufficient for an hour in action. St. Cyr had formed them in one column at daybreak. When the Spanish artillery began to play upon the head of that column, Pino, of whose division it was composed, sent an aide-de-camp, to ask if any change was to be made in the dispositions for battle. St. Cyr’s reply was, “We have neither time nor means to make dispositions. In this covered country it would take at least three hours to reconnoitre the enemy well, ... in less than two, Lazan might arrive to attack us in the rear, and Milans might fall upon our left. We have not a minute to lose; but must bring our whole force to bear upon the centre of their line.” Notwithstanding these orders, the first brigade deployed, and attacking the left of Reding’s division suffered considerably, and began to give way. St. Cyr, when he saw his orders disobeyed, instructed Pino to execute his original plan with the second brigade, and, changing the direction of Souham’s division, sent it to turn General Reding’s right. Two battalions were ordered to make a false attack upon the left of the Spanish position. Here the rout began. The centre was forced at the same time; and Vives and his staff, seeing all hope lost on that side, hastened to the right, where the advantage had hitherto appeared to be with Reding. But they carried panic with them; Souham’s division decided the battle in that quarter with equal celerity, and the steadiness with which some of the old troops behaved was not supported well enough to save the Spaniards from a total and scandalous defeat. It was eight o’clock when they formed for action, and before nine they were in full flight. General Vives lost his horse, and, escaping on foot across the mountains, reached Mataro, and got on board a vessel. There was an end of all order: officers and men shifted as they could, each for himself. One column alone under Colonel Ybarrola retreated unbroken; and two out of fourteen guns were brought off by a Sub-lieutenant named Uzurrun. Reding, who had been saved by the speed of his horse from close pursuit, fell in with these at Mommalo, rallied what fugitives could be collected, and retreated with them by S. Culgat, across the Llobregat to Molins de Rey. The artillery had been well served, and the French loss by their own account amounted to 600 men. Of the Spaniards 2000 are said to have been taken, of whom 800 were wounded. Their killed were about 400. The loss in men was trifling, for the fugitives dispersed in all directions, and the conquerors wasted no time in pursuit: but the most favourable ?CabaÑes, p. 3. c. 11. St. Cyr, 63–70.? opportunity which presented itself to the Spaniards during the whole war was lost, ... the opportunity of cutting off a second French army, which would have drawn after it the recovery of Barcelona, and a second deliverance of Zaragoza. ?Retreat of the Spaniards from Barcelona to the Llobregat.? The firing was heard at Barcelona, from whence Duhesme, seeing so large a part of the besieging force drawn off, sallied against the remainder: he was bravely received, and repulsed at all points. But when night came, Caldagues, who had been left in the command, hearing the fatal issue of the battle, withdrew behind the Llobregat, removing almost the whole of his artillery, but leaving copious magazines which Vives, with that want of discretion that characterized all his conduct, had collected at Sarrea, and which it was now impossible to save. The retreat was effected without molestation; but so miserable a scene had not for many generations been witnessed in Catalonia. The country around Barcelona was one of the most flourishing and delightful parts of the whole kingdom, bearing every mark of industry and opulence and comfort. The whole population of that vicinity followed the retreat, men, women, and children carrying upon their backs such effects as they could bear, and leaving all the rest to the spoilers. The nuns of three convents were among the fugitives: about an hundred of these poor women were so advanced in years that they were hardly able to walk, ... since childhood they had never been beyond the walls of their cloister, and now they were thus driven abroad into the world. Reding had reached Molins de Rey at midnight, and by great exertions restoring some order among the troops which he had collected in his flight, took a position upon the heights that command the bridge. ?St. Cyr marches against them. Dec. 17.? St. Cyr entered Barcelona on the following morning, ill satisfied with Duhesme for not having interposed to cut off the fugitives; and still more displeased when he found that the distress of the garrison for provisions had been greatly exaggerated, and that in consequence of these false representations he had been compelled to undertake a march so perilous that nothing but the gross incapacity of his opponents ?Dec. 20.? could have saved the army from2 destruction. He rested his men three days, and on the fourth took a position on the left bank of the Llobregat in face of the Spaniards, that they might have no time to strengthen themselves in the advantageous post which they occupied, nor to be joined by the troops under Lazan and Milans. But these officers had no intention of joining; and Reding, upon whom the temporary command had devolved, was less able than a Spaniard would have been to struggle with the difficulties in which he found himself. A Spanish General would neither have foreseen defeat nor have been cast down by it; he would have thought a change of fortune as likely as a change of weather; he would have relied upon the Saints and the Virgin, his good cause and the insuperable constancy of his countrymen. But Reding saw only the fearful realities of his situation; he knew that his own knowledge of the art of war was of no avail when he could depend neither upon officers nor men; and his sole hope was, that a speedy and honourable death might remove him from the sight of calamities which he deemed it impossible to avert. A more pitiable condition cannot be conceived, ... except that of the brave and honourable men employed against him, who from a sense of military duty served with their utmost efforts a cause which they knew to be infamously unjust, and acting in obedience to a merciless tyrant with miscreants worthy of such a master, aided and abetted crimes at which their hearts revolted ... sinning thus against God and man, against the light of conscience and against their own souls. ?Indecision of the Spaniards. Dec. 18.? On the second day after the rout, Vives, who had landed at Sitges, appeared upon the Llobregat, and having approved of Reding’s dispositions, left him in the command while he went to Villafranca to take measures with the Junta for calling out the whole peasantry of the country, and for reuniting the dispersed troops. There was the difficult task of providing for the army, ... their magazines had been abandoned to the enemy, and they were in a country which now for six months had been the immediate scene of war. They were without clothes and without shelter, and a piercing wind from the mountains swept down the valley of the Llobregat. ?Dec. 20.? While they were employed in felling trees and