Robert Southey

PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND. SUCCESSES OF THE FRENCH IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN: THEIR FAILURE IN CATALONIA. MONCEY REPULSED FROM VALENCIA. DUPONT ENTERS CORDOBA. BATTLE OF RIO SECO. THE INTRUDER ENTERS MADRID. SURRENDER OF DUPONT’S ARMY. THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM MADRID.

?1808.

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Feelings of the English people concerning the transactions in Spain.?

The first news which reached England of the Spanish insurrection was brought by the Asturian deputies, and it was soon followed by dispatches from CoruÑa, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Never was any intelligence received with more general joy. Notwithstanding the frequent hostilities in which Spain had been involved with this country, first, during the age of its power; then through its connexion with the Bourbons; and afterwards from the ascendance which the Directory and Buonaparte had obtained over an infamous minister, an imbecile King, and a wretched government, the English had always regarded the Spaniards as the most honourable people with whom they were engaged either in commerce or in war; nor was there ever a war in which some new instance of honour and generosity on their part did not make us regret that they were our enemies. Hitherto the present contest had been carried on with little hope. ?1808.
June.? No other sympathy than that of mere political interest had as yet been felt in our alliances with Austria or Russia; but, from the moment when the Spaniards called upon us for aid, we felt that we had obtained allies worthy of our own good cause, and the struggle assumed a higher and holier character. It became, avowedly and plainly to every man’s understanding, a war for all good principles; and we looked on to the end with faith as well as hope. Never since the glorious morning of the French revolution, before one bloody cloud had risen to overcast the deceitful promise of its beauty, had the heart of England been affected with so generous and universal a joy. They who had been panic-stricken by the atrocities of the French demagogues, rejoiced to perceive the uniform and dignified order which the Spaniards observed in their proceedings, and their adherence to existing establishments; ... firmer minds, in whom the love of liberty had not been weakened by the horrors which a licentious and unprincipled people committed under that sacred name, were delighted that the Spaniards recurred with one accord to those legitimate forms of freedom, which a paralyzing despotism had so long suspended; the people universally longed to assist a nation who had risen in defence of their native land; and professional politicians, not having time to consider, nor being able to foresee in what manner these great events would affect their own party purposes, partook of the popular feeling.

?Proceedings in parliament.

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June 15.?

The first parliamentary notice of these proceedings was by a speech of Mr. Sheridan’s, made by him for the purpose of stimulating the ministry to a vigorous co-operation with the Spaniards. “There had never,” he said, “existed so happy an opportunity for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. Hitherto, Buonaparte had run a victorious race, because he had contended against princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom, and countries where the people were indifferent as to his success; he had yet to learn what it was to fight against a people who were animated with one spirit against him. Now was the time to stand up, fully and fairly, for the deliverance of Europe; and, if the ministry would co-operate effectually with the Spanish patriots, they should receive from him as cordial and as sincere a support, as if the man whom he most loved were restored to life and power. Will not (said he) the animation of the Spanish mind be excited by the knowledge that their cause is espoused, not by ministers alone, but by the parliament and the people of England? If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be roused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation? Never was any thing so brave, so generous, so noble, as the conduct of the Spaniards! Never was there a more important crisis than that which their patriotism had thus occasioned in the state of Europe!”

Mr. Canning replied, that his Majesty’s ministers saw, with the most deep and lively interest, this noble struggle against the unexampled atrocity of France; and that there was the strongest disposition on the part of government to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. In endeavouring to afford this aid, he said, it would never occur to them that a state of war existed between Spain and Great Britain. They should proceed upon the principle, that any nation who started up with a determination to oppose a power, which, whether professing insidious peace, or declaring open war, was the common enemy of all nations, ... whatever might be the existing political relations of that nation with Great Britain, became instantly our essential ally. As for what were called peculiarly British interests, he disclaimed them as any part of the considerations which influenced government. In this contest, wherein Spain had embarked, no interest could be so purely British as Spanish success; no conquest so advantageous for Great Britain as conquering from France the complete integrity of the Spanish dominions in every quarter of the world. This declaration satisfied Mr. Whitbread; but that gentleman thought proper to deprecate the tone in which the Emperor Napoleon was spoken of, saying, that, when he heard him called despot, tyrant, plunderer, and common enemy of mankind, he wished from his heart England could come into the cause with clean hands.

?June 4. Mr. Whitbread proposes to negotiate with France.?

A few days after this debate, Mr. Whitbread, in a speech upon the state of the empire, took occasion to refer to an opinion concerning peace, which he had delivered early in the session. “I then stated,” said he, “that it did not appear to me degrading for this country to propose a negotiation for peace with France: at no period of the interval which has elapsed, has it appeared to me that such a proposition would be degrading; nor can I anticipate, during the recess which is about to take place, any circumstance, the occurrence of which can, by possibility, render it unexpedient or degrading to open such a negotiation.” The common feeling and common sense of the country were shocked at the mention of negotiating with Buonaparte, just at the moment when his unexampled treachery towards an ally was the theme of universal execration; and when a whole nation had just arisen against his insolent aggression. ?July 4. Mr. Whitbread speaks in favour of the Spaniards.? Mr. Whitbread felt that he had injured himself in the opinion of the people, and therefore, on the last day of the session, took occasion to express his admiration of the Spanish patriots; and to regret that ministers had not applied for a vote of credit, which would enable them more effectually to second the wishes of all ranks of Englishmen, by aiding and assisting the Spaniards. “Had such a message,” he said, “been sent down, it would have been met with unanimous concurrence; and that concurrence would have been echoed throughout the country. The Spanish nation was now committed with France: never were a people engaged in a more arduous and honourable struggle; and he earnestly prayed God to crown their efforts with a success as signal as those efforts were glorious. He could not help thinking, that it would have been well to have given an opportunity of manifesting to them the sympathy which glowed in every British heart, through the proper channel, the legitimate organ of the British people. For himself, from the bottom of his soul, he wished success to the patriotic efforts of the Spaniards; and that their present struggle might be crowned with the recovery of their liberty as a people, and the assertion of their independence.”

?Mr. Whitbread’s letter to Lord Holland.?

As a farther avowal of these sentiments, Mr. Whitbread addressed a letter, on the situation of Spain, to Lord Holland; “the subject,” he said, “being peculiarly interesting to that distinguished nobleman, from the attachment he had formed to a people, the grandeur of whose character he had had the opportunity to estimate, and to which he had always done justice, even when that character was obscured by the faults of a bad government.” Having repeated his professions of ardent sympathy with the Spaniards, he recurred to his proposal for negotiating. “It has been falsely and basely stated,” said he, “that I advised the purchase of peace by the abandonment of the heroic Spaniards to their fate. God forbid! A notion so detestable never entered my imagination. Perish the man who could entertain it! Perish this country, rather than its safety should be owing to a compromise so horridly iniquitous! My feelings, at the time I spoke, ran in a direction totally opposite to any thing so disgusting and abominable. I am not, however,” he pursued, “afraid to say, that the present is a moment in which I think negotiation might be proposed to the Emperor of the French by Great Britain, with the certainty of this great advantage, that if the negotiation should be refused, we should be at least sure of being right in the eyes of God and man; an advantage which, in my opinion, we have never yet possessed, from the commencement of the contest to the present hour; and the value of which is far beyond all calculation.”

In vindicating himself from the imputation of regarding the cause of the Spaniards with indifference, Mr. Whitbread succeeded for the time; but, in other respects, this letter lowered him in the opinion of judicious minds. The folly of wasting time in a farce of negotiation; the certainty that such delay would injure the Spaniards, and the probability that it might induce them to regard us with a suspicion, which such conduct would render reasonable; above all, the absurdity of proposing to treat with the tyrant at the very time when he was perpetrating the most flagrant breach of treaties; when he had proved in the eyes of all Europe, that no treaties, no alliances, no ties of public faith, or individual honour, could restrain him, ... were so glaring to every man’s understanding, that Mr. Whitbread’s advice appeared like absolute infatuation. So far, indeed, from opening a negotiation at that time, and on these grounds, with the Corsican, it behoved the British Government then to have made the war a personal war against him, ... to have proclaimed loudly before God and the world, that this country never would treat with a man who had avowed his contempt for the laws of nations; and given open proof that he made treaties only for the purpose of more securely effecting the destruction of those who were credulous enough to rely upon his faith. Then was the time to have appealed to the French people themselves.... The Spanish war was a war of the Buonaparte family, not of France. Hitherto, Buonaparte and his immediate agents were the only persons implicated in the infamy of this unexampled treachery and usurpation. Would France appropriate that infamy to herself? Would she, for the sake of this foreign family, entail upon herself the privations, the sacrifices, and the hazards of interminable war? To France we offered peace, under any other ruler; we reclaimed none of her conquests; we asked nothing from her, ... we were ready to restore prosperity to her merchants, her citizens, and her peasantry; and to open her ports to the commerce of the world. But peace with Buonaparte was impossible. How could England, so long the object of his avowed and inveterate hatred, trust him, when his insatiable ambition did not spare the oldest, the most faithful, the most serviceable, the most submissive of his allies and friends! If proclamations to this tenor had been scattered over the whole coast of France, Buonaparte might have been endangered by the British press and the force of truth, when he stood in no fear of any other force. The importance of communicating true intelligence to the French was manifested by the care with which he kept them in ignorance, and the shameless falsehoods which continually appeared in his official papers.

?Measures of the British Government.?

Arms, ammunition, and clothing were dispatched to the northern provinces, immediately upon the arrival of the Deputies: men, they said, they did not want. Colonel Sir Thomas Dyer, Major Roche, and Captain Patrick, were sent at the same time on a military mission to Asturias, and Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, Captain Carroll, and Captain Kennedy, to Galicia. The Spanish prisoners were released and sent home; and, in the King’s speech, at the close of the ?July 4.? session, Spain was recognised as a natural friend and ally. It was there declared, “that the British government would make every exertion for the support of a people thus nobly struggling against the tyranny and usurpation of France; that it would be guided in the choice and direction of its exertions by the wishes of those in whose behalf they were employed; and that, in contributing to the success of this just and glorious cause, England had no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy.” An order of council appeared on the same day, announcing that hostilities against Spain had ceased. Nor was Portugal overlooked by the British government. Lieut.-Colonel Brown, Colonel Trant, and Captain Preval, were sent to obtain intelligence of the state of affairs in the northern provinces, and preparations were made for sending an expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley, to free that kingdom from the French; and in thus delivering an old and faithful ally, to operate a powerful diversion in aid of the Spaniards.

