No new torpedo invention should be adopted, however theoretically perfect it may be, until it has been subjected to a very severe practical test, under conditions as nearly analogous to those that would occur on active service as it would be possible to obtain. The vast importance of a carefully planned and executed system of submarine defence is an established fact, and it only remains to discover what are the best weapons for, and most practicable mode of manipulating a system of submarine offence, to establish torpedo warfare in all its branches as a necessary function of naval warfare.

It would be a mere waste of time to dwell on the Anglo-French and American wars of the beginning of this century (1797-1812); though during that period various attempts were made by Fulton and others to destroy hostile vessels by means of submarine infernal machines, inasmuch as they all partook more or less of the nature of experiments, and were all failures, but come at once to the Crimean war (1854-1856), when what may be termed a systematic employment of torpedoes for harbour defence was first employed.

Crimean War (1854-56).

Defence of Sebastopol Harbour, &c.—The Russians employed a large quantity of submarine mines, both electrical and mechanical, principally the latter, in their defence of the harbours of Sebastopol, Sveaborg, and Cronstadt.

According to General Delafield, U.S.A., the arrangement of the mechanical mines was entirely new, the conception and idea of an eminent Russian chemist, Professor Jacobi.

Electrical Mines.—No mention is made by the General of the employment of electrical mines, but the fact of a hulk being captured by the Allies at Yenikale, with a number of torpedoes on board, and all the arrangements necessary to explode them by electricity, such as Voltaic piles, electric fuzes, several miles of conducting wire, &c., is sufficient proof of this type of submarine mine being extensively used by the Russians in their harbour defences.

Many of their mechanical mines were picked up by the Allies, several of which were found to have their safety caps on. Owing to this neglect, and the smallness of the charge of the torpedoes (only some 25 lbs. of gunpowder), it is not to be wondered at that no serious injury was done to any ships of the allied squadron.

Deterred most probably by the failures of Bushnell, Fulton, and others in previous years with the submarine and other torpedo boat attacks, nothing of this description was attempted by either side.

Russian Mechanical Mines.—The Russian mechanical mines consisted of barrels of powder fitted with fuzes, so arranged that a blow would smash a glass tube containing sulphuric acid, causing the acid to mix with some chlorate of potash, resulting in combustion and the explosion of the mine.

Austro-Italian War (1859).

Defence of Venice by Von Ebner.—During this brief struggle, defensive torpedo operations were carried out under the direction of Colonel Von Ebner, of the Imperial Austrian Engineers.

The harbour of Venice was protected by a most elaborate system of submarine mines, devised by the above-named officer. Though the importance of his system was proved by the fact of no attempt being made on Venice, yet no opportunity was afforded of practically testing its efficiency.

American Civil War (1861-65).

Cause of the Present Importance of the Torpedo.—The prominent position the torpedo now holds as a most important and legitimate function of naval warfare is owing without doubt to the successful and extensive employment of them on the part of the Confederates during this long and bloody struggle.

Reasons which induced the Confederates to employ Torpedoes.—The numerous harbours and navigable rivers in the possession of the Southerners, the few ships of war at their disposal, the overwhelming fleet of the Northerners, and the introduction for the first time of ironclads in naval warfare, are the principal causes which forced the Confederates to resort to torpedoes as a means of offence and defence.

Though a few rude and extempore submarine mechanical mines were met with by the Federals during the earliest part of the war, it was not until many months after the commencement of hostilities that the Confederates, finding themselves quite unable to cope with their rivals on the sea, set to work in earnest to organise a system of submarine warfare on a grand scale.

Torpedo Corps formed, &c.—Loss of "Cairo."—By October, 1862, a secret service torpedo corps, with headquarters at Richmond, was in full swing, and the principal harbours and rivers of the Confederates were systematically protected by means of electrical and mechanical mines, also a scheme of offence by drifting and spar torpedoes was in preparation, and in December of the same year they experienced the first-fruits of their labour by the total destruction of the Federal war steamer Cairo.

The following brief review of the numerous torpedo operations carried out by both sides, and the effect their use had on the war, will be sufficient to enable the general reader to gain some idea of the vast importance of this submarine weapon in future warfare.

Fuller and more detailed accounts will be found in Commander S. Barnes's, U.S.N., Colonel Von Scheliha's, and Captain H. Steward's torpedo works.

