KEY TO THE REFERENCES

In most cases it will not be difficult to determine where the MS. sources are preserved. Despatches to or from a military or naval officer, a diplomatic or a consular agent may be understood, if there is no indication to the contrary, to be in the corresponding archives of the government addressed. (The connection of the author of a despatch may be ascertained by looking up his name in the index.) This direction may seem vague, but the officials at the archives will be found able to supply the needful details. The principal foreign agents in Mexico were (U. S.) Poinsett, Butler, Ellis, Thompson, Shannon, Slidell, and (consuls) Jones, Black, and Dimond; (England) Morier, Ward, Pakenham, Ashburnham, Bankhead, Doyle, Thornton, and (consul) Giffard; (France) Cochelet, Martin, Deffaudis, and Cyprey; and (Spain) BermÚdez de Castro and Lozano. Mexican documents cited in the form “To S. Anna, Apr. 20” or “S. Anna, Mar. 4,” are in the archives of the War Dept. of Mexico, National Palace. Many unofficial letters can readily be traced by means of the list of MS. sources. When it has seemed desirable, however, particularly at the beginning of a chapter, heavy figures referring to that list have been prefixed to the citation, and also to many citations of official documents. The MS. sources are given in the appendix of each volume; the printed sources in the appendix of the second volume.

A formula like “Ho. 60; 30, 1” means House Executive Document no. 60, of the Thirtieth Congress, first session; and “Cong. Globe, 30, 2” refers to the Congressional Globe, Thirtieth Congress, second session. In some cases it has been found best to cite a document broadly by mentioning the first page of it; and the same remark applies to passages in other publications. The year in the date of a cited document is omitted when it is the same as that of the events referred to in the corresponding paragraph of the text. E.g. a document dated Oct. 15, 1847, attached to a paragraph dealing with Scott’s landing at Vera Cruz (March, 1847) or capturing Mexico City (Sept., 1847) is cited as of “Oct. 15,” not “Oct. 15, 1847.” This is done to save space. The abbreviations are plain. “Gov.” means governor; “comte. gen.,” comandante general; “comte. mil.” comandante militar. “Gov. Puebla,” etc., means governor of Puebla, etc. “Diario” means the official newspaper. For fuller titles of books the list of sources may be consulted.

The want of definiteness and the lack of statistics in numerous cases (particularly Mexican affairs) may be charged to a dearth of trustworthy data.

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NOTES

PREFACE

1. Another reason for the neglect of the Mexican War has been its unpopularity. But for that, it would no doubt have been thoroughly studied sooner.

2. A second reason for preparing this history was that a number of important topics—such as the conditions existing in the two countries just before the war, the war in American politics, our conduct and methods in occupied territory, the finances of the war, its foreign relations, etc.—had been treated most superficially or not at all. In the third place it was hoped to handle more carefully the material previously used. The bound volumes entitled “Archivo de Guerra” in the Archivo General y PÚblico at Mexico occupy some 200 feet of shelf room, and the papers examined in the Archivo de Guerra y Marina, which had to be examined one by one, would probably, if placed one on another, make a pile sixty feet high.

As will be seen from the detailed account of the MS. sources (appendix), the author did not visit the archives of all the Mexican states and cities. This was because nothing further of local value could be hoped for, and because the practice of communicating from state to state copies of important documents made it seem unnecessary to continue in those directions. The results in Peru and Colombia were negative, but this fact had a positive significance, for there were reasons to look for an active sympathy and correspondence with Mexico in those quarters. The author planned to examine the Prussian archives, but the outbreak of the great war prevented him from doing so. From other trustworthy sources, mostly unpublished, he fully understood the attitude of that government, however (chap. xxxv). The reports of the Prussian representative at Mexico cannot have been reliable, both because of his personal characteristics and because for several reasons he did not stand within the inner circle, and probably, since his government felt scarcely any interest in the war, they were not full. Hence it is not believed that anything of material value has been lost through the impossibility of examining them. Of some of the newspaper files only scattered portions were found. Many newspapers, as well as many books and pamphlets, were read to ascertain the general temper, social state, and political conditions of the two countries, and it appeared unnecessary to set down references—which would have been almost innumerable—to such literature. The author contemplated at one time a critical discussion of the sources, but he soon found that this would require too much space. It would in fact make a volume. For additional information regarding the sources one may consult an article of the author’s that appeared in The Military Historian and Economist, vol. i, no. 1.

3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated with the originals. On the value of official military reports the author presented some remarks in the American Historical Review, vol. xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott’s report on the battle of Cerro Gordo was “a lie from beginning to end,” and in a sense different from what this language would at first sight appear to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later General) Bragg wrote: “The feelings succeeding a great victory caused many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence” (210to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as “full of inaccuracies” (117R.Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848).

A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap, and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the article in the Military Historian cited above). Even minutiÆ enable one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents. In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts, documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood. Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott’s statement see 65gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847.

Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa BÁrcena present statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon personal knowledge. Roa BÁrcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an interesting though not wholly correct review of Ripley, So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1851, 149–60). Pillow 185wrote in reference to Ripley’s book, He has torn Scott “the man and the officer all to pieces.” The recent work by Rives contains much that is sound as well as dignified; but his investigations came far short of the requirements. The present author has frequently taken pains to write in such a way as to correct errors without mentioning them, and the reader may feel sure that he has carefully considered all statements not in agreement with his own.

4. Particular reasons why a civilian could venture to prepare the history of this war were that (1) owing largely to the smallness of the numbers engaged, the operations were simple; (2) the reports were written for non-military readers; and (3) a large amount of good criticism was written at the time or soon afterwards—mostly in a private way—by competent officers who were personally familiar with the circumstances. As a matter of fact military men’s technical knowledge does not necessarily enable them to reach correct historical conclusions. This is proved by their radical differences of opinion (e.g. compare the articles on Wilcox’s History of the Mexican War, Journal of U.S. Artillery, July and Oct., 1892) and their manifest errors of judgment. Gen. U. S. Grant pronounced Scott’s strategy on Aug. 20, 1847, faultless as a result of the perfect work of his engineer officers (Pers. Mems., i, 145); but the engineer from whose report Scott’s essential orders regarding the battle of Churubusco resulted admitted privately that he blundered (xxvi, notes, remarks on Churubusco). The dicta of military authorities are not often quoted by the author, because war cannot be made by rule and it would be necessary to consider in each case whether the dictum was applicable.

A very difficult matter was to decide how many military details to introduce. There is hardly any limit to the names of officers and commands and the minutiÆ of movements that might have been presented. The principle adopted was to draw the line between historical value and antiquarian value, to include what was needed to show how the important results were brought about and allow the curious reader to ascertain the rest of the details by looking up the references.

The reader who has given no study to the subject may perhaps welcome a few informal and obviously incomplete remarks on the principles of war. One proper aim is the occupation of territory, and this may possibly be accomplished without fighting; but essentially combat is presupposed, and the purpose is then to destroy or in some other way eliminate the enemy’s military strength, so that he will feel compelled to accept our terms. Therefore the general should (1) make all possible preparations; (2) take the initiative and lose no time; (3) secure unity in plan and in action; (4) obtain as much information as possible regarding the enemy and beware of despising him; (5) embarrass him and break down his morale, while building up your own, through rapidity of movement, surprises, feints, threats against his communications, etc.; (6) select for objective a point combining, as far as may be, weakness and decisiveness—qualities often incompatible, of course; (7) running no avoidable risk of inadequacy, concentrate near and move upon this an overpowering force, while diverting the enemy’s forces from it; (8) strike with energy and decision; and (9) if successful, pursue to the limit of endurance and safety. In a general way it may be said that an “indirect” or “oblique” (i.e. flank) attack is preferable, but obviously the actual conditions must decide whether to adopt that method. In view of these principles, strategy determines when, where, and with what forces a battle shall be fought, and tactics directs the battle itself. It follows that on the defensive one should protect one’s communications, force the enemy to send out detachments and rout or annoy these; and, if such methods have no saving effect, retire to a position strong by nature, art, or both, and, while defending it, watch for opportunities to strike. One may consult on these points and on the text to which this note refers Clausewitz, On War, book i, chap. 7; Jomini, PrÉcis, i, 470–2; Murray, Reality of War, 21, 77; Donat, Strategical Science, 275–6; Henderson, Science of War, 19–20; Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116; Goltz, Conduct of War, 10–12; Jour. Milit. Serv. Instit., 1908, p. 31; Am. Hist. Rev., xi, 388.

5. As the author was compelled to depart in many cases from the familiar method of referring to the sources, he feels bound to explain how these were handled. All the material, condensed as much as it safely could be, was marked in the margin with Roman figures, indicating to what chapter each sentence or larger section would belong. Then the sections were copied into packets, each of which contained all the material of a chapter. Next the material of each packet was analyzed into topical items, and the items were numbered with Arabic figures. In writing a chapter the author placed after each sentence (or, if the case demanded, after each clause, phrase or word) the Arabic figures numbering the items upon which it rested. These figures were retained through the successive revisions until the MS. was ready to print, and were used in the re-examination of the work. By this routine every document was considered at least five times. Of course care was taken at all stages to ensure correct copying; yet in the final revision the author went back, unless there was a good reason for not doing so, to originals or to trustworthy copies from the originals—doing this not merely to verify the references but also to see, in the light of the completed investigation of the subject, whether he had omitted or misunderstood anything of importance in making notes and condensations. The text and remarks as written looked thus:

“Gen. Patterson once asserted that Volunteers were no worse than regulars 578, but the evidence of other officers 83–4 340 385 564 568 1266 and of the Mexicans 84 87 340 489 582 1236 was overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these appear to have been commonly mere pilfering 181 562, and to have been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits 83 1103. It is probable, however, that the Volunteer troops often bore the blame 109 for acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged 659 981, deserters 582 601 659 689 945, teamsters and other civilian employees 358 1315 and the many “black legs” 377 and “human vultures” 1292 who followed the army 365 568 639. The great difficulty was to identify the culprits 1315. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against our soldiers 1266.”

The saving of space and labor that resulted from the grouping of citations can easily be illustrated. Take the case of ten statements resting upon ten documents, which may be represented by the first ten letters of the alphabet. Were the usual method followed the references might be: acj, dfghi, be, adeghj, fij, bcf, adeg, cfh, i, bdghj; whereas by the group method the references would be abcdefghij—in the former case 35, in the latter 10. The higher cost of the former method might have enforced the omission of all references from the printed volumes, if indeed the increased labor of writing, copying, and proof-reading the references had not deterred the author—as it might well have done—from completing his task. As it stands, the book probably represents (including the work of clerical assistants) nearly twenty years of labor. After all, the chief value of citations is perhaps their effect upon the author. Few look them up; but, no matter how conscientious he may be, the fact of constantly giving such pledges of fidelity keeps him wide-awake to the necessity of accuracy, and indeed compels him to refer to his sources more than he might otherwise feel obliged to do.

I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS

(To the sources mentioned below may be added a residence of more than a year in Mexico, during which the author met people of numerous categories and made every possible effort to understand the national traits.)

1. Physical Mexico. U. S. War Dept., Monograph. Bureau of Amer. Republics, Mexico. EncyclopÆdia Britannica, “Mexico.” Numerous books of travel mentioned in note 8.

2. Population. The census which served as a basis for the elections of 1841 and some later years gave the population as 7,016,000 (DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 152, gives the figures by states). The American governor of Jalapa, Col. Hughes, 257wrote, Jan. 28, 1848, that according to “authentic Mexican official documents” the population was about 7,500,000, of whom 2,500,000 were under seventeen years of age, 500,000 were over sixty, and 300,000 were idlers, beggars, etc., incapable of work. The population of the United States in 1840 was 17,069,453. Observador Judicial, 1842. Consideraciones, 5. Journal des DÉbats, Sept. 9, 1847. 261MÉmoire. Macgregor, Progress, i, 317. Ward, Mexico, i, 28. Mora, Obras, i, 54. MÉxico Á travÉs, iii, 19; iv, p. vii. Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9, 1847. 82Decree, Dec. 16, 1847. Diario, May 4, 1847, claimed 8,000,000.

3. Racial divisions and characteristics. MÉxico Á travÉs, iii, 18–21. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 367, 381, 411–6; ii, 1–4, 9, 45, 48–52. 52Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Mayer, War, 13, 16. Commerc. Review, ii, 165–76. Consideraciones, 5–7. GarcÍa, Conquista, 4, 370–2, 397. Thompson, Recolls., 7. Poinsett, Notes, 161. 13Hervey, Description of Mexico. 261MÉmoire. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 166, 174–89. Mora, Obras, i, 54–6. Cuevas, Porvenir, 12–14. 178Davis, diary. 162Conner to wife, Mar. 4, 1846. Diccionario Universal (Mexicanos). 13Morier, no. 10, Feb. 10, 1825. Eco del Comercio, Mar. 22, 1848.

Technically the child of a Spaniard and an Indian was a “mestizo,” the child of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a “castizo,” and the child of a Spaniard and a castizo was a “criollo” (creole); but “criollo” came to include all these classes and also pure whites born in Mexico. As very few Spanish women went to Mexico, the mixture of blood was practically inevitable. As is well known the Spanish blood itself is a singular mixture. Hence the Mexican was naturally peculiar.

4. The class divisions. Otero, CuestiÓn, 37, 47–51. 13Morier, no. 12, Feb. 10, 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, i, 232. 26lMÉmoire. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 391–5, 400–1, 429–31; ii, 40. Poinsett, Notes, 162. Constituent Cong. of Mex., Address. Consideraciones, 18, 19. Mora, Obras, i, 54–6. Paredes, Papers, 136. 52Poinsett, no. 166. MÉxico Á travÉs, iii, 18. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 188–9.5. Church, army, civil service. Mayer, War, 20–1, 132. Otero, CuestiÓn, 38–46, 59, 60, 71–3. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii, xcvii-cxviii, ccxlvii; ii, 122–8. 261MÉmoire. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 38, 94, 117–28. Humboldt, Polit. Essay (London, 1811), i, 231–2. MÉxico Á travÉs, ii, 896; iii, 23; iv, 149, 447, 639. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 37. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637, 642. Thompson, Recolls., 41, 53, 101–3, 169–74. 52Poinsett, nos. 2, 12, 36, 55, 166 (May 28; Aug. 5, 1825; Feb. 18; Aug. 26, 1826; March 10, 1829). Consideraciones, 6, 7, 12, 26–30, 37, 39–42. 13Ashburnham, Oct. 3, 1837; July 26, 1838. Semmes, Service, 14–5, 21. 11Martin, Feb. 1; July 20, 1827; Dec. 25, 1828. 11Cochelet, June 6; Nov. 20, 1829. Correspondant, April 15; July 15, 1846. CalderÓn, Life, i, 337, 408. 13Hervey, Description. Picayune, April 22, 1843. Bocanegra, Memorias, i, 32. Tornel, ReseÑa, 19–21, 84. 11Despatch to the French govt., about June, 1823 (anon.). 13Morier, no. 13, Feb. 10, 1825. 13Morier and Ward, no. 1, April 10, 1825. 13Ward, no. 37, Apr. 29, 1826. 13Pakenham, nos. 17, Jan. 30, 1830; 25, Feb. 26, 1841; 77, Aug. 29, 1842. 13Bankhead, nos. 73, Aug. 29, 1844; 56, Apr. 29, 1846. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 30, 1845. Mobile Commerc. Register, Aug. 9, 1845. Veracruzano Libre, Dec. 27, 1845. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Memoria de ... Guerra, Nov. 7, 1823, 17, 18. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 75, 77. Id., Estado Militar, 58. 375Perry to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 16, 1846. BÚlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 182. Rivero, MÉx. en 1842, 25, 137–9. Ward, Mexico, i, 307–17, 330–40. London Times, Nov. 11, 1845.

According to Otero, an able editor and statesman, the income of the Church represented in 1829 a capital of $127,000,000, besides the buildings, etc., used for worship and for the housing of ecclesiastics; and practically none of its property was taxed. Of its wealth, large for any period but huge for that day, $18,000,000 were invested in city and country real estate; and consequently there was an army of agents looking after Church interests in all quarters, and a great number of proprietors and financiers were closely associated with the clericals. One may say, reported a French diplomatic agent, “that religion does not exist [in Mexico], for its influence is nowhere felt”; and in truth, as an ardent Roman Catholic said in Le Correspondant of Paris in 1846, that country needed to be evangelized anew. Trist: “The lazy, ignorant, and stupid monks, whose views do not extend beyond the round of purely animal enjoyments, and include no esprit de corps save pecuniary greed mixed with an idol worship fanaticism” (52no. 18, Oct. 25, 1847). RamÍrez, MÉxico, 219: Christianity merely gross idolatry here. The Mexican church stood naturally in opposition to the government, for both claimed the right of ecclesiastical patronage. The influence of the Church was lessened by Leo XII, who exhorted the Mexicans to return to Spain (MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 149).

350Weber: “If the Mexican soldier has something to eat, he eats it; if not, he goes without. That is all.” Diario, May 20, 1847: The army has been burdened with enough generals and field officers for the army Napoleon led against Russia. (24,000 officers) Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 20. ($21,000,000) 52Slidell to Buchanan, Jan. 14, 1846. Negrete, InvasiÓn, iv, app., 400. Eco del Comercio, Mar. 22, 1848. 11Martin: The army belongs to the first who “gives it money or promises it plunder” (Dec. 25, 1828). 13Doyle, no. 81, Oct. 30, 1843. Don Simplicio, July 19, 1846. Nacional, Jan. 19, 1848.

6. Justice, education, the press. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 35, 396; ii, 393. Thompson, Recolls., 20–4, 147–52. London Times, Jan. 8, 1846. 13Ward, no. 58, confid., April 18, 1827. 13Pakenham, nos. 39, May 27, 1836; 5, Jan. 25, 1841. 13Bankhead, no. 54, May 30, 1845. 13O’Gorman to Pakenham, Jan. 19, 1835. Pakenham, Nov. 23, 1834, separate; no. 8, March 8, 1835. 56W. S. Parrott, Oct. 11, 1845. 52Jones, June 1, 1837; nos. 168, Oct. 30, 1838; 252, May 5, 1839. Leclerc in Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1, 1840, p. 638. 11French vice-consul, Mex., Aug. 19, 1829; Feb. 3, 1830. Tornel, ReseÑa, 288. Consideraciones, 6, 7, 12–4, 43, 48. Memorias de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1825; Feb., 1828; Jan., 1831; May, 1833; Dec, 1846. Memorias, min. of justice, 1833, 1835, 1845. Ward, Mexico, i, 337. 52Poinsett, no. 166. Constit. Cong, of Mex., Address. Liberal Moderado, Aug. 4, 1846. Mora, Obras, i, pp. clxxxviii-cxcvii. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 109–16. Lavalles, Etudes, 31–3. Villar, Proyecto. CalderÓn, Life, i, 195, 340–2. Esparza, Informe. Memorias, min. of treas., May, 1833; July, 1845. Memorias, min. of pub. instr., Jan., 1844; July, 1844; March, 1845. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637.

For a long time after 1821 only one slight attempt was made to improve the old judicial methods, and that was a failure. 11Vice-consul of France, Aug. 19, 1829: “Justice is so venal, that with money one could have the victim arrested and the criminal rewarded.” In 1836 the British minister reported the opinion of an able Mexican lawyer that certain important court proceedings were nothing but “a conspiracy authorized and supported by judicial formulas, one more illegal than another.” Mexican minister of justice, 1835: “On all sides is heard a unanimous outcry against the bad administration of justice” (Memoria). At a public meeting, Aug. 13, 1846, Pedro Zubieta said: “What have been thus far the judiciary and the magistracy? A shameful market, in which those august names have put Justice up at auction” (Diario, Sept. 19). The gov. of MichoacÁn 76wrote, Nov. 28, 1845: I am unable to prevent some judges from favoring criminals. AlamÁn reported secretly to Congress in 1830: The tribunals ensure impunity to criminals (Pakenham, no. 25, Mar. 25, 1830). RamÍrez, Mexico, 225: Our magistrates are usually insignificant (hombrecitos), “vigorous to persecute, feeble to command, and incapable of serving as models of a just and severe impartiality.” The reports of the American ministers and consuls were full of similar complaints. Once when our consul reminded the minister of foreign affairs that it was the constitutional duty of the Executive to have the laws faithfully administered, the latter replied, “Yes, but it is impossible.” In 1838 France took strong ground against the miscarriages of justice in the Mexican courts.

The Lancastrian system of pupil helpers was tried in the schools; but it failed, for nobody understood it practically. The educational authorities gave ear to bright young men who had merely picked up a few ideas on the boulevards of Europe, and wasted their time in theorizing and making projects. We have become, said a thoughtful writer in March, 1848, the most persistent of charlatans, glad to talk on any subject without understanding it, and ready to try all sorts of theories, which vanish like smoke as soon as put into practice.

7. Industries, trade, means of communication. Revista EconÓmica, Dec. 14, 31, 1843. Macgregor, Progress, i, 308, 670, 674. Ward, Mexico, ii, 3–170. MÉxico Á travÉs, iii, 18. London Times, Aug. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845. 52Thompson, no. 4, July 30, 1842. 13Ward, nos. 45, 99 (May 20; Aug. 20, 1826). 261MÉmoire. Gazette d’Etat de Prusse, Nov. 11, 1823. Consideraciones, 8–12, 14–8. Otero, CuestiÓn, 31–4, 46, 49, 50, 97–8. Pakenham, nos. 25, Mar. 25, 1830; 28, June 11, 1833; 61, July 8, 1841; 4, 49, 123, Jan. 6, June 2, Dec. 25, 1842; 5, Jan. 24, 1843. 13Ashburnham, no. 3, Jan. 31, 1838. 13Bankhead, nos. 44, June 29, 1844; 6 Jan. 29, 1845; 8, Jan. 30, 1846. 261aMÉmoire. 52Poinsett, reply to Mexico state (with his no. 176, Aug. 7, 1829). Memorias, Relaciones, Feb., 1830; March, 1835; Dec, 1846. Memoria, min. of justice, March, 1845. Mayer. War. 13. Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Constituent Cong., Address, 1824. Thompson, Recolls., 35. Journal des DÉbats, March 16, 1844; Feb. 18, 1845; April 4; Sept. 9, 1847. Bocanegra, Memorias, ii, 162–3. 52Dimond, no. 273, Nov. 4, 1845. 11Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. Banco de AvÍo, Informe. Memoria, min. of interior, Jan., 1838. AlamÁn, Memoria. Robertson, Remins., 88. 76Mora y Villamil, report from superior board of engineer corps, Nov. 15, 1845. McSherry, El Puchero, 147. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 254. Diario, July 20–5, 1846 (report on the state of agriculture).

The American minister stated in 1829 that the cost of producing crops in Mexico was double that in the United States and the expense of marketing them fourfold. Besides, the farmers had suffered blow after blow during the revolution and the succeeding commotions. The system of “forced loans,” so familiar in Mexico, consisted in assigning to corporations and individuals—presumably according to their wealth—amounts that they were required to hand over in exchange for promissory notes, which the government did not expect to pay. The prohibition of many foreign articles reduced the public revenues and promoted smuggling.

8. Country and town: manners and mora’s. Thompson, Recolls., 39, 40, 82, 90, 93, 101–2, 115, 125–8, 132, 135, 160, 163, 217. CalderÓn, Life, i, 80, 124, 127, 138, 140, 150–1, 162, 165, 175, 273, 314, 336, 340–5, 395; ii, 126 (AlamÁn), 137 (village), 237, 247. Ward, no. 52, secret and confid., Nov. 10, 1825. 52Thompson, no. 1, 1842. 52Poinsett, nos. 2, May 28, 1825; 94, July 8, 1827; 166, Mar. 10, 1829. 52Butler, July 9, 1834. ArrÓniz, Manual, 109, 123, 131, 161. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 36, 47–8, 59, 130, 133, 137, 140, 142, 147–9, 151–4, 159, 163–6, etc. Decaen, MÉxico, 22. Rivera, Los Mexicanos Pintados. Memorial HistÓrico, Jan. 16, 20, 1846. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 291. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 142. Revue Independante, Apr. 25, 1845. Revue de Paris, Dec, 1844. Diario, Jan. 24, 1841. Davis, Autobiog., 102. Mayer, War, 14. Bravo in BoletÍn Oficial, Apr. 30, 1846. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 20, 25, 34–6, 39, 40, 44, 46, 59. Robertson, Remins., 104–6, 116, 122. Mason, Pictures, i, 17, 19, 110, 201; ii, 23, etc. Vigneaux, Voyage, 286. Orbigny, Voyage, 413, 422, 425, 428. Robertson, Visit, ii, 50, 58, 61–2, 147. Commerc. Review, ii, 165–76. 11Cochelet, Sept. 29, Nov. 15, 1829. 13Forbes (Tepic), July 2, 1846. Kendall, Narrative (1844), ii, 145, 317, 335–6. Tudor, Tour, ii, 266, 328. Stapp, Prisoners, 133–4. Valois, Le Mexique, 86–7. Delta, June 12; Nov. 6, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, passim. 218Henshaw narrative. (Apathy) Pakenham, no. 15, Mar. 21, 1834. Morier and Ward, no. 6, Apr. 30, 1825 (“That extraordinary Compound of Ignorance, Suspicion, and Fanaticism, which now forms the most striking Feature of the National Character.” “AlamÁn and Esteva represented that we were dealing with Children, and must suit our Arguments to their Capacity.”) Ward, nos. 20, 60, July 12; Nov. 23, 1825. Zavala, Revoluciones, ii, 152–3, 365. McSherry, El Puchero, 158.A ministerial report submitted to Congress in Jan., 1844, showed how a Mexican could regard himself: “If the present epoch begins to be brilliant in Europe, Mexico finds herself still more advanced. She has learned from the wise men of all the world but has contemned their errors.... The virtues of the Mexican spring from a heart not withered by the pleasures of sense, a heart still expanding with generous enthusiasm. His soul rises to sublime regions; it knows how to feel; it knows how to understand; it knows the celestial origin of virtue; and it appreciates all that itself contains of spontaneity and magnanimity.... This delicious country breathes into our sentiments the suavity of its climate; this ardent sun kindles the beautiful flame that makes men love one another; and amid the sweetness of a natural world so magnificent and sublime the germ of heroic merits is formed within us.”

II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO

1. To sketch the political development of Mexico is by no means easy. No scientific history of it exists, and all those who have written on the subject with first-hand knowledge have been party men. The best basis is the reports of the British ministers, for they were men of ability near the heart of affairs, comparatively without prejudice, and anxious to give a true account of what was taking place. With these reports as a prima facie standard, the author has felt able to use intelligently the statements of other foreign agents—diplomatic and consular—Mexican authors, the historical and political writers of several nationalities and a great number of periodicals.

For the colonial rÉgime he consulted the following sources. Humboldt, Polit. Essay, i, passim. 52Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of 1829. Cuevas, Porvenir, 15. Ward, Mexico, i, 91–120. Rivero, MÉxico, 24. 261MÉmoire. 11Serrurier to “the Duke,” Apr. 20, 1818. 11VillevÊque, Feb. 3, 1830. Mora, Obras, i, pp. cx-cxiii. Macgregor, Progress, passim. Tornel, Breve ReseÑa, 4. Consideraciones, 50–1. 11MÉmoire submitted to the king by a Spaniard. Gage, Voyages, i, 223. Amer. Antiq. Soc., Proceedings, New Series, xxi, 277–83. LatanÉ, Diplom. Rels., 12–20. Diario de MÉxico, 1810. Pensador, 1812, 45–6, 49, 51, 53. Gaceta del Gob. de MÉx., 1810. Priestley, JosÉ de GÁlvez, chaps. i and ii. Esperanza, Mar. 5, 1846. 296Poinsett to the Prest., Apr. 26, 1827.

2. The Revolution. Cuevas, Porvenir, 15, 17. Ward, Mexico, i, 84, 96, 100, 116–8, 120, 135, 195–6. MÉxico Á travÉs, ii, pp. x-xiii, 507–8, 525; iii, pp. iv-ix, 30–5, 76, 85–127, 162, 188, 210, 226, 271, 283, 311, 323, 331, 339, 343, 405, 428, 450, 460, 487, 491–2, 656, 661–85, 735–56; iv, pp. iv, vii, 30, 199, 200, 316. ArrangÓiz, MÉxico, i, 33–5. Humboldt, Polit. Essay, i. 261MÉmoire. Tornel, ReseÑa, 4–6, 162. Otero, CuestiÓn Social, 51–2. GarcÍa, Plan. ItÚrbide, MÉmoires. Poinsett, Notes, 91; app., 39. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 65, 68, 78–9, 86, 104, 111, 272, 406. 13Ward, nos. 37, 114 of 1826. 52Poinsett, no. 166 of 1829. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. AlamÁn, MÉxico, i-iv. 11Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. Sierra, Evolution, i, 126, 149. 13Morier, no. 10 of 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 229–30, 234, 245. Consideraciones, 43, 51–2. Memoria de ... Guerra, 1823, p. 9. ArrÓÑiz, Orizaba. Liceaga, Adiciones, 378. Mora, Obras, i, p. vii. Mateos, Hist. Parl., ii, 222. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 293. S. Anna, Manifiesto, 1823. SuÁrez y Navarro, Alegato. Id., Hist. de MÉx. y del ... S. Anna. CarreÑo, Jefes, 13. Sol, June 15, 24, 1823. Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 107–26. Gaceta del Gob. de MÉx., 1810, p. 867 (decree of the Inquisition summoning Hidalgo). Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 1–72. Puga y Acal, Documentos, 20. Portrait of ItÚrbide: City Hall, Mexico.

3. ItÚrbide, the Triumvirate ,and the Constitution. 13Ward, secret and confid., July 14, 1825; no. 114 of 1826. 52Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of 1829. 11VillevÊque, Feb. 3, 1830. 11Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. 13Morier, no. 10 of 1825. 11Cipher despatch to French govt. about July, 1823. 261MÉmoire. Cuevas, Porvenir, 14, 36, 140–2, 195–206, 211–5, 220–5, 231–3, 239, 245–51, 261, 277, 318–9, 358–9. Bocanegra, Memorias, i, 13–4, 18, 31–3, 38–40, 49–57, 61–3, 76–82, 97–9, 111–25, 207, 215, 220–4, 226, 231, 241, 284–9, 328–9, 370, 374. ItÚrbide, MÉmoires. Tornel, ReseÑa, 6–15, 18–22, 28, 37. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii-viii, xii, xiv. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 113–23, 152, 173, 176, 211, 214–5, 254–62, 274, 294, 347; ii, 294. Ward, Mexico, i, 202–6, 260–82. Poinsett, Notes, 71. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 262. Negrete, MÉxico, xiii, 296; xiv, 239. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Casasus, Deuda. Romero in No. Amer. Review, Jan. 1, 1896. GutiÉrrez de Estrada, MÉxico. Mata, Reflecciones. Arco Iris, Dec. 7, 1847. Eco del Comercio, Mar. 10, 1848. Cosmopolita, Aug. 22, 1838. Maza, CÓdigo, 263. Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 225, 228. Id., Gobernantes, ii, 73–94. Esperanza, Mar. 5, 1846. 208MS. of the man who proclaimed the empire. Tornel, Discurso, 17. AlamÁn, MÉxico, v. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. Otero, CuestiÓn Social, 53–5, 75, 108–9. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, pp. iv, vii, 9–21, 26–37, 40–8, 50–9, 65–111, 115, 198, 200–9, 360. Sierra, Evolution, i, 160–6, 169, 173, 316. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Reforma, Jan. 23, 1846. Consideraciones, 46. Sol, July 27, 1823. Mayer, War, 27–8, 135. Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 21. Dictamen of revol. committee, June 12, 1835. CalderÓn, Life, i, 336. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 294. Thompson, Recolls., 58. Lacombe, Le Mexique, 31.

4. It has recently been denied that our Constitution was imitated, but this was stated by Poinsett (no. 166, March 10, 1829), Bocanegra (Mems., i, 329), Tornel (ReseÑa, 14), Otero (CuestiÓn Social, 121), and 261MÉmoire; and the Congress itself, in an address to the nation, said, “In all our proceedings, we have taken for a model the happy Republic of the United States of the North.” The Spanish constitution of 1812 and that of the French Republic were also in view. There was a supreme court, but it had no power to hold the balance between the states and the central government.

5. Victoria’s administration. Portrait in city hall, Mexico. 52Poinsett, nos. 12, 20, 24, 32, 55, 60, 92, 94, 96–7, 99, 105, 107, 110, 114, 153, 166, 192 (1825–29). 296Id. to King, May 16, 1826. 13Hervey, Dec. 15, 1824. 13Morier, nos. 10, 19, 1825. 13Ward, nos. 15, 21, 34, 36, 44, 60, 64 and most private and confid. (Sept. 30) of 1825; 32, 77, 85, 99, 107, 114, 128, 136, secret and most confid. (Oct. 22/25), and private (Oct. 26/27) of 1826; 3, 11, 15, 19, 24, 52, 58 of 1827. 13Pakenham, nos. 62, 84, 90 of 1827, 1, 107 of 1828; 22, 32, 38 of 1829; 17, 30 of 1830; and to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. 11Martin, Feb. 1; Mar. 30; Apr. 25, 1827; Aug. 25; Dec. 25, 1828. 11Cochelet, Jan. 16, 1830. 11VillevÊque, Feb. 3, 1830. 11Paper submitted to the French Cabinet, 1828. 11Instructions of Bresson, 1828. Tornel, ReseÑa, 16, 19, 24–5, 28–30, 34, 39, 43, 45–8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 129–30, 133–4, 163–4, 177–82, 200, 238. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 113, 231, 286, 374, 390, 444, 463, 467, 522. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 149, 271, 343, 346–8, 351; ii, 35, 41, 44. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 103–4, 116, 121, 127–9, 131–3, 141, 144–5, 154–67, 170, 172, 193–4, 208–10. Mora, Obras, i, pp. viii-xii, xiv-xvi. CalderÓn, Life, i, 42, 96. Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 22. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 290. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Cuevas, Porvenir, 268–9, 353, 376, 406, 411–2. Sierra, Evolution, i, 183. 52Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, June, 1827. Son Peores los Gachupines. Ah, Traidores Gachupines. Crimenes de Zavala. Acta del Pronunciamiento. Revista EconÓmica, Dec. 31, 1843. Cosmopolita, Feb. 14, 1838. Anteojo, Aug. 1, 1835; and other references in chap. iii (Poinsett section). Dictamen of revol. committee, June 12, 1835. 261MÉmoire. Otero, CuestiÓn Social, 60, 66. Poinsett, Notes, 20. Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 364.

The following passage illustrates the pamphleteering of the day: “The country is threatened; and by whom? The Gachupines. Persons in the midst of us are working for our ruin; and who? The Gachupines. Persons are laboring to sow discord among us; and who? The Gachupines. Persons are looking for hostile troops to reduce us to slavery again; and who? The Gachupines.” The popular party, associated with Masonic lodges of the York Rite, were commonly called Yorkinos, and the aristocratic party, associated with the Scotch Rite, Escoceses (i.e. Scotch). A particularly unfortunate fact was that under the Mexican constitution the arbiter between the nation and the states was a political body, Congress.

6. Guerrero’s rise and fall. 52Poinsett, nos. 60 of 1826; 105, 151–3, 155, 157–60 of 1828; 166, 173 of 1829, and Apr. 3, 15; Sept. 2; Nov. 20; Dec. 23, 1829. 13Ward, Nov. 10, 1825. 13Pakenham, nos. 89, 99, 110, 122, 132, 143–4, 146, 151, 153 of 1828 (“totally unfit,” Aug. 23); 2, 4, 8, 52, 79, 99, 108, 109 of 1829; 8, 17, 25 of 1830; 62 of 1833; to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. 11Martin, June 30, 1827; Aug. 25; Sept. 26; Oct. 31; Dec. 1, 10, 19, 25, 31, 1828; Jan. 4, 13, 1829. 11Cochelet, June 6; Oct. 20; Nov. 29; Dec. 26, 1829. 231Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834. 52Butler, Dec. 31, 1829; Jan. 5; Mar. 9, 1830. 52Cameron, Feb. 14, 1831. 261MÉmoire. 52Zavala, ExposiciÓn to chamber of deputies, Apr. 23, 1829. Id., Revoluciones, i, 146; ii, 47, 57–8, 77, 147, 150–2, 175, 221. Gaxiola, InvasiÓn, 156. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 302–6, 336, 396. Cuevas, Porvenir, 285, 383, 413, 458, 475. Tornel, ReseÑa, 34–6, 45–6, 237, 309–13, 315–8, 323–4, 333–4, 338, 347–9, 383–6, 392, 407, 423–4. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 375, 473–4, 492, 494; ii, 7, 10–1, 25, 34, 57–9, 120, 135, 144, 150–9, 190, 657. MÉxico Á travÉs, ii, 612; iv, 98, 102, 166, 177–94, 197, 209–12, 215, 217–37, 267. Sierra, Evolution, i, 177–8. Juicio Imparcial. El Pueblo Pide Justicia. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Mora, Obras, i, pp. xvi-xx. Bustamante, Manifiesto, 1830. Derrota del Sr. Guerrero. Mateos, Hist. Parl., iii, 256, 263. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1830, 11, 13. Poinsett in Commerc. Review, July, 1846, 34–9. 231T. H. Ellis, July 8, 1839. Anteojo, Aug. 1, 1835. 52Guerrero to Poinsett, Nov. 1, 1827. 11Id., Address on becoming President. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 164. Sosa, BiografÍas, 429, 1101. American Sentinel, June 15, 1836. The Acordada was a conspicuous building at Mexico made use of in Zavala’s insurrection.

7. Bustamante and the change of system. Pakenham, nos. 88, 108 of 1829; 5, 17, 24–5, 31, 59, 62, 66–7 of 1830; 8 of 1831; 47, 54, 70, 81–3, 87, 96 of 1832; 10, 19, 35, 39, 44, 62, 67, 69, 82–3 of 1833; 15, 22–3, 29, 36, 42, 48, 51, 57, 64 of 1834; 25, 35, 40, 47 of 1835; 24 of 1837. Poinsett, no. 12 of 1825. 52Butler, Jan. 5; Mar. 9; June 29; Aug. 26, 1830; Feb. 19; Aug. 20; Oct. 5; Dec. 6, 1831; Jan. 10; Feb. 27; Mar. 22; July 25; Oct. 7; Dec. 12, 1832; Mar. 16; June 5, 1833; Mar. 2, 8, 28; June 2; July 1, 9; Sept. 1; Oct. 20, 1834; Feb. 8, 1836. 52Butler to Jackson, July 22, 1831; June 21; July 18; Aug. 30, 1832; Jan. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; July 9; Dec. 24, 1834; Feb. 26, 1835. 52Ellis, nos. 2, 3, 1836. 52Ellis to Jackson, Aug. 26, 1836. 11Cochelet, Nov. 21, 1829. 261MÉmoire. 13Morier, no. 10, 1825. 13Ward, secret and confid., July 14; no. 40, Sept. 25, 1825. 13Ashburnham, no. 70, 1838. 52Jones, no. 71, 1837. 52W. S. Parrott, no. 15, 1835. A. Bustamante to Congress, May 23, 1832. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, 275. Mora, Obras, i, pp. xx, xxi, xliii-xlvi, xlix, l, lvii, lxi, lxv, lxxvi-xc, cxii-cxxviii, cxxxix, cxcvii, ccxiv-cclxxxi, cclxv. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 393, 396–7, 399, 403, 414, 548. CrepÚsculo, May 8, 16, 1835. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 157–75, 195–202, 225–8. Id., Gobernantes, ii, 151–3, 168–9, 173, 177–8. Tornel, ReseÑa, 25. Cuevas, Porvenir, 342. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 263; ii, 254, 269–70, 289, 365, 367, 369. Zamacois, MÉxico, xii, 24–5. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 150–3, 157, 159, 190, 208, 329–31, 378–85, 417–8, 433–9, 445–60, 546–54, 598. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 142, 201, 230–1, 235–7, 240, 246–7, 255, 258, 265, 267, 285–6, 289–93, 295, 298–311, 315–9, 321–7, 332–53, 355, 357, 359, 362–82, 386–8, 390–1. CalderÓn, Life, i, 96; ii, 126. Poinsett in Commerc. Review, July, 1846, 34–9. Thompson, Recolls., 87–8. Sierra, Evolution, i, 181–2, 184, 187; ii, 494. El Vil y Traidor S. Anna. Juicio Imparcial. Imparcial, June 18, 1906. BÚlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 208. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 284, 287. Aviso Á los Estados. S. Anna, proclam., June 1, 1834.

When Santa Anna resumed the Presidency in May, 1833, he painted himself in an address to Congress as the ideal patriot and saint, consecrated to liberty, enlightenment, morality, and the Christian religion, “straightforward” and “simple” in principles, “mild and tolerant” in character. His life, he assured the nation, was “entirely devoted to the freedom and happiness of the people and the preservation of the Federal system.” Before long his picture was drawn in different colors. “The Vile and Traitorous Santa Anna wishes to be Emperor,” cried one pamphleteer. “Depravity and ambition make up the character of that miserable Proteus,” responded another.

8. Centralism. 13Ashburnham, nos. 51, 52, 58, 64 of 1837; 7, 21, 23, 24, 37, 70, 111 of 1838. 13Pakenham, nos. 11, 12, 67, 76 of 1839; 21, 40, 72, 92, 95 of 1840; 42, 53, 94, 101, 116 of 1841. 13Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. 52W. D. Jones, June 22; July 19; Aug. 29; Sept. 26; Oct. 7, 17; Nov. 4, 11; Dec. 6, 1837; Apr. 10; Sept. 5, 8, 22; Oct. 1, 30; Dec. 7 (anarchy), 1838; Feb. 16, 19; Mar. 23 (Valencia); Apr. 20, 23; May 11, 1839. 52W. S. Parrott, July 29, 1837. 52Black, no. 307, 1840. 52Ellis, no. 29, 1840. 52Ellis to Jackson, Oct. 15, 1839. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 807. GimÉnez, Mems., 70–3. Rivero, MÉxico, 75. Otero, CuestiÓn, 62–5. Robertson, Visit, i, 317. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 382, 387, 390–2, 395, 397, 399, 404–16, 419, 423, 427, 430–2, 438, 440, 443–4, 446–8, 451–2, 455–74. CalderÓn, Life, i, 349; ii, 187, 223–6, 232, 246, 250, 254, 274. El Que me Importa. Noticia Extraordinaria. Republicano, Feb. 3, 1847. London Times, Nov. 25, 1841. Lara, Revista PolÍtica, 1840. Cosmopolita, Dec. 28, 1836. 56Greenhow, Aug. 12, 1837. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 284. Sierra, Evolution, i, 185. BÚlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 208.

“I do not believe,” wrote the British minister (no. 116, Nov. 8, 1841), “that history affords an example of the fate of a Country being so completely dependent upon the will of one man” [as Mexico’s now is upon S. Anna’s].

9. Santa Anna as Dictator and President. 13Pakenham, nos. 82 of 1833; 119 of 1841; 20, 57, 77, 99, 121 of 1842; 13 of 1843. 13Doyle, nos. 47, 72, 76, 81 of 1843. 13Bankhead, nos. 4, 43, 54, 66, 72, 73, 96, 105, 108, 110 of 1844; 1, 20, 50 of 1845; 57 of 1846. 231Butler to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. 52Ellis, no. 44 of 1841. 52Thompson, nos. 1, 3 of 1842; 31 of 1843; 40 of 1844. 52B. E. Green, April 8; May 16; June 7, 21; July 14, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844 (Ho. 2; 28, 2, p. 59). D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844 (Jameson, Calh. Corr., 975, 991, 1000). 52Consul Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. 52Consul Dimond, no. 200, 1843. 52Shannon, nos. 3, 4, 5, 1844. 52Id., Jan. 9, 1845. 52B. Mayer, statement, Dec. 9, 1842. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, 1, 11, 22, 65, 94, 106, 247, 287, 289, 298, 322–4, 384. GimÉnez, Mems., 263. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 679. CalderÓn, Life, i, 337; ii, 195, 272–4, 392. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Mar. 12, 1845; Dec, 1846. Mem. de ... Hacienda, Feb., 1844. Mem. de ... Justicia, Jan., 1844. Paredes [Letters], Advertencia, 141. Jones, Memoranda, 433 (Arista). MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 474–80, 484–90, 492–9, 506, 509, 517–30, 532–4, 540, 547. Zamacois, MÉxico, xii, 280–1, 283, 285, 330. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 288. Rivero, MÉxico, 90, 94. Diario del Gobierno, Jan. 12, 1845. Journal des DÉbats, Sept. 13, 1842; Mar. 16, 1844; Apr. 29, 1845. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Constitutionnel, Jan. 6, 1844. Otero, CuestiÓn, 69–70. Tornel, ReseÑa, 74. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 151. 231Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834. 11Martin, Aug. 25, 1828. 11Cochelet, Feb. 3, 1830. 52Butler, July 9, 1834. Alvarez, Manifiesto, 1845. Ellis, Soul of Spain, 37. Sierra, Evolution, i, 211. Defensa del Gen. S. Anna. Causa Criminal. S. Anna, Address, 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 507, 545, 612, 647–73. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 502–5, 511. Texas Register, Mar. 15, 1845 (Eye-witness). London Times, Nov. 15, 1841; Feb. 13; Dec 6, 1845. Thompson, Recolls., 76, 80, 85–6. Tudor, Tour, ii, 164. Proceso de S. Anna, 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845. (S. Anna’s appearance) N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, July 18, 1836; 52Consul Cameron, Feb. 14, 1831; Stapp, Prisoners, 151–2; Mofras, Explor., i, 14; Thompson, Recolls., 66; Ferry, Revols., 253–5; 231Ellis to family, July 8, 1839.

“Genius of evil,” cried a pamphleteer to Santa Anna, “demon of avarice and covetousness, you are, like Attila, the scourge of God. Your power has been, like that of Satan, a power of corruption, of ruin, and of destruction. You resemble a fury of hell, blind, devastating, and bloody. Amid the horrors of civil war, amid lakes of blood and mountains of dead bodies, you always present yourself like a spectre, inciting all to devastation, slaughter, and revenge”; and such productions almost whitened the pavements.

10. Herrera’s administration. (In Sept., 1845, Herrera became President by regular election.) 13Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ ], 17, 30, 70, 82, 85 of 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845; May 22, 30; June 10, 24; July 12, 15, 26, 30; Aug. 16, 23, 29; Sept. 2, 18, 29; Oct. 11, 1845. 52Slidell, no. 4, Dec. 27, 1845. 52Consul Campbell, June 7, 1845. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Zavala, Revoluciones, ii, 47. 52Dimond, June 11; Dec. 14, 1845. Siglo XIX, Oct. 5, 9; Nov. 15, 22, 30; Dec. 6, 9, 1845. Diario, Apr. 19; June 7; Sept. 10, 1845. Republicano, Feb. 3, 1847. Amigo del Pueblo, Nov. 30, 1845. London Times, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Jan. 8, 1846. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 529, 541–5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423–4. Importantes Recuerdos. National, Mar. 18, 1845. Journal des DÉbats, Apr. 29; Aug. 2, 1845. Wash. Union, Sept. 29, 1845. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. Cuatro Palabras. Consideraciones, 43–5. Voz del Pueblo, Nov. 12, 1845. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 693–720. Baz, JuÁrez, 43. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 281–4.

11. A thoughtful Mexican analyzed the situation in substance as follows: Our people as a whole have forgotten morality, sincerity, patriotism, disinterestedness, and all the other virtues that upbuild great nations; only selfishness, base and ruinous passions, hatreds and vile revenges exist among us, and on all sides discords and rancors force themselves upon the dullest eye; the country, weakened by the parties, divided by incompatible interests and claims, has been unable to obtain order and repose, because interested persons have always promoted anarchy and disorder in every possible way; the liberty that the army achieved has been used only as brutal license; and each of us, regarding himself as a judge in the land, has felt entirely emancipated from all obligations, and fully at liberty to upset everything at his will.

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1825–1843

1. As was mentioned in chap. ii (p. 30), the Spaniards had endeavored to keep foreign ideas out of Mexico, and the people of Protestant countries had been studiously misrepresented—even as having tails. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, 419; 231Butler to Jackson, June 23, 1831; 13Pakenham, nos. 29, Apr. 26, 1832; 2, Feb. 14, 1835; 11Cochelet, Sept. 29, 1829. Evidence without limit could be cited.

2. One does not like to write such things. But (1) if the subject is to be understood, they must be said; (2) they are not as hard as things alleged against the United States by the Mexicans; and (3) they are written of a long past generation. On this point we will confine ourselves to Mexican testimony and testimony from that nation which was on the most intimate and friendly terms with Mexico, had the chief interest there, and enjoyed the lion’s share of mercantile profit. In 1823 the minister of the treasury said that only in the case of one state could its financial condition be learned even approximately from the public accounts (11despatch to French govt. about July, 1823). Eleven years later the head of that department announced that it was impossible to ascertain what the legitimate income of the government for the previous year had been (Memoria, 1834). In 1838 the man occupying that post admitted officially that no minister of the treasury since 1822 had possessed sufficient data to make a satisfactory report (Memoria, July, 1838), and the British representative stated that “the most vitally important matters” were “wholly left to chance” by the government (13Ashburnham, no. 37, May 24, 1838). That the national authorities were evasive and jesuitical, resorting to subterfuges, shifting their responsibility upon the legislative or the judicial department, and referring matters repeatedly to distant local officials, is proved by reports of British ministers from 1825 to 1845 (e.g. 13Ward, no. 143, 1826; 13Ashburnham, no. 59, 1837; 13Pakenham, no. 96, 1841; 13Bankhead, nos. 5, 12, 1844). Once at least money was borrowed by hypothecating a fund which the government did not possess (Trigueros in 52Mayer, Dec. 9, 1842). Mortgaged revenues were spent at will (52Zavala to Deputies, Apr. 23, 1829; Bankhead, no. 103, 1844; see also 52Mayer, Dec. 9, 1842). Definite arrangements made with foreign representatives were secretly circumvented (Pakenham, no. 23, 1837; Ashburnham, no. 15, 1838). The Cabinet showed itself capable of breaking a direct promise and even a definite contract (Pakenham, nos. 9, 1843; 44, 1839; Bankhead, no. 86, 1845). The highest authorities were untruthful in word, writing, and print (Pakenham, sep. and confid., Mar. 27, 1828; Id., nos. 32, 1833; 98, 1841; 9, 1843; Bankhead, nos. 12, 1844; 98, 1846. See also Poinsett, no 24, 1825); and they did not scruple to utter injurious calumnies against friendly nations (Pakenham, no. 98, 1841).

Changes of system appeared to make little difference, for these were national characteristics. The most honorable administration of this entire period broke a direct and solemn pledge given to the French minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1845; see also 56W. S. Parrott, Sept. 4, 1845); and the best journal of the country, El Siglo XIX, told only the truth when it said, December 2, 1845, “All our governments have been dishonest,” adding that dishonest methods had been practiced “not only from necessity but from favoritism and for speculative reasons.” It should, of course, be remembered that carelessness about truth, justice and honesty was the shady side of Mexican amiability, and that other nations are not faultless.

3. For an account of Poinsett’s mission and very numerous citations bearing upon the subject one may refer to a paper by J. H. Smith in the Proceedings of the Amer. Antiquarian Soc., Apr., 1914. 52Poinsett, ContestaciÓn. Gamboa, RepresentaciÓn. Causas para Declarar. (Concessions, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 285 (Poinsett). One would suppose that the prompt recognition of Mexico by the United States, our efforts to induce Spain to recognize her (e.g. Amer. State Papers, 2 series, vol. vi, 1006; Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 118 (McLane), 119 (Van Ness), 147, 150 (Forsyth); 77Livingston to Montoya, Oct. 1, 1831), and the “Monroe Doctrine” would have earned us gratitude. But these were attributed very generally to a desire on the part of this country to monopolize the western hemisphere (Diario, June 17, 18, 1846), and were offset by our opposition to the cherished Mexican scheme of driving the Spanish from Cuba and by our proposing to have the retention of Havana guaranteed to Spain (see particularly Ward, no. 53, secret and confid., May 29, 1826). Denunciations of Poinsett: e.g. Bravo, Manifiesto, 1828; Sol, Jan. 4, 1830; 261MÉmoire; La Ruina de los Mexicanos; Bocanegra, Mems., i, 379, 382, 390; Pakenham, no. 152, 1828; 11Martin, July 26, 1827; 11Cochelet, Aug. 7, 1829; N. Orl. Delta, July 9, 1847. Pakenham (no. 74, Aug. 26, 1829) reported that owing to Poinsett’s course and the fact that his government kept him in Mexico, the feeling toward the United States was one of “jealousy, suspicion, and dislike.” The prevailing belief was that the United States, fearing Mexican competition, sent him there to paralyze Mexico by exciting dissension (Poinsett, no. 94, July 8, 1827; 52state dept. to Butler, Apr. 1, 1830; Diario, Apr. 17, 1847).

4. Poinsett was attacked by the states of Puebla (Pakenham, no. 98, 1829), Vera Cruz (Manifiesto, 1827), MÉxico (Preamble and resolution, 1829), and QuerÉtaro (Pakenham, no. 73, 1827). 296Poinsett to Pres., June 8, 1827. (Protest) 52Clay to Poinsett, no. 25, Nov. 19, 1827. (Failure, attitude) Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829 (P. S., Oct. 17). (Sinister, pointedly) Van Buren to Poinsett, Oct. 16, 1829. (No charges) Van B. to P. and to B. (P. S., Oct. 17), Oct. 16, 1829; Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 18–20; 77Montoya, no. 30, Dec. 10, 1829; 296Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827. Poinsett was secretary of war under Van Buren. So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, 429. Nueva ConspiraciÓn.

5. 52Clay to Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; Sept. 24, 1825; Mar. 15, 1827; Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. 231Butler to Jackson, June 23, 1831. Poinsett, no. 12, Aug. 5, 1825. (Officials) 52Morfit, no. 7, Sept. 6, 1836; Ho. 35; 24, 2, p. 17. (Ten times) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846, p. 76. (Indians) 13Ashburnham to Backhouse, July 26, 1838. (Victoria) 13Ward, no. 54, 1825. (Trouble) Clay, supra; 135Jackson, several letters to Butler.

6. Poinsett’s correspondence with Clay, Van Buren, and AlamÁn: Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 19–29. Amer. State Papers: Foreign Relations, vi (folio ed.). 296Notes in Poinsett papers. Commerc. Rev., July, 1846, 21–4, 27–42 (Poinsett). Poinsett, nos. 12, 1825; 113, 115, 1828; 166, 1829. (Urgency) 52Tornel to Poinsett, June 27, 1827. (Dropping) 77MartÍnez, Nov. 2, 1837; Poinsett, no. 113, 1828; Adams, Memoirs, ix, 377–8; 52Consul Taylor, Nov. 7, 1829. He dropped the project of buying territory because he saw it would give offence. Treaties and Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 661–3, 675. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 27–8. (Reached, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40 (Van Buren to Butler); 190, 285, etc. (Poinsett). Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 8 (Clay); 10 (Van Buren); 38 (Butler, Dec. 21); 46–8. (Charged) Filisola, Memorias, ii, 602; Tornel, ReseÑa, 79, 80; Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 384; Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 44.

Before the paper was placed in Poinsett’s hands he knew it would reach Washington too late (to Clay, Apr. 24: Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 28), and hence it was unnecessary, as it would have been dishonorable and dangerous, to withhold it. (May 10) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 202. As the instructions to buy territory were repeated in 1829 (note 5) when Mexico was at war with Spain, it has been urged by some Americans that we showed a mean disposition to take advantage of a neighbor’s difficulties. But it is rather kind than otherwise to offer even a low price for real estate when the owner is in straits for cash, and Mexico was free to consult her own interest about selling. The instructions of 1829 were, however, wholly inoperative at that time.

That a people so fond of indirect methods and so destitute of principle in public affairs were suspicious of the United States was not, however, surprising. It was known of course that up to 1819 we had claimed the Rio Grande boundary. When Poinsett found that Victoria and AlamÁn intended to reassert the boundary pretensions of Spain, he endeavored to discourage them by replying that in such a case the old claim of the United States also would be revived (to Clay, Sept. 20, 1825).

In 1827 members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed the opinion in debate that the United States was at least privy to a recent insurrection in Texas, and a leading newspaper asserted that we had encouraged it (Poinsett, no. 74, 1827). Among the attacks upon the unfortunate Guerrero was the charge—based, it was alleged, upon documents—that he was plotting to sell us territory in that quarter (Pakenham, no. 18, 1831). Bravo, after a visit to this country, brought out a pamphlet in 1829, declaring that “the politicians and journalists” of the United States were “at present occupied about the dismemberment” of Mexico. The following July Bocanegra, minister of relations, hearing of our customary militia drills and armed escorts for traders in the far west, demanded the meaning of these operations, and in spite of sensible reassurances from the American minister, he felt so much disturbed as to commit a real offence against him and the United States by repeating his inquiry (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 288, 292). The next year, when our squadron set out for a cruise in the Gulf, AlamÁn represented this to Congress as a threatening movement (Filisola, Memorias, ii, 601). A pamphlet issued at New York to point out the value of Texas was attributed to our government (Pakenham, no. 24, 1830), and the Mexican agent at London endeavored to excite the British cabinet regarding the supposed peril of his country (77Gorostiza, Apr. 22, 1830). European diplomatic representatives at Mexico fanned this flame. In particular Ward, the British minister, did his utmost to increase the alarm regarding Texas (nos. 32, 54, 64, 1825). See W. R. Manning in Southwest. Hist. Qtrly., Jan., 1914. For American feeling toward Mexico see chap. xxxvi, note 1.