erecting huts, the alarm was given that the French were taking a position in front of them. The men were immediately placed under arms, and dispositions were made for maintaining a post strong in itself, and defended by numerous artillery. But it was soon perceived that the attack would not be made that day. St. Cyr fixed his head-quarters in the centre at San Feliu, having his left at Cornella and his right at Molins de Rey. He saw by the movements of the Spaniards that they expected the main attack would be at that place, by the bridge over which the high road passes to Tarragona, and a little way beyond branches off to Zaragoza. They had in fact made such preparations that it was impossible for the French to debouch there while the point was defended with any resolution. St. Cyr therefore ordered General Chabran to draw their attention thither during the night, and not to make any real attempt till he should see both the centre and the right of the enemy turned: for the river was fordable in several places, and the Spaniards with strange improvidence had taken no means for rendering it impassable in those points. Indeed as soon as they were satisfied that the attack was delayed till the morning, Reding held a council of war in his tent; and all who were present agreed that considering the temper of the troops after their late defeat, it would be imprudent to hazard another engagement.... Some were for retreating to Ordal, and occupying a position there; ... it was not so defensible as that which they proposed to abandon; but to men in their state of mind it seemed better, because it was at a distance: others were for retiring at once to Tarragona, where the army might be re-organized in safety. Reding himself thought it certainly advisable to retreat: but he who had no fear of death was miserably afraid of responsibility; and wanting resolution to act upon his own judgement, dispatched a courier to solicit instructions from General Vives, who was seven leagues off. Night came on; the troops were under arms, exposed to severe cold and snow; the fires of both armies were seen along their whole lines; ... an alarm was kept up at the bridge by Chabran’s division, and from time to time the Spanish batteries fired where they saw any movement on the opposite bank. At midnight no answer from Vives had arrived; and Reding, not doubting that it would confirm the opinion of the council, issued orders that the troops should be in readiness to commence their retreat as soon as it came. But Vives also sought to shift the responsibility from himself; and when his answer arrived, which was not till four in the morning, its purport was, that Reding was to retire to Ordal if he could not maintain himself on the Llobregat. Reding now felt that the night had been lost in this ruinous indecision, and finding the responsibility which he dreaded thrown back upon him, deemed it better to die where he was than commence a retreat with the certainty of being instantly and closely pursued. He made this determination known to the officers who were about his person, exhorting them to do their duty like true Spaniards, and die in defence of their country: ?CabaÑes, p. 3. c. 12.? they shook hands with him in pledge of their promise, and in this temper waited for the attack. ?Dec. 21. The Spaniards routed, and pursued to Tarragona.? At break of morning on the shortest day in the year, the left wing of the French under General Souham forded the river at St. Juan d’Espi, and ascended the right bank to protect the centre, which in like manner crossed in a line from St. Feliu, opposite to the right of the Spaniards. The first brigade of the centre effected its passage before any such intention was perceived or apprehended by their opponents. The Spaniards could have given no greater proof of negligence than in leaving undefended points which were so easily defensible, and upon which the security of their position depended; but in making dispositions as soon as they discovered the enemy’s movements, they evinced a degree of skill which convinced the French that there were officers among them who would have been formidable antagonists had they commanded troops upon whom they could have relied. The first brigade, however, was in time to establish itself with little opposition upon the heights of Llors and S. Coloma; the second followed, and placed itself at the foot of those heights, masked, in column, and ready to debouch. Chabot’s troops crossed at the same ford, and marched to the left of the others, with the intention of turning the Spaniards’ right. The effect of these movements was, that the Spanish troops, dismayed, as their officers had anticipated, by the late reverses, easily gave way: the right was driven back behind the centre; that being attacked also, was thrown back upon the left toward the bridge; their retreat upon Villa Franca was cut off by Chabot: a detachment from the French right, which had crossed at a ford above the bridge, intercepted them also on the way to Martorell; and if Chabran had then forced the passage of the bridge, they would have been beset on all sides, and driven together for slaughter like wild beasts at a royal hunt in the East. Chabran, however, not willing to expose his men to a loss which might be spared, waited till Souham’s troops arrived on the opposite bank, and then debouched from the bridge. There are no troops in the world except the Spaniards, says St. Cyr, who could have escaped from such a situation. They did it by abandoning every thing, and flying every man his own way. General Reding and the officers who had pledged themselves to die with him in maintaining the position had not even an opportunity of dying afforded them, unless they had sought it like suicides. The country being craggy, wooded, and full of ravines, favoured the fugitives, so that during an active pursuit of fifteen hours not more that some 1100 prisoners were taken. Caldagues was among them, and the good service which he had performed in relieving Gerona did not exempt him now from a suspicion of having betrayed the Spaniards in favour of his countrymen. The pursuit was followed to the very gates of Tarragona, and some of the fugitives did not stop till they reached the Ebro. All the artillery, consisting of 50 pieces of cannon, was taken; and large magazines of ammunition were found at Villa Franca, to the great relief of the French, who had not enough in Barcelona for a month’s consumption. Chabran’s division established itself at Martorell, Chabot’s at S. Sadurni, Souham’s at Vendrell and upon the left bank of the Gaya, Pino’s at Villa Franca, Villa Nueva, and Sitjas. St. Cyr fixed his head-quarters at Villa Franca. Thus far he had completely succeeded in whatever he had proposed: ... there was no longer an army in the field to oppose him; Barcelona was not only relieved, but stored and rendered secure; and Zaragoza (which in a moral if not a military point of view was an object of more importance) ?St. Cyr, 82–88. CabaÑes, p. 3. c. 12.? was precluded from all succour in that quarter, from whence alone an effectual effort might reasonably have been expected.
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