Robert Southey

CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE.

?1808.

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Buonaparte reproaches and insults the English.?

In all the bulletins and proclamations of Buonaparte the English were held up to the Spaniards for indignation and contempt: they were a people, he said, who fomented war every where, and distributed arms like poison, ?14th Bulletin.? but who shed their own blood only for their own direct interest. At this time it is probable that he sincerely despised the English as a military nation. ?Gazeta de Madrid, Dec. 18.? Can any thing be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that England should pretend to struggle with her land forces against France? ?Do. Dec. 24.? she will realize the fable of the frog swelling itself to rival the ox, till it burst. “The day,” said Buonaparte, “wherein we succeed in seeing these English will be a day of jubilee for the French army. Oh, that they may dye with their blood this continent, which they have desolated with their intrigues, their monopolies, and their frightful selfishness! Oh, that they might be met with to the number of 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that English mothers might feel the evils of war, and the English government cease to sport with the ?14th Bulletin.
12th Bulletin.? lives and blood of the continental nations. All the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict the human race, come from London.” He represented the Spaniards as complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing, but had sent troops only to excite ?14th Bulletin.? them, lead them astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger, when 40,000 British at Espinosa or Tudela might have balanced the fortune of the war.... That number of British troops would at either place have turned it.

Great Britain possessed at that time men, means, and generals equal to any service; but the nation did not yet understand its own strength, nor had the government yet learnt either to direct it wisely, or to make exertions commensurate to the end whereat they aimed. The lessons which books and history might teach had been neglected, and experience therefore was to be purchased at a heavy price.

?The British army from Portugal enters Spain.?

As soon as the campaign in Portugal was ended, Sir Hew Dalrymple began to prepare for entering Spain: on the 6th of October Sir John Moore received his appointment to the command; the preparations meantime had not been relaxed, and in eight days afterward part of the troops were in motion. Difficulties and doubts had occurred at the very outset. The infantry were to go either by sea or land at the Commander’s discretion; the voyage at that season was thought too precarious; and the Junta represented, that if they went by sea, half the army would be unable to leave the coast for want of necessaries, there being scarcely means at CoruÑa for forwarding 10,000 men who were to land there under Sir David Baird, and join the Commander wherever he should appoint. The land-journey therefore having been chosen, the Spanish Commissary-General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting the army on the great road by Elvas; but the quantity of meat which was required astonished him; and he computed that in three months all the oxen in the country would be consumed, and very few hogs left. There was no want of food in the north of Portugal, but it was said that artillery could not be transported across the mountains. British officers were sent to examine the roads, and they confirmed this assertion of the natives. It was ascertained when too late, that bad as the ways were, they were practicable for cannon; but in consequence of this error, it was deemed necessary to divide the army, and this led to serious evils. General Hope, with the artillery, cavalry, and four regiments of foot, was to go by the Madrid road; General Paget, with two brigades, by Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved through Almeida; two brigades, under General Beresford, by way of Coimbra; three, under General Fraser, by Abrantes, crossing the Tagus there, and recrossing at Villa Velha, ... a point which, in former wars, has been considered the key to Lisbon. These were to unite at Salamanca, and General Hope and Sir David Baird to join them either there or at Valladolid.

If the people of England had been required to name the general who should be employed on this important occasion, Sir John Moore would certainly have been their choice, so generally was he respected as an officer and as a man. ?Former services of Sir John Moore.? He was born at Glasgow in 1760. From the eighteenth to the twenty-third year of his age he was on the continent with his father (a physician and a distinguished man of letters, then travelling with the young Duke of Hamilton), and soon afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the army. He served with distinction in Corsica, the West Indies, the Helder expedition, and in Egypt; had often been wounded, and given proofs of professional skill as well as of personal gallantry, for he was fond of his profession, and had studied it well. But the constitution of his mind led him to look at the dark rather than the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his farther misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of their Emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always labouring to produce, for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their country.

?His care to maintain discipline.?

Before the troops began their march Sir John Moore warned them in his general orders that the Spaniards were a grave, orderly people, extremely sober, but generous, and easily offended by any insult or disrespect; he exhorted them to accommodate themselves to these manners, to meet with equal kindness the cordiality wherewith they would be received, and not shock by their intemperance a people worthy of their attachment, whose efforts they were come to support in the most glorious cause. His resolution to maintain order and proper discipline was farther evinced by punishing a marauder upon the march with death: the offender was one whose character gave no hope of amendment, and the General took that opportunity of declaring his determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders, in other words, to thieves and villains. Farther to gratify the Spaniards, the army, upon entering Spain, were ordered to wear the red cockade in addition to their own.

?Ill prospect of affairs when he arrives at Salamanca.?

On Nov. 13, Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca. Before he entered the city, he learnt the defeat of the Extremaduran army at Burgos, and on the second night after his arrival, was awakened by an express, with news that the French had possession of Valladolid, ... twenty leagues distant. He had only three brigades of infantry with him, and not a single gun. His first thought was to fall back upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the French had retired to Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos: he therefore sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope, to concentrate their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought with it intelligence of new disasters. Blake’s army was dispersed, and Buonaparte might either turn his force against CastaÑos, or march against the English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive. Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government, and indignant at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity, which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not, he said, shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their wisdom was not a wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they were a fine people; that they had a character of their own, quite distinct from that of any other nation; and much, he thought, might have been done with them. He erred in thinking that they would not do much for themselves.

?Sir David Baird arrives at Astorga.?

Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition under his command reached CoruÑa on the 13th of October; and such were the idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish authorities, that the troops were kept on ship-board till an order for their landing could be received from the Central Junta. This General had been accustomed to an Indian army, with its train of slaves and sutlers, elephants and palanquins; he had now to march through a country where it is not without difficulty that a party of travellers can obtain food, and which had already been drained by its own troops; and his commissaries were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but ignorant of the language of the people. Dividing his army into small detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance, he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat of Blake’s army, and anticipating that of CastaÑos’s, he consulted with his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole force was assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. Sir John Moore’s opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed by Sir David Baird. “I see my situation,” he said in his journal, “as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; yet I am determined to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.”

?Sir John Moore resolves to retreat upon Portugal, and embark from Lisbon.?

It was not long before intelligence arrived that CastaÑos was defeated, and his army dispersed. ?Nov. 28.? This event the British Commander had expected; it had always been his opinion that the south of Spain ought to have been the scene of action; that Cadiz, not CoruÑa, should have been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon Portugal.... “Thus,” he said, in a letter to the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, “he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detached a force against him, and be ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest, they might have troublesome subjects.” And, in his letter to Sir David Baird, ordering him to fall back upon CoruÑa, and sail from thence for the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order that transports might be sent to Lisbon; “they will be wanted,” said he; “for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.” He had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that he had ordered a depÔt of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas; in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency. “If the French,” said he, “succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be defended against a superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south, and the English might still be of use, if they were landed at Cadiz. But it was impossible to be very sanguine on this subject, after what had been seen.”