7. Treaties and Conventions: note 6. Treaties in Force (1899), 389–90. 52McLane to Butler, Jan. 13, 1834. 52Butler to GarcÍa, Sept. 6, 1833. 231Id., to Jackson, Mar. 7, 1834. Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 59 (Livingston). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40–53, 556. 77Castillo, no. 71, Dec. 7, 1833. (Denounced) 77Castillo, no. 2, res., Jan. 22, 1835. The boundary was not run, for the battle of S. Jacinto occurred just after the exchange of the ratifications.

8. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 17, 21; 33 (Butler); 49 (Van Buren). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 190, 210, 287 (Poinsett); 369–70, 410. Foreign Rels., folio ed., vi, 583–600. (Treaty) Ho. 225; 22, 1. Treaties and Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 664–74. Sen. Exec. Journ., iii, 568–72, 605–6. (Dark) Ward, [no. 103], Sept. 9, 1826. (Victoria) Poinsett, no. 12, Aug. 5, 1825. 77Montoya, no. 25, Sept. 19, 1829.

One of the two objectionable articles in the treaty of 1828 concerned the returning of fugitive slaves, and has been characterized by certain writers in the United States as a gross insult to Mexico; but that country had not yet abolished slavery, and her Cabinet, which possessed a full share of pride, accepted the article.

9. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178. 77Montoya, no. 30, Dec. 10, 1829. 52Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16 (P. S., Oct. 17), 1829. (Friend) 77Tornel, no. 3, res., Mar. 6, 1830; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 381; 52Butler, July 9, 1834. 135Butler, Notes on Texas. 135Id. to Jackson, Jan. 4, 1827. 77Almonte to Mex. Leg., Washington, July 22, 1834. (Ignorant) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 381. (Careless) 52Ellis, June 25, private; July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; 52Forsyth to Butler, Nov. 9, 1835; to Ellis, Jan. 18, 1837. (Consuls) 52Wilcocks, Feb. 15, 1833; 52W. S. Parrott, Oct. 24, 1835. (Spirits) 52Butler, Aug. 26, 1833.

10. Poinsett reached the conclusion that endeavoring to buy Texan territory would anger Mexico and lead her to seek European support (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 286), but Butler stimulated Jackson to take the matter up. 52Butler’s correspondence, including letters to and from Mexican officials. Many of these documents were printed with substantial correctness in Ho. 256; 24, 1; Ho. 42; 25, 1; Ho. 351; 25, 2. 296Notes from Butler, Wilcocks and Zavala, to Poinsett. Corresp. with Jackson in 231Jackson papers and 135Butler papers (for deciphering a number of the latter the author is indebted to Dr. E. C. Burnett of the Dept. of Hist. Research, Carnegie Instit.). 77Tornel, no. 3, res., 1830. 77Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835. Sen. Exec. Journ., iv, 488, 502. 52Ellis, May 19; June 25; July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; to Jackson, Aug. 26. Pakenham, nos. 6, 7, 1830; 11, 1836. Barker in Nation, xcii, 600–1; in Amer. Hist. Rev., July, 1907, 788–809. Filisola, Mems, ii, 590, 612. Adams, Mems., ix, 377–8. Benton, View, ii, 659. Bankhead, no. 125, 1845. Mosquito Mex., Aug. 4, 1835.

Butler had some excuse for basing hopes on AlamÁn, for until the war with Spain ended AlamÁn wished to be on very good terms with the United States, and later he was in serious financial troubles. Nothing in the documents involves Jackson in Butler’s dishonor. The American secretary of state was even less censurable. Our government expressed all due regrets for Butler’s misconduct (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 184, 750; Forsyth to Ellis, no. 22, Nov. 16, 1836; 77Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835). (Recall) 77Relaciones to Castillo, Oct. 31, 1835; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 719, and 77Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835.

11. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 11–33. 52Butler, May 8, 1836. 231Id. to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. Ellis, no. 2, May 19, 1836. Pakenham, nos. 75, 1835; 25, 1836. Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 29, 30 (Forsyth); 8 (Castillo); 10 (Monasterio). Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 141 (Monasterio); 149 (Forsyth). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 82 (Livingston); 160 (Forsyth); 571–2 (Tornel, Monasterio). Memoria de ... Interior, Jan., 1838. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 377, 401–3, 512. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 78. Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 48. The state of Mexican feeling will come up again.

12. The Gaines episode. Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. Butler to Jackson, Sept. 26; Oct. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; Mar. 7, 1834. 231Jackson to Butler, Nov. 27, 1833. 58Dickins to Cass, Aug. 20, 1836. 77Castillo, Nov. 10, 1835. 39Gaines to gov. Tenn., June 28, 1836. 52Burrough, nos. 39, 40, 1836. 77MartÍnez, no. 10, res., 1838. 77Relaciones to MartÍnez, Oct. 10, 1838. 77Gorostiza, Apr. 25, 29; May 30; July 12, 24; Aug. 18, 19; Oct. 4, 5, 1836. Pakenham, nos. 18, 94, 1836. Sen. 1; 24, 2, pp. 46, 92, 105 (Dickins); 60, 85 (Jackson); 84 (memo.); 32, 44, 68, 89, 91, 100 (Gorostiza); 133–4 (Macomb). Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 157 (Forsyth). Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 28, 29, 31–3, 35, 45 (Forsyth); 6, 11 (Castillo); 15, 21, 23, 25, 27 (Gorostiza); 45 (memo.); 40, 43, 48, 54 (Cass to Gaines); 42, 46–8 (Gaines); 55 (Macomb); 58 (Many); 59 (Green; adj. gen.). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 769–806 (Gaines et al.); 806 (McCall and documents). Jackson, Message, Dec. 5, 1836. Gorostiza, Correspondencia. Reply to Gorostiza: Lib. Cong., Mss. Div., “Mex. War, Miscellaneous.” Tex. Dipl. Corr., i, pp. 83 (Carson); 104 (Burnett); 164–5, 177, 202 (Henderson); 175 (Wharton); 156 (Austin); 205 (Catlett). Brown, Texas, ii, 90. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 736–69. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 378. CalderÓn, Life, ii, 123. Kohl, Claims, 24. Barker in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., i, 1; in Amer. Hist. Rev., July, 1907, p. 794 (Jackson thought the Neches was a branch of the Sabine). N. Y. Ev. Post, Aug. 1, 1836. Wash. Globe, Aug. 1, 1836 (Cass). Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 12, 1836. Mobile Commercial Register, June 27, 1836. Nat. Intelligencer, May 5 (Virginian); July 26, 1836. N. Orl. Courier, Sept. 27, 1836 (Fulton). Sen. 189; 24, 2. (Indorsed) Monasterio to Gorost., Dec. 21, 1836, in Gor., Correspondencia. (Erroneously) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 22.

Gorostiza’s view, and no doubt that of the Mexicans generally, amounted practically to this (see Forsyth in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 157): the essential point was to respect Mexico’s territory; by the right of occupation, at least, her territory extended to the well-known Sabine River; the United States forces were therefore bound under all circumstances to remain east of that stream, and should some of our citizens be robbed and murdered, we could call upon Mexico to pay compensation and protect the rest; after almost endless evasions it would appear that she had no power to fulfill her treaty obligations, and therefore, since that fact was known to all the world, she should not be expected to comply with our wishes; and then, should we please, we could declare war. In other words, for the sake, at most, of a technicality, they would have had us quietly see irreparable injuries done that we could have prevented and had known Mexico could not prevent, and then do irreparable injuries ourselves to punish her for her involuntary helplessness.

As for the evidence of danger (which Gaines was instructed to examine carefully), Gorostiza declared it was fabricated in order to excuse the crossing of the boundary and get American troops into Texas—thus giving the rebels at least the moral support of their presence and infringing upon the rights of Mexico (Pakenham, no. 94, 1836; Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 20; Gor., Correspondencia, xxvii), and he protested that his country was incapable of stirring up the savages against our border (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 84; 77Gor. to Relaciones, Oct. 4). But there is not the slightest sign that he made the difficult and extended investigation requisite as a basis for denying the testimony presented to Gaines, whereas he was capable of asserting, more than a month after the battle of San Jacinto, that the news of it was “entirely destitute of authenticity,” and stating that he had “reasons for believing it to have been expressly forged in Texas” or at least to have been exaggerated “to the very confines of the ridiculous” (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 33). His contention was therefore valueless, and almost equally so was that of certain Americans, against the evidence of danger. One such opinion, however, is entitled to notice. It came from the governor of Louisiana (Macomb: Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 55). But (1) the governor, who was far from the scene, merely expressed a view unsupported by evidence; (2) there may have been good reasons why he did not wish to have citizens of Louisiana called out, as Gaines proposed, to do arduous and perhaps perilous military service; and (3) it may have seemed undesirable to have the American army, which made a good market in the western part of the state, move to Nacogdoches and obtain supplies there. Gaines appears really to have had adequate grounds for crossing the Sabine. A letter from the Texas secretary of state to the President of Texas (Tex. Dipl. Corr., i, 84), which no one can imagine was “fabricated,” shows that Gaines insisted upon having the facts, and that strong evidence was presented to him (see also Bee in Sen. 14; 32, 2, p. 53). May 5, 1836, the National Intelligencer printed a letter dated April 20, which stated that the writer heard, when about six miles from Nacogdoches, that the Indians were coming, felt satisfied the news was correct, and saw the people fleeing in the utmost alarm. It was deemed necessary to divert some of the few Texan troops, desperately needed at the front, in order to ward off the danger from Indians (Brown, Texas, ii, 89, 90). The governor of Arkansas called out forces to protect the frontier (N. Orl. Courier, Sept. 27, 1836). The other evidence cited above in the references, when taken together and fairly weighed in view of the circumstances, has also a very substantial value. The part of it most doubted, probably, is that referring to a Mexican agent engaged in rousing the Indians against the whites; but we have documentary proof that early in 1839 Mexicans tried officially to do this, and employed the very man who was charged with similar activities in 1836 (Sen. 14; 32, 2, pp. 31–6; also 47). See also the 77reply of Relaciones to MartÍnez’s despatch of Oct. 10, 1838. It should be remembered (1) that Gaines, charged with the defence of the frontier against a wily, treacherous and savage foe, could not afford to take chances; and (2) that even fabricated evidence, if it possessed all the marks of credibility, would have been sufficient ground for acting.

But after all the real issue was the good faith of our government in authorizing Gaines (while requiring him to maintain our neutrality) to cross under extreme circumstances the Sabine (Gorostiza in Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 44; Von Holst, U. S., ii, 584, note 1); and this good faith was clearly maintained at Washington. In the very letter demanding his passports Gorostiza admitted that Forsyth’s assurances appeared to dispose of the possibility that Gaines’s movement had a bearing on the boundary question (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 104). It has been felt that Forsyth was sometimes rather curt with him, but Gorostiza was almost, if not quite, insulting. The Mexicans had some reason to be suspicious and a full right to be on their guard, but they went farther than right and reason warranted.

13. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 52–63, for a discussion of this subject and references to the sources. Ethel Z. Rather in Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly., xiii, 155–256. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 133 (Castillo); 135 (Forsyth); 145 (Monasterio). 52W. Thompson to Bocanegra, April 25, 1843. Pakenham, no. 64, 1836. Memoria de ... Relac., Jan., 1838. Mem. de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844.

The situation of Texas after 1836 was precisely the same as that of Mexico from 1821 until recognized by the mother-country in 1836, and during this period she regarded herself and was regarded generally, except by Spain, as independent. Mexicans refused to accept this obvious analogy on the ground that the Mexican revolution was mainly the work of native-born citizens, while most of the Texans had been born elsewhere. But an adopted child has all the rights of a natural child. See chap. iv, note 1.

14. Diplomatic strife, 1842–3. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 38. Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 31, 1842: Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 5, 15. Webster to Thompson, nos. 9, 11, 1842; Jan. 31, 1843. Thompson to Webster, nos. 3, 4 and June 2, 1842; Jan. 5 and no. 15, 1843. 52Id. to dipl. corps, July 30, 1842. 351Tyler to Webster, July 10, 1842. 52W. S. Parrott, private, July 29, 1837. 52B. E. Green, no. 8, 1844. 13Bocanegra to Doyle, April 19, 1843; reply, April 20. 52S. Anna, decree, June 17, 1843. 52Upshur to Thompson, no. 43, 1843. 52Bocanegra to Thompson, Sept. 10, 1842. 76Id., circular, May 31, 1842. Pakenham, nos. 49, 75, 1842. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 71 (Thompson). Texas Diplom. Corresp., i; 567 (Reily); ii, 163 (Eve). Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1844. Diario, Oct. 4, 1842. Thompson, Recolls., 82. Zavala, Revols., ii, 152–3. Sen. 1; 27, 3, pp. 146, 156 (Thompson); 146, 157 (Bocanegra). Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 7, 17 (Webster); 5, 15, 19 (Bocanegra); 21 (Thompson). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 97, 99 (Adams). Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131. (Mexican threats, 1843) Ibid., 42. Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 48. 11To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836. (The translations of Mexican documents published by our government are cited, unless there is a particular reason for not doing so. In many cases they could be better, but they were for the American government and people the official versions.)

Oct. 4, 1842, the official journal reprinted this from El Provisional: “Who is not aware of that criminal connivance, that stubborn and insolent protection, which—in violation of righteous law and in violation of the treaties with Mexico—is given by the policy of North America to a Department filled with rebels from every land, who are determined to ruin it completely and to soil the dignity and honor of a lawfully constituted government?” Webster made the same protest (against raids) to the Texans as to the Mexicans.

15. 52Thompson, Jan. 5, 1843. 52Id. to Bocanegra, Dec. 30, 1842. Ho. 166; 27, 3, pp. 1–93. Bancroft, Calif., iv, 302–29. 285NarvÁez to Vanderlhinden, Dec. 10, 1842. Richman, California, 273–4. Bandini, California, 136–8. 13Letter from S. Gabriel, Nov. 11, 1842. Diario, Jan. 7, 1843. 47Jones, Aug. 31; Sept. 1, 1842. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 103–7. 351Letters from J. Tyler to Webster. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 493. Nat. Intelligencer, Mar. 14, 1843. Adams, Memoirs, xi, 346. N. Orl. Bee, Jan. 13, 1843. Memphis Eagle, Nov. 5, 1845.

Jones sailed with the frigate United States and the sloop of war Cyane. After leaving Monterey he proceeded to Los Angeles to meet Micheltorena and explain the affair. Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington, demanded that an example should be made of Jones, but he was merely recalled—a fully sufficient punishment. Indeed, our government commended his zeal (47Jones to Bancroft, Oct. 3, 1845).

16. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 576 (Butler).

17. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 6 (Bocanegra; documents); 9 (Thompson, with extract from treaty). 52Shannon to RejÓn, Sept. 30, 1844. Tyler, Message, Dec. 3, 1844, in Richardson, Messages, iv, 334. See also documents cited with reference to the Santa Fe expedition.

18. Ellis, no. 24, June 9, 1840. Forsyth to Ellis, Aug. 21, 1840. 52Memorial of the prisoners, May 25, 1840. 52J. O. Jones to Ellis, June 23, 1840. 52Statements of prisoners, particularly Graham’s of May 29, 1840. 52Larkin, Mar. 22; April 20, 1840. 52LegarÉ to Thompson, no. 36, May 12, 1843. 52Farnham to Ellis, June 23, 1840. Richman, California, 266. 13Palmerston to Mexican minister, Aug. 11, 1841. 11Captain of La Danaide to Cyprey, July 8, 1840. Royce, California, 36. Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 88, 1840; 37, 118 (merely a scheme to weaken the opposing faction in Cal.), 1841. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 3242–3 (a judicial review of the case and award of damages to victims. One of them received $38,125). Pakenham obtained a revocation of the order of expulsion by demanding his passports (no. 88).

19. 45Ranson to Eve, April 28, 1842. 45Bee to Roberts, July 13, 1841. Kendall, Narrative, passim. Yoakum, Texas, ii, 321–3. Garrison, Texas, 245–6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 37. Sen. 325; 27, 2, pp. 3, 6, 8 (Webster); 19, 29 (Ellis); 33, 100 (Bocanegra); 48, 50 (Falconer; Van Ness particularly); 94 (Thompson). Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 34 (Thompson). Pakenham, no. 15, 1842. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1844. 11To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836.

20. Ho. 42; 25, 2, p. 20, 23 (AlamÁn). Poinsett, June 18, 22, 1825. MartÍnez, no. 7, 1832. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 11, 1843. Boston Atlas, Jan. 26, 1844. 52Camacho to Poinsett, May 13, 1826. 231Butler to Jackson, Jan. 2, 1833. Sen. 1; 28, 1, p. 36. Tyler, Tyler, ii, 289. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 71 (Van Buren, Mar. 1). See also chap. xiv.

21. Upshur to Thompson, no. 51, Oct. 20, 1843. 13S. Anna, proclam., Oct. 5, 1843. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 (Calhoun). Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 30 (Thompson); 31 (decree); 34 (Upshur). Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 16, 18 (Thompson). 52B. E. Green, April 8, 1844. 52Bocanegra to Thompson, Oct. 20, 1843. 52Thompson to Bocanegra, Nov. 23, 1843. 52Shannon to RejÓn, Oct. 25, 1844. 52RejÓn to Shannon, Oct. 11, 1844; Nov. 22, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 1, 4, 1844. 13Foreign Office to Doyle, no. 30, 1843 (While every independent nation has, e.g., an abstract right to close its ports, “the practical assertion on the part of any Nation of an extreme abstract right may, and often does, involve, if not actual hostility, at least a degree of unfriendliness almost amounting to hostility.”) France also protested (Green, supra).

22. 13Tornel, order. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 3–15. 52Bocanegra to Thompson, Dec. 22, 1843. 53Almonte, Feb. 6, 1844. 52Shannon to RejÓn, Oct. 10, 1844. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 (Calhoun). 13Doyle, nos. 65, 90 (order executed in Sonora), 1843. 13E. Barron, no. 10, Oct. 19, 1843.

Another objection to the modified order was that, as the British minister maintained in another case, while the general government itself might with justice banish undesirable foreigners, it had no right to delegate such a power to distant subordinates practically exempt from supervision, to be exercised by them as prejudice, caprice, and possibly avarice might suggest and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself or settle his affairs (Pakenham, no. 78, 1840). Thompson was described by his French colleague as inexperienced (11no. 108, 1842).

23. These are too numerous to be catalogued here, but a few can be cited as illustrations. General TerÁn seized the schooner Topaz and compelled her to transport some of his troops. During the voyage the Mexican officers and soldiers killed the master, and, returning to port, had the crew imprisoned on the charge of having done it. The vessel was held, and property on board seized (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 2992). The schooner Hannah Elizabeth, stranded on the Texan coast, was fired upon by a Mexican vessel of war, and her crew and passengers were put in jail (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 85. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 167). The Mexicans asserted that the schooner was carrying contraband of war; but if so, the Mexican officer did not know this when he opened fire, and anyhow no penalty except the confiscation of the cargo could rightfully have been exacted. Our acting consul at Tabasco was arrested and publicly ill-treated, because he would not legalize documents intended, in his opinion, to defraud an insurance company (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 89). The brig Fourth of July was sent to Vera Cruz for sale to the Mexican government, and before the sale was made officers and soldiers took possession of her, ran up their flag, arrested the captain, and disregarded the protest of our consul (ibid., p. 91). A boat-load of seamen from our sloop-of-war Natchez landed at Vera Cruz, became intoxicated while the midshipman in command of them was in conference with our consul, and, as the result of a quarrel with a fisherman, were severely handled by the Mexican guard. As they were now unable to manage the boat in the rough sea, the midshipman, on the advice of the consul, requested the captain of the port to take charge of them over night. The next morning the authorities would not give them up to him, nor was our consul permitted to communicate with them (ibid., p. 93). Two Americans were arrested, maltreated and imprisoned at Matamoros on the baseless suspicion that they intended to visit Texas, and the premises of our consul were forcibly entered, searched and robbed (ibid., 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 172). A lieutenant of the American revenue cutter Jefferson, going ashore at Tampico to see our consul, was arrested, and his boat’s crew were imprisoned. For this outrage the Mexican government removed the responsible officer, General GÓmez, but soon afterwards he was given a better post at Vera Cruz, and showed his unchastened spirit in the Natchez affair (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 98. Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 70: Ellis).

24. British complaints were almost numberless: e.g. Ward, no. 77, 1826; Pakenham, nos. 48 of 1827, 119 of 1828, 37 of 1830; 13Ashburnham, nos. 16 of 1837 and 74 of 1838 (a man persecuted with a “tissue of iniquities” for years); Bankhead to Bocanegra, July 4, 1844.

The Foreign Office distinctly stated that contract and treaty rights were denied (13Aberdeen to Mex. min., Nov. 1, 1843; to Pakenham, no. 19, Aug. 15, 1836). 77Dec. 31, 1844, it made this statement: “In Mexico British Subjects have been oppressed, harassed, and maltreated without redress except that which has been extorted by unceasing remonstrance.... The expostulations of Great Britain ... have been with very few exceptions contumeliously set at naught; and the same illegal exactions which have been the subject of those expostulations have been repeated, while yet the former grievance was unredressed.” The British minister complained, e.g., that the coast officials annoyed his fellow citizens; that frequently to their injury the constitution was violated by state authorities; that some of them were persecuted, imprisoned, or expelled from the country in defiance of law; that money was extorted from them under threats. A loud 52protest of American ship captains, Campeche, May 26, 1835, illustrates well the tricks and outrages to which our commercial interests were subjected. What abuse and tyranny our citizens were liable to suffer in the interior is shown by the memorial of Augustus Storrs and twenty others, Chihuahua, April 17, 1832, transmitted through C. W. Davis, who was described by our secretary of state, Nov. 24, 1832, as a respectable citizen of the U. S. who had long been practising medicine at Chihuahua (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 87). (France) Coxe, Review, 69; Barker in Texas Review, Jan., 1917; Rives, U. S. and Mexico, i, 433.

25. The international tribunal was established under the Claims Convention of 1839, and the national tribunal under the treaty of 1848 and a United States Act of 1849. It should be remembered that the amount of our claims was substantial. The total receipts of the U. S. government for the fiscal year ending with June, 1845, were less than $30,000,000. It is true that many of the claims were exaggerated, and some of them a great deal; but this does not matter, for what the United States asked was an investigation of the demands, not the payment of any one at its face. Still, as the inflation of the claims has been urged as an excuse for inattention to them, a word upon that point is desirable. The amounts demanded in such cases are always made as great as possible, and in the instance of Mexico there were special grounds for exaggeration. Our claimants, so far as just in their demands, were entitled to as high interest as other creditors of that government, and the rate it had to pay was very large. In 1832, for instance, this was four per cent a month (Butler, no. 32, 1832), and in 1844 two per cent a month besides six per cent for brokerage (Bankhead, no. 112, 1844). At such rates longstanding claims mounted high, and when the interest was scaled down to five per cent in the process of adjudication (Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 237), they naturally seemed to have been exorbitant. Indeed, the claims were entitled to even a higher interest than loans, for a good deal of trouble—sometimes an extraordinary deal—was necessary to prove them. “The authorities here can prove anything,” reported even the philo-Mexican Waddy Thompson (no. 4, 1842); and this was only one of numerous obstacles. Probably, too, there was more uncertainty as to eventual payment. Again, if paid at all, the claims were likely to be settled in treasury notes of little value. In fact, all those accepted by the international tribunal already mentioned were actually so payable (Calhoun in Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21), and these notes were worth at the time only about thirty cents on the dollar (Thompson, Recolls., 223).

Yet the degree of inflation was much less than has been supposed. The most conspicuous instance was that of W. S. Parrott, who demanded $454,504.01 as principal (Sen. 320; 27, 2). Thompson declared (52Nov. 20, 1843) that Parrott was hardly entitled to two per cent of what he asked; but on inquiry a very different conclusion is reached. Parrott was a sufficiently good man to be employed as consul and confidential diplomatic agent by the United States, yet for some reason he was deeply disliked by the Mexican government, and the courts seemed determined to ruin him (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 3011). He was therefore entitled to punitive damages, but none were allowed him. The cost and annoyance of prosecuting his case were excessive. All the excuses for inflation mentioned above applied in his case. A considerable amount included in his claim had to be thrown out on purely technical grounds; and a large part had to be ignored because (in violation of her agreement) Mexico would not let him have certain specified papers that were needed to prove it. And yet, after all these deductions had been made, our own treasury paid him under the treaty of 1848 the sum of $71,000 as principal (Moore, 1284). In many cases the percentage of inflation was low. For example, in the case of claims aggregating $595,462 the tribunal awarded $439,393 after scaling the interest down to five per cent (Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 8). In fact the awards were probably a somewhat uncommonly high percentage of the amount claimed in such cases. It has commonly been said (e.g. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 205) that on the conclusion of the war we discharged Mexico from all obligation on account of our claims ($8,491,603) yet bound ourselves to pay only $3,250,000, thus admitting that our claims were nearly three times too large; but the second of these two sums corresponds to only a part of the first (Treaty with Mexico, Arts, xiii-xv: Stat. at Large, ix, 933).

26. ItÚrbide seized the cargo of the Louisa, and the Mexican government not only acknowledged the debt but paid a fraction of it (Ho. Report 1056; 25, 2). The Mexican supreme court ordered the money actually realized from the unlawful sale of the Cossack and her cargo to be paid to her master, but it was not paid (ibid.). The decree of the Mexican supreme court of 1821 in favor of this claim was presented in support of it by the U. S. secretary of state, yet that government alleged in Nov., 1837, that the claim had just been “for the first time brought forward” (ibid.). Cox and Elkins furnished supplies to General Herrera (Moore, 3430). Chew and Eckford built war vessels for Mexico (Moore, 3428–9). Parrott made advances on a bill of exchange drawn by Herrera (Moore, 3429). Green supplied money to a war vessel that put in at Key West in distress (Moore, 3425). A sum of money on its way to Peter Harmony, a New York merchant, from his Mexican consignee, was seized by the government (Moore, 3044). Contrary to law, a forced loan was extorted from Ducoing (Moore, 3409). Aaron Leggett carried on an extensive logwood business in Tabasco; but the action of Mexicans in seizing vessels of his for military use entirely ruined him (Moore, 1275), and even Santa Anna admitted that his claim was just (Butler, Feb. 8, 1836). Sixteen bales of wax were confiscated as of Spanish origin, when the fullest certificates, including that of the Mexican vice-consul at New York, proved that it came from Russia (Poinsett in Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 248). Gahagan was inhumanly persecuted and for a time rendered insane, because in a perfectly lawful and respectful manner he tried to prevent the authorities from illegally appropriating his employer’s property (Moore, 3240). Santangelo, a naturalized American, was expelled without trial and thereby ruined, in direct violation of the treaty of amity (Moore, 3333). A case of which the essentials, at least, were simple is also worthy of mention. Evidently to drive him away and get his property, Dr. Baldwin, described by our minister as “a gentleman of great respectability and intelligence” (Ellis, Nov. 8, 1836), was prosecuted on the basis of depositions which a superior Mexican court admitted were forgeries, was falsely charged with murdering a woman and firing on a soldier, was put into the stocks and then imprisoned while suffering from a freshly broken leg, and in short was persecuted by the local authorities for a term of years (Moore, 3235–40). Other cases, though less easily stated, were not less clear; yet Mexico would give no redress. See Forsyth’s despatch of May 27, 1837 (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 105).

27. This point was taken advantage of by the clever Mexicans to the utmost, and it illustrates one of the great embarrassments encountered in dealing with them. Because they had the words “constitution,” “courts,” and “law” they pretended to have the realities. It was as if they had coined lead at the mint and required us to accept it as silver, while it passed among themselves for merely what it was. See also Ashburnham, no. 11, 1838. For the character of Mexican courts see vol. i, 12–13.

28. The Mexican government demanded that Baldwin (note 26), for example, should seek redress from the very tribunal that had wronged him (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 64). In 1834 Simon McGillivray, a director of the United Mexican Mining Company, wrote thus to the British minister: Even when we obtain report after report and decree after decree against the confiscation, already effected, of our property, “we never can succeed in obtaining the enforcement of such Decrees, because the parties against whom they are given are Mexicans of influence or connexion in the place, and we, the claimants for justice, are only foreigners”; and three months later the minister (no. 61, 1834) reported that a letter from the governor of the state “in substance fully admits” this. Once when Baldwin obtained a verdict, the judge would not execute it, and the Doctor had to flee for his life (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 65). Under such circumstances, to deny the right of injured foreigners, especially the unpopular Americans, to invoke the aid of their governments was plainly unfair, and so France and England held as firmly as did the United States.

29. 11Canning, March 25, 1825. Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 321 (Webster). This obligation grows out of the benefits conferred by recognition.

30. (Early) Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 68. (Avoid) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 40 (Van Buren). (Covered) 231Butler to Jackson, June 23, 1831. (Amicable) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 92 (Livingston); 160 (Forsyth). As the net result of four years of effort Butler was informed that full specifications must be given; yet no attention was paid to a group of cases thus made out and proved (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 499). Then he was told that the claimants must come to the treasury department in person, that nothing would be done until all the American claims should have been presented, and that a call from our minister would not advance matters (ibid., 501–3). Evidently all this was to gain time, and it was fairly characterized by our secretary of state as a denial of justice (ibid., 144). In November, 1832, a bearer of despatches from Butler to our government was detained on his way to Vera Cruz by the governor of Perote castle, and was there robbed of his papers, though a passport from the national government established his official character. The case was both simple and outrageous. Our minister insisted upon an investigation; but in February, 1834, he found that (confessedly “on account of some trifling difficulty”) it had been suspended, and in the following April was merely informed, in reply to an inquiry, that it was again proceeding (ibid., 462, 470, 517, 521).

31. Sen. 160; 24, 2, pp. 62, 112, 156 (Ellis). 52Forsyth to Ellis, July 20, 1836. 52Monasterio to Ellis, Oct. 21; Nov. 15, 1836. Pakenham, no. 96, 1841. (Withdrew) Ellis, no. 46, Jan. 12, 1837. He gave the fortnight’s notice on Nov. 4. Gorostiza, Correspondencia. (Approval) Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 84 (Monasterio); Sen. 189; 24, 2. Kohl, Claims, 18. Even the philo-Mexican Thompson said that a discussion with that government in writing was as “endless as the web of Penelope” (Recolls., 228).

32. 58Jackson, Mar. 12, 1823 (he thought himself too sympathetic toward Mexico to be our minister there). (Agreed) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 581, 601. Diario, Feb. 2, 1836. Messages, Dec. 5, 1836; Feb. 6, 1837 (Richardson, Messages). Ho. 139; 24, 2, p. 1. Jackson has been said by a certain school of historians to have used our claims (in the February Message) as a bludgeon to force Mexico to sell Texas. But was his temper such that he did not care to assert American rights unless to gain territory? What cession was he aiming at when he enforced our claims against France? And if Mexico felt (as she asserted: Diario, supra) that baseless grievances of ours were to be used as a pretext for trouble, why did she not make haste and refute them? From every sane point of view, indeed, the charge looks absurd. As early as March, 1833, Butler was urged to settle the boundary negotiation at once, lest a step toward independence on the part of Texas should make it impossible to obtain that territory by arrangement with Mexico (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 21); yet now, after four years have passed, and after that province has practically effected its independence, Jackson is accused of trying to compel a cession of it from Mexico. Moreover he was at this very time rejecting the petition of Texas to be annexed (ibid., 63). Besides, in April, 1836, the envoys of Texas at Washington had been instructed to enter a “solemn protest ... against the right of Mexico to sell or the U. S. to purchase [Texas]” (Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 76). Even more surprising, the charge is made by representatives of the anti-slavery historical school, which denounced Jackson for wickedly conspiring at this precise juncture to help establish Texas as an independent nation by precipitately recognizing her. The truth is that while engaged in no conspiracy, he now favored the recognition of Texas, and hence one could not accept the opposite and inconsistent view even were it otherwise possible to do so. Probably the fact that Jackson had settled our long-standing claims against France by adopting a firm attitude influenced him in regard to Mexico. (Rupture) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1838.

33. Ho. Report 281; 24, 2. Sen. 189; 24, 2. 52Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 181–3, 187–92 (Wharton); 218–21 (Catlett); 273–4 (Greyson); 284–8 (Hunt). Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. Buchanan, Works, iii, 213, 233, 415.

34. Ellis had taken the legation papers to Washington. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 105, 108, 109 (Forsyth). 52Greenhow, Aug. 12, 1837. Certain historians drawing their views largely from the heated anti-slavery writers of that period have been led to misrepresent our relations with Mexico as much as our conduct with reference to Texas. At this point it has been alleged that the United States required Mexico to examine and settle a large number of complicated cases within a week, which our acceptance of the dilatory reply proves that we did not require. Greenhow was merely directed to say that [for the convenience of the Mexican government] he would remain seven days and bring back any communication it should wish to make (56Forsyth to Greenhow, May 27, 1837). That country, on the other hand, had decreed in May that all pending grievances of the two nations might be settled by arbitration, but that should the United States refuse complete satisfaction of any demands Mexico should present, or delay it beyond the time fixed under the arbitration treaty, commercial intercourse with this country should be cut off and preparations be made for war (Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2, p. 9; DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, iii, 392). Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111 (Cuevas).

35. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 113–27 (MartÍnez); 30 (Forsyth). Forsyth to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2. In respect to one clear case, already many years old, MartÍnez promised that “every exertion” should be made to have it taken up by the next regular Congress; but when that Congress met, the minister of relations did not even mention it (ibid.). Mayer, War, 343. Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 758 (Forsyth); 759 (Greenhow). Richardson, Messages, iii, 377–9. 53MartÍnez to Forsyth, Apr. 7, 1838; reply, Apr. 21. 77MartÍnez, no. 1, res., 1837. MartÍnez coupled his proposal of arbitration with a demand that the United States should reaffirm our neutrality. This was an affront, but Forsyth merely expressed surprise.

36. The plan of arbitration was first brought to the attention of our government during the latter part of Dec, 1837. Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2. Ashburnham, no. 42, 1838. (Surprise) 52W. D. Jones, nos. 132–3, 1838. Mexico proposed arbitration to France also, but met with a refusal (MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 411). Later, MartÍnez proposed to give the arbitration a scope that would have included Mexican complaints regarding Texas. To admit such diplomatic and political questions would have made the affair practically endless, and thus have nullified it so far as its essential object, the adjustment of private claims, was concerned; and our government properly refused to accept this proposition (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1217).

37. Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 24 (MartÍnez), 27. Ho. 190; 26, 1. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1216–8. Forsyth to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. To save time, the United States transported MartÍnez’s courier to Vera Cruz, but the man spent about three weeks in making the four-days’ trip from the port to the capital (ibid.). 53Forsyth to MartÍnez, Mar. 16, 1839. (Excuse) Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 21 (Jones, Jan. 10); Ho. Report, 320; 25, 3. (Disavowed) Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 2, 14.

38. Pakenham, no. 60, 1840. (Waived) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1221–3. Castillo and LeÓn declined to take an oath in the regular way, saying that each had administered it to the other. The United States was represented by ex-Senator John Rowan and W. L. Marcy. Rowan was succeeded by H. M. Breckenridge. 52Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1, 1845.

39. Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 11 (Forsyth). Ho. 57; 27, 1. Sen. 320; 27, 2, pp. 185 (Webster); 22–9, 90, 92, etc. Sen. 61; 27, 1 (Marcy and Rowan, May 26, 1841). Sen. 411; 27, 2 (com. for. rels.). Ho. 269; 27, 2 (Leggett case).

Castillo and LeÓn insisted that cases should come before the board only by documents presented through one of the governments—a process likely to consume much time. When Rowan withdrew in August, 1841, and Marcy desired to proceed even under this disadvantage, his Mexican colleagues gained a delay of about six weeks by refusing to do so (Moore, Inter. Arbit., 1235. Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 254). They falsely asserted that four particular claims, three of which were accepted by our commissioners and the fourth was paid later by our government, had been withdrawn by the American minister at Mexico, and by thus holding them back for some two months defeated them (Sen. 320; 27, 2, pp. 179, 251–3).

Under the treaty, that country was positively bound to furnish the evidence called for in support of the claims, and W. S. Parrott’s requisition was the first or among the first made out and forwarded. None of his papers came, however, for seven months, and those received were taken without leave from the custody of the board by Castillo and LeÓn, and held back for nearly two months more; a part of them had evidently been mutilated or forged; only about one half of the number specified were furnished, though it was known that all were under the control of the government; and more than 2000 pages actually prepared for transmission seem to have been withheld (Sen. 320; 27, 2, passim). Leggett’s case, another of the principal ones, was vitally damaged by documents afterwards fully proved to be spurious (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1277–8), and as the claimant certainly would not have presented them against himself, they must have come from the Mexican government.

Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 22: “For the rest, the Committee, while they abstain [as was proper in official action] from imputations on the commissioners of the Mexican Republic, yet cannot but perceive that the instructions under which those commissioners acted, and the course they pursued, in the organization, proceedings, and final action of the commission, were of most questionable validity, and operated to the serious injury of the parties interested.” The American commissioners expressed the belief that had the board been acting half the time between Aug. 25 and the day it took up the first case on its merits, all the cases would have been “finally adjusted” (Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 197). The claims left undecided in the umpire’s hands amounted to $1,864,939.56, and those which the board had not time to consider to $3,336,837.05 (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232).

Mexico has been given great credit for sending many original documents on a hazardous journey; but, had they been lost, the claimants would have suffered and she would have profited. She had time enough and clerks enough to make this risk unnecessary. Also Mexico has been given great credit for accepting certain indisputable claims growing out of her revolutionary war, which pro-Mexican Americans have declared it was outrageous to present; but as she had formally recognized in 1824 all debts of the revolutionists, there was no escape. Numerous claims failed to be considered because presented too late, but this was doubtless mainly or wholly due to the attitude of the Mexican commissioners, which made it appear more than doubtful for a long time whether it would be worth while to incur the trouble and expense of making up the cases. In fact the notice of the state dept. (Washington Globe, Apr. 16, 1840) that the commission would meet was falsified by the non-appearance of Castillo and LeÓn in time (Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 23). Much time and expense were needed to get papers from Mexico, etc. The Mexican commissioners took the unreasonable ground that all undecided claims, considered by the board, were extinguished (Sen. 411; 27, 2, p. 3).

40. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232, 1245. Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. Pakenham, nos. 49, 97, 1842. Ho. 144; 28, 2, p. 20 (Green). Besides the twenty instalments a preliminary payment, covering the interest that would be due, April 30, 1843, on the awards, was to be made on that date (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1246).

A forced loan was ordered for the payment of the interest and principal of the awards (Voss in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 7. Sen. 85; 29, 1; Negrete, InvasiÓn, iv, 327); and the goods of all who would not or could not meet their assessments were confiscated and sold amid the lamentations of the owners and general curses against the United States (Bustamante, Gobierno, 130). Nearly all the proceeds of the forced loan were, however, used for other purposes (Green in Ho. 19; 28, 2, p. 32). Our agent was finally given drafts for the next instalments after the third, and supposing these would be cashed, he receipted for them in full (Buchanan, Nov. 19 in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 3); but the government stopped all such payments (B. E. Green, Dec. 17, 1844) and refused to give up the receipts (Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 11). In short, it pursued a course that was not only dishonorable but positively fraudulent. To make all this the more exasperating, the nation was permitting Santa Anna to expend great amounts.

In the treaty of January, 1843, Mexico promised to make a new convention providing for the settlement of all our outstanding claims, including those not adjudicated by the joint commission. Delay and evasion followed, of course; but in October of that year the British minister severed diplomatic relations with Mexico, and in November, 1843, probably in order to be on good terms with us in case of a war with England, she signed the proposed convention (Doyle, no. 79, 1843). The United States accepted the plan of a joint commission, as Mexico desired, but required that it should meet at Washington. This appears to have been just. The claimants were all Americans, were numerous, had a great number of papers which it was not advisable to take abroad by sea, and could not, without much inconvenience and loss, expatriate themselves for an indefinite period. Another objection was even more serious, perhaps. Pakenham (no. 14, 1842) wrote emphatically to his government that a commission of this kind should not sit at Mexico, because the pressure of public sentiment would not allow the Mexican members to act properly on the claims of aliens, and because the foreign ministers, from whom the actual umpire would almost necessarily be selected, were more or less entangled in similar cases, and therefore would not be thought impartial.

To provide, as Mexico demanded, for the arbitration of private Mexican grievances, which that government admitted unofficially did not exist, would have been to cast a gratuitous aspersion upon ourselves; and to allow the presentation of a national claim on account of Texas (which] also was demanded), besides enabling Mexico to nullify through her pretensions and endless declamations the essential purpose of the treaty, would have been to question the good faith of our official declarations of neutrality, and make it possible for a subject of some foreign power—the umpire—to impose upon us an immense indemnity, which would also have been a monumental impeachment of our honor. No sovereign state would place itself in so dangerous and ridiculous a position. Accordingly the Senate of the United States eliminated these features of the agreement signed by Minister Thompson. The justice of its action Mexico did not undertake seriously to deny, and she promised immediate attention to the subject; but once more she resorted to dilatory tactics, and thus her promise of January, 1843, one important consideration for granting a delay in the payment of our awards, was evaded.

One difficulty needs to be faced here. The United States defended itself for certain breaches of neutrality on the part of American citizens during the revolutionary war of Texas on the ground that they could not legally be prevented; why then could not Mexico plead the legal impossibility of preventing local authorities and citizens from committing outrages against Americans? In reply it may be said (1) that there was no analogy between the two cases. While our government may have asked that such outrages be prevented, its real demand was that compensation be paid; our breaches of neutrality were political offences, and therefore called for different treatment than the civil grievances on which these claims were based; the former could not be proved (Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 23–24), while the latter could be; and the former, unlike the latter, could not properly be redressed by the payment of a definite amount of money. (2) We have abundant reason to believe that if Mexico had been able and had desired to present a bill for damages on account of such breaches of neutrality, it would have been examined fairly and promptly by the American government. As a single illustration of the ability of Mexico to pay our claims, it may be mentioned that in 1844 Santa Anna and the Lizardi banking house, in combination, robbed the treasury of about $1,200,000 (Mofras, Explor., i, 65).41. [This note is missing from the original.]

IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1843–1846

1. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, text, notes, and index, particularly pp. 68, 74, 78, 85–7, 94, 99, 194–5, 199, 210, 273, 288–95, 409–31, 464. Webster: ibid., 194. See remarks in chap. iii, note 13. 137Donelson to Calhoun, Jan. 8, 1848. 77Doyle, British chargÉ, to Bocanegra, April 20, 1843: “The undersigned must remind His Excellency that Texas has been recognized as an independent nation by the Government of Her Majesty, and that treaties have been negotiated with that Republic as independent.” 77Cyprey, the French minister, to Bocanegra, April 20, 1843: “The Mexican Cabinet has doubtless overlooked the fact that with respect to France and most of the states of Europe Texas is absolutely in the same position as that in which Mexico was before her independence had been recognized by Spain.”

As early as 1839 Gorostiza admitted privately that Mexico had lost Texas (11E. de Lisle, June 21); and in 1840 the French government notified Mexico that its recognition of Texas was merely the acceptance of a fait accompli (11to Cyprey, no. 4, May 6). Webster, Writings, ix, 158: “Nothing can exceed, I have always thought, the obstinacy and senselessness manifested by Mexico in refusing for so many years to acknowledge the independence of Texas”; xiii, 351: Our annexing Texas gave Mexico no just ground of complaint (Sept. 29, 1847). In his Memoria of Jan., 1849, the Mexican minister of relaciones called the refusal of Mexico to recognize the annexation of Texas a caprice or whim (capricho). (Never) See note 5. 137Gallatin to Calhoun, Mar. 3, 1848.

2. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 25 (Bocanegra); 27 (Thompson); 34 (Upshur).

3. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 38, 42 (Almonte); 41, 45 (Upshur). 53Memo. of conference between Upshur and Almonte. 53Almonte to Upshur, Apr. 22, 1844. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 194.

4. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 199, 288. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 53 (Calhoun).

5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 289–295. 77Relaciones to Almonte, May 30, 1844. According to Santa Anna’s published account of the interview, which doubtless misrepresented the bearer of despatches, Thompson said the assent of Mexico was an essential preliminary to the annexation of Texas, and plainly recognized her ownership of the province, and the President replied that the right of subjugating it would be transmitted to posterity, and assent would never be given to its absorption in the United States. In reply to Bocanegra’s assertion that the United States had now recognized Mexico’s claim to Texas Calhoun sent word to the Mexican government that we recognized no such claim, but held that Texas was an independent nation both in fact and in right (Ho. 2; 28, 2, p. 23). In Tyler, Tyler, ii, 692, is a statement, apparently based on good authority, that Mexico consented to cede Texas for $15,000,000; but internal evidence and many facts are decidedly against it, and the author has not found the slightest evidence in its support. It was made forty years after the event, and probably was due to a misunderstanding or defective recollection.

Out of this affair grew a diplomatic tilting-match (Ho. 2; 28, 2). Bocanegra, though personally agreeable and officially painstaking, dignified and courteous (Thompson, Recolls., 82) was not a great logician; and the son of Duff Green could hardly be regarded as an intellectual giant. Still, certain points emerged from the discussion. The Mexican planted himself on the technical theory of ownership, accused the Texans of stealing the territory which they had been graciously permitted to occupy, and charged the United States in the usual manner with violating treaties and international law. Green, on the other hand, relied upon facts: the fact of actual Texan independence, the fact that Mexico herself owed her existence to a revolution, and the fact that she had regarded herself as independent and had been so regarded by other nations long before the mother-country would recognize her. But the correspondence as a whole was indecisive, disagreeable, and exasperating.

6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 273–9, 365–7.

7. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 416–7. Shannon and RejÓn: Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 47; Ho. 19; 28, 2. 52RejÓn to Shannon, Nov. 21, 1844. Buchanan to Shannon, no. 10, 1845. 13Bankhead, no. 67, 1844. Von Holst, U. S., ii, 685. Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 662. Tyler, Message, Dec. 18, 1844 (Richardson). N. Y. Eve. Post, Dec. 18, 1844. (RejÓn) Sosa, BiografÍas; 52B. E. Greene, no. 17, 1844. N. Y. Herald, Dec. 16, 1844. Nat. Intelligencer, Dec. 20, 1844. Democ. Review, Feb., 1847, 99, 100. Richtofen, ZustÄnde, 54–6. RejÓn, JustificaciÓn.

A recent Mexican author has said that “perfidy,” which the Mexicans loved to charge against the United States at this period, was made impossible by the publicity of our diplomatic affairs (BÚlnes, Mentiras, 167). It should be remembered that we had a perfect right to seek, in the way we had sought, to acquire Texas—i.e. by purchase.

8. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 38 (Almonte); 39 (Buchanan). Smith, Annex. of Texas, 420–3. Shannon, no. 10, Apr. 6, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 30, 38, 1845. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. O Se Hace la Guerra. Diario, May 12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846.

“Is it possible,” exclaimed La Voz del Pueblo of March 26, “that Mexico is a nation of slaves, a wandering tribe, to be the prey of other nations? Eleven years of war [to gain our independence], all the victims executed, all the costly sacrifices made,—have these been in vain? War and only war can save us”—“war without quarter,” “extermination and death.” For other references and quotations see Smith, Annex. of Texas, 425–7. 52Dimond, nos. 244–5, 249, etc., 1845. Min. of treasury to Deputies, Apr. 19, 1845 (Diario, Apr. 20). 56W. S. Parrott, Apr. 26.

9. Amigo del Pueblo, July 17, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 427. Diario, July 17, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 11; Oct. 11. Siglo XIX, Aug. 1. 52Dimond, nos. 245, 249, etc., 1845. Journal des DÉbats, Sept. 20. 56W. S. Parrott, July 12, 15, 22, 30; Aug. 16. Patriota Mex., Nov. 14. 52Shannon, no. 3, 1844. St. Louis Republican, Aug. 18, 1845. Wash. Union, Aug. 1, 14; Sept. 29. 297Buchanan to McLane, priv. and pers., Sept. 13. 77Relaciones to mins., July 30. 52Campbell, Havana, Aug. 14. 76Guerra, circular, July 16. Bankhead, no. 38, 1845. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 43–5.

July 30, 1845, the Mexican minister of relations wrote to the Mexican minister at Paris: “Mexico has been left no choice except to fight the United States”; “The campaign will soon begin”; 14,000 troops are en route; 6000 will soon be organized to join them (77Cuevas to Garro, res.).

10. Siglo XIX, July 27. Picayune, Sept. 23. St. Louis Reveille, Sept. 14. 52Black, no. 341, 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, July 22, 30. Dimond, nos. 249, 257, 1845. Diario, July 31. 297Polk to Buchanan, private, Aug. 7.

Spanish-American subtlety was not the only subtlety at work. Aug. 1, 1845, the Mexican agent at London reported: I have told Aberdeen that war is inevitable; he suggests that we merely suspend relations with the U. S., since a declaration of war would lawfully be followed by the occupation of California, the bombardment of Vera Cruz, and a blockade (77Murphy, no. 9). The view that no declaration of war was necessary and that an attack might be made at once on Texas was well understood in the United States, as the preceding citations show. As early as Aug. 5 the Mexican commander at Matamoros 52proclaimed: “Comrades, the moment has arrived to present ourselves on the field of honor.”

11. 108Wikoff to Bancroft, May 10, 1845. 52Buchanan to Parrott, Mar. 28, 1845.

In one respect this was an unfortunate appointment, for the Mexican authorities hated Parrott; but Buchanan, who probably was not aware of that fact, regarded him as “a discreet man, well acquainted with public affairs,” and entitled to the confidence of the President (52to Black, Sept. 17). He was familiar with Spanish, had an intimate acquaintance with Mexican politics and politicians, and was available. It is highly improbable that any one else combined these necessary qualifications; and, as his errand called for no public recognition and was mainly to be executed indirectly, prejudice was likely to be disarmed. 162Bancroft to Conner, Nov. 20, 1845. 162Id. to Latimer, Nov. 7, 10.

12. 56W. S. Parrott, June 24; Sept. 6. His quoted words, added to other declarations of a similar character, dispose completely of the assertion, often found in Mexican and American writings, that we offered to pay for Texas and thus admitted that we had wickedly annexed it. Baldly and as of right, Mexico’s claim could not be recognized by this nation; but in a spirit of good-will, under cover of paying for a satisfactory line, we were disposed to soothe her feelings with a gift.

13. Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174 (Green). Slidell, Dec. 17. Shannon, no. 8, 1845. Dimond, nos. 256, 259, 266, 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16 (Herrera has said, “If a Minister from the United States should arrive, he would be well received”), 26, 29. (Black, Aug. 23) Polk, Diary, Sept. 16. 108Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3: letters from men in daily intercourse with Herrera, Almonte, and the minister of relations say the government desires peace; and one says: “We know from good authority that if a Minister were sent from the United States he would be well received” (note the word “Minister”).

14. Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 9. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845; to Slidell, Nov. 10. Dix in Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 176. See also pp. 136–7.

15. GarcÍa, JuÁrez, 9, 12. 52W. D. Jones, Sept. 22, 1838. (Estrada) Valencia, proclam., Oct. 22, 1840, in Papeles Varios. London Times, Mar. 13, 1845. Picayune, Dec. 30, 1844; Jan. 25, 1846. McLane, March 3, 1845 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 583). Feb. 28, 1846, the British Foreign Office transmitted to Bankhead a letter (delivered to it by the Spanish minister by order of his court) which pointed toward the establishment of monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish prince.

16. (Believed) 297Buchanan to McLane, priv. and pers., Sept. 13, 1845.

17. Polk, Diary, Sept. 16, 17, 1845. (Caused) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 (Buchanan). Slidell had been born and educated at the north.

18. Bankhead, nos. 94, 101, 104, 1845. The British government censured Bankhead for going so far in efforts to restore harmony between the United States and Mexico (13to Bankhead, no. 36, 1845. 77Murphy, no. 2, 1846). 13PeÑa to Bankhead, Oct. 15. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 545. PeÑa only said that Mexico would be “inclined” to hear the United States, but of course he would not, on the ground of a passing mood, have expected two British ministers to act for his nation.

19. Bankhead, nos. 101, 104. Id. to Pakenham, Oct. 16. Richardson, Messages, iv, 437–43. That Mexico knew our claims counted among the “differences” is proved by the letter of Cuevas to Forsyth, July 29, 1837 (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111): The President is anxious for “that final and equitable adjustment [of the claims] which is to terminate the existing difficulties between the two Governments.”

20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 12 (Buchanan); 13, 14, 17 (Black). PeÑa to Black, Oct. 14 in Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Diario, Nov. 6. 341Black, memorial, Dec. 20, 1847. Sen. 12; 30, 1.

21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 (Buchanan). Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. Monitor Repub., Aug. 1, 1846 (Herrera had been determined to settle with the United States).

22. Sen. 325; 27, 2, p. 64. Sen. 337; 29, 1, p. 10. As to Slidell’s Title, cf. together Buchanan to Parrott, Mar. 28; Id. to Black, Sept. 17; PeÑa to council of state; and report of council of state. Polk, Diary, Nov. 6, 9, 10.

In Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174, may be found a statement from B. E. Green to the effect that Herrera sent word to him that a minister of the usual sort could not be received, and that he transmitted this message to Polk. But (1), if such was Herrera’s attitude, why was it not made clear to Black, who had been expressly commissioned to ascertain whether a minister would be received; (2) Green, as a member of the Calhoun faction, and perhaps as an official who had lost a good post in our legation at Mexico, was not favorable to Polk, and a statement made by a prejudiced person from memory forty-four years after the event, regarding a delicate matter in which precision is essential, cannot be considered at all authoritative. (3) This statement is out of harmony with a number of material facts. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Feb. 1, 1846: Slidell was sent “on an express agreement that a minister would be received.”

23. 52McLane, no. 8, Sept. 26, 1845. 108Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3, 1845. Dimond, no. 269, 1845. Times, Oct. 14. (Impatience) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 17 (Black). Polk, Diary, Nov. 10.

24. Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10; Dec. 17. Veracruzano Libre, Nov. 30. 52Comte. princ. to Dimond, Nov. 30. Slidell, Nov. 30; Dec. 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). (Fleet) Conner to Dimond, Oct. 23, 1845 (Wash. Union, Dec. 1, 1847). Conner felt so sure of the conciliatory spirit of his government that he withdrew without waiting for orders. California was well known to be in a chronic state of rebellion (chap. xvi), which Mexico had not the power to subdue, and therefore it was natural for one who knew very little about the Mexicans to suppose they would be willing to take a price for the practically worthless claim to that territory.

The view that Polk explicitly instructed Slidell to give up the plan to buy California rather than allow that plan to stand in the way of regaining amicable relations with Mexico does not seem to be correct (Kelsey, Consulate, 62, note 5). But Buchanan’s letter of Dec. 17 to Slidell lays stress upon his “two last alternatives,” which were to purchase northern California, including (a) the Bay of San Francisco or (b) Monterey also; yet he instructs Slidell to drop this matter, if pressing it would endanger success in endeavoring to obtain the Rio Grande boundary or a line including all of New Mexico. Now such a settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary would have involved a restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. The two matters (boundary and relations) were inextricably interwoven both in fact and logically. Hence in effect Buchanan instructed Slidell to drop the plan of purchasing California if pressing it would be liable to prevent the restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 69, note 2) takes a different view, but seems to have erred in more particulars than one.

25. See pp. 55–6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423–31. 52Slidell, Dec. 17, 27. Amigo del Pueblo, Nov. 1: “It is hardly possible to believe such perfidy, such baseness and such audacity ... treason more horrible has never been seen.” Patriota Mexicano, Nov. 18: “To listen to talk of peace from these men [the Americans] is to take the road to perdition, death, ignominy.” Voz del Pueblo, Dec. 3: “The treason has been discovered.... We no longer own the very ground on which we walk.”

26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). Slidell, Dec. 29, 1845. Bankhead, no. 127, 1845. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 545. Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 19. Sierra, Evolution, i, 212. Black, Dec. 18.

One of PeÑa’s minor points was that it did not appear from Slidell’s credentials that he had been confirmed by the Senate; and in fact, since the American Congress had not been in session at the time of his appointment, he had not been. This was not only to inquire into our domestic affairs, but to hold that the Executive of the United States could not appoint a diplomatic agent during a recess of the Senate. Shannon’s letter of credence had said nothing regarding his confirmation, and Murphy had acted as our chargÉ in Texas for about nine months before his name went to the Senate. Another point was that Slidell’s letter of credence did not expressly state that he had full powers for the business in hand; but it was practically absurd, after the United States had taken so much trouble and shown its good faith by withdrawing our fleet, to suppose that we would send an agent to Mexico without giving him the authority to do what we were evidently so anxious to bring about. When this complaint was brought to his attention, Slidell replied that his credentials described him as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, and also that it was not usual to exhibit one’s full powers at so early a stage in such negotiations, adding that he would have done so, however, had any desire to see them been suggested. Buchanan was doubtless right in calling the objection a quibble; and one cannot suppose that under different circumstances it would have been presented. The council of state rejected PeÑa’s objections in both of these cases.