?Movements of the French in Navarre and Old Castile.?

The French in Spain, meantime, had acted with their wonted celerity, and for the most part, at first, with their wonted success. General Verdier having routed the people who had assembled at LogroÑo, entered that town, and put the leaders of the people to death as rioters. General FrÈre defeated a body of 5000 men at Segovia, and reduced the city to submission. Lasalle marched from Burgos upon the little town of Torquemada, where Queen Juana, in former times, watched during so many weeks the body of her husband, as jealously as if he had been living; suffered no woman to approach the church wherein his bier was placed; and listened eagerly to the knave who flattered her insane affliction with a tale, that a certain King fourteen years after his death had been restored to life, and why might not a like miracle be vouchsafed in compassion to her grief, and in answer to her prayers? Some 6000 Spaniards had gathered together there: ?Torquemada burnt.? he dispersed them with great slaughter, and burnt the place; then marched upon Palencia, disarmed the inhabitants of that city and the vicinity, and being joined at Duenas by General Merle, proceeded against Valladolid, which had declared for the national cause.

?G. Cuesta attempts at first to quiet the people.?

D. Gregorio de la Cuesta, whom Ferdinand had appointed Captain-General of Castille and Leon, had endeavoured to suppress the spirit of resistance when it first manifested itself in those kingdoms. He was in correspondence with Urquijo; and the leaders of that party, who were considered as the Liberales of Spain before they attached themselves to the service of the Intruder, reckoned upon his co-operation, and had already nominated him to the Vice-royalty of Mexico. ?Nellerto, t. 2, p. 203.? Cuesta was an old brave man, energetic, hasty, and headstrong: in the better ages of Spain he would have been capable of great and terrible actions; and the strong elements of the Spanish character were strongly marked in his resolute, untractable, and decided temper. Yet the national spirit was dormant within him till it was awakened by the voice of the nation. He published a proclamation at Valladolid, exhorting the people to remain tranquil, and accept the powerful protection which was offered to the kingdom, and threatening with punishment all who should attempt to raise disturbances, or take part in them. And when the Ayuntamiento of Leon applied to him for advice how to act upon the abdication of the Bourbons, he resented their application as implying a doubt of his own sentiments; and replied, that nothing ought to be attempted against the determination of the Supreme Junta who governed in the Emperor’s name; that the nation ought peaceably to wait for the King whom Napoleon should appoint; that a struggle without arms, ammunition, or union, must needs be hopeless; and that even if any successes were obtained, the leaders would quarrel among themselves for command, and a civil war must arise, which would end in the destruction of the kingdom. But when Cuesta saw how strong the tide of popular feeling had set in, and that what he had looked upon at first merely as a seditious movement, ?Impugnacion al Manifesto del G. Cuesta, p. 8, 9.? ?He takes the national side.? had assumed the sacred and indubitable character of a national cause, perceiving then that the choice was not between subordination and anarchy, but between France and Spain, he chose the better part, and entered into it heartily, and exerted himself to embody and discipline the impatient volunteers, who, in their honest hatred of the French, would have hurried to their own destruction.

?Evil of his hesitation.?

But great evil arose from the resistance which he had opposed to the patriotic cause. Where the principal persons and constituted authorities declared themselves frankly and freely at first, the zeal of the people was easily restrained within due bounds, and no excesses were committed; but wherever the higher orders acted manifestly in deference to the multitude, and in fear of them, the mob knew that they were masters, and always abused their power. Thus it was at Valladolid. General Miguel Cevallos was imprisoned there by Cuesta, as the only means of preserving him: the ferocious rabble broke in, dragged him out, and murdered him, and paraded with his head and lacerated limbs in bloody and abominable triumph through the streets. Nor was this the only ill consequence: while he advised submission, and endeavoured to enforce it, time, which should have been employed in uniting, arming, and training the willing people, was irrecoverably lost; ?Impugnacion, p. 13.? and when the French approached Valladolid, they found Cuesta at the head of an undisciplined assemblage numerous enough and brave enough to raise a vain and unreasonable confidence in themselves, and perhaps in him. ?He is defeated at Cabezon.? They had taken post at Cabezon, a village surrounded with vineyards, two leagues from the city. Lasalle having reconnoitred their position, ordered General Sabatier to charge them, while Merle cut off their retreat from Valladolid. According to the French account they stood the enemy’s fire half an hour, then took to flight, leaving upon the ground a thousand dead (the seventh part of their number), and 4000 muskets. Cuesta, with the remains of his army, retired to the borders of Leon, defeated, but not discouraged. ?The French enter Valladolid.? Valladolid was now at the conqueror’s mercy; and the Bishop, with the other heads of the clergy, came out to intercede for it. The people were disarmed, the adjoining country was kept down by military force, and deputies from Valladolid, Segovia, and Palencia were sent to Bayonne to solicit the Emperor’s clemency, and pledge themselves for the allegiance of their fellow citizens. Two detachments under Generals Merle and Ducos were then ordered into the MontaÑas de Santander by different routes. The patriots, consisting almost wholly of untrained volunteers, were beaten at LantueÑo, at Soncello, and at Venta del Escudo. ?They enter Santander.? The two detachments entered the city on the same day, and Santander also was compelled to send deputies with promises of submission to Bayonne. By these operations Marshal Bessieres kept Navarre and the three Biscayan provinces in subjection, and, for the time, reduced the MontaÑa and the greater part of Old Castile.

?G. Lefebvre Desnouettes defeats the Aragonese.?

The movements of the French had not been less successful on the side of Aragon. General Lefebvre Desnouettes was ordered to suppress the insurrection in that kingdom. He began by arresting D. Francisco Palafox in Pampluna, who having accompanied Ferdinand to Bayonne as his chief equerry, was on his way through that city with the supposed intention of joining his brother. Lefebvre then marched from Pampluna upon Tudela. Palafox had detached a ?June 9.? body of Aragonese from Zaragoza, chiefly armed peasantry, to assist the Tudelans in defending the passage of the Ebro: they were defeated by superior discipline and superior numbers, their cannon were taken, and Lefebvre having entered Tudela, put the leaders of the insurrection to death, following, after Murat’s example, the principle of the tyrant whom he served, that the Spaniards who opposed him were to be considered and treated as rebels. The French paid dearly in the end for the insolent barbarity with which they thus began the war: it called forth the revengeful spirit of the nation, and the contest assumed a character hateful to humanity, the guilt and the reproach of which must lie mainly upon those by whom the provocation was given. Lefebvre then repaired the bridge over the Ebro, which had been burnt, and advanced to the village of Mallen, where the Marquis de Lazan, at ?June 13.? the head of ten thousand raw troops, with two hundred dragoons, and eight ill-mounted cannon, had taken a position, with the canal of Aragon on the right, and the village on the left, and supported by an olive grove. A short but bloody action ensued: brave as the Aragonese were, they were in no condition to oppose flying artillery, well disciplined troops, and a powerful cavalry. They were defeated, but not disheartened; and on the following day sustained another action with the same ill success at Alagon, about four leagues from Zaragoza. ?He marches against Zaragoza.? The French then approached the city, expecting that not more resistance would be made there than at Valladolid, and that the submission or punishment of the capital would intimidate the rest of Aragon; this object was to be aided by a movement from the side of Catalonia.

?Troops sent from Barcelona toward Valencia and Zaragoza.?

There were between three and four thousand Spanish troops at Barcelona in the beginning of June; but in a short time there remained scarcely more than as many hundreds, so rapidly they had deserted, some to return home, or seek their fortunes, the greater part to serve their country in these stormy times. The French secretly encouraged this desertion: so large a force in Barcelona would have rendered a stronger garrison necessary, and have increased their uneasiness and danger; but in the field they cared not what number of Spaniards might be collected against them; the more numerous they were in their present state of indiscipline, the more easily, and with the greater effect, they might be defeated. ?June 3.? Being thus rid of their presence, Duhesme was able to send out more than half his force in two detachments, under Generals Chabran and Schwartz. The first, who had distinguished himself in Switzerland against the Austrians in the dreadful campaign of 1799, was ordered with 4200 men to enter Tarragona, garrison it with a thousand men, incorporate in his division Wimpffen’s Swiss regiment of 1200 men, which was stationed in the city, and then proceed by way of Tortosa to co-operate with Marshal Moncey against Valencia. General Schwartz’s orders were to march with 3800 men by Molins de Rey and Martorell upon Manresa, and raise upon that city a contribution of 750,000 francs, to be paid within eight and forty hours, and applied to the service of the division. He was instructed to take means for putting the promoters of sedition to death, but to pardon them upon the plea of the Emperor’s clemency. What powder was in the magazines he was to send to Barcelona, and then to destroy the mills; next he was to proceed by way of Cervera to Lerida, and get possession of that city, if it could be done by a sudden attempt; in that case he was to garrison the castle with 500 men, incorporate with his own troops the Swiss who were there, and levy a contribution of 600,000 francs, for the use of Lefebvre’s army, with which he was then to co-operate according to sealed instructions, which he was to open at Bujaraloz, on the way to Zaragoza.

?G. Schwartz marches toward Manresa.?

The French plans were widely combined and well concerted. Here, however, they failed in execution. The people of Manresa and Igualado received timely intelligence from Barcelona of the intended movements; the Somatenes, or armed population, were called out, and posted to wait for the enemy in the strong positions of Bruch and Casa Masana: powder was served out from those mills at Manresa which Schwartz intended to destroy; and curtain rods were cut into small pieces, and distributed instead of bullets. The French lost a day by halting at Martorell because of the rain: the time which they thus lost was well employed by the Catalans, and when Schwartz arrived at Bruch a fire was opened upon him by an enemy concealed among the crags and bushes. Driven from this pass, after a brave defence, some of the Somatenes retreated to Igualada, others to Casa Masana; the latter were pursued and again defeated; they fled with all speed to Manresa, and if Schwartz had pursued his success he might have reached the city without opposition; but having met with more resistance than had been looked for, and perceiving how determined a spirit had been manifested in the people, he halted, as if doubtful whether to advance or retire. Upon discovering this irresolution the Somatenes again took heart; and being reinforced by the peasantry from the plain of Bages, a hardy active race, and excellent marksmen, they attacked the vanguard of the enemy at Casa Masana, and drove them back upon the main body of the column near Bruch.