?He asks the opinion of the British Ambassador.?

When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at Salamanca, murmurs against it were heard in every quarter, and from men of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the resolution of their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat of CastaÑos was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation? “This movement,” he said, “would be one of great hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain, and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats.” “The question,” said Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, “is not purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion.” Mr. Frere knew that what the Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit in all Spain: the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them: living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily belong to the party which was superior in cavalry; ... yet even there there was no want of a right feeling; the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of allegiance to the Intruder, nor had the French been able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to be very active; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon be remedied. “They are resolute,” said Mr. Frere, “and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at least set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity.”

?Mr. Frere wishes him to advance for the defence of Madrid.?

Great advantages, the ambassador thought, would result from advancing speedily to cover Madrid. It was a point of great moment for effect in Spain, and still more in France, and in the west of Europe. The people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable to the claim of the Intruder than a siege of the capital. The first object of the English, therefore, he thought, should be to march there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before farther reinforcements arrived from France. There were reports that the resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual, and a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that these reports were not wholly without foundation. An advantage obtained over the French now would be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it would render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their present forces, they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces, which would give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces, and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries, which could stand out longest against the waste of population.

If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of his Majesty’s government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat from thence to CoruÑa (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castille.... Before this letter arrived, the General’s resolution had been taken, in consequence of the news of CastaÑos’s defeat. It was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he had asked, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal.

?1808.
December.

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Two Spanish Generals sent to confer with Sir John Moore.?

The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable. But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience, were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted. Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid, nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.

?Morla and the Military Junta urge him to advance.?

On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla, informing him that about 25,000 men, of the central army, were falling back on Madrid; that 10,000 from Somosierra were coming thither; and that nearly 40,000 would join them. With that number of troops, the French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But the Junta, apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter was written on the second, and the men who signed it had then determined to betray their country, ... but though they might have wished and designed to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil and military Junta also, and was such as true Spaniards would have given. While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England, arrived, with dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in Madrid on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who told him there were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material importance to the common cause that the British commander should make a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus afford some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making for resistance. By another Grandee he was requested to say to Sir John Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta for a better government; but especially that he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under Lord Peterborough.

?Col. Charmilly sent to Sir John Moore by the Duque del Infantado and Mr. Frere.?

When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr. Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered. Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador’s first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been entrusted to him for that purpose. “I have no hesitation,” he added, “in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt. I say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success.” Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly’s communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired, however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention: ... both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various quarters. He was persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be necessary.

?Sir John Moore resolves to advance.?

Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir David to return to Astorga. “We must be at hand,” said he, “to aid and take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.” But he added, “I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.” These were ominous words. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was sacrificing his own.

While Sir John was dispatching these instructions, it was not known at Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating: officers and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General, not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered him to quit Salamanca. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had not deserved such treatment. The General replied that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was obeyed. Sir John Moore, in his resentment for what he conceived the improper interference of the Ambassador, soon, however, recollected what was due to him as the King’s minister. He told Mr. Frere, therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. “I certainly,” said he, “did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him.” He informed the Minister that every thing should be done, for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such an army as he commanded, ... but he could not make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was much too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.

?News of the surrender of Madrid.

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Dec. 7.?

On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of Toledo, telling him they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies there, and defend the city to the last. He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain; and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from Talavera, with tidings that these men had surrendered Madrid. The number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000 men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no sooner approached than it was surrendered to him. These circumstances did not induce the British General to alter his plan: his object was to threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat, as an event which would soon be unavoidable; in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon, and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to evacuate the peninsula.

?Correspondence with Romana.?

Having determined, in this inauspicious state of mind, upon advancing, he wrote to Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting the remains of Blake’s army. Sir John complained to him that he had been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, had been kept perfectly in the dark with respect to their movements, the plans of their generals and their government, and that while his army was on the march to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed, without the least support. Therefore, though his wish had always been to co-operate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that feeling he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back on CoruÑa, and meant himself to retire upon Portugal, there to be ready for the assistance of Spain whenever their affairs were better managed, and an opportunity offered for doing them any good. Perhaps this opportunity had now occurred; and as his retreat had been reluctant, so he had stopped it the moment a chance of acting to advantage presented itself. His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he had the highest respect, and who would always find him ready to undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish nation. The account which Romana gave of his army in reply was far from encouraging. He had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost all without haversacks, cartridge boxes, and shoes, and at least two-thirds were without clothing, from head to foot. Their spirits however were good, and if they were well fed they would do their duty. Their dispersion in Biscay had been wholly owing to the want of subsistence. He should not doubt of uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive attack upon the troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a division of 8000 or 10,000 men, extending from Sahagun to Almanza, whose apparent object was to check his army. As long as they remained in that position, he could not abandon his, because it would leave them a free way into Asturias; they would take possession of the country from whence he drew large supplies, and they would threaten the passage into Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird might oblige them to fall back upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult to form a junction.

?First skirmish at Rueda.?

From the beginning Sir John Moore had thought so poorly of the Spaniards, that this account of the force with which he was to co-operate could make no alteration in his views. It was perfectly understood by him that he must stand, or fall, by his own means. He left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day, Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and General Stuart surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French in Spain; and the prisoners declared it was universally believed that the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. He would have no English in front, it was said; for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared from this letter, that Soult had two divisions with him at SaldaÑa; that Junot was collecting another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso), had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.

?Head-quarters removed to Toro.?

Sir John had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and unite his army there, Sir David Baird doing the same at Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before that General should be reinforced. While the head-quarters were at Toro, a member of the Junta arrived there with Mr. Stuart. After the manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr. Frere had little reason to hope that any thing would induce Sir John Moore to alter his determination of retiring from the country in despair. The Spanish Government ?The command of the Spanish armies offered to Sir J. Moore.? had, however, pressed him to make one effort more: if that determination were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most dreadful consequences. The measures which alone could save Portugal and Spain would be completely disconcerted, and England would have afforded them succour only to make them rely on an effective aid, and then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most needed. In reality, the enemy at this moment exposed himself to ruin by dividing his army to cover such an extended line. Romana would join Sir John Moore with 14,000 men, and the Junta had taken such measures that within a month 30,000 would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and Asturias. Mr. Frere inclosed this note to the British Commander, and reminding him of the immense responsibility with which he charged himself in adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate if not final ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was entrusted, expressed a hope that Mr. Stuart, who was personally esteemed by the General, would by that advantage be enabled to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. “I am unwilling,” he pursued, “to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.... That the defence of Galicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible.”... This letter arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John’s movements; he had advanced, but it was with a heavy heart: and when the Deputy from the Junta, D. Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, he refused it. He would not have done this if he had had any hope of acting with success against the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them: for at this time he learnt that Romana was beginning to retire on Galicia, and felt how inconvenient it was that the army which was to co-operate with him should be independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques, saying, he had looked for the assistance of such part of his corps as was fit to move; and had expected also that the road to CoruÑa would have been left open for the British army, as that by which it must receive its supplies, and the only one by which it must retreat, if compelled so to do. Romana replied, that he should have had no thought of retreating had it not been for the intelligence which he received from Sir D. Baird; that he was ready to act with Sir John; and that this was the moment, not for retreating, but for trying what could be done against the enemy, and drawing him from the capital.