27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 31, 58 (PeÑa); 28 (Black). 52Slidell, Dec. 17.

28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 58 (PeÑa). 77Relaciones, circular to govs., Dec. 11. ComunicaciÓn circular. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1848. Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 21, 24, 25, 28, 32 (Slidell); 22 (Black); 25, 30 (PeÑa). Slidell, Dec. 17.

Even the unfriendly Mexican correspondent of the London Times wrote, “For once” the United States is right, for the documents prove that Mexico made no ad hoc condition (Times, Mar. 13, 1846). The matter can be viewed in another light also. PeÑa agreed to receive a “comisionado”; later he said he had agreed to receive a “comisionado ad hoc.” If the words “ad hoc” added anything, they indicated a difference between his earlier and his later positions; if not, why were they used? Many Americans, doubtless without perceiving what the significance of the act would have been, have insisted that the United States ought to have humored poor little Mexico by sending an envoy ad hoc. Aside from the weightier objection to so doing, such a concession would probably have led to further demands (see note 34). PeÑa, instead of recognizing our magnanimity in taking the first step to heal a breach caused by Mexico, described our overture as “a tacit but clear and strong confession of the rights of Mexico [and] of the wrongs done to her” (77circular, Dec. 11). Gallatin stated that treaties of peace were always negotiated by special commissioners, but this was incorrect (see e.g. Jenkinson, Collection, iii, 355).

29. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. The council of state said: From the language in which the ministry “explains the condition of receiving the proposed envoy (enviado), we cannot draw a satisfactory reason for not receiving Mr. Slidell.” Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 28–49, 56. Bankhead, no. 127, 1845.

In his manifesto of July 26, 1846 (Diario, July 30), Paredes mentioned, as third among the causes of the war, the attempt of the United States to induce Mexico to receive a resident minister, so as to restore friendly relations without first making amends for the offence [annexation of Texas] that had broken off official intercourse.

30. Webster, Writings, iv, 32. R. C. Winthrop, another leading Whig, took the same ground (Union, Mar. 20, 1847). (Awkward) Calhoun in Benton’s Abr. Debates, xvi, 99.

31. Revolution of Paredes. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846 (including documents). Contestaciones (between Paredes, Arista, and the government, 1845). CarreÑo, Jefes, clxiii-clxxvii. Patriota Mex., Dec. 23, 1845. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 80–124. 77Relaciones, circular, Jan. 3, 1846. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 546–56. 56Mexican corr. of London Times to W. S. Parrott, Nov. 19; Dec. 18. 76Guerra, circular, Jan 5. Dimond, nos. 279, 302, 1845. Aguila del Norte, Feb. 11; Mar. 18, 1846. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 281–5, 287–8. GimÉnez, Mems., 91. 285Tornel to Paredes, Nov. 19, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 94, 97, 116, 119, 120, 124, 1845; 2, 1846. Tributo Á la Verdad. 56W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16, 29; Sept. 29, 1845. Black, June 10; Sept. 2, 1845. Picayune, Jan. 24, 1846. Portrait of Herrera: city hall, Mexico. London Times, Feb. 10; Mar. 2, 20, 1846. Monitor Constit., Jan. 1, 16, 1846. Slidell, Dec. 27, 1845; Jan. 14; Feb. 6, 1846. Memorial HistÓrico, Jan. 14, 1846.

The condition of Mexico on the eve of this revolution was well described by the Revista EconÓmica y Comercial: “The country wavers, goes backward, loses courage, and loses hope, because all the systems of government that it has tried, one by one, have failed to give the fruits promised by their authors, and, worn out and exhausted by so many and varied medicines that have been applied in vain, it desires only order, peace, and some degree of security. Our men of merit, education, and patriotism are silent, live in retirement and sadness in their houses, occupied solely with private affairs ... we have become a nation of soldiers, officials, lawyers, clergymen, and smugglers, where the number who produce bears a miserable proportion to the number of those who live by the labor and sweat of the producers, and where the continual political changes, the disorders, the bad administration of justice, and the bad commercial and financial system offer more or less sustenance to those who produce nothing, always at the expense of the toilers and their allies, the merchants.” The political situation was thus explained by El Siglo XIX: “When a long series of civil dissensions, of frauds upon the public, of treasons against the parties, of perjuries to principles, have mixed up men and things, blotted out the line between political groups, and confused all ideas, politics must become a genuine chaos. Mexico is in precisely that condition.” When charged with upsetting public order Paredes replied, “None existed” (Esperanza, Jan. 8, 1846). As late as Aug. 6, 1846, Texas was called upon, like the other political divisions of the country, to elect members of Congress.

32. (Scheme) 52Black, Dec. 30, 1845; 52Slidell, Dec. 27; 297McLane to Polk, private, Jan. 17, 1846; Memorial HistÓrico, Jan. 26, and the Mexican press generally. Slidell saw grounds for hope: the delay in furnishing him an escort; a possibility that Paredes might hold that Herrera had committed Mexico; the improbability that money to pay the troops could be borrowed while war seemed likely (hence he sent a hint to the government that money could be obtained by accepting a boundary satisfactory to the United States); Castillo, with whom he had talked a number of times before he became minister of relations, was intelligent and averse to a war with the United States. Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20, 28; Mar. 12.

33. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 63 (Slidell). Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. The council said that Slidell could not be received on any footing, unless Taylor (now at Corpus Christi) should retire. “The limiting of the mission of the comisionado to the sole question of Texas,” it remarked, “was a tacit condition (una condiciÓn tÁcita).” This admitted once more that the condition was not stated. The council admitted also that comisionado was not the proper term for an envoy ad hoc, which refutes again the contention of a certain American school that Mexico explicitly required us to send a “commissioner” instead of a minister. Castillo’s reply to Slidell (Mar. 12) said: Mexico cannot have agreed to receive a regular minister, for it would have been imprudent to do that; by fraud and violence the fair province of Texas has been stolen; and now, after robbing and outraging Mexico, your country seeks to obtain a pretext for war by demanding of us the impossible humiliation of receiving you (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 67). At this time Castillo did not know that Taylor was advancing toward the Rio Grande (Diario, Mar. 15, 1846). 166Slidell to Conner, Feb. 7; Mar. 15.

34. Mar. 17 Slidell answered Castillo at some length (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 72), vindicating the course of the United States in regard to Texas. All the threats of war, he pointed out, have come from Mexico; to suppose that the present Mexican administration in particular does not intend to fight, would be to accuse it of declaring, in order to overthrow Herrera, what it did not mean; so far as words can produce war it already exists by the act of Mexico, and is the United States to remain entirely passive, taking no precautions, till your army “shall be prepared to strike, with due effect, the threatened blow?” Slidell at the same time requested his passports. Castillo to Slidell, March 21 (Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846) declared the discussion closed and transmitted passports. April 23 Paredes said in a manifesto that he rejected Slidell because “the dignity of the nation resented this new insult” (MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 559). In view of the grounds on which his revolution had been launched (73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 200, res., 1846) he could not have received Slidell without grave danger to himself (Black, May 26, 1846; Slidell, no. 11). See chap. viii, note 24. Slidell sailed from Vera Cruz on March 31, but at Polk’s request he retained his commission and held himself in readiness to go to Mexico again for about a year (Moore, Buchanan, vii, 211; 52Slidell, no. 14, 1847).

V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR

1. Mexican feeling. (Subjugate) 52Consul Black, no. 349, Oct. 9, 1845; 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. 52Slidell, nos. 3, 10. 52Consul McCall, Tampico, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. (All of Mexico) 52Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. (Threat) Diario, Mar. 25, 1845; 77Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1849, 97, 102; Thompson, Recolls., 238; London Spectator, Sept. 26, 1846. (Hinder) 52Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, [June, 1827]; Poinsett’s reply; 52Poinsett’s reply to MÉx. state legisl., Aug., 1829; Shannon, no. 3; La Ruina de los Mexicanos. (Indians) Mosquito Mexicano, Aug. 4, 1835; 75gov. Durango, Apr. 27, 1846. (Privileged classes) J. H. Smith in Proceeds. Amer. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914, and the citations there given. (Siglo XIX) 56W. S. Parrott, June 29, 1845. (Politicians) Green, nos. 8, 103, 1844; Calhoun Corresp., 975; Shannon, no. 3, 1844, and the Mexican press.

The following citations, which might be indefinitely extended, bear upon various aspects of the subject. Pakenham, nos. 74 of 1828; 74 of 1829. Bankhead, nos. 38, 1845; 28, 58, 1846. 345Ellis, Sept. 20, 1839. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Voz del Pueblo, Mar. 29; May 3, 1845. Amigo del Pueblo, June 26; Oct. 9, 1845. OrizaveÑo, Mar. 30, 1845. Patriota Mex., Nov. 14, 1845. Monitor Repub., Jan. 28, 1847. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. ComunicaciÓn circular que. 77Almonte, no. 130, priv., 1844. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 50, res., 1845. Decree of Mex. Cong., June 4, 1845 (broadside). 56W. S. Parrott, June 29; July 5, 1845. 108Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3, 1845.

2. (Danger) 76 Gov. Ibarra of Puebla, Sept. 5, 1846; Diario, Apr. 17, 1846; 77Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; law of June 4, 1845, in DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 19; Monitor Repub., May 15, 1847; London Spectator, Sept. 26, etc., 1846. C. M. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 45. Castillo; council of state (chap. iv). (Paredes) Bankhead, no. 28, Feb. 27, 1846. (Chief) Shannon, no. 3, 1844; Negrete, InvasiÓn, iv, app., 182; Diario, Mar. 25, 1845; Mar. 25; Sept. 26; Dec. 6, 1846; 80legislat. of MÉx. state, address, Apr. 26, 1847; Patriota Mex., Nov. 14, 1845; 77ArrangÓiz, no. 50, res., Mar. 13, 1845; Siglo XIX, Nov. 30, 1845. (Clamored) Amigo del Pueblo, Oct. 9, 1845; Voz del Pueblo, Mar. 29, 1845. (Superiority) Tornel, Tejas, 95; Monitor Repub., May 12, 1846.

3. (Abject) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 993. 77Almonte, June 19, priv.; Sept. 20, 1844; Mar. 17, priv., 1845. (Panic) Amer. Review, Sept., 1845, 222.

4. To precisely what extent European journals were read in Mexico cannot be determined; but it seems probable that few important expressions escaped notice there, and certainly the leading journals were quoted freely.

5. (Differences) 77Almonte, June 19, priv., 1844; 77Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 994; Constitutionnel, May 12; Aug. 5, 1845. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. Diario, Apr. 3, 1845.

6. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. Negrete, MÉxico, xxi, 130. 13Elliot, July 3, 1845. Gorostiza, Dictamen. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. FederaciÓn y Tejas. Tornel, Tejas, 95–7. (Elliot in Mex.) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 411–3. 77Deffa dis, July 29, 1835.

7. Britannia, Feb. 15, 1845. (1812) Negrete, MÉxico, xxi, 130. 13Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. Times, Apr. 5, 1845. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 65, res., Apr. 23, 1845.

8. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846 (Swarms of the best irregular cavalry that I have ever seen). Watson, Taylor, 113–4 (The British, Spanish, and Prussian ministers at Washington agreed that Scott would be beaten; CalderÓn spoke as quoted in the text). (Generals) Wash. Union, Dec. 18, 1846. Elliot, note 6. Times, July 5, 1845.

Napoleon said, “The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and hardship” (Maxims, 47). In this quality the Mexicans excelled.

9. Requena in Monitor Repub., Mar. 9, 1846. Negrete, Mexico, xxi, 131. (Boasted) 52W. S. Parrott, Dec. 14, 1835. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. BoletÍn Oficial, Apr. 15, 1845. Apuntes, 168. Thompson, Recolls., 170–1. (Self-confidence) Mofras, Explor., i, 70. 76Min. war, circular, Nov. 11. (Ensure) Diario, Sept. 25, 1845. (Voz del P.) FederaciÓn y Tejas.

10. (Texas) Tornel, Tejas, 95–7; 13Bankhead, no. 125, Dec. 30, 1845. 77Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19; Sept. 20, 1844; instructions to G. de la Vega, Apr. 10, 1844. 13Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. Elliot, note 6. (Urged) Negrete, MÉxico, xxi, 131–2. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849.

11. Requena in Monitor Repub., Mar. 9, 1846. London Times, June 11, 1846. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846. Britannia, June 10, 1844. 169Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. 137Clemson to Calhoun, Mar. 28, 1847. Elliot, note 6.

12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. 77Cuevas, no. 67, 1836. (Herald)Diario, June 4, 1845. (Globe) Charleston Mercury, Sept. 8, 1845. Some of the documents quoted above are later than the beginning of the war, but the opinions must have existed before.

13. (Defensive) Requena, note 11. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 129, res., Nov. 29, 1844. Times, Apr. 5, 1845. Britannia, June 10, 1844. Times in Diario of June 8, 1845.

14. Herald, May 3, 1845. 77ArrangÓiz, note 13; no. 101, res., July 8, 1845. (Tornel) 47Wood to Bancroft, July 4, 1846. (Own) Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 5; Savannah Republican, Aug. 25; N. Y. Herald, Aug. 30, 1845. Times of Apr. 5, 1845, in Diario of June 8.

15. Standard, Aug. 12, 1845. 13Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. (Fig red) BÚlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 150.

16. (Endured) 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 532, res., Sept. 24, 1846; 77circular, Nov. 27, 1846. (Credit) London Times, Apr. 15, 1845; and chap. xxxiii. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 36, res., May 23, 1844. Constitutionnel, Aug. 15, 1845.

17. Benefits. 77Cuevas, no. 67, July 13, 1836. Diario, Mar. 25, 1845. 52Green, Apr. 8, 1844. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. 52Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. 56W. S. Parrott, July 5, 1845. Siglo XIX, Aug. 1, 1845. (Baptize) La Verdad Desnuda. (Blockade) 52Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843; Macedonian, Mar. 28, 1845; 13Doyle, no. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. (Voz del P.) FederaciÓn y Tejas. (Crisis) Reflexiones sobre la Memoria.

18. Central and South America. J. M. L. Mora, pamphlet, 1834. Diario, Sept. 25, 1846. (Press) chap, vi, note 13. 77Cuevas, no. 67, July 13, 1836. 77Mex. min., Lima, no. 23, Aug. 15, 1837. (Dorsey) Savannah Republican, Aug. 25, 1842. Adams, Mems., xi, 340, 367. Imparcial, June 13, 1844. Aurora de la Libertad, Apr. 6, 1845. Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. 80Legisl. of MÉx. state, address, Apr. 26, 1847. 76Gov. Ibarra, Sept. 5, 1846. 312Basadre to S. Anna, Apr. 9, 1847. Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 243, note.

19. Diario, Apr. 3, 1845. Mail, Aug. 30 in Diario, Nov. 1. London Times, Sept. 10, 1845 (War is “clearly the duty” of Mexico). Journal des DÉbats, Sept. 24, 1845. (The European outlook) Chap xxxv.

20. (Jealousy) Mayer, War, 82; Amer. Review, Jan., 1846. (Policy) J. H. Smith in Proceeds. Am. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914. Correspondant, Jan. 1, 1846. London Times, Jan. 1, 1846.

21. (Cotton) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 89, 90. (Checked) Ibid., 382, 389; Tornel, Tejas, 97; London Standard, May 2, 1845; Times, Sept. 9; Dec. 15, 1845; Jan. 1, 1846. (Guizot) Niles, Mar. 14, 1846, pp. 25–6. (Journal des DÉbats) National, Dec. 27, 1845.

22. (Texas) Smith, Annex. of Texas, chap, xviii. Id. in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., June, 1914. Morning Herald, Mar. 27, 1845, in Diario, June 4. Times, Dec. 15, 1845.

23. Times, Aug. 6; Sept. 9, 1845. (It was the Mexico correspondent of the Times who spoke, but evidently the editor allowed him to be heard.) Standard, May 2, 1845. Journal of Commerce, Sept. 6, 1845. Journal des DÉbats, Feb. 4; Sept. 24, 1845. Constitutionnel, May 12, 1845. Monitor Constit., supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. Aurora de la Libertad, Apr. 6, 1845.

24. Journal des DÉbats, Sept. 24, 1845. 13Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. (Blockade) 13Bankhead, no. 162, Oct. 30, 1846.

25. (Fear) BoletÍn Oficial, Apr. 15, 1845. (Guarantee) 13Bankhead, no. 117, Nov. 29, 1845.

26. 13Bankhead, nos. 113, Nov. 29, 1845; 125, Dec. 30, 1845; 14, Jan. 30, 1846; 28, Feb. 27, 1846; 52McLane, nos. 8, Sept. 26, 1845; 55, June 18, 1846; 52Shannon, no. 9, Mar. 27, 1845; 52Slidell, Jan. 14; Feb. 6, 1846; Correspondant, May 1, 1846; Times, Mar. 13, 1846; Ho. 2; 29, 1, pp. 139–92; 52J. Parrott, June 4, 1846. 52Dimond, no. 332, Apr. 22, 1846: The Mexican thermometer for peace or war is governed by the prospects of war between us and England. The contemptuous and abusive tone of the British journals with reference to the United States encouraged Mexico. Our minister at London reported that the British press as a whole represented that the United States could not wage war successfully against Mexico (297McLane to Polk, received, June 21, 1846). 77Murphy, no. 9, Aug. 1, 1845 (Aberdeen would like to see, etc.).

27. 52Slidell, Jan. 14, 1846. Times, Mar. 13, 1846. 52McLane, no. 55, June 18, 1846. (Hoped) 13Bankhead, no. 31, Mar. 10, 1846; Tornel, Tejas, 97.28. Diario, Mar. 25, 1845. (Enthusiasm, veil) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. 77Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19, 1844. Monitor Constit., supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. Almonte (who, as recently minister to the United States, had great influence on the question of peace or war) held that Mexico ought to fight and protract the war as long as possible in order to make us so tired of it that we should never repeat the experiment (13Pakenham, no. 119, Sept. 28, 1846). Espectador, Apr. 25, 1846 (“We are profoundly convinced of the triumph of the Mexican arms”). Reforma, Mar. 9, 1846. 13Bankhead, nos. 130, Sept. 7, 1846 (“They cannot be convinced” of their inability to fight the U. S.); 151, Oct. 10, 1846 (The cry of the government is, “a levy of 40,000 men and make terms only on the other side of the Nueces”). (Prussian) 256Memo. (Historians) Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 19–20; BalbontÍn, Estado Militar, 58. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 235. S. Anna, proclam., Sept. 16, 1847, in Monitor Repub., Oct. 2, 1847. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 57: After a long stay in Mexico, I believe the sentiment of the people was “unanimous for war.” Franklin Pierce, speech, Jan. 27, 1848: After conversing with the most intelligent men in Mexico I was satisfied that the war was unavoidable (N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848). Other documents, too numerous to be cited, assisted the author in reaching his conclusions. This condition of the Mexican mind helps to explain the rejection of Slidell. See also chap. ix, pp. 221–2.

VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR

1. Buchanan in Cong. Globe, 28, 1, app., 723. For public sentiment regarding the Santa Fe prisoners see the New Orleans papers of March, 1842 (e.g. Com. Bulletin, Mar. 18), and Smith, Annex. of Texas, 31–2. 52Consul Dimond, Jan. 20, 1843. (Sentmanat) 52Consul Porter, July 20, 1844. Sentmanat’s party included several Americans. (Reptiles) 77Clipping from New Orleans Bee. State Sentinel, Sept. 27, 1845. (American prisoners) N. Orl. Comm. Bull., Mar. 18, 1844. Ark. Hist. Comm., Bulletin no. 6, p. 182.

2. The statements regarding American feeling appear to be self-evident. In the daily press the author has found abundant proof of them, but it would require a great deal of space to prove inductively the state of public sentiment. 42Delegates, Feb. 12, 1847.

3. These statements also are presented as conclusions based upon an extended examination of the daily press (see Smith, Annex. of Texas, 472), speeches in Congress, etc. For example, the remarks made in Congress with reference to Jackson’s request for authority to adopt forcible measures (p. 77 of this volume) contained many kind references to Mexico. This feeling persisted. In the Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 9, 1845, its Washington correspondent stated that he found the Democrats of both houses of Congress sincerely desired the friendship and confidence of that country. Id., Oct. 17, 1845. Note the first page of chap. xxxvi. For anti-slavery accusations: J. Q. Adams in Boston Atlas, Oct. 17, 1842 (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131). For the use of money to influence the American press: ibid., 184.

4. (Forbearance) N. Orl. Bee, Feb. 19, 1846; Picayune, May 5, 1846; Guard, May 15, 1846; N. Orl. Comm. Bull., Mar. 16, 1846, and infra. 52Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829. 13Count E. de Lillers to GutiÉrrez [Mar., 1830]. (Jackson) Chap. iii, p. 77. (Imbecility) Picayune, June 23, 1842.

5. Picayune, Apr. 6, 1842. (Webster) Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 205. Sen. 411; 27, 2. (Less willing) Chap. iii, p. 80. Jeff. Repub., Aug. 7, 1845.

6. Republican, Feb. 2, 1846.Picayune, Jan. 28, 1846. Delta, Jan. 21, 1846. Mo. Reporter, Apr. 18, 1846. Comm. Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1846.

7. Mex. consul, no. 79, Apr. 1, 1842. (Justly) Smith, Annex. of Texas, “England” in index. (Influence) Ibid., 72, 136, 153; 56W. S. Parrott, June 4, 1846 (“Mexico may be said to be completely in the hands of England”). Commonwealth, Feb. 23, 1846. Times, Nov. 21, 1845.

8. Natchez Courier and Journal, Apr. 14, 1846. Courrier des E. U. in Memphis Enquirer, Feb. 24, 1846. E.g. Picayune, Feb. 5, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 256 (Hannegan).

9. Delta, Mar. 27: the pending difficulties must be settled effectually. La. Courier, Mar. 6: “The time has arrived when the U. S. must decide to act firmly and put an end to the uncertainty of our relations with Mexico.” Picayune, Jan. 24: “While our relations remain in this miserable condition, our territory is liable to sudden invasion and our citizens to arbitrary exactions ... the intrigues of trans-Atlantic states demand to be counteracted, and the hostile purposes of Mexico need to be met with peremptory measures.” St. Louis Reporter, Jan. 31: “Delay on our part to bring to a positive settlement all existing difficulties with Mexico would be mere madness and folly.” Picayune, May 5: “There is no proposition in mathematics more absolutely demonstrable than the impossibility of having a good understanding with Mexico before giving her a sound drubbing.” (Designs) Id., Dec. 30, 1845; Feb. 5, 1846. 52Consul Campbell, Jan. 7, 1846.

10. (Abolitionists) N. Orl. Comm. Bulletin, Mar. 18, 1842. (Calhoun) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 209, 211, 213–6. Calhoun’s remark was given to the author by Judge Martin of South Carolina, to whom it was made in the spring of 1847, and is fully in line with Calhoun’s action. (Mississippi) The author thinks he has heard Dr. Wm. E. Dodd of the University of Chicago express such an opinion.

11. E.g. Ills. State Register, Dec. 27, 1844: “If war shall ensue, let it not close until the empire of Mexico” is added to the Union; Baker of Illinois in House, Jan. 29, 1846: “We must have California, and perhaps all Mexico” (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 279). Besides this feeling there was a general territorial ambition, which looked in an indefinite way to a rather distant future and a peaceful, natural extension.

12. American Review, Sept., 1845, 227. No Burr was needed, however, to plant these seeds.

13. (Consul) 13Salkeld to Crawford, Feb. 25, 1830. (1835) Journal des DÉbats, May 25, 1848. 13Elliot to Pakenham, Apr. 14, 1843. (News and Tribune) Nashville Union, Aug. 5, 1845. Plebeian, Mar. 1, 1845: “The whole world cannot resist our onward march, until our proud flag waves over every inch of territory on the continent of North America.” 253Sanders to McLean, Dec. 29, 1846: “The people if not wicked are rapacious and Anglo-Saxon-like prefer conquest to principle.” The Oregon discussion revealed clearly the thirst for territory (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., e.g. Smith, Hunter, Pollock, Rockwell, Toombs, pp. 104, 89, 120, 129, 133. W. H. Seward, Mar. 31, 1846: “The popular passion for territorial aggrandizement is irresistible” (Works, iii, 409). N. Y. Herald, June 15, 1844. Livermore, War, 12.

14. Herald, Aug. 30, 1845. (Illinois) Everett, Recolls., 194. W. E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, p. 17. Indiana State Sentinel, 1845, passim. (Debt) Green, Repudiation, 13. American Review, Sept., 1845, p. 227. (Calhoun) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 692. Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257. Livermore, War, 6, 8, 10. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 49. (Powerful) New Englander, v, 318–9; 206J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846.

15. Herald, Aug. 30, 1845. News in Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 4, 1845. Journ. of Comm., May 21, 1845. Gen. Worth wrote in the autumn of 1845: “Our people will not rest satisfied without a war with some power” (N. Y. Times, July 16, 1916). Claiborne (Quitman, i, 310): the people “demanded war and were determined to have it.” For information regarding the state of mind prevailing in western Tennessee and the adjacent regions the author is greatly indebted to Gov. James D. Porter of Nashville, who was a young man at the time of the Mexican war. The fact that hunting occupied the place of work had no little influence. (Hunting) Rose, McCulloch, 29.

16. Comm. Bulletin, Mar. 17, 1842. (Wealth) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 49. (Willing) Tribune, May 11, 1845. 210I. E. Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846 (The Westerners want to despoil the churches and plantations). (Letter) Globe, Aug. 25, 1845. News in Mobile Herald and Tribune, Sept. 7, 1845. The Whigs were of course inclined on partisan grounds to denounce the Democratic party and the administration for every sign of hostility to Mexico, and to maintain that if the Texas policy of their candidate for the Presidency, Henry Clay, had been followed there would have been no danger of war. Indeed, it would seem at first sight as if they could have found no logical escape from this position. But they were able to say, particularly in the south: We opposed immediate annexation; we predicted that it would cause trouble with Mexico; but the country voted that way, and now as patriotic Americans we accept the consequences. Sentiment in favor of fighting Mexico was by no means confined to the Democrats.

17. (“Slaves”) N. Orl. Comm. Bulletin in Savannah Republican, Aug. 15, 1845. The popular American idea of a Mexican was a fat face, a double chin, a muddy complexion, a bloated body, coarse appetites, a crude organization generally, and no brains to speak of above the ears—only enough to talk with. Spanish rule and the mixture of Indian blood had tended naturally to produce something of this sort, but finer types were very numerous and sometimes brilliant. (Soldiery) N. Y. Tribune, May 11, 1845; 354Welles papers. (Picture) Comm. Bulletin, Mar. 17, 1842. “Who’s for Mexico?” ran Colonel Dakin’s advertisement in the New Orleans Tropic; “All who may feel disposed to make a pleasant excursion to the Frontiers of Mexico (and perhaps to explore some parts of that country) will find all the means and facilities requisite by enrolling themselves in the Regiment of Louisiana Volunteers” (Phila. No. American, Aug. 27, 1845).

18. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 4. Picayune, Aug. 27. Enquirer, Aug. 10. Union, Aug. 21, 1845; Feb. 10, 1847. Reveille, Aug. 28. (“Go”) Picayune, Aug. 17. 297Buchanan to McLane, Sept. 13.

19. (News) Mobile Herald and Tribune, Sept. 7; Oct. 22, 1845. Less was said for a time, but probably no less was felt. Of course the New Englanders did not share the sentiment very fully. The South Atlantic states—influenced by Calhoun and, as Poinsett admitted (192to Lewis, Jan. 5, 1846), by the dread of privateers—did not feel sure that the stake was worth the risk. But the total sentiment in favor of war with Mexico was tremendous. Calhoun himself recognized that the country stood that way (Jameson, Cal. Corresp., 704 to T. G. C.). Correspondent, Apr. 15, 1846. Enquirer, Jan. 20, 1846. Mo. Reporter, Apr. 18, 1846. 210Hammond to Simms, Mar. 21, 1847.

20. (Glory) 345Poinsett to Van Buren, Mar. 9, 1848. (Power) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 728. (Oregon) Pendleton, Stephens, 76. (Re-elected) Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 200. (Bancroft) Schouler, U. S., iv, 498; Howe, Bancroft, i, 288, 290. The subject of California will be discussed fully in chap. xvi, but in order to allay prejudice it is touched upon here.

21. See “Office-seekers” in index of Polk’s Diary.

22. Anson Jones, the last President of the Texas republic, asserted in his book that Polk was “pre-determined to have a war” with Mexico (p. 46). As evidence he maintained that Donelson, the United States minister in Texas, under the pretext of defending Texas against an unreal danger of invasion, brought into that country American troops in order to ensure a collision with Mexico; but (1) Donelson fully believed that Texas was in danger of invasion, and (2) there were ample grounds for that opinion (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 449). Moreover Donelson, instead of hurrying our troops into Texas, was very anxious that none should cross her frontier until after her full acceptance of annexation, which could not occur before July 4, 1845 (ibid., 446, 448, 456); and we have seen how threatening were the language and movements of Mexico at that stage. As Texas became to all intents and purposes a part of the United States on accepting our proposition, the duty to protect her people was then clear.

Jones also asserted that agents of Polk urged him to send the Texas militia against Mexico in the spring of 1845 in order to bring about a war;but this is misleading (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 446–8). The confidential orders given to Conner and Stockton of the navy and the correspondence between the state department and Donelson prove that Polk’s administration had not the least intention of adopting at this time an aggressive course toward Mexico.

Finally, Jones stated that he received clear proof of his charge from Texan agents at Washington. He admitted, however, that (although he does not appear to have lost any other important documents) he had mislaid their reports; and his assertion is inconsistent with known facts. For example, he said (p. 491) that Lee, one of these agents, reported about September 13 that he found Polk, Marcy, Walker and Ritchie “excessively angry” with Jones for not consenting, months before, to an attack upon Mexico; but Lee did in fact report, September 6 and 8, that he was received “cordially” by Polk, Walker and Ritchie, and that Polk sent his “sincere regard” to Jones (Jones, Memoranda, 485, 490; Tex. Dipl. Corres., ii, 398). Again, according to Jones another Texan agent informed him “of the deep anxiety expressed by Polk for a war with Mexico.” Now of course Polk may have said that a war was needed to redress American wrongs, but to suppose that a man who kept his own counsel so closely would have confessed to this comparative stranger a dishonorable intention concealed from everybody else, and would have done so knowing that in reality he and Jones were at swords’ points on a vital matter, annexation, is incredible. When Jones wrote his book he was a ruined man in consequence of the general and well-founded belief that he had tried to prevent the incorporation of Texas in the United States, and he was very bitter against Polk. Not long afterward he committed suicide. His book, apparently prepared as a defence of himself, is often untrustworthy; and how clear-headed he was at the time of writing it is shown by his assertion that Texas was in undisputed possession of the territory to the Rio Grande, yet that by advancing to that stream Taylor “produced the Mexican war” (p. 68).

Ashbel Smith, in general a much better witness, stated that agents of Polk endeavored to have the militia sent against Mexico so as to bring on a war (Remins., 66–7); but as he was in Europe at the time he had no personal knowledge regarding the matter, and he also was opposed to annexation.

Evidence of Polk’s alleged desire to provoke a war may be seen by some in the language of the Union, his organ at Washington, which declared blatantly that the Rio Grande was the boundary of the United States, and that Mexico would invite ruin, should her troops cross it (May 1; September 11, 13, 1845, etc.). But (1) the government had reason to believe that we had been too mild toward Mexico, and may have wished to suggest to her the danger of being rash; (2) the purpose may have been to satisfy the many Americans who complained that our national authorities lacked spirit; (3) as Polk was officially offering Mexico the olive branch at this time, the bellicose utterances of the Union, which was not recognized by the administration as its organ, could not have been regarded by the Mexican government as evidence that he desired a war, but only at most as a suggestion of what might follow should the olive branch be rejected. From this point of view they would seem to have tended toward peace rather than war (cf. his policy of having Taylor and Conner assume bold attitudes—chap. vii, p. 152).

23. The author’s estimate of Polk is based upon a study of his conduct and all the documents relating to him. One may consult to advantage the Welles papers; Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 124, 129, 132; Poore, Perley’s Remins., i, 328–9; Howe, Bancroft, i, 294; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 228; Jenkins, Polk, 330; McLaughlin, Introd. to Polk’s Diary; Meigs, Ingersoll, 273–4; Id., Benton, 382; Reeves on Polk’s Diary in Polit. Science Review, 1911, 288. 297H. M. Field to Mrs. Polk, Mar. 30, 1889 (Bancroft told me yesterday that Polk was abler than any member of his Cabinet). Benton, View, ii, 680. (Toombs) Phillips, Toombs, 37. Though Polk seems personally destitute of humor, he had known how to make an effective use of it on the stump. It must not be forgotten that he had served fourteen years in the national House and been Speaker twice. (Fidelity) Polk, Diary, Aug. 14, 1848 (I had not been three miles from the White House since July, 1847).

24. (Discussions) E.g. Smith, Annex. of Texas, p. 264, note (Benton). 351Webster to son, Mar. 11, 1845. (Writhings) The reference is to Polk’s anxious and unfriendly expressions about Scott and Taylor, which grew largely out of political considerations. See chap. ix, pp. 199–200.

25. 297Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, confid. 297Buchanan to McLane, Sept. 13, 1845.

26. 48To Conner, Mar. 29; July 11; Aug. 16. 48To Sloat, Mar. 21; June 24. 48To Id., Aug. 30 (orders to “preserve peace if possible”). The despatch of June 24 to Sloat said further: You and every part of your squadron “should be assiduously careful to avoid any act which could be construed as an act of aggression.” Dec. 5, 1845, Sloat was notified that “our relations with Mexico are becoming more friendly.” The instructions to Sloat about occupying San Francisco were made contingent on Mexican action, indicating that an American declaration of war was not even contemplated. 52To Donelson, June 3. (FrÉmont) Benton, View, ii, 579. Mrs. FrÉmont, with the approval of her father, Senator Benton, held back the order (ibid.). Richardson, Messages, iv, 427–8. The Washington correspondent of the N. Y. Sun wrote: “It is the opinion of those best qualified to judge, though not my own, that the President did not seek or wish the war with Mexico” (Sun, June 4, 1846).

27. Republican, Aug. 19. Picayune, Aug. 27. Globe, Aug. 25. Courier in Picayune, Aug. 27.

28. (Scale) Polk, Diary, Sept. 30, 1845. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 209 (Scott); 649 (Bancroft). Howe, Bancroft, i, 289. (Navy unprepared) Conner, Home Squadron, 9–10.

29. 56W. S. Parrott to Buchanan, June 29, 1845. The correspondence between Buchanan and Slidell contains, to be sure, expressions indicating a design to influence public opinion in the United States. January 20, 1846, the minister was directed to conduct himself “with such wisdom and firmness in the crisis” that the voice of the American people would be “unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much injured and long suffering claimants” (Buchanan, no. 5). But as Herrera had now refused to receive Slidell and a peaceful settlement had become extremely improbable, this was obviously a wise and proper injunction, and by no means implied that a rupture had been desired. No one who goes open-mindedly through the documents can accept the fine-spun theory that Polk knew Slidell would not be received, and sent him in order to make a show of pacific intentions and obtain a pretext for war. He already had better grounds for war; and had he been determined to fight, he would have been extremely foolish to offer his intended victim an opportunity to restore friendly relations, for undeniably it was quite possible—from the American point of view, considering the comparative weakness of Mexico, far more than possible—that she would seize upon it. Polk, Diary, Mar. 28–30; Apr. 3. American (Whig) Review, 1847, p. 325. Slidell, no. 13, Apr. 2. Id., Apr. 9 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 599).

30. Examiner, June 13. Ho. 158; 28, 2, p. 3 (Upshur). 13Ashburnham to Backhouse, July 6, 1838. Santangelo, Address, 31: “Have a number of American citizens been unjustly injured by Mexico in their persons and property, or not? Have our government and nation been gratuitously outraged by Mexico, or not?”

31. Slidell, Mar. 18 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 66). 52Dimond, no. 265, Oct. 1, 1845. British minister in Siglo XIX, Sept. 24, 1845.

32. Times, Jan. 8, 15. Picayune, Dec. 30, 1845. Buchanan to Slidell, no. 7, Mar. 12, 1847 (Information received from various quarters that several European powers may be aiming to establish monarchy in Mexico). Dec. 1, 1847, Olozaga showed in the Spanish Cortes a statement of large sums spent by Spain in 1846 to place a Spanish prince on the throne of Mexico (Dix, Speeches, i, 214, note). See also chap. x, note 21.

33. Vattel, Law of Nations (Chitty), book ii, chap. iv, secs. 49–51.

34. American trade with Mexico declined from $9,029,221 in 1835 to $1,152,331 in 1845 (Niles, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104). (Contrary) 52Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. The protest of the Mexican minister at Washington against the annexation of Texas asserted the right of his country to recover Texas at any time and by all the means in her power (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, 334).

35. (Oregon) London Times, Sept. 30, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 22, 1846.

VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT

1. The claims did much to embitter feeling in both countries, were one reason for Mexico’s breaking off and refusing to resume diplomatic relations, and brought Polk to the point of resolving to recommend forcible action to Congress (p. 181). The series of diplomatic clashes led to the danger of a Mexican attack and hence to Taylor’s advance; and his movement, besides exciting further displeasure in Mexico, offered her a convenient and promising opportunity to strike.

2. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 445, 449. 56Wickliffe, private, May 21, 1845. 63Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 79, 804. Donelson, June 4, 1845, in Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 66. 297Polk to Dallas, confid., Aug. 23, 1845.

3. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. 52J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845.

4. M. B. de Arispe in Niles, Aug. 17, 1816. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 130 (CÁrdenas); 140 (Ampudia); 430 (Taylor, no. 93). Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 911 (Stephens). 245Bliss to Lamar, Oct. 15, 1846. 52Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. Wilson, Slave Power, ii, 8. Z. T. Fulmore in Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly., v, 28. T. M. Marshall, ibid., xiv, 277. I. J. Cox, ibid., vi, 81. Aguila del Norte, Mar. 11, 1846. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 5, 1845; Dec. 12, 1846. Ho. Report 70; 29, 2. Kennedy, Texas, ii, 30. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 200. Fisher, Memorials. Bolton, Texas, 1. Bancroft, No. Mex. States, i, 375, 604. Garrison, Extension, 100, 103–7. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 257 (Irion). 52Consul Belt, July 5, 1844. Jones, Memoranda, 299 (Hockley). Sen. 18; 30, 1, p. 8 (Marcy). Garrison, Texas, 262. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 375–6. Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 90 (Donelson). 351Storrs to Webster, Oct. 23, 1847. 52Woll, proclam., June 20, 1844. Boston Advertiser, July 13, 1843. 64Ayunt. of Matamoros to Taylor, June 10, 1846. 82Gov. Tamaul. to govs., Nov. 27, 1846. South. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v, 351.

The mere assertion of a boundary by Texas proved nothing. She claimed Santa Fe, but the U. S. did not regard the claim as valid (52Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845). Her jurisdiction was not established far beyond the Nueces. Santa Anna, while a prisoner in her hands, made a convention with her which appeared to recognize her claim, and the fact that he was under duress did not signify; but he did not possess Presidential powers at that time; Texas broke the agreement, and Mexico repudiated it. England appeared to countenance the claim of Texas by negotiating with her about the Beales grant, which lay in the disputed region (Wash. Union, Feb. 25, 1847), but this was not at all decisive. Trist’s view that any previously existing boundary had been obliterated by the war does not seem to have been attacked by the Mexican peace commissioners (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 214). Roa BÁrcena argues that if there was no boundary in Apr., 1846, the United States could not assert that its territory had been invaded. This is a typically Mexican style of argument, apparently decisive but not sound. The reply is that while no established boundary existed, there was a claimed boundary, and that a serious claim entitles one to act and speak provisionally very much as if it had been established. Trist made another point: If Mexico does not consider the wide and swift Bravo a safe boundary, how could Texas feel satisfied with the little Nueces? The fact that the terms of annexation specified “the territory rightfully belonging to Texas” was often cited as evidence that we knew the Nueces-Rio Grande region did not. This was a mistake. The expression only meant that we were not ready to endorse all the territorial claims of Texas without investigating them. The most doubted of her claims had nothing to do with that region; it related to a part of New Mexico.

5. Clay, Works, v, 213. Amer. State Papers: For. Rels., ii, 662; iv, 424, 430, 468–78. Cong. Globe, 25, 2, app., 555 (Preston); 29, 1, p. 817 (Adams). Richardson, Messages, iv, 483. Woodbury, Writings, i, 361. Wash. Globe, Feb. 3, 1844 (Walker). Treaties in Force, 593. Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. Forum, July, 1901 (Boutwell). Ficklen in So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., Sept., 1901. Sato, Land Question. Wash. Union, Apr. 27, 1846. 297Polk to Houston, June 6, 1845; to Donelson, June 15, 1845. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 14. Richardson, Messages, iv, 479 (Texas as a part of old Louisiana). Ho. Report, 752; 29, 1. 52Donelson to Mayfield, July 11, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 140–4, 457–8. Chase, Polk Admin., 128. Polk assured Houston that he need feel no apprehensions regarding the Texas boundary in the event of annexation. It may be said that Polk was inconsistent in offering to negotiate about the boundary; but people negotiate about claims they believe in and even about property they clearly own. He had in mind of course to hold the Rio Grande boundary by satisfying Mexico.

The aim in this paragraph is to bring out the essential (for the present purpose) points of a matter that it would require a long article to discuss fully, and many things have to be left unsaid. Personally the author regards the American claim and all conclusions based upon it as unsound. His aim is to show how the matter appeared to Polk. The author is indebted to Dr. E. C. Barker and Dr. I. J. Cox for assistance in reference to this statement; but no responsibility rests on them.

6. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 236 (Totten); 193 (Marcy); 208 (Scott). Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 81 (Bancroft). Wash. Globe, Sept. 4, 1845. Journal Milit. Serv. Instit., xvii (Van Deusen). Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 32, 36–7, 57. Stevens, Campaigns, 12–3. Commercial Review, Dec., 1846, 429 (Poinsett). Capt. Willing in Prof. Memoirs of Corps of Engineers. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, 534–5 (Yell et al.). Ho. 38; 30, 2 (strength of the regular army, Jan. 1, 1846: 7194). Ho. 24; 31, 1: on Texas frontier, May, 3554 (regulars “present and absent”). 61Maynardier, June 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, 47–8. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 53 (Marcy: May 13, 1846, the entire military force was not over 7640). In Nov., 1845, the army occupied thirty-seven posts.

Each regiment comprised ten companies, but for economy the army had virtually been skeletonized in 1842. After that time a company of infantry and “artillery” included theoretically forty-two privates, a company of field artillery sixty-four (Journ. Milit. Serv. Inst. of U. S., iii, 415), and a company of cavalry fifty; but the numbers always ran ten or twenty per cent below what the law allowed (Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 193). One or more “grenadier” companies (tall men) formed the right of the infantry regiment, and it had also one or more “light” companies (180C. F. Smith, Sept. 30, 1846; J. D. Toll in Mich. Pioneer Soc. Colls., vii, 112).

Most of the infantry carried flintlock muskets, which could not be relied on for more than a hundred yards. Scott preferred that arm because it had been thoroughly tested (Rowland, Register, 407) and perhaps also because flints could be obtained more readily and surely than could percussion caps. Some 38,000 smooth-bore muskets and 10,000 rifles (calibre 54) were issued during the war. There seem to have been several models of muzzle-loading rifles: Harper’s Ferry (1814), model of 1819, model of 1840 or 1842; and some of Hall’s breech-loading rifles were used (Sen. 54; 30, 1, particularly table C). The First Mississippi had Whitney rifles (Rowland, Register, 407). The rifles were much more effective but much slower in operation than the muskets. Some 400,000 flints and 950,000 percussion caps were issued. Regarding arms, etc., one may consult Talcott, June 10 (Sen. 54; 30, 1); 39Maynardier to gov. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1847; 39Marcy to Id., Sept. 27; Ho. 2; 29, 1, pp. 402, 418, 425; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 162; Ho. 41; 29, 2 (Talcott’s report); Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 683; Norton, Amer. Breech-Loading Small Arms; and visit the National Museum (Washington), and the museums at West Point, Colt’s factory (Hartford), and U. S. Cartridge Co. (Lowell).

Our dragoons, who were “light cavalry,” were armed with musketoons which were carried on sling belts except on the march, sabres of the Prussian dragoon style and horse pistols. The Mounted Rifles had percussion rifles and Colt’s army revolvers but no sabres. The cavalry had sabres, rifle carbines, and Colt’s navy revolvers (Brackett, U. S. Cav., 160). Some “pepper-box” revolvers were used (Arnold, Jackson, 113). The regular cartridge (very carefully made) consisted of powder, a bullet, and three buckshot (148Chamberlain, recolls.).

The field batteries were Companies K (Taylor) of the First regiment, A (Duncan) of the Second, C (Ringgold) of the Third, and B (Washington) of the Fourth. E (Bragg) of the Third actually served as light artillery though not officially recognized as such until June, 1847. Each of these companies had four or six bronze pieces, which included two or more 6-pounders and usually one or two 12-pound howitzers. See particularly 61Maynardier’s statement, June 15, 1846, several letters in the Duncan papers, and Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., iii, 415. In 1839 Capt. Robert Anderson translated the French “System of Light Artillery.” By 1842 a long course of experimenting gave us suitable bronze for guns (Sen. 1, 30, 1, p. 679). That year the commander-in-chief ordered a regular course of practice with field artillery, and a liberal allowance of ammunition was made (ibid., 680). This branch of the service was also greatly improved by sending three ordnance officers abroad to study the subject. Each head of a battery was chosen for his special fitness, and Ringgold in particular devoted himself to developing the arm with remarkable intelligence and zeal (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 105; Niles, May 30, 1846, p. 201; 259Ridgely to cits., July 24, 1846; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 679; Wynne, Ringgold; Benet, Ordnance Reports, ii, 158).

By permission of the French government, Capt. A. J. Swift was sent to Metz soon after the war with Mexico began to qualify himself to command and instruct an engineer company. The corps included Swift (who died before seeing service), G. W. Smith, and G. B. McClellan as officers, 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates, and two musicians (Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers no. 16). The American infantry drill did not differ materially from that of the British army (Ballentine). Our army was not fully equal to the best European troops (Poinsett). There had been few opportunities to work the three arms together. A serious defect of the army was the lack of an intelligence department.

The privates wore cloth fatigue caps, jackets and trousers, all of blue; and the officers wore the same, except that at first they had single-breasted frock coats (128Brackett, diary. Id., Lane’s Brigade, 250. Ramsey, Other Side, 424). Later, officers frequently had jackets like the men’s, but differently trimmed. Further remarks on our army may be found in chap. xxxvi.

7. Taylor. Fry and Conrad, Taylor, passim. French, Two Wars, 84. 224Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845. Howard, Taylor, passim. Robinson, Organization, ii, 6. 147Chamberlain, diary. 332Tennery, diary. Scott, Mems., ii, 382–3. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 198, 203. Meade, Letters, i, 26. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253–4. Poore, Perley’s Remins., i, 354. 280Nunelee, diary. Frost, Taylor, 277. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847. Grant, Mems., i, 100, 139. Donnavan, Adventures, 21. 180Pillow to wife, Aug. 8, 1846. Wash. Union, Aug. 24, 1846. Am. Hist. Review, Apr., 1919, 446, 455–6, 462 (Marcy’s diary). And all of Taylor’s correspondence.

8. Scott, Mems., ii, 381–2, 386, 408. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 444. 224Williams to Hitchcock, Nov. 8, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 147. Meade, Letters, i, 131. Mrs. W. R. Stauffer of New Orleans, granddaughter of Gen. Taylor, to whom the author is indebted for documents and information, told him that the family name for Bliss was “Perfect Bliss.” His precise title was Assistant Adj. Gen., of course. It is instructive to compare Taylor’s autograph letters with the official reports credited to him.

9. 63Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 57, 107 (Donelson). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 81 (Bancroft); 800–2, 806 (Taylor); 804 (Donelson). Sen. 18; 30, 1, pp. 6 (Donelson); 3 (Taylor); 8, 9 (Marcy).Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 73–5. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., 1882, p. 399. Autograph, Dec., 1911 (Taylor). Wash. Union, June 25, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 193. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1846, pp. 440–3. Hist. Mag., Jan., 1870, 19. Mexico had an outpost customhouse at Point Isabel, just north of the Rio Grande. Paredes charged that a Mexican reconnoitring party was disarmed at Laredo, on the north side of the Rio Grande. We have no other evidence of such an affair. Taylor instructed Maj. Hays, commanding Texas Rangers at S. Antonio, to send word of any Mexican movements in the vicinity of Laredo, “with strict injunctions, however, to molest no Mexican establishments” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107), and the orders to occupy Laredo were not given until Oct. 15, 1846 (245Bliss to Lamar). Possibly a threatening Mexican party may have been disarmed as a measure of precaution, but the bare statement of Paredes cannot be accepted as proof.

10. Taylor, gen. orders, 1. Henshaw narrative. So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1846, pp. 442–4. 66Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846. 197Gaines to R. Jones, Sept. 10. N. Orl. Tropic, Oct. 16. 42Gov. Va. to gen. assembly, Dec. 7, 1846. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 173. 224Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. 13Elliot, no. 21, 1845. 13Kennedy, no. 22, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 98, 100, 102–3, 802 (Taylor). Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 13, 1845. 52J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7. 331Taylor to Conner, July 16. Mayer, War, 91–2. N. Y. Tribune, Sept. 12. French, Two Wars, 34. J. Davis in Cong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41. Polk, Messages, May 11; Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 194. Meade, Letters, i, 26. Grant, Mems., i, 64. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 17, 32. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 45.

The Texans were kept at that point as scouts. Corpus Christi had been held by Texas during her revolutionary contest with Mexico (Tropic, Oct. 25, 1845). The other two companies of the Fourth Infantry were ordered from Fort Scott to Taylor, and Bragg’s artillery came from Charleston harbor. The New Orleans artillery companies were called out without authority by Gaines, who commanded the military dept. of the west. They remained with Taylor the three months for which they engaged (Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 3). Taylor planned to go on to S. Patricio, now a name rather than a place, 25 miles up the Nueces—a plan like that which he soon executed on the Rio Grande. Lieut. Col. E. A. Hitchcock, who had taught at West Point and now commanded the Third Infantry, pointed out that, should he do so, his base would be a fine mark for attack. Taylor would not see the point but he gave up the plan. (For this episode see: 224Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846; Id., Fifty Years, 48, 196; Grant, Mems., i, 71–2; Meade, Letters, i, 29.) He thought of Pt. Isabel also; but, having so small a force, no engineers, and little artillery (at first none), he deemed it unsafe to go there (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107).

11. London Times, May 14, 1846. (Knew) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 195; So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1846, p. 443; Mayer, War, 91. (Accepted) 52J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. 256Marcy to Wetmore, May 10, 1846 (private): A “liberal confidence” was reposed in Taylor; “His positions in Texas were left very much to his own judgment except they were to be taken between the Nueces and the Rio del Norte.”

12. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 38–9. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 110. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 257. J. Davis, in Cong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41. N. Y. Tribune, Sept, 12, 1845.

13. 65Taylor, gen. orders, 2. 61Id. to adj. gen., Feb. 3, 1846, and Scott’s comments. 61Adj. gen. to Taylor, Jan. 5, 1846. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1846, pp. 440–57 [probably from Bragg]. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20, 1845. 13Elliot, nos. 3, 14, 1846. 218Henshaw narrative. 136Butterfield, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 93, 96. 224Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845; Feb. 10, 1846. Mobile Commercial Register, Aug. 23, 1845. Autograph, Jan.-Feb., 1912 (Taylor). 364Worth to S., Oct. 24; Nov.—, 20, 1845; to daughter, Nov. 3. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 388–90. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 198, 203, 215. Meade, Letters, i, 31, 37. 13Letter from Corp. Chr., Nov. 29 (sent by Elliot). 185Duncan to Bliss, Jan. 5, 1846; to court of inquiry, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 45. 213Hatch to sister, Oct. 28, etc. The conditions were probably tolerable until November.

14. Worth to S., Dec. 20, 1845; Jan. 1; Mar. 4, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 87. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 204, 206. 60Worth to Taylor, Mar. 8, 1846, and Scott’s comments. 60Churchill to Scott, Mar. 2. 69Twiggs to Bliss, Feb. 18. 69Worth to Taylor, Feb. 24. 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 1846. (Concluded) 224Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846.

15. 63Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23. (No declaration) 297Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23; 52J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845.

July 30 Marcy 63instructed Taylor to place some forces south of the Nueces, but Taylor had anticipated the order. The government was accused of issuing vague orders with the hope that the General would assume the responsibility of going to the Rio Grande; but it does not seem to have shrunk from taking a stand when it had the requisite information. Mexico did not in fact have all the “posts” north of the Rio Grande that Marcy seems to have supposed were there, but besides the customs men at Pt. Isabel, there seem to have been troops at Laredo and soldiers from Matamoros crossed the river. Aug. 30 Marcy ordered Taylor to drive the Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande, should they invade Texas (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 88). This was proper, for such an invasion would have seemed to mean war; but the order showed a want of prudence (Upton, Mil. Policy, 197) because (1) Taylor was expected to draw reinforcements from the states, which could not have provided them in time to save him from the sudden attack of an overpowering Mexican army, and (2) he was authorized to cross the river with militia, who could not legally be taken beyond the border. Oct. 4 Taylor wrote that under his instructions he did not feel at liberty to go to the Rio Grande. Oct. 16 Marcy directed him to place his winter quarters (which implied that no aggressive plans were in mind) as near the Rio Grande as prudence and convenience would permit (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 89). This was judicious, for (as Marcy pointed out) the troops might have to repel Mexican or Indian incursions, and, at a season when they would be somewhat unprepared to move quickly, it was particularly desirable to have them as near as possible to scene of action.

16. Polk, Diary, Jan. 13, 1846. The despatches were Slidell’s Dec. 17 (with copy of El Siglo XIX containing the council’s report) and Black’s Dec. 18, which indicated that the administration and the council of state had decided against Slidell. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 240–1. 63Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 13.

17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 103, 108, 111, 116–21 (Taylor); 649, 651–2 (Cross). W. P. Johnston, Johnston, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 207. 224Id. to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 52. 65Taylor, gen. orders, 13, 20, 26, 30. 69Sibley, Feb. 21. 69Hunt of the Porpoise, Mar. 11. 69Mansfield to Taylor, Mar. 6. 76MejÍa, Mar. 14. The soldiers were accompanied by about an equal number of quadrupeds.

18. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 90, 92 (Marcy); 117, 120–4, 127 (Taylor); 651 (Cross). Diario, Mar. 30; Apr. 10. C. Christi Gazette, Mar. 12.

19. The march. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 401–4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 53–65. Smith, To Mexico, 22–9. French, Two Wars, 37, 41–5. Henshaw narrative. 69Twiggs to Bliss, Mar. 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, 69. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211.

20. Picayune, Apr. 7, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 123 (Taylor); 127 (MejÍa). 65Taylor, gen. orders 33. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 404–6. Diario, Apr. 24. 69Alba to Taylor, Mar. 12. Henshaw narrative. Smith, To Mexico, 29–31. Grant, Mems., i, 87–8. 69Statement of Italian. And from 76the following. To MejÍa, Mar. 1 (MejÍa was forbidden to take the aggressive because the govt. wished first to gather enough troops to strike a decisive blow: 76to Vega, Mar. 1). MejÍa, Jan. 18; Feb. 16; Mar. 4, 6, 14, 17, 18. Canales, Feb. 28. MejÍa to Vega, Feb. 16. C. Bravo to MejÍa, Mar. 13; reply, Mar. 17. To Vega, Mar. 1. Mex. officer (spy), Feb. 18. MejÍa to Parrodi, Mar. 6; to Canales, Feb. 16. Ampudia, Mar. 28.

21. 65Taylor, gen. orders 34–7. Henshaw narrative. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 123, 125, 129, 132 (Taylor); 130 (CÁrdenas). 224Hitchcock, diary, Mar. 25. 66Mansfield to Totten, Mar. 25; Apr. 23. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 173. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy). 69Statement of Italian. Picayune, Apr. 7; May 1. Apuntes, 32. Niles, Apr. 18, p. 112. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211–7. Meade, Letters, i, 59, 100. Nebel and Kendall, 1. Smith, To Mexico, 32–4. 163Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. Robertson, Remins., July 7. Monitor Repub., Apr. 17. Diario, Mar. 15. 76MejÍa, Mar. 21, 28. 76To MejÍa, Mar. 21; Apr. 3.

On his way to Point Isabel Taylor was presented with a formal protest against his advance by J. CÁrdenas, prefect of northern Tamaulipas. On the approach of his transports the captain of the port, by MejÍa’s orders, set fire to the customhouse and the few poor thatched cottages of the hamlet, and fled with the officials. Mar. 31 Taylor had present opposite Matamoros and at Point Isabel 248 officers, 3001 rank and file (62R. Jones to Cass, Jan. 21, 1848).

22. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132–3, 145, 1202 (to MejÍa, Mar. 28), 1203 (Taylor); 134 (minutes); 1203 (MejÍa). 65Taylor, gen. orders 38–9, 45. 61Id. to adj. gen., Mar. 29. 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. 285MejÍa to Paredes, Apr. 3. 76Id. to Guerra, Mar. 28. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 120. Smith, To Mexico, 34. 118Berlandier, diary. 118Id., memo. Meade, Letters, i, 59.

Taylor, a few minutes after his arrival, deputed Worth to reach an understanding with MejÍa. This proved impossible. Worth demanded permission to confer with the American consul residing at Matamoros, but was not permitted to do so. He notified the Mexicans that crossing the river in armed force would be viewed as an act of war. Taylor’s field-work was called Fort Texas or sometimes Fort Taylor at first. Taylor offered to let the people of Matamoros continue to use their port on Brazos Island, which was north of the Rio Grande. 76Jan. 6 he had proposed to the Mexicans to agree on measures to prevent “exasperation on either side.”

23. See p. 117. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138–9, 142, 145 (Taylor); 140, 144 (Ampudia). (Leave town) 52Consul Schatzel, July 18. Niles, May 2, p. 132. Monitor Repub., Jan. 28, 1847. Diario, Apr. 5, 8, 25. 283Gen. orders, army of the north, Feb. 18; Apr. 3, 14. Ampudia, To Fellow-Cits. (and docs.). Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 154, 157, 160. 52Black to Castillo, May 1, 9. 52Castillo to Black, May 5. 69Report from spy. And from 76 the following. MejÍa, Feb. 4; Mar. 17, 18; Apr. 2. Id. to Ampudia, Apr. 5. To Ampudia, Feb. 18; Mar. 28; Apr. 4. Ampudia, Mar. 28; Apr. 9, 11, 13, 14. Id. to gov. Tamaulipas, Apr. 12. Id. to Schatzell, Apr. 11 (order of expulsion; any American crossing the river to be shot). Id. to MejÍa, Mar. 30. Id. to Arista, Apr. 14.

Ampudia was thoroughly Mexican in demanding that he should have all the advantages and Taylor all the disadvantages of the quasi state of war that he insisted upon, in protesting against Taylor’s action as a declaration of blockade, which it did not pretend to be, and in ordering Taylor to go beyond the Nueces, which he knew was regarded by many Americans (though by no Mexican) as the boundary of Mexico. In two additional ways he indicated that in his view a state of war existed (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 144, 147). The American consul, seventy years old, had to set out on foot and spend the first night in a field during a norther (RepÚblica de Rio Grande, June 6).

24. (Ampudia’s orders) 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 218, res., Mar. 29. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 545. Slidell, Jan. 14. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 79. 285MejÍa to Paredes, Apr. 3. CarreÑo, Jefes, ccii, 141 (Ampudia was a Cuban by birth). 199Arista to Paredes, Dec. 15, 1845. 13Bankhead, no. 56, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 61. (Aim) Bustamante, N. Bernal, i, 113. Apuntes, 34–5. And from 76 the following. (A.’s plans) Ampudia, Mar. 28. Id., to Arista, Apr. 14. To Ampudia, Feb. 18. To Arista, Feb. 10; Apr. 4, 20, 22. Arista, Apr. 12, 29. Parrodi, Apr. 29. Ampudia, Apr. 13, 14. Id., proclam., Apr. 18. Arista to Ampudia, Apr. 10.

According to BermÚdez de Castro, the Spanish minister, the opposition writers at Mexico expressed surprise because, after ordering Ampudia to attack the Americans, the government stated it had not committed and would not commit an act of aggression against the United States. Mar. 7 Ampudia ordered MejÍa to attack the Americans, but not to risk a decisive action (76MejÍa, Mar. 17). The evidence that Ampudia had been ordered to attack Taylor is supported by the fact that he tried to do so even after he knew he had been superseded.

25. (Orders) 76Tornel to Arista, Apr. 4; 76Arista to Guerra, Apr. 26; May 7; Washington Union, Aug. 27; Bankhead, no. 90, 1846. 76Arista to TorrejÓn, Apr. 24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132, 140, 1205 (Taylor); 290 (Thornton); 291 (Hardie); 1204 (Arista). 76Testimony in the court-martial of Arista (JÁuregui, TorrejÓn, Carrasco, Canales, Mendoza). Smith, To Mexico, 39–42. Spirit of the Times, May 23. CampaÑa contra, 4. 69Court of Inquiry on Hardee, May 26. Wash. Union, May 9. Niles, May 16, pp. 165, 176. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 147. 65Taylor, gen. orders 74. 169Id. to Crittenden, Sept. 1.

Taylor had called repeatedly for reinforcements to the regular army (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 102, 114, 132). Up to May 8 he received 56 recruits (ibid., 142). The conciliatory policy of the Americans made it impossible to take military precautions against spies, and Thornton was doubtless betrayed. He did his best. Taylor, with a view to the vigorous prosecution of the war, called on Texas for two regiments of infantry and two of horse, and on Louisiana for two of infantry. The order to attack Taylor was doubtless recommended by Tornel, the minister of war, who hated the United States; but perhaps he had a particular motive. He had been at work for S. Anna when Paredes seized the Presidency, and he knew that it would cripple Paredes (thus opening the way for S. Anna) to provide funds and send troops from Mexico City for a war with the United States (52Black, May 26; Dimond, Jan. 15).

26. Boston Atlas, a strong Whig journal, said, Dec. 11, 1846: “There is no doubt that the conduct of that government [Mexico] towards us has been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war.” Polk, Diary, Apr. 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5–9.

27. C. J. Ingersoll, chrmn. Ho. com. for affairs (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 128): I urged Polk to anticipate invasion by crossing the Rio Grande, but he would not. (Reasons) So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, 434–5. 331Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. (Effect) 60Lieut. Irons, Apr. 20; 76Arista, Apr. 27; Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 120. (Flimsily) 312MejÍa to Arista, Oct. 6, 1845; 76Requena in trial of Arista.

28. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194. 52Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 4, 1846. (People) Mo. Reporter, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right to go to the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See Lumpkin’s speech (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214–5). The order of Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling upon the President for information regarding the matter (ibid., 280). Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor’s army must be supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to the Rio Grande Polk had been “invading Mexico” (ibid., 558); yet, though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery—in behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken—and there were other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (ibid., 573–4). Note also the vote on Delano’s motion (chap, ix, note 4). See chap. xxxiv, note 16, and the corresponding text.

29. (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131–2; Schouler, U. S., i, 296–7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310–4, 318. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 148. (Adams) Ibid., p. 127.

30. (Weakened) Wash. Union, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in Senate); 256Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) 52Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20, 1846. (Argument) 56W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17, 1846; 364Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor, Oct. 4); Niles, July 18, 1846, pp. 313–4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, 1845; 108Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London Times, May 30, 1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on war); M. Brown in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of force to intimidate Mexico (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun felt somewhat the same (ibid., 497); Boston Atlas, May 15, 16, 1846 (Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; 345Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846; 108Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38. Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising, not defending, Polk. 162Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash. Union, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston Atlas, May 15, 16, 20, 1846. See also chap. vi, note 22, last paragraph.

31. Wash. Union, Oct. 15, 1847. 256Paper indorsed “Projet—Genl. Scott.” Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) 76Mora, Nov. 15, 1845. (Prevented) 81Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; 76Id. to Parrodi, Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year. 77Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) 66Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; Nat. Intelligencer, May 29, 1845; Sept. 10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. 52Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S. Parrott, July 22, 1845. 297Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate) 256Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with Mexico “have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place in that country”). 76MejÍa to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar. 17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed, would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent. Note also Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 209–10, col. 1 (action of com. for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of our claim to the intermediate region (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 425–6).

32. Picayune, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) 218Henshaw narrative. 13Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106.

33. 297Scott, memo., undated.

34. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. Autograph, Jan.-Feb., 1912 (Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is voluminous: e.g. Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico “does not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and she will defend her invaded territory”); 76Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845 (“the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States for the possession of the territory of Texas”); Diario, Mar. 25; Sept. 18, 26 (the Sabine “is the boundary”), 1846; Monitor Repub., June 28, 1847 (Mexico “neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except the Sabine”); PeÑa, ComunicaciÓn circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas); Otero, ComunicaciÓn. (After Herrera’s fall “reconquest [of Texas] again became our policy”); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash. Union, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) 69Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846; 76MejÍa, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; 76Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846: note MejÍa’s action in Feb. and March, 1846, supra; and Ampudia’s orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice) 76Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next note.

35. Otero, ComunicaciÓn. Negrete, InvasiÓn, iii, app., 486, 490. Monitor Repub., Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) SuÁrez y Navarro, Alegato, 48. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista, Apr. 18 (captured in A.’s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. Union, Aug. 27, 1847, and in Tex. Democrat, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the question discussed in the preceding paragraph.

36. Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against Polk’s course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the American (Whig) Review should have been able to find them. Calhoun (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east (the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them to that river (see Wash. Union, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See also the text.) Calhoun’s fundamental objection against the President’s policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties alone until after settling the Oregon question (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been given on pp. 118, 120–2, 134–7.

Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk ordered the occupation of territory to which we had “no ascertained title” (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary [being committed to that position], and “intended to extinguish the Mexican title by force” (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of Slidell’s mission should have been decided. Polk’s diary shows that he desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only “self-defence” could justify sending troops into a territory claimed and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29). [This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an equality with her.] And “there was, I think, no case of such necessity for self-defence” (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence (i.e. defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor’s letters prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor’s outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations and a sudden invasion.] “Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities” (p. 31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster’s suggestion that sending the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy.] If the President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that Taylor’s advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk’s object to force Mexico to treat? If so, it was an “idle hope” (p. 32). [Here Webster seems to admit that such might have been Polk’s intention. The fact that Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It will be said that Polk’s course was sanctioned by “the act of May 11th,” 1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble nor an act of Congress can “create a fact” (p. 32). [But a preamble can state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the President’s course.] “I hardly suppose” Congress by that act “meant more than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the limit claimed by him” (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit; and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river, it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a right to send troops thus far.

The most plausible criticisms made by the American (Whig) Review (July, 1846) were the following: Buchanan informed Slidell that the army had been ordered to advance in view of his probable rejection, and hence Taylor’s advance was not, as Polk asserted, due to the urgent necessity of defending Texas. [But the probable rejection of Slidell meant probable fighting of a more or less serious nature north of the Rio Grande.] Attempts were made from time to time, by throwing out hints, to induce Taylor to advance on his own responsibility to the Rio Grande [note 15]. As he did not, Slidell was sent to precipitate the issue. [There is no evidence in support of this theory and much evidence against it, as we have seen.] As Slidell failed to do so, Taylor was positively ordered to the Rio Grande. [January 13 there was every reason to believe that Slidell would be rejected, and that thus an issue would be precipitated. December 20 PeÑa y PeÑa wrote to Slidell that unless the pending difficulties were settled by negotiation there must be war.

In January, 1847, the Review repeated Webster’s argument that Taylor reported no danger of invasion. [Note the comment made above.] October 16, Marcy wrote to Taylor that no serious danger from Mexico was feared, yet gave him authority to advance to the river. [A foray would not be considered a serious military operation, but it was necessary to guard against forays.] On January 13, Polk had no reason to expect that Paredes intended to open hostilities. [He had grave reasons for expecting hostilities. See p. 100.] He had Slidell’s despatch of December 17, which intimated that it might be more possible to negotiate with Paredes than with Herrera. [Slidell only said that he might have greater chances of accomplishing something with a less friendly but more efficient government.] Besides, it was known that war would have to proceed from the Congress, not from the President of Mexico. [Holding that Texas was a part of Mexico and the presence of American troops there an invasion, Paredes took the ground that attacking us would not be making war, but merely defending the country as it was his duty to do. (See his manifesto of April 23, 1846.) Consequently no action by Congress was necessary.] Polk says the Mexicans did not place their hostilities on the ground of our occupying non-Texan territory, but they did do so. [Certain Mexicans took this ground for the purpose of embarrassing the Americans, among whom there was known to be a difference of opinion on this point; but the national Mexican authorities regarded as our essential offence the presence of our troops on Texan soil: note 34.

In February, 1847, the Review said that on January 13, 1846, Polk did not know Slidell would be rejected. [Polk carefully avoided stating that at that date Slidell’s rejection was certain. He spoke of it as “highly probable,” which was rather less than could have been said.] April 6, Taylor referred to the Mexicans of Matamoros as “the enemy.” [As the word occurred in a report to our government it did no harm, even if not well chosen; but at that date Taylor had been given by the Mexicans sufficient ground for using it.] Taylor pointed guns at Matamoros for the purpose of stinging the Mexicans into hostility. [See p. 151.] The intention of the American government was to manage things so as to make Taylor the scapegoat if matters should go ill, and take the credit if they should go well. [The orders of the war department were probably as definite as they could safely be made. See p. 142.] Polk ordered Taylor to advance because he did not believe the failure of Slidell would be a pretext for war that Congress would accept. [This does not agree with the charge made by Polk’s enemies (e.g. supra) that he sent Slidell in order to have him rejected and thus bring about a war. It is also wide of the mark. In Polk’s mind the essential ground for action was not the rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely.

In October, 1847, the Review stated the policy which it said Polk should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas, that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas, perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue such a promise on the eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the Review’s proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much. This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position, or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point. The first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting (p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the Review could be offered.

VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA

1. The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de ... Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; 152Claiborne, Mems.; Diario, May 30, 1845; BalbontÍn, Estado Militar; Paz, InvasiÓn; 5Anaya, Memoria; PeÑa, ComunicaciÓn circular; Siglo XIX, Aug. 19, 21, 1845; S. Miguel, RepÚb. Mex., 133–4, 136; Wash. Globe, Oct. 15, 1845; Molina, recolls.; Hist. Mag., Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch, 13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; 75Memorias drawn up by war dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; 81Seminario PolÍt. del Gob. de N. LeÓn; Moore, Scott’s Camp., 19; 76Report of superior engineer board, Nov. 15, 1845; BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 77–8; Monitor Repub., Nov. 30, 1847; 148Chamberlain, recolls.; 69report of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, May 21, 1846; 76Carrera, report on artillery, Dec, 1847; 76reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa FÉ.

Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment. There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first, were kept at the fortresses. What horses could be had for artillery service were too light and frisky. Paredes reorganized this arm, and assigned to it about 250 officers, 5000 privates, and 200 clerks and workmen. The bronze cannon manufactured in Mexico during 1846–47 were not satisfactory, and the grape-shot was so poorly made that its range was considerably reduced. The importance of artillery had never been appreciated in that country. There was a good arsenal at Mexico, and there were old-fashioned powder-mills at Santa Fe (near that city) and Zacatecas. The latter blew up early in 1845, and, though repaired, worked at a disadvantage. Mexican powder was usually of an inferior quality. The Active corps contained fewer men than the Permanent. The infantry musket carried an ounce ball; and the escopeta bullet was even heavier and went farther. In both cases the very liberal charge of powder increased the normal range. Many of the escopetas were merely sawed-off muskets. The shaft of the lance was usually about six feet long and the head about one foot. The Line infantry included light companies (cazadores), which sometimes had rifles and sometimes deserved to be called sharpshooters. There were mounted cazadores also.

Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, and each infantry regiment included two battalions, one commanded by the lieutenant colonel, and the other by the major (comandante de batallÓn). There were mounted corps called hussars, etc., but the difference of name signified little or nothing, practically. Owing to the smallness of the horses, the cavalry had not much shock-value. There were 635 cannon on hand at the end of 1845, 25,789 muskets, 8155 swords, 100,000 artillery projectiles, and more than 400,000 bullets. Tornel imported 104 new cannon early in 1846. Differences of caliber interfered greatly with the usefulness of the muskets. March 9, 1846, the departments were urged to complete their legal quotas of troops as soon as possible.

2. On the first day when volunteers were to enlist only eleven came forward at Mexico.

3. The figures are based upon the 76official return of April 17 supplemented by a large number of Mexican and American statements. Most of the latter were exaggerated. The Americans were doubtless misled often by the statements of prisoners, who wished to please their captors. “The information obtained from prisoners ought to be estimated at its proper value” (Napoleon, Maxims, 53). MejÍa, the regular commander of the first brigade, gave way temporarily to GarcÍa on account of ill health.

4. 69Reports of spies. RepÚblica de Rio Grande, June 27. 118Berlandier, memo., undated. 66Mansfield to Totten, May 4. 217Henshaw papers. 76Testimony at the trial of Arista. 76MejÍa, Feb. 28; Mar. 18. 76Commander of zapadores, Apr. 8. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 68, 70. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 561. CampaÑa contra, 4.

5. Monitor Repub., Mar. 17. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 113, 117. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 388–93. 13Elliot, nos. 12, 14, etc., 1846. 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. 61Worth to Taylor, Apr. 2. 61Scott to Marcy, May 7. 65Taylor, gen. orders 42. 65Marcy, gen. orders 5. Sen. 230; 29, 1. 224Hitchcock, diary. 62Twiggs to Davis, May 4. The principal causes of the absenteeism were assignment to higher duties elsewhere and the impossibility (owing to the lack of a retired list) of replacing invalided or superannuated officers. Locomotor, Mar. 27. CampaÑa contra, 4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 129–30. Upton, Mil. Policy. 206. 285MejÍa to Paredes, Apr. 3. 76Comte. of Zapadores, Apr. 8. 76MejÍa, Mar. 14, 28; Apr. 2. 76Id. to Arista, Apr. 30. 76Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30.

6. 66Sanders to Totten, Apr. 10 (Ft. B. badly placed). 185Id. to Duncan, Apr. 27. 69Requena to Arista, Apr. 30 (might have enfiladed). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 217. RepÚblica de Rio Grande, June 27. Picayune, May 10. 118Berlandier, memo. (Groves) Ampudia, Address (1846). 52Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 21, 1845. Giddings, Camp., 36. Niles, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179. Kenly, Md. Vol., 42. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. 218Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 35. 66Sanders to Taylor, May 2. Wash. Union, May 9; June 6. Meade, Letters, i, 59–60. Journal U. S. Artill., July, 1892, p. 293. 132King to Buchanan, June 1. 69Spy to Taylor, Apr. 11.

Taylor’s army lay on the Pt. Isabel road, which connected here with the principal Matamoros ferry (Paso Real). Fort Brown was about a mile and a half from the site of the present fort. The line of the fort at Pt. Isabel enclosed about fifty acres, and could not be properly fortified with the means at hand in the time allowed. May 2 the works were far from complete. Some at least of the disadvantages of his position were pointed out to Taylor, but he seemed to feel no concern. Marcy was surprised that the Mexicans did not cross the Rio Grande near its mouth and capture Pt. Isabel. The explanation probably was that they believed the plan they acted upon was better.

7. 217Henshaw papers. 61Crossman to ... Apr. 23. 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138, 142, 288 (Taylor). Spirit of the Times, May 23. Meade, Letters, i, 66 (the murder of Cross caused intense resentment). MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 561. CampaÑa contra, 4. 69Walker to Taylor, May 2. Walker was absent on service when the men were surprised. 52Consul Chase, Tampico, May 1. National, June 18.

8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 302 (Taylor). (West Pointers) 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. 76MejÍa, Apr. 9. 76Id. to Arista, Apr. 30. 76Ampudia, Mar. 28. Tropic, May 7 (proclam. of Ampudia). Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 57–9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 39, 40. (Promises, etc.) 69Arista, “Advice,” Apr. 20. 69Report of spy, Apr. 5. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 408. Meade, Letters, i, 53. London Times, June 8. Ho. 194; 29, 1 (Jones, May 5). Spirit of the Times, May 16. Esperanza, Apr. 18. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 11. 69Mier y TerÁn to MejÍa, May 4. Taylor gave orders to shoot soldiers attempting to cross the river. Later, British deserters were not accepted.

9. 76Arista, May 1, 7. So. Advocate, June 10, 1846. 76Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30. 76Parrodi, Apr. 8. 69Arista, “Advice,” Apr. 20. 76MejÍa proclam., Mar. 18. (Lasted) Donnavan, Adventures, 102. 76Comte. gen. S. L. PotosÍ, proclam., Mar. 27. 76Comte. gen. Zacatecas to troops, Apr. 1. The Mexican press teemed with the ideas here suggested. To an Indian anything as foreign as a neighboring estate seemed dreadful. 76Ampudia, Mar. 28. Apuntes, 33. (Despised) 162Conner to wife, May 9; Henshaw narrative; Niles, May 16, p. 165; Sept. 12, p. 22. (Hardee) 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Ampudia’s troops had mutinied on the way, but an appeal to their patriotism had brought them round. There had been, as was usual, a good deal of desertion; but to a certain extent those who stood by the colors were for this reason above the average (76Ampudia, Mar. 10, 11, 12). Taylor’s method—uniformly despising the enemy and teaching his troops to do so—was contrary to the practice of CÆsar, Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington (Napol., Maxims, 49, note).

10. (Obvious) Henshaw narrative. 63Marcy, Jan. 13. 69Friend, [Apr. 11]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 138, 140, 142 (Taylor). 65Taylor, gen. orders 45. (Seven) 69McCall, report, Apr. 30. May 3 Taylor reported that his lack of light troops had helped to keep him in ignorance of the enemy’s movements as if that lack had been due to some one else. He did not call on Texas for troops until Apr. 26. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 133) says he did not call in February because such troops could serve only three months. But had a call been issued then, the troops would probably not have begun to serve for a month or two; and later he could have called for a second small body.

11. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 561. 76Arista, Apr. 27; May 1. 76Id. to Ampudia, May 5. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 394–6. Republicano, June 5. CampaÑa contra. 76Arista to MejÍa, May 1, 2. 76MejÍa to Arista, May 1, 3. 69Diary captured in Arista’s papers. 76Plana mayor diary. Apuntes, 35–7. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 16. 76Testimony at trial of Arista. People in the United States could not believe Taylor would permit the enemy to get between him and his base (e.g. Mobile Herald and Tribune, May 3). At first Arista left only 1007 men at Matamoros, but, becoming anxious about the town, he sent back the Morelia battalion.

12. Henshaw narrative. Mansfield, Mex. War, 35. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. Picayune, May 12. Nebel and Kendall, 1. Niles, May 23, p. 178. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1161 (Conner). 62Twiggs to Davis, May 4. (Lowd, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 74–5. Appleton’s Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). Autograph, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Smith, To Mexico, 44. Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109–10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 86. 76Diary of plana mayor. 76To Arista, May 15.

MejÍa notified Arista that Taylor was preparing to move, but the news arrived so late that the guns of Matamoros did not open fire upon him. Arista pursued the Americans but could not overtake them; and a body of dragoons that he ordered on was equally unsuccessful. On the morning of May 3 the boom of heavy guns in the direction of Fort Brown (Grant, Mems., i, 92; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88) alarmed Taylor, and he gave orders to set out at one o’clock (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88; Smith, To Mexico, 44), which showed that he felt no great confidence in its defensibility even then; but he desired to strengthen the base and to receive some ordnance and reinforcements that he then expected (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288), and hence sent Capt. Walker with a small party to communicate with Brown (Henshaw narrative). This was a hard task; but after some fighting, Walker reached the fort, stated that Taylor would return as soon as possible, obtained a reassuring report (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293), and with great difficulty made his way back (Henshaw papers; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 289, 293). May 1 Pt. Isabel had a force, including civilians who took up arms, of 400–500 (Niles, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179; Picayune, May 10; Wash. Union, May 9).

13. Meade, Letters, i, 74–8, 93. 65Taylor, gen. orders 56, 58. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xli, 94. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 292–4 (Taylor); 527 (spec. orders 60). Autograph, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Nebel and Kendall, 2. Grant, Mems., i, 167–8. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88–9. (Leaving train, etc.) 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Wash. Union, May 9, 29, 30. Niles, May 16, p. 162. 62Twiggs to Davis, May 4. French, Two Wars, 49. Some of the officers were anxious to wait for larger reinforcements (185L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 21), but Taylor feared Fort Brown was getting short of ammunition.

14. The battle of Palo Alto. Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). 65Taylor, gen. orders 58. Id., Letters (Bixby), 1. CampaÑa contra. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 561–3, 566. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23. 61Arthur to brother, May 10. Meade, Letters, i, 79, 80. 13Pakenham, no. 54, 1846. McCall, Letters, 449–54. 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Eyewitness, Complete History, 23. 210Alvord to Hammond, May 22. Wash. Union, May 30. Map in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Nat. Intelligencer, May 11, 18; Sept. 3, 10. N. Y. Journ. of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1847. Diario, May 29. Tex. Democrat, June 24. Spirit of the Times, May 30. Portrait of Arista, city hall, Mex. 350Weber, recolls. 213Hatch, letters. Picayune, Aug. 1, 1845; Sept. 24, 1846. Delta, May 24. 118Berlandier, diary and map. 185Duncan to adj. gen., June 19. 185Marcy to Duncan, July 27. Nebel and Kendall, 2–3. Smith, To Mexico, 45, 47–9. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal [re Arista’s conduct]. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16. Niles, June 6, pp. 215–16; Oct. 24, p. 122. Frost, Taylor, 81. Hist. Mag., Feb., 1870, 101–2. Haskin, First Artill., 80. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xli, 96. Ampudia ante ... la OpiniÓn PÚblica. (Stepped aside) Grant, Mems., 95. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57. Sierra, Evolution, i, 214. Esperanza, May 23. Monitor Repub., June 2. Autograph, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Ampudia to Fellow-cits. 285Arista to Paredes, May 14. 285Segura to Escudero, June 4. Ramsey, Other Side, 39, note, 48. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393 (Taylor); 392 (Marcy); 1102 (McIntosh); 403. 185Duncan to Belknap, May 12. French, Two Wars, 49, 50. 364Worth to S., June 13. Donnavan, Adventures, 102. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 90–3, 95. Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 36, 39. Sumaria mandada formar ... J. L. Uraga. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 233. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 414–9. Apuntes, 38–41. So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, p. 446. And from 76 the following. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. To Arista, May 17. Arista, May 7, 8, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Ampudia, May 14. Requena to Arista, May 8. VÁzquez to sister, May 25. Arista to Ampudia, May 5; to Parrodi, May 9. Ampudia to Arista, May 11. Plana mayor diary. Remarks. When first seen, the Mexicans were probably two or three miles from the Palo Alto pond, but they advanced until about a mile and a half from that point. Both lines of battle were too long. The batteries on both sides used solid shot mostly. On the placing of our gunners in advance of the troops, see Napoleon, Maxims, 45. The Mexican gunners fired mostly at the American artillery, but the American gunners mostly at the Mexican infantry. It was said that not more than a dozen Mexicans were killed with bullets. Many of the Americans were ordered to sit down or lie down (particularly the Eighth Infantry); and as most of the Mexican balls approached at a ricochet it was not very difficult to dodge them. Whatever the Americans accomplished was almost wholly due to their cannon. Not only the excellence of the ammunition and the accurate fire, but the boldness and rapidity of the manoeuvres astonished the Mexicans. It is not known why Taylor decided to rely on artillery, to which (it was stated) he had referred contemptuously on the morning of the battle as mere “gun wagons”; but presumably, as the field was peculiarly well suited for that arm, Ringgold and Duncan, supported by Bliss, urged him to let it have a chance. The American officers, though they had not over-much confidence in Taylor, felt a great deal in one another, and so had a vast advantage over the Mexicans (MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 566). Ringgold was mortally wounded, but would not let his men leave their work to care for him. During the intermission the Americans removed their wounded, replenished caissons, and made repairs. Commodore Conner, hearing Taylor was likely to be attacked, sailed for that quarter, and on May 8 and 9 landed 500 seamen and marines at Point Isabel (166Conner Letter-book. See also 65Taylor, gen. orders 60.). The chief Mexican surgeon and a number of assistants made an early and rapid retreat. The Mexican loss was estimated by Taylor as 200 killed and 400 wounded; by Arista as 252 killed, wounded, and missing.

15. (May 8 indecisive) 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13; Giffard to Pakenham, May 28; McCall, Letters, 454; Meade, Letters, i, 80; Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 416–7. Sen. 388; 29, 1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. (Consulted) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 418; Stevens, Campaigns, 20; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16; Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xli, 98; 185L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 24; Article by J. Davis on Taylor in Appleton’s Biog. Dict. Accounts of this conference differ so much that little can be said of it. Some of the officers were for entrenching and awaiting reinforcements. It was known that Conner’s fleet had arrived (note 14). (Defend) Taylor, supra; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; map of P. Alto in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Churchill’s 18-pounders and two 12-pounders taken from the baggage were left here. The wounded were sent to Pt. Isabel. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 153) states that Taylor marched early May 9 to Resaca de la Palma and parked the train there, but this is incorrect (Taylor in Sen. 388; 29, 1, p. 6; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; 369map of Palo Alto; Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 124; etc.). The point is important because troops were left with the train to protect the wagons—not as a rear guard (Rives). Rives (p. 154) states incorrectly that the Eighth Infantry was left with the train.

16. The battle of May 9. Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). Apuntes, 42–7. SuÁrez y Navarro, Alegato. CampaÑa contra. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 230, 233. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393, 396, 403 (Taylor); 392, 395 (Marcy); 1104 (McIntosh). 69Canales to Arista, May 9. 13Giffard to Bankhead, May 13. Henshaw narrative. 147Chamberlain, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. 210Alvord to Hammond, May 22. 210Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847. 213Hatch, letters. Wash. Union, July 25, 1846. 369Map of P. Alto. Spirit of the Times, May 30; June 20. Picayune, May 19; June 3. Berlandier, diary and map. Nebel and Kendall, 3–4. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 564, 566. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal, 19. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1162. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xvii (Van Deusen); xli, 98. 370Taylor to —–, June 18. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. Ampudia ante ... la Opin. PÚb. (Uraga). McCall, Letters, 455. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57 (Bliss). Grant, Mems., i, 93, 96–8. Meade, Letters, i, 81–2, 149. 72Reales Ordenes, Serie de GobernaciÓn, leg. 43. Appleton’s Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. 285Arista to Paredes, May 9, 14. French, Two Wars, 51–4. Autograph, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). 210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, 1847. Ampudia to Fellow-cits. 285Segura to Escudero, June 4. Smith, To Mexico, 49–52. 185Duncan to Belknap, May 10. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 25–6. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 422–3. Niles, June 6, pp. 211–7; July 4, p. 277; Sept. 26, p. 57. 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 96–9. 61Arthur to brother. Puritano Mex., May 26. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. 61Patton to Polk, July 18, and enclosure. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 564, 566. Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 48. The verse is by JosÉ de Saltillo, trans. by C. F. Hoffman. And from 76 the following. Arista, May 9, 10, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Id. to Mateos, May 31; to Parrodi, May 13; to Taylor, May 10. Carrera, May 25. Requena to Arista, May 10. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. R. VÁzquez to sister, May 25. Plana mayor diary. Ampudia to Arista, May 11, 14. Canales to Tornel, May 10. Remarks. It would be unsafe to give fuller information than that of the text with reference to the positions of the Mexican corps. All the accounts are unsatisfactory. Owing to the nature of the ground and the irregular shifting of the troops, this was natural. The Mexican leaders thought their position would ensure victory. Horses were unsaddled and mules relieved of their packs. The chief danger to Ridgely’s battery was from Mexicans ambushed—as Taylor had reason to suppose they would be—on both sides of the road. May, very tall and straight, with long black hair and a black beard that reached to his waist, became a newspaper hero, and for reasons that are rather hard to understand, was promoted several times during the war; but he seems clearly to have been essentially a cowardly sham. In this fight he seized a cannon, but only the infantry prevented the enemy from recapturing it. He claimed the credit of making Gen. Vega his prisoner, but the real captor was a bugler. By his own account, he could rally only six of his men after running through the batteries. The horses appear to have “run away” with the men. Taylor’s report laid stress upon what occurred at the road, and he does not seem to have known—at that time, to say the least—what mainly caused the sudden collapse of the enemy; but an abundance of Mexican evidence, partly given under oath, makes the matter clear. See also Henry, Camp. Sketches, 98. After Americans were seen at the placeta Arista’s secretary went to where the road crossed the resaca, and found May’s dragoons there. This fixes the order of events. Duncan’s battery did nothing during the battle, for Ridgely had the only opportunity to use artillery without injuring Americans. Duncan and Kerr followed the Mexicans at some distance; the Third Infantry coÖperated; and so did the Artillery Battalion, after it reached the scene; but the Mexicans were not aware of any real pursuit. Fort Brown fired on the throngs of fugitives, but no sally was made. One might imagine the garrison feared the guns of Matamoros; but they watched the Mexican fugitives from the parapet. MejÍa’s ammunition had been almost used up. Paredes informed Congress, June 6, that after May 9 Arista had 4000 regulars (Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846). May 13 Arista gave the number as 3758 “men.” Arista’s chief of staff estimated the captured, drowned, and dispersed as 500. Arista informed Parrodi, May 13, that the total number of men, including the wounded, taken by Taylor was less than 200, and this seems to have been true. May 11 prisoners were exchanged. Arista reported the number in American hands as 144, including the wounded.

17. When Taylor set out for Point Isabel, though he described the fort as “in a good state of defense,” one side was still open, and the drawbridge and interior defences had not been begun (66Mansfield to Totten, June 23; diary in Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 3); and not before the night of the third was the position considered by its defenders even comparatively secure. The fort had six bastion fronts, which made a perimeter of 800 yards, a strongly designed wall of earth 9½ feet high from the natural ground, a parapet 15 feet thick, a ditch about 8 feet deep and from 15 to 22 feet wide, a gate and a drawbridge (mostly from 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23). For about 4 feet from the base the inside of the wall was fortified with a sort of basket work of willow twigs. The magazine was made of pork barrels filled with sand, seven tiers thick and four tiers high, with a timber roof covered with 10 or 12 feet of sand. The fort was a “child of circumstance,” admitted Engineer Mansfield (66supra), and in addition to the faults of position already mentioned, the ground was irregular and the defence was made difficult by the extent of the walls, for as considerable portions were allowed to remain covered with thick chaparral (66Mansfield, supra), its area was evidently too large for the 500 men which it had been intended to cover; but it was after all a strong work, and in comparison with it Mansfield regarded the Mexican forts as “trifling” (66to Totten, May 4). Near the end of April the four 18-pounders were removed from the battery to a bastion of the fort looking toward Matamoras, where they were protected with merlons faced with sand-bags, and so attack as well as defence was provided for; but there were only 150 rounds of ammunition for each of these guns. For this note: Henshaw narrative and papers; 66Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23; May 4; June 23; 65Taylor, gen. orders 39, 45, 53; Mobile Herald and Tribune, May 6; Journal of U. S. Artil., July, 1892, p. 293; Taylor in Autograph, May-June, 1912; Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 3; Robinson, Organization, ii, 49; Niles, June 13, p. 230; McCall, Letters, 441, 443; (300 wagons) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 651 (Cross).

18. Sen. 388; 29, 1, pp. 31, 35 (Hawkins); 35 (Arista); 36 (Mansfield). Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. Apuntes, 37–8. Henshaw narrative and papers. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 296 (Taylor); 293 (Brown). CampaÑa contra. Picayune, May 19, 21; Aug. 28. 69Diary captured with Arista’s papers. 69Ampudia to Arista, May 5–6. 69Canales to Arista, May 5, 7. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 561. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. 66Mansfield to Totten, May 4; June 23. 13Giffard to Pakenham, May 28. 76Ampudia to Arista, May 11. 76MejÍa, May 4, 14. 76Mier y TerÁn to MejÍa, May 3, 4, 5, 7; to Requena, May 4. 76Testimony given at the court-martial of Arista. 76Arista, May 7. 76Id. to Ampudia, May 5. 76MejÍa to Arista, May 3. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 3. 76Requena to Arista, May 5. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, May 18. 364Worth to S., July 25. Johnson, Thomas, 23. 76Canales, May 5. 76Diary, Apr. 30-May 6. Remarks. May 6 the fort was summoned, with an intimation that no quarter would be given, should the garrison hold out longer (Henshaw). Brown was mortally wounded by a bomb-shell. He was succeeded by Captain Hawkins. In all one man was killed; nine officers and men wounded (Ho. 24; 31, 1). An attempt was made to burn Matamoros, but the balls could not be heated sufficiently (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293). Perhaps a general more farseeing than Taylor would have provided a furnace. Ampudia had about 830 men at first and later drew others from the city. When Arista called him to Palo Alto on May 8, a small force remained behind to continue the siege. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 140) says that Arista should have reduced the fort. But Arista judged rightly that, if he should defeat Taylor, the fort would have to fall, and therefore it would be unwise to risk heavy losses; and probably he did not wish Ampudia to have the glory of capturing it.

19. 13Giffard to Bankhead, May 13; to Pakenham, May 28. 118Berlandier to Arista, undated draft. Sen. I; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. (Bridge, plank, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 101–2. Apuntes, 46. 69Sanders to Taylor, May 10 (“the scows and flats of the Quarter-Masters Dept. would give us the means of crossing the river at once”). Niles, May 30, p. 202. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, May 18. Nat. Intell., May 18. 165Conner to Bancroft, May 28; to Aulick, May 18. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 132. 166Wilson to Conner, May 15. 166Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1161–2 (Conner). Parkers Recolls., 56. (Steamers) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 522; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 115 (the Neva at Matamoros May 24); Niles, May 30, p. 203; 166Munroe to Conner, May 9; N. Y. Herald, June 11. 65Taylor, gen. orders 59. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297, 300 (Taylor). Wash. Union, May 18, 30; June 17. N. Y. Herald, June 10. 364Worth to S., June 1. 166Wilson to Conner, May 15. 166Bliss to Munroe, May 9. 166Sanders to Bliss, May 16. 166Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Giddings, Camp., 36.

There was additional help at hand. 69May 10 Captain Sanders, the engineer officer at Point Isabel, conferred with Conner about crossing the river, and Conner said he was “perfectly ready and willing to go into the river and proceed up as far as Burita,” where he would place all his men and boats at Taylor’s disposal. (In fact Conner did assist in the Burrita expedition actually executed.) This was reported to Taylor at once. Matamoros had no defences except toward the river.

20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297 (Taylor); 1206 (Arista). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. CampaÑa contra. 69Arista to Taylor, May 10. 76Parrodi, May 22. 76Plana mayor diary. 13Giffard to Pakenham, May 28. 61Spanish letter to Taylor, undated. 285Ampudia to Paredes, May 14. 76Arista, May 13, 16. (Duty) Jomini, PrÉcis, i, 475; Wagner, Strategy, 45; Henderson, Science of War, 42. Apuntes, 47. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 107. 76Testimony at court-martial of Arista. Fallo Definitivo (Arista was entirely exonerated, and at a later day he became President).

21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 298 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. Apuntes, 47–51. CampaÑa contra. 76Arista, May 16, 18, 29; June 4. 76Prefect of No. Tamaulipas to gov., May 29. 76Plana mayor diary. 285TorrejÓn to Paredes, June 3. 76To Arista, May 27; June 9. 76Parrodi, May 22–3, 31. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 219. 76Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. 76Ampudia, Sept. 9. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Fallo Definitivo. Meade, Letters, i, 85, 95. 76Gen. orders, June 15, 1848. Arista had a choice between two routes—one through a settled region, the other through a desert—and for strategic reasons chose the latter.

22. 65Taylor, gen. orders, 59–61, 78–9, 83. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297, 300–1 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3, 175. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 425–6. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43. 66Mansfield to Totten, June 23. 370Taylor to ... June 18. Henshaw papers. Smith, To Mexico, 52–4. 76Parrodi, May 31. Murray, Reality, 75. 69Garland to ... May 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106–9, 113. Meade, Letters i, 88. As Roa BÁrcena says (Recuerdos, 40), the Americans were physically stronger than the Mexicans, had better arms, cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition, plenty of food, ample and well-served ambulances, were quicker and more forceful in their movements, and were more obedient; and the officers had more confidence in one another. They were also cooler and more intelligent, and had greater reserves of will-power, and the men felt more confidence in their superiors.

23. Meade, Letters, i, 98, 101. Metrop. Mag., Dec, 1907 (Hamilton, July 29, 1846). 139Campbell to Martin, July 29; (nine tenths) to D. Campbell, Aug. 9. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Schouler, U. S., v, 248. Weed, Autobiography, 571–2. Albany Evening Journal, June 18. Scott, Mems., ii, 389.

Larnard, an excellent officer, wrote to Hitchcock that Taylor did not give an order to the artillery on May 8 nor a material order to any one, and that he was no more responsible for winning the two battles than a rock rolling down a hill for crushing what is before it. This was intended, no doubt, to be taken with a grain of salt. The editor of Niles’ Register said: Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the enemy, the army under Gen. Taylor made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation (July 18, p. 309); and, considering the ardor of the Mexicans as well as the embarrassment caused by the American wagons, one must believe that had the General carried out the plan which he seems to have formed, the results would have been unfortunate. See Semmes, Service, 70. Meade (Letters, i, 99) remarked that Taylor’s neglect of precautions probably helped induce the Mexicans to fight. This was not true, for Arista’s orders were express; but, even had it been so, one could not excuse a general for really (not seemingly, as a ruse) neglecting precautions and preparations demanded by the circumstances. “Boldness is the acme of wisdom” in war, the German general staff has said (Donat, Russo-Japanese War, 255); but the distinction between boldness and rashness is real and vital. No doubt graduates of West Point felt a prejudice against men of antecedents like Taylor’s, but they showed in the course of the war a willingness to recognize merit. The popular enthusiasm over Taylor’s “victories” was the greater because he had been supposed to be in extreme peril.

24. 52J. Parrott, June 4. Bankhead, nos. 71, 90, 1846. 285Vega to Paredes, Apr. 3. 76Tornel to Arista, May 27. The London Times, Feb. 24, 1847, quoted the Journal des DÉbats as saying in effect that the Mexican War prevented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Paredes had no doubt been encouraged by the reports of MejÍa regarding the state of things at Corpus Christi, and very likely these reports helped decide him to reject Slidell.

IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS

1. Our policy did not permit us to accept a European arbitrator, and an arbitrator from Central or South America would not have been thought impartial.

2. Polk’s Message was based upon the view that the left bank of the Rio Grande belonged to the United States (p. 139), and this was said by some to be inconsistent with the idea (involved in the resolutions annexing Texas and in Slidell’s mission) that the boundary was an open question. But Polk’s language amounted only to an assertion of the American claim; and a claim, however just, may be a subject of negotiation. His expression (taken from the Washington Union of May 9), “shed American blood upon the American soil,” though denounced as a falsehood, was merely another assertion of the same claim, and was entirely in accord with the language of Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, Pinckney, and J. Q. Adams. A claimant, convinced that his cause is just, declares roundly, “This is mine,” even though aware that his contention is disputed. A more conservative statement would have been: Mexico has invaded a region that I hold to be ours, and shed American blood on what I regard as American soil; but Polk seems to have felt no doubts, and in a trumpet-call to arms qualifications would have appeared out of place.

3. Benton, however, reported the House bill, which did not divide the subject.

4. Incidents preceding and attending the passage of the war bill (May 13). Richardson, Messages, iv, 388–92, 437–43. Benton, View, ii, 679. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5, 8, 9–13, 1846. 260Extracts from National Intelligencer. 315Winthrop to Schouler, Mar. 20, 1848. Webster, Writings, iv, 138. 260Winthrop, The Mex. War Bill. 210Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. 354Welles papers. Proceedings of Senate and House in Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 257, and May 11–13; app., 912; Feb. 24, 1847 (Calhoun). Boston Courier, May 14. Boston Atlas, May 15. N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 9, 1847. Calhoun to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29, 1846: Jameson, C. Corresp., 690, 692. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. 345Dix to Van Buren, May 16, 1846. Wash. Union, May 15, 1846; Jan. 2, 1848. Greeley, Am. Conflict, i, 187. Foster, Am. Diplom., 315. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 203. Nat. Intelligencer, Dec. 27, 1847. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573. Pub. Ledger, Dec. 4, 1846. 132Buchanan, memo. Certain incidents (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 231) emphasize the fact that a regular war was contemplated by Congress. E.g. Holmes moved that the war bill should apply southwest of the Nueces only for the withdrawal or rescue of our army; voted down by 8–122. See also notes 9 and 10.

5. Benton states that Polk relied for peace upon the project of replacing Paredes with Santa Anna, which will be mentioned later in this chapter (View, ii, 680). He also charges (ibid.) that the administration—particularly Walker—was influenced by a wish to bring about the payment of American claims and make good certain speculations in Texas lands; but it was proper that the claims should be paid, and there is no proof of the second point.

6. Benton hesitated, and May 11 Polk counted on his opposition (Diary). In the debates on the annexation of Texas the Senator had denied that her territory extended to the Rio Grande (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 264, note), and he did not approve of Taylor’s going there. Besides, he desired to see the Oregon issue settled before coming to an issue with Mexico. Possibly Calhoun’s anxiety to prevent or defer war helped to drive Benton to the opposite side (354Welles papers; Polk, Diary, May 3, 11, 1846).

7. One may also view the matter at a slightly different angle. It was possible for Mexico, on learning that General Taylor had advanced peaceably to the Rio Grande, to say, Very well, he may occupy the disputed district jointly with us for the present. England and the United States maintained a peaceable joint occupation of Oregon for years. Taylor’s advancing, therefore, did not per se and necessarily create a state of war. Now the United States did nothing else that could fairly be termed aggressive; but Mexico, by attacking American troops engaged in peaceful reconnoitring, destroyed the state of potential harmony, and consequently the state of war that ensued existed by her act. C. J. Ingersoll stated later (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 125) that the language of the preamble was adopted for the purpose of conciliating, not offending, the Whigs; and one can see that it might seem likely to be easier for them to accept the war as an accomplished fact than to vote for a declaration.

8. From what is known of Calhoun’s designs (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 209–216) this statement seems reasonable, and it is supported by positive evidence (chap, vi, note 10). 232Calhoun to —–, Nov. 7, 1846: The triumph of abolitionism at the north would cause disunion, for the southern people are determined to defend their rights.

9. To justify Calhoun’s theory the Constitution should have been made to read: “Congress shall have power to declare war, and without such a declaration the United States shall never be at war,” which would have been manifestly ridiculous; and the provision in article i, sect. 10, that a state, when in imminent danger, might begin war, should have been cancelled. Doubtless for partisan reasons, Webster (Curtis, Webster, ii, 301) took the same position as Calhoun, saying that Congress could not “create a fact”—i.e. could not state that war existed before it had declared war. Von Holst on the other hand, in order to face the tolerably evident certainty that we had a legal war with Mexico, says (United States, iii, 253) that Congress made Polk’s lie [that war existed] into a fact! Many members of Congress had too little confidence (Calhoun to Thompson: Am. Hist. Rev., i, 314) in their knowledge of the situation to feel positive as to the full justice of the American cause, but this did not affect the validity of their action. Particularly noticeable was the rejection (27 to 97) of Delano’s proposition that nothing in the war bill should be construed as approving of the President’s conduct in taking armed possession of the intermediate region. Thus a much discussed question was formally raised and formally decided. 132King to Buchanan, June 1.

10. Discussion of the proceedings. (Feeling) 354Welles papers. (Assured) Polk, Diary, May 11, 1846. (Congressmen) Meigs, Benton, 360; Benton, View, ii, 680. Tribune, May 15. Journal of Commerce, July 1, 1847. Weekly Herald, May 16, 1846. (Dissensions) Boston Atlas, May 18, 1846; Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 1038 (Harris); Polk, Diary, Apr. 30; 345Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4; Feb. 22, 25, 1845; 345Wright to V. B., Jan. 17, 1845; 345Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; 345V. B. to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; 345S. T. Van Buren to M. V. B., Mar. 2, 3, 4, 1845; 297Cave Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844; and see chap, xxxiv. (Offices) Polk, Diary, May 10; June 22, 1846, and passim. 210Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 1105. (Whig vote) 260Winthrop, Mex. War Bill, 108; Nat. Intelligencer, May 16, 1846; N. Y. Journal of Comm., Dec. 11, 1847; Wheeler, Hist, of Cong., i, 411; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 251. Calhoun to Clemson, Jan. 29, 1846; to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29; to Clemson, July 11; to J. E. C, July 29, in Calhoun Corres., 679, 691, 693–4, 700–1; also 707. 345Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 1846. Calhoun in Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 501. Hunt, Calhoun, 279. Niles, May 16, 1846, p. 162. (Endorsed, etc.) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 802 (Crittenden). Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 367 (Stanton). Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210. 132King to Buchanan, June 1, 1846. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 108, 139. 132Buchanan, memo. Holmes of New York proposed in the House, May 11, that sect. one of the war bill should not apply southwest of the Nueces except for the rescue of our army. This was rejected by 8–122. May 12 Senator Crittenden, one of the foremost Whigs, proposed to substitute in the war bill the words “for the purpose of repelling the invasion” in place of the words “prosecute said war, etc.” This recognized the territory as American. His proposal was supported by twenty senators (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 803).

11. Livermore, for example, argued in this way (War, 15): Texas was annexed for the protection of Southern institutions; the war with Mexico resulted from the annexation of Texas; therefore the war with Mexico was due to the slaveholders’ interest in slavery. But both of his premises need qualification; and the conclusion, so far as it suggests that the war was the necessary and designed consequence of the slaveholders’ action in the Texas matter, does not follow. The abolitionists were enthusiastic, earnest, and on the outside of things. Hence they were naturally and almost unavoidably over-suspicious. Von Holst (U. S., iii, 302) says that the radical wing of the southern Democratic party openly avowed that the war with Mexico was a southern war; but was not Calhoun the leader and prophet of that wing? A few public men, the Charleston Patriot and Courier, and the Federal Union of Alabama looked upon the war as for the interest of the South; but it does not appear that they had any appreciable influence in bringing it about.

12. The occasion of the war was Taylor’s going to the Rio Grande; but see chap, vii, p. 154.

13. Apparently one might say that—since Polk intended to recommend redress of our grievances—war was sure, without reference to the annexation of Texas, to come. But we are tracing the cause of an actual, not of a possible, war; and the President’s recommendation might not have proved effectual. Benton (View, ii, 679) said that without the clash of arms it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring about war. Calhoun (Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: note 10) said it could not have been done. This opinion, however, was biased.

14. The cause of the war. Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 5, 23, 1847. Webster, Private Corresp., ii, 283. 370Taylor to Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. 32Buchanan to Shields, April 23, 1847. (Bulwark) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 132, 134–5, 204–8. (Unsuitable) 132Donelson to Buchanan, May 15, 1847. No. Amer., Feb. 10, 1847; Thompson in Wash. Union, Oct. 25, 1847, and Greenville (S. C.) Mountaineer, Oct. 21. Bourne, Essays, 227, 235. Charleston Mercury, Dec. 30, 1847 (long argument against annexing Mexican territory). W. Thompson to Calhoun, Dec. 18, 1847 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1149 (slavery will not exist in Mexico). 137Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. 137J. A. Campbell to Calhoun, Mar. 1, 1848. (Aiken) Boston Courier, Dec. 2, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. 132King to Buchanan, June 11, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 26, 1847. 157Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846. (Toombs) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 133. So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, 427–34. (Benton) Abr. Deb., xvi, 87; Benton, View, ii, 678. (Clay) Schurz, Clay, ii, 290. (Winthrop) Wash. Union, Sept. 30, 1846; Oct. 25, 1847; Winthrop, Winthrop, 59. (Douglas) Cutts, Questions, 154. (Johnson) Brown, Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 354. (Van B.) Wilson, Rise and Fall, ii, 9; Smith, Annex. of Texas, 243. Amer. Historical Association Rep., 1911, ii, 95 (Glenn). (Organs) Mr. Winthrop’s Vote. (Sumner) Sumner, report, 30. (Report) Wash. Union, Feb. 25, 1847. (Agree) Winthrop in Wash. Union, Sept. 30, 1846. (Paredes) Diario, July 30, 1846. (Almonte) N. Y. Sun, Nov. 26, 1846 (Caractacus); Monitor Repub., May 9, 1847. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Mofras, ExpÉdition, 8. Polk, Message, May 11, 1846 (Richardson). Cole, Whig Party, 121. See also the conclusion of chap. v.

At the end of March Paredes said: “Peace is not compatible with the maintenance of the rights and independence of the nation” (Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 22).

15. The dates are those of approval.

16. The action of Congress was promulgated by the adj. gen. in 65gen. orders 14, 18, 21, 34. See an article on the engineer company by Captain Willing, published by the U. S. engineer school, Washington Barracks. See also U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 9–13, 17, 20; Upton, Milit. Pol., 204; Richardson, Messages, iv, 603–4.

17. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846. Wash. Union, May 21. 65Gen. orders 12. 59Circular. With the freedom that has commonly marked authors dealing with the unpopular Polk Von Holst says (U. S., iii, 339) that his profession of seeking only a peace was a “falsehood.” But Polk meant of course a peace satisfactory to the American government, for a peace satisfactory to Mexico would not have had to be “conquered,” and this implied in general about the terms that we actually imposed.

18. “Germanicus” stated in the N. Y. Commercial Advertiser that in the Florida war the ratio of expense between regulars and militia was 1 to 6; of efficiency, 1 to 0 (Nat. Intell., Nov. 7, 1846). Of course the volunteers, who wished and expected to fight, were in general better than the militia, who wished and expected to remain at home. Had the regular army been increased to 50,000 privates (giving, say, 30,000 in the field), there would no doubt have been a great saving of time, blood and treasure (Stevens, Campaigns, 14). Taylor’s position gave him a special responsibility. He should have pointed out the disadvantages of the volunteer system, recommended enlisting such troops (if at all) for the duration of the war, and continued to demand regulars.

19. The military measures. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 141. 65Gen. orders 57, Dec. 22, 1846. Upton, Mil. Pol, 195, 202, 204 (sequel showed). (1838) R. Johnson in Sen., Jan. 11, 1848 (Wash. Union, Jan. 12). Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 7, 1846. (Cowardly, etc.) 354Welles papers. 63Marcy to Wright, June 3, 1846. 63Circ. letter, May 19, 1846. Webster, Letters, 346. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 46–7. Wash. Union, June 25, 1846. (Stimulated) Sen. 4; 29, 2, p. 53. Johnson, Douglas, 114. Polk, Diary, June 20, 22, 1846. (Vacancies) Richardson, Messages, iv, 513–7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 554 (Jesup). (Might have been) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 75.

The authorized maximum of the army was 16,998 officers and men (Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 53). The volunteer service was more attractive than the regular because it was easier to get rank there and the discipline was less severe; and something to offset this difference was needed.

20. Many of the volunteer regiments were in fact, owing to the appreciation of a West Point education shown by some of the states, commanded by trained men (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 127).

21. For numerous details on the subject of this paragraph see an article by the author in The Military Historian and Economist, Jan., 1917, p. 30, note 12.

22. The executive staff of the war dept. consisted of Bvt. Brig. Gen. R. Jones, adj. gen.; Lieut. Col. George Talcott, head of the ordnance bureau; Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, quartermaster gen.; Brig. Gen. N. Towson, paymaster gen.; Dr. T. Lawson, surgeon gen.; Bvt. Brig. Gen. G. Gibson, commissary gen. of subsistence; Col. J. G. Totten, chief engineer; Col. J. J. Abert, chief topog. engineer (Ho. 143; 29, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1 p. 547).

23. The following remark from J. D. McPherson (in “General Grant’s Political Myth”), who was close to Marcy in the war dept., seems worth quoting: “His massive intellect, his calm wisdom, his uncalculating integrity, the justness of all his purposes, the purity of his private life, and the goodness of his heart inspired me with admiration and reverence.” Marcy loved books, too. Still he was, as Welles said, a keen, wary and adroit politician, well taught by a wide experience and fully acquainted with human nature of the sort with which he had to deal. He had faltered at one juncture in his devotion to orthodox Democratic principles, and probably felt that he could never regain the position thus lost.