?He is defeated at Bruch, and retreats to Barcelona.?

An odd accident deceived the French. There was among the Somatenes a drummer, who had escaped from Barcelona: little as the knowledge was which this lad possessed of military manoeuvres, it enabled him to assume authority among these armed peasants, and he performed the double duties of drummer and commander with singular good fortune. For the enemy inferred from the sound of the drum, which was regularly beaten, that the peasantry were supported by regular troops: ... there were Swiss in Lerida, and the regiment of Extremadura was at Tarrega; the apprehension therefore was not unreasonable, and, after a short stand against a brisk fire, Schwartz determined upon retreating. The Somatenes, encouraged by success, and now increasing in number, pressed upon him; and the news of his defeat raised the country behind him, to his greater danger. He had to pass through the little town of Esparraguera, consisting of one narrow street, nearly a mile in length. The inhabitants cut down trees, and brought out tables and benches to obstruct the way, and they stored the flat roofs of their houses with beams and stones. The head of the French column, ignorant of these preparations, entered the street at twilight; but having experienced the danger, Schwartz divided them into two bodies, one of which made its way on the outside of the town by the right, the other by the left. From this time the retreat became disorderly; the enemy lost part of their artillery in crossing the Abrera; and had the people of Martorell acted upon the alert like those of Esparraguera, and broken down the bridge over the Noya, the fugitives, for such they were now become, might probably all have been cut off. ?June 7.? They entered Barcelona in great confusion and dismay: their loss was less than might have been expected in such a route, for the Spaniards had neither horse nor cannon; they left, however, one piece of artillery in the hands of the pursuers, and about 400 dead, the greater part being Swiss.

?G. Chabran recalled in consequence of Schwartz’s defeat.?

The effects of this action were of great importance. It was the first success which the Spaniards had obtained, and it had been obtained by the people without any troops to assist them, ... without any military leader. The insurrection became general throughout Catalonia as fast as the tidings spread; the plan of co-operating with Lefebvre against Zaragoza was disconcerted; and Duhesme, perceiving that it would require all his force to repress the Catalans, recalled Chabran from his march toward Valencia. That General had reached Tarragona without opposition on the day when Schwartz’s routed division re-entered Barcelona; but receiving orders to return without delay, he could neither secure that fortress, as had been intended, nor venture to incorporate the Swiss, who were more likely to take part with the Spaniards than against them. Meantime the people of the intermediate country, encouraged by the victory at Bruch, had risen: they began to harass him at Vendrell, and attempted to maintain a position against him at Arbos, which they brought artillery to defend. ?Arbos burnt by the French.? Here, however, they were totally defeated; fire was set to the place, a neat and flourishing agricultural town, two-thirds of the houses were destroyed by the flames, and cruelties were committed upon the inhabitants which exasperated the Catalans instead of intimidating them. Even the people of Arbos themselves, who escaped the enemy, when they returned to inhabit their half burnt habitations, or the hovels which they constructed amid the ruins, instead of repenting the part which they had taken, or bewailing the ruin of their property, prided themselves in the thought that their town should have been the first to suffer the full vengeance of the enemy in so glorious and unquestionable a cause. Duhesme came out to protect the division on its farther retreat; they halted at S. Feliu de Llobregat, and having been reinforced, Chabran was ordered to proceed against Manresa, and punish that city, which was believed to be the centre of the revolution. ?Chabran defeated at Bruch.? The fatal pass of Bruch was upon the road, and it was now occupied with some degree of skill. The Catalan Juntas, conceiving a high opinion of the strength of this position, had used great exertions to strengthen it; artillery had been planted there, and the Somatenes were supported by some of the soldiers who had fled from Barcelona, and by four companies of volunteers from Lerida under Colonel Baget. Chabran had a stronger detachment than that with which Schwartz had forced the pass; but after losing some 450 men, and some of his guns, he deemed it advisable to retreat, and was harassed by the Catalans almost to the gates of Barcelona.

?Duhesme endeavours to secure Gerona.?

Duhesme now perceived, that instead of dispatching troops to assist in the subjugation of Aragon and Valencia, there would be employment enough in Catalonia for all his force. The French, expecting no resistance from the people after the government was subdued, had thought it sufficient to possess themselves of Figueras and Barcelona: the distance between these places is about fourscore miles, and they had neglected to secure the intermediate posts of Gerona and Hostalrich. Duhesme now learnt, not without some alarm, that Figueras was invested by the peasantry, and that though impregnable to any means which they could bring against it, it was in danger of being reduced by famine; thinking, therefore, by a prompt attack upon Gerona to repair the oversight which had been committed, he drew out a considerable force from the capital, and marched with it in ?June 17.? person, with Generals Lecchi and Schwartz, against that city. Intelligence had been obtained of his intention; and the peasantry of Valles, and the inhabitants of the sea-shore, posted themselves to oppose his march on the heights which terminate at Mongat, a small fortress, or rather strong house, with a battery to protect that part of the coast from the Barbary corsairs. An armed vessel sailed from Barcelona to act against this place, in co-operation with the land forces; and Duhesme easily deceiving his unskilful opponents by demonstrations which drew their attention from the real point of attack, defeated them, drove them from the ground, took the strong house, and disgraced his victory by the cruelty which he exercised upon his prisoners, as well the unarmed villagers who fell into his hands as those who were taken in action. ?Mataro sacked by the French.? The people of Mataro, not intimidated by the enemy’s success, defended the entrance of their town: the French general, in revenge for the loss which the head of his column sustained in forcing it, gave up this rich and flourishing place, containing above 25,000 inhabitants, to be sacked by his troops; and the men were not withheld from committing the foulest atrocities by ?Cabanes. 1. p. 63.? the recollection, that they had recently been quartered during two months in that very town as allies and guests, among the people who now found no mercy at their hands.

?Failure of the attempt on Gerona.?

Duhesme proceeded plundering, burning, and destroying as he went along. On the morning of the 20th he appeared before Gerona, sacked the adjoining villages of Salt and S. Eugenia, opened a battery upon the city with the hope of intimidating the inhabitants, endeavoured to force the Puerta del Carmen without success, and was in like manner repulsed from the fort of the Capuchins. A second battery was opened with more effect in the evening, and its fire was kept up during the night, which was so dark that none of the besiegers’ movements could be distinguished. They attempted to scale the bulwark of S. Clara, and some succeeded in getting upon the wall; these were encountered there by part of the regiment of Ulster, and their fate deterred their comrades from following them. The people of Gerona evinced that night what might be expected from them when they were put to the proof. The clergy were present wherever the fire was hottest, encouraging the men by example as well as by exhortations; and the women, regardless of danger, carried food and ammunition to their husbands, and fathers, and brothers, and sons. Without the city the Somatenes collected in such force, that they prevented the French from fording the river Ter, which they repeatedly attempted, with the intention, it was supposed, of proceeding to relieve Figueras. Duhesme employed artifice as well as force: he sent proposals at various times to the Junta; and some of his messengers were seized and detained as prisoners, for endeavouring when they entered the city to distribute proclamations from Bayonne, and from the government of Madrid. Finding, however, that the place was not to be taken by a sudden assault, and not being prepared to undertake a regular siege, he deemed it expedient to return on the following day towards Barcelona, after no inconsiderable loss in men as well as in reputation. ?Figueras relieved by the French.? This repulse would have drawn after it the loss of Figueras, if the Catalans could have collected a regular force on that side. They blockaded it with the Somatenes of Ampurdan, assisted by a few troops from Rosas: the garrison consisted of only 1000 men; had they been more, the place must have fallen, for the French had had no time to introduce provisions, and they were reduced to half allowance. Not being strong enough to sally against the besiegers, they revenged themselves upon the town, and laid about two-thirds of it in ruins. At length the relief which their countrymen in Spain could not effect was brought to them from France. General Reille being made acquainted with their distress, collected 3000 ?July 3.? men at Bellegarde, and putting the Somatenes to flight with that force, introduced a large convoy of provisions, and reinforced the garrison.

?Movements of M. Moncey against Valencia.?

The preservation of Figueras by the French was an event of more importance in reality than in appearance; but at this time appearances and immediate effect were what they stood in need of to maintain that opinion of their power which had been so rudely shaken by this national resistance. It was part of their plans, that, while Lefebvre chastised Zaragoza, and terrified Aragon by the fate of its capital, a similar blow should be struck in the south by Marshal Moncey. For this purpose he collected a force of 12,000 men besides cavalry in the province of Cuenca. The Spaniards were doubtful whether his march would be directed against Murcia, where Count Florida Blanca coming at the age of fourscore from the retirement in which he had hoped to pass the remainder of his honourable age in piety and peace, had proclaimed Ferdinand, and hoisted the standard of independence; or against Valencia, where the inhabitants had reason to expect severe vengeance for the massacre which had been committed there. This uncertainty produced no evil when the Spaniards had no armies on foot, and every province was left to its own resources. ?Defeat of the Spaniards.? Valencia was the point of most importance; the people were more willing to meet the danger than to wait for it; and with such a force as could be raised of peasantry, new levies, and a few regular troops, they occupied the entrance of a defile near Contreras, and the bridge over the river Cabriel. ?June 21.? They were forced from thence with the loss of four pieces of cannon, the whole of their artillery; but they were not pursued like a routed enemy: the French deemed it expedient to proceed with caution in a country where the whole population was decidedly hostile, and the Spaniards took up a second and stronger position at Las Cabrillas, and in front of Las Siete Aguas. ?June 24.? There also they were unable to withstand the attack of disciplined troops, well commanded, and well supplied with all the means of war; yet they made a brave resistance, retreating from one position to another; and when they fell back upon Valencia, as they had no cause for shame, they brought with them no feeling of despondency, and communicated no dismay, with which the arrival of a beaten army might under other circumstances have infected the people.

?He approaches the city.?