?Junction with Sir D. Baird formed.?

The junction with Sir D. Baird was formed at Mayorga on the 20th; the united force amounting to something more than 28,000 men, of whom 2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the enemy’s cavalry were posted at Sahagun, Lord Paget endeavoured to cut them off. The alarm was given, and they had time to form in a favourable position; but they were out-manoeuvred, charged, overthrown in a moment, and dispersed in every direction, with the loss of many killed, and 157 prisoners, including two Lieutenant-Colonels. In this affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French; and the British felt and proved their own exceeding great superiority. Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was severe; the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the troops had suffered from forced marches, they halted there for a day, and there a co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to move with from 900040 to 10,000 men, being that part of his force which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Pitiable as their condition appeared when they were compared to troops so admirably equipped as the English, it was, nevertheless, evident, even to a desponding observer, that they might be brought into action as auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy’s force, and to complete his destruction in case of victory.

?They advance against M. Soult.?

According to the information which Romana could obtain, Soult’s corps consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse; but that General, apprehending that some attempt would be made against him, had applied for reinforcements, and without waiting for them, called to his assistance the nearest troops; he had thus brought together about 18,000 men, who were posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, ... never more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun were prepared for the reception of the wounded; and the soldiers confidently anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was less sanguine. “The movement I am making,” he said to Mr. Frere, “is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us.” The truth is, that nothing had been done; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and he had no faith in the people: his own judgement would have led him to fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what would be the feelings of the English nation, if its army had retired without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr. Frere, for having given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the suggestion of that Minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy of consideration. It was at once rejected, as futile; and he advanced against this detachment of the French, “bridle in hand,” as he himself said, and expecting to “have a run for it,” ... not thinking that any possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking a reason which might appear valid to the people of England for abandoning the peninsula, and for leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate.... “It was necessary to risk this army,” he said, “to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other effect than the character it will attach to the British arms.”

At the hour appointed, the whole force was under arms; the right column had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting the word of command: ... just at this time came a letter from Romana, with intelligence ?The French endeavour to surround the British army.? that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements ?Dec. 23.? had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by daybreak next morning be again under arms. “In my life,” says one who was present, “I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures! A few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart and ?Sir J. Moore begins his retreat.? hope.” The next morning General Hope fell back to Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own division and with General Fraser’s. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river Ezla at Valencia de San Juan: on Christmas-day the Commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve on the 26th. When Sir John Moore apprized Romana that he should fall back, he told him that if he were pursued he should stop and offer battle: and in a second communication from Sahagun he said, that if he were pressed after crossing the Ezla, he should have no objection to try an action. But he had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage, and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst, he could defend himself, and, with Romana’s aid, defend Galicia. “You may rest assured,” he added, “that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted.... You will find no inclination in me to abandon the Spanish cause.” But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th, show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously entertained, was soon abandoned; and as for the reinforcements, he had already countermanded them in his feeling of despair. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000; Romana could not have above 8000. The troops moving against him he estimated at not less than 50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming, with 10,000 of his guards. His real purpose was not to stop longer at Astorga than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where he had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated to him, some time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia by this route, but Sir John begged it might be left open to the English, being the only communication they had for their retreat or supplies.

From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made his army superior to the British. Junot, with the army which had been transported from Portugal to France, had advanced to Palencia, and threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening from Madrid, with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Lefebvre was counter-ordered from the road to Badajoz, and directed toward Salamanca. The retreat of the British upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers advancing against him Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the prisoners; and they were accordingly stowed in covered waggons. A thaw came on the day when they first fell back; on the following it rained without intermission: the soil in that part of the country is a heavy loam, and the roads were above a foot deep in clay. The proclamations of the French travelled faster than the British army: these were, as usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility and a fanatic priesthood. All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken them, speedily returned, should receive no injury; but otherwise, whatsoever belonged to them should be confiscated. Unhappily, the conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills. The soldiers were indignant ?Ill conduct of the troops.? with the Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken their mules, and run away in the night, because the movements of a retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want of rest and food, disappointed in their confident hopes of victory, and indignant at turning their backs upon an enemy whom they would so eagerly have met in the field, it was a relief for them to vent these feelings, in the shape of anger, upon the only objects within their reach. In this temper they began to plunder and commit havoc wherever they went; and the officers, many of whom already murmured at the rapidity of the retreat, and were discontented with the total silence which the Commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future measures, did not exert themselves as they ought to have done, to prevent these excesses.

Sir David Baird, who took the shorter line to Astorga, by way of Valencia de S. Juan, effected his march without molestation. The sick and wounded, following the same track, halted at the latter place, to pass the night. Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food, and laid to rest, before the alarm was sounded, and they were again hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and exceeding dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the town. They were not provided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous, because of the rapidity of the stream, occasioned by two narrow banks of shingles, which form an angle in the middle; and at this time the river was fast rising, from the melting of the snow upon the mountains. A serjeant’s guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to assist the waggons in passing, and skuttle two ferry-boats, when they had effected their passage. They kindled a fire with grass and rushes, for the sake of its light, but the materials were wet, and the wind soon extinguished it. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide them over the ford: his mule tripped in the mid stream, he was thrown, and saved by a soldier, when just in the act of sinking. Perilous, however, as the ford was, the passage was accomplished, without other loss than that of some baggage-waggons, which broke down.

