Persons visiting the County Prison, are struck with the evidence that abounds of some great defect in the system of primary justice in this city; and the evils so justly and so greatly to be deplored, are often unhesitatingly referred to the incompetency or malfeasance of a portion of the magistrates by whom the vagrants, the drunkards, and the violators of the public peace are committed. Without offering an opinion at present on the question, whether we owe the results of which we speak, to the ministers of justice, or to the system upon which they receive their office, and discharge its duties, we are certainly right in saying that any attempt to alleviate the miseries of public jails, must first grapple with the administration of primary justice; must begin with creating a respect for the officers of the law, and must satisfy the accused that the object of arrest is not so much the profit of the magistrate as the benefit of society; and that while the balance is held with a clean and steady hand, the costs are imposed less for the benefit of the magistrate than for the punishment for a violation of the law and the improvement of the offender.

But before we can hope for any amendment of the system, we must enable the public to comprehend the reality and the extent of the evil which is deplored, and which it is the object of the friends of sound justice to correct.

The “Station-House” and the County Prison are crowded with persons who do not feel that they have done an injury to others, or at most, they think their offence is of a most venial kind. The offence of “vagrancy” is so undefined, that it is easy to commit almost any idle person upon such a charge, and equally easy to let him go. “Disorderly conduct,” which appends to the offence of drunkenness, the punishment of a month confinement instead of a day is so uncertain in its character, that the jubilant politician is in danger of imprisonment if his huzzas are strengthened and multiplied by even moderate potations. And “disorderly house” is made to cover all kinds of disturbances between singing loud to a crying child, and the repeated orgies of drunkenness and prostitution, just as “misdemeanor” includes all indictable offences below actual felony. And “abuse and threats,” that formerly expressed something definite, now fill the commitment with most undefinable charges, and the cells with most astonished and astonishing inmates.

The whole system of magisterial justice has, in this city, fallen into disrepute; and those who are the objects of its penalties, seem to lose respect for its ministers and their ministration, and to regard arrest and imprisonment as a misfortune which is as likely to fall upon one as another, if poor, and which therefore justifies any effort to evade the penalty.

This was not always so; we speak of the estimate of aldermanic justice. There never was a time when vice and crime did not abound in a great city, and, consequently, if respect for public rights exists, and a necessity for order is admitted there is likely always to be business for the police, and cases for the magistrates. But there is a mode of conducting both arrests and “hearings,” that makes the difference in the proceedings and their effects. And when we shall have looked a little more into the details of the matter as they are presented, we shall not only see the cause of the evils which we deplore, but shall rapidly and easily arrive at a conclusion with regard to some of the means which are to be employed to alleviate the miseries of public prisons, and thus see that the subject of which we now treat, is one that directly connects itself with the aims of the Society, and that it demands from us an opinion of the evil which it involves, and a consideration of the plans which may be suggested as a remedy.

The small income from the office of Alderman in this city is augmented by a salary allowed to six of them, who may happen to be of the right kind of politics to ensure their claims upon Councils to be elected Police Magistrates. The changes which the Charter of the City has undergone by amendments and substitution, have left Philadelphia in an anomalous situation with regard to offices. Every ward in the city has one or more Aldermen, who possess now little else than the functions of a justice of the peace. And the roll of officials bears also the name of a “Recorder,” yet that functionary has few if any other relations with the city government than has the humblest of the Aldermen; or if he has, it is some remnant of ancient obligation to do service never required, or to demand fees seldom paid to him. No one can deny that the present Recorder discharges well the duties of a justice of the peace, so far as his power extends; but no one will say that the office is essential to any branch of justice in the city if all others are well executed.

We speak now rather in abstract, but it may not be out of the way to say, that the citizen who occupies at present the place of Recorder, seems to illustrate the idea of an efficient magistrate, as, without any particular call upon him, he has been a terror and a scourge to evil doers, and thus he magnifies his office, and makes it honorable.

The report of our Prison Agent, extracts from which have been given, shows to what an extent the evil to which we allude has already extended. His labors procured the release of more than a hundred persons every month. Now, though in many instances the prisoner thus released may have violated some law, and thus have rendered himself obnoxious to the penalties of the statute, yet in a greater part of the committals, investigation shows that the idea of just convictions did not enter into the complaint, and that the magistrate might have caused a settlement of the matter, without recourse to incarceration, in the infliction of fine; or at least it would be easy so to amend the laws of the State as to empower the magistrate to deal thus with the accused. Much the largest part of the commitments, however, are of a kind that do not often come to the knowledge of the Agent, but are referred to the “Visiting Inspectors” of the Prison. These are for drunkenness, disorder, breach of the peace, and vagrancy; and as an Act of Assembly gives to the Inspectors of the Prison the power to discharge persons committed for such offences, it follows that many committed for thirty days are released before the expiration of their term. Intoxication is charged, and the miserable offender is sent to the prison; perhaps a family is dependent upon his or her labor, or an infant needs the nourishment, which only a mother can afford; and the miserable mother is suffering from an excess of that from which only an infant can ordinarily relieve her.