Moncey, on the other hand, had found a more determined resistance than he expected, and was disappointed of the succours which should have joined him from Catalonia. He has been censured for not advancing against the city with the utmost expedition, before the people had time to make preparations for resisting him; but knowing the anarchy which prevailed there, he might not unreasonably think that an interval of delay would either abate their ardour, or increase their confusion; if he failed to intimidate them into submission, he had reason to believe that the gates would be betrayed to him; and if the traitors who had engaged to perform this service should be detected, or fail in the execution, even in that case a successful resistance could hardly have been contemplated by him as a possibility. In a military view Valencia indeed must then have appeared incapable of defence. Suburbs nearly as large as the city itself had grown up round the whole circle of its old brick walls, and the citadel was small, ill fortified, and altogether useless. In so large a city, for the population exceeded 80,000, a besieger might reckon upon the wealth, the fears, and the helplessness of a great portion of its inhabitants; and perhaps he might undervalue a people whom travellers had represented as relaxed by the effects of a delicious climate, by which, according to the proverbial reproach of their Castillian neighbours, all things were so debilitated, that in Valencia the meat was grass, the grass water, the men women, and the women nothing.

?Preparations for defence.?

On the day after his second victory Moncey wrote from his head-quarters at La Venta de Bunol, six leagues from the city, to the Captain-general, saying, that he was ordered by the Junta of government at Madrid to enter and restore tranquillity there, and promising to pardon the atrocious massacre which had been committed if he were received without opposition. The Junta appealed to the people with a spirit that inspired confidence: the very women exclaimed that death was better than submission; and Padre Rico, with a sword in one hand and a crucifix in the other, went through the streets exhorting his fellow citizens to exert themselves to the utmost, and die, if they were so called, like martyrs, in the cause of their country. The public opinion having been decidedly expressed, all persons capable of bearing arms without exception were ordered to repair to the citadel, and there provide themselves with weapons. The quantity of muskets was insufficient for the number who applied, and all the swords, of which there was a large stock, were delivered out, though many were without hilts. A few twelve and sixteen pounders, with one twenty-pounder, were planted at the Puerta del Quarte, where the principal attack was expected; a great quantity of timber, which had just been floated down the river, was used in part to form a breastwork at this important point, and part in blocking up the entrance of the streets within the walls. The other gates were fortified, though less formidably; and the ensuing day was employed in filling the ditches with water, and cutting trenches across the road to impede the enemy’s approach.

So little were the Valencians disheartened by their preceding defeats, that even now they would not wait for the French within their vantage ground. ?The Spaniards defeated at Quarte.? On the evening of the 27th Moncey found some 3000 of them under D. Joseph Caro, brother of the Marquis de Romana, posted about six miles from the city, behind the canal at the village of Quarte, where they had broken down the bridge. A severe action ensued: the mulberry trees, with which that delightful country is thickly planted, afforded cover to the Valencian marksmen, and before they were dislodged and defeated, the number of slain on both sides amounted to 1500. At eleven on the following morning the advanced guard of the city came in with the expected intelligence that the enemy were close at hand; and shortly afterwards a flag of truce arrived with a summons, saying, that if the French were permitted to enter peaceably, persons and property should be respected; but otherwise they would force their way with fire and sword. A short time for farther preparations was gained by assembling the parochial authorities, under the plea of consulting them; and then, in the name of the people, it was replied, that they preferred death to any capitulation. Moncey immediately gave orders for the attack. A smuggler, who, for the purpose of better concealing his intentions, affected to put himself foremost among the patriots, had undertaken to deliver up the battery upon which the Valencians depended in great part for their defence, and which they had placed under the patronage of St. Catharine. He had engaged a sufficient number of accomplices; but the treason had been discovered on the preceding night: he and his associates were put to death; and when the French approached the battery, instead of finding it manned by traitors, they were received with a brisk and well-sustained fire.

The approach to the Puerta del Quarte was by a broad street leading straight for the gate. The Spanish commander, by a bold stratagem, ordered the gate to be opened; and when the French hastened forward, thinking either that their agents had done this, or that it was a mark of submission, a fire of grape was opened upon them, with effect equal to the most sanguine hopes of the defenders. The enemy drew back, leaving the ground covered with their dead. They then directed their efforts against the weakest point of the whole weak circuit of the walls, ... so well were they always acquainted with whatever local circumstances might contribute to the success of their military operations. It was where the old gate of S. Lucia had been built up; but the battery which they erected against it had scarcely begun to play, before a well-directed fire from the Puerta de S. Vicente dismounted the guns, and killed the men who were employed there. It was now manifest from the determined spirit of the Valencians, that if Moncey could have forced his way within the walls, his army was not numerous enough for the civic war which it would have been compelled to wage from house to house, and from street to street. After persevering in vain attempts from one till eight in the evening, he became convinced of this unwelcome truth, and withdrew for the night to his head-quarters between Mislate and Quarte, about a league from the city. ?Moncey retreats into Castille.? To maintain his position there was impossible: he retreated, leaving part of his artillery, and suffering from the peasantry, and the parties who harassed his retreat, that vengeance which Murat had provoked, and which the conduct of the French wherever they were successful had exasperated. An attempt was made to intercept him on his way, and inclose him between the Valencian and Murcian forces: the plan was well conceived, and he had twice to attack and defeat the enemy, who had taken post in his rear, before he could reach Almanza. He had now effected his retreat out of the kingdom of Valencia, but his position was still so insecure, that it was deemed necessary to fall back from Almanza to S. Clemente, nearer the main force of the French in the two Castilles; there while the Valencians were exulting in the deliverance which they had obtained, he collected artillery and stores, and waited for reinforcements which would enable him to renew the attack with means that might ensure success.

The failure of the French in Valencia would have been amply compensated if they could have reduced Andalusia to obedience, and for this more important object greater and more commensurate efforts were made. One of the first acts of Murat after he reached Madrid had been to prepare for securing Cadiz. General Dupont was appointed governor of that city soon after the abdications at Bayonne had been effected; and he had commenced his march towards the south, when he was diverted to Toledo, to repress some tumults by which the people there had manifested their temper, before the insurrection in the capital kindled the whole kingdom. The apprehension of that insurrection, or the determined intention of provoking some such crisis, made Murat deem it expedient to keep the whole of his force within call. Dupont, therefore, was detained at Toledo; but when the disposition of the Andalusians was known, and fears were entertained for the French squadron at Cadiz, he was dispatched thither with a force esteemed fully equal to a service which, momentous as it was, was not thought difficult to be performed. He began his march at the end of May, and crossing the Sierra Morena without opposition, arrived on the third of June at Andujar. There he obtained the unwelcome intelligence that a Junta had been formed at Seville, and that not that province alone, but Granada, Cordoba, and Jaen also had declared against the French. Proceeding, therefore, now, as in an enemy’s country, he occupied Montoro, El Carpio, and Bujalance, and throwing a bridge over the Guadalquivir at El Carpio, passed some of his corps to the right bank, and proceeded with the main body along the left to the bridge of Alcolea, where the Spaniards had taken a strong position. ?G. Dupont defeats the Spaniards at the bridge of Alcolea.? The bridge is very long, consisting of twenty arches, constructed of black marble; and the Spaniards had erected a redoubt to command the approach. They had planted some batteries upon an eminence, and confiding in these defences, had not thought it necessary to destroy the bridge. Want of skill, rather than of courage, rendered these preparations ineffectual: the tÊte-du-pont and the village were carried after a brave resistance. The way was now open; but when the French began to pass, a fire was opened which swept the bridge, and made the bravest of the assailants for a moment hesitate. A lieutenant of grenadiers, by name Ratelot, whose courage was worthy of a better cause, advanced to the middle of the bridge alone, and placing his hat upon his sword, waved it over his head, crying Vive L’Empereur! and calling his comrades to follow him. His example roused a brave spirit, which was only the more excited by the sight of his death. They crossed, and attacked the Spaniards with all the advantages which discipline gives to courage; and at the same time the division which had passed the river at El Carpio came up, and falling upon their left, completed their defeat. The French without delay advanced against Cordoba. A camp had been formed before that city with the intention of defending it; but the routed troops brought dismay with them; and the Cordobans, at the approach of danger, chose rather to rely upon their walls than their lines. Among the arms which they abandoned there were many of English manufacture, and others which, for their antiquity and unusual form, became objects of curiosity to the conquerors. ?Cordoba entered and pillaged by the French.? Resolute men might have defended weaker walls than those of Cordoba, which were partly the work of the Romans, partly of the Moors; but stronger fortifications would not have afforded security unless they had been better defended. In two hours the gates were forced, the troops and the new levies retreated or fled towards Ecija, and the city was at Dupont’s mercy.

Though by this easy conquest the French were enabled to enrich themselves with pillage, they were far from feeling themselves at ease. The news from Cadiz was of the worst kind; their squadron had been captured there, and the Spaniards were in communication with the English. The only considerable body of Spanish troops in the peninsula, under D. Francisco Xavier CastaÑos, which had been stationed in the camp of S. Roque, had heartily entered into the national cause; and the English from Gibraltar (which in the hands of England was now more serviceable to Spain than it had ever been made injurious to her) had assisted him with money, and with arms for the new levies. The alliance with England enabled the Spaniards also to bring over troops from Ceuta, who had been sent to garrison that place early in the year, because of a rumour that the English were intending to attack it. On all sides the insurrection was spreading; and the armed peasantry had occupied the passes of the Sierra, to cut him off from retreat and from reinforcements. He had looked for co-operation from the side of Portugal. A detachment of Junot’s army was to have proceeded along the coast of Algarve, and have crossed the Guadiana; a body of English troops from Gibraltar, sent under General Spencer to Ayamonte, had defeated this intention. ?He is disappointed of succours from Portugal.? Junot, therefore, was fain to send them by the circuitous way of Elvas; but his own situation was now becoming perilous. The Spaniards under his command contributed to his danger at this time rather than to his strength. An English squadron off the Tagus kept him upon the alarm, while it encouraged the hopes of the Portugueze; and when General Kellerman was ordered to Elvas, the insurrection at Badajoz made it doubtful whether he would be able to proceed and effect his march to Cadiz with so small a force as could be spared from Portugal, and a detachment from Madrid was sent to join with him, and quell the people of Extremadura. Dupont could not be placed in a condition to effect the object for which he entered Andalusia, unless he received strong reinforcements; and Savary, therefore, ordered two divisions under Generals Vedel and Gobert, a force which was deemed more than sufficient to secure him against all danger, even if it should not be equal to the subjugation of the whole province.