Sir John Moore, meantime, with the other division of the army, reached Benevente, and there found it necessary to issue general orders, ?Dec. 27.? which reflected severely upon the conduct both of his men and officers. “The misbehaviour of the column which had marched by Valderas exceeded,” he said, “what he could have believed of British soldiers. He could feel no mercy towards officers who neglected, in times like these, essential duties, nor towards soldiers who disgraced their country, by acts of villany towards the people whom they were sent to protect.” Alluding then to the discontent which was manifested at the hurry of the retreat, and the mystery which was thrown over their proceedings, he said, “it was impossible for the General to explain to his army the motives of the movements which he directed; he could, however, assure them, that he had made none since he left Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, as far as he was a judge, they had answered the purposes for which they were intended. When it was proper to fight a battle he would do it, and he would choose the time and place which he thought most fit. In the meantime, he begged the officers and men to attend diligently to discharge their parts, and leave to him, with the general officers, the decision of measures which belonged to them alone.” Strong as this language was, it had no effect, and the havoc which had been committed at Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle there is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; we have nothing in England which approaches to its grandeur: Berkley, Raby, even Warwick and Windsor are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open galleries, where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters, with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns and tesselated floors, niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna; and the splendour of old times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls. They proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them: their indignant feelings broke out again in acts of wanton mischief; and the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation. Every thing combustible was seized, fires were lighted against the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps, of the greatest Spanish masters, and of those other great painters who left so many of their finest productions in Spain, were heaped together as fuel. The archives of the family fortunately escaped.

The soldiers had, however, here an opportunity of displaying a spirit more becoming them as ?Dec. 28.? Englishmen. Soon after the rear of the army had marched into the town, an alarm was given that the enemy were on the opposite heights. In an instant all was on the alert; every man hastened to his place of rendezvous; the cavalry poured out of the gates: ... the plain in the opposite direction was covered with fugitives, and the streets were filled with women bewailing their fate, and calling upon the Saints and the Virgin for protection. The French, seeing with what alacrity they would be encountered, looked at our men from the heights, and retired. It was ?Dec. 29.? towards evening, and as the enemy were so near, orders were given to destroy the bridge. This was effected about daybreak the following morning; and it was supposed that their progress was for a while impeded. The troops again continued their retreat, and the whole of the infantry and heavy artillery had departed, when intelligence arrived that the French were again appearing, and that their cavalry were in the act of passing the Ezla: ... they had found a ford about three hundred yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in the town. The picquets of the night, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair to their alarm posts; and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget hastened to the spot: he found four squadrons of imperial guards already formed and skirmishing with the picquets; other cavalry were in the act of passing. The 10th Hussars were sent for: as soon as they arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets, and charged the enemy. The French gave way, and repassed the ford more expeditiously than they had crossed it. They formed again on the other side, and threatened a second attempt; but three pieces of horse artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the bridge, and opened a fire upon them, that did considerable execution. About seventy prisoners were taken; among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes, Commander of the imperial guard of cavalry. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained: it was variously guessed, from 60 to 200. Ours was about 50 in killed and wounded. It was reported that Buonaparte was on the heights during this action.

The ardour of the French was manifestly damped by this fresh proof of British valour; and they continued their pursuit at such respectful distance, that the rear of the army, which had been engaged with them, reached BaÑeza ?Dec. 30.? that night unmolested. The next day the Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was the rallying point, and here they found about 5000 men of Romana’s army. That army was literally half naked and half starved; a malignant typhus fever was raging among them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the hospitals. About this number, however, were fit for service. Romana arrived there the same day. The first intimation that the French were advancing to interpose between Portugal and the British army had been received from him; but it was his opinion that that information ought to have produced no change in Sir John Moore’s intentions. The intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made; Soult might have been beaten in time to fall upon the corps which was coming to reinforce him, and by the success which prompt and vigorous measures would have ensured, they should have become masters of Leon and Castille. To his utter astonishment he now found that there was no intention of making a stand at Astorga, part of the British army being already on the way to Villa Franca, and a regiment of cavalry all that was left on the side of BaÑeza. He went therefore to the British Commander, and represented to him the propriety of facing the enemy where they were, a point from whence they had always a secure retreat by the passes of Manzanal and Foncebadon, ... passes so strong that a small force might maintain them against any numbers. He represented to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferrada, where also the hospitals were established, and there were magazines of corn; that in Villa Franca there were more than 2000 sick, with hospital stores and depÔts of arms, and therefore it was of the utmost consequence to defend the Bierzo. But Sir John Moore replied, that he had determined upon retiring into Galicia, because his troops required rest. He desired that the high road of Manzanal might be left to him, saying, he would defend that and the principal entrance to Galicia by Villa Franca; and that Romana might take the Foncebadon pass, and enter by way of the Val de Orras and Puebla ?Honourable conduct of Romana and his army.? de Sanabria. And here a proof of Spanish magnanimity was given by these half armed, half naked, and half famished men, for such they literally were. A malignant fever was raging among them, and long fatigue, privations, and disease, made them appear more like an ambulatory hospital than an army. Under such circumstances it might have been supposed they would have sought to secure their retreat under protection of the British to CoruÑa and Ferrol. But Romana and his forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden upon those allies with whom they had so lately expected to co-operate in honourable and hopeful enterprise; and they assented without hesitation to the British General’s desire. Romana only requested that the British troops might no longer be permitted to commit disorders which even in an enemy’s country ought never to be allowed; it must have been painful indeed for Sir John Moore to have heard of such excesses, and still more painful to feel, that in a retreat so hasty as this was intended to be, it was impossible to prevent them.

The troops had been assured, at Benevente, that they were not falling back upon CoruÑa, but that their march was only to secure a more favourable position: ... no affirmations could make the soldiery believe this: and when Sir John Moore reached Astorga, and issued his orders, it was too manifest that they were not retreating, but flying, before the enemy. Ammunition waggons were burnt here, and an entire depÔt of entrenching tools abandoned, so that the army was thus deprived of a most important means of impeding the enemy’s progress. The position at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of. Two brigades under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense, to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned. General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with orders to proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the coast. “With respect to me and the British troops,” said the Commander, in his official letter, “it has come to that point which I have long foreseen.... From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able.... We must all make forced marches, from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us.”

It appears evident, from these expressions, that Sir John Moore was not well informed of the nature of the country through which he was about to retreat. Westward of Astorga, two great ?The Bierzo.? ranges of mountains trend from north to south: Puerto del Rabanal, Cruz de Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern branch; those of the western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto del Courel, and Puerto del Aguiar; they meet, on the south, with the Sierra de Sanabria, the Sierra de Cabrera, and the Montes Aquilianos. The tract which these mountains enclose is called the Bierzo: from summit to summit it is about sixteen leagues from north to south, and about fourteen from east to west. The whole waters of this amphitheatre have but one opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass, through a narrow gorge, into the Val de Orras, in Galicia.... The centre is a plain of about four square leagues. There is scarcely in Europe a more lovely tract of country, certainly no where a more defensible one. The main road, one of the finest in Europe, is that of Manzanal; that of Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo; there is no third ingress, and from Villa Franca toward CoruÑa the only way is that of the Puerto Cebrero; both the former passes lead along defiles, where, as Romana observed three months before this miserable retreat, a thousand men might stop the march of twenty times their number: and beyond Villa Franca there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird’s army had travelled this road; they supposed that it could not possibly be intended to fall back beyond that point. But the Commander saw no security till he should reach the coast; there he hoped to find transports ready, or to take up some defensible position till they arrived. The same difficulties which affected him must affect his pursuers. It was not probable that all the numbers which were now marching against him would follow him the whole way; and once on the coast, it was his determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force: ... “it is only while retreating,” said he, “that we are vulnerable.” His sole object now was to bring off the army, ... to effect this he had already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and now left behind many of the sick.