24. Raising and forwarding Volunteers. 60Marcy to Giles, May 19, 1846. For the corresp. with govs., May 15–19, see 60, 61, 63. 63Marcy to govs. of Ala., etc., June 5. 63Id. to Wright, June 3. 65Gen. orders 15, Wash., May 29. Marcy, report, Dec. 5, in Sen. 1; 29, 2. 61Memo., May 18. Polk (insists upon energy), Diary, May 19; June 23–4; Sept. 22, 24. (Marcy) Poore, Perley’s Remins., i, 333; Wise, Seven Decades, 235. (Multitudes) 63Marcy to govs., May 19. 354Welles papers. (Motives) Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1904, p. 283; 1905, pp. 194–6; 1906, 174–5; Robertson, Remins., 59, 62–7; 146Caswell, diary, Jan. 26, 1847; Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257; 139Campbell to D. C, Nov. 9, 1846; Carleton at mtg. of Mex. veterans; Prickett in Madison Record, 1850; Jamieson, Campaign, 73, 78. (High) Public Ledger, May 18, 1846. Quitman in Cong. Globe, 35, 1, p. 970. Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 343–5. N. Y. Herald, June 20, 1846. (Song) N. Y. Globe, June 1, 1846. Cameron in Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 826. 149L’Hommedieu to Chase, May 20, 1846. Wash. Union, May 27; June 12, 1846. Ohio Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., 1912, p. 280. Ills. State Hist. Lib. Pubs., ix, 38. Ark. Hist. Commission, Bulletin no. 6, p. 181. Perry, Indiana, 4–13, 17. I. Smith, Remins., 5. 239Kemper to daughter, May 30. St. Louis weekly Reveille, May 10. Everett, Recolls., 194–9. McCormack, Koerner, i, 495–7. Wallace, Autob., 114. Davis, Autob., 94–5. Iowa adj. gen., Roster, vi, 788–9. Quisenberry, Taylor, 22. 216Heiman, Services. Ex-gov. Porter of Tenn. to the author. Memphis Eagle, May 15. Niles, June 13, p. 227; July 4, p. 288; July 18, p. 313. Scharf, St. Louis, i, 362–8. 206Graham, Message, Nov. 17. 14Fair to Martin, June 4. 14Martin to Marcy, May 31. 61Bullock to war dept., May 8. 14Placard, May 7. 29Brown to Duffield, May 11; to Marcy, June 3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 223–4, 228. 63Marcy to Brown, June 16. 225Cooke to Holt, May 17. (The drums) Poem by W. R. Benjamin, by permission. Polk, Diary, May 26. 189Evans, letter. 110Barbour, diary. Bishop, Journal, passim. For additional details see The Military Historian and Economist, Jan., 1917, p. 32, note 14.

As was natural, many complications arose in preparing the regiments for the field. The volunteers themselves, as a rule, did not know what they needed nor even what they wanted. They were ignorant and helpless regarding all military matters. Such officers as understood the business were compelled to work almost night and day. Everything had to be provided, and many of the things had to be made; and the men were usually ahead of the supplies. Two Tennessee regiments were able to move south about June 1, but it was not until about July 23 that the last Illinois regiments advanced in that direction.

25. To Brazos Island. 300Prickett, letter, July 30. Robertson, Remins., June 11, 17, 23. 332Tennery, diary, Aug. 13. Houstoun, Texas (1845), 68, 91–2, 147, 255–6. Oswandel, Notes, 31, 38, 44–8. 190Ewing, diary, July 12, 19, 21. Perry, Indiana, 83. Everett, Recolls., 197–8. 274Neeld, letter. French, Two Wars, 33. 272Memoir of Gen. Morgan. 110Barbour, diary, July 23. Bishop, Journal. 193Foster to mother, June 16.

“Brazos Island” is the name on the U. S. Coast Survey map. Gens. Butler, Marshall, Quitman, Pillow and Shields left New Orleans on the steamer New York, and arrived at the island Aug. 4 (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 239). The strait between Brazos Id. and Padre Id. on the north was called the Brazos de Santiago (Giddings, Sketches, 27). Gaines’s proceedings led to great expense, and embarrassed the government very much. He kept on even after he knew of Taylor’s victories, and the total number called out by him perhaps exceeded 12,000. For most of these forces there was no place under the law of May 13, and the government did not regard them as necessary. A few who had actually left their states were accepted for three months under a law of 1795; but the requisitions were countermanded, Gaines was peremptorily ordered (May 28) to suspend his operations in this regard, was relieved of his command, and was placed before a court of inquiry. His intentions were unquestionably good, and hence the court recommended that no further action should be taken. The best information on this subject is given in the record of the court (68judge advocate general’s office) and in 65gen. orders no. 39, Washington, Aug. 20, 1846, which presents the facts, the conclusions of the court, and the remarks of the President thereon. See also Polk, Diary, June 5, 20; Aug. 15. 63Marcy to govs., June 5, 1846. 69Id. to Gaines, May 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 308. Docs. in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 50–81. Gaines to Marcy, June 7: Sen. 402; 29, 1. Sen. 415; 29, 1. 65Gen. orders (Wash.) 16, 23. 63Marcy to Taylor, May 23. Wash. Union, June 9. Sen. proceeds., June 24. Gaines was succeeded by General Brooke. The headquarters of this military dept. were at New Orleans.

26. Scott, a Whig, testified that Polk was “in great alarm” (Coleman, Crittenden, i, 244). 256Marcy privately called the state of things “adverse” (to Wetmore). Holmes of South Carolina said the administration was prostrated (210to Hammond, May 10). Charleston Mercury, May 19: At the first symptom of actual fighting our government is taken all aback. Had Polk sent Taylor to the Rio Grande to bring on a war, he would have been rejoicing.

27. Polk, whose principal interview with Scott occurred on May 14, did not at that time believe that 20,000 volunteers would be needed (Diary).

28. Scott’s information about the region was derived from Anthony Butler, formerly our minister to Mexico, and Gen. J. T. Mason (Scott in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 11), both of whom had been on the ground, and it led him to think the inactive season somewhat longer than it really was. Although Taylor with competent engineers had been for about seven months, while at Corpus Christi, in touch with a stream of traders and other persons from Matamoros, and might have sent out spies and reconnoitring parties, and had been on the river nearly two months, he does not seem to have supplied, despite urgent requests from the war dept. (e.g. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 87, 88, 90, 91, 92), any adequate ideas about conducting a campaign in that quarter or even to have formed any for himself. Marcy, May 28, 1846 (ibid., 282), said, “I wish to be favored with your views as to what should be the future operations of the army on the Rio Grande.” In submitting such views the General would have had to present information regarding topographical and other conditions, about which he seems to have left the government in the dark.

29. One should not be in haste to condemn the administration and the Democratic politicians, for ours is a party system and Scott was in politics. He should have realized that, standing at the head of the army, he was bound to serve the country as a whole, and should have refrained from seeking party honors that evidently might (as they now did) interfere with the fulfilment of that prime duty.

30. The question of general-in-chief. (It is believed that later events render a somewhat full treatment of this topic desirable.) 191Fairfield to wife, Apr. 14. Stanwood, Presidency, 195. (Politics) 13Pakenham, no. 74, June 13. 253Peters to McLean, June 26. Gaines, Sept. 10, 1845 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 38. So. Advocate, Apr. 3 (Sanderson). Gaines, June 7 in Sen. 402; 29, 1. (Scott’s personality) Scott, Mems., passim; F. Lee, Lee, 49; 354Welles papers; 252Mackall, Dec. 29, 1847; Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 562 (Scammon, one of Scott’s aides, here says that he never knew a man of the world less given to vanity than Scott); Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., 1st ser., ix, 234–9; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 182; Corwin to Follett, Mar. 13, 1845, in Ohio Hist. and Phil. Soc. Publics., July-Sept., 1914; Semmes, Service, 280–1; Grant, Mems., i, 41, 139; Grone, Briefe, 80; Keyes, Fifty Years, 1–82; 335Trist on Scott. Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 2–4. Richardson, Messages, iv, 448. Wash. Union, May 18. Scott-Marcy correspondence in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 4–18; and in 256. 60Scott, memoranda for gen. staff. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243–4. Polk, Diary, Mar. 28; May 13, 14, 19, 21–3, 25–6, 1846; Apr. 1, 1847. Niles, June 6, 1846, p. 214. Nat. Intelligencer, Aug. 29. Grant, Mems., i, 119. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, June 18. Watson, Taylor, 121. Boston Atlas, June 12. N. Y. Herald, June 13. Welles papers. N. Orl. Picayune, June 17. 253Reed to McLean, Oct. 26. Boston Courier, June 15. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., July 3, 1846. 256Marcy to Wetmore, April 22, 1847.

La BruyÈre said, “There is in some men a certain mediocrity of mind that helps to make them wise.” This was not at all true of Scott. It was characteristic of him that he blamed Marcy for only a want of candor and nerve, regarding him as merely the instrument of the party (Coleman, Crittenden, i, 244–6).

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 204) remarks that the private note of Scott (addressed to Senator Archer) “was enough to rouse the meekest of Presidents.” But (1) the note charged only what was charged commonly—that the administration was making its appointments in a partisan, political way; (2) it was private; and (3) Scott had a legitimate reason for writing it—to explain why he did not intend to recommend men for commissions, as Archer probably expected him to do. In taking cognizance of a private note Polk acted as an eavesdropper, and he should have recalled the saying, “Eavesdroppers never hear anything good of themselves.” Rives says also (ii, 413) that “for more than fourteen months before war was actually declared it was evident to every observer that war was highly probable, but Scott made no plans, collected no information, and did nothing to prepare for the coming strain upon the head-quarters organization of the army.” But (1) war was not deemed highly probable, as Rives states, by the President, the Cabinet, Congress, Wall Street, Taylor or competent observers in general (see p. 133, etc.); (2) it is a rather bold assertion that Scott “did nothing to prepare,” etc., and the present author, who intended to examine every war dept. paper relating to the subject, saw no proof of it; (3) as Rives states (ii, 582), the army had no intelligence bureau, and Scott possessed no authority to establish one; (4) to collect reliable data regarding Mexico and our frontier even informally would have cost a great deal, and the government was so economical that it would not provide even a pontoon train that was asked for (see p. 177); (5) before Jan. 13, 1846, Scott had studied the frontier and planned for Taylor’s advance to the Rio Grande (p. 153); (6) May 14 he was ready with plans so elaborate and far-reaching that Polk thought him “scientific and visionary,” and the next day he issued orders to the chiefs of the general staff (p. 199). Such plans and orders implied knowledge.

31. May 30, Taylor was brevetted major general and assigned to duty with that rank (Ho. 119; 29, 2, p. 12. Also Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283).

32. Anti-slavery theorizers represented (see Lalor, CyclopÆdia, iii, 1091) that Polk brought the Oregon issue to the verge of war so that Mexico should dare—with the expectation of having England for an ally—to fight us, and when hostilities had begun, made peace with England at a sacrifice of our claim; but this view has little or nothing except its ingenuity for support, and has a great number of facts against it.9.33. The Oregon affair. 206J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846. Dr. Bacon: “The ascendancy of the West is a fact” (New Englander, v, 319). (Cass) 1—— to Allen, Sept. 1, 1846. 210Hammond, diary, Feb. 19. Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 697–8. Polk, Diary, Oct. 21–3, 1845; Feb. 24–5; Apr. 18; June 3, 1846. Lodge, Webster, 260. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Apr. 30, 1845. Johnson, Douglas, 105. (Cabinet) 354Welles papers. A. Smith, Remins., 41. Garrison, Extension, 170. Polit. Sci. Qtrly., xxvi, 443–61 (Schuyler). Amer. Hist. Rev., xvi, 298–9 (Schafer). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 243–64. London Times, Jan. 26, 1846. Hume in Ho. Commons, Jan. 23.

34. For Santa Anna’s banishment see vol. i, p. 53. In May it was believed at Mexico that Santa Anna’s return would mean peace (56W. S. Parrott, June 4, 9); and as late as July 31 and August 12 166PommarÈs, a secret agent of Conner at Vera Cruz, said that such was the prevalent opinion there.

35. Atocha, Statement. Nat. Intelligencer, June 10, 1845. 13Bankhead, no. 41, 1846. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 444, res., 1847. Monitor Repub., Feb. 16, 1847.

36. Apparently Conner was to obey this order or not as the circumstances of the moment should render expedient. Consul Campbell of Havana was directed in June to write often to Conner and express his opinion on the propriety of allowing Santa Anna to enter Mexico (166to Conner, July 9); at the time Santa Anna sailed for Vera Cruz Campbell wrote (166Aug. 7) to Conner arguing that he should be permitted to land; and Conner, in a 162letter to his wife (Aug. 19), explained why he had thought it best to let him pass. The Journal des DÉbats (Oct. 6, 1846) believed that the American government had reason to count upon Santa Anna’s intentions though not upon his word; this was no doubt Polk’s view. Those who, in the usual fashion, have charged that Polk’s Message of Dec. 8, 1846, lied about his relations with Santa Anna have failed to observe that it referred exclusively to the events preceding the order of May 13 to Conner (Richardson, iv, 491–2). Before Mackenzie was sent to Havana stronger and more definite information to the effect that Santa Anna was likely to regain power was received—particularly from Consul Black (Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 34).

37. The United States appears (Consul Campbell, May 25, 1846) to have sent an earlier agent, who passed at Havana by the name of Brown, and was commonly said there to have brought proposals to Santa Anna. Mackenzie’s ostensible mission—real enough, too, probably—was to ascertain whether privateers had been commissioned in Cuba (Polk, Diary, Jan. 8, 1848). He spoke Spanish fluently. Santa Anna took care to put out an explanation of Mackenzie’s visit.

38. The negotiation with Santa Anna. Polk, Message, Dec. 8 (Richardson, iv. 492). London Times, Oct. 6, 1845; Jan. 31; July 6, 1846. Semmes, Service, 117–8. 52Dimond, nos. 324–6, 329, 1846. 52Campbell, June 9, 1846; April 9, 1847. 166Campbell to Conner, May 10. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 282–3. 52Slidell, Mar. 18; April 2. 166Dimond to Conner, Sept. 14, 1845. 166PommarÈs to Conner, July 2; Aug. 12. Chase, Polk Admin., 163. Monitor Repub., Feb. 20, 1846. Wash. Union, June 21, 1847. Scribner’s Monthly, xvii, 299. Constitutionnel, Sept. 20, 1846. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 441, 1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 13, 14, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 1848. Id. to Ho. Repres., Jan. 12, 1848 (Richardson). 46Bancroft to Conner, May 13, 1846. 297Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7, 11; Aug. 15, 1846. 335Id. to Trist, Jan. 2; June 8; Aug. 17, 1846. Courrier des Etats Unis, Aug. 11, 1846. (Conspicuous) Benton, View, ii, 680. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xli, 105. Meade, Letters, i, 116.

Polk stated in his diary, Jan. 8, 1848, that Mackenzie “wholly exceeded his authority” by writing out his recollection of the conversation with Polk and giving this to S. Anna as a message from the President. Mackenzie’s report reached Washington Aug. 3, and was immediately followed up by Polk with a request for two million dollars to facilitate a settlement with Mexico (chap, xxvii).

X. THE LEADERS ADVANCE

1. Comanches were making raids near Reynosa (69Worth to Bliss, July 28), and the freebooter and cut-throat, Canales, was living on the country not far away with a band that he said consisted of more than 600 mounted men (June 16).

2. Taylor to daughter, June 9, in Autograph, July-Aug., 1912. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1848. 76Berlandier to MejÍa, June 9, 1846. (Reynosa) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 305, 306, 397, 522–3, 550; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 117; 76MejÍa, June 20; Smith, To Mexico, 57; Henshaw narrative; Meade, Letters, i, 98; 76Spanish consul, Matamoros, June 7, 1846; 76Canales, May 20; June 4, 7, 16, 1846. (McCulloch) Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43; Picayune, June 24; Aug. 15; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. 139Campbell to D. C, July 3; Aug. 9. 224Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Weed, Autobiog., 573. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 4, 6–10, 13–15, 17–20, 31. 370Id. to —–, June 18 (draft): The war dept. has been “mean and contemptable to the last degree.” 375Id. to E. G. W. Butler, July 1: Madigan, catalogue no. 2, 1914. (Disliked) Meade, Letters, i, 103. Scott, May 18 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 17. This letter was acknowledged by Taylor July 2 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329). He wrote the substance of it to Dr. Wood on June 12 (Bixby). By May 28 U. S. newspapers stating that 30,000 volunteers were coming reached the Rio Grande (Meade, Letters, i, 95). “Licking” so many volunteers into shape involved an immense amount of work, but Taylor did not have to do this personally.

3. The laws recognized only the regulars, the militia (who could be required to serve but three months: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 282) and the twelve-months volunteers. The six-months men, therefore, had to join one of the other classes or be discharged. Marcy enforced this plain legal requirement and was roundly abused for so doing. For the case of the Louisiana men see Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 307, 309, 311, 315–20; Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176–7; La. Courier, Aug. 6; gen. orders 61 (Niles, Aug. 15); N. Orl. Bee, Aug. 3. For the St. Louis men see Scharf, St. Louis, i, 377.

One has to be extremely careful here about making assertions regarding dates and numbers. Affairs were in such confusion that even headquarters would seem to have been to a considerable extent in the dark. Marcy, June 8, did not know how many troops Taylor had (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 323), and the statements that one finds are nearly always wanting in precision or completeness. The facts given in the text are believed, however, to be adequate for the history of the operations. One may refer also to: Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 13; Matamoros News, July 8; 76Parrodi, July 8; Hamer in Wash. Union, Aug. 18; and Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547.

The facts about the Texan troops are particularly confused, but it is plain that while unexpectedly late—none arriving until on or about June 10—a regiment of foot, under Albert Sydney Johnston, and two regiments of horse finally appeared in response to Taylor’s call for four regiments. Henderson, who commanded these men, claimed the rank of a major general, and—apparently because mounted men were particularly needed—his claim was allowed. See Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 307, 321–2; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 118; Rose, McCulloch, 69; Henshaw narrative; Johnston, Johnston, 133; Meade, Letters, i, 104. Scott (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 325) supposed that Taylor would receive about 16,280 twelve-months volunteers and enough recruits for the regular regiments to make his aggregate 23,070, besides the three-months and six-months men who would engage for a longer term. June 14 Meade (Letters, i, 105) thought Taylor had 10,000 men. By July 30 substantially all the twelve-months foot intended for Taylor, except those from Illinois and Missouri, had arrived (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 401).

4. Meade, Letters, i, 114–5. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Robertson, Remins., 76. 139Campbell to D. C, July 3. 308Shields to R. J. Walker, Aug. 3. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 301, 305, 307, 315, 320–1, 329, 550 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176–7. Marcy, report, Dec. 5, 1846 in Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46. Nearly 1000 Louisiana vols. arrived at Brazos Id. or Pt. Isabel on May 13 (Conner in Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1162).

5. Later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 546) Boca Chica was bridged.

6. Camp Lomita, a hill of about eight acres in extent, was five miles by water above Burrita; and above that lay Camp Patterson. Camp Palo Alto was on elevated ground near what was called Arista’s Crossing. There was also a Camp Lane. Few troops were quartered at Matamoros. It is hard to understand why the well-behaved regulars were not permitted to occupy the many vacant houses there (Picayune, July 9, 14, 1846). This town, which looked attractive from the opposite side of the Rio Grande, dated from 1820. It had prospered for a time, but had been greatly injured by a hurricane in 1844, and was now falling to pieces (Meade, Letters, i, 86; “Matamoros” in Diccionario Univ.; 60Irons, April 20; RepÚblica de Rio Grande, June 27; Robertson, Remins., 104–6; 217Henshaw papers; London Times, Oct. 16, 1844; Smith, Remins., 34–5).

7. The camps and soldier life. Picayune, Apr. 7; May 30; June 14, 24; July 9, 26. Perry, Indiana, 84–5, 87, 97, 100–2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 697 (Thomas). Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 18, 22, 33. Robertson, Remins., 76–97. Giddings, Sketches, 27, 36–40. 254McClellan to sister, Oct. 8. 274Neeld, letter. 139Campbell to D. C, July 11, 19, 29, 31; Aug. 9. 280Nunelee, diary, July 5; Dec. 10. Meade, Letters, i, 59 (nine feet of water on Brazos bar; six feet to Pt. Isabel). 218Henshaw narrative. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 571 (Jesup). 332Tennery, diary, Aug. 12; Sept. 18. 190Ewing, diary, July 21-Aug. 17. Wash. Union, June 10; Aug. 3, 18; Sept. 1 (letters). 322W. B. Smith, diary. Special orders 71 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 528. Reid, Scouting Expeditions, 20. I. Smith, Remins., 9, 25, 34. Matamoros News, July 8. 69Shields, Aug. 28. Niles, July 4, p. 288; Sept. 12, pp. 21, 22. (Funds) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 560–1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176. 61Carlin to Polk, May 19. Henry, Sketches, 121. Nat. Intelligencer, Aug. 3. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 4. 69Miller to sister. 291C. Cushing to Pierce, May 4, 1847. Bishop, Journal. Allen, Pencillings, 25.

8. In the N. Y. Sun of Dec. 12, 1915, Major William Wallace showed why time is needed to make a soldier.

9. Hamer was, however, a man of strength and sound judgment, and for this reason proved very useful to the volunteers.

10. 252Lieut. Mackall wrote with reference to this matter, “I am determined, with God’s aid, to do my duty cheerfully and show no sign of impatience.” The letters and diaries of 6Robert Anderson and others give us reason to believe that such a spirit was not uncommon among the regular officers.

11. Morale of the army. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 7, 23, 42. Ewing, diary, Aug. 17; Sept. 7. “A Soldier’s Honor,” 22–3. Meade, Letters i, 91, 102–3, 108–10, 115–6, etc. (Brawls, etc.) Henry, Camp. Sketches, 124, 128, 137. W. B. Smith, diary, Aug. 13. Ewing, diary, Sept. 7. Niles, Sept. 19, p. 40. (Months) 69Bankhead, Apr. 7. St. Louis Republican, Aug. 5. Vedette, ix, no. 1 (officer, Aug. 22). 1Woll to Allen, July 2. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 425. 139Campbell to D. C, July 3; Aug. 28; Nov. 9; Dec. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 276. Jamieson, Campaign, 71. Scott, Mems., ii, 392. 148Chamberlain, recolls. 224Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23 (cf. 139Campbell to D. C, Aug. 9). 252Mackall, Aug. 4. 218Henshaw narrative. 13Giffard to Bankhead, June 9. The fundamental idea of military discipline is that each man is a factor in a great organization, and must do his part in coÖperation with all the rest. Time is necessary to bring a man to this point of view. More will be said about the morale of the troops in chap. xxxi.

12. Taylor attempted to defend himself (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 558) by citing his letter of April 26 to the department, in which he said that he trusted it would “give the necessary orders to the staff department for the supply” of the new troops from Louisiana and Texas; but this was by no means what he was bound to do in the premises (see note 13); and, in particular, river steamboats of an unknown description and number not only did not come under the head of army supplies, but were almost certainly not even in his own mind when he wrote that letter.

13. The question of boats. (View) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329–32 (Taylor); Taylor to Butler, July 1, 1846 in 375Madigan, catalogue no. 2, 1914. (Rules) 61Adj. gen. to Kearny, May 14; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 560, 751 (Jesup). Dec. 26, 1913, the chief clerk of the quartermaster general’s office, Washington, stated to the author (for publication) that under the regulations in force in 1846 Taylor was bound to specify the kind and amount of supplies that he wanted. (Knew) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 685 (Whiting, Nov. 30). (Assuming) Taylor to Butler, July 1, supra. (Depended) Ibid. (Useless) Ibid.; Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547. (Denunciations) Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547–8, 558, etc.

Marcy to Taylor, June 8, 1846: You are expected to “push your advantages to the utmost extent it can be done with the means at your command” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 325).

As late as May 24 Taylor knew little about the depth of the river. It was then being studied (Thomas in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 654). May 18 he called for only one steamboat (ibid., 653), and May 28 for only three more (ibid., 656). By August 11 about twenty were said to be on the river. The documents appear to show that the quartermaster’s department, notwithstanding Taylor’s complaints against it, did about all in this matter that could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances (ibid., 549, 763). It was difficult to find light-draught boats that were strong enough to risk a voyage across the Gulf. It should be borne in mind here and elsewhere that the war bill of May 13 threw suddenly upon the war department a very extensive and complicated business, such as it requires years to build up in civil life. Many of Jesup’s subordinates were doubtless old, lazy or fond of “red tape”; others lacked the necessary capacity; still others were political henchmen; but they seem in general to have been willing. Taylor said he did not like the plan of campaign (to Butler, July 1, supra), but had not been willing to obtrude his ideas upon the government. On this point consult note 28 of chapter ix.

When Taylor found himself in trouble about boats, he undertook to cover his lack of foresight by denouncing (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547–8, 558, etc.) the government for sending a flood of volunteers without supplying the means of transportation. But evidently, in the first place, if Taylor, who had been near the Rio Grande for about seven months and then upon it for nearly two, did not feel sure as late as May 21 whether it could be made to serve (ibid., 300), Jesup, who possessed no definite and reliable information on the subject of the river (ibid., 560) could not very well know whether Taylor could and would use it, how many boats he would need, and how much water they should draw. In the second place, if the General had provided transportation for his regulars and the men he called out on April 26, he would have been able to establish the dÉpÔt, leave about 1000 men to guard it, and advance with as many troops (some 6000) as he planned to throw forward at first (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 330 (Taylor), 561 (Jesup); Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Taylor, July 1); Taylor, Letters (Bixby) 40, 44; 370Id. to —–, draft, June 18; Smith, Remins., 14). Thirdly, even if a flood of twelve-months volunteers came, those he did not require for the forward movement could have been left at healthy camps in the rear, as he himself pointed out (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 330), to drill and prepare. Fourthly, instead of complaining that a lack of boats prevented his advancing (ibid., 305, 307), he might—for aught that we know—have pushed forward his regulars promptly by land, having for this operation a month of good weather and a wagon train ample for twice that number of men (ibid., 560, 651). And, finally, it is worth mention that Scott’s letter of May 18 was probably as early an official notification of the coming volunteer forces as could prudently have been given. Rives observes (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 252), “Taylor was thus obviously disabled for some time [by the sickness of the volunteers resulting from the rainy season] from making any extensive forward movement.” But (1) Taylor had a month of good weather after the capture of Matamoros; (2) the regulars were not sickly, and might have been pushed forward with little delay; (3) the sickness near and below Matamoros was not such as to prevent him from completing his expeditionary force with volunteers; (4) the boats, which began to arrive about the first of July, would have enabled the necessary number of volunteers to move promptly; (5) and even the severe sickliness at Camargo did not prevent advancing with fair promptness after Taylor had decided to move. Of course it must be remembered that Taylor had much to think about, and lacked experience.

14. There was also a notable want of order and energy, said Worth, in the control of the steamboats (69to Bliss, July 27).

15. By August 4 substantially all of the regulars except the cavalry and two or three batteries set out. June 16, the adj. gen. (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 454) estimated that Taylor would have under his immediate command about 11,840 twelve-months volunteers and would soon receive nearly 800 regulars. This left out of account a regiment and a half from Texas and some other small corps. Taylor may, then, have had at about this time (not allowing for discharges) 15,500 men. An account printed in the Cincinnati Chronicle of Sept. 6 gave him 15,810. Lieut. Col. Clarke, Eighth Infantry, remained in command at Matamoros, and Major Gardner, Fourth Artillery, at Point Isabel and Brazos Island (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 533). The rank of these officers indicates that but few soldiers were left behind, and at Reynosa and Mier there were only detachments. During July Capt. Gillespie with a company of Texas Rangers marched from San Antonio and passed through Laredo, Guerrero and Mier, finding the people quiet in those towns (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 402).

16. Occupation of Camargo, etc. The distance from the Gulf to Camargo by water was also called 450 miles (Smith, To Mexico, 92). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 690–1 (Hunt). (Mishaps) 76Letter from Matamoros, July 13; Whiting, Aug. 3 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 675; Gaceta de Ciudad Victoria, July 21; Matamoros Reveille, June 24 (“The channel [of the river] shifts and fills with incredible rapidity”); Niles, July 18, p. 310; Aug. 1, p. 341. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 300, 336–8, 397–402, 408. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 120, 123, 125, 132–151. 69Smith to Bliss, July 8. Donnavan, Adventures. 180Pillow to wife, Aug. 8. Meade, Letters, i, 106–7, 118. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 239. Robertson, Remins., 107–9. Brackett, Lane’s Brig., 23–4. Tilden, Notes, 10. 69Miles to Bliss, July 8, 14. (Alcalde) Encarnacion Prisoners, 25. 76Comte. gen., Saltillo, July 20. 76MejÍa, July 19. Picayune, July 26; Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 279. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 25, 30, 39, 40. 65Id., gen. orders 93, July 30. Ewing, diary, Aug. 20–31, 1846. 76GarcÍa to Parrodi, Aug. 10. Grant, Mems., i, 104. 267Memo. [apparently from Maj. Smith]. Kenly, Md. Vol., 61–4. French, Two Wars, 59. Niles, Sept. 5, p. 1; 19, p. 56. Sanders, June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. (Mier) 69Vinton to Lee, Aug. 1; Smith, To Mexico, 66; Green, Journal, 82.

17. At Camargo. 99Gov. Tamaul. to Tampico ayunt., July 23. 80Gov. N. LeÓn, July 2, 1846. Picayune, Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15; Sept. 12. Smith, Remins., 35. Sanders, June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. McClellan, diary. Henshaw narrative. Meade, Letters, i, 119, 121. Ewing, diary, Aug. 31-Sept. 19. Robertson, Remins., 109–11. Wash. Union, Sept. 14; Oct. 5. Bishop, Journal. 185Worth to Duncan, July 30. (Worth) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 278; Special orders 72 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 529; 61W. to adj. gen., May 9; 61Marcy to W., May 11. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 121, 152–4. Giddings, Sketches, 83. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 42, 176. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 176–7. Vedette, ix, no. 10. Tennery, diary, Oct. 28. 139Campbell to D. C., Aug. 28. Nashville Union, Oct. 17. Niles, Sept. 12, p. 23; Jan. 2, 1847, p. 286. 117Pillow to wife, Sept. 6; Dec. 24. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 13, 30. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1, 1846. (Mier) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1180 (Taylor).

Camargo was the proper place for Taylor’s dÉpÔt, but no Americans were needed there except the quartermaster’s force and a guard of regulars. For these there was sufficient elevated ground. The regulars occupied this ground (Picayune, Aug. 15), and suffered comparatively little; but we know enough of the conditions existing at Camargo to pronounce the place unfit for the number of men encamped there.

18. May 9 Paredes decided that all the American consuls should cease to exercise their functions, and four days later orders were issued that wherever a U. S. war vessel should appear, the Americans should embark or go twenty leagues into the interior. Mexican consuls in the United States were soon directed to close their offices. 52B. E. Green, Apr. 25, 1844: Tornel “hates us with a most envenomed spite.” 52Ellis, Sept. 20, 1839: Tornel shows a bitter and unrelenting hostility toward the United States.

19. Feb. 4, 1846, El Tiempo, the favorite journal of Paredes, had said: “We are not a people of traders and adventurers, the scum and dregs of all countries, whose only mission is to rob the Indians of their land and then seize the fertile regions opened to civilization by the Spanish race.” June 13 La Esperanza, of Tampico, close to the field of war, printed the Address of a Patriotic Junta [Committee] to raise funds for the campaign, which used the following language about the Americans: “People without morality, composed of the scum of all nations; people without honesty, who count their bankruptcies by the numberless number of their enterprises; people without religion, who tolerate all beliefs and mock at the most sacred things; people for whom probity is not a virtue, who value money and know nothing of glory, a monstrous collection of the most heterogeneous elements united by the double bond of crime and fear, etc.”

20. Paredes, Mexico and the war. (Paredes’ appearance) Portrait, City Hall, Mexico; Aguila del Norte, Mar. 18. London Times, Mar. 13, 1846. Bankhead, nos. 13, 45, 72, 92, 100, 1846. 52Slidell, Feb. 6, 17. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 567–8. DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 134–6. Apuntes, 68. Diario, May 18; June 2, 7, 12, 17, 26–30; July 2, 4, 6, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 58. 52Black, no. 379, July 4. Monitor Repub., June 1, 4, 30, 1846. Imparcial, July 15, 1846. Indicador, June 4; July 24, 1846. Esperanza, May 30, 1846. Pregonero, June 18, 1846. 84S. L. PotosÍ assembly, procl., May 22, 1846. Wash. Union, June 18, 1846. BalbontÍn, Estado Militar. 13Foreign Office to Bankhead, June 1, 1846. 76Parrodi, June 8, 1846.

21. Mar. 31, 1846 (no. 8), the British Foreign Office wrote to Bankhead, the minister at Mexico, that according to the British minister at Madrid the project of setting up a monarch in Mexico was entertained in Spain. See also chap. iv, note 15 and chap. vi, note 32.

22. The political situation of Paredes. 52Slidell, Jan. 14; Feb. 6, 17; Mar. 1, 18, 27; Apr. 2, 1846. 13Bankhead, nos. 12, 15, 22, 27, 34, 45, 49, 57, 62, 63, 80, 92, 98, 111, 1846. Conner, Mar. 2 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 121. DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 134–6. Diario, April 19; May 4, 13; June 7, 28, 1846. Tributo Á la Verdad. 52Black, June 1; July 29; Aug. 12. London Times, Mar. 13; Apr. 11; Aug. 7; Sept. 5, 9; Oct. 7. Gov. Durango to Dur. cong., Nov. 8, 1846 (pamphlet). 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4. BermÚdez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. 76Acta, MazatlÁn, May 7, 1846. 52Dimond, no. 317, Feb. 2, 1846. Paredes, Papers (GarcÍa, ed.), 43, 46. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 556, 558. 75Gov. Jalisco, Feb. 24, 1846. 75Circular, Apr. 18, 1846. Monitor Constit., Jan. 9, 1846. BoletÍn de Noticias, June 1, 1846. Monitor Repub., May 23; June 6, 7, 9, 22; July 5, 14, 1846. Republicano, June 27, 1846. 80Gov. Jalisco, decree, May 25, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 15. 76Paredes, manifiesto, Mar. 21. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. 76Comte. gen. MÉx., Aug. 2, 1846. Niles, June 6, p. 211; June 20, p. 242. 80Gov. MÉx., April 20, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 524, 530, 531, 536. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. 13Forbes to Bankhead, July 2, 1846.

A pamphlet said, “A las armas, Mexicanos! People, a horrible treason, an infamous treason threatens our independence, our adored independence, for which our fathers gave their lives”; Paredes and his coterie of wretches are aiming to hand us over, manacled, to the foreigners; “this is a fact, Mexicans; read, read that newspaper, protected by the government, called El Tiempo.”

23. E.g. El TelÉgrafo said in capitals on March 31: “Many a nation would like to take by the hand” one of the heroes who helped to establish it, and “the silence of the majestic tomb replies, ‘He no longer lives’; but Santa Anna does live, and his voice proclaims, 'Mexico shall be great, free and happy.’”

24. A revolt in favor of Santa Anna occurred at MazatlÁn on May 7, but it was not an integral part of the movement.

25. Paredes was imprisoned in the fortress of UlÚa, transferred to Perote castle, and early in October permitted to leave the country. In this revolution Tornel miscalculated and stood out against Santa Anna. The Puebla garrison also was hostile at first. The title of Salas was, “Most Excellent SeÑor, General-in-Chief of the Liberating Republican Army exercising the Supreme Executive Power.”

26. The downfall of Paredes. London Times, Aug. 6, 1845; Feb. 10; May 13; Oct. 7, 1846. W. S. Parrott, June 4. 52Campbell, Apr. 8, 1845. Slidell, Mar. 27, 1846. Imparcial, June 18, 1906. Dimond, nos. 324–7, 329, 331, Mar. 18, 22, 31; Apr. 1, 5, 17, 1846. Santa Anna’s “Plan,” etc., in Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 34–6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215–7. SuÁrez y Navarro, Causas, 82. Mora, Papeles Ined., 59. Bankhead, nos. 57, 78, 88, 100, 110, 111, 149, 1846. 13Giffard, April 1; Aug. 1. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (and documents). GimÉnez, Memorias, 92. Acta, Guadalajara, May 22, 1846 (pamphlet). MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 555, 569–76. Picayune, April 21. Diario, May 4; July 31; Aug. 1–9, 26. 285Montoya to Paredes, April 1. 285Parrodi to Paredes, July 25. 182Almonte to —–, May 13. Monitor Repub., June 22; Aug. 4. 52Black, Apr. 26; May 21; July 29; Aug. 6, 22, 27; Sept. 17; Oct. 8. Plan Salvador, Feb. 11, 1847. 47Conner, July 16, 28; Aug. 12., 1846. 166PommarÈs to Conner, July 31. Monitor Repub., Aug. 4. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 531–5. Memoria ... de Guerra, Dec., 1846. DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 146, 155. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 63, 67–74. 94Circular of Hacienda, Aug. 15. Also from 76 the following. Letter to Guerra, Acapulco, Apr. 15. To Garay and Falcon, April 7. To Bravo, April 13. Rea, June 5. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, June 15. YÁÑez, Aug. 31. Id. to troops, May 20. Id., address, June 7. Id., proclam., July 16. Acta, MazatlÁn, May 7. Acta, Tepic, May 12. YÁÑez to Reyes, May 22. To Morales, Aug. 7. To Parrodi, July 31. Acta, Coatepec, July 20. Comte. gen. V. Cruz, July 1, 9, 21. Rebolledo to Echagaray, July 20. Paredes, Sept. 12. To comte. gen. Vera Cruz, Sept. 18. Acta, Jalapa, Aug. 2. Salas to Mora, Aug. 4. To Paredes, Aug. 4. Agreement, Aug. 6. Salas, proclam., Aug. 6. Circulars, July 27; Aug. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17. The Guerra archives contain a great number of documents relating to internal troubles at this time. For the Organic Bases see chap, ii, p. 52.

27. The captain general of Cuba had been ordered—evidently in the interest of the Mexican monarchical party—to prevent Santa Anna from returning to Mexico, but was friendly to him, and gave him a passport on the grounds that he could not be prevented from going, that an attempt to hold him (contrary to the rules of neutrality and hospitality) might be made an excuse for misusing the Spanish residing in that country, and that, even should the monarchical plan be carried out, its results would probably not be stable (72Reales Ordenes, Serie de GobernaciÓn, legajo 43). He went in a hired vessel called the Arab, under British colors. Near Vera Cruz the Arab was hailed by the U. S. sloop-of-war St. Mary’s and boarded, but was permitted to proceed (S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 17; Semmes, Service, 118; Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254–5). Conner stated that the Arab was not boarded, but apparently he wrote this before receiving a report from the St. Mary’s. The city of Vera Cruz had not declared for Santa Anna, and did not do so for some time. In fact the city government appeared so unsympathetic that an effort was immediately made to overthrow it. Santa Anna was accompanied by Almonte, RejÓn and other partisans. See Courrier des Etats Unis, Aug. 22; 313Letters in Saunders papers; 297Mackenzie, July 11; 166Campbell to Conner, Aug. 7; 166Conner, Aug. 17; (“Flower”) Kenly, Md. Vol., 392–3; 76comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 16, 22; Tributo Á la Verdad; Semmes, Service, 118–9; 100Landero and PÉrez, July 31; Bankhead, nos. 121, 122, Aug. 29; 47Conner, Aug. 16; Diario, Aug. 28; Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846.

28. Santa Anna till he reaches El Encero. Ruxton, Adventures (1849 ed.), 17, 18, 20, 47. 76Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 14, 16, 22. Encarnacion Prisoners, 45. Stapp, Prisoners, 89, 90, 95. CalderÓn, Life, i, 48–50; ii, 121. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 16–8. Kendall, Narrative, ii, 364. Am. Sentinel, June 15, 1836. 297Mackenzie, July 11. 76S. Anna, Aug. 16. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 183, 186, 221. London Times, June 25, 1836. Thompson, Recolls., 66. Ferry, Revolutions, 175–206. 231Powhatan Ellis, July 8, 1839. 76Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Aug. 28. 76Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Aug. 28. 76Comte. gen. Tamaul., Aug. 26. 76Comte. gen. Sinaloa, Oct. 14. 13Bankhead, nos. 120–2, Aug. 29. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254–5. Semmes, Service, 118–9. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 536. 47Conner, Aug. 16 (unofficial), 25, 30; Sept. 5. 166Conner, Aug. 17. 76Circular, Aug. 19. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Indicador, Aug. 16. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 134, 137, 139–40. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 777 (S. Anna). Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 86–7. 76S. Anna, Sept. 7. Diario, Aug. 27–8. 162Conner to wife, Aug. 19. 52Campbell, Nov. 10.

29. This account is based upon a study of his career and a wide range of reading. A few sources may be specified: Atlas, Feb. 1, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 66, 110, 1844. CalderÓn, Life, ii, 121. Sierra, Evolution, i, 190, 198, 203, 210, 216. Mofras, Exploration, i, 14. Negrete, MÉxico, xiii, 370. LeÓn, Historia, 480. Defensa de S. Anna. Nacional, Dec 22, 1847. Arco Iris, Dec. 7, 1847. Monitor Repub., Oct. 12; Dec. 12, 1847. 166Campbell to Conner, July 9, 1846. Noticias Importantes. 73Reports of the Spanish legation (which give striking evidence of S. Anna’s intellectual qualities and volubility). Proceso del Gral. S. Anna. Biog. del Gral. S. Anna.

30. No doubt Santa Anna had felt at an earlier period and possibly felt even now an occasional emotion of patriotism inundate his soul, as a Mexican proclamation would have said. Few are so utterly selfish as never to bestow a kind wish upon their fellow-creatures, and Santa Anna was bad in a spontaneous, human way, not in that of cold villainy. Probably he was largely guided by worse men than himself, who had more ability to think but needed him to execute their designs.

31. The army sent agents to question Santa Anna with reference to his intentions. It may safely be assumed that he reassured the military chiefs regarding his real aims.

32. The BoletÍn Oficial of S. L. PotosÍ said on July 31: “And liberty! Oh liberty! There also we meet with fine phrases. How beautiful are phrases! How they fill the heart! Santa Anna instead of Paredes ..., is not this liberty, I ask? A prince from abroad, a dictator from Mexico,—is not this also liberty, I ask?”

33. 47Conner reported that on August 28 an American urged upon Santa Anna the necessity of making peace with the United States, and that Santa Anna replied in substance as follows: I am convinced of that but will not assume the responsibility of proposing it; I am old; I have money enough; I will not run the risk of dying in exile; I will assemble Congress as soon as possible and act as the majority shall decide; meanwhile I will attempt the arduous task of repelling the invaders. This American was Hargous, a merchant of Vera Cruz (see Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90; 166PommarÈs to Conner, Aug. 29). The British minister believed that Santa Anna had made an arrangement with the United States at Havana, but was prevented by the unpopularity of his return from carrying out the agreement (Bankhead, no. 128, Sept. 7).

34. A striking glimpse into the situation is given by the fact that for some time the government could not communicate confidentially with Santa Anna because there was nobody it dared trust with such a mission, and no person of importance dared absent himself from the centre of intrigue (RamÍrez, MÉxico, 145).

35. A series of acts concluded on October 23 restored fully the externals of the federal system (RamÍrez, Memorias, 33–4). This change metamorphosed departments into states.

36. The constitution of 1824 was revived so far as it did not conflict with the revolution of Aug. 4. Salas was a weak man and longed to escape from his difficult and trying situation (Bankhead, no. 140, Sept. 29; Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 101; MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 577).

37. Other war measures were: (Aug. 28) free importation of arms; (Aug. 31) severe penalties for civil and military officers refusing to obey orders during the war; (Sept. 3) the free manufacture and sale of gunpowder; (Sept. 4) a commission to provide lands for American deserters; (Sept. 10) naturalization to be gained by entering the army or navy; (Sept. 10) reËstablishment of the Military Normal School at Chapultepec under the name Military College; (Sept. 11) regulations for the National Guard. The purpose of offering a pardon to deserters from the regular army was probably to transfer men from it to the National Guards (Bankhead, no. 126, Sept. 7).

38. The attitude of the best citizens was probably stated by the Monitor Republicano of Aug. 25: “We will say to Santa Anna: ... if you recognize your errors, promote the welfare of the country, pursue a course entirely different from your former policy, and prove by acts—not words—that your misdeeds were not crimes but errors, then Mexico will forget the past and reward liberally the citizen conferring upon her so marked a benefit.”

39. Thirteen municipalities of Oaxaca contributed a total of 75 pesos.

40. Guadalupe Hidalgo, a suburb on the northern side of Mexico, contained a deeply venerated shrine of the Virgin.

41. The situation and Santa Anna’s course. 47Conner, July 28; Aug. 12, 16 (unofficial), 25; Sept. 5, 13, 22; Oct. 4. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28; nos. 345–6, Sept. 28. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 131–5, 137, 145, 149. 52Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 12, 22, 28; Oct. 8. Mora, Papeles Ined., 60. 162Conner to wife, Aug. 29. Heller, Reisen, 195–6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. Tributo Á la Verdad. 70Degrees, Aug. 22, 28. 76Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; decrees, Sept. 10, 27. 13GutiÉrrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. 76Circular, Aug. 28 (“infamous” reports that the govt. aims to destroy the army). 13Bankhead, nos. 111, 120–2, 126, 128, 136, 140, 142, 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 787–9. 166Campbell to Conner, July 9, 13. 166PommarÈs to Conner, Aug. 29; Sept. 23. Amer. Sentinel, June 15, 1836. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 404. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 577–9, 590, 628. Diario, Aug. 27-Sept. 6, 9, 11–20, 23, 25–30. 47Black to Conner, Sept. 24. Eco de Tampico, Nov. 4 (If S. Anna beats the enemy he will be the idol of the Mexicans). 76Circulars, Aug. 17, 22, 28, 31; Sept. 3, 15, 17, 20, 25, 28. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. GarcÍa, Revol. de Ayutla, 15. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec. 77Circular, Sept. 10; Nov. 27. DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 155–61. Republicano, Sept. 15, 29; Nov. 5. 76To Almonte, Aug. 28. 76S. Anna, Sept. 7, 13, 14, 21, 24, 25, 26. Apuntes, 67, 115. Tributo Á la Verdad. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 94, 96, 101, 111. 76Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 6. Diario, supplem. to no. 39. 70Almonte to comte. gen. MÉx., Sept. 15. 76Comte. gen. V. Cr., procl., Oct. 1. Monitor Repub., Aug. 25; Sept. 14–15, 18, 25. Ruxton, Advent. (1847), 47, 49. Imparcial, June 18, 1906. 76Comte. gen. QuerÉtaro, procl., Sept. 29. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 20. London Times, Oct. 7; Nov. 6. (380) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1046 (Scott).

42. (Bulls) 121Handbill.

XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO

1. 76Arista, May 25, 29. 76To MejÍa, May 27. (Monterey) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50–3. 76MejÍa, June 9, 19; July 2. 76Id., proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to MejÍa’s illness, Requena assumed the actual command in June (CarreÑo, Jefes, ccii).

2. Apuntes, 51, 53. 285Letter to Paredes, July 13. 285Segura to Escudero, June 4. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 26. 76Arista, Apr. 24. 76MejÍa, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. 76Id. to Baz, July 29. 76Ampudia, Aug. 28. 76MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31. 69Spy to Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had no arms (76gov. N. LeÓn, May 24).

3. 69Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. 285MejÍa to Paredes, July 20. And from 76 the following. MejÍa, June 14 (“The loss of the immense territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable”); July 9, 19; Aug. 10, 17, 21. Id. to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S. Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8. Canales, June 18. Id. to MejÍa, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N. LeÓn, June 24.

MejÍa reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they might be; but a spy reported “utter confusion” in the public mind there (Vinton, supra) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken advantage of by Taylor (69to Bliss, Aug. 27).

4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: “If the gov. think proper to entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same” (Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17) that he was to have the command. The orders to that effect had been issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr. 26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91, 141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp. Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the Mexican press. 76Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would serve their own country). 76MejÍa (July 19) classed the people of the border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently the duty of obtaining information (Niles, Sept. 12, p. 22; So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed. What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of information, and did something of real utility. Taylor’s lack of data will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed, wrote on Sept. 17 near MarÍn that the Americans knew no more of the numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros (Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156–60) endeavors to show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and endorsed Scott’s “interference” (ibid., p. 328); and (2) there was no practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance. Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter “of course.” Marcy said it had not been decided whether he should advance to the capital.

5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545 (Jesup). 76Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 559, 565–6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13–15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 177–8. 61Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 164. N. Y. Commerc. Advertiser, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote that the means of transportation might be pack-mules “chiefly” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor’s plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup). (Complained) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; 61to adj. gen., Sept. 10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557.

Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later, that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general’s entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons (May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition, and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief quartermaster, who said, “With respect to the means of transportation to be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen. Taylor” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it.

When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546–764). In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made, and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100–150 wagons intended for him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but Wool was under Taylor’s orders, and the latter neglected to regulate the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.; but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to Taylor, and described the General’s complaints as intended to ward off responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success (364to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the chief clerk, quartermaster’s office, Washington, see chap. x, note 13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 567).

One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey; have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers, a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men, heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone to Saltillo via Monclova. The distance would have been considerably greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to coÖperate. Both Santa Anna and MejÍa feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to all this it may be said that on pp. 198–9 the author mentioned without disapproval Scott’s plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the “hot mud” and needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and decisive one, which probably would not have advanced via Monterey.

6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. Herald, July 25; Niles, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391–2; Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (Niles, July 18, p. 309). One newspaper called Taylor “Gen. Delay.” (Sustain) Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected) Taylor, ibid., 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1 (“I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our legs can carry us there”); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411 (Taylor “anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying Saltillo”); 135Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; Hist. Mag., x, 207–8 (Backus); 180Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson, Remins., 125.

It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk’s negotiations with Santa Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general in the field under orders to press the war. 185Aug. 5 Worth ordered Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept. 3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): “The country ... shall not be disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster.” One does not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate expedition.

7. 61Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet, Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor). For S. Anna’s task see note 5 and chap. xix. 66Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15. 61Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178.8. Robertson, Remins., 118. 69Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. 69Wolf to Bliss, Aug. 10. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. 65Taylor, gen. orders 98–9, 105, 108, 110. 76Canales to MejÍa, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 411–2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). 76Aldrete to MejÍa, Aug. 30. Picayune, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. Niles, Sept. 5, p. 2. 69P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps (War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes.

The army was organized as follows: Regulars (mostly). A battery of two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First Artillery. First Division (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second Dragoons. Ridgely’s battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland): Bragg’s battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver’s volunteer company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry, Washington and Baltimore battalion. Second Division (Brevet Brig. Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan’s battery, Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P. F. Smith): Taylor’s (Mackall’s) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry, Blanchard’s Louisiana volunteer company. Volunteers. Field Division (Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417). Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500 privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37 artillery. Texas Division (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon attached to Butler’s staff as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). “Field Division” simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11 Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000); 4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery (100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230 men and 4–500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug. 15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501.

A pack-mule (mula de carga) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting. One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56–8; Robertson, Remins., 269; Picayune, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i, 274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100 under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt. Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson commanded all these forces.

9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119–22. 69P. F. Smith to Bliss, Aug. 26. 69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. 148Chamberlain, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 161–77.

10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122. Velasco, GeografÍa, iv, 121. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. 69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 281. 76Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 154, 177–9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. Picayune, Sept. 22; Oct. 6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. Metrop. Mag., Dec, 1907, p. 316.

Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats, sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (180Pillow to wife, Sept. 20). These facts bear upon Taylor’s complaint that the government’s failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (65gen. orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful. Worth’s command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge in the mountain.

11. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 10–24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 304–5. 93Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from 76 the following. To RamÍrez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15, 28; Sept. 2, 16. RamÍrez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. MejÍa, Aug. 17, 19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2, 3, 9. Ponce de LeÓn, Sept. 19, 22. Id. to Ampudia, Sept. 15. MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day. This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive. It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. PotosÍ Aug. 29, was halted there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22.

Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. RamÍrez, Gen. MejÍa, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades under Gens. TorrejÓn and Romero, the former commanding by right of seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the seÑorita might excite suspicion, but there were others who bore it.

The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns, but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers; do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211. Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397; First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First) of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. PotosÍ, 340; Do. of QuerÉtaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140; Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do. of S. L. PotosÍ, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of BÉjar, 68; First Permanent Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23; Do. of BÉjar, 22; Do. of La BahÍa, 1; First Activo Co. of N. LeÓn, 56; Defensores [militia] of N. LeÓn, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the above return. They became the nucleus of the “San Patricio” corps.

12. From 76 the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug. 24 Ampudia was told to have MejÍa suspend his retreat, unless Taylor had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia’s decision to hold the city was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter’s advice. The comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic.

13. From 76MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Aug. 26. Ampudia to MejÍa, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia, Aug. 31.

Ampudia’s reasons were: 1. It would take a month to demolish the fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on advantageous terms; 2. The matÉriel could not be saved; 3. The abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry, leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions.

14. Apuntes, 54. From 76 the following. To MejÍa, May 27. MejÍa, June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Aug. 12. Ampudia, Sept. 9. MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

15. 307Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136. Richmond Enquirer, Oct. 20. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 53–4; 176Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 24. 92Map and plan of defence. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 327 (Ampudia). Picayune, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45. Numerous maps, published and in MS.

16. Apuntes, 53–4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about the citadel garrison). Picayune, Oct. 21. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins., 126–8. 69Mansfield, report. 66Id. to Totten, June 30, 1847. 147Chamberlain, diary. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 43. 76Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Sept. 20. 76Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of the citadel as the “Black Fort” or the “Old Colored Gentleman.” Its Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the densely-built part of the city.

17. 69Mansfield, report. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 27, 38, 42. 76MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). 364Worth to —–, Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). 221Hill, diary. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 217.

18. From 76. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28. To Ampudia, Sept. 4. MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

19. Diario, July 4; Sept. 21. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 120. Picayune, Sept. 22. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 326. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, Sept. 22. 76Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31. 76Proc. in English, Sept. 15. 76Circular, Sept. 15.

20. Monitor Repub., Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (JÁuregui). 13Bankhead, no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 26. 76Nevia to Ampudia, Aug. 26.

21. Tampico Eco, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose, McCulloch, 73. MejÍa to Paredes, July 20. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 26. Apuntes, 55–8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from 76 the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. Id. to TorrejÓn, Sept. 1. MejÍa to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. Id. to Ampudia, Aug. 30–1. MejÍa to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17.

Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable.

22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. 147Chamberlain, diary. Giddings, Sketches, 97. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall, 5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159–61. Picayune, Nov. 13. 65Gen. orders 115. Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally varied.

23. Picayune, Oct. 6. Greensborough Morn. Post, Apr. 5, 1903. 349Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. Metrop. Mag., Dec., 1907, 316–7. Spirit of the Times, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183–6, 244. 364Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 128. 190Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123–4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 421–2 (Taylor).

One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country, where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See Monitor Repub., Oct. 20, remitido.

24. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Id., Letters (Bixby), 57, 59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins., 125–6. 65Taylor, gen. orders 119–20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 288. 76Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 142. Picayune, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. Niles, Oct. 17, p. 103. 244Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 189–91.

Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth’s old regt. and had the use of Worth’s papers, states that, after arriving at MarÍn, Taylor was “firm” in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia’s regulars at only about 3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422).

25. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. Id., Letter to Gaines. Id., Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67. Apuntes, 58. ChÁvez, July 29, 1848. 76Ampudia, Sept. 19. Monitor Repub., Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190–2.

Taylor’s 61field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster’s battery (24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely’s batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg’s batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf. (6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver’s Co., 3; 55. 1 Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2d Div. (see below), 93; 1558. Field Div. (see below), 148; 1781. Tex. Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt. (10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2d Div. (Sept. 17). Staffs, 5. 1st brig.: Duncan’s batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8 Inf., 331. 2d brig.: Mackall’s batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282; Blanchard’s Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7; 45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos. Field Div. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482; Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21), 425; 5795 = 6220.

Taylor’s formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have been classed as heavy field guns (69memo., ordnance office, June 15).

XII. MONTEREY

1. 66Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76, 83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289. 76Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58.

2. Apuntes, 59. Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and Kendall, 6. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20. J. Davis in Cong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41. Picayune, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. 221Hill, diary. Smith, To Mexico, 73–4. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M. 147Chamberlain, diary. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth).

The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to Saltillo.

3. 76Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Sept. 20. 69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28. 76Ampudia, Sept. 19, res.

4. 221Hill, diary. 277Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). 76Comte. gen. N. LeÓn, Sept. 20. Picayune, Nov. 13. 245Hays to Henderson, undated. Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Metropol. Mag., Dec, 1907 (Hamilton). Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson, Remins., Sept. 20; 185J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156; 185W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.) Republican, Nov. 25; Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282; 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —.

A part of Hays’s four hundred did not march until a little later. It seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary; Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our “artillery” served as infantry. Blanchard’s company was made up of men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was ordered home (p. 205).

Worth’s movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil. Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): “Nothing is more rash or more opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at the foot of which you must defile.” This maxim seems to fit the case precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth’s command and of the Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y. Sun also, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit (Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (210to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the natural presumption.

5. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor). Picayune, Nov. 13. Monitor Repub., Oct. 29 (JÁuregui), 31 (Berra). 245Hays to Henderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152. 218Henshaw narrative. Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130–1. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M.

6. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). Monitor Repub., Oct. 29. 76VÁzquez, Sept. 23. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 27. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 20, 9:30 p.m. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins., 131–2.

7. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). 185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. GonzÁlez, Aguascalientes, 152. 185Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 a.m.; 3:40 p.m. Picayune, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb. 17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash. Union, Nov. 20. 252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 14. Monitor Repub., Oct. 17, 31; Nov. 15. 245Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery, 309. 180C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. 277Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157–9.

McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post behind the fence, and hence fought in the road.

8. The operations on Federation Ridge. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 3:40 P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). 245Hays to Henderson, undated. 180C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. 277P. F. Smith to Id., Sept. 27. Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra). 252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201–3. Nebel and Kendall, 6–7. Hist. Mag., Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash. Union, Nov. 12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls. 278Niehenke, statement. Meade, Letters, i, 134. Picayune, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 162–6. Hill, diary.

Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth “has the great misfortune of being most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous.” U. S. Grant (Mems., i, 123) said: Worth “was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him.”

Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence. Gen. Smith’s attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility, had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence Hill and the Bishop’s Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and Blanchard (who was under Scott’s orders) were recalled from No. 3 to El Soldado the next morning to coÖperate in the attack on the Palace. According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800 feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based to a large extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give a scale of miles.

9. The capture of Independence Hill. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30 a.m., 5 p.m. French, Two Wars, 64–5. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recolls. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 38–9. Apuntes, 61–2. 190Ewing, diary. 218Henshaw narrative; 221Hill, diary. Picayune, Nov. 13. 252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135–6. Wash. Union, Nov. 20. Diario, Sept. 30. Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra). 245Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205. Nebel and Kendall, 6. 185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 183–5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the hill, but they did not arrive. Worth’s loss, Sept. 22, was only about a dozen killed and wounded.

10. Taylor’s and Ampudia’s operations, Sept. 20–3; Worth’s, Sept. 23. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76–109 (reports of Taylor and officers). Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers). 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847. 190Ewing, diary. 218Henshaw narrative. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303–7. 221Hill, diary. Numerous reports and letters in 174 and 176. Smith, Chile con Carne, 82–97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia, Manifiesto. Id. to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences, 136–50. 61Graham to Polk, April —, [1847]. 61Quitman to Hamer, Sept. 28. 69Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders 115. 69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11 p.m. 69Trowbridge to Stewart, Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64–6. 66Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. 69Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recolls. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 24, 27–35, 40–3. Roa BÁrcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60–4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary. Hist. Mag., Jan., 1874, pp. 8–9. Picayune, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134–5, 137–8, 163–5. 185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. 242Kingsbury to mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps., 23–9. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846. Hist. Mag., x, 207–13, 255–7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136–40. J. Davis: note 2. Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash. Union, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar. 2, 1847. Balt. Sun, Nov. 6. Monitor Repub., Nov. 15. Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. 245Wood to Henderson, Sept. 24. 245Hays to Id., undated. Niles, Nov. 28, p. 201. 244Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. 175Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct. 18. 175Cooper to Davis, Sept. —. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md. Vol., 77, 107–27, etc. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9, 1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193–201, 203–4, 206–12, 221. 130Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7–10. 139Campbell to Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1. 150Cheatham to son, Oct. 6; to sister, Oct. 16. 277P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190. 76Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25. 76Id. to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28. 76Head of Ampudia’s medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman. Remarks. Taylor’s lack of interest in studying the topography and fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said Garland’s charge was made in “utter ignorance” regarding it (Camp. Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools; but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers, and erecting new defences at the TenerÍa redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns, 29) undertook to defend Taylor’s operations on Sept. 21 by saying that the ardor of Garland’s men brought them into action before Mansfield’s reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually instructed to follow Mansfield’s directions and did so, and (2) Oct. 24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all that he learned later about the situation—i.e. Garland executed Taylor’s ideas and wishes (61Graham to Polk, Apr. —, [1847]). Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement of Taylor’s that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland’s command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of Garland’s proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George Gibson, who gave the writer “a high character.” It may be added, that it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it.

The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not in Garland’s charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed. There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the number of guns in TenerÍa redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement in the text seems to be safe.

The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own statement. He says (Historical Magazine, x, 255) that the distance from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117–3/4 yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to TenerÍa redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards (Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance. His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept. 21, MejÍa asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this been done the results might have been very serious.

The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind a corner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French, Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115–6); and as he belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken. It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not think it worth mention. According to Taylor’s report the reason for withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety, and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of the city (Ripley, op. cit., i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish anything.

When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey; the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker, took the Calle de ItÚrbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries, the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia’s courage. PurÍsima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral.

It is probably true that Taylor’s operations at the eastern end of the town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect that. The head of Ampudia’s medical service reported, Sept. 24, that only sixty privates had been seriously wounded.

11. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78 (Taylor). 364Worth to S., Oct. 2. GarcÍa, RevoluciÓn, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262–9. Ampudia, Manifiesto. Apuntes, 64. 13Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 50–2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms). 76Ampudia, Sept. 29. Nat. Intelligencer, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash. Union, Jan. 18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847. Niles, Nov. 28, p. 197. Epoca, Feb. 9, 1847 (Ampudia). Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement (Requena). Diario, Oct. 2 (Ampudia). Republicano, May 28, 1847.

Worth’s cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday morning. Worth’s 364reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable; (3) “Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in the intelligence that directed” the American operations; (4) Our government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for their battery.

The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to a Mexican letter from S. Luis PotosÍ dated October 3, 1846, the loss of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause. There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega, Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three 8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The armistice seems to be “in direct opposition to the rule laid down in Mr. Buchanan’s letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July” [Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded (13Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12.

12. Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106 (Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy). Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62. 364Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2 (Peyton). 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157. 13Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor’s ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer). Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 316 (Clayton).

Worth: Twiggs’s division and the volunteers “were taken into action without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered” (364to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to Monterey without more transportation (139to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell’s regiment): “I consider, that old Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open field fighting” (50to son, Oct. 6). Id.: “We were rushed headlong into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going” (150to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland’s brigade): “I look upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly useless” (Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland’s brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were “entirely inadequate to the duty required” of them; “this hazardous and useless enterprize” (Hist. Mag., x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first one general and then another till I and my men “became completely worn out” (Picayune, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being sent to Worth, should have been placed in TenerÍa redoubt; Taylor should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns, 27). Officer: Garland’s charge a fatal mistake (Balt. Sun, Nov. 6). Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at the east end were “a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of our general-in-chief” (Metrop. Mag., Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M. Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: “Harsh and unfavorable criticism” of the operations at the east end was “universal” there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due to Taylor’s misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only Ampudia’s personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins., 18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena, probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor blundered (Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry: Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost certain defeat into victory (Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 410). An editorial in Niles’ Register of July 18, 1846, is curiously interesting: “Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the enemy” Taylor “made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation” in May. “One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a sufficient admonition to” Taylor.... “He will be cautious to keep his troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of transportation.” The editor proved to be mistaken in every point.

One of Taylor’s excuses for the terms was consideration for the non-combatants (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (ibid.) was the propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life; but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 46).

The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said Taylor (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200 besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)—the only army possessed by Mexico—with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such had been the outcome (52Black, Sept. 26; 76S. Anna, Sept. 29) tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, “done what we might,” Taylor urged (cf. Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison were in the strong buildings near the main plaza, he could certainly have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in the day might have suggested a design to do this.) But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should—on a political ground—be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General said that a change of rÉgime had occurred at Mexico since the date of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a political change in the enemy’s country—of which nothing definite was heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges—could authorize a general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his “grand motive” in advancing from the Rio Grande was “to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to negotiate for peace”—i.e. by showing that otherwise it would suffer the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and indulgently would have the desired effect?

Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition, could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously. Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott’s letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328) that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)—i.e. not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent to negotiate (256to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie’s negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover, he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat with (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition and provisions (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal sufferers.

All the arguments put forth in Taylor’s despatches to the government were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army, which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss, to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without letting the truth be known.

A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor’s course in this matter was not due to an expectation that Wool’s column (chap. xiii) would render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed “no element” in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact, since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately—and one can easily believe him—that only Taylor’s popularity saved him from removal at this time (169to Crittenden, Oct. 19).

When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were sufficient for “not more” than ten days; but Worth had written privately on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that the army had provisions then for only about ten days (364to S.). According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston Atlas (Feb. 8, 1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely have arrived in time (Littell’s Living Age, no. 141, p. 191). Col. Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded, rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this purpose (73Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning of Sept. 21 Taylor’s supply of ammunition was very limited and the supply of provisions still more so (139to D. C, Nov. 2).

The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later 487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut. Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted in Niles, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was “generally supposed” at Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7). Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, who was on the ground, wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans) were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in Niles, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same figures. A Tennessee captain reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S. Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was “perhaps many more” than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth’s loss seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was “almost destroyed” (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24; 31, 1).

Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably quite 400. The guard at the camp—one company from each infantry regiment—probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other special services. If we call Taylor’s loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650 tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault.

The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to signify.

13. 147Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106 (Worth). 169Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. Delta, Feb. 14, 1847. 169Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117–8. Welles papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane, Adventures, 42. Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War, 268–9. 76Ampudia, Sept. 28.

As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States criticised Taylor sharply.

XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO

1. Probably he did not include Wool’s troops. A Mexican reported that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600 regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600 volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and Mounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana, 600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400 or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa, Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239). The returns showed only 13,000, he said.

2. It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests) Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing Taylor’s Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (76Sinnott, Oct. 12; 76Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5; 76to Hacienda, Dec. 2; 76S. Anna, Jan. 1, 1847).

3. 61July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813. He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia.

4. Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should be compelled “to keep in their proper places.” Due retribution soon followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson’s officers, upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381, 384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines, defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was published in the N. Y. Herald, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the writer presented information and opinions about the American military operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United States—a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1, 1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he regarded him as “a vindictive and ignorant political partisan.” See Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809); 108Marcy to Bancroft, April 28; 256Id. to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj. gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25–7; Phila. Pub. Ledger, Jan. 26–7; Ho. 37; 30, 1.

5. A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners.

6. Preliminary incidents. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341, 344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472–3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270 (Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350–1, 358, 361, 381, 424, 437–40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson). 69Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145–6, 152. Morning News, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240. 307Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. 69Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2. 69Riley to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846. Niles, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290. 65Patterson, orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29. 169Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash. Union, Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19–22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20; Nov. 21. 69Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8. 234A. Johnson to —–, Dec. 2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273–4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48. 205Graham, mem. book. Diario, Nov. 14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178. 65Id., gen. orders, no. 139, Nov. 8. 69GonzÁlez, Sept. —. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 346, 354, 356. Also the following from 76: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3. Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec. 12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. OrdÓÑez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov. 20, Worth to OrdÓÑez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J. F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii, note 4.

7. Lieut. Mackall’s battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith.

8. The maguey (agave Americana) is the century plant, and produces the liquid known as pulque which, after it ferments, is about as intoxicating as beer, and is consumed liberally by the common people of Mexico. The stiff, thick, wide-spreading leaves are protected with thorns.

9. The governor expected a reply, and on finding that none was to be made he retired to Parras.

10. The occupation of Saltillo. 65Gen. orders 139. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 361, 374, 377, 436, 543, 545 (Taylor); 362–3 (Marcy); 378 (Aguirre). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. 364Worth to S., Nov. 20. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71. 267Memo. (probably from Major Smith). Meade, Letters, i, 144, 152, 155, 157–8. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 295–9. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 24. Apuntes, 65. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 59. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. 69Worth to Arnold and Deas, Nov. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 175, 192, 195. Henry, Campaign Sketches, 245. Smith, To Mexico, 77. Eyewitness, Complete History, 48. 299Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. The following are from 76. S. Anna to Ampudia, Sept. 30. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct. 3; Nov. 21. GonzÁlez, Nov. 19. Id. to R. VÁzquez, Saltillo, Nov. 16; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; to MejÍa, May 27. MejÍa, June 9. Id. to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 17. Memo., dated Nov. 22, of a conference with Taylor. Wool’s advance may have helped to cause Ampudia’s abandonment of Rinconada Pass. The distance from Monterey to Saltillo by the railroad is about 68 miles, and that by road must be about the same. (Marcy, Oct. 22) see p. 350.

11. The celebrated military writer, Clausewitz, on whose work our present views of strategy are principally founded, recognized two distinct kinds of war: that aiming to overthrow the enemy’s forces, and that aiming to make conquests on the frontier, either to be held permanently or to be used in exchanges on the settlement of peace (Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nachricht, par. 1; Donat, Strat. Science, 112). Polk aimed to accomplish both ends by having the main army bring Mexico to terms, and at the same time taking possession of territory; but he did not apply the principle understandingly. He overrated the influence that the occupation of the northern provinces would have on the Mexican government; he thought peace was near at hand, and was figuring on the terms of a treaty when he should have been taking steps to bring Mexico speedily to the point of making a treaty; and he ordered this expedition without knowing the conditions under which it would have to be conducted in Mexico, and without asking proper expert advice. The occupation of the frontier provinces would have been sagacious had it been part of a strong coercive military policy. Quotation at the end of the second paragraph: Meade, Letters, i, 152.

12. La Vaca, now Port Lavaca, is on Matagorda Bay.

13. In view of the Mexican charge that the Americans incited the Indians to ravage the southern side of the border, it should be mentioned that not only Taylor, but Wool, exerted himself to prevent such raids (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 425).

14. Harney committed a further impropriety by raising a company of Indians for the U. S. service. It was not our policy to employ Indian troops.

15. The author’s description of Wool is based largely on the 147diary and 148recollections of Gen. S. E. Chamberlain, who served as his orderly for a time in the Mexican War; also on 257Hughes to Markoe, Dec. 13, 1847; Niles, May 8, 1847, p. 156; 61Horton, Dec. 3; Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes); 371Mitchell, statement; 316Bragg to Sherman, March 1, 1848. Wool was a spare man of medium height, light complexion and brown hair. His manner was reserved and gentlemanly.

16. Buhoup says this section set out with 1244 effectives. Wool soon joined it with 144 men. At the Rio Grande, Oct. 12, eight companies (aggregate, 574) of the First Illinois came up. The second section (not over 1200) did not leave San Antonio until Oct. 14, and some of the men were detained there still longer. The whole force consisted of Washington’s six-gun battery, to which were attached two small guns taken by the Texans from the Mexicans years before and destined to be lost at Buena Vista and recovered at Contreras; a squadron of the First Dragoons, a squadron of the Second Dragoons, a regiment of Arkansas horse, three companies of the Sixth Infantry, one company of Kentucky foot and the First and Second Illinois regiments. The aggregate was given by Capt. Hughes of the Topog. Engineers as 3400, of whom about 600 were regulars. Wool’s route to Monclova was in general that of the So. Pacific and Mexican International railroads.

17. Shields, Irish by birth, practised law in Illinois, became a judge of the state supreme court and was then appointed commissioner of the General Land Office, Washington. He became discontented under Wool’s command, and sent Davis, his aide, to Washington in the hope of obtaining command of the Illinois regiments or possibly of displacing Wool.

18. Frequently not all of the troops arrived at a place on the same date.

19. Possibly news of the restoration of the constitution had reached Monclova but not Santa Rosa.

20. The authorities of Monclova stated that Wool kept every pledge, and they complained only that the Americans ate up provisions needed for the people. The officers who criticised Wool most appear to have been Shields, who—besides being notably egotistical (Ill. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, pp. 36–8)—had been appointed by Polk on a confidential basis (Davis, Autobiog., 96) and therefore felt entitled to be ambitious; Harney, whose characteristics have been explained; Bonneville, who proved himself later incompetent or worse; and Yell, whose men were soon to disgrace themselves at Buena Vista in consequence of lacking discipline. Nov. 10 Taylor issued orders detaching Shields and Harney from Wool’s command (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 542). This change doubtless tended to promote harmony. In December Harney brought charges against Wool, asserting that his “extreme imbecility and manifest incapacity” ruined the expedition. The judge advocate general advised that the charges should be ignored (61Horton, Dec. 3).

21. Just after leaving Parras Wool learned that 2700 Mexicans with four guns had moved from Zacatecas against him. One fault of the expedition was that it could neither support nor be supported by Taylor’s army (see Halleck, Mil. Art, 410 and chap. xi, note 5, of this history). One asks why Ampudia was not ordered to attack Wool. With Blanco’s irregulars he would have been formidable. The explanation probably is that Santa Anna wished to build up at S. L. PotosÍ as large an army as possible under his own command. Besides, he expected Wool to turn west.

22. Wool received on Nov. 14 Taylor’s instructions to give up the expedition, and on Nov. 26 his instructions to go to Parras and await orders (61Wool, Jan. 17, 1847). He moved, however, in anticipation of the latter instructions (61Wool, Dec. 7). Nov. 16 he reported that he expected three mounted and two infantry companies as escorts to the last wagons, and after their arrival would have about 2750 in all. 60Marcy to Taylor, May 6, 1847: It is not important to hold Chihuahua, for you are in advance of it. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 337), probably to have a fling at Wool, says Wool “only” wished to give up the expedition in order to go toward Durango and Zacatecas in pursuit of glory; but the document he cites does not so state, and Taylor wrote that Wool proposed to join him (Bixby coll., 71).

23. In chap. xix.

24. July 2 Taylor had expressed the opinion that the expedition might prove very important (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329), but suggested that only mounted men should be employed.

25. Marcy said that the expedition prevented a considerable part of Mexico from sharing in the campaign against Scott, and to some extent this was doubtless true.

26. Wool’s expedition. Polk, Diary, May 14, 16; Oct. 20. 164Conner to Bancroft, May 31. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, Aug. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 152. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 363 (Marcy); 325 (Scott); 458 (Freeman); 328, 454, 466 (Jones); 424, 426 (Wool); 428 (Thomas); 305, 329, 351, 361, 374, 377, 400, 409, 418, 424, 433 (Taylor); 410 (Bliss); 567 (Jesup). 254Mansfield, report, Apr. 19. 61Wool, July 28; Aug. 5, 15; Sept. 2, 15, 28; Oct. 15, 19; Nov. 4; Dec. 16. 256Wool, July 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 545. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes and others). 65Adj. gen., gen. orders 19. Wash. Union, Oct. 19; Nov. 20, 21, 28, 1846 Feb. 8; Mar. 23, 1847. 61Maynadier, Aug. 25. 61Horton, June 23; Aug. 8; Oct. 20; Dec. 3. 69Harney, Aug. 12. Reavis, Harney, 155. Sen. 178; 29, 2. Diario, Sept. 11. 68P. F. Smith, Oct. 2. 245Duvall to Lamar, June 27. Buhoup, Narrative. Davis, Autobiog., 105–19. 61Shields, Aug. 28. Niles, Oct. 24, p. 118; Dec. 26, p. 263; May 8, 1847, p. 156. 61Kingsbury to Wool, Oct. 13. Sen. 64; 31, 1. National Intelligencer, Nov. 3, 21. Carleton, Buena Vista, 161–76. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 76. 65Wool, orders 89, 117, 121, 126, 143, 144, 148, 155. 61Wool to Taylor, Jan. 17, 1847. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. 180McDowell to Newton, Sept. 16, 1846. 132Butler, Dec. 10. Wool in Ceremonies. Bishop, Journal. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71. 63Marcy to Kearny, Dec. 10. Picayune, Mar. 4, 6, 17, 1847. 69Wood to Taylor, Dec. 7. 66Lee to Totten, Dec. 5. Donnavan, Adventures, 41. Wallace, Wallace, 21–9. 69Wool to Taylor, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 20, 1847 Baylies, Wool’s Camp. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 301. 82S. Anna to comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 6. Neville, diary. The following are from 76: Gov. Coahuila, Sept. 7, Oct. 8. Gefe Partido del Rio Grande, Aug. 28; Oct. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to comte. gen. Durango, Oct. 14; to S. Anna, Oct. 21. Gefe polÍtico, Monclova, to Wool, Oct. 24; reply, Oct. 26. Comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 11. Heredia to comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 10. Gov. Coahuila to Id., Nov. 30. R. VÁzquez to S. Anna, Oct. 1. CastaÑeda to VÁzquez, Sept. 24. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Nov. 4; Dec. 19, 24. Wool to Arziniega et al., Oct. 9. Aldrete to MejÍa, Aug. 30. Ugarte, Sept. 26. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 31. Lobo to R. VÁzquez, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Gov. Coahuila to Id., Nov. 30. Comte. gen. Coahuila, Sept. 7. Gefe polÍtico, Parras, to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 25. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 208) places Polk in a rather absurd position with reference to the expedition. He misunderstands a statement in Polk’s Diary, May 28, 1846. The orders to Wool there mentioned had prime reference to getting volunteers in motion to Taylor (Military Historian and Economist, ii, 32 and note on p. 33).

27. The idea that the occupation of Tampico would mask and aid the expedition against Vera Cruz came forward a little later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 949).

28. This is inferred from the fact that Marcy’s letter, which was published in the Diario of Oct. 6, would naturally have met Santa Anna about Oct. 3, and from the character of Santa Anna’s letter of that date.

29. None of these statements should be taken too literally. The various accounts, which come mainly from Parrodi and Santa Anna, differ considerably though not essentially, and both men had reasons for exaggerating the weakness of Tampico.

30. Parrodi and the court that tried him declared that he threw away nothing of value. But many did not believe this, and it is hard to see why he should have taken the trouble, when in such haste, to transport a large quantity of material to the river, if it was worthless. The government naturally wished the evacuation to appear inexpensive.

31. This sentence is inferential. Writing to his wife, Nov. 17, 162Conner stated that he was much surprised to find the city evacuated, and that, had the garrison been there, he would have had hard work. Why Mrs. Chase did not give notice of the evacuation cannot be explained. No doubt there was a high state of popular excitement and, as she had been suspected of playing the spy, the people perhaps cut her off more effectually than the military men had done. Later she presented a claim to Congress, and it was supported by letters from some of Conner’s officers but by none from himself. This fact may be a hint that he was not pleased with her course. It seems to have been from her that Parrodi heard the imaginary tale of Conner’s heavy landing force, which probably counted for a great deal in bringing about the evacuation. Chase had sent a sketch of Tampico to Conner in June, and later his wife forwarded a plan with a description of the forts, the number of guns, etc. We do not know, however, that Conner received these papers. Taylor belittled the capture of Tampico, saying that Santa Anna’s order to evacuate the town had been printed in the Mexican papers, and that Conner must have been aware of the fact; but Conner was on a ship at some distance from any town, and his letter of Nov. 17 shows that he was not aware of it. The names of the captured gunboats were Nonata, Bonita and Reefer.

32. Signed by Tattnall and Ingraham; approved by Conner; accepted by the deputation of the ayuntamiento. The Americans felt that formal terms would bind them yet could be repudiated by the Mexican government.

33. Two merchant vessels also were captured.

34. According to Apuntes, pp. 82–6, Dr. Francisco Marchante of the Mexican medical service, who had charge of other public property, was not far away, but the Mexicans persuaded Tattnall that he could not be overtaken. On Tattnall’s return to the port, however, a Mexican declared this could not have been true, and hence a second expedition set out in all haste. It was unavoidably delayed; and finally, as the Americans learned that a Mexican force had been sent forward to protect Marchante, the chase was abandoned. A large amount of ammunition was thrown into the river at PÁnuco by Marchante. The total loss of material was thus of considerable moment. Some of the ammunition was saved by sending it to TuxpÁn.

35. Gates had two companies of his own (Third Artillery). The other five were Belton’s. A steamer carrying ordnance and ordnance stores was lost.

36. Perry flew the pennant of a vice commodore (Conner, Home Squadron, 12).

37. Brooke had at first intended to send also four companies of Mounted Rifles; and Taylor, on hearing of this, protested sharply to the government that “a large and efficient force of cavalry,” on which he counted, had been diverted to a place where they were not needed (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 382, 388), overlooking the fact that this corps had no horses (orders no. 149: ibid., 512). Now that Tampico had been captured by the navy, Taylor said it was of no consequence (Letters (Bixby), 78). These points are mentioned to show his state of mind, which will need to be understood when we come to Scott’s operations. The Alabama regiment was ordered to Tampico by Patterson (Bliss: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 383).

38. Occupation of Tampico. Eco, June 9; Sept. 12; Oct. 29; Nov. 18, 19, 25. 303Juanito del Bosque, Jan. 6, 1847. Apuntes, 78–86. 61Gates to Barnard, May 4, 1849. 69Prout to Patterson, Oct. 28. 164Chase to Conner, June 4. Parrodi, Memoria (including letters to and from S. Anna and others). Ampudia, To Fellow-citizens, July 10. Commerc. Review, 1846, p. 165. 47Conner, Oct. 7; Nov. 5, 21; Dec. 1. Polk, Diary, Sept. 19–22. 297Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 480–1 (Jones); 339, 341 (Marcy); 378–9, 387 (Taylor); 252 (Mason); 270 (Conner); 271 (Tattnall and Ingraham); 271 (Cervantes et al.). 162Morris to Conner, Sept. 21. 162Tattnall to Conner, Nov. 20. Parker, Recolls., 68. Conner, Home Squad, 11 (Conner), 12. 48Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 29. 48Mason to Id., Sept. 22. BalbontÍn, Estado, 52. Diario, Sept. 22; Oct. 6; Nov. 28. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 29–31. 99S. Anna to Tampico ayunt., Oct. 27. 245Bee to Lamar, Dec. 5. 99Parrodi to Tamp. ayunt., Oct. 26. 99Urrea to Id., Oct. 29. 99Gov. Tamaul. to Id., Oct. 25. 99Gov. Tamaul., circular, Nov. 17. VindicaciÓn del Gen. Parrodi. 69Worth to Bliss, Dec. 4. Steele, Amer. Camps., 125. 226Beauregard to Totten, Nov. 27. 69Chase, Dec. 3, 1845. 313Id. to Saunders, May 26, 31. Public Ledger, Jan. 7, 1847 (Mrs. Chase). 52Mrs. Chase to Conner, Oct. 20. 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., i, 267. 69Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. 60Id. to Barnard, Apr. 20, 1849. Meade, Letters, i, 159–60. 46Perry to Mason, Nov. 15, 19. 46Declaration, Nov. 15. N. Y. Eve. Post, Nov. 18, 1847. 165Conner letter book, Nov. 13-Dec. 4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 77–8. Negrete, InvasiÓn, iii, 170–3. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 54. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1171, 1173 (Conner); 1174–5 (Tattnall). Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 381. 69Perry, memo., [Nov. 16]. 61Gardner, Dec. 2. 61Gates, Nov. 20. 61Brooke, Nov. 21. 69Gates, Nov. 26. 163Perry to Mason, Nov. 16. 61Patterson to Marcy, Nov. 23. 162Tattnall to alcalde, Nov. 19. Bennett, Steam Navy, 93. Monitor Repub., Dec. 2. 166Patterson to Perry, Nov. 22. 166Perry to Conner [about Nov. 30]. 166Tattnall to Id., Nov. 22. 313Saunders to Taylor, June 5. 61Jones to Scott, Nov. 28, 30; to Patterson, Nov. 29; to Taylor, Nov. 30. 313Letters from Conner to Saunders, Nov. 61Gardner to Taylor, Nov. 17. Smith, Remins., 28. 61Shields, Dec. 23. EspÍa de la Frontera, no. 7. 76Gov. Tamaul., address, Nov. 27. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846 (circular, Nov. 21). Picayune, Jan. 2, 1847. 112Barnard, Dec. 20, notes on the fortifications. 112Id. to Gates, Dec. 11; to Shields, Dec. 28. 112Beauregard to Totten, Feb. 2, 1847; to Gates, Feb. 24. 61Gates to Barnard, May 4, 1849. 66Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 1847. The following are from 76. Parrodi, Oct. 17. S. Anna to Urrea, Oct. 18. Prefect Huejutla, Nov. 23, 30. MÚÑoz, Nov. 21, 23, 26; Dec. 1. Order, April 24. Gov. Guanajuato, Nov. 27. Gov. MichoacÁn, Nov. 26. MÚÑoz to Gov. Tamaul., Nov. 14. Tampico ayunt. to Conner, Nov. 14. Parrodi, proclam., June 9. To Parrodi, June 3; Aug. 28. Circular, Nov. 21. To Bravo, May 14. Bravo, May 18. MejÍa, June 9. To comte. gen. QuerÉtaro, Nov. 21. Parrodi, May 20; June 17; July 8; Sept. 2, 5. MÚÑoz to Parrodi, Nov. 14. S. Anna to Parrodi, Oct. 12. To S. Anna, Oct. 15; Nov. 8. Ampudia, Sept. 29. S. Anna, Oct. 3, 10, 12; Nov. 4, 12, 21. Affidavit of M. Dorante, Dec. 23. Comte. Nat. Gd., Tampico, to Urrea, Nov. 4. To Ampudia, Aug. 28. When Perry reached Brazos Id. the weather was so bad that he could only leave an officer on an anchored vessel.

39. An estimate of Taylor’s strength on Dec. 9 was 14,000 for the entire field (Picayune, Dec. 27). One of Wool’s companies was still at San Antonio, one on the Rio Grande, and four at Monclova on Dec. 16, he stated; several were left behind when he marched from Parras, and he probably had 200 sick. Dec. 24 he reported about 2000 effectives as with him. At Camargo and doubtless elsewhere in that region there was considerable sickness. See a letter (probably from P. F. Smith) in Littell, no. 141, p. 191. One may doubt whether Taylor had a fighting force of over 12,000 at this time. The lines are reckoned as from Point Isabel or the mouth of the Rio Grande to Camargo, Saltillo and Parras, and from Monterey to Tampico. They were soon longer, because Taylor advanced beyond Saltillo. His advance to Victoria began Dec. 13 (chap. xviii, p. 357).

40. Opinions as to the number of men under Santa Anna at this time differed. Taylor’s report on Dec. 4 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 441) was 20,000 infantry and a large cavalry force; Meade, Nov. 24, 35,000; Meade, Dec. 8, 30,000. 69Wool wrote on Dec. 24 that according to spies sent out from Parras Santa Anna had 12,000 at San Luis PotosÍ, 30,000 at some distance from there, and 9000 on their way from Guadalajara. 69Butler wrote from Saltillo on Dec. 20 that Santa Anna appeared to have 35,000 at S. L. P. and 9000 at Tula.

41. Taylor’s military policy. Taylor, Letter to Gaines, Nov. 5 (and in Picayune, Feb. 2, 1847). 169Id. to Crittenden, Oct. 9. 370Id. to Davis, April 18, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 351–4, 377, 379–82, 441, 514–5 (Taylor); 389–91 (Marcy). 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 24; Mar. 29, 1847. Scribner, Campaign, 55. Meade, Letters, i, 152, 168–9. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5, 1847. 61Wool, Dec. 16. 69Id. to Taylor, Dec. 24. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71–2. 330Id. to brother, Dec. 12. 256Scott to Marcy, Dec. 27, priv. Morning News, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. 267Memo. (probably from Maj. Smith). P. F. Smith, Memoir, Oct. 15.

There was also the difficulty of supervising lines so extended. At this very time Taylor was afraid things were going badly in his rear (330to brother, Dec. 12). It is particularly hard to find any good reason for posting a (necessarily large) force at Victoria, so very far from support. The pass between that point and Tula was not practicable for artillery, and was not the only pass by which infantry and cavalry could cross the mountains. Taylor (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 380) argued that from Victoria he could threaten the Mexican flank, should Santa Anna advance. But he would have had to force the pass, and without artillery he could not have accomplished much. In case of Santa Anna’s advancing and succeeding, this flanking force would have been in great peril, while in case of his failing it would have been useless. Anyhow it would have been more useful with the main army. Not only were the Americans scattered at posts, but they moved about in parties of only 200 or 300 with a carelessness that astounded the Mexicans (Camargo letter: N. Y. Journal of Commerce, Jan. 8, 1847). Taylor could not safely count upon coÖperation between Wool and Worth in the case of an advance of the Mexicans, for it was likely that Santa Anna’s first care would be to block the road, as probably he could have done.

XIV. SANTA FE

1. Independence is ten miles east of Kansas City and about thirty-five from Fort Leavenworth.

2. Conditions in New Mexico; Armijo. 13Bankhead, no. 148, 1846. St. Louis Weekly Reveille, May 23. St. Louis Republican, Aug. 25. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). 60Leitensdorfer, June 7. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1 (Wislizenus). Inman, Old S. Fe Trail, 27–54, 67–92. 75Armijo, Jan. 12. 75Hacienda to Relaciones, Mar. 16. Monitor Repub., Apr. 15. Memoria de ... Guerra, March, 1845. Picayune, March 18. DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 10. Niles, Sept. 26, p. 52. 52Alvarez, Feb. 2, 1842; Sept. 4, 1846. 52Jones, Sept. 20, 1837. 13Ashburnham, no. 50, 1837. Sen. 90; 22, 1, pp. 30–41. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Pacheco, ExposiciÓn. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 110, 185–6. Cooke, Conquest, 60. Kendall, Narrative, i, 295, 314–5, 346–60. Amigo del Pueblo, Aug. 19, 1845. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 403. Wash. Globe, Sept. 2, 1845. N. Orl. Courier, July 5, 1845. Houston Telegraph, Jan. 24, 1844. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 63, res., 1843. 77Almonte, no. 4, 1844. Amer. Antiquarian Soc. Proceeds., new series, viii, 324–41. And the following from 76. Assembly of N. MÉx., Feb., 1846 (petition for comte. gen.). Re-extracto on N. MÉx. (Sambrano). Ayunt., Hermosillo, Son., proclam. Comte. gen. N. MÉx., May 17, 1845. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. To Hacienda, Mar. 6. Trial of Magoffin (testimony). A merchant’s estimate of Santa Fe caravan business for 1846 was that the first cost of the goods amounted to $937,500 (Captain of Vols., Conquest, 11).

3. The text includes two companies of dragoons that joined Kearny on the march. On account of the scarcity of grass at Santa Fe and because he considered infantry the chief reliance, Kearny did not wish so large a proportion of mounted men. Fischer’s company enlisted to serve as horse. The artillery had twelve brass 6-pounders and four 12-pound howitzers. Kearny’s army, being near states abounding in resources, was more readily set in motion than Taylor’s or Wool’s, but on account of its long march 459 horses, 3658 mules, 14,904 oxen, 1556 wagons, and 516 pack mules were required to transport it, its reinforcements, and its supplies. (This account is not complete, but on the other hand it refers not only to Kearny’s expedition but to troops that followed him. Rives’s account in U.S. and Mexico, ii, 214–5, is therefore misleading, and makes the short rations endured on the march seem incredible.) The Indians drove off many of the cattle, robbed trains and killed not a few drivers (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545).

4. S. Fe expedition ordered and organized. S. Louis Weekly Reveille, May 11, 23. Polk, Diary, May 13, 14, 16, 30. 69Jones to Kearny, May 13. 63Marcy to Kearny, May 27. 240Kennerly, Narrative. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). 69Kearny, orders, June 19; July 31. Richardson, Journal, 3–6. 61Kearny to gov. Mo., June 16; to Cummins, June 20. 60Marcy to gov. Mo., May 13. Wash. Union, Sept. 24. Nat. Intelligencer, Oct. 2. Monitor Repub., Mar. 27, 1847. Scharf, St. Louis, i, 369, 372–3. St. Louis Republican, May 13, 22, 30; June 26. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545. Niles, July 4, 1846, p. 281; July 3, 1847, p. 279. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 326. Elliott, Notes, 217, 221. Ruxton, Adventures (1849), 312–3. St. Louis New Era, Aug. 20. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. 212Hastings, diary. 256Penn, Jr., [May 23]. Bancroft, Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Hughes, Doniphan’s Expedition, 24–7. Cooke, Conquest, 2.

5. The route taken by Kearny was not the shortest but it seemed the best for his purpose (Cooke, Conquest, 13). Distances from Fort Leavenworth: to Council Grove, 126 miles; to the Arkansas River, 393; to Bent’s Fort, 564; to S. Fe, 873 (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 236).

6. To and at Bent’s Fort. Mexico in 1842, 128. Sen. 7; 30, 1. 63Marcy to Howard, May 13, 1846. Ho. 41; 30, 1. 61Kearny, June 5; Aug. 1. 61Kearny, orders, June 27; July 31. 61Capt. Johnston, diary. 201Gibson, diary. Prince, Concise Hist., 164–74, 178. Niles, Aug. 1, 1846, p. 343. Cooke, Conquest, 3–4. Elliott, Notes, 222–3. 58Cooke, Map of S. Fe Trace. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Ho. 45; 31, 1. Sen. 23; 30, 1. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Richardson, Journal. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 5–13. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 179–81. 212Hastings, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 151, 168. Ruxton, Far West, 189. 69Kearny, July 17. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 30–59. 76Kearny to Armijo, Aug. 1. 76Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846. Bent’s Fort lay about fifteen miles above the mouth of Las Animas River (Cooke, Conquest, 12).

7. Armijo’s motives and preparations. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Gibson, diary, Sept. 5. Republicano, Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847 (Armijo). Twitchell, Milit. Occup., 60. Read, Guerra, 219. Prince, Concise Hist., 179. 52Alvarez, Sept. 4, 1846. From 76 the following. M. E. to F. Pino. N. to F. Pino. J. F. to J. E. Ortiz. J. F. Ortiz to P. Armendaris. M. RamÍrez to SeÑora Casanoba. N. Quintanar to L. TÉllez. D. Vigil to J. F. Zubia. Decision of the mesa. Testimony given at the trial of Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8, 1846. Summary of four packets of letters, and conclusion of the mesa. Armijo, Sept. 8, 1846; Jan. 20; Mar. 30, 1847. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. Id. to Ugarte, Mar. 10; June 25; July 25. Segundo cabo, Chihuahua, July 10. Armijo to Ugarte, July 1. To Armijo, July 25. Comte. gen. Durango, July 16. Ugarte, July 17; Aug. 23. Letter from El Paso, Aug. 9.

8. The regiment under Price numbered at first about 1000, and the battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. Willock, about 300. In July a third force (infantry) was ordered to take the same route but it was found unnecessary, and the plans were given up (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 162).

The second (Price’s; Mormons) and third (abortive) expeditions. Polk, Diary, May 30; June 2, 3, 5; July 18, 1846; Apr. 28, 1847. 62Marcy to gov. Mo., May 11, 1847. 62Jones to Price, May 18, 22, 1847. 63Marcy to gov. Mo., Apr. 28; May 6, 11, 1847. 69Jones to Scott, Apr. 20, 1847. 61Doniphan to Marcy, Oct. 20, 1846. 61Shields, Aug. 9, 1846. 62Marcy to gov. Mo., July 18, 1846. Wash. Union, Sept. 24, 1846. Scharf, St. Louis, i, 375–6. Niles, July 18, 1846, p. 312. 2Allred, recolls. Sen. 439; 29, 1, p. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 49. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 171. Bancroft, Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Cooke, Conquest, 2. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 134, 137–8.

9. Kearny’s letter to Armijo, found in the Mexican archives, is stated to have been translated by the American consul from a certified copy of the original. A little later an American trader, who had married a Santa Fe woman, was despatched to distribute the proclamation and sound the people at Taos. A scouting party under Bent went forward to examine the route.

10. Kearny was criticised for undertaking to release the people from their allegiance to Mexico; but since, as our Supreme Court decided in the Castine case, the inhabitants of conquered territories pass under at least a temporary allegiance to the conquering power, they must necessarily be absolved from their former obligations. See Washington Union, August 21, 1847.

11. Kearny returned a conciliatory message by the bearer of Armijo’s letter. See note 13.

12. Estimates of the number of the people in arms vary from about 1800 (76Armijo) to 4–5000 (Cooke). Armijo’s reports minified all his means of defence. Apparently there were about 3000. So Magoffin stated on his 76trial, and this was the conclusion of the war department at Mexico. Probably Armijo felt surprised and embarrassed by the response of the people.

13. It was charged by Mexicans that Armijo was bought by American agents. But Kearny had no money to use in this way, and in the absence of substantial evidence there seems to be no good ground to suppose that the merchants had a sufficient reason for buying him. Armijo sent Dr. Henry Connelly back with Cooke to treat in his behalf with Kearny (Cooke, Conquest, 31, 33), but nothing seems to have been accomplished. Kearny probably desired (76Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19) that Armijo should surrender with his troops, and presumably Armijo asked for impossible concessions. Magoffin went on to Chihuahua, was arrested, tried, and imprisoned until the end of the war, and later was paid $30,000 by the U.S. government for his services and losses (Benton, View, ii, 683). There is little reason to suppose that his services were of much value.

14. The Mexican archives contain many letters from New Mexico bearing upon Armijo’s conduct and motives. Most of the writers called him a traitor; and a war department board (mesa), after reviewing the evidence, decided that he ought to be tried. But of course this was the opportunity for his enemies to turn upon him. The popular party naturally insisted that the people wanted to fight, and were betrayed by him. But he denied this, demanding why, in that case, they did not select some other chief, and hold their ground. Armijo hovered about for a time, pretending to coÖperate with Ugarte; but, not being permitted to remain in Chihuahua, he went south with a train of wagons filled with American merchandise and guarded by Missourians, and finally, making his way to the capital under an order to come and answer for his conduct, he repeatedly demanded to be put on trial.

15. The population of Santa Fe was about 3000.

16. Events from Aug. 1 to 18 inclusive. Mexico in 1842, p. 128. Sen. 7; 30, 1. Polk, Diary, June 15, 17, 1846. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 17–20. Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 237. 61Kearny, Aug. 1. 61Capt. Johnston, diary. 62Marcy to Kearny, June 18. 201Gibson, diary. Republicano, Sept. 10, 1846; Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 104. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 181, 184. Anzeiger des Westens, Aug. 6; Sept. 5, 7, 24, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 168–70. Wash. Union, Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 27, 1846; July 12, 1847. Diario, Sept. 9, 10; Oct. 5. Read, Guerra, 220. Prince, Concise Hist., 179–80. Niles, Oct. 10, pp. 90–2. Robinson, Sketches, 20–1. Elliott, Notes, 225, 231, 234–5, 237, 241. 52Alvarez, Sept. 4. Sen. 23; 30, 1. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 110. Benton, View, ii, 683. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. 212Hastings, diary. 268Kearny, letter book. 337Capt. Turner, diary. Cutts, Conquest, 44. Cooke, Conquest, 5–43. Richardson, Journal. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 59–87. From 76 the following. Letters from N. Mex. (undated letters in note 7). Testimony at trial of Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8. Summary of four packets of letters and conclusion of the mesa. Armijo, Sept. 8. Armijo to Kearny, Aug. 12. Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19. Armijo, Jan. 20; Mar. 30, 1847. Re-extracto from statement of Sambrano. Reyes, Aug. 25, 1846. Ugarte, Aug. 23; Sept. 5. Kearny to Armijo, Aug. 1. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., Chih., and N. Mex.

17. Events from Aug. 19 to Sept. 25 inclusive. 61Wooster, Sept. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169–74 (Kearny). Sen. 7; 30, 1. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 55, etc. 61Kearny, Aug. 30; Sept. 24. 69Kearny, orders, Aug. 27; Sept. 12. 201Gibson, diary. Anzeiger des Westens, Sept. 26; Nov. 16. 243Kribben, home letter, Aug. 28. Wash. Union, Oct. 27. Prince, Concise Hist., 180, 182. Niles, Oct. 10, p. 90. Hastings, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169–70. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 100–19. 76Vigil, reply to Kearny, Aug. 19. 76Letter from El Paso, Aug. 9. 76Heredia, Oct. 17. Some of the force did not set out until Sept. 26 (Cooke, Conquest, 71).

XV. CHIHUAHUA

1. Willock’s battalion was under Price’s command. The Mormons were intended for California. Kearny’s order to Doniphan anticipated a suggestion made independently by Scott and by Benton in November, and forwarded, with Polk’s approval, to Kearny on December 10 by Marcy. Doniphan was anxious to be ordered to Wool, and his men, reacting from the atrocious conditions prevailing at Santa Fe—of which quite enough will be heard in chapter xxxi—were eager to be off.

2. Arriving at Santa Fe without provisions, the soldiers soon ate up what supplies could be obtained there, and as the people were declared to be American citizens, nothing could be taken without the consent of the owners. Besides, Kearny had no adequate funds. By a surprising blunder the contracts for the supplies that followed him called for delivery, not at Santa Fe, but at Bent’s Fort. Doniphan’s setting out for the south was delayed by a lack of provisions. The description of his men is based upon a large number of documents (particularly the diaries of Gibson and Hastings and Ruxton’s Adventures) which will be cited when the occupation of New Mexico comes to be considered (chap. xxxi).

3. Ruxton speaks of tents, but perhaps he was thinking of Clark’s men. Doniphan stated that they marched across the Jornada without tents (St. Louis Republican, July 3, 1847).

4. December 19 Heredia reported to Santa Anna that there were 108 infantry and 320 cavalry at El Paso. There is no reason to suspect the honesty of this report, and none of the other troops in the state had time to reach that town before Christmas. Some ex-soldiers, however, are said in Apuntes, 141, to have joined the colors, making some 1200 in all, including militia.

5. It is impossible to state positively how many men Ponce de LeÓn had. The American accounts run as high as 1300 (Hughes), but evidently they were not based on reliable information, and very likely the writers assumed that all of Vidal’s troops were under Ponce. From the Mexican accounts it would appear that such was not the case. Vidal would naturally keep men back to act as a reserve, hold what he called his “line of defence,” and guard his person; and this probability is strengthened by the fact that three of his four guns were not used in the fight. The figures of several Mexican accounts are about 500. The reports of the details of the skirmish are equally irreconcilable. El Brazito (The Little Arm) was the smaller (eastern) of the two channels into which the river was here divided by an island.

6. Doniphan’s operations to Dec. 25 inclusive; Mex. preparations at the Chihuahua frontier. 61Wooster, Sept. 25. 268Portrait of Doniphan. 240Kennerly, narrative. 61Kearny, special orders 11. Sen. 7; 30, 1. Richardson, Journal. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 61. 61Kearny, orders, Sept. 23. 61Doniphan, Oct. 20. 61Price, Feb. 26, 1847. 61Scott, Nov. 24 and Marcy’s endorsement, Dec. 9. Cooke, Conquest, 51. 201Gibson, diary. Republicano, Jan. 26; Apr. 10, 1847. Picayune, Mar. 6, 18, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. Anzeiger des Westens, Apr. 11, 14; May 17, 18, 1847. 243Kribben, letters, Oct. 20, etc., 1846. Wash. Union, Mar. 18, 21, 1847. St. Louis Republican, July 3, 1847. Niles, Mar. 6, 1847, p. 7; Apr. 3, p. 71; July 3, p. 279. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 496–7 (Don.). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 171, 1128. Apuntes, 141–3. Elliott, Notes, 227, 229. Sen. 23; 30, 1, pp. 90–6. Sen. 439; 29, 1, p. 2. (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 171–2, 176, 178, 183. Statement re Doniphan from Hon. Champ Clark, Jan. 27, 1906. Benton, View, ii, 686–8. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. 212Hastings, diary. Cooke, Conquest, 39. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 256–67. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 589. From 76 the following. Trias, proclam., Nov. 19, 1846. Id., Nov. 23; Dec. 18. BalmÚdez, El Paso, Oct. 28. Vidal, proclam., Dec. 21. Id., Dec. 26. Heredia, Dec. 25. Ponce to Vidal, Dec. 26. Gov. Chih. to prefect El Paso, Sept. 19.

7. October 22 Marcy, learning from Kearny that surplus troops might be ordered to report to Wool at Chihuahua, directed Taylor to notify and instruct any such detachment in case he (Taylor) should decide to have Wool join him (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 365). It was probably possible to have a Mexican spy go from Parras to Chihuahua and thence north to meet Doniphan, but so far as we are aware no attempt to do this was made.

8. The insurrection will be described in chap. xxxi.

9. During the stay at El Paso some of the traders stole away, went to Chihuahua, and sold ammunition to the enemy.

10. Lieut. Col. Mitchell had been ordered south by Price in December to open communication with Wool, who was believed to be approaching Chihuahua, and Mitchell had organized the Rangers as an escort. Christian Kribben, who commanded one of the two companies, wrote (Nov. 30) that Mitchell selected the best men then at S. Fe. The commander was named Hudson. (See also Richardson, Journal.) Mitchell nearly reached El Paso while Doniphan was engaged with the Indians; but, alarmed by reports of Mexican troops, he returned and joined Doniphan. There was no engineer in Doniphan’s command.

11. Events from Dec. 26 to Feb. 27 inclusive. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 61. 61Price, Feb. 26, 1847. 61Wooster, Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. Picayune, Mar. 18. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. Wash. Union, Mar. 18. Richardson, Journal. 228Hughes to Miller, Jan. 26. Id. to war dept., Jan. 25. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498–9 (Don.), 503 (Gilpin). Apuntes, 143. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 365, 1128. Elliott, Notes, 245. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 156, 158, 168. Kendall, Narrative, ii, 35. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 256, 269, 271–4, 280, 286, 289–95, 301–2. From 76 the following. GarcÍa Conde, Apr. 5. Comte. gen. Chih., Oct. 10, 1846. Heredia, Jan. 9, 1847. Id. to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5, 1847. Gov. Sonora to Bustamante, Feb. 28, 1847. Trias, Feb. 7. The artillery arrived on Feb. 1, but the baggage and provision train not until Feb. 5.

12. After the battle the Mexicans represented their forces as small; but, as Trias himself wrote on February 20 that he would set out the next day from Chihuahua City with 2000 troops (it is not probable that he looked upon the rancheros as troops), and GarcÍa Conde was then north of the Sacramento with about 800 cavalry, it seems impossible to reduce the total given in the text.

13. Mexican preparations to defend Chihuahua; the ground and the fortifications. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. Gibson, diary. Republicano, Mar. 25; Apr. 10; June 8. Anzeiger des Westens, May 17, 18. Diario, Nov. 5, 1846. Edwards, Campaign, 127. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498–513. Apuntes, 143–6. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 159. 47Conner, May 31, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Mar., 1845, p. 28. Kendall, Narrative, ii, 63. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 303–5. From 76 the following. GarcÍa Conde, Apr. 5, 1847. MartÍnez, Oct. 10, 1846. Reyes, Oct. 9, 1846. J. M. Conde, Feb. 24; Mar. 15, 1847. S. Anna, Oct. 12; Nov. 11; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 4, 1847. Tornel, June 25, 1846. Gov. Durango, July 27; Sept. 3, 1846. Re-extracto of Sambrano letter. BoletÍn no. 8, Chih. Reyes to Trias, Oct. 7, 1846. Comte. gen. Durango, Aug. 22; Sept. 3; Oct. 30, 1846. To Reyes, Aug. 31; Sept. 9, 18, 25, 1846. Reyes, Aug. 25; Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 6, 1846. Memo., Sept 9. To director gen. of artill., Sept. 18. Patriotic junta, plan, July 27, 1846 (reported upon by generals, Sept. 4). Comte. gen. Chih., [Sept.] 15, 1846. Trias, Sept. 19; Dec. 26, 1846; Feb. 20; Oct. 26, 1847. Gov. Chih., July 23, 1846. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, July 31. Segundo cabo, Chih., July 18, res., 21, 25; Aug. 17. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., Chih. and N. Mex. Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 13, 20, 1847. To Heredia, Mar. 13, 1847. Memo, on defence of Chih. Heredia, Oct. 10; Nov. 2; Dec. 7, 1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 20; Mar. 2, 22, 1847. Estado of Dur. troops sent to Chih., dated Feb. 20, 1847. To comte. gen. Dur., Sept. 9, 1846. And many others.

14. A letter of May 18, 1847, from Chihuahua said that in the opinion of sensible persons commercial interest in the caravan had much to do with Doniphan’s victories, and that certain extraordinary events could be explained in no other way (Republicano, June 8). 76Heredia suspected that Chihuahua merchants were secretly working to bring about the arrival of the caravan.

15. Doniphan might have crossed the cordillera bounding the eastern side of the valley and turned the Mexican position entirely, wrote 76GarcÍa Conde; but he did not say that the wagons could have gone that way. If they could not, the plan was impracticable.

16. Doniphan said later: “There was no particular generalship at the battle. You were marched within the proper distance, when you were turned loose. The enemy first recoiled, then gave way, then fled.” To a great extent this was true. Doniphan knew that he was not a general, and did not try to play the part. For a time at least he merely watched and whittled (Edwards, Campaign, 112). Affairs were mostly in the hands of his subordinates. But he gave some directions. Lieut. Wooster of the Fourth Artillery, who had arrived at Santa Fe on August 28, was on the ground, and according to his own report was mainly responsible for the conduct of the battle.

17. Events of Feb. 28. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498 (Doniphan), 502 (Mitchell), 503 (Gilpin), 508 (Clark). (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. 201Gibson, diary. 212Hastings, diary. American Eagle, V. Cruz, May 26. Richardson, Journal, 61–4. Polk, Diary, May 4. 188Edwards, diary. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. 61Wooster, Mar. 7. Republicano, Mar. 25; Apr. 10. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 644. Anzeiger des Westens, May 18 (Kribben). Wash. Union, July 12. Diario, Mar. 17; Apr. 8. Edwards, Campaign, 111–2, 117. Niles, July 3, 1847, p. 279. Robinson, Sketches, 57–8. Apuntes, 146–9. Elliott, Notes, 245. 13Bankhead, no. 29, 1847. Captain of Vols., Conquest, 38. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 159. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Benton, View, ii, 686. Cooke, Conquest, 89. 240Kennerly, narrative. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 306–13. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 418, 590. From 76 the following. GarcÍa Conde, Apr. 5. J. M. Conde, Mar. 15. YÁÑez, Mar. 23. To Heredia, Mar. 2, 13. Heredia, Mar. 2; Apr. 1. Ugarte, Mar. 10. It is hardly necessary to point out that howitzers and cavalry should not ordinarily be used in storming entrenched positions. Ibarra’s list of officers killed during the war (p. 8) mentions but one as falling here. This fact seems to suggest the true character of the battle. Drawing the fire of the Mexican fortifications by sweeping to the left prepared the way for our decisive charge.

18. Trias made active efforts but in vain. Heredia had only 200 men on April 10; and Ugarte on April 15 merely expected to have two small parties afoot before long. ArlÉgui, comandante general of Durango, was anxious to protect his own state by recovering Chihuahua, but the governor showed no interest in that project.

19. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 61–2. Frost, Taylor, 304. 61Wooster, Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. Republicano, Apr. 10; June 8. Wash. Union, July 12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 501 (Doniphan); 503 (Mitchell). Apuntes, 149. Robinson, Sketches, 62. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1088 (Mora); 1128 (Doniphan). RondÉ, Voyage, 136. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 316, 327, 335. Richardson, Journal. From 76 the following. Ugarte, Mar. 15; Apr. 8, 15. To comtes. gen. in Jalisco, Zacat., Guanaj. and Dur., Mar. 13. To Filisola, Apr. 1, 30. Gov. Dur. to comte. gen., Mar. 7; Apr. 3. ArlÉgui, Mar. 31. Id., proclam., Apr. 11. Heredia, Mar. 2, 18; Apr. 8. Trias, May 26. Olivares and Maceyra to Doniphan, Mar. 5. Gov. Zacatecas, Mar. 18. The news that Mexican forces were coming was not without foundation. Gen. Filisola, a veteran officer, had now been given Heredia’s place, the comandantes general of three states had been ordered to the north, and the governor of Durango was expecting 1000 men.

20. About sixty-five Comanches had raided Parras just before the Americans arrived there, killing eight or ten persons. As the people of the town had been friendly to Wool, Captain Reid with about thirty-five men pursued the Indians, and without losing a life killed seventeen, wounded at least twenty-five, and recaptured nineteen boys and girls besides hundreds of horses and mules. Doniphan’s men were reviewed by Wool at Buena Vista.

21. The return home. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1127, 1131, 1136, 1143, 1170 (Taylor); 1128 (Doniphan); 1144 (Reid). Richardson, Journal. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 339–51, 359, 363–5, etc. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 62–82. 61Wooster, Mar. 7. 65Wool, gen. orders 293. Cutts, Conquest, 89. Republicano, June 8. Richardson, Journal. Independiente, May 29. Wash. Union, July 12. Scharf, St. Louis, i, 379. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 591. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 502. Captain of Vols., Conquest, 37, 39. Cooke, Conquest, 90, note. 148Chamberlain, recolls. 65Taylor, gen. orders 59. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, app., 15–7. Connelley, Doniphan’s Exped., 596. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Hastings, diary. Niles, July 3, 1847, p. 279; July 17, p. 316; Aug. 14, p. 372. Robinson, Sketches, 64–71. 76Ugarte, May 3. 76Relaciones, May 20. 76ArlÉgui, May 7, 14. 76Aguirre, May 14. 76Jefe polÍtico, Mapimi, May 10. The distance from Chihuahua to Saltillo was called 675 miles. Doniphan resumed the practice of law, managed his fine farm, and served in the Missouri senate. When the Civil War broke out, he supported the Union; but apparently he felt too much tenderness for his neighbors to take up arms.

XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION

1. In 1845 there entered at Monterey, the only port of entry, twenty-seven American vessels (9435 tons), eighteen Mexican (2620), four British (966), three French (756) and three German (525).

2. Mexico tried to keep the emigrants out with proclamations and orders to the California authorities, but the Americans appealed successfully to the treaty of amity and commerce and (it may be presumed) to the self-interest of local authorities.

3. The Mexican government was urged to buy New Helvetia, and negotiations began; but it was said that the Americans in the valley declared they would not permit Sutter to sell, and it seemed doubtful whether Mexico could hold the place even if she purchased it.