These troops did not effect their junction without experiencing proofs of the national feeling, which might have taught them in how severe as well as hateful a contest the insatiable ambition of Buonaparte had wantonly engaged them. In passing through La Mancha they found that the sick, whom Dupont had left at Manzanares, had been killed; and they did not enter the little town of Valdepe as without a severe contest: the inhabitants embarrassed the invader’s cavalry by chains, which they stretched across the streets, and kept up a brisk fire from the houses, from which they were not dislodged till the French set the town in flames. When the advanced guard attempted to pass the Sierra Morena, they found an irregular force well posted and entrenched in the tremendous defiles of that great line of mountains, and they were compelled to fall back upon the main body. Notwithstanding this warning, the French entered upon the pass without precaution, in full confidence that even the strength of the situation would not enable the Spaniards to withstand them; and this presumption cost them many lives which might well have been spared. The first brigade and the cavalry were allowed to pass an ambush, which was laid among the trees and rocks, in advance of the entrenchment; a fire was then opened upon the second, and the French suffered three discharges before they were ready to act in return. Their Voltigeurs then dislodged the enemy from their vantage ground; the works were forced with a loss, according to the French account, of 900 on the part of the defendants; and the invaders leaving a detachment to secure the defiles, crossed the mountains, and entered Andalusia. Vedel, with his division, was stationed at Carolina; Gobert occupied the large and ancient village of Baylen, about four leagues farther on, nearly half way between Vedel and Dupont, who had his head-quarters at Andujar. A tÊte-du-pont was constructed to command the passage of the river there, and another at the village of Manjibar, between Baylen and Jaen.

While the intrusive government believed that by this junction its army in Andalusia was so strengthened, that the defeat of the Spaniards was certain if they could be brought to action, an opportunity was afforded it of striking a great blow in Castille, by which the way to the capital was laid open. A force considerable in numbers had been raised in Galicia, and arms and stores in abundance had now been supplied by Great Britain. Filangieri exerted himself in training these new levies, and gave orders for forming entrenchments at Manzanal; a position of extraordinary strength on the heights above Astorga. Whether this preparation for defensive war, when the people were too eager to be led against the enemy, renewed the suspicions which his conduct on St. Ferdinand’s day had excited; or whether private malice, as has been asserted, was at work for his destruction; he was murdered by some of his soldiers at Villa Franca, in the Bierzo, and the command of the Galician army then devolved upon D. Joaquin Blake, an officer of Irish parentage. Advancing to Benevente he formed a junction with the army of Castille and Leon, which Cuesta, with that characteristic energy which on such occasions he was capable of exerting, had collected after his defeat at Cabezon. The two generals disagreed in opinion; Blake dreaded the discipline of the French, and would therefore have avoided a general action; Cuesta relied upon the courage of his countrymen, and was eager to engage: he took the command, as being superior in rank, and they proceeded, in no good understanding with each other, in a direction which threatened Burgos. Nothing could have been more conformable to the wishes of the enemy; and Marshal Bessieres, in the expectation of sure victory, marched against them with the divisions of Generals Mouton and Merle, and General Lasalles’ division of cavalry, in all 12,000 men.

He found them posted near Medina del Rio Seco, an ancient, and, in former days, a flourishing city, and containing now in its decay some 8000 inhabitants. The numbers of the Spanish army have been variously stated from 14,000 to 40,000. They attacked the enemy’s infantry with such determined ardour that they forced them to give way; won four pieces of artillery, spiked them, and set up their shout of victory, ... too soon; for the French cavalry charged their left wing, and by their great superiority decided the day, but not till after a most severe contest. Few bloodier battles have ever been fought in proportion to the numbers in the field, even if the force of the Spaniards be taken at its highest estimate: upon the best authority, that of the neighbouring priests, it is affirmed that 27,000 bodies were buried. The stores and artillery were taken, but the victors were not in a condition to complete the rout of the defeated army, and take advantage of the dissension between the two generals.

When Buonaparte received intelligence of this victory, he said, “it is the battle of Villa Viciosa. Bessieres has placed Joseph upon the throne:” and calculating with contempt the farther resistance which might be expected, he added, “Spain has now some 15,000 men left, and some old blockhead to command them.” Little did he know of Spain and of the Spaniards. The battle of Rio Seco did not intimidate even the men who were defeated there; but the enormities which the French committed in the city increased, if that were possible, the hatred with which the whole nation regarded them. The people of that city, unsuspicious of the future, had illuminated their houses, when the French on their entrance into the country arrived there, and some of the troops had been quartered among them. This did not save them from the worst horrors of war.

The way to Madrid was now open, and the Intruder proceeded on his journey thither without molestation. He had been proclaimed in that city on Santiago’s day, and the circumstances had been such as were little likely to encourage his partizans. The great standard-bearer and his son withdrew from the capital, rather than incur the guilt and contract the degradation of bearing part in the ceremony. Joseph and his train arrived on the evening of the 20th, ... all the troops being under arms to receive him, a most necessary part of the parade. Nothing indeed could be more striking than the contrast between the popular feeling on this day, and on that when Ferdinand, only four months before, made his entrance as king! Then the streets swarmed with the population of the whole surrounding country, and all the power and exertions of the magistrates were required to repress the general enthusiasm; now what few demonstrations of joy were made were procured by the direct interference of authority, the officers going from door to door to call upon the inhabitants, and even with this interference the houses were but just sufficiently decorated to save the inhabitants from vexation which they would otherwise have incurred. The money which was scattered among the populace lay in the streets where it fell, for the French themselves to pick up; and the theatres, which were thrown open to the people, were left to be filled by Frenchmen.

Yet every possible means had been used to prepare the metropolis for his reception, and keep down the spirit of the inhabitants by fraud and force. The publication of news from the provinces was prevented by the severest measures, and if any of the patriots’ manifestos found their way to Madrid, to print, copy, read, or listen to them, was declared and punished as high treason. A paper was forged in the Bishop of Santander’s name, recommending the people to receive with gratitude the King and the army, who were come to regenerate them. Revolution, they were told, was one of those indispensable remedies which must be employed when abuses had proceeded to a length which could not be restricted by the ordinary resources of public law. It was a species of war declared by the people against their own government to remove the established authority, when, either from ignorance or disinclination, it was not exercised for the general advantage. Happily for Spain, it was spared the necessity of passing through the calamities which other countries had experienced in this inevitable process; and it had only to receive a new government under the authority of the protector of the nations of Europe. In spite of these artifices and false representations, in spite also of all the measures taken to keep the inhabitants in ignorance of what was passing in the provinces, the agitation of the public continued; and a new edict was issued, enacting, that all strangers arriving in the metropolis should, within four and twenty hours, send in their names to the police, with an account of their occupations, the places from whence they came, and their motives for visiting Madrid.

The intrusive government had hoped that the battle of Rio Seco, and the terrible slaughter which had there been made of the Spaniards, would intimidate the nation, and convince them that all opposition to the new dynasty must be unavailing. In this expectation they were soon undeceived. The battle, bloody as it was, proved that the Spaniards were not to be discouraged by any defeat, however severe; and the Intruder, on his arrival in Madrid, experienced a resistance in a quarter where he looked only for pliancy and submission. The Council of Castille, when it was called upon to swear to the constitution, demurred; and avowed that it had not circulated the constitutional act, which it had been ordered to do by an edict from Vittoria: a transfer of the succession from one family to another, it maintained, could not be made without the authority and intervention of the nation: nor would the Members of the Council swear to the new constitution, because they were not the representatives of the nation; the Cortes were, and the Cortes had not accepted it. Now it would be a manifest infraction of the most sacred rights, if in a matter of such importance, relating not to the introduction of a new law, but to the extinction of all their former codes, and the formation of new ones in their stead, they should take an oath of observance before the nation should have signified its acceptance. The Junta of Bayonne had not been convoked to form codes and laws, but to treat of the advantages which they could obtain for the respective bodies or provinces by which they were deputed.

This was the point at which the Council had determined to make their stand. Many and great concessions they had previously made, yielding to compulsion, and trusting or hoping that political considerations, if worthier motives failed, might even yet prevent Buonaparte from effecting his designs of usurpation. But all temporizing was now at an end. The oath was to supply the invalidities of the forced abdications, to cover all the injustice and villany by which the Royal Family had been ensnared, to sanction the insolent intrusion of a stranger upon the throne, and bind the nation in honour and in conscience to support him there. It had already been ordered that no person in any public employ should receive his salary, or enjoy any of the emoluments of his office, till he had taken the oath. The Council therefore resolved now to stand forward, and give an example to those, who, like themselves, were within the power of the intrusive government, of the resistance which it was their duty to oppose. Their written memorial was laid before Joseph Buonaparte, who, upon hearing that the oath had not been taken, refused to read it, and directed Azanza to demand of them an immediate compliance with his decree; requiring that if the Council would not unanimously obey, as many as were obedient, though they should be the minority, should, without delay, subscribe the written oath. ?July 26.? This order was twice repeated on the following day; and on the day after, the Council returned a dilatory reply, stating that it was a matter of conscience, and advising that as such it should be propounded to the chief universities, or other bodies or communities, as the Kings of Spain were wont to do in arduous points, which were to be decided not upon legal reasons alone, but upon theological considerations also; or that a Junta of the most approved Canonists and Theologians should be appointed, before whom the Council would send ministers to dispute the case. When this demand was delivered strong measures were meditated in return: an example, it was said, must be made of the Council, which might operate as a warning to all minor bodies and individuals; and it was generally believed that they would not escape death or banishment into France. But the policy of gaining time and trusting to events proved fortunate in this instance; and they were delivered from danger when all further arts of procrastination would have failed, by the splendid success of their countrymen in Andalusia, which compelled the Intruder and his ministers to consult their own safety by immediate flight.

When Vedel and Gobert had effected their junction with Dupont, it was thought proper, for the security of his position at Andujar, to occupy the old city of Jaen, the Aurigi, Oringe, or Oningis of the ancient Spaniards, in latter ages the capital of a Moorish kingdom, taken from the Mahommedans by King St. Ferdinand, famous afterwards for its silk manufactories; and still, though its trade and population had declined, containing some 12,000 inhabitants. It is situated on the skirts of the Sierra, and at the foot of Mount Jabaluez, in one of the happiest parts of a delightful country. The French had already made one of their plundering visits there; ?July 1.? and when General Cassagne was now sent with a brigade consisting of 1300 men to take possession of the city and maintain it, a number of armed peasants awaited his approach among the fields and gardens without the walls. Their defence was ill planned and ill conducted; they fired their musquets repeatedly before the enemy were within shot, and took flight at the first discharge of the French artillery, many of them throwing away their cartridges to disencumber themselves of any thing which might impede their escape. The city was entered without any resistance from the inhabitants; and while one party of the assailants, singing the song of Roland, scaled the heights to attack an old castle, the others found an easier way to it through the town: it was abandoned at their approach, and they placed a garrison there.