An innocent woman has often been taken up in a grand swoop which a spasmodic effort of the police has made, and she is included in the long list of commitments as drunk, or a vagrant. Many of those who were guilty of the lower offences charged against them receive no good from their incarceration, and society is not benefited by their removal from the labor which maintains them and a family, and the imprisonment devolves upon the city the expenses of the support, often both of the offenders and their families.

A considerable portion of the community that have acquaintance with the prison by commitment, are of a class that think all personal redress, and all protection from wrong, and all safety from the consequences of their own misconduct lie in an appeal to the magistrate, and a trifling quarrel in a neighborhood frequently leads to the arrest and incarceration of the principal members of several families, and the offending and the offended parties are often seen withdrawing from the contests of hands and clubs, and contending in a foot race to see which shall first enter complaint before a magistrate. Often in these matters both succeed; each contrives to get his antagonist into prison, and mulct him in costs. Occasionally it happens, that “the race is not to the swift;” success is found to depend on the possession of the means to pay the first cost of the action. Perhaps the most painful, because the most unrighteous, of this kind of suits, are those in which a quarrelsome drunkard, having beaten his wife, proceeds at once to the magistrate and charges her, on oath, with assault and battery, or with assault and threats, and the poor woman comes down to the prison with her head bruised, her eyes blackened, and her whole frame bearing marks of the outrageous injury inflicted by her cowardly, drunken husband, who, after a few days, finding his household matters in some derangement for want of a female head, obligingly releases his wife from prison, till his time for another debauch has arrived. Nor is it to be denied that the drunken wife often, very often, brings the husband into similar difficulties. In some of these cases a magistrate might, by interference, mitigate a portion of the misery which is inflicted, and by his friendly advice prevent much that usually follows.

This constant resort to litigation in those who have no “cause” but what they create of themselves, is one of the crying evils of the times. The facility of a warrant, and the knowledge that the facility results from its price, cause a large portion of the cases which reach our courts of justice, or are settled, “with costs,” between the Alderman’s office and the jury-room.

Another class of cases is found in the prison—that of disorderly houses. Now it is well understood that the term “disorderly house,” has a specific signification when connected with a charge before an Alderman; yet, on enquiry as to the character of the “disorder,” it frequently happens that the offenders were in the exercise of customary rights in their own apartment. Singing, perhaps, or talking loudly; or, it may happen, that not even such disturbances are mentioned. But the proprietor of the house, usually an under-letter, can do better with his contracted premises by a larger rent, or more ready collection, he therefore incurs the cost of magisterial interference, the tenants, he knows, cannot find freehold bail, they will sell a part of their goods to pay back rent and cost, and for the sake of exemption, or release from confinement, will agree to leave the rooms, and thus the prosecutor secures the first object of his unjust movement, and is saved also the cost of a defeat in court.

The number of persons committed on the charge of “disorderly houses,” is astonishing; especially when it is considered how many “disorderly houses” remain unvisited, and the occupants not arrested. But we must not forget the fact, that the movement of the magistrate in these cases is sanctioned, perhaps required, by the solemn oath of the complainant.

With these remarks we are led to the consideration of the subject with which we commenced this part of our Report, namely, The Magistracy, and their alleged complicity in the evil which we deplore, and which we would diminish for the sake of the miserable victims of temporary power, and for the sake of the credit of our community.

On all sides we hear the complaint of the character and conduct of the Aldermen of the city; many of them, it is stated, use their office to extort from the unfortunate poor, a portion of their hard earnings, and thus deprive the homes of the laborer of the little comforts of which they are susceptible. They entertain complaints, it is said, of acts which need not be construed into offence against the law, and thus encourage litigation, and perpetuate feuds among those whom it would seem to be their duty, as magistrates, to “keep at peace with all men.”

We have already enumerated and repeated the classes of cases which most encumber the dockets of the Aldermen, and which are made of more importance than they deserve by the effects on the income of the magistrates which these causes produce. But the enumeration and repetition alone of these would not be a part of the duties of this Society, or form a portion of this Report, if they did not suggest a call for remedy. It is not the evils of prisons that constitute the object of this Society, but the melioration of those evils.

Taking, then, the existence of the evils, as we have only hinted at them, and admitting (as we are free to do, and as we do with pleasure, because it is just) that while the cry against the magistracy is universal, the fault is really found in only a part of them, the inquiry is, “how shall all this be remedied?”