4. California and its population. 13Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 1840; 1, 1842. 13Capt. Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. Revue de Paris, Jan., 1849. 13Forbes, no. 2, 1846. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 26, 1842; Nov. 5, 1844. Madisonian, Dec. 24, 1842. 77To gov. Calif., June 1, 1842. 77Almonte, no. 84, 1844. 13Barron, May 5, 1837; Jan. 20, 1844. Id. to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. 12Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. 52Vessels entering at Monterey, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 155, 225, 276. Bulletin de la Soc. de GÉog., no. 77, May, 1844, 99–102. Dana, Two Years, 83–8, 90–3, 200. Colton, Three Years, 19–22, 37–8, 45, 68, 111, 118, 155, 158, 172–3, 231. Whittier, “The Crisis.” 61R. B. Mason, Sept. 18, 1847. Sherman Letters, 43. Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 319, 402; ii, 24. Wise, Gringos, 42, 49. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7–8. 61Kearny, Mar. 15; Apr. 28, 1847. 77Covarrubias, Apr. 5, 1846. 247March to Larkin. 247Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. Bidwell, Calif., 157, 161. Revue des Deux Mondes, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1039. Sherman, Sloat, xv, xxxix. St. Amant, Voyages, 513. Richman, Calif., 265, 267, 276. 13Forbes to Barron, Jan. 27, 1845. 13Elliott, July 3, 1845. Royce, Bidwell. Boston Post, Nov. 27, 1845. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 946. 247Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. 372Hyde, statement, 6. Farnham, Life, 358–60. Diario, Mar. 21, 1846. SoulÉ, Annals, 168, 201. Sherman, Home Letters, 114. Niles, June 6, 1846, p. 211. Schafer, Pac. Slope, 231. Simpson, Narrative, i, 287, 297. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 97. Revere, Tour, 70. Sen. Rep. 75; 30, 1, p. 50. Sherman, Mems., i, 20. Bryant, What I Saw, 447. Royce, Calif., 31–2, 38–9, 41. 123Bidwell, statement. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 (52Cons. letters, Monterey, i, 1). Letter from S. Fe, July 29, 1841; Mex. in 1842, p. 128. London Times, June 18, 1841. Phila. No. American, Oct. 31, 1843. 52Larkin, nos. 7, June 20; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; 12, Mar. 22; 22, June 6; 26, Sept. 29, 1845.

5. Startled by this affair, the Mexican government now proposed to send 1200 men to California with the idea of establishing them as military colonists; and in May, 1845, Ignacio Iniestra, a Mexican educated at Paris and regarded as a competent officer, was appointed to the chief command. No such number of troops was, however, provided; Iniestra refused to set out until sure his men would be paid and fed; and the requisite money was not supplied. In August U. S. Consul Parrott and the Amigo del Pueblo of Mexico stated that a commissioner had come from California to inform the government that the troops would not be admitted. About this time the lack of funds caused a mutiny; but that was suppressed, and the dwindling forces lingered on until, at the end of the year, a large part of them were swept by Paredes into the vortex of his revolution. For nearly two months they were cantoned near Mexico; but finally another sham effort was put forth. Though Iniestra died, the men proceeded under various embarrassments—receiving accessions en route from the prisons of Guadalajara—to the port of MazatlÁn, and the arms, munitions and provisions made their way under equal difficulties to Acapulco, where seven small vessels were gathered to receive them. But the restless Juan Alvarez, called “The Tiger of the South,” seized the effects of the expedition, giving his brigandage a color of respectability by pronouncing, as we have seen, against Paredes, and three weeks later the troops at MazatlÁn, commanded now by Col. Rafael TÉllez, took a similar step—being determined on the one hand not to go to California, and quite willing on the other to live riotously on the funds of the expedition and the ample revenues of the customhouse. They pronounced for Santa Anna; and soon after the revolution of the citadel took place, August 4, 1846, the government, promising to make up his command to 1000, ordered TÉllez to sail, but the necessary reinforcements were not provided. TÉllez advised giving up the expedition, and on Sept. 7 the government expressed its concurrence in this recommendation. Thus ended even the pretence of taking the California situation in hand. TÉllez stated that according to documents in his possession Paredes never intended to have the expedition sail; and it is certain that secret instructions were given to Iniestra, which the government was extremely anxious to keep from the knowledge of the public. In all probability the real purpose of proposing the expedition was merely to make people feel that something was to be done. (13Bankhead, nos. 13, 1845; 74, 1846. Diario, May 4, 1846. London Times, Jan. 8, 1846. 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. ComunicaciÓn Circular que ... PeÑa. Amigo del Pueblo, Aug. 14, 1845. Of the author’s very numerous 76documents relating to the expedition the following are enough to cite. Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. Tornel to gov. Calif., May 13, 1846. N. Flores, Mar. 8, 1846. YÁÑez, Mar. 10, 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17; Apr. 7, 1846. M. GutiÉrrez, May 19; June 16, 1846. To J. I. GutiÉrrez, May 13, 1846. TÉllez to prest. of consejo de gob., July 25, 1846; reply, Aug. 18. J. I. GutiÉrrez, May 9, 1846. To Iniestra, Mar. 31; May 9, 1845. Iniestra, July 31; Aug. 24, 29; Sept. 23; Dec. 2, 24, 1845; Jan. 5, 18, 24; Feb. 28, 1846. CastaÑares, Oct. 27, 1845. To Monterde, Apr. 10, 1846. T. Moreno, Mar. 3, 1846. Baneneli to TÉllez, May 7, 1846. Moreno to GutiÉrrez, Apr. 16, 24, 1846. TÉllez, Feb. 9, 27; Mar. 2; Apr. 11; Aug. 24, 26; Sept. 2, 1846. To TÉllez, Sept. 7, 1846. See also chap. xxx, note 27.)

6. Mexico fully warned. London Times, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; Oct. 6, 1845. 77Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. 13Pakenham, no. 2, Jan. 6, 1842. 13Bankhead, nos. 31, Mar. 31, 1845; 42, 1846. 77ArrangÓiz, Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., June 28, 1844; 41, res., Feb. 28; 70, res., May 7; 101, res., July 8, 1845. London Chronicle, Aug. 13, 1845. CastaÑares, Documentos. 75SÁnchez, Apr. 2, 1846. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 32. 76Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, 1845. 76Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. 76Mil. comte., Acapulco, July 22, 1845. 76J. Castro to CastaÑares, Oct. 6, 1845. 76Id., May 30, 1845. 76Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. In November, 1845, the Mexican minister of relations told Bankhead that Castro could not be punished for revolting (13Bankhead, no. 113).

7. If anyone doubts this, let him look at the present populous, rich, happy state of California, think how much it contributes to the world, and consider what it would now be, had it remained a part of Mexico, and suffered from the anarchy, devastations and massacres of recent years.

8. France had at one time cast longing glances at California. In the early forties Duflot de Mofras made a visit there, and according to the British vice consul in California a formal offer of protection was made by him, Admiral Du Petit Thouars and Capt. Laplace in the name of their government (13Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844); but the time for such a move was not then ripe, and France, aside from maintaining a consular representative on the ground, became inactive. England was even less responsive. While many British subjects, particularly the correspondent of the London Times at Mexico (e.g. Times, Sept. 9, 1845), felt that England should take California, the British government, though doubtless extremely anxious that the territory should not fall into the possession of the United States, refused to move or countenance any move in that direction. December 31, 1844, the Foreign Office wrote to Consul Barron at Tepic, Mexico, who had charge of Vice Consul Forbes at San Francisco, that in the California agitation the British agents were to be entirely passive, and that the idea of a British protectorate could not be countenanced, adding that the authorities of California “should be clearly made to understand that Great Britain would view with much dissatisfaction the establishment of a protectoral power over California by any other foreign State.” Other documents bearing on the subject are the following. 13Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844. Kennedy in London Times, June 18, 1841. 13Pakenham, nos. 91, Aug. 30, 1841; 61, July 21, 1842. 13To Id., Dec. 15, 1841. Bankhead, nos. 74, July 30, 1845; 73, May 30, 1846. 13To Bankhead (exactly in line with the despatch addressed to Barron on the same day), nos. 53, Dec. 31, 1844; 18, May 31, 1845; 16, June 1; 4, Aug. 15, 1846. 108Ashburton to Sturgis, Apr. 2, 1845 (“we certainly do not want colonies, and least of all such as would be unmanageable from this distance, and only serve to embroil us with our neighbours”). 13Mora to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1847. London Times, Oct. 6, 1845. 12For. Off. to Admty., June 19, 1846. Webster, Writings, xviii, 192. 12Seymour to Admty., Apr. 27, 1846. Monitor Repub., Apr. 16, 1846. 52Everett, Mar. 28, 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 155, 230, 417. Mackintosh, Brit. consul at Mex., proposed to place 500,000 European colonists in California in twenty years (13to Bankhead, July 26, 1845) with a view to turning over to England the control of the province (13Bankhead, no. 73, May 30, 1846). Paredes promised to give “every possible facility” for the execution of this plan (13Bankhead, no. 73), but the British government would not take it up.

9. Mexican rule to the end of 1845. 13Forbes, nos. 1, Oct. 19, 1843; 2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston Advertiser, Sept. 26, 1842. Nat. Intelligencer, May 11, 1844. London Times, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11, 1845; Mar. 13, 1846. Revue de Paris, Jan., 1849. 77Almonte, nos. 84, P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. 13Barron, May 5, 1837; Feb. 18, 1845. 13Id. to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. 13Pakenham, nos. 13, 1837; 66, 1840; 91, 1841; 2, 1842. 13Doyle, no. 79, 1843. 13Bankhead, nos. 108, 1844; 31, 52, 113, 1845; 73, 1846. Paredes, address on opening Cong., June 6, 1846 (Diario). Mobile Commercial Register, June 13, 1843. Diario, Mar. 27; June 3; Aug. 21, 1845. Wash. Globe, May 29; Oct. 21, 1845. Amigo del Pueblo, Aug. 14, 1845. St. Louis New Era, Aug. 20, 1845. Memphis Eagle, Oct. 1; Nov. 5, 1845. 52Black, Sept. 2, 1845. Britannia, May 15, 1847. 52Virmond to Jones, Feb. 4, 1837. 52Larkin, nos. 9, Aug. 18; 11, Oct. 30; 12, Dec. 9, 1844; 16, Jan. 1; 1, Mar. 22; 2, Mar. 22; 20, Mar. 24; 25, July 10; 26, Sept. 29, 1845. 247Stearns to Larkin, May 14, 1846. 52Parrott, Aug. 26, 1845. 12Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. 12Seymour, June 13. Otero, CuestiÓn Social, 117. GimÉnez, Memorias, 90. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 404. 52Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. 77Castillo, no. 119, 1835. (Simpson) Amer. Hist. Rev., xiv, pp. 88–9. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Mar., 1845. Royce, Calif., 202. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844; Mar., 1845. Mateos, Hist. Parl., v, 98. Bandini, Calif., 138. 13Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. LÖwenstern, Le Mexique, 84. 13Diaz to Barron, Sept. 29, 1845. London Chronicle, Aug. 13, 1845. 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. St. Louis Reveille (weekly), May 18, 1846. 77ArrangÓiz, Jan. 9; Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., 1844; 70, res., 76, res., 101, res., 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Forbes, Calif., 146–52. Bulletin de la Soc. de GÉog., no. 77, p. 186. CastaÑares, Documentos. Colton, Three Years, 20, 22, 32. Argonaut, Feb. 2, 1878 (Sutter’s diary). Sherman Letters, 43–4. 13Forbes to Barron, Aug. 9; Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7–8, 42. 75P. Pico, July 1, 1845; Feb. 13, 1846. 75Covarrubias, Apr. 5, 1846. 75SÁnchez, Apr. 2, 1846. 75Calif. Commission, Aug. 10, 1846. Reforma, Feb. 10, 1846. 122Bidwell, Calif., 119, 123. 3Alvarado, Calif., v, 129. Revue des Deux Mondes, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1037. Richman, Calif., 273–9. 334Torres, Peripecias, 49. Blackmar, Span. Instits., 10–12. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 205. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Dec. 30, 1846. 11Cyprey to Guizot, no. 58, 1841. Wilkes, Narrative, v, 171. 13Aberdeen to Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. Sen. 7; 30, 1. 52Larkin, Calif, prior to 1846 (Cons. letters, Monterey, i, 1). Dana, Two Years, 90–1, 200. (Prussia) 52Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. And from 76 the following. To gov. Calif., Apr. 1, 1845; May 9, 1846. TÉllez, Mar. 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17, 1846. Guerra, circular, Apr. 1, 1845. Comte. gen. Iguala, Mar. 13, 1846. Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, 1845. Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. J. Castro, memo., undated. Id., Oct. 6, 1845. CastaÑares, Jan. 27, 1846. Estado, Monterey, June 15, 1845. Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. Sutter to Mex. commr., Nov. 19, 1845. CastaÑeda to P. Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Carrera, Apr. 8, 1846.

10. Interest of the American people in California. 13Pakenham, no. 63, 1841. N. Orl. Commercial Bulletin, Feb. 19, 1840; May 21; Oct. 12, 1841. London Times, June 18, 1841; Aug. 1, 1845. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Oct. 9, 1841; Feb. 23, 1842. St. Louis Reveille, Sept. 17, 1845. Wash. Globe, Feb. 27; Aug. 23; Oct. 21; Nov. 4, 1845. Nashville Union, Mar. 13, 1845. Memphis Eagle, May 2; Nov. 5, 1845. N. Orl. Picayune, Apr. 21, 1842; Apr. 5, 1844; Nov. 25, 1845; Mar. 31, 1846. 13Bankhead, no. 113, 1845. Savannah Republican, Apr. 25, 1845. N. Orl. Courier, Feb. 17, 1840; Apr. 26; July 10, 1845. American Review, Jan., 1846, 82–99. Diario, Nov. 3, 1845. Charleston Courier, July 11, 1845. Journal des DÉbats, June 1, 1846. Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 12, 1845. Balt. Clipper, Mar. 2, 1840. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 22, 1845. (Regulations) 52Larkin, no. 8, June 24, 1844. Charleston Mercury, Feb. 24, 1845. N. Orl. Bee, Apr. 19, 1842. Phila. North American, Nov. 1, 1845. N. Y. Tribune, Apr. 5, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 147–8. Dana, Two Years, 200. Southwestern Hist. Qtrly., xviii, nos. 1–3 (R. G. Cleland). (Whalers) Hunt’s Merchants’ Mag., Jan., 1845. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 197 (Allen); app., Hunter, Jan. 10, 1846. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 98. 77Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16, 1844. 77ArrangÓiz, 71, res., May 12, 1845.

11. Views and policy of U. S. government. Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 18 (Forsyth, Aug. 6, 1835). 52Ellis, Sept. 24, 1836. 108Hooper to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. 52Slidell, no. 3, Dec. 17, 1845. 13Pakenham, nos. 43, 1833; 63, 91, 1841. 13Forbes, no. 2, Jan. 26, 1846. London Times, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; Sept. 9; Oct. 6; Nov. 19, 1845; Apr. 11, 1846. 77Mex. commrs., Feb. 16, 1842. 52Larkin to Stearns et al., Apr. 17, 1846. Journal des DÉbats, July 10, 1843; Jan. 12; June 1, 1846. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 399. Wash. Globe, Feb. 27, 1845. 52Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. 52Shannon, Jan. 9, 1845. Gilmer in U. S. Ho. Repres., Jan. 28, 1843. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Nov. 17, 1845. 77Almonte, no. 4, res., Jan. 10, 1843; 84, P., July 16, 1844. 52Thompson, nos. 1, Apr. 29; 4 July 30, 1842. 56W. S. Parrott, May 13; Sept. 2, 1845. Constitutionnel, Oct. 13, 1844; Mar. 29, 1845; July 9, 1846. National, Sept. 4, 1845. 52Wickliffe to Buchanan, private, [June] 3, 1845. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Feb. 23, 1842. Harvey, Webster, 203–4. 52Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1, Nov. 10, 1845. Adams, Mems., xi, 346, 355. Curtis, Webster, ii, 250. Forbes to Barron, Mar. 10, 1845. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 19. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. Charleston Mercury, July 12, 1845. Charleston Courier, Nov. 12, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 149. Mofras, Exploration, i, 517. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 109. Polk, Diary, Oct. 24, 1845. St. Louis Reveille, Apr. 29, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 45. 247Hastings to Larkin, Mar. 3, 1846. 247Allerton to Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. 247Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. 1Allen in U. S. Sen., Aug. 6, 1846. Revue des Deux Mondes, Dec. 15, 1845, pp. 1037, 1043. Vallejo, Documentos. Van Tyne, Letters of Webster, 269. Texas Review, Jan., 1917, p. 217 (Barker). Schafer, Pac. Slope, 229. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 280–1. 52Flower to Van Buren, Feb. 8, 1840. 52Kelley to Webster, Jan. 2, 1842. Kelsey, Consulate, 7, 35, etc. 52Larkin, nos. 8, June 24; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; Mar. 22; 25, July 10; 26, Sept. 29; 29, Dec. 31, 1845; 37, Mar. 9; 42, Apr. 17; 44, June 1, 1846. Webster, Writings, xviii, 203–4. N. Orl. Picayune, Nov. 25, 1845. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 978. 351Thompson to Webster, Jan. 30, 1843. Monitor Repub., Apr. 16, 1846. Royce, Calif., 38–9. 122Bidwell, Calif., 138. Richardson, Messages, iv, 398, 539–40. Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 12, 1845. 77ArrangÓiz, no. 41, res., Feb. 28, 1845. 13Crampton to Palmerston, no. 63, 1848. London Chronicle, Aug. 13, 1845. Democratic Review, July, 1845, p. 9. 48Bancroft to Sloat, Mar. 21, secret and confid., Oct. 17, 1845. Southwestern Hist. Qtrly., xviii, nos. 1–3 (R. G. Cleland). Meade, Letters, i, 65.

12. For the facts merely alluded to here see pp. 127–8, 130–4. (Virtually forbid) chap. iv, note 24. Polk’s announcement that he should endeavor to obtain California (Schouler, United States, iv, 498) is sufficiently explained by his attempts to purchase it. When he determined to lay our grievances before Congress, it is not certain that he expected war to result. He seems to have felt that a determined stand on our part might bring Mexico to terms. And his promptly taking advantage of the rights conferred by the state of war to occupy the territory and bar out foreign interference counts for nothing as proof that he brought on the war for the alleged purpose. See e.g. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 266.

13. Bancroft’s history of California, which at times is rather free in its conclusions, denies that such a meeting was held (Pacific States, xvii, 61–2). His principal reasons are lack of corroborative evidence, the silence of Larkin, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of it. But (1) we have corroborative evidence from several persons; (2) Larkin may not have wished to mention a confidential talk held under his own roof—especially as it accomplished nothing; and (3) inconsistencies are found in the accounts of many events. On the other hand some accounts of the meeting have no doubt been exaggerated and embellished.

14. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 200) says there is no evidence that Gillespie had official relations with Sloat; but Sloat’s 47report, February 25, 1846, said that in accordance with “the verbal orders he delivered me,” Gillespie was immediately sent forward.

15. Although no formal meeting took place at Santa Barbara, Capt. Blake, of the British warship Juno, who went there, was appealed to for protection on the ground that Mexico and England were allied nations (12Seymour to Admiralty, Aug. 27, 1846). Some proposed, should England refuse it, to address France. About this time an Irish priest named McNamara arrived in a British vessel with a grand scheme of colonization, and obtained an immense grant of land. The scheme was much talked about, but signified nothing. The grant was illegally made. Mexico, though she treated McNamara pleasantly did not endorse the plan, and in all probability would not have confirmed such a grant, had California remained under her jurisdiction, for she was extremely suspicious of England, and could see that 10,000 British colonists would be a dangerous element. Indeed, McNamara was suspected at Mexico of acting in the interest of England. A few of the documents bearing on this subject are: RamÍrez, MÉx., 246; Ho. 17; 31, 1 (Halleck, Cuevas, Castillo y Lanzas); Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 215–23; Sen. Report 75; 30, 1 (testimony of FrÉmont and others; the McNamara papers); Royce, California, 166; 52Larkin, no. 56, Aug. 22, 1846; 335McNamara, proposition, May 17, 1845.

16. Politics in California, Jan.-June, 1846. 13Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. 108Hooper to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. 13Forbes, no. 2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston Advertiser, May 27, 1843. 13Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. 13To Barron, Dec. 31, 1844. Diario, Aug. 21, 1845. 52J. Castro to P. Pico, June 8, 1846. 12Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. 52Larkin to Stearns et al., Apr. 17, 1846. 13To Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. 47Sloat to Bancroft, Feb. 25, 1846. 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. 12Seymour to admty., Aug. 27, 1846. Colton, Three Years, 429. 247Stearns to Larkin, May 14, 1846. 13Forbes to Calif. govt., Jan. 28, 1846. 13Seymour to Bankhead, June 13, 1846. 13Pico to Forbes, June 29, 1846. 13Barron, Aug. 12, 1846. 52Military junta, Monterey, Apr. 11, 1846. 52Larkin to Gillespie, Apr. 23, 1846. 52Larkin, circular (in Spanish). Sherman Letters, 43. 13J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, 1846. Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 574 (Stevenson). 75P. Pico to Relaciones, Feb. 13, 1846. 75Covarrubias to Relaciones, Apr. 5, 1846. 75SÁnchez to Relac., Apr. 2, 1846. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 41–75, 215–22. 247Allerton to Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. 247Larkin to Bennett, May 26, 1846; to Stearns, May 24, 1846. 247Stearns to Larkin, June 12, 1846. Revere, Tour, 24. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. 122Bidwell, Calif., 138, 147, 151. Alvarado, Calif., v, 129–43, 222, 241. 126Botello, Anales, 133, 136. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 284. Amer. Hist. Rev., xiv, 88–9. Richman, Calif., 316, 474. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 246. Lancey, Cruise. 343Vallejo, Documentos. 334Torres, Peripecias, 48–9. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 208. Ho. 17; 31, 1, p. 121. Hall, S. JosÉ 143. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 377. McGroarty, Calif., 190–1. Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 16 (FrÉmont), 19, 31, 33 (Gillespie), 37 (Hensley), 44 (Minor), 46 (Childs). Sherman, Sloat, 56, xv. 263Mervine to Sloat, July 1, 1846. Swasey, Early Days, 57, 81. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 604–7 (Benton). Willey, Transition Period, 19. Kelsey, Consulate, 45, 51. Royce, Calif., 36, 166. 123Bidwell, statement. 52Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 (Consular letters, Monterey, i, 1). 52Id>., nos. 4, Apr. 16; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; 20, Mar. 24; 26, Sept. 29, 1845; 39, Apr. 2; 42, Apr. 17; 44, June 1; 48, June 18; 54, July 20; 56, Aug. 22, 1846; 63, Jan. 14, 1847. 13Crampton to Palmerston, nos. 35, 63, 1848. 76P. Pico to Relac., June 29, 1846. 76Id., proclams., May [13]; June 23, 1846. 76Vallejo, Nov. 24, 1845. 76Pico, May 25, 1846. 76J. Castro, Mar. 5; Apr. 1, 2; May 30, 1846. 76Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845.

XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA

1. FrÉmont’s clash with Castro. 13Forbes to Barron, Jan. 26. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 50–1. Benton, View, ii, 580, 688. 67Abert to FrÉmont, Feb. 12, 1845. 13Pakenham, no. 130, 1846. 13Forbes to Calif. govt., Feb. 28. 62Adj. gen. to Benton, Nov. 2, 1847. 75J. Castro to P. Pico, Jan. 30, 1846. 75FrÉmont to J. Castro, Jan. 29. 247Larkin’s memoranda and correspondence with FrÉmont and others on the subject. 52Id., nos. 36, 38, Mar. 5, 27; 41, Apr. 17, 1846; 63, Jan. 14, 1847. 3Alvarado, Hist. de Calif., 239. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 4–23. FrÉmont, Mems., i, 454–70. Id., Geog. Memoir. Niles, Nov. 21, 1846, pp. 188–9. Diario, Apr. 24. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 372–4 (FrÉmont here states that he was given permission to explore south of the Colorado, and was on his way to do so when stopped by Castro. This permission does not appear in the documents of March, 1846. It may have been given very incidentally, and this may have been the cause of the trouble). Bandini, Calif., 139. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 16. Richman, Calif., 308. Tuthill, Calif., 163. Sherman, Sloat, xv. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 604–5. Kelsey, Consulate, 96. 76Castro, Mar. 6; Apr. 1. 76Larkin to alcalde, Mar. 10. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xxxi, 711.

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 172–3) decides roundly against FrÉmont, and cites for support a letter from the prefect to Larkin demanding the reason for FrÉmont’s movements; but it was perfectly in accord with Mexican methods that such a letter should have been written purely to satisfy the authorities at Mexico.

2. Gillespie’s mission. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 605. 247Gillespie to Larkin, May 24. 13J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9. Polk, Diary, Oct. 30, 1845. 247Leidesdorff to Larkin, Apr. 25, 1846. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1890, pp. 548, etc. Sen. 33; 30, 1, 373. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 30. FrÉmont, Mems., i, 489. Century Mag., N. S., xix, 923. Calif. Hist. Soc. Papers, i, pt. 1 (1887), pp. 69–72. 52Larkin, no. 44, June 1. 52Id. to Stearns et al., Apr. 17. Benton, View, ii, 689. Cooke, Conquest, 203–4. Royce, Bidwell.

Gillespie took to FrÉmont a letter of introduction from Buchanan and letters from FrÉmont’s father-in-law, Senator Benton. The former was entirely non-committal; and the latter, while very likely they contained veiled allusions to conversations in which the desire of the administration to acquire California had been mentioned, must have been like it in that respect, else Gillespie would not have dared to carry them through Mexico.

3. The evidence on this point, including FrÉmont’s positive statements made not long after the event, is conclusive (Polk, Diary, March 21, 1848; Senate Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32; 132Benton, Feb. 18, 1848; Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 4; 52Larkin to P. Pico, July 5, 1846. Speaking in the Senate, April 10, 1848 (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 604), Benton, though feeling extremely bitter toward Polk and no doubt fully informed by his son-in-law and client regarding all the facts, did not intimate that any instructions inconsistent with the instructions of Larkin were sent to FrÉmont. Indeed he stated the contrary. See also his Thirty Years View, ii, 689.

4. FrÉmont stated before a committee of the Senate that he had learned from Bancroft that Polk’s plan, in case of war, contemplated the occupation of California; but FrÉmont wrote to Capt. Montgomery of the Portsmouth, June 16, 1846, that even in the case of war he was not expected to prosecute “active hostilities.” In 1886 Bancroft stated that Gillespie was to inform FrÉmont of the President’s intentions.

5. First, many of the settlers had ample reasons to feel alarmed: the illegality of their presence; Castro’s sudden and cruel seizure of Americans in 1840; his attack upon FrÉmont in violation (the Americans believed) of a promise; official notices, issued about May 1, to the effect that the majority of the Americans were liable to be expelled at the convenience of the authorities; Castro’s warlike preparations; his talk of moving against the immigrants with armed forces (52Larkin, no. 42, April 17); and reports, more or less authentic and reliable, from various persons regarding what he said or intended. Secondly, the contemporary testimony of FrÉmont, Gillespie and other Americans—some of it given under oath—that alarm was actually felt is too strong to be rejected (see note 6). Much has been made of Bidwell, a clerk of Sutter’s, who tells us that alarm was not felt. But (1) his 123Statement was made thirty years after the events; (2) he admits that he was not on good terms with FrÉmont, and the Statement aims to show that FrÉmont invented the story of alarm as an excuse for his conduct; (3) his Statement is in other respects clearly inaccurate; (4) it assumes that he knew the sentiments of all the persons on the Sacramento, yet proves that an important fact may have been known to but few; (5) it shows that at the critical time he was absent in the mountains; (6) it says, “Californians were always talking of expelling Americans” [and therefore were talking of it in April, 1846]; (7) his book mentions that in 1845 an attack upon New Helvetia was so confidently expected that he rode day and night to warn Sutter; (8) he undertakes to disprove positive testimony with negative. The legitimate settlers had no direct occasion to feel alarmed; but, as Bidwell himself points out, they could not have held aloof, had an attempt been made to expel their fellow-countrymen. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Americans who joined FrÉmont in these operations were actuated solely by patriotism and the idea of self-defence.

6. The Bear movement. (Starred citations refer, among other facts, to the alarm felt by Americans.) *12Blake of Juno to Seymour, July 5. Benton, View, ii, 691. 12Seymour to admty., Aug. 27, 1846. 75M. Castro to Calif. govt., Jan. 29. Niles, Nov. 21, 1846, p. 191; Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110. Colton, Three Years, 175. Cooke, Conquest, 204–11. 13J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, 14. 13P. Pico to J. A. Forbes, June 29. 52M. Castro to —–, [Apr. 30]. 52Larkin to M. Castro, June 14. *52Ide, proclams., June 15, 18. 52J. Castro, proclams., June 17. 52P. Pico, proclam., June 23. 52Id. to Larkin, June 29. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 51–2. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. 52J. Castro to Larkin, undated. 247Larkin to Stearns, Apr. 17. 52Larkin to Pico, July 5. 48Bancroft to Sloat, June 24; Oct. 17, 1845. 123Bidwell, statement. Royce, Bidwell. Willey, Thirty Years, 10. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12. McGroarty, Calif., 192. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 39–48, 101–86, 199. Apuntes, 353–4. 247Gillespie to Larkin, May 24; June 7. 247Larkin to Mott, Talbot & Co., June 18. Peters, Kit Carson, 269. 247Leidesdorff to Larkin, Mar. 19; June 19. 247Montgomery to Larkin, July 2. 247Vallejo to Larkin, Sept. 15; to J. Castro, July 23. 122Bidwell, Calif., *141–2, 161, etc. *3Alvarado, Calif., 184. *Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279, 284, 291. Oakland (Cal.) Tribune, June 30, 1914. *Richman, California, 308–14. 249Leese, Bear Flag Papers, 9. 105Baldridge, Days of 1846. Diario, Dec. 27, 1846. *Colton, Deck and Port, 389. 247Guerrero to Leidesdorff, Apr. 30. 314Sawyer papers. Polk, Diary, Sept. 1. Niles, Nov. 14, 1846, p. 174; Nov. 21, p. 191 (FrÉmont to Benton, July “25”); Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110 (FrÉmont’s declaration of June 6). *Upham, FrÉmont, 228. Century Mag., N. S., xix, 1917 (Mrs. F.), 780 (Royce), 782. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 258. 263Mervine to Sloat, July 1. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 606 (Benton). 52Larkin, Calif, prior to 1846. *Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 374. Ho. Report, 817, 30, 1, p. 4. Bandini, Calif., 142. Revere, Tour, 64. *Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 13, 25–9, 32–4, 38–40. *Sherman, Sloat, xv (Gillespie’s note). *Swasey, Early Days, 49. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 11. *Willey, Transition Period, 39, 42. Kelsey, Consulate, 15, 72. Royce, Calif., 132. Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1890, pp. 548–57. 52Larkin, nos. *41, Apr. 17; *48, June 18; 53, July 18; 54, July 20, 1846; 63, Jan. 14, 1847. *Californian, i, nos. 3–5. 76Pico to Relac., June 29. 76Pico, procl., June 23. 76M. Castro to Pico, June 19. 76Alvarado, June 28. 76NarvÁez (undated). *Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xxxi, 715.

7. As Sloat was in personal intercourse with Gillespie about Feb. 20–22, he probably learned from him something more about the intentions of our government.

8. 48Oct. 17, 1845, Bancroft wrote to Sloat, “In the event of actual hostilities between the Mexican Government and our own,” you will carry out “the instructions [of June 24] forwarded to you from the Dept. in view of such a contingency.” Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 168) draws a sharp distinction between the “actual hostilities” of this order and the “declaration of war” of June 24. But (1) Bancroft said, Oct. 17, “actual hostilities” [not between forces in the field but] between the two governments; and (2) in his last quoted words above he indicated that the two orders contemplated precisely the same [not, as Rives holds, a different] contingency. As, therefore, the order of June 24 was the formal and fundamental one, Sloat had a technical ground for falling back upon it, whereas an officer of broad, clear views, decided character and unselfish loyalty would have acted more promptly, even at a slight personal risk. To do him justice, the reader should recall that many Senators refused to believe that the border hostilities were hostilities between the two governments (p. 182); and also that Sloat was old and not robust, and that he had the case of T. A. C. Jones before his eyes.

9. We find both July 1 and 2 given as the date of his arrival. The log book of his vessel says that she anchored at Monterey July 1, and that Larkin came aboard July 2. As he would have gone aboard as soon as possible, it seems probable that the vessel arrived July 1 at night.

10. Capt. Mervine wrote, July 6, to Capt. Montgomery that Larkin believed Castro, Pico and others would meet the following day to deliberate about declaring independence and hoisting the American flag.

11. Sloat stated later that he acted on his own responsibility in taking possession of California; and in fact the orders of May 13 did not reach their destination until about August 28 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 229).

12. It has been said (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 250) that Sloat merely pretended to have based his action on FrÉmont’s operations, so as to have a way of escape should he be blamed; but (1) we should not without evidence accuse him of lying, (2) he showed strong feeling when he learned that FrÉmont had acted without authority (e.g. Baldridge, Days of 1846; Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178), and (3) as a rational man he could not fail to be influenced greatly. Bancroft says (ibid., 227) that Sloat learned from Larkin that FrÉmont’s coÖperation with the insurgents was not certain; but he admits (ibid., 228–9) that on July 5 a launch from the Portsmouth, then lying at San Francisco, brought proof that FrÉmont was so doing; and the next day Sloat and Larkin, according to the log book of the Savannah, were busy preparing the proclamation, etc. Royce (California, 158) places against FrÉmont’s testimony (that Sloat said his action had resulted from FrÉmont’s) the fact that Larkin did not so state; but silence is not equal in strength to assertion, and FrÉmont is supported by Gillespie (Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, p. 32), by Wilson of the Savannah (ibid., 41), by Sloat’s private secretary (Baldridge, Days of 1846), by Sloat’s anxiety to obtain FrÉmont’s coÖperation, and by the resentment that he exhibited on finding that FrÉmont had acted without authority (Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178). See also Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 17.

13. August 27, 1846, 12Seymour wrote to the Admiralty: “My principal object has been, for many months, to be at hand to prevent or retard it [the American occupation of California], if I should be directed to take any proceedings for these purposes.” It was presumably to wait for orders that he placed himself at San Blas. What led him to sail for Monterey, however, as he did on June 14, was not Sloat’s leaving MazatlÁn, but news that the Santa Barbara convention was likely to declare for independence (13Seymour to Bankhead, June 13). Had that been done, he would have felt that he had a ground on which to oppose American occupation, though he thought that a large body of reliable colonists would be necessary to establish British ascendancy (12Id., Aug. 27). When he arrived at Monterey he was aware that the United States and Mexico were at war, and this was in his opinion an additional reason for inaction (12Id., Aug. 27); but he wrote to Pico that American occupation should be regarded as merely provisional (12to Pico, July 23). Sir Thomas Johnson, commanding a British sloop-of-war off MazatlÁn, showed his sympathies by constantly giving the Mexicans information about our vessels (76GutiÉrrez, Apr. 8, 1846, res.).

14. Sloat also guaranteed land titles. This was impracticable. In annexing California he exceeded his authority.

15. Sloat’s operations, etc. 47Sloat, Nov. 19; Dec. 3, 1845; Feb. 25; Mar. 17; Apr. 8, 30; May 31; June 6, 1846. 47Id. to Howison, Apr. 1, 1846; to Montgomery, Apr. 1. 47Wood to Bancroft, June 4. Benton, View, ii, 692. Bulletin de la Soc. de GÉog., no. 77. 12Seymour to admty., no. 47, Aug. 27, 1846; to Pico, July 23. Dana, Two Years, 78–9, 90. Sherman, Address. Wise, Gringos, 47. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 258–64. 247Sloat to Larkin, May 18. 247Larkin to Stearns, Aug. —. N. Y. Herald, Mar. 4, 1880. Davis, Sixty Years, 196. Hist. Soc. of So. Calif., viii, 77 (Barrows). 47Conner, Oct. 9, 1846. 13Seymour to Bankhead, June 13. 13A. Forbes to Bankhead, Aug. 1. 13J. A. Forbes to A. Forbes, July 14. 52J. Parrott, June 4. 13Letter from MazatlÁn, Aug. 4. 13Seymour to J. A. Forbes, July 22. 52Larkin to J. Castro, July 8; reply July 9. 52Id. to Alvarado, July 8; reply, July 9. 142Carson, recolls. 52Sloat, gen. orders, July 14. 47Conner, Aug. 26. 48–9Bancroft to Sloat, June 24; Oct. 17, 1845; May 13, 15; June 8; July 12; Aug. 13 (two), 1846. 108J. Parrott to Buchanan, private, July 23, 1846. Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 400–6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378–9. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 204, etc. 247Larkin to Ten Eyck, Sept. 19. 247Frazer to Larkin, Aug. 27. 4Amador, mems., 169. 247Atherton to Larkin, Dec. 3. 3Alvarado, Hist., 214–9. Proceeds. U. S. Naval Institute, 1888, pp. 539–40. Bennett, Steam Navy, 91. N. Orl. Picayune, Oct. 23, 1848. Sherman, Sloat, passim. 120Fauntleroy to Biddle, Mar. 12, 1847. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 291. Richman, Calif., 315. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 643–4. Diario, Aug. 16; Oct. 16, 1846. 106Lancey, cruise (logbook of Savannah). 105Baldridge, Days of 1846. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 204. Wash. Union, Sept. 24; Oct. 3, 26. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1013–4, 1019–20. Dunbar, Romance, 38. Sherman, Home Letters, 85. Niles, Oct. 10, 1846, p. 87. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32, 40, 44, 70–4. Century Mag., N. S., xviii, 794. N. Y. Nation, xlviii, 141. Hittell, Calif., ii, 466. 295Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 374, 377. Ho. Rep. 817; 30, 1, pp. 4–5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 649–67. Revere, Tour, 55, 77. FrÉmont, Mems., 534, 539. 172Cyane log book. 263Mervine, letter book. Swasey, Early Days, 60. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 606–7. Royce, Calif., 157–61. 52Larkin, nos. 1 (descript. of Calif.); 52, July 10; 53, July 18; 54 and 55, July 20. 76GutiÉrrez, no. 42, res., Apr. 8. 76To Castro, May 9; July 25. 76To comte. gen. Sonora, July 25. 76To min. of eccles. affrs., July 25. 76Monterey estado, Apr. 1. 76S. Anna, Oct. 30.

16. Stockton sailed from Norfolk on the Congress in October, 1845. Some mystery has been attached to his sealed orders (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 251); but they were merely to sail via the Sandwich Islands for Monterey, deliver the original of the despatch of October 17 to Larkin, and then join Sloat’s squadron. For his character see e.g. Royce, California, 179; 330Taylor to brother, January 19, 1848; 108Appleton to Bancroft, April 27, 1847; Porter, Kearny, 6, 7; Sherman, Home Letters, 108; Quincy, Figures, 230–40.

17. One aim of the proclamation was doubtless to provide a way of escape for the United States and its agents in case there should be no war, but even from this point of view it was ridiculous. Sloat repudiated the reasons for his action that were ascribed to him by Stockton.

18. Castro and the Californians generally did not believe that war had been declared, and of course Larkin’s letter to Stearns tended to confirm their opinion. Had it proved correct, Stockton would soon have been making apologies like T. A. C. Jones. This may help to explain Castro’s firm attitude. The Life of Stockton attempts to explain his haughty and menacing language as due to Castro’s military preponderance and the necessity of intimidating him. Stockton himself said later that, as Castro had no authority from the central government to make terms, it would have been useless to treat with him; but Castro could have laid down his arms, and that was the vital point just then. Stockton’s other reasons (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1041–2) are equally unsatisfactory. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 269) expresses the belief that Stockton did not wish to make terms with Castro and the other officials, but to eliminate them. This is quite possible. Probably temperament and thirst for glory counted. Stockton’s pretence (in his reply to Castro) that since the two countries were at war, he could not suspend hostilities until Castro should raise the American flag, was absurd. Truces have often been made during war, and never during peace. This was enough—especially as it came after Larkin’s overture—to show Castro he could expect nothing from Stockton.

19. 76Later Castro complained bitterly that after forsaking all for Mexico he had to beg for bread.

20. Stockton’s rÉgime to Sept. 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Colton, Three Years, 16, 25, 28–9, 32, 56, 175, 180. Cooke, Conquest, 213–6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 265–8. 247Larkin to Stearns, Aug.—, 1846. 61R. B. Mason, Sept. 23, 1847. Sec. navy to Stockton, Aug. 18, 1846. 13J. A. to A. Forbes, July 14; Sept. 22, 1846. 13Seymour to Bankhead, July 22, 1846. Californian, i, no. 1. 47Stockton, proclam., Aug. 22. 47Id. to FrÉmont, July 23; Aug. 24, 1846. 47Flores to Stockton, Aug. 7. 47Stockton to Bancroft, July 25; Aug. 22; Sept. 19; Oct. 1; Nov. 23. Id. to Mervine, Sept. 19. Bancroft to Sloat, Aug. 13. Mason to Stockton, Nov. 5, 1846; Jan. 11, 1847. Bancroft to Stockton, Oct. 17, 1845. 108Appleton to Bancroft, Apr. 27, 1847. Wise, Gringos, 50, 70. Royce, Bidwell. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 52, 379. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 1–3. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 143. 4Amador, mems., 169. 115Belden, statement, 48. 3Alvarado, Calif., v, 239–41. 161Journal of the Congress, 1846. 171Journal of the Cyane, 1846. Cutts, Conquest, 125. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 299, 300. Richman, Calif., 318. 109Bandini, documentos. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 215. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 9–14. Wash. Union, Oct. 26; Dec. 4, 1846. 295Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. Diario, Oct. 16. Statement to the author by Asst. Sec. of the navy Roosevelt. Sherman, Home Letters, 108. Du Pont, Official Despatches, 1. Quincy, Figures, 230, etc. Proceeds. of U. S. Naval Instit., xxiv., pt. 1, 270 (Neeser). Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 10, 83, 109–10, 118–9, 175, 178–83, 374, 377. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 36–41, 43–5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 657–8. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1034–42. Ho. 19; 29, 2, p. 104. McGroarty, Calif., 199. Bandini, Calif., 143. Revere, Tour, 55, 77–80. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 17, 47, 51. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 9. 263Mervine to Stockton, Sept. 16. Swasey, Early Days, 73. Porter, Kearny, 6–7. Life of Stockton, 120–3, 157–8. Bryant, What I Saw, 330, 366. Royce, Calif., 177–84. 123Bidwell, statement. 52Larkin, nos. 54, 55, 58, 1846. And the following from 76. J. Castro, July 13; Sept. 9, 1846; June 5, 1847. To comte. gen. Calif., May 9; July 25. To comte. gen. Sonora, July 25. Stockton to Castro, Aug. 7. Castro to Stockton, Aug. 7. Id., procls., Aug. 9, 10. Id. to consuls, Aug. 9. Moreno to Bustamante, Mar. 20, 1847. CastaÑeda to Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Bustamante to Castro, June 23, 1847.

21. In a proclamation of October 1 Flores charged that the Americans were dictating “arbitrary and despotic laws” and crushing the people with exactions intended to ruin them. His aim was announced as the expulsion of the Americans. All Mexicans and Californians 15–60 years old, not joining the insurgents, were declared to be traitors and under penalty of death. All Americans acting directly or indirectly against the insurgents were to lose their property and be sent into Mexico as prisoners. It cannot be denied that many Californians, especially in the north, had been deprived of their property—particularly horses and saddles—by FrÉmont’s men in the name of the United States, and that many had suffered personal abuse (Sen. 33; 30, 1; pp. 97, etc.; Ho. Report, 817; 30, 1; Sen. Report 75; 30, 1; Colton, Three Years, 155). Colton estimated that in all 1200 Californians were in arms at one time.

22. Flores charged that Gillespie violated the terms and Gillespie denied this vigorously. Gillespie seems to have interpreted the terms, which were loosely drawn, with a view to the advantage of his side, and Flores to have judged largely, if not entirely, from what he supposed to be Gillespie’s intentions. We have not sufficient data to say more. A misunderstanding was very natural, and possibly Gillespie, since he was dealing with perjured men, thought it right to take every advantage he could. Flores sent parties to San Diego and Santa Barbara, and captured those places. Capt. Merritt of the California Battalion, commanding at the former place, took refuge on a whale-ship. Lieut. Talbot, commanding at Santa Barbara, refused to surrender, and with his eight or ten men made an extremely brave escape through the mountains.

23. At this point Mervine’s log book was extremely bitter with reference to Stockton, whom it described as vain, selfish, cowardly, false and ignorant of naval life and duties. The Captain was doubtless smarting under his repulse, due (he asserted) to Stockton’s selfishness in retaining all his field pieces. Stockton explained his going to San Diego by saying that San Pedro was not a good base, and there was force in this view; but it was much nearer to Los Angeles, and certainly he should have decided whether it was a good base before attempting to use it as such. San Diego had been recovered by Merritt and others (Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit., 1888, p. 544). Lieut. Minor of the navy now commanded there.

24. Kearny’s march; battle of S. Pascual. Colton, Three Years, 153, 180. Cooke, Conquest, 84–6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 153, 242. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, pt. 2, pp. 55–66. 337Turner, diary. 61Kearny to adj. gen., Oct. 3, 11. 62Marcy to gov. Mo., June 3. Ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 551–63, 567–614. 47Stockton, Feb. 4, 1847. Polk, Diary, May 25, 30; June 2, 1846. 61Emory to adj. gen., Feb. 2, 1847. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 204–30. 61Wooster to adj. gen., Sept. 25, 1846. Apuntes, 359–60. Bidwell, Calif., 200. 126Botello, Anales, 154–6. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 315. 177Davis, statement. 290Pico, documentos, 105, 115. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 23, 1847. Journal U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294; Oct., 1892, p. 413. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 513–6. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 31, 41, 46, 64–5, 129–33, 161, 186–9, 204, 272, 331. McGroarty, Calif., 261. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 236, 1049–50. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 24–7. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Peters, Kit Carson, 281. Porter, Kearny, 14–23. Life of Stockton, 134–6. 76Flores, Dec. 11, 1846; Mar. 31, 1847. 207Griffin, journal.

Including servants and quartermaster’s men, Kearny probably had at least 150; but precisely how many took part in the fighting one cannot say—perhaps not more than 80. Some of the men had to guard the baggage and manage the howitzers, and probably others did not reach the front in time. The howitzers were tied up with rawhide; when made ready they could not fire at first because the two parties were mixed in a hand-to-hand struggle; and when they were preparing to do so later, one was carried away by frightened mules and captured by the enemy. Botello, who talked with Pico after the fight, says that Pico was afraid forces from San Diego would attack him, should he continue to operate against Kearny, and also that Pico’s horses were now too much exhausted to be serviceable. 207Griffin thought the Californians drew off to make sure of keeping the howitzer. It seems clear that Pico did not retire from fear of Kearny—unless possibly from fear of his guns. Dec. 7 Kearny advanced a short distance, drove some Californians from a rocky hill near San Bernardo, and occupied it. In the night of Dec. 10–11 Lieut. Gray and about 215 men from San Diego reinforced him. Lieut. Beale of the navy and the scout Christopher (“Kit”) Carson made their way past the enemy with remarkable courage and endurance, to inform Stockton of Kearny’s desperate situation, and arrived just as Gray was setting out.

25. The troops were all on foot except Gillespie’s men. Stockton had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces.

26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder, and a 2-pounder (76Mar. 31).

27. The insurrection in the south. 330Taylor to brother, Jan. 19, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 266–8. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, pt. 1, pp. 47–54; ix, p. 19. 237Kearny to Stockton, [Jan. 13, 1847]. 47Flores, procl., Oct., 1846. 47Id. to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. 47Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1845; Jan. 11, 15; Feb. 4, 5, 1846. 51Queen to Henderson, Apr. 30, 1848. 61R. B. Mason, Oct. 7, 1847. 61Emory, Feb. 2, 1847. 373Evans, narrative. 376Nicholson, recolls. Kell, Recolls., 29, 80. 12Admty. records, class 1, 5577, enclosure in Y 93. Apuntes, 355–61. 247Gillespie to Larkin, Nov. 29, 1846. 247Larkin to wife, Dec. 14, 1846. 115Belden, statement. 3Alvarado, Calif., v, 220, 240, 267–8. 126Botello, Anales, 140, 158–61. Colton, Three Years, 64, 74, 78, 82, 95, 98, 123, 131, 169–70, 201. Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit., 1888, pp. 139, 539–49. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 311, 316–19. Parker, Recolls., 50. Richman, Calif., 317. 334Torres, Peripecias, 49. 103Avila, notas. 258Marshall, recolls. Upham, FrÉmont, 258. Morrell, Four Voyages, 201. 171Journal of the Cyane. Wash. Union, Apr. 23; May 7; July 24, 1847. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Apr. 2, 1847. Diario, Dec. 1, 1846; Jan. 24, 1847. Sherman, Home Letters, 100. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 266. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 47–323. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 45. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 516–7. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045–54, 1065–70. McGroarty, Calif., 246–52. Bandini, Calif., 143, 146. Revere, Tour, 164–6. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 49–52. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 15–20, 22–4, 30–6 (Stockton). 207Griffin, diary. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. 172Cyane log book. 263Mervine to Stockton, Oct. 25 (2). Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 608 (Benton). Porter, Kearny, 7–9, 25–9. Life of Stockton, 129–48 and appendices. Cutts, Conquest, 156, 197, 203, 207. Bryant, What I Saw, 330. Royce, Calif., 185–94. 47Stockton to Bancroft, July 25, 1846. 52Larkin, no. 63, Jan. 14, 1847. And from 76 the following. Flores, Sept. 30; Oct. 7, 9, 24, 25, 1846; undated; Jan. 2; Mar. 31 (2), 1847. Carrillo, Oct. 8, 1846. Gillespie to Flores, Oct. 2 (2), 3 (2), 4. Flores to Gillespie, Oct. 4 (2). Flores-Gillespie, terms of capitulation, Sept. 29. Carrillo to Flores, Oct. 9. To Flores, Feb. 6, 1847. Bustamante, Mar. 8, 13, 1847. Moreno to Bust., Mar. 20, 1847. Stockton, procl., Jan. 5, 1847. Flores to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. And others of minor importance. Jan. 9 some Mexicans charged our front.

28. FrÉmont’s methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct in June, or accuse him—as did many at the time—of a cowardice that would explain, after all, only a part of the facts.

29. It is particularly singular that FrÉmont did not use the Savannah to communicate with Stockton.

30. The reports of Flores show that FrÉmont’s approach embarrassed the insurgents. FrÉmont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny wrote a note to FrÉmont stating that the Americans were entering Los Angeles.

31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened, and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years, 73–6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378–383; 10Aram, statement; 4Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California Flores released him. (See particularly 52Larkin, no. 63, January 14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; 263Mervine to FrÉmont, Nov. 21.)

32. FrÉmont’s operations. 316Fulsom to Sherman, Jan. 9, 1848. 47Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1846; Jan. 11, 15, 1847. Colton, Three Years, 98. 47FrÉmont, orders, Jan. 12, 1847. 122Bidwell, Calif., 203. 258Marshall, recolls. Bryant, What I Saw, 365–94. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 6, 73–7, 119–21, 131, 184, 194, 260, 377–9, 405. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045, 1052, 1067–9. Revere, Tour, 78. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 40–2 (Wilson), 50 (Russell). Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 18, 21–2. Tuthill, Calif., 222. Porter, Kearny, 29. Life of Stockton, 148–9. Royce, Calif., 194. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). 76Flores, Mar. 31, 1847 (2). 76Moreno to Bustamante, Mar. 20, 1847. Cutts, Conquest, 156–64. Sherman, Home Letters, 113.

XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS

1. As early as August 16 Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor thought it would be necessary to attack the city of Mexico by way of Vera Cruz.

2. The fortress of San Juan de UlÚa stood on a reef about three-quarters of a mile from the strong fort which guarded the north end of Vera Cruz at the water line. U. S. Consul Campbell of Havana informed Conner before June 10, 1846, that the defences of UlÚa on the side facing the city were partially undermined and poorly armed, and that, as all the Mexican preparations had been founded on the belief that future assailants would adopt the French plan of attack, he could place his vessels on that side at night with little or no injury, and easily take the fortress by escalade; but Conner does not appear to have endorsed this opinion. An American named Jobson, who resided at Vera Cruz, wrote to the war department, Feb. 14, 1847, that nobody except the Americans was afraid of UlÚa; that in September, 1846, it had been garrisoned by only 180 men, who, being neither paid nor fed, ran up the American flag on the night of Sept. 17; and that Conner might have passed in by the south channel, put 500 men ashore, and captured the fortress in half an hour. See chap. xxx, note 20.

3. These regiments were to come from Mass., New York, Penn., Va., No. and So. Carolina, Miss., La. and Texas (mounted men)—one from each; and in December a second regiment was invited from Penn. There was considerable hesitation about calling on Massachusetts, but it was concluded that should she fail to supply her quota, the country would take note of her attitude. Marcy issued the calls on Nov. 16 (Nov. 27 Florida was asked for a company), and the abruptness of the change wrought by Benton is shown by the fact that only five days earlier Marcy had stated that the volunteers then in service were “deemed sufficient for the prosecution of the war” (Wash. Union, May 28, 1847). The field and staff officers were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant (a lieutenant from one of the companies), a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant and two principal musicians. Each of the ten companies of a regiment was to have a captain, a lieutenant, two second lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians and eighty privates, but a company including sixty-four effective privates was to be accepted. These privates were to be in physical vigor and apparently 18–45 (inclusive) years of age. The field and company officers were to be men appointed and commissioned under the laws of their state. The rendezvous of the infantry were to be Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Guiandotte (Va.), Wilmington, Charleston, Vicksburg, New Orleans. Most of the regiments were made up rather slowly, and there was so much difficulty in Virginia that her recruiting officers went into Maryland. This difficulty appears to have been due to a lack of enthusiasm for the war (first part of chap. xxxiv). The supposedly brilliant victory at Monterey had exercised a favorable influence, but the obligation to serve the war out had a contrary effect, and the terms of the law, which required the independent action of the state governments, caused delay in some instances. The First Pennsylvania reached New Orleans Dec. 29 and 30, and at that time the Mississippi regiment was expected to arrive there by Jan. 10. The South Carolina regiment was ready on Dec. 22.

Special efforts were made at the same time to bring the regular army up to 15,000 men. The authorized maximum was at this time 16,998 (including 780 commissioned officers), but in spite of energetic recruiting only 10,381 were actually serving in the two regiments of dragoons, one of Mounted Riflemen, four of “artillery,” eight of infantry, and a co. of engineer soldiers (Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 62–3). Nov. 3 the recruiting officers were authorized to pay a citizen, non-commissioned officer, or soldier $2.00 for each accepted man brought to the rendezvous (65gen. orders 48). The minimum height was reduced to five feet and three inches (65gen. orders 51). Men desiring to enlist had probably felt more drawn to the briefer volunteer service, and had waited for a second call. Besides, the widows and orphans of volunteers (but not of regulars) were to be pensioned, and the prevailing high wages for labor deterred many from wishing to enlist. The lack of officers in the regular army still continued serious. On July 30, 1846, less than one third of the regimental field officers were available. The regiments in Mexico did not average one field officer apiece.

According to the report of the adjutant general dated Dec. 5, 1846, Taylor had (including the garrison at Tampico and troops en route, but subject to some deductions) 7406 regulars and 10,926 volunteers, besides 621 and 2039 respectively under Wool. Adding to these 446 and 3546 respectively under Kearny, and the New York regiment en route to California, one finds that the land forces amounted to 25,750 men before the November calls were issued; but subtractions of an unknown magnitude needed to be made from these figures so far as availability was concerned. These and further details may be found in Sen. 1; 29, 2. See also the following. 62Marcy to govs., Nov. 16. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). 61Bowman to Jones, Dec. 4; to Polk, Dec. 29. 61Brooke to Jones, Dec. 29. Wash. Union, Nov. 30, 1846; May 28, 1847. 61Jones to Scott, Dec. 17. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 10, 14–16. 62Marcy to gov. Fla., Dec. 27. 63Marcy to gov. Mass., Nov. 16; to gov. Tex., Nov. 20; to gov. Iowa, Nov. 25. Niles, Nov. 21, 1846, p. 179; Jan. 16, 1847, p. 308. 29Brown to Marcy, Oct. 6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 62. 13Pakenham, no. 132, Nov. 23. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 428 (Cabell). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 478 (Freeman), 873 (Marcy). West Va. dept. arch. and hist., report, 1910, p. 186.

4. Genesis of the Vera Cruz expedition. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45 (Marcy, report). 52Black, Oct. 29. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 63. 13Pakenham, nos. 119, 130, 132, 140, 150. 228G. Flagg to A. Flagg, Dec. 17. Picayune, Apr. 30; Oct. 5; Dec. 11, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847 (Taylor to Gaines). (Calhoun) Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 323. Polk, Diary, July 2; Aug. 29; Oct. 10, 17–22; Nov. 7–17; Dec. 1, 2, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Meigs, Benton, 361. 108Bancroft to Polk, Dec. 3. Benton; View, ii, 693–4. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, priv., Dec. 29. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273. 335Letter from P. F. Smith (with Trist’s letter to Buchanan, Sept. 28, 1847, private). Wash. Union, Sept. 29; Oct. 2. Niles, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 20. 206James Graham to Gov. Graham, Jan. 10, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 1. Scott, Mems., ii, 404. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 134. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 333, 355, 363, 1231 (Marcy); 1268–1270, 1273–4 (Scott); 351 (Taylor). 297Benton, memo., July 4. 297Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7. 47Conner, June 11; July 22; Oct. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 148. 52Campbell, June 9. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. 58Jobson, Feb. 14, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 170. Bancroft to Conner, May 30. Conner, Castle of Ulloa. 256Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1847. 180Pillow to wife, Aug. 16. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1. 13Doyle, no. 79, 1843. 69P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. 354Welles papers. 152Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, priv. and confid. Journal des DÉbats, Nov. 4. Boston Atlas, Dec. 17. Buchanan, Works, viii, 365. Diccionario Universal (UlÚa). Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 191. (UlÚa) See chaps. xxii, p. 21, xxx.