The French, conformably to the system upon which they began this wicked war, put to death the peasants who fell into their hands. One of these victims excited admiration even in his murderers; he asked for life in a manner not unbecoming a Spaniard in such a cause: finding that no mercy was to be expected, he wrapt his cloak around his head and began his prayers; and when the bullet cut them short, fell and expired without a cry, or groan, or struggle. These military murders were not unrevenged. On the first day after the arrival of the French, the Spaniards increased in number, regular troops came to their assistance, and some smart skirmishes took place at the outposts. Early on the ensuing morning they surprised the castle; most of the garrison chose rather to leap from a high crag, at the imminent hazard of life or limbs, than to fall into the hands of an enemy to whom they had given such provocation; the others were put to death, and some of them barbarously tortured before that relief was given. Encouraged by this success, the Spaniards entered the city; a terrible fire was kept up upon the enemy from roofs and windows; the French were driven out, they formed upon some level ground in front of the town, where the Spanish cavalry charged them, and their guns were taken and retaken. The French occupied the same ground from which they had first driven the peasantry, and which was covered with stubble and with sheaves of corn, for there had been no time to carry in the harvest when these invaders approached. The sheaves took fire during the action, the cartridges which had been left there by the Spaniards exploded, threw the French into disorder, and killed and scorched many of them; and the whole field was presently in flames, out of which the wounded in vain endeavoured to crawl upon their broken limbs.

This action continued from an early hour in the morning till four or five in the afternoon, when the French again forced their way into the city; they pillaged it, they committed the foulest enormities upon the nuns and other women who had not taken flight in time; and in many places they set the houses and convents on fire. But the invaders had now learnt in what kind of war they were engaged; that they had provoked a national resistance, and that victory brought with it so little advantage, that when they had won the field, they were masters only of the ground on which they stood. The Spaniards were preparing for another attack, to avoid which General Cassagne ordered a retreat under cover of the night. The French families who resided in Jaen, suffering now for the crimes of their countrymen, abandoned their property and their homes to save their lives, and put themselves under the protection of the retreating troops. They had been thrown into prison on the morning when the invaders were first expelled, and that precautionary measure on the part of the magistrate might probably have failed to save them from the fury of an unreasoning multitude. As many of the wounded as could be carried by the dragoons’ horses were removed, the rest were left to their fate, for the French had no other means of transport; but most of those who were removed died on the way from the heat of the ensuing day’s journey and the pain of their wounds. ?Memoires d’un Soldat, t. i. 145–168.? Their whole loss, as stated by themselves, amounted to a fourth part of their number. They were not pursued, and they effected their retreat to Baylen.

Dupont’s situation became now every day more insecure, for at this time neither men nor means were wanting to the Spaniards in Andalusia, nor prudence to direct their efforts in the wisest way. ?Conde de Maule, t. xiii. p. 9.? The city of Cadiz alone supplied a donative of more than a million dollars and 5000 men; and as the men were mostly employed in filling up old regiments, the army was not weakened by having great part of its ostensible force consisting in raw levies. The general, CastaÑos, acted steadily upon the principles which the Junta of Seville had laid down; he harassed the enemy by detachments on all sides, cut them off from supplies, and allowed them no opportunity of coming to a regular engagement; and thus, while the difficulties and distresses of the French were continually increasing, the Spaniards acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves and in their officers. CastaÑos even attempted to reform the Spanish army, and introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by which Cromwell, and the great Gustavus before him, made their soldiers invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the camp and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he called upon the officers to set their men an example, by putting away the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons; he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened condign punishment to any person, of what rank soever, who should act in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness the French, who for their foul abominations were justly hated by God and man; and it would be in vain to gather together armies, if at the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure them the victory over their enemies. Happy would it have been for Spain if this principle had been steadily pursued; the foundations of that moral reformation might then have been laid, without which neither the strength nor the prosperity of any country can be stable.

Dupont might have secured his retreat across the Sierra Morena, if he had not relied too confidently upon his actual strength and the reputation of the French arms, and if he had not still hoped for succours from Junot. His force, though reduced by sickness, and the harassing service in which it was engaged, amounted to 16,000 effective men, enough to have defeated the Spaniards if they had been rash enough to engage in a general action, and more than he could well provide for. A large convoy from Toledo, together with all his hospital stores, was intercepted in the mountains. His men were fain to reap the standing corn, and make it into bread for themselves; the peasantry, whom they would otherwise have compelled to perform this work, having left the harvest to take arms against them, and bear a part in the defence of their country. He wrote pressingly for reinforcements; it was now, he said, nearly a month that he had occupied the position at Andujar; the country was exhausted, it was with extreme difficulty that he could obtain the scantiest subsistence for his army; the enemy were acquiring strength and courage to act upon the offensive: the anniversary of their great victory at the Navas de Tolosa was at hand, and to this the Spaniards, from religious, national, and local feelings, attached great importance. Every moment which he was compelled to waste in inaction increased the evil. Surely at such a crisis it would be prudent to neglect all partial movements of the insurgents for the purpose of enabling him to act in Andalusia with a sufficient force; if the enemy were permitted to acquire strength so as to keep the field, their example would be followed by all the provinces, and by all the Spanish troops throughout the kingdom; whereas one victory obtained over them here would go far towards the subjugation of Spain. These letters fell into the hands of the Spaniards; but if they had reached their destination, it was not in Savary’s power to have reinforced him.

On the 11th of July a council of war was held by CastaÑos, and it was determined that a division of 9000 good troops, under General Reding, should proceed by way of Menjibar to attack the enemy at Baylen, where Gobert was stationed for the purpose of guarding the road to Carolina, and maintaining a communication with Madrid. The MarquÉs de Coupigny, with 5000, was to proceed by La Higuereta and Villanueva, toward the same point, and co-operate with Reding; and Lieut.-Colonel D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, with a corps of 2000, was to go by Marmolejo, and act against the enemy if they attempted to escape by the Sierra. CastaÑos himself occupied the Visos de Andujar, a strong and advantageous position, of which he thought it necessary to retain possession, though the troops were without tents, there was a want of water, and the heat excessive. But this position enabled him to keep Dupont upon the alarm, and prevent him from acting against Reding and Coupigny, while they interposed between him and the two other divisions of his army. ?July 16.? Reding succeeded in driving the enemy from their tÊte-du-pont at Menjibar, and from the positions which they took up one after another between that place and Baylen, disputing their ground skilfully and well. Gobert was killed, one cannon and the baggage in the encampment taken. During these operations some of the Spaniards died from excessive heat and exertion; and in the afternoon Reding retired to Menjibar, and crossing the Guadalquiver again on the following day, effected a junction, on the third morning, with Coupigny, who had beaten the French from a strong post near Villanueva. Their intention was to have attacked Baylen; but Dufour, who succeeded to the command of Gobert’s division, had evacuated that place, finding himself unable to maintain it, and fallen back to unite with Vedel, at Carolina.

One part of the Spanish commander’s plan had thus been accomplished, and, in pursuance of his arrangements, Reding and Coupigny prepared to march from Baylen upon Andujar, and there attack the main body of the French on one side, while the reserve of the Spanish army was ready to act against it from the Visos. Dupont meantime had formed the same intention of placing a part of the enemy’s force between two fires; and on the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed, the French marched from Andujar, after plundering the inhabitants of whatever was portable, and took the road toward Baylen. ?July 19.? Reding was preparing to begin his march when the enemy arrived at three in the morning, and fell upon him, thinking to take him by surprise. The attack was made vigorously, and might probably have been successful, had not the Spaniards, because of their intended movement, been in some degree of readiness. The foremost companies both of horse and foot were engaged hand to hand; but the Spaniards rapidly took their stations, and repelled the assailants at all points. When day broke they were in possession of the high ground, and the French were forming their columns to renew the attack in a situation which was not exposed to the Spanish artillery. In this renewed attack both parties conducted themselves with the greatest intrepidity. Several times the assailants broke the enemy’s lines, and fighting with the resolution of men who had never known what it was to be defeated, they once made way to the batteries. But the Spaniards stood firm, they knew that reinforcements were at hand, and that if they kept their ground, the situation of the French was desperate; they had confidence in their leaders and in their own strength, and, above all, that thorough assurance of the justice of their cause, which, when other points are equal, will inevitably turn the scale. The action was long and bloody; it continued till noon without any other interruption than what arose from occasional recession and the formation of new columns. Dupont then, and the other generals, putting themselves at the head of their men, made a last charge with the most determined bravery; they were, however, once more repulsed. By this time they had lost 2000 men, besides those who were wounded. Dufour, who was with this part of the army, was killed, and Dupont himself wounded. No hope of victory remained, and no possibility of escape, the French therefore proposed to capitulate; and the arrival of the Spanish reserve, under D. Manuel de la PeÑa, at this point of time, enabled the victors to dictate their own terms.

Dupont’s intention of marching from Andujar had been so well concealed till the moment of its execution, that though that city contained some 14,000 inhabitants, no information was conveyed to the Spaniards on the adjacent heights, nor were they apprized of his movements till two in the ensuing morning, when he had been five hours on his march. CastaÑos immediately ordered La PeÑa to pursue him with the reserve and some corps of the third division. Upon his arrival he learnt that a capitulation had been proposed, upon which he referred the French negotiators to the commander-in-chief, and took such a position as effectually to surround the defeated army. The answer which CastaÑos returned was, that the French must surrender themselves prisoners of war, and no other terms would be granted; that because of the manner in which they had sacked the towns which they had entered, he would allow the general and officers to retain nothing more than their swords, and each a single portmanteau with apparel for his use; but that in other respects they should be treated like their squadron at Cadiz, in a manner conformable to Spanish generosity. And he required that Dupont should capitulate not only for the troops who had been actually engaged, but for the two other divisions also. The next day was spent in adjusting the terms; and on the 21st CastaÑos and the Conde de Tilly, as the representative of the Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies, a title which the Junta of Seville at this time arrogated, advised the Junta that Dupont and his division were made prisoners of war, and that all the other French between the summit of the Sierra Morena and Baylen were to evacuate the peninsula by sea.