The mountain-tops were covered with heavy clouds, and the roads knee-deep in snow. Provisions, in a country where the natives are not rich enough at any time to lay by a store, can never be abundant, and what there were, had already been exhausted by the repeated march of troops, English and Spaniards. The little order with which such food as could be found was issued out, occasioned waste, and thereby increased the evil. The men, half famished, half frozen, and altogether desperate, were no longer in any subordination. They forced their way into the houses where their rations should have been served, seized it by force, frequently spilling the wine, and destroying more than they could carry away. This was not all: ... pillage could not be prevented. Houses and villages were burning in all directions; but when they thus acted as enemies, they were treated as such; and many of them were put to death by the peasantry, in revenge, or in self-defence.

Buonaparte pursued in person no farther than Astorga: he left Marshal Ney with 18,000 men to keep that part of the country in subjection; and assigned to Marshal Soult, with 23,000, what he called the “glorious mission of destroying the English army, ... pursuing them to their point of embarkation, and driving them into the sea.” Marshal Soult’s was an easy task: he had only to follow the English just close enough to keep them at the pace at which they set out, and not come near enough to make them turn and stand at bay; fatigue would do his work more surely than the sword. From Astorga to Villa Franca del Bierzo is fifteen leagues, about sixty English miles; the road for the first four leagues is up the mountain, but through an open country. Having reached the summit of Foncebadon, you enter into some of the strongest passes in Europe. It would scarcely be possible for an invading army to force their way here, against a body of determined men. These passes continue between two and three leagues, nearly to the village of Torre; from thence, through Benvibre and Ponferrada, nothing can be finer than the country, and the circle of mountains which binds it in. But never, in the most melancholy ages of Spanish history, had a more miserable scene ?1809.
January.? been represented, than was now to be witnessed here. The horses of the retreating army began to fail, and this, in great measure, for want of shoes and shoe-nails. There was no want of iron to hammer new ones: there are iron-works near Villa Franca, and enough might have been procured, had there been time allowed. As soon as these noble animals foundered, they were shot, lest the enemy should profit by them. The rain continued pouring, ... the baggage was to be dragged, and the soldiers were to wade through half-melted snows, ... the feet of the men as well as of the beasts began to fail, ... more waggons were left behind, ... more ammunition destroyed along the way; and when the troops reached Villa Franca, they were in such a state, that several experienced officers predicted, if this march against time were persevered in, a fourth of the army would be left in the ditches, before it was ?Jan. 2.? accomplished. More magazines and carriages were here destroyed. Some of the men abandoning themselves now, as knowing that if they proceeded they must die of cold, hunger, and weariness; they got into the wine cellars, and, giving way to desperate excess, were found dead when the French entered the town. When the General marched with the reserve from Benvibre, he left a detachment to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers of their danger, and drive them out of the houses, ... for the place was filled with them, near a thousand men of the preceding divisions having remained there, all abandoned to despair, and most of them to drunkenness. A few were prevailed upon to move on; the greater number were deaf to threats, and insensible to danger, till the rear-guard was compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still covered them, and did not quit the town till the enemy approached, and then the road was filled with stragglers, armed and unarmed, mules, carts, women, and children.... Four or five squadrons of French cavalry compelled the detachment in the rear to retire, and pursued them closely for several miles, till General Paget, with the reserve, repulsed the pursuers. As the French dragoons galloped through the long line of these wretched stragglers, they slashed them with their swords to the right and left, ... the men being so insensible with liquor that they neither attempted to resist nor get out of the road. Some of these men having found their way to the army, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks, to show their comrades the miserable consequence of drunkenness at such a time.

The Spaniards at Villa Franca would not believe that the French were advancing; through so strong a country, and in so severe a season, they thought it was impossible. Sir John Moore, however, well knew that he was pursued, and he was afraid of halting, lest the enemy should get in his rear, and intercept him at Lugo; an apprehension which could not have been entertained, had he been acquainted with the country. The troops, therefore, were hurried on: the artillery and head-quarters went foremost; General Baird’s column, and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, covered the rear. The advanced guard of the enemy, under General Colbert, were close at their heels: Merle’s division joined them on ?Jan. 3.? the 3d, and on the afternoon of that day they ventured to attack the rear-guard at Cacabelos. They were repulsed by the dragoons and riflemen. General Colbert received a ball in his forehead, and fell; he was an officer of great promise, and of so fine a person, that Canova is said to have called him the modern Antinous. Having thus once more shown the enemy what they could do in battle, the rear of the army, reluctantly and almost broken-hearted, continued their retreat.