“Elect better Aldermen,” say those who wish for a better state of things. “Elect suitable men, and the evil is at once remedied.”

Undoubtedly the plan is good; but is it practicable? For many years the Aldermen of Philadelphia have been elected by the people, and in many instances the choice has been judicious, but in others either the official conduct of the magistrate has deteriorated into the grossest kind of improprieties, or he has been compelled to give place to some greater favorite of the voters of his ward, who would begin his descending march some grades below that at which his predecessor closed his career. So large a portion of the duties of the Alderman who has most to do as a police magistrate, are beyond the knowledge and sympathy of the respectable portion of the community, that little interest is taken in his election by those who feel a sense of shame at the improprieties of a functionary connected with the administration of justice; and in many parts of the city the knowledge and sympathy of that class would avail nothing towards the election of another person.

The Grand Jury recently inquiring for the city and county of Philadelphia, made the following severe strictures upon Aldermen:

“It has been a matter of exceeding regret that the law has not clothed this body with discretionary power to tax the magistrates, before whom the cases were heard, with the costs, as a proper rebuke to that avarice which seeks to convert litigation and contention into a source of gain,—which offers a premium for crimes, by making the ministers of the law the transgressors, and prostituting the province of peace-makers to that of a common barrator.”

As the Grand jury did not, of course, desire to be directly personal when they were not about to find a bill, they let their censure take a general course. They set forth an evil, and that, perhaps, was enough, till some special case of wrong should be laid before them.

But the alleviation of the evil—the remedy. It is evident the remedy is not in the ballot-box—the root of the evil lies far back of that; nor is it in the statutes of the Commonwealth. The Constitution of the State is in fault; and until that is modified, or till some act of the Assembly can be passed superseding the Aldermen in their special police duties, we cannot hope for any diminution of the evil. The Aldermen of the city are elected by the voters of their own wards, and he who can command the most votes, can, if he desire it, be chosen Alderman. No man of wealth seeks the place,—no man of business habits asks for a nomination. The rewards of the office are, at best, below that of ordinary business; and the distinction which the place confers is not that which gratifies the wishes of the ambitious. But the place is coveted and obtained, its emoluments spring from the fees paid by those who come or are brought before the magistrate. If his business is multiplied, his profits, of course, are increased; and as he sought the place for the means of a living, he must avail himself of the capabilities of the place to augment those means. If people will “sue and be sued,” if people will fight and go to law, if neighbors will quarrel, and then drag each other before the magistrate, it may seem, to the functionary, rather a thankless exercise of his ability, to recommend such an adjustment of the case as will deprive him of the fees of office, by which he lives. And while most philanthropists would applaud the magistrate who sat to reconcile rather than to punish,—who dispensed with his fees while he dispensed kindness and affection rather than justice,—it is probable that the family for which he was bound to provide would have to look to some other means of support than those supplied by the man who looked to the peace of the neighborhood rather than the augmentation of fees. And it may as well be added, that the magistrate who should thus employ his functions, would soon fail of objects, provided another alderman could be found who would grant to passion its first demand. For it is evident that most of the complaints that come before our aldermen are brought by those who seek to gratify personal animosity and a sudden desire of vengeance rather than any wish to punish the wrong-doer for the sake of right. We must take men as they are, not as we could wish them to be. We must recognize in the office of an alderman the means of support for the incumbent and his family; and while all around us, men are exercising their talents and taxing their ingenuity, to gain wealth by the advantages which the law allows, we must not suppose that the alderman is to sit in magisterial quiet, and suffer the vails of office to escape his grasp, when they are the fruits of a labor sanctioned by law or warranted by official custom.

If we would remedy the evils about which so much has been justly said, and concerning which the Grand Jury has spoken so plainly, we must do something more than talk and complain.

We have already said the evil finds its source and sanction in the Constitution of our State. The change of the whole mode of supplying the magistrates and judicial officers, that was wrought by the present Constitution, may have corrected some evils: the general question is one which we are now not called upon to discuss; but we may say, that experience shows that nothing has been gained with regard to the administration of justice in the magistrates offices of our city. Twenty-five years experience shows that none of the evils complained of in this department have been diminished, while most of them have been augmented, and new ones added to the list. This seems almost a necessary result of the system, and thus calls for prompt, effective remedy.

What is required in Philadelphia, is a class of Police Magistrates, with a salary that shall secure and compensate the services of competent men, who shall have no pecuniary temptation to commit any person brought before them, and whose character and condition shall give weight, no less to their decisions than their recommendations. Placed by the tenor and fixed reward of their office above dependence upon those who shall demand justice in others, or receive it in themselves, they shall not shrink from their duty to condemn, more than from their sense of propriety to discharge.

