| CHAPTER I. |
| ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. |
| PAGE |
| 1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy, | 1 |
| (a) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view, | 1 |
| (b) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy, | 3 |
| 2. The inquiry into the ethical end, | 5 |
| (a) Fundamental, | 5 |
| (b) Implies a new point of view, | 7 |
| (c) Distinct from other ethical questions, | 9 |
| (a) From the inquiry into the methods of ethics, | 10 |
| () From moral psychology and sociology, | 13 |
| 3. Scope of the present inquiry, | 14 |
|
| PART I. |
| THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. |
| CHAPTER II. |
| EGOISM. |
| Definition of Naturalism, | 20 |
| Psychological hedonism, | 21 |
| 1. Its theory of action ambiguous, | 22 |
| Referring to— |
| (a) Actual consequences of action, | 23 |
| (b) Or its expected consequences, | 23 |
| (c) Or its present characteristics, | 24 |
| 2. Ethical inferences from this theory, | 25 |
| 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism, | 31 |
| 4. Possible objections considered, | 37 |
|
| CHAPTER III. |
| THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. |
| 1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State, | 41 |
| 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham, | 45 |
| (a) Utilitarianism not a political duty, | 46 |
| (b) Nor a moral duty, | 47 |
| (c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty, | 49 |
| (d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, | 50 |
| 3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of view, | 51 |
| (a) The religious sanction (Paley), | 53 |
| (b) Limits of the political sanction, | 54 |
| (c) Uncertainty of the social sanction, | 55 |
| (d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social, | 56 |
| 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, | 57 |
| (a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, | 58 |
| (b) Ambiguities in his proof, | 60 |
| 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, | 62 |
| (a) Recognition of sympathy, | 64 |
| (b) The idea of equality, | 69 |
| 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection, | 73 |
| 7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism, | 75 |
|
| CHAPTER IV. |
| MORAL SENTIMENT. |
| 1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism, | 78 |
| 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, | 84 |
| 3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, | 89 |
| (a) As harmony of impulses, | 90 |
| (b) As a separate sensitive faculty, | 92 |
| (c) As an internal law, | 100 |
| 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, | 105 |
|
| PART II. |
| THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. |
| CHAPTER V. |
| THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. |
| 1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, | 107 |
| An assertion of the unity of life, | 109 |
| Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, | 110 |
| 2. The development of morality, | 116 |
| (a) Historical psychology, | 116 |
| Its difficulties, | 117 |
| Its result, | 123 |
| (b) Development of society, | 124 |
|
| CHAPTER VI. |
| EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. |
| Bearing of the theory of evolution, | 126 |
| 1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, | 127 |
| (a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their origin, | 130 |
| (b) Organic character of moral sentiments, | 132 |
| Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, | 133 |
| 2. On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism, | 134 |
| (a) Social nature of the individual, | 135 |
| (b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, | 141 |
| (a) Continued existence of competition, | 142 |
| () Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, | 143 |
| (?) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, | 143 |
| (d) Weakness of altruistic feelings, | 146 |
| (c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, | 148 |
| Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, | 148 |
| Nor of ethical hedonism, | 150 |
| 3. On utilitarianism, | 152 |
| Modification of the utilitarian method, | 153 |
| And of its principle, | 155 |
| Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, | 155 |
| (a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, | 156 |
| (b) As a theory of consequences, | 160 |
| (c) As related solely to sensibility, | 161 |
|
| CHAPTER VII. |
| HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. |
| 1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, | 164 |
| (a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of life, | 164 |
| (b) From interpreting life by pleasure, | 165 |
| 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure, | 167 |
| 3. Objections to this argument, | 168 |
| (a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain, | 169 |
| (a) From the negative nature of pleasure, | 171 |
| () From the facts of human life, | 172 |
| (b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to pleasure, | 172 |
| (a) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument, | 173 |
| () The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery, | 175 |
| (aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious, | 176 |
| (bb) The nature of volition, | 177 |
| (cc) The facts of human progress, | 179 |
| Individual progress, | 179 |
| Social progress, | 181 |
| 4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to evolutionist ethics, | 186 |
| (a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, | 187 |
| (b) The conditions of pleasure and pain, | 190 |
| (c) Application of the theory of evolution, | 197 |
|
| CHAPTER VIII. |
| THE EVOLUTIONIST END. |
| Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory of evolution, | 201 |
| 1. Adaptation to environment, | 203 |
| (a) As the end for present conduct, | 207 |
| Opposed to progress, | 207 |
| Does not fully represent evolution, | 209 |
| (b) As describing the ultimate condition of life, | 210 |
| Resultant absolute code, | 211 |
| (a) Abstract principles of social relation, | 212 |
| () Personal end only defined as adaptation, | 213 |
| (?) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, | 213 |
| (c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, | 217 |
| 2. End suggested by the tendency to variation, | 221 |
| (a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation, | 222 |
| (b) Standard for measuring development found in complexity of act and motive, | 227 |
| (a) Antinomy between social and individual ends, | 231 |
| () Psychological defects, | 232 |
| 3. Development or increase of life as the end, | 236 |
| (a) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, | 242 |
| Cannot define life without an objective standard, | 244 |
| (b) Objective standard: defined in two ways, | 247 |
| (a) Conformity to the type, | 248 |
| Which can be reduced to— |
| () Abundance and variety of vital power, | 251 |
| That is, to the subjective standard, | 253 |
| Summary as to the evolutionist end, | 256 |
| (a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends, | 256 |
| (b) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible, | 257 |
| (c) No independent ethical ideal, | 259 |
|
| CHAPTER IX. |
| ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. |
| 1. Principles involved in theory of evolution, | 263 |
| 2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics, | 264 |
| (a) The principles being treated empirically, | 265 |
| (b) No logical transition having been effected from efficient to final cause, | 267 |
| 3. Difference between causality and teleology, | 269 |
| 4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution, | 277 |
| (a) Attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness, | 278 |
| (b) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action, | 283 |
| 5. The unity of self-consciousness, | 284 |
| (a) As making possible the transition from knowledge to morality, | 284 |
| (b) As determining the character of the ethical end, | 286 |
| (c) As showing that the realisation of the end must be progressive, | 291 |