These, however, though thus officially announced to the Junta, and by them made known to Lord Collingwood, were not the terms which had been signed, and the cause of this misstatement has never been explained. There could have been no motive for deceiving the French by promising them better conditions than it was intended to observe, for the enemy were absolutely at their mercy; so confessedly indeed, that when La PeÑa made a threatening movement to accelerate the treaty, Dupont sent him word that if he thought proper to attack them no defence would be made. The most probable conjecture which can be offered seems to be, that the French negotiators, Generals Chavert and Marescot, had sufficient address not only to make the Spaniards relax the tone of severe justice which was at first assumed, but also in the course of drawing up the capitulation, to obtain modifications in the latter articles, by which the intention of the former was set aside; that Tilly and CastaÑos had been thus led to make greater concessions than they were themselves aware of, and had no suspicion when they communicated to the Junta the result of the treaty, that one part of it, and that the most important, was actually annulled by the other. The capitulation began by stating that their excellencies the Conde de Tilly and CastaÑos had agreed with the French plenipotentiaries upon these conditions, as desiring to give proofs of their high esteem for his excellency General Dupont, and the army under his command, for the brilliant and glorious defence which they had made when completely surrounded by a very superior force. The troops under General Dupont were to remain prisoners of war, except the division of Vedel; that division, and all the other French troops in Andalusia who were not included in the former article, should evacuate Andalusia, and take with them the whole of their baggage; but to prevent all cause of uneasiness while they were passing through the country, they should leave their artillery and other arms in charge of the Spanish army, to be delivered to them at the time of their embarkation; their horses, in order to save the trouble of transporting them, should be purchased by the Spaniards at a price agreed upon by two commissioners, one of each nation. The other troops, who were made prisoners, were to march out of the camp with the honours of war, with two guns at the head of each battalion, and the soldiers with their muskets, which they were to surrender to the Spaniards at the distance of four hundred toises from the camp. All the French troops in Andalusia were to proceed by stated journeys, not exceeding four leagues a day, and with proper intervals of rest, to Sanlucar and Rota, there to be embarked in Spanish vessels and transported to Rochefort; the Spanish army guaranteeing the safety of their march. The generals and officers were to retain their arms, and the soldiers their knapsacks. The generals should retain a coach and a baggage cart each, the officers of the staff a coach only, free from examination, but without breaking the regulations and laws of the kingdom: all carriages which they had taken in Andalusia were excepted, and the observance of this exception was left to the French General Chavert. Whereas many of the soldiers in different places, and especially at the taking of Cordoba, notwithstanding the orders of the generals and the care of the officers, had committed excesses which were usual and inevitable when cities resisted at the time that they were taken (thus carefully was the article worded by the able French negotiators), the generals and officers were to take proper measures for delivering up any church vessels which might have been carried away as booty, if any there were. Any thing omitted in this capitulation which might add to the accommodation of the French during their passage through the country and their tarriance in it, should be added as supplementary to these articles.

The French displayed more address in the management of this capitulation than they had shown in the campaign. During the battle of Baylen, Vedel was near enough with his division to hear the firing, but he had received no intelligence of Dupont’s movements, and did not move toward the scene of action till the firing had ceased. The French soldiers endeavoured to account for their defeat by vague accusations of treachery, by the want of a good understanding between the two generals, and by the alleged misconduct of Dupont, in making his corps attack one after another, instead of charging with his whole force, and in leaving too strong a detachment to guard the spoils with which he and the superior officers had enriched themselves. The more than likely supposition, that his messengers had been intercepted, would explain the want of co-operation, and the other charges may safely be dismissed. That when they were at the enemy’s mercy they should have obtained such favourable terms may indeed appear surprising, even though the French have exceeded all other people in the art of obtaining good terms under the most unfavourable circumstances. It is more easy to perceive why the conditions were not observed; for in fact it was impossible to observe them. Nothing could be done at that time in opposition to the will of the people; and an universal cry had gone forth against invaders who had set towns and villages on fire, pillaging wherever they went, plundering churches and convents, violating women, and putting to death the people whom they took in arms. The Andalusians were exasperated against the French because of these atrocities, as well as by that general feeling of indignation which the cause of the quarrel, the murders at Madrid, and the whole course of transactions at Bayonne, so justly excited. The Junta had issued a regular declaration of war against France, but the people knew and felt that this was not an ordinary war, and that no formalities could make it so; that the invaders had entered their country not in open hostility as fair and honourable enemies, but perfidiously and basely in the character of allies; and that by the complicated wickedness of their cause and their conduct they had forfeited all claim to the courtesies and observances of civilized war. They regarded Dupont’s army rather as criminals than as soldiers, ... men who had laid down their arms, but who could not lay down their crimes; and in that state of general feeling, if the Junta of Seville, or any other persons in authority, had attempted to perform the conditions of the capitulation, they would have been suspected of treachery, and might probably have fallen victims, like Solano, to the fury of the populace.

Aware of this, and yet withheld from breaking the capitulation by that national sense of honour which the revolution had not continued long enough to destroy, the Junta hesitated how to act, like men who, under the pretext of necessity, would willingly have done what, as an avowed and voluntary act, they were ashamed to do. ?The Junta apply to Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple.? They were deliberating whether to observe the treaty when CastaÑos and Morla arrived at Seville. The former felt that his country’s honour and his own would be wounded by the breach of faith which was meditated, and he opposed it with the frankness of an upright mind. Morla, on the contrary, supported the popular opinion; and the Junta, deferring to it in fear, or in inclination, circulated a paper, wherein it was affirmed that, both Vedel and Dupont had broken the capitulation, that it was impossible to fulfil it, and that even if possible, it ought not to be fulfilled. This paper, composed by an officer of high rank, who was probably envious of CastaÑos, was sent by the Junta to Lord Collingwood and to Sir Hew Dalrymple, in the hope of obtaining their sanction for a mode of conduct which they themselves secretly felt to be unworthy.

Lord Collingwood had not been satisfied with the terms granted to Vedel: he was not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances to understand why an inferior41 division should have been allowed to capitulate after the principal force had been defeated; and he perceived that these troops might again reach the frontiers of Spain in a week after they were landed at Rochefort. But although these were his feelings, nevertheless, when he was applied to from Cadiz for assistance in transporting Vedel’s men to France, he replied, that he would order seamen to fit out Spanish merchant vessels for that purpose, as there were not more English transports in those parts than were required for the conveyance of our own troops. It proved, however, that Spanish vessels were not to be found; and the answer of Lord Collingwood, when his opinion upon the fulfilment of the terms was directly called for, was, that although he was sorry such a treaty, or indeed any treaty, should have been made with the French General, it was his opinion that all treaties, when once solemnly ratified, should be held sacred, and the conditions observed as far as possible. The present engagement was one which it was not possible to perform, and therefore annulled itself. Sir Hew Dalrymple’s answer was still less satisfactory to those persons who sought a British sanction for breaking the terms. His opinion, he said, exactly coincided with what must have been that of the Spanish and French Generals by whom the capitulation was sanctioned, namely, that it was binding on the contracting parties, as far as the means of carrying it into execution were in the power of each. He hoped that the laws of honour, and not the rules of political expediency, continued still to govern the conduct of soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; and certainly the surrender of General Vedel’s corps could only be justified by the confidence he placed in that honour which characterized the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, particularly one newly-formed, is, said he, a valuable part of its property, and ought not to be lightly squandered. And perhaps the question might be argued even on grounds of expediency.

Disappointed in these applications, but yielding to the real difficulty of the case, the Junta made no preparations for transporting the French troops; and Dupont at length addressed a letter to Morla, as Captain-general of the Province, complaining of this, and of orders which had been given to examine the baggage of the general and other officers at Lebrixa. Morla beginning, as he usually did, with a declaration of his own honour and veracity, replied, that neither the capitulation, nor the approbation of the Junta, nor an express order from their beloved King himself, could make that possible which was not so. There were neither transports for his army, nor means of procuring them; and what greater proof of this could there be than that the prisoners taken in the squadron were detained at a great expense, because the Spaniards were unable to remove them? ?1808.
August.? General CastaÑos, when he promised to obtain a passport from the English for this army, could promise no more than that he would earnestly ask for it; and this he had done: but how could the French commander believe that the English would let an army pass which would certainly carry on the war in some other point, or perhaps in the very same? I am persuaded, he pursued, that neither the general nor your excellency supposed such a capitulation would be executed; his object was to relieve himself from embarrassment, yours to obtain conditions which, impossible as they were, would render your inevitable surrender honourable. Each effected his desire, and now the imperious law of necessity must be obeyed. The national character permits no other law than this with the French; it will not allow us to use the law of retaliation. Your excellency compels me to speak bitter truths.... What right has such an army to require the impossible fulfilment of a capitulation? ... an army which has entered Spain professing friendship and alliance, imprisoned our King and his Royal Family, sacked his palaces, murdered and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, and despoiled him of his crown! If you do not wish to draw upon yourself more and more the just indignation of the people, which I am exerting myself to restrain; you will cease to advance such intolerable pretensions, and endeavour by your conduct to abate the strong sense of the horrors so recently committed at Cordoba. He added, that the orders for examining the baggage came from the Supreme Junta, and were indispensable.