From Villa Franca to Castro is one continued ascent up Monte del Cebrero for about fifteen miles, through one of the wildest, most delightful, and most defensible countries in the world. The road is a royal one, cut with great labour and expense in the side of the mountain, and following all its windings; ... for some part of the way it overhangs the river Valcarce, a rapid mountain stream, which falls into the Burbia near the town, and afterwards joins the Sil, to pass through the single outlet in the gorge of the Bierzo. Oaks, alders, poplars, hazels, and chestnuts grow in the bottom, and far up the side of the hills: the apple, pear, cherry, and mulberry are wild in this country; the wild olive, also, is found here; and here are the first vineyards which the traveller sees on his way from CoruÑa into the heart of Spain. The mountains are cultivated in some parts even to their summits, and trenches are cut along their sides, for the purpose of irrigating them. Even those writers whose journals were written during the horrors of such a flight noticed this scenery with admiration. It was now covered with snow: ... there was neither provision to sustain nature, nor shelter from the rain and snow, nor fuel for fire, to keep the vital heat from total extinction, nor place where the weary and foot-sore could rest for a single hour in safety. All that had hitherto been suffered was but the prelude to this consummate scene of horrors. It was still attempted to carry on some of the sick and wounded: the beasts which drew them failed at every step; and they were left in their waggons, to perish amid the snow. “I looked round,” says an officer, “when we had hardly gained the highest point of those slippery precipices, and saw the rear of the army winding along the narrow road.... I saw their way marked by the wretched people who lay on all sides expiring, from fatigue and the severity of the cold: ... their bodies reddened in spots the white surface of the ground.” The men were now desperate: excessive fatigue, and the feeling of the disgrace there was in thus flying before the enemy, excited in them a spirit which was almost mutinous: ... a few hours’ pause was what they desired, an opportunity of facing the French, the chance of an honourable and speedy death, the certainty of sweetening their sufferings by taking vengeance upon their pursuers. A Portugueze bullock-driver, who had faithfully served the English from the first day of their march, was seen on his knees amid the snow, with his hands clasped, dying in the attitude and act of prayer. He had at least the comfort of religion in his passing hour. The soldiers who threw themselves down to perish by the way-side gave utterance to far different feelings with their dying breath: shame and strong anger were their last sentiments; and their groans were mingled with imprecations upon the Spaniards, by whom they fancied themselves betrayed, and upon the generals, who chose rather to let them die like beasts than take their chance in the field of battle. That no horror might be wanting, women and children accompanied this wretched army: ... some were frozen to death in the baggage-waggons, which were broken down, or left upon the road for want of cattle; some died of fatigue and cold, while their infants were pulling at the exhausted breast: ... one woman was taken in labour upon the mountain; she lay down at the turning of an angle rather more sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which drifted along; ... there she was found dead, and two babes, which she had brought forth, struggling in the snow: ... a blanket was thrown over her, to cover her from sight, ... the only burial which could be afforded, ... and the infants were given in charge to a woman who came up in one of the bullock-carts, ... to take their chance for surviving through such a journey.

While the reserve were on this part of the road, they met between thirty and forty waggons filled with arms, ammunition, shoes, and clothing, from England, for Romana’s army. There was no means of carrying them back; ... such things as could be made use of were distributed to the soldiers as they passed, and the rest were destroyed. Indeed, the baggage which was with the army could not be carried on: nearly an hundred waggons, laden with shoes and clothes, were abandoned upon this ascent. The dollars, too, could no longer be dragged along: had the resolution of sacrificing them been determined upon in time, they might have been distributed among the men: in this manner, great part might have been saved from the enemy, and they who escaped would have had some little compensation for the hardships which they had undergone: ... they were now cast over the side of the precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal them from the French: ... many men are supposed to have been lost, in consequence of having dropped behind, for the hope of recovering some of this money. Dreadful as this march appeared to those who beheld the wreck of the army strewing its line of road, it was perhaps still more so for them who performed it in a night stormy and dark, wading through sludge and snow, stumbling over the bodies of beasts and men, and hearing, whenever the wind abated, the groans of those whose sufferings were not yet terminated by death.

From the summit of this mountain to Lugo is nearly twelve leagues. There are several bridges upon the way, over glens and gills, which might have impeded the pursuit, had they been destroyed. One, in particular, between Nogales and Marillas, is the most remarkable work of art between CoruÑa and Madrid. This bridge, which is called Puente del Corzul, crosses a deep ravine: from its exceeding height, the narrowness of its lofty arches, and its form, which, as usual with the Spanish bridges, is straight, it might at a little distance be mistaken for an aqueduct. Several of those officers who knew the road relied much upon the strength of the ravine, and the impossibility that the French could bring their guns over, if the bridge were destroyed. Grievous as it was to think of destroying so grand a work, its destruction was attempted; but, as in most other instances, to no purpose; whether the pioneers performed their office too hastily, or because their implements had been abandoned upon the way.

The different divisions had been ordered to halt and collect at Lugo. Sir John Moore was now sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, ... the distance was double that to CoruÑa, the road was said to be impracticable for artillery, and the place itself offered no advantages for embarking in the face of an enemy. The brigades, however, of Generals Craufurd and Alton had marched for that port; and General Fraser, with his division, had been ordered to follow and join them. A dispatch was sent to stop him: the dragoon who was entrusted with it got drunk on the way, and lost the letter; and these troops, in consequence, had proceeded a full day’s journey on their way towards Vigo before the counter-order reached them, and they were marched back. Thus, instead of having two days’ rest at Lugo, as had been designed, they returned to that place excessively harassed, and with some diminution of number, occasioned by fatigue. When the horses entered Lugo, many of them fell dead in the streets, others were mercifully shot; ... above four hundred carcasses were lying in the streets and market places; ... there were none of the army who had strength to bury them; the towns-people were under too painful a suspense to think of performing work which it seemed hopeless to begin while the frequent musket-shot indicated so many fresh slaughters; there therefore the bodies lay, swelling with the rain, bursting, putrifying, and poisoning the atmosphere, faster than the glutted dogs and carrion birds could do their office. Here the retreating army might have rested, had the destruction of the bridges been effected; but this attempt had been so imperfectly executed, that the French came in sight on the 5th, and, collecting in considerable strength, took up a good position opposite our rear-guard, a valley dividing them.

On the following day they attacked the outposts, opening upon them with two Spanish pieces of ordnance, which they had taken on their march. The attack was made with great spirit; but it was received, says an officer, “with a steadiness which excited even our own wonder;” ... for at the sight of the enemy, and the sound of battle, the English recovered heart, and derived from their characteristic and invincible courage a strength ?Jan. 7.? which soon made them victorious. On the 7th another attack was made, and in like manner repelled. The prisoners reported that Marshal Soult was come up with three divisions. Sir John Moore, therefore, expecting a more formidable attempt, drew up his whole force on the morning ?Jan. 8.? of the 8th. It was his wish now to bring the enemy to action; he had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and perceived, also, that, unless he crippled his pursuers, there was no hope of embarking unmolested. Order and discipline were instantaneously restored by this resolution to fight, and the men seemed at once to have recovered from their sufferings. The French were not equally eager for battle; the trial which they had made of their enemies on the two preceding days was not such as to encourage them; and Soult was waiting for more troops to come up. The country was intersected with inclosures, and his position was thought too strong to be attacked by an inferior force. But, in reality, the French at this time were less numerous than the English. Another reason assigned for not attacking the enemy was, that the commissariat had only provisions for two days: delay, therefore, was judged as disadvantageous as retreat. It was afterwards known, that the French expected to be attacked, that they had no confidence in the strength of their position, and that their ablest officers apprehended their advanced guard would have been cut off. They frequently spoke of this to those English who were left in their power at Lugo, and exulted that Sir John Moore had contented himself with offering battle, instead of forcing them to an engagement. After waiting till the afternoon, during a day of snow and storms, Sir John ordered large fires to be lighted along the line, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and continued his retreat during the night.