5. It is believed that the preceding text and notes afford ample support for this sentence. Note 27 contains additional references; and see Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 361–2. Taylor seems never to have perceived that Polk could have superseded him with a Democrat by merely sending Jesup or Wool to the army with reinforcements before brevetting him major general and ordering him to serve with his brevet rank. Nov. 10 Polk asserted in his diary that he had known no politics with reference to Taylor. The diary shows that he was aware how Taylor felt about him. This was not at all surprising. Pillow’s letters indicate plainly that he understood the matter and he was in confidential correspondence with the President. Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor systematically proscribed Polk’s friends, and this may offset some of Taylor’s assertions that he himself was persecuted by the administration.

6. Dec. 10 (Bixby) Taylor wrote to his son-in-law that he would not say he would refuse to serve, if elected President. This meant of course that he was a candidate. His formal announcement came the following month.

7. It is probable that the administration knew how Taylor felt about the Vera Cruz expedition, for he was outspoken, and Polk had more than one correspondent in his camp.

8. Scott, like nearly all the Whigs, disapproved of a war made by a Democratic administration for (as the Whigs generally alleged) party reasons, but was ready to do his duty as a soldier (13Pakenham, separate and confidential, Sept. 28).

9. The selection of the commander. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 363, 367, 369, 373 (Marcy); 372, 1268–70 (Scott); 383 (Bliss); 384 (Patterson). 169Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26 (“I never, for a moment, ceased to watch over your fame and interests with the liveliest solicitude”). Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 15; Oct. 22; Nov. 10, 14, 17–19, 21, 1846; May 6, 1847; Jan. 4, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 386, 399. London Times, June 30, 1847. 132Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5. 169Scott to Crittenden, Sept. 17. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26; Mar. 25, 1847. 354Welles papers. Note particularly Taylor’s political exchanges with. 169Crittenden and Wood (Bixby coll.) during the summer and autumn. 180Pillow to wife, Oct. 27; Dec. 8. 330Taylor to brother, Dec. 12, 1846; Jan. 19, 1848. Id., Letters (Bixby), June 3; Aug. 23; Nov. 26; Dec. 10, 13, 1846; Jan. 26; Feb. 9; May 9; Aug. 29, 1847. 345Blair to Van Buren, July 7. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243–4. 169Scott to Marcy, Sept. 12. 62Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14. 256Id. to Wetmore, June 28. Watson, In Memoriam, 115. Grant, Mems., i, 120. Meade, Letters, i, 175. Nat. Intelligencer, Aug. 29. Garrison, Extension, 242. Bancroft, Pacific States, viii, 375. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 564. Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846, private: “The fate of the Administration depends on the successful conduct of the war” (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601).

10. Scott’s figures were slightly below the adjutant general’s. Possibly the latter used returns of later dates. Taylor did not have so many available troops, and accused Scott of stating what he knew or should have known to be false (Bixby coll., 181); but if the adjutant general was incorrectly informed as to the strength of the forces, the fault was Taylor’s. See note 3.

11. Scott was severely criticised by Marcy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1239) and others for ordering so many boats, guns and shells, and it was triumphantly proclaimed that, as the result proved, he did not need so large an outfit. But this argument was not sound. He had to reckon on a failure to produce and deliver at the point of shipment in season all that he specified, on a heavy loss through wreckage and other accidents, on the probability that his landing would be opposed, and on the expected necessity of reducing UlÚa; nor did he know that naval guns (to which he actually was compelled to have recourse) would be available. It has been said, too, that the army could have landed in the boats of the blockading squadron, but Scott found on inquiry that only about 500 could go ashore in them at a single trip (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1274). Scott on the other hand was unreasonably bitter in charging the war department with negligence. More could have been done by the government, and errors were committed, but shortcomings and mistakes were inevitable. Marcy’s reply to Scott’s charges (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1218, 1227) needs to be scrutinized carefully. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 14) ridicules Scott (for asking for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for wagons and heavy guns. RÍo del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del RÍo. See Ripley, op. cit., ii, 165.

12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (ibid., 844; 61Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28).

13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except Clifford was opposed to Scott’s marching against the city of Mexico, though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to obtain peace (Polk, Diary).

14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of the expedition, but Polk’s precaution was wise. Some despatches were intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to Taylor, marked “confidential” both outside and within, was opened by a subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402). See note 15.

15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (62adj. gen. to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by specified dates should have been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty messengers not later than Nov. 30.

16. Scott’s operations, etc., up to Dec. 27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 373, 838–41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273–5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873, 1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov. 10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727–8. Journ. of Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 442. 234A. Johnson to —–, Dec. 2. 191Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402. 256Id. to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. 61H. L. Scott, Nov. 24. 61W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. 62Jones to Taylor, May 5, 1847. 164Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P. S. Dec. 27). Picayune, Dec. 24. “The Brazos” signified loosely a region comprising Brazos Id., Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande.

Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New Orleans via New York when he might have reached that place in seven (ibid., 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of head winds.

While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that the expedition (which Scott intimated was bound for San Luis PotosÍ) would strike at Vera Cruz, and Polk showed what he meant in promising Scott his full confidence by charging that he had betrayed the secret (Diary, Jan. 14; Feb. 27). The secret was out at New Orleans in reality about two weeks before Scott arrived there, and the newspaper stated later that its information did not come from any person connected with the army (Niles, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 370). (See 256Scott to Marcy, Jan. 27, priv.) Polk also complained—another mark of confidence—that Scott’s vanity was causing him to make “extravagant preparations,” as if Taylor had not shown at Monterey the consequences of failing to prepare adequately. In fact Scott, instead of insisting upon extravagant preparations, wrote Dec. 23 that he would move against Vera Cruz if he could land even 5000 men there early in February (374to Conner).

17. The new First Division included Harney’s (Third) Brigade, now consisting of Co. C (Bragg’s light battery) of the Third Artillery, companies B, C, D and E of the Second Dragoons, the Second Infantry and the Third Infantry; and P. F. Smith’s (Fourth) Brigade, now consisting of Co. E (Sherman’s light battery) of the Third Artillery, two companies of the Mounted Riflemen (without horses), the First and the Seventh Infantry. The rest of the Second Dragoons were to be assigned whenever they should join. Five companies of the Second Infantry had been for some weeks at Montemorelos; the rest, like the Second Tennessee, marched to that point from Camargo. The Fourth Infantry and two companies of the First Artillery were to occupy the citadel. The Washington and Baltimore battalion, which had belonged to the First Division, was now attached to Quitman’s brigade. It will be noted that Taylor, who was incorrectly said to have been exposed with inadequate forces to Mexican attack, now treated Worth in precisely that way, exposing also Saltillo, which he himself called “our most important point” in that region (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 381). Taylor overtook Quitman Dec. 16. Nearly 2000 wagons were now under Taylor’s orders, yet pack-mules were used mainly for the train. By the railroad Victoria is 284 kilometers from Monterey.

18. As the Americans had no positive information regarding Santa Anna’s intentions and movements, Worth was blamed for giving a false alarm. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 304) says S. Anna was unable to leave S. L. PotosÍ. Worth really did expect the Mexicans to reach him considerably sooner than they could have done. Major Gaines with three companies of Kentucky cavalry, previously ordered to Saltillo, seems to have arrived there on Dec. 17. Butler was now ordered to take command at that point.

19. In one letter Taylor stated that he received Scott’s note when two days from Monterey, but this must mean “second day.” Dec. 20 Scott had written to him from New Orleans, explaining his plans more fully, but this letter did not reach him until January 16 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, 1101).

20. From Montemorelos Taylor sent a topographical engineer, escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, to examine Santa Rosa Pass and rejoin the command at Linares. Ten men of May’s rear guard and the baggage were cut off in the pass (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 387–8, 1095. Maury, Recolls., 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 284).

21. “Norther” was the name given to an extremely violent wind which blew at frequent intervals from October to April, lasting usually about three days. During Scott’s operations one lasted seventy-six hours. It grew more violent as one went south toward Vera Cruz, probably because the cordillera approached the coast and produced somewhat the effect of a funnel. Its merit was that it prevented yellow fever.

22. The real Mexican cavalry numbered about 1000 under Gen. Romero, who was sent by Valencia, now commanding at Tula, because the governor of Tamaulipas had asked for 1000 infantry. The cavalry arrived at Victoria on Dec. 24. Only 200 were regulars. The rest were badly armed and munitioned, and cavalry were not suitable for a region covered with woods and intersected with rivers. The people, however, prepared to coÖperate with them; but arms were lacking, and the revenues of the state had mostly been cut off by the occupation of Matamoros and Tampico (Gaceta de C. Victoria, July 23, 1846). Valencia was very anxious to attack the Americans, but Santa Anna would not permit this—probably because he did not wish Valencia either to be defeated or to win Éclat by succeeding. December 26 Romero received positive orders not to risk an action, and two days later he retired (82gov. Tamaul. to gov. Puebla, Jan. 6, 1847. 77Id. to Relaciones, Apr. 23). Taylor strongly desired to capture Valencia (Roberts, diary).

23. Taylor’s march to Victoria (including Worth’s alarm). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 513 (orders 156); 361, 379, 381, 385, 387–8, 848, 1100 (Taylor); 839, 851, 1156 (Scott). Meade, Letters, i, 170, 172. Autograph, July-Aug., Nov.-Dec., 1912 (Taylor). Diccionario Universal (Itinerario). 307Roberts, diary. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. Henshaw narrative. Velasco, Geog., iv, 150. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277 (Holt’s journal). Henry, Camp. Sketches, 262–287. Robertson, Remins., 185–198. Vedette, ii, no. 9 (Townes). 193Foster to father, Dec. 10. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., Jan. 2, 1847. 69Worth to Bliss, Dec. 16; to Butler, Dec. 18. 69Butler to Bliss, Dec. 20. 69Wool to Worth, Dec. 24. 69Riley to Bliss, Dec. 10. 69Quitman to Bliss, Dec. 30. 69Worth to Bliss, Dec. 4. 65Taylor, gen. orders 160, Dec. 22. 169Id. to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Id., Letters (Bixby), 180. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 300–1. 61Clarke to McCall, Dec. 27. Apuntes, 86–7. Scott, Mems., ii, 402. 69Wool to Butler, Dec. 25. Delta, Jan. 24; Feb. 13, 1847. 52Black, Oct. 8. 299Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 6, 1847. Scott wrote privately (256Jan. 16) that “friend Taylor ... turned his back upon the appointment I gave him ... saying he would be back, at Monterey, in 36 days, the 1st of February!!” Taylor actually wrote that he might return “early in Feb.” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 848). Also the following from 76. S. Anna, Dec. 22, muy priv. Id., Dec. 24; Jan. 1. Gov. Tamaul., Oct. 22; Dec. 3. E. GonzÁlez, Dec. 29. Comte. Nat. Gd., Catorce, Dec. 30. Instead of admitting that his journey to Victoria delayed the receipt of Scott’s letter of Jan. 3 to him, Taylor complained in his characteristic fashion that it should have been sent by a special messenger (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1101).

24. One naturally inquires why Taylor concentrated more than 5000 men at Victoria. He stated that he went in that direction to examine the passes and establish one or more posts, and that he sent Patterson’s command there because Mexican parties were going from Tula to that point; but he had been ordered, Oct. 22, to have 4000 men ready to embark for Vera Cruz, if he could spare them (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 366), and presumably had this in mind. But see his letter, Bixby coll., 72.

25. Such was the regular Mexican measure. In this as in some other cases the American estimates were higher.

26. Patterson’s march to Victoria. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 358 (Marcy); 379, 387–8 (Taylor); 383 (Bliss); 383–4 (Patterson); 569, 571 (Jesup). 60Patterson, Dec. 8. 292Pillow to wife, Dec. 15. Amer. Flag, Matamoros, Dec. 26. 332Tennery, diary. 254McClellan, diary. 322Smith, diary. Diccionario Universal (Itinerario). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (G. W. Smith). Engineer School, U. S. A., Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). 60Belknap, memo, (with Patterson, Nov. 1). 193Heiman to Mrs. Foster, Feb. 28. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 16. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 275–318. 335Trist, draft of address. Welles papers (Pol. Hist. of U. S.). 139Campbell to D. C., Nov. 2, 1846; Jan. 2; Feb. 19, 1847. Scott, Mems., ii, 423. 159Collins, diary. Hist. Teacher’s Mag., Apr., 1912, p. 75. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 250–1. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857 (Scott). 146Caswell, diary. 275Nelson to Coe, Oct. 14, 1846 (“The General in making a speech to us a day or two ago said that we should go on, or if it so happened that we had to stay that he (Pillow) would remain with us. This would make our situation deplorable indeed. Our Brigadier General I am sorry to say is universally unpopular”). Two soldiers wrote: “We do not charge Gen. Pillow with that wholesale abuse that has been heaped upon him by many. It is his misfortune to be cursed with unalloyed selfishness” (McLean County Hist. Soc. Trans., i, 24). 280Nunelee, diary. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277 (Holt’s journal). 180Pillow to wife, Oct. 27. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 180. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, 177–8. McCall, Letters, 474. 273Mullan, diary. Bishop, Journal.

27. Scott’s operations, Dec. 27-Jan. 7, including the division of the troops. 61H. L. Scott, Dec. 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 842, 844, 848, 851, 853, 875, 1156 (Scott); 858–9 (Butler); 860–1 (Worth). 61Butler, Jan. 8, 1847. Wash. Union, Jan. 13, 1847. (Suggested) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353; Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Ordered) Polk, Diary, Nov. 17–19. (Appointed) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 372 (Marcy). (Authority) Polk, Diary, Mar. 21, 1847; Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 502 (Douglas). (Condition) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 390, 1276. (Admitted) Ibid., 1102. (Manner) Ibid., 373, 839, 848, 851. (Purpose) Ibid., 373, 839; Scott, Mems., ii, 403. (Reach) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 848, 852. (Required) Ibid., 864; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 47. (Recognized) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. (“Wormed”) Ibid.; 370Taylor to Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. (Kill) 330Taylor to brother, May 29, 1847. (“Contemptible”) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 180. (Suggestion) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 337, 375 (Taylor). (“Intrigue”) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 84. (Outraged) Ibid., 180. (Degraded) Ibid., 181. (“Discourteous”) Ibid., 179. (Ruin) Ibid., 90, 95. (Expecting) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 890, 1109–10, 1113. (“Sacrificed”) Ibid., 863; Bixby coll., 114. The New Orleans Comm. Bulletin said a fearful responsibility rested on the government for exposing Taylor. See also 330Taylor to brother, Feb. 8; Apr. 5, 22; May 29, 1847; Jan. 19, 1848.

For a particular reason both Scott and Taylor (169to Crittenden, Jan. 26) felt sure that Santa Anna would go to Vera Cruz promptly. This reason was the capture of Scott’s original letter of Jan. 3 to Taylor, borne by Lieut. Richey (French, Two Wars, 71; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 876, 890; Meade, Letters, i, 182; Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 82). It was believed that the letter was in Santa Anna’s hands by about Jan. 15. For this reason and the tardiness of the new volunteer regiments Scott felt that he needed more and Taylor fewer troops than he otherwise would have estimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). Indeed, Taylor wrote to Scott on Jan. 26 that Santa Anna had already left the north (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 890). Scott was so confident that he would meet serious opposition at Vera Cruz that he employed five or six agents to obtain information about the forces assembling there. Marcy entertained the same expectation (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 369). Ripley (op. cit., i, 358) argues that S. Anna had a better chance of success in attacking Taylor than he would have had in attacking Scott, and therefore Scott should not have believed that S. Anna would oppose his debarkation. But Ripley could not have proved his premise; and, even were that true, the additional advantage that would have been gained by guarding the route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City looked like a decisive consideration. S. Anna’s moving against Taylor was largely due to political considerations not understood by either Scott or Ripley.

Taylor gradually settled down upon the idea that the aim of Polk and Scott was to cause him to leave Mexico in disgust (330to brother, Feb. 8; Apr. 5). Later he changed “Scott, Marcy & Co.” to “Scott, Polk & Co.” (330to brother, Jan. 19, 1848), thus smiting at one stroke a rival in his own party (see 330letter to brother, Apr. 5, 1848) and a supposed rival in the other.

The number of troops left with Taylor for defence against an enemy who was not expected to advance was about 800 regulars and 6–7000 well seasoned and respectably trained volunteers (169Taylor to Crittenden, March 25, 1847) besides several regiments of new volunteers—say 2400–2800 men—who were expected to arrive soon; while Scott had less than 13,000 to face (with all the disadvantages of debarking) the garrisons of Vera Cruz and UlÚa, the army that Santa Anna was believed to be leading against him, and all such reinforcements as the Mexican government could raise when threatened at the vital point. Moreover Scott’s new volunteers were to land with practically no training whatever, and could hardly be counted on for the initial fighting. Taylor said that for a blow at the capital 25,000 men (10,000 of them regulars) would be required (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353). As Scott pointed out, Taylor now had really nothing to do except defend Texas (Memoirs, ii, 409) and, should it be practicable, aid Scott’s offensive by threatening to advance. Scott took Robert E. Lee from Taylor’s army.

On receiving Scott’s orders of Jan. 3 Taylor replied in a style corresponding to his state of mind (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 863). Scott answered: “There are some expressions in those letters [of Jan. 15] which, as I shall wish to forget them, I shall not specify or recall” (ibid., 864); and to Marcy Scott wrote privately: “However, he [Taylor] is still the same excellent man” (256Jan. 23). In his correspondence on this subject Taylor appeared to regard the troops placed under his command as his personal property. The battle of Buena Vista has commonly been cited as the cause of Taylor’s election, but it was the idea that he had been deliberately exposed to the Mexicans which gave that victory its remarkable political effect (210Simms to Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847; So. Qtrly. Review, Jan., 1851, p. 37). It may be observed further that for the government to sacrifice him, his army and all the public property in northern Mexico, and give Santa Anna an opportunity to ravage Texas would have been to commit suicide. The idea was unreasonable.

28. Scott, who was a great soldier but not a great lawyer, had the imprudence to attack Marcy, a master of fence, in regard to the supply of vessels, and he fared rather badly. Marcy’s defence was, however, by no means wholly sound. He himself called it privately a “special plea” (256to Wetmore, Apr. 11, 1848). For example, Dec. 15, 1846, he notified Scott (and also Jesup, who had gone to the front) that he was ordering ten transports in ballast to the Brazos, but later, on receiving a letter dated Jan. 27 from Jesup (then at the Brazos) which over-confidently stated that all needed vessels could be chartered there, he countermanded the order; and this looks like a satisfactory defence against Scott’s complaint that none of the ten transports specified by him in his requisition appeared. But Marcy neglected to inform Jesup or Scott that the order had been countermanded, and, as Jesup’s letter could not have reached Washington before about Jan. 7, Jesup naturally assumed that the ten transports had got under way. Indeed, Jan. 23 the adjutant general wrote what Scott understood to mean that the latter might soon expect ten ships in ballast (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 897). Therefore Jesup and Scott counted upon them (ibid., 896), and naturally did not exert themselves to obtain shipping (when disappointed about vessels already engaged) as otherwise they doubtless would have done. (See Scott, Marcy, Jesup, Hetzel in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 894, 1218, 1227, 1253.) Besides, it was found necessary to send a number of the Brazos vessels to Tampico for the troops of Patterson, Twiggs and Quitman. Jesup (supra) charged Scott with causing delay by changing the assignation of certain regiments; but Scott certainly did not desire to waste time, and it is only fair to suppose that he made the changes for adequate reasons. Jesup complained that many of his officers were inefficient, and Marcy with well feigned naÏvetÉ replied that their names had been presented to Polk [by politicians] with “the highest testimonials.”

29. Harney soon disobeyed Scott’s positive orders at MedellÍn bridge (chap. xxii, note 25), and his biographer admits that he might justly have been shot (Reavis, Harney, 186). Scott, however, merely refrained from reporting the affair, whereupon Harney complained that he had been unjustly ignored. One of the best reasons for studying the Mexican war is to observe how political considerations interfered with military affairs. The Harney episode was enough to justify Scott’s apprehensions of a fire from the rear, but it was not the only instance of executive meddling (213Hatch to sister, Feb. 11, 1847). Another incident also, which occurred at this time, illustrates his magnanimity and good sense. Lieut. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a man of notable talents and attainments and formerly instructor in tactics at West Point, was admirably qualified to act as inspector general, and Scott gave him the post although Hitchcock had repeatedly opposed him, and was personally unfriendly to him. Experience soon made Hitchcock one of Scott’s firmest admirers and partisans (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 234–6).

30. Scott’s operations, Jan. 8-Feb. 15. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 844, 855–6, 866, 875, 880, 882, 890–1, 893, 896, 1218, 1273 (Scott); 874, 1227 (Marcy); 568, 571, 1253 (Jesup); 884, 894 (Hetzel); 868, 870, 887–9, 893, 1164–6 (H. L. Scott); 867, 869, 888 (Harney); 860–1, 870 (Worth); 858–9 (Butler). Niles, Feb. 13, p. 369; Feb. 27, p. 401. 63Marcy to qtrmr. officer, Dec. 11, 15, 1846. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 42–3. 358Williams to father, Jan. 17. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 257. Picayune, Feb. 3; Mar. 12. 180Pillow to wife, Feb. 14. 65Scott, gen. orders. 8, 11. Polk, Diary, Dec. 14, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. Reavis, Harney, 186. Grant, Mems., i, 123–4. 61Worth to adj. gen., Feb. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 176. 60Scott to Marcy, April 5, 1847. 256Id. to Id., Jan. 23, 1847, private. Amer. Flag, Matamoros, Feb. 17. Oswandel, Notes, 48. 62Stanton, Nov. 29; Dec. 7, 13, 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 16, 1847; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 91 (Hitchcock). 322Smith, diary. 364Worth to S., Feb. 17; to wife, Feb. 18. Smith, To Mexico, 84–103 (Worth’s march from Saltillo).

31. An American estimate was 130 miles. This is partially explained perhaps by the fact that the pioneers made some “short cuts” (mule paths) available. Meade (Letters, i, 159) even cut the distance to about 100 miles, but this appears to have been little more than a guess. By the railroad the distance is about 141 miles.

32. From Victoria to Tampico. 146Caswell, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1097 (Taylor); 879 (Patterson). Diccionario Universal (Itinerario). 303Orders 3, Jan. 12. Robertson, Remins., 199–207. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 181. U. S. Engineer School, Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (Id.). Prieto, Tamaulipas, 229. 332Tennery, diary. 273Mullan, diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 27. 322Smith, diary. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26. 69ColecciÓn de Itinerarios. 307Roberts, diary. Meade, Letters, i, 174–5. Defensor de Tamaul., Jan. 18. 76Cos, Feb. 1. 218Henshaw narrative. 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Jan. 25. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 342–93.

33. The author’s opinion of Pillow is based upon his letters to his wife, Polk, Scott, Duncan and others, the Trist papers, the Campbell papers, the records of two courts of inquiry regarding his conduct, and a large number of additional documents, most of which will be cited later, particularly in chaps. xxvi and xxix. An army correspondent of W. T. (later Gen.) Sherman described Pillow, Feb. 26, 1848, as “a mass of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth.” There was good warrant for this characterization, but one should add plausibility, cunning, energy and a genial disposition. For his personal appearance: Semmes, Service, 165.

34. Scott had not yet heard from Washington regarding Harney.

35. At Tampico. 332Tennery, diary. 273Mullan, diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 10–64. 146Caswell, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 896, 899, 900, 1169 (Scott); 901 (Totten); 850 (Clarke); 896 (Hetzel). Robertson, Remins., 207–13. Bishop, Journal. 180Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846; Feb. 23, 1847. 111Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 14; to Gates, Feb. 24. Kenly, Md. Vol., 241–5. 330J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12. 280Nunelee, diary. Apuntes, 88. Meade, Letters, i, 177, 184–5. 218Henshaw narrative, Feb. 20. 254McClellan, diary. 303Shields to Quitman, Mar. 4. 159Collins, diary, Feb. 19, 25. Davis, Autobiog., 121–3. 65Scott, gen. orders 21, Feb. 19. 76Cos, Feb. 19. 76Anon. letters to Garay, Jan. 25, 28, etc. 139Campbell to wife, Feb. 3, 7, 16. Mason, Lee, 37. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 394–415. Works defending the two land approaches to Tampico were now ready, and Col. Gates of the Third Artillery with a company of artillery, the Md. and D. C. battalion and the new Louisiana regiment—about 1200 men in all—were detached as a garrison. Rumors came that Taylor was in danger, but the air was full of rumors about the enemy, and Scott had ample ground for disregarding these, though criticised for doing so. Von Moltke said (Franco-German War, 71): “It would have been unjustifiable to entirely change the line of march on the ground of rumors that might, after all, prove unfounded.” Feb. 19 Scott announced his staff appointments. The possession of Tampico was extremely useful to him. Fresh provisions abounded there, and the embarking of about 5000 men on the dangerous coast at the Brazos was avoided.

36. The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col. De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6 on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at TuxpÁn about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton, Artillery Officer, 32–5; 270Moore, diary; 76F. de Garay, Mar. 5).

37. To Lobos Islands. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259 (Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896 (Scott). 65Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 23, 65. 61Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott, Jan. 9, 21. 62Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 413. 298Porter, diary. 254McClellan, Feb. 23. 193Foster to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108. 164Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. Niles, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20, p. 48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54–6. Picayune, Feb. 18. 159Collins, diary. 146Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal.

38. Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue (256Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants that supposition.

39. Taylor’s movements. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097 (Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180–2. 169Id. to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Mar. 21–23; Apr. 1, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit. xiv, 443.

Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: “I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, and to make no detachments, except for reconnaisances and immediate defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the government, founded on reasons in which I concur” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at his advanced position unless “positively ordered to fall back by the government at Washington” (ibid., 1162). In addressing the government on the same day (ibid., 1110) he referred to Scott’s instructions as advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to make a diversion toward San Luis PotosÍ (ibid., p. 876). Polk (Diary, April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his orders by taking his advanced position.

Taylor’s ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region that lay between San Luis PotosÍ and the advanced American position, rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it, the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey would have starved or been destroyed, the troops—disheartened by retreating, and beyond succor—would have surrendered or been cut to pieces, and every American dÉpÔt in the rear would have been abandoned or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (i.e. both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2) This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and, if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all ways—as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 356, 364) to prepare it—for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor, 238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor’s explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor’s retirement to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat Taylor’s personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works (Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8) Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to Monterey from San Luis PotosÍ? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor’s; and, if he was to stand a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north were en route, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only forty men: Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 335) via Presidio del Rio Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain, as he actually did, whether he could safely go there.

Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently, had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847), and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion the author is indebted to Ripley’s “War with Mexico.”) In short, the only rational explanation of Taylor’s course appears to be that suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day’s march beyond Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy’s (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: “We have advanced as far from our base in this quarter as we ought to venture” (Bixby coll., 72).

The troops that Taylor now had were: regulars—two squadrons of cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of artillery; volunteers—two regiments of horse, eight regiments of foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098).

XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE

1. Butler returned to Monterey about the first of February.

2. The statements regarding Taylor’s negligence are from Gen. Benham, who was on the ground as an engineer officer. His “Recollections” was published in 1871, and whether it was based on documents is not known. But, being an engineer, he was a man of clear and trained intelligence; he possessed superior ability; and on careful inquiry the author was told by Major Lukesh, director of the engineer school, Washington Barracks, that in 1878 his faculties appeared to be entirely sound. Moreover his account shows internal evidences of credibility. The alleged negligence of Taylor was in accordance with his temperament and previous record, and he probably thought it would reassure the troops.

3. Taylor wrote nothing and did nothing indicating an intention to make his stand at Carnero Pass, and the evidence that he intended to fight at Agua Nueva seems to be decisive. He might, however, have endeavored to annoy the enemy at the Pass.

4. Affairs with Taylor up to Feb. 20. Carleton, Buena Vista, 2–8, 50, 179–80. 190Ewing, diary. 330Taylor to brother, Feb. 8. Raleigh (N. C.) Star, Aug. 18, 1847. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 86, 182. 69Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20, 29. 69Warren to Wool, Feb. 14. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recollections. 61Am. offs. to S. Anna, Mar. 24. 61Heady to Marshall, Aug. 30, 1848. 61Gaines to Scott, May 3, 1847. 65Wool, orders 222. C. M. Clay, Mems., i, 143. Vedette, ii, no. 2 (Oury); no. 8 (Lee). 61[Wool] to adj. gen., Jan. 17. Article on Taylor (by J. Davis) in Appleton’s Biog. Dict. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 248–9. 185Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. 299Posey to friend, Feb. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 161. Smith, Remins., 41–5. Upton, Mil. Policy, 209. Amer. Flag, Matamoros, Feb. 17. N. Y. Tribune, Mar. 29. 367Yell to —–, Jan. 19. Ho. Report 413; 30, 1. Encarnacion Prisoners, 35–8, 92–4. Meade, Letters, i, 169, 182. 300Prickett, letters. Bishop, Journal. 8Anon. diary. 245Bee to Lamar, Dec. 5, 1846. RÁpida Ojeada, 6, 8. Coleman, Critt., i, 308–10. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 70. Benham, Recollections. 253Harney to McLean, June 13. 349Pattridge to Miss W., July 21. Spirit of the Times, May 1 (H. von S.). Hist. Teacher’s Mag., Apr., 1912., p. 75. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. 316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 4, 1848. 146Caswell, diary, Jan. 12. 139Campbell to D. C., Nov. 2, 9, 1846. Senex, Myth. N. Y. Sun, Jan. 28. (Urrea) Delta, Jan. 16. Picayune, Mar. 11; Apr. 14 (Taylor); June 25. Niles, Mar. 20, p. 60; May 8, p. 156. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 441, 1098, 1106–10, 1162 (Taylor); 864, 876 (Scott); 1108 (Wool); 1111–2, 1182 (lists). Monitor Repub., Jan. 14. 76S. Anna, Jan. 26; Feb. 27. 76Zambonino, Jan. 23. 76Auxil. inspector of N. LeÓn to Canales, Jan. 20.

Col. Campbell (First Tenn. regt.): “Old Zack’s” manners are such that he excites no jealousy; “no one feels that he [Taylor] is his superior, but his equal or inferior, and each thinks he can control and manage such a mind” (139to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847). U. S. Grant: We thought the battles on the Rio Grande pretty important, but had “only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the North by the Press and the reports came back to us” (Mems., i, 99). It will be noted that Taylor pursued now the same anti-CÆsarean, anti-Napoleonic policy of teaching his troops to despise the enemy that had been followed by him before the battles of May, 1846 (chap. viii, note 9). The distance by rail from Saltillo to Agua Nueva station is eighteen miles. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 350) speaks of the buildings at Buena Vista as “laid out in regular streets”; but, as the text states, Buena Vista was only a poor farm, not a rich hacienda. A soldier, there present, called it an “insignificant, dirty little rancho.”

5. El Crepusculo, May 16, 1835, said that Santa Anna triumphed over Zacatecas “with the tranquillity of the tiger, which, sated with the flesh of its prey, lies down on what it does not wish to devour.” During December, 1846, very sharp 76letters were exchanged by Governor GonzÁlez and Santa Anna.

6. This estimate is based upon about thirty statements, none of them official. About the middle of August Salas ordered to the north the troops that had been fighting in Jalisco. About 5500 regulars preceded or accompanied Santa Anna’s journey to the north, and later he called other troops from the capital and the states. Though accounts varied, Ampudia seems to have brought nearly 6000; the Fourth Brigade, which had failed to reach Monterey, and the former garrison of Tampico were substantial additions; Guanajuato state, roused personally by Valencia, contributed more than 5000; the Jalisco regiment, which arrived at the end of October, numbered 1345 foot; the state of S. Luis PotosÍ did well, and other states did more or less; and an artillery company was made up from American deserters, mostly Irishmen, under the name of San Patricio (see chap. xi, note 11); but desertion—due to the inborn distaste of the masses for war, to bad treatment and to poor subsistence—was constantly unraveling the work of accumulation.

It seems to have been a mistake to draw Ampudia’s army to San Luis at so early a date. It was in no danger before the end of the armistice; it could have encouraged the people near Saltillo to act as guerillas; and it needed time to regain its morale. Besides, this backward movement had a bad effect on the other troops, and so much was said at San Luis by Ampudia’s men about the prowess of the Americans, that a general order forbidding such talk had to be issued. Ampudia and a number of his officers were put on trial; but the trials were suspended, and most of the accused were exonerated in orders. Several thousand men (successively under Urrea, Valencia and VÁzquez) were kept at Tula, about 125 miles northeast of San Luis. Santa Anna knew the Americans could not bring artillery via Tula, and did not fear them without it; but he looked forward to operating via Victoria against Taylor’s line of communication. Another body was kept at Matehuala. Smaller forces were echeloned in the same general direction; and MiÑÓn’s brigade was thrown still farther forward as a screen, corps of observation and means of annoying the enemy. In order to prevent the Americans from learning about his operations, Santa Anna gave orders to the cavalry at his front that no one should be permitted to go to Saltillo or Monterey without a pass signed by himself.

7. Santa Anna’s arrival, plans and operations at S. L. P.; his financial difficulties there. Amer. Eagle, Apr. 8. 52J. Parrott, Feb. 6. 52Black, Nov. 17, 1846. London Times, Dec. 18, 1846; Mar. 11; Apr. 20, 1847. Matamoros Amer. Flag, Mar. 13. GimÉnez, Mems., 96–7, 264. Journal des DÉbats, Feb. 22. Constitutionnel, Dec. 5, 12, 1846; Jan. 17, 31, 1847. 69Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29, 1846. 69Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. 58Jobson, Feb. 14. 61Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19. 47Black to Conner, Sept. 24, 1846. 47Conner, Oct. 26; Nov. 5; Dec. 1. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Doblado, Memoria que contiene. 70Canalizo to S. Anna, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 249, 271. Gamboa, Impug., 26. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 351; iii, app., 444; iv, app., 177, 417. RamÍrez, MÉxico, 9, 10, 12. MÉxico Á travÉs, iv, 579, 591–2. Don Simplicio, Oct. 10, 1846; Jan. 9, 30; Feb. 17, 1847. Observador Zacat., Dec. 27, 1846, suplem. 100Jefe dept. of V. Cruz to ayunt., Dec. 21, 1846. Eco de Tampico, Oct. 8, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 6. Durango congress, Dec. 11, 1846. Republicano, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847. 80MÉx. state, decree, Nov. 26, 1846. Epoca, Sept. 26; Oct. 13, 1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 16. 77Relaciones, circulars, Sept. 30; Oct. 6, 19, 20, 22, 1846. 75aHacienda, circular, Oct. 14, 1846. 83Gov. QuerÉtaro to other govs., Oct. 16, 1846; to FarÍas, Oct. 18; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; Dec. 21. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 309. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 53–4, 58, 61. Apuntes, 69, 70, 73, 75. Defensa de ... Estrada. Donnavan, Adventures, 51, 76. 13Bankhead, nos. 140, 144, 151, 173, 178, 1846. Muro, MiscelÁnea, 65, 68, 70. GarcÍa, Revol. de Ayutla, 27. Sierra, Evolution, i, 217. CrepÚsculo, May 16, 1835. Puga y Acal, Docs., 57. GarcÍa, JuÁrez, 65. Bustamante, Apuntes ... S. Anna, 289. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 24–5; app., 3, 14, 18–24, 30, 30–9, 66–7. 80Id. to gov. MÉx. state, Nov. 26, 1846; Jan. 31, 1847. Picayune, Mar. 10. Delta, Jan. 22. Independiente, May 22. Wash. Union, Nov. 16, 30, 1846; Mar. 17, 1847. N. Y. Journ. of Commerce, Jan. 8. 80Gov. to legislature, Feb. 15, 1847. Diario, Oct. 1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 24; Nov. 2, 14, 19, 27; Dec. 4, 6, 8, 16, 20, 24, 25, 28, 1846; Jan. 30; Feb. 15, 17, 1847. Monitor Repub., Oct. 18, 31; Nov. 17, 18, 20, 21; Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 8, 29; Feb. 11, 16; Apr. 22; Nov. 30, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 64, 66. 162Conner, Dec. 1, 1846 166Black to Conner. Sept. 24, 1846. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 57. Meade, Letters, i, 160. 52J. Parrott, June 4, 1846. 73BermÚdez de Castro, nos. 343, 346, 1846. 75Gov. MichoacÁn to Relaciones: circ. no. 252 of Relac. Parrodi, Memoria (S. Anna, Oct. 18). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 776, no. 4. 366Letters from S. Anna to gov. S. L. P., Nov. 1. And from 76 the following. Carrera, Nov. 10. Plana mayor, Dec. 1. Valencia, addresses, Oct. 6, 30. Gov. to cong. Durango, Nov. 8. M. EscandÓn, July 21. Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; Nov. 11. PiÑa to Carrera, Dec. 10. Decrees, Sept. 27; Dec. 2. Memo, of artill. sent to S. L. P. Circular, Aug. 4. Report on artillery, Nov. 13. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Oct. 3. Comisario gen. to S. Anna, Nov. 30; Dec. 5. Juan Morales, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Durango, address, Oct. 16. Guerra, circulars, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Nov. 30; Dec. 2, 1846. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct. 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 22, res., 25, res., 28, 30, 31; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 19, 22, 28, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 20; Feb. 27, 1847. Mora, Apr. 22, 1847. Comte. gen. Guanajuato, Oct. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 28, 1846. S. L. P. assembly, decree, June 17, 1846. Ampudia to S. Anna, Oct. 18. Relaciones, Jan. 11. J. G. P. Garay, June 8, 1846. Valencia, proclam., Dec., 1844. YÁÑez, Oct. 9; Nov. 6, 1846. Ampudia, Oct. 1, 1846. Valencia, Nov. 8. To S. Anna, Oct. 17. S. Anna to gov. Zacatecas, Dec. 17.

8. Copies of the Herald containing this letter arrived at Vera Cruz, but were seized. Later Santa Anna denied flatly that he had had any dealings with the United States (ApelaciÓn, 16).

9. As Santa Anna’s movement rested essentially upon non-military reasons, Scott’s forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect. The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have arrived in that vicinity (76S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, 18, 1847. Id., ApelaciÓn, 33. 76To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847). Taylor’s moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott’s letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor’s weakness, and thus may have been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista.

10. Why Santa Anna marched north (complaints of his conduct). 52Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, 218. Soldado de la Patria, no. 13. London Times, Jan. 28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Courrier des Etats Unis, June 20; July 9, 1846. 335Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846. Gamboa, Impug., 15–19, 21–2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. RamÍrez, Mexico, 173, 192. Don Simplicio, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. 82MS. apparently written in Jan., 1847. 77Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. Republicano, Jan. 21, 31. 13Pakenham, no. 127, 1846. 83Gov. QuerÉtaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S. Anna, 1847. 13Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete, InvasiÓn, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, ExposiciÓn. 13Bankhead, nos. 121, 140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. GarcÍa, JuÁrez, 65. Tributo Á la Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, MÉx., 1847, 6. Id., ApelaciÓn, 16, 23. Picayune, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, MazatlÁn, Jan. 18. 80OlaguÍbel to S. Anna, Jan. —, 1847. Wash. Union, Oct. 10, 1846 (from La Patria); Mar. 17, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond Times, Sept. 2, 1846. Diario, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30, 1847. Monitor Repub., Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4, 6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor’s forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 57. 73BermÚdez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. 76Relaciones, Jan. 11. 76S. Anna, Feb. 27. 76Id., Manifiesto, Jan. 26.

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned from Richey’s despatches (chap. xviii, note 27) that Taylor’s forces had been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna’s declaration in defence of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack Vera Cruz (ApelaciÓn, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2) S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico to S. Luis PotosÍ shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is hardly conceivable that Scott’s intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not, like Marcy’s of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters.

11. The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500 infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under MejÍa) stationed at Matehuala, and 1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (TorrejÓn at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and MiÑÓn at La EncarnaciÓn), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers—a total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from RÁpida Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna’s staff) printed in El Republicano of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna’s figures were smaller but perhaps did not include MiÑÓn’s and Parrodi’s troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16’s, all of which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12’s, five 8’s and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition, appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor’s communications and threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points not named above.

It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (e.g.) be an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla and Saltillo.

12. At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power.

13. The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17–19 (Apuntes, 96). Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125 miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo, through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, note 5). After MiÑÓn advanced to PotosÍ, Andrade occupied La EncarnaciÓn (night of Feb. 11). The wheel pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. PotosÍ to Agua Nueva by rail is about 223 miles.

14. Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures may or may not have included these and MiÑÓn’s force. Probably they did include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (Republicano, May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and operations have disappeared from 76.

15. To and at La EncarnaciÓn. Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229. LeÓn, MÉx., 474. GarcÍa, JuÁrez, 67. London Times, May 10. Journal Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. GimÉnez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution, 219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31–49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. RÁpida Ojeada, 4, 7–9, etc. OrdÓÑez, RefutaciÓn, 5, 8, etc. 61Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. RodrÍguez, Breve ReseÑa, 1848, 57. Republicano, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. 80S. Anna to gov. MÉxico state, Jan. 27. Epoca, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 389. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 60–9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91–7. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. Id., ApelaciÓn, 24–7, 32; app., 67. Muro, MiscelÁnea, 73–5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153–8. De Peyster, Kearny, 127. Diario, June 13. Monitor Repub., Nov. 30. Journal of U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. RÁpida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 62. 73BermÚdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. 76S. Anna, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of the route.

16. One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him information about the ground (76Mora, April 23, 1847).

17. From La EncarnaciÓn to Carnero Pass. Carleton, Buena Vista, 232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. Epoca, Feb. 25. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 25. OrdÓÑez, RefutaciÓn. Republicano, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156–8. Diario, June 13 (OrdÓÑez). Diccionario Universal (Itinerarios). 76Mora, Feb. 25. 76S. Anna, Feb. 27.

18. McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La EncarnaciÓn and found cavalry there.

19. Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named VÁldez the failure of his plan to surprise Taylor (ApelaciÓn, 26), but the story of VÁldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande.

20. Chamberlain’s 147diary states in detail, quoting the remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary, which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool’s orderly he served as one of May’s dragoons, who were commonly used by Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it.

As the route via La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista, one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point; and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, note 39).

21. At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall’s Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them (officer’s diary in Republicano, May 3, 1847). Yell’s instructions were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from La Encantada.

22. Taylor’s operations Feb. 20–21 (including night of Feb. 21). 299Posey to friend, Feb. 19. 69Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recollections. Madison Record, 1850 (Prickett). 300Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service, 121–2. Tampico Sentinel, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins., 37, 42. Picayune, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in Cong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41. 173Id., Address. Benham, Recolls. Journ. U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168, 1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12–21, 24–6, 45. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. 76Mora, Feb. 25.

The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the circumstances called for them.

XX. BUENA VISTA

1. Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18.

2. The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor’s verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer in writing was sent by Bliss.

3. Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22.

4. This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington’s guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men were urgently needed for the American left.

5. 330The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76), 209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns—the fourth being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell, 479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col. Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle battalion of four companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col. Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company (attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch’s Texan scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner’s company had been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers. Mostly Wool’s men had been well trained. McCulloch’s company probably served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry. In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309).

6. MiÑÓn issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass.

7. No satisfactory explanation of Taylor’s trips to Saltillo was made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from MiÑÓn while the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua Nueva (N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt, which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor’s escort were not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt. Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion in their reports to Taylor’s visits, while the third only said that the General ordered him to watch MiÑÓn, and, if attacked, defend his post to the last extremity—which were his obvious duties. There seems to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor’s duty to be on the ground at that time.

8. Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97–9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry); 171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186 (Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren); 206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5–9, 27–49, 177–86. GonzÁlez, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77–8. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. 190Ewing, diary. Raleigh Star, Aug. 18. 276Neville diary. Delta, Mar. 14, 1848. 69Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recolls. 110Barbour, diary. Vedette, iv, no. 8 (Lee). 8Anon. diary. 61[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. 300Prickett, letters. RÁpida Ojeada. Diario, Apr. 17. Matamoros Amer. Flag, Mar. 20. Republicano, May 3. 80Ampudia to gov. MÉx. state, Oct. 10. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 71–3. Apuntes, 98–100. Taylor and his Generals, 166. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 25–7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55. Scribner, Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214–5. Smith, Remins., 37, 48. Picayune, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct. 19; Dec. 3. Delta, July 11. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 413–4. Benham, Recolls. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 7. Spirit of the Times, May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis, i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. CarreÑo, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168 (Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38–9. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. Littell no. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat. Notes. 76Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig. Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora.

9. The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated, cannot be fully harmonized. E.g. Carleton puts the 24-pounders on the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough ground. Gen. PÉrez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills.

10. Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the time and did not understand his work (65orders 281). His men keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner, Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss of Marshall’s troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa Anna’s columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles’s order is not certain; but O’Brien’s horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of his order was that he specified no place to stop.

Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran (Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (ibid., 163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (ibid., 276). Other officers were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous delinquent and became the scapegoat.

11. The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to coÖperate, and prevented a large force of infantry from doing so (Republicano, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer. He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them fought here (Niles, May 8, 1847, p. 157; Spirit of the Times, May 1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93). American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes.

What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool’s. He understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers (“cuirassiers”) retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley, and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna’s position. On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm (BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack.

12. A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move; but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order. Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best position, except in the case of absolute necessity.

13. Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon.

14. The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna, designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans give the view of the text (e.g. Apuntes, 102), and a field officer (probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155, p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain (Carleton, B. Vista, 105).

15. As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been equal in the north field. Santa Anna’s critics charged that he simply threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre, sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on the west side of the road and from behind the western hills. Again, as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat to MiÑÓn’s failing to attack Taylor’s rear (Negrete, InvasiÓn, ii, 378); but MiÑÓn had not force enough to do this effectively, and such a duty had not been assigned to him (BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 71). GimÉnez (Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa Anna upon the soldiers.

16. Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor’s aide, told Mansfield that he carried this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact. Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor’s eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order emanated from Taylor (Charleston Courier, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford, who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report. Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded, and hence PÉrez, second in that command, took his place. It has been said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his old wound had reopened (76Feb. 23).

17. The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg’s 6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained in the city. MiÑÓn found that on account of the broken ground he could do nothing (MiÑÓn in Delta, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson of Webster’s company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that MiÑÓn lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near Saltillo but they accomplished nothing.

18. Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done. With convincing energy Taylor replied, “Go and tell your Colonel that he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give them Jesse”; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a stronger Biblical word than “Jesse.” According to Gen. Chamberlain, instead of saying, “Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg,” he exclaimed, “Double-shot your guns and give ’em hell!” Rev. Theodore Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be “very well authenticated.” Seeing McKee’s regiment stagger, Taylor cried as if the men could hear him, “By God, this will not do; this is not the way for Kentuckians to behave.” Then they rallied, and rising in his stirrups he shouted, “Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That’s the way to do it. Give ’em hell, damn ’em!” There is ample reason to believe that such Taylor could be on the battlefield.

19. The battle of Feb. 23. The reports of Taylor and his officers in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97–209. 267Reports of Miss. captains. Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista, passim. CalderÓn, Rectif. Ceballos, CapÍtulos, 122–3. GonzÁlez, Aguascalientes, 159–60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. RÁpida Ojeada, Segunda Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78–83. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443–4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary. Sierra, Evolution, i, 219. Delta, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182. 69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30. 147Chamberlain, diary. 148Id., recolls. 69Bragg to [Bliss], Mar. 5. 190Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212–3. Dix, Speeches, i, 210. 330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept. —. Raleigh Star, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. Charleston Mercury, Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410–12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1904, pp. 49–50, 53–6; 1905, p. 209. 61Gorman, report, Mar. 2. 61O’Brien court of inquiry. 61Gen. Lane, statement, May 19, 1849. 65Gen. Lane court of inquiry. 65Bowles court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63. 110Barbour, diary. Greensborough (N. C.) Morn. Post, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith). 8Anon. diary. 61[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. Madison Record, 1850 (Prickett). 300Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton’s Biog. Dict. (Taylor by J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504–5. Parker, Sermon. 256Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20. 256Wool to Marcy, June 12. 277Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace, 44–51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11–16. Semmes, Service, 120–2. RÁpida Ojeada, i. 5Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 60–5. Id., ApelaciÓn, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24–5. 185Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol., 264. Tampico Sentinel, Mar. 27. Diario, Apr. 16. Republicano, Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20. 80Ampudia to gov. MÉx., Oct. 10. 208Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los Cuerpos. 212Hastings, diary. Negrete, InvasiÓn, iii, app., 33–5. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 80–8. Apuntes, 100–4. Taylor and his Generals, 166. Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59–71. OrdÓÑez, RefutaciÓn, i, ii. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, MiscelÁnea, 75. Smith, Chile con Carne, 215–49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl. Picayune, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24. Delta, Apr. 4; May 30; June 6, 16; July 11. Tropic, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy, 209–10. BoletÍn de la Democracia, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120, 123. 210Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20. 349Pattridge to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34–5. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, pp. 413–7. Benham, Recolls. Wash. Union, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 7, 23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y. Journ. of Commerce, Apr. 16. Monitor Repub., May 6, 16; Nov. 30. Spirit of the Times (H. von S.), May 1. Journ. of U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 296; Oct., 1892, pp. 415–8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis, 87. Charleston Courier, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies. 367Moore to Moore, Apr. 15. Davis, J. Davis, i, 341–50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. CarreÑo, Jefes, ccxxxiv-v. Niles, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83–4; Apr. 24, p. 117; May 8, p. 156. 92AccusaciÓn del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210–3. Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Bragg). 210Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans. ix, 50. South. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1851, 169–89. Littell, no. 155, pp. 233–5. 251Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem. 76S. Anna, Feb. 23. 76Id. to Adame, Feb. 26. 76Mora, Mar. 31, res.

A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H. L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: “I’ve no doubt—inter nos—had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, to vamos [i.e. retreat] we would have been off for Monterey”; but we knew MiÑÓn was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 84).

20. Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other—one out of 3.75 men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212).

21. Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary, March 23, 1847). (Querying) 173J. Davis, Address.

22. The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua Nueva (BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 83), where they hoped to find provisions and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded (Uraga in Monitor Repub., Nov. 30, 1847).

23. BalbontÍn (InvasiÓn, 89) said that the troops felt confident of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body) to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general. Thousands had deserted already.

24. The night of Feb. 23. Semmes, Service, 122. Ceballos, CapÍtulos, 122. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor). 69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30. Chamberlain, diary. Id., recolls. Barbour, diary. Prickett, letters. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 99, 137 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). Delta, June 16; July 11. Benham, Recolls. RÁpida Ojeada, i, ii. OrdÓÑez, RefutaciÓn, i, ii. 5Anaya, Memoria. 185Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. Republicano, Mar. 24; May 3. Carleton, B. Vista, 125–31, 191. French, Two Wars, 81–2. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443–4. Ewing, diary. Dix, Speeches, i, 213. 330Memo. in Taylor’s letters to his brother. 330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Nebel and Kendall, 13. 267Bradford to J. Davis, Mar. 2. Perry, Indiana, 178, etc. Polk, Diary, Mar. 23. Sierra, Evolution, etc., i, 219. Independiente, Apr. 10. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 83, 89, 90–1, 93, 100–1. Apuntes, 104–7. 118Berlandier, journal. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, 29, 32, etc. Gamboa, Impug., 23–5. Scribner, Camp., 66. 52Black, Mar. 6. Picayune, Mar. 24 (Sold. de la Patria); Apr. 11. Monitor Repub., May 6; Nov. 30. Niles, Apr. 10, p. 83. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, 50. 316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. 76S. Anna, Feb. 23, 26, 27. 76Id. to Adame, Feb. 26. 76J. M. Aguirre, Jan. 27, 1848. Wallace, Wallace, 40.

The Kentucky horse and the guns (First Artillery) should have been ordered up from Rinconada Pass as soon as Taylor found there was to be a battle (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 437–8). They could have guarded La Angostura, and Washington’s field pieces would have been invaluable on the plateau.

25. The Mexicans were not driven away by hunger. Statements from persons knowing the facts regarding the provisions available at Agua Nueva differ so radically that we can reach no precise conclusion on that point; but certainly there were enough to support the army more than two days, and then enable it to move. Whatever provisions were at that place could have been brought to the battlefield (BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 89). It seems as if there must also have been supplies at Patos and La VaquerÍa; and MiÑÓn asserted later that, as he sent word to Santa Anna, he had plenty of provisions for the army (Delta, June 16). The question of water is more difficult; but there were many wagons, and enough could have been transported for say 6000 picked men. Apparently some water must have been brought up on Feb. 22 and 23. In short, had Santa Anna felt any assurance of being able to rout the Americans on Feb. 24, he would have tried to do so, knowing that abundant supplies lay at Saltillo. Possibly he might have remained in the vicinity and prepared for another battle, even if he could not fight again the next day; but probably he remembered Scott, and he had not counted upon remaining long at the north.

26. Taylor doubtless expected to obtain the men captured at La EncarnaciÓn, but they had gone south (see Encarnacion Prisoners). Santa Anna had very few to give up, for almost all Americans who had been or might have been captured were killed by his excited troops (RÁpida Ojeada; BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 81; Republicano, March 24, 1847).

27. The Mexican sequel. RÁpida Ojeada, i, ii. Gamboa, Impug., 23–5, 27–9. Otero, ComunicaciÓn, 11. Republicano, Mar. 24; May 3. Epoca, Mar. 2, 11. 208Herran to Acal, Mar. 6, 13. BalbontÍn, InvasiÓn, 95–100. Apuntes, 108–15. S. Anna, ApelaciÓn, app., 39–55, 67. OrdÓÑez, RefutaciÓn, i, ii. Muro, MiscelÁnea, 77–8. 52Black, Mar. 6. Picayune, Mar. 24 (Sold. de la Patria). Independiente, Apr. 10. BoletÍn de la Democracia, no. 21. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 99 (Taylor). Diario, Mar. 31 (S. Anna); June 13. Monitor Repub., Mar. 31; May 6; Nov. 30. CarreÑo, Jefes, ccxlii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor); 1125 (S. Anna). DublÁn, LegislaciÓn, v, 267. 82Gil to Ruano, Mar. 6. 76S. Anna, Feb. 26, 27. 76Id. to Adame, Feb. 26. 76Comte. gen. Puebla, Mar. 3. 76Comte. gen. Tabasco, proclam., Mar. 11. 76Mora, Mar. 31, res. 76Comte. gen. S. L. PotosÍ, Mar. 6. 76A. Bustamante, Mar. 9. 76Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Mar. 4. 76Guerra, circular, Mar. 1.

28. The fortifications of Monterey had already been greatly improved. Col. Morgan, Lieut. Col. Irwin and Major Wall of the Second Ohio occupied respectively Cerralvo, MarÍn and Punta Aguda (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1123). Morgan distinguished himself by a march executed in the face of great odds, and Irwin went to his aid (ibid.). Urrea attacked at least one other train (Mar. 6), and did a large amount of damage. So great became the alarm of the Americans that Col. Curtis, now in charge at Camargo, sent an officer to Washington with a requisition for 50,000 volunteers (Nat. Intelligencer, Mar. 23).

29. The American sequel. 330J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12. 330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Perry, Indiana, 127–8, 137, 149. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5; Mar. 21–3; Apr. 1, 7. 69Mesa to Trist, Mar. 3. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Mar. 25; May 15. 251Lowry, narrative. Amer. Pioneer, Mar. 8. 272Memoir of Morgan. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 327–9. RÁpida Ojeada, 9. 139Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Meade, Letters, i, 143, 182. 69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7. 60Marcy to Brooke, Mar. 22. Picayune, Feb. 18; Mar. 13, 28; Apr. 8. Kenly, Md. Vol., 263–4. Tampico Sentinel, Mar. 27. Carleton, B. Vista, 153–4. 60Marcy, Mar. 22, to Pierce; to Brooke; to Scott; to govs. Grant, Mems., i, 123. Smith, Chile con Carne, 151–71. Delta, Jan. 19. Matamoros Amer. Flag, Feb. 13, 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118–9, 1123–5, 1131 (Taylor). Wash. Union, Mar. 23. N. Y. Journ. of Commerce, Jan. 8. Nat. Intelligencer, Mar. 23. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 59; May 1, p. 131; May 8, pp. 151–2. 185Thomas to Duncan, Mar. 18. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Parrodi, Memoria. Benham, Recolls. 76S. Anna, Feb. 27. 76Carbajal to Urrea, Mar. 8. 76Mora to S. Anna, Mar. 17. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 49, 99, 210–5. 245Curtis to Lamar, Mar. 1. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14.

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