Of legal qualifications we have little to say. The layman, fitted by character and ordinary education for the place of police magistrate, might soon become sufficiently learned in the law and requirements of his place, to discharge with fidelity and success the duties thereof. A considerable number of those now holding the office of Alderman, and as such elected occasionally as Police Magistrates, show themselves competent to all the duties of their office, and worthy of the position which would be opened to them, should the reformation that we suggest ever be made. It is not always the man,—it is the circumstances in which he is placed; it is the necessities of nomination, the demands of the election, and the condition into which the office has been brought, that hinder some in their attempts at good, and deprive the city of benefits from the services of those who, under other circumstances, would promote public order, and acquire honor by their administration of justice and their exercise of humane powers.

And while so much freedom has been exercised in censuring the official conduct of some of the Aldermen of our city,—a freedom that is suggested and can be sustained by facts,—it is due to the cause of truth and justice to repeat emphatically what is readily admitted above, that many of the magistrates are eminently deserving of commendation, as well for the abilities they possess, as for the use to which those abilities are applied in the discharge of their vexatious duties. And it may be added, that some of those who have been most censured, have shown themselves possessed of good feelings, and amenable to the requirements of courtesy and humanity. The system is in fault; and till that is changed for the better,—reformed altogether,—we cannot look for any considerable improvement in the administration of justice in police offices. For it is a lamentable fact, that such is the want of confidence in some of the magistrates, that the decisions of the able and the good are treated with a distrust most dangerous to public order.

Our judiciary, from the lowest offices to the highest, was derived from England. The names of the officials, the cause of their proceedings, the rules of their action, are all from the parent country. If we have not derived from these all the benefits which might be expected, and all we see England enjoy, it is worth while for those interested to inquire what has disturbed public opinion, what has weakened public respect, what has augmented the law’s delay, or what has strengthened the general opinion of its uncertainty. So far as such feelings, if any such exist, may connect themselves with the “courts of record” of our State, it is not the object of the present Report to discuss the cause, to point to their extent, or suggest a remedy. But we have legitimately before us the evils of a bad system of minor justice, and we are therefore right in suggesting a remedy.

The progress of society abroad suggests remedies for evils which it is the duty of the people of this country to consider. And the mode of administering justice in police courts in London, eminently deserves the attention of those who deplore the deficiency and seek for a substitute in Philadelphia. It is simple, easy, practical. Magistrates of established character are appointed, to hold office during good behavior. They have a salary ample to maintain themselves and a family. Their office has with it something of the character of the Court of Sessions, and thus there attaches to their persons an idea of judicial dignity, which is to be respected on the police bench, and which respects itself when in the world. These officers are not tempted, by inadequacy of income, to augment the business of their office, that they may profit by costs or compromise. Those who are compelled by business or misfortune to appear before them, feel that respect is due to the administration of justice in its incipient stages, and a large portion of those who are charged with the violation of law, appeal with confidence to those magistrates for summary proceedings, (which the law there allows,) in preference to the delay which would attend a reference of their case to a jury. Such a power on the part of the police magistrate is found most advantageous to justice in London, resulting in great saving to the city and county, without lessening the terrors of the law,—rather augmenting them by the promptness of punishment.

Should the Legislature of the State be disposed to remedy the existing evils in this city, by providing for an alteration in the Constitution, by which the mode of acquiring, and the terms of holding, office by the Aldermen shall be changed, it is possible that an enlargement of power, such as we have noticed in the London magistracy, would be granted, so that justice would be promptly as well as carefully administered.

We have, in this chapter, touched upon one disturbing element, and we have done it with no view to cast indiscriminate odium upon any citizen. The evil to which we have adverted, exists. The great cause, however, of the evil, we have shown to arise out of the Constitution of the State, or from a deficiency of legislation. We lack no talent in this city for judicial or magisterial place; but we have failed in attempts to call those talents into the best exercise, and to insure to them the highest public respect.

There is, however, another disturbing cause, which we must look at steadily, if we would understand its bearing on society, its influence on morals, and especially its connection with the subject of prison occupation and prison discipline. And especially ought we to present the subject in immediate connection with a consideration of the Magistracy. It is Intoxication that crowds the police office and the alderman’s tribunal. Hourly is the magistrate called to commit or fine the violator of the law of temperance. The miserable wretches come into his presence without power to discriminate between right and wrong, with no command of their own movements, and no sense of propriety with regard to conduct or conversation; and complaints are sometimes made that these creatures are not treated with suitable consideration. Let us, when we consider the duties and conduct of magistrates, not overlook the disgusting materials to which they are to administer justice, nor blame them if they sometimes suffer the prisoner to hold the rank which he assigns to himself.