Before the reserve left Lugo, the General once more endeavoured to repress the irregularity of the march. He warned the soldiers that their safety depended entirely upon their keeping their divisions, and marching with their regiments; and that those who stopped in villages, or straggled in the way, would inevitably be cut off by the French cavalry, ... “who have hitherto,” said he, “shown little mercy even to the feeble and infirm who have fallen into their hands. The army has still eleven leagues to march; the soldiers must make an exertion to accomplish this: the rear-guard cannot stop; and they who fall behind must take their fate.” These representations were ineffectual: ... it was, indeed, impossible to obey them: many of the men were exhausted and foot-sore, and could not keep their ranks: ... others, who had totally broke through all discipline, left them for the love of wine, or for worse motives. So irresistible was the temptation of liquor to men in their state, that it was deemed better to expose them to the cold and rain of a severe night, than to the wine-houses of Betanzos, the next town upon their march. When the Royals reached that place, they only mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants, and three privates: the rest had dropped on the road; and many of those who joined did not come up for three days. There was a memorable instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might have been accomplished by discipline and presence of mind. A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two squadrons of the enemy’s cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among them: he made an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor men, then halted, rallied round him such as were capable of making any resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could. This party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.

The partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which he had been exposed of a general one, checked Soult in his pursuit; and he was too sensible of the danger which he had escaped, to trust himself again so near the British, without a superior force. The British army, therefore, gained twelve hours’ march upon him, and reached CoruÑa with little farther molestation; they obtained implements from CoruÑa for destroying the bridge over the Mero, and thus impeded ?Jan. 11.? the enemy’s progress. At CoruÑa, if the General had not represented the cause of Spain as hopeless, they might have found reinforcements from England, which would have enabled them to turn upon their pursuers, and take ample vengeance for the sufferings and the shame which they had endured. But, instead of reinforcements, he had directed that empty transports should be sent; and, for want of due knowledge of the country, had ordered them to Vigo, instead of CoruÑa. That order had been countermanded as soon as the error was discovered; but contrary winds detained the ships, ... happily for the honour of their country, for otherwise the troops would have quitted Spain as fugitives. It was apparent now that they could not escape unless they gained a battle. CoruÑa was a bad position. Had they been numerous enough to have occupied a range of hills about four miles from the town, they could have defended themselves against very superior numbers, ... but these heights required a larger force than the English army, of which not less than a fourth part had been foundered by the way. Both flanks would have been liable to be turned: it was therefore necessary to relinquish them to the enemy, and be content with occupying a second and lower range. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this situation, that some of our general officers advised the Commander to propose terms to Soult, for permitting the army to embark unmolested. In communicating this to the Government, Sir John said he was averse to make any such proposal, and exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect, ... but whatever he might resolve upon this head, the Ministers might rest assured that he would accept no terms which were in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. Happily for his own memory, upon farther consideration, he rejected the advice. It is sufficiently disgraceful that such advice should have been given; and deeply is England indebted to Sir John Moore for saving the army from this last and utter ignominy, and giving it an opportunity of displaying to the world that courage which had never forsaken it, and retrieving the honour which, had this counsel been followed, would irretrievably have been lost.

Arrangements, therefore, were made to give the enemy battle. One division, under General Hope, occupied a hill on the left, commanding the road to Betanzos: the height decreased gradually to the village of Elvina, taking a curved direction. At this village General Baird’s division commenced, and bent to the right: the whole formed nearly a semicircle. On the right of Sir David Baird, the rifle corps formed a chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser’s division, which was drawn up about half a mile from CoruÑa, near the road to Vigo. The reserve, under General Paget, occupied a village on the Betanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. On the outside of the British posts was a magazine, containing 4000 barrels of gunpowder, which had been brought from England, and left there, while the Spanish armies were without ammunition! It was now necessary to blow it up: ... the explosion shook the town like an earthquake; and a village near the magazine was totally destroyed.

The French made their appearance on the morning of the 12th, moving in force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position near the village of Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the houses along the river. Their force was continually increasing. On the 14th they commenced a cannonade, which was returned with such effect, that they at last drew off their guns. In the evening of this day the transports from Vigo hove in sight. Some slight skirmishes took place the following morning. Preparations meantime were making for the embarkation. Sir John finding that, from the nature of the ground, much artillery could not be employed, placed seven six-pounders and one howitzer along the line, and kept four Spanish guns as a reserve, to be advanced to any point where they might be wanted: the rest of the artillery was embarked. The sick and the dismounted cavalry were sent on board with all possible expedition. A few horses also were embarked, ... but there was little time for this: most of them were completely disabled; another slaughter, therefore, was made of them: and the beach was covered with their bodies. Some of these animals, seeing their fellows fall, were sensible of the fate intended for them: they became wild with terror, and a few broke loose.

The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the 16th, and the General gave notice, that he intended, if the French did not move, to begin embarking the reserve at four in the afternoon. This was about mid-day. He mounted his horse, and set off to visit the outposts: before he had proceeded far, a messenger came to tell him that the enemy’s line were getting under arms; and a deserter arriving at the same moment, confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward. Their light troops were pouring rapidly down the hill on the right wing of the British, and the advanced picquets were already beginning to fire. Lord William Bentinck’s brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d, and 50th regiments, maintained this post. It was a bad position, and yet, if the troops gave way on that point, the ruin of the army was inevitable. The guards were in their rear. General Paget was ordered to advance with the reserve, and support Lord William. The enemy opened a cannonade from eleven heavy guns, advantageously planted on the hills. Two strong columns, one advancing from a wood, the other skirting its edge, directed their march towards the right wing. A third column approached the centre: a fourth advanced slowly upon the left: a fifth remained half way down the hill, in the same direction. Both in number and weight of guns they had a decided superiority; and they fired with such effect from the commanding situation which they had chosen, that the balls in their bounding reached the British reserve, and occasioned some loss there.

Sir David Baird had his arm shattered with a grape-shot as he was leading on his division. The two lines of infantry advanced against each other: they were separated by stone walls and hedges which intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body of the enemy was observed moving up the valley to turn it. Marshal Soult’s intention was to force the right of the British, and thus to interpose between CoruÑa and the army, and cut it off from the place of embarkation. Failing in this attempt, he was now endeavouring to out-flank it. Half of the 4th regiment was therefore ordered to fall back, forming an obtuse angle with the other half. This manoeuvre was excellently performed, and they commenced a heavy flanking fire: Sir John Moore called out to them, that this was exactly what he wanted to be done, and rode on to the 50th, commanded by Majors Napier and Stanhope. They got over an inclosure in their front, charged the enemy most gallantly, and drove them out of the village of Elvina; but Major Napier, advancing too far in the pursuit, received several wounds, and was made prisoner, and Major Stanhope was41 killed.