A large sum of money had been found in possession of a private soldier, and Morla reminded the French general how greatly such a fact would provoke the rage of the populace. The discovery of some church plate, which was brought to light by the fall of a package at Santa Maria, roused the popular feeling beyond all farther endurance, and they immediately seized upon the whole baggage. Dupont upon this wrote angrily to Morla, demanding the restoration of the equipage, money, and effects of every kind belonging to himself and the other superior officers; invoking the principle of honour and probity, and saying, that jealous as he was for the glory of the Spaniards, the horrible excesses of the Spanish mob had made him groan. ?August 14.? Undoubtedly, replied Morla, the conduct of the people has grieved me greatly; not that the act itself was wrong, but because it manifested a distrust of their government; because they took the administration of justice into their own hands; because it might have happened that in their fury they might have performed the vile and horrid office of the executioner, and have stained themselves and their compatriots by shedding that blood which had been spared on the field of battle. This is the cause of my concern, and on this account I proposed, as a thing expedient for the safety of your excellency and of those who accompanied you, that your equipages should undergo a prudent examination before they left Lebrixa, and advised you that nothing but submission and a discreet demeanour could save you from the indignation of the people. But it never was my intention, and still less the Supreme Junta’s, that your excellency and your army should carry out of Spain the fruit of your rapacity, cruelty, and impiety. How could you conceive this possible? How could you suppose us to be so stupid and insensible? Could a capitulation which speaks only of your equipage, give you the property of the treasures which your army has accumulated by means of murders, profanation of all sacred things, cruelties and violence of every kind, in Cordoba and in other cities? Is there any reason, law, or principle which enjoins that faith, or even humanity should be observed towards an army which entered an allied and friendly kingdom under false pretences, seized its innocent and beloved King with all his family by fraud and treachery; extorted from him a renunciation in favour of their own sovereign, ... a renunciation impossible in itself, ... and because the nation would not submit to this forced and invalid transfer, proceeded to plunder palaces and towns, to profane and sack the churches, murdering the ministers of the altar, violating nuns, carrying rape every where, seizing every thing of value which they could transport, and destroying what they were not able to bring away! Is it possible that such persons as these, when deprived of a booty, the very sight of which ought to fill them with compunction and horror, should have the effrontery to appeal to the principles of honour and probity! My natural moderation has made me hitherto write to your excellency with a certain degree of respect; but I could not refrain from tracing a slight sketch of your conduct, in reply to your extraordinary demands, ... demands which amount to this, ... do you plunder the temples and houses of Cadiz to reimburse me for what the people of the Puerto have taken from me, and what I took from Cordoba, with every circumstance of atrocity, violence, and brutality. Let your excellency lay aside such expectations, and be contented that the noble character of the Spanish nation withholds it from performing the vile office of the executioner. He concluded by saying, that every attention should be paid to the personal safety and convenience of the French general; and that he would use all endeavours in his power to have him sent to France with the least possible delay.

Dupont, when the first danger from the populace was over, had reason for his own sake to rejoice that the capitulation was not carried into effect. Enraged as Buonaparte was at the first signal defeat which his armies had sustained, he well knew that no opportunity of vindicating himself would be allowed him, and Admiral Villeneuve’s example was before his eyes. Most of the Swiss in his army, the officers excepted, entered the Spanish service; the more willingly, because General Reding, who had borne so conspicuous a part in the victory, was their countryman. But, in truth, it was to them a matter of indifference on which side they were engaged, and in whatever action they were present the victor was sure to find recruits. Many, however, as well as many of the Germans who were taken at the same time, were allowed to engage as agricultural labourers. But toward the French the vindictive feeling of the people was never mitigated. The troops who escorted them with difficulty saved them from being torn to pieces by the peasantry; the murder of a Frenchman, so strong a hatred had their atrocities excited, was regarded as a meritorious act; untold numbers disappeared in consequence of this persuasion; and at Lebrixa a whole detachment, eighty in number, were massacred at one time, upon a cry of danger, absurd indeed, but sufficient to give the cowardly rabble a plea for gratifying that cruelty which is every where the characteristic of depraved and brutalized man. Letters were addressed to Morla from Madrid and various parts of Spain, some requiring that Dupont and the other French generals should be put to death, others that the whole of the prisoners should suffer, as an example which the public good demanded, and which justice called for. Some of these letters, by their ill writing and incorrect language, indicated from what base hands they came; others were the elaborate composition of men whom the very hatred of cruelty had made cruel, and who pleaded for a massacre in the same spirit of perverted zeal which had produced the Inquisition and the horrors of St. Bartholomew’s day. These letters were so numerous that Morla thought proper publicly to reply to them, representing that such an act would not only bring on reprisals, but would fix a lasting stain upon the Spaniards. He took that opportunity of excusing himself from any concern in the breach of the capitulation, desiring it might be understood that he neither executed, nor desired to execute the supreme power; but that it was the Junta of Seville which, for weighty reasons, not fit to be made public, had delayed the transportation of Dupont and the other French generals. “I,” said he, “had only to obey; for it is not in my character or manner of thinking ever to resist a constituted authority; such resistance can only occasion civil dissensions, which are the greatest evil a nation can suffer, and which I shall never spare any sacrifice to avoid.”

By the battle of Baylen Andalusia was left in peace. CastaÑos had made a vow to dedicate the victory to King St. Ferdinand, who won Seville from the Moors, and lying inshrined in the magnificent mosque of that city, which he converted to a Christian church, is venerated there with especial devotion. The ceremony was performed with great pomp, and the French eagles were offered at the shrine of the canonized King and conqueror, as trophies of the most signal victory which had been achieved in Andalusia since his time.

Among the papers which fell into the hands of the Spaniards were dispatches from Madrid, recalling Dupont to protect the capital against the army of Galicia and Castille and Leon, then advancing against it. These dispatches were written before the battle of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s fatal rashness exposed that army to destruction. The Spanish generals separated after their defeat, and Cuesta complained that he was abandoned by the Galician force. He retired with his part of the army to Leon, and knowing that that city could not be defended, instructed the Leonese Junta to remove to Astorga; but Astorga itself was not more secure, and they withdrew across the mountains to Ponferrada. Cuesta then dispersed his infantry on the frontiers of Asturias, and retreated with the cavalry into Castille, cutting his way through the enemy’s rear-guard. Marshal Bessieres meantime reaped the fruits of his victory by seizing arms and stores which, in consequence of this rash action, were only brought from England to fall into the enemy’s hands. He found large depÔts at Villalpando and Benevente; then turning southward to Zamora, was informed there that Cuesta had ordered his troops to rendezvous at Mayorga. Deceived by this information, to Mayorga he went, and there a deputation from Leon waited upon him to solicit his clemency. At Leon also he found arms and ammunition to a great amount, which, if not imprudently accumulated there, were carelessly abandoned.

Blake was thought to have given proof of great military talents both in the action and in the retreat; and Marshal Bessieres, hoping that so severe a defeat would convince him all farther resistance must be ineffectual, endeavoured to win him over to the Intruder’s service. For this purpose he wrote to him, under the pretext of assuring him that the prisoners should be well treated; and he took that opportunity for urging him to obey the act of abdication, and acknowledge King Joseph Napoleon. ?July 24.? The Spanish general made answer, he acknowledged no other sovereign than Ferdinand of Bourbon, or his legitimate heirs; and if that unfortunate family should be altogether extinguished, his allegiance would then be due to the people of Spain, lawfully represented in a general Cortes. These, he said, were the sentiments of the whole army and of the whole nation; and he warned Bessieres against the error of mistaking the forced submission of towns which were occupied by French troops, for a real change of opinion in the inhabitants. “Undeceive therefore,” said he, “your Emperor; and if it be true that he has a philanthropic mind, he will renounce the project of subduing Spain. Whatever partial successes he may obtain, it is evident that his brother never can reign in this country; unless he reign over a desert, covered with the blood of the Spaniards, and of the troops employed on this unjust enterprise.”

This answer did not satisfy the Frenchman, who, in a second letter, told Blake it was his duty to avoid the effusion of blood; for while France, and the greatest part of Europe, continued in their present state, it was impossible that the Bourbons could reign. He accompanied this reasoning by proposing a conference with him upon the subject, ... a proposal which, Blake replied, it was not fitting that he should address to a man of honour. Bessieres had set at liberty four or five hundred prisoners, under the title of peasants; this title the Spanish general disclaimed for them, maintaining that they were regular soldiers, incorporated with the troops of the line, though not wearing the uniform. In explaining this, he said, “his intention was not to release himself from acknowledging the generous conduct of the Marshal towards them, ... but to prevent the possibility of their receiving, upon any occasion, in consequence of any misconception, a treatment which they did not deserve; and which, he was sure, from the sentiments that his excellency had manifested, could not but be painful to his own feelings.” This answer was in a lower tone than the occasion required; it admitted a distinction between the peasant and the soldier: but it became him to have proclaimed, that Spain was in circumstances when, by the first principles of law in all countries, every man is called upon to defend his country, and, becoming a soldier by necessity and duty, is to be accounted such in virtue of the cause for which he is in arms.

Bessieres might now have sent a reinforcement to Junot, who had to contend against a spreading insurrection, while he was threatened with the more serious danger of an English expedition; but as that danger had prevented Junot from succouring Dupont, so the destruction of Dupont’s army cut off his hopes of assistance from Bessieres, who was then summoned in all haste to protect the flight of the Intruder from Madrid. There is some reason to believe that the news of the battle of Baylen reached the capital some days before it was known to Joseph and his ministers, that this knowledge emboldened the Council of Castille to make their resolute stand against taking the oath of fidelity, and that it was concealed as long as possible in the hope of preventing or intercepting the Intruder’s retreat. He was not apprised of it till eight or nine days after the event; and no time was then lost in providing for his safety by retiring to Vitoria, with the intention of concentrating the French force in that part of the country, and remaining there under their protection till reinforcements from France should arrive, numerous enough to effect the subjugation of Spain. Till this time, hope had been entertained by his adherents, that the opposition of the Spaniards, unexpected and violent as it was, would soon be quelled: but now it was apparent that what had hitherto been regarded as an insurrection, had assumed the serious form of war; and it is said that Joseph, considering that this extremity had not been contemplated by the Spaniards who had entered ?Azanza y O’Farrill, p. 101.? ?De Pradt, 192.? into his service, left them now at liberty to choose their part, for or against him, in the ensuing contest. In so doing he may have acted from a generous feeling, of which he was not incapable when master of his own actions; but in reality it was not in his power to withhold the liberty which he offered. The Duke del Infantado had already escaped from Madrid, and travelling in the dress of a peasant, had joined one of the Spanish armies. The Duke del Parque also had taken the first opportunity to withdraw. Two of the Intruder’s ministers, Cevallos and Pinuela, availed themselves of the liberty which was now within their choice, and remained at Madrid. Jovellanos, always true to himself and his country, had refused to obey his summons. The other five, Urquijo, Azanza, Mazarredo, O’Farrill, and Cabarrus, adhered to what they still believed to be the stronger part, and accompanied Joseph in his retreat.

END OF VOL. I.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.