The General now proceeded to the 42d. “Highlanders,” said he, “remember Egypt!” ... they rushed on, and drove the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall: Sir John accompanied them in this charge. He now sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the 42d. The officer commanding the light infantry conceived, at this, that they were to be relieved by the guards, because their ammunition was nearly expended, and he began to fall back. The General, discovering the mistake, said to them, “My brave 42d, join your comrades: ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets!” Upon this, they instantly moved forward. Captain Hardinge returned, and pointed out to the General where the guards were advancing. The enemy kept up a hot fire, and their artillery played incessantly on the spot where they were standing. A cannon-shot struck Sir John, and carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. He fell from his horse on his back, his countenance did not change, neither did he betray the least sensation of pain. Captain Hardinge, who dismounted, and took him by the hand, observed him anxiously watching the 42d, which was warmly engaged, and told him they were advancing; and upon that intelligence his countenance brightened. Colonel Graham, who now came up to assist him, seeing the composure of his features, began to hope that he was not wounded, till he perceived the dreadful laceration. From the size of the wound, it was in vain to make any attempt at stopping the blood; and Sir John consented to be removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him up, his sword, hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs: Captain Hardinge began to unbuckle it; but the General said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a distinct voice, “It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the field with me.” Six soldiers of the 42d and the guards bore him. Hardinge, observing his composure, began to hope that the wound might not be mortal, and said to him, he trusted he might be spared to the army, and recover. Moore turned his head, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, replied, “No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.”

As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them frequently turn round, that he might see the field of battle, and listen to the firing; and he was well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A spring-waggon came up, bearing Colonel Wynch, who was wounded; the Colonel asked who was in the blanket, and being told it was Sir John Moore, wished him to be placed in the waggon. Sir John asked one of the Highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket was best? and the man said the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. So they proceeded with him to his quarters at CoruÑa, weeping as they went.

General Paget, meantime, hastened with the reserve to support the right wing. Colonel Beckwith dashed on with the rifle corps, repelled the enemy, and advanced so far as nearly to carry off one of their cannon; but a corps greatly superior moved up the valley, and forced him to retire. Paget, however, attacked this body of the enemy, repulsed it, and pressed on, dispersing every thing before him, till the enemy, perceiving their left wing was now quite exposed, drew it entirely back. The French then advanced upon Generals Manningham and Leith, in the centre, and there they were more easily repelled, the ground being more elevated, and favourable for artillery. The position on the left was strong, and their effort there was unavailing: but a body of them took possession of a village on the road to Betanzos, and continued to fire from it, till Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls attacked it, and beat them out. Night was now closing in, and the French had fallen back in all parts of the field. The firing, however, was not discontinued till it was dark.

Never was any battle gained under heavier disadvantages. The French force exceeded 20,000 men; the British were not 15,000. The superiority in artillery was equally great: ... the enemy had met English guns on the way, sent off, thus late, to the patriotic armies, and these they had turned back, and employed against the English. Our artillery was embarked; and the Shrapnell shells, which contributed so materially to the success at Vimeiro, were not used in this more perilous engagement. If the moral and physical state of the two armies be considered, the disadvantages under which our soldiers laboured were still greater: ... the French, equipped in the stores which they had overtaken upon the road, elated with a pursuit wherein no man had been forced beyond his strength, and hourly receiving reinforcements to their already superior numbers; ... the English, in a state of misery, to which no army, perhaps, had ever before been reduced till after a total defeat; having lost their military chest, their stores, their baggage, their horses, their women and children, their sick, their wounded, their stragglers, every thing but their innate, excellent, unconquerable courage. From 6000 to 7000 men had sunk under the fatigues of their precipitate retreat. The loss in the battle did not amount to 800; that of the42French is believed to have exceeded 2000. If such a victory was gained by the British army under such circumstances, what might not have been achieved by that army when unbroken, with all its means at hand, in health and strength, in its pride, and in its height of hope!

The General lived to hear that the battle was won. “Are the French beaten?” was the question which he repeated to every one who came into his apartment; and he expressed how great a satisfaction it was to him to know that they were defeated. “I hope,” he said, “the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice.” Then, addressing Colonel Anderson, who had been his friend and companion in arms for one-and-twenty years, he said to him, “Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.... You will see my friends as soon as you can: ... tell them every thing.... Say to my mother”—But here his voice failed, he became excessively agitated, and did not again venture to name her. Sometimes he asked to be placed in an easier posture. “I feel myself so strong,” he said, “I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness ... it is great pain.” But, after a while, he pressed Anderson’s hand close to his body, and, in a few minutes, died without a struggle. He fell, as it had ever been his wish to do, in battle and in victory. No man was more beloved in private life, nor was there any general in the British army so universally respected. All men had thought him worthy of the chief command. Had he been less circumspect, had he looked more ardently forward, and less anxiously around him, and on all sides, and behind, ... had he been more confident in himself and in his army, and impressed with less respect for the French Generals, he would have been more equal to the difficulties of his situation. Despondency was the radical weakness of his mind. Personally he was as brave a man as ever met death in the field; but he wanted faith in British courage, and it is faith by which miracles are wrought in war as well as in religion. But let it ever be remembered with gratitude, that, when some of his general officers advised him to conclude the retreat by a capitulation, Sir John Moore preserved the honour of England.

He had often said that, if he were killed in battle, he wished to be buried where he fell. The body was removed at midnight to the citadel of CoruÑa. A grave was dug for him on the rampart there, by a party of the 9th regiment, the aides-du-camp attending by turns. No coffin could be procured; and the officers of his staff wrapped the body, dressed as it was, in a military cloak and blankets. The interment was hastened; for, about eight in the morning, some firing was heard, and they feared that, if a serious attack were made, they should be ordered away, and not suffered to pay him their last duty. The officers of his family bore him to the grave; the funeral service was read by the chaplain; and the corpse was covered with earth.

Meantime, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, passed the night in embarking the troops. At ten o’clock he ordered them to march from the field by brigades, leaving strong picquets to guard the ground, and give notice if the enemy approached. Major-General Beresford, with a rear-guard of about 2000 men, to cover the embarkation, occupied the lines in front of CoruÑa. Major-General Hill, with a corps of reserve, was stationed on a promontory behind the town. Nearly the whole army was embarked during the night: the picquets were withdrawn and embarked also before day, little remaining ashore at daylight except the rear-guard and the ?Jan. 17.? reserve. The French, seeing this, pushed on their light troops to the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour, got up some cannon to a rising ground, and fired at the transports. Several of the masters of these vessels were frightened, and cut their cables: four of them ran a-ground. The men were put on board other ships, and these were burnt. During the night of the 17th, and the following morning, Beresford sent off all the sick and wounded who were in a condition to bear removal: and lastly, the rear-guard got into the boats, no attempt being made to interrupt them. Thus terminated our first campaign in Spain.

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.