Every Species of Torpedo used—Frame Torpedoes at Charleston, &c.—Federal Ship Disasters—Small Effect of Electrical Mines—Loss of the "Commodore Jones," &c.—Every species of submarine mine seems to have been used by the Southerners for their harbour and river defence, the most effectual of which were the barrel, frame, and Singer's torpedoes. These were all mechanical, fired by means of sensitive concussion fuzes. At Charleston and elsewhere the frame torpedo, which also acted as an obstruction, was largely used, and where this species of mine was known to be laid, the Northerners never attempted to force a passage. Out of some thirty or forty Federal ships sunk or injured by torpedoes, by far the larger proportion of such disasters was effected by means of the barrel and Singer's mines. Though electrical mines were very extensively used on the St. James River and at Charleston, &c., yet only one Federal steamer, the Commodore Jones, was sunk, and only one other, the Commodore Barney, was injured.

Case of the "New Ironsides."—The Federal ship New Ironsides, at the attack on Charleston in 1863, was anchored for one hour and a half exactly over a 5000 lbs. electrical mine, which despite all the efforts of the Confederates could not be exploded. The reason of this was owing to the deterioration of the primer, due to too constant testing.

Welden Railway.—A notable instance of the effect of torpedoes on the war was the saving of the Welden line of communication in December, 1864. The Welden Railway was the principal artery of communication to Richmond for the Confederates. To intercept this, by destroying the railway bridges, a fleet of nine Federal gunboats was sent up the Roanoke river; when nearly arrived at their destination, and though every precaution in the shape of bow projecting spars, creeping, &c., was taken, seven of the vessels were either sunk or severely injured by submarine mines. Thus the expedition ended in a most disastrous failure.

General Butler's Attack on Richmond.—Again, in April, 1864, General Butler's attack on Richmond utterly failed, owing to the Federal fleet being unable to co-operate with him, the destruction of the Commodore Jones completely checking any further advance of Admiral Lee's ships, thus allowing the Confederates to employ the garrisons of their river batteries in their land line of entrenchments.

More than One Line of Torpedoes required.—The capture of the Spanish fort at Mobile in April, 1865, by a Federal fleet under Admiral Lee, proves the necessity of employing more than one line of torpedoes, where the safety of a position depends almost entirely on those means of defence, as this one did. Here, though several Federal vessels were either sunk or severely damaged, yet the fort was captured.

Boat Torpedo Attacks.—In regard to boat torpedo attacks, the Confederates were only successful in two out of many attempts made by them to sink Federal vessels.

The "Housatonic" and "Minnesota."—These successes were the complete destruction of the Housatonic by a submarine boat, fitted with a spar torpedo, and serious injury caused to the Minnesota by the explosion of a contact spar torpedo, carried by an ordinary gig, commonly termed "David's." In the former instance the attacking boat was sunk,[Q] in the latter instance she was uninjured.

Destruction of the "Albemarle."—On the part of the Federals, Lieutenant Cushing with a steam launch fitted with a Wood and Lay torpedo, succeeded in sinking the Confederate ram Albemarle. The boat in this instance was swamped by the column of water thrown up on the explosion of the torpedo, she having been driven full speed at the Albemarle.

Ship Spar Torpedoes.—On both sides, spar torpedoes fitted to the bows of ships, and also on rafts slung over the bows, were somewhat extensively used, but on no occasion were they the means of injuring or sinking any vessels.

To increase the difficulties of the Northerners in searching for submarine mines, the Southerners laid down a great number of dummy torpedoes, also erected false torpedo stations, and laid false wires.

It must always be borne in mind, in connection with the torpedo operations above detailed, that the apparatus were very crude, and the operators at the commencement inexperienced.

Paraguayan War (1864-68).

Torpedoes employed by the Paraguayans.—During their protracted struggle with the Brazilians, the Paraguayans employed submarine mines for the protection of their river forts, &c.

Loss of the "Rio Janeiro"—Brazilian Fleet entrapped.—On the 2nd of September, 1866, the Brazilian ironclad Rio Janeiro, after being well-battered by the guns of the Curupaity fort, was sunk by a torpedo. Later on, near the same place, a whole fleet of Brazilian war ships were entrapped by the Paraguayans, between two rows of submarine mines, but owing to faulty arrangements they escaped unharmed.

Austrian War (1866).

Venice, Pola, &c., protected by Torpedoes.—During this war, torpedoes for the defence of Venice, Pola, &c., were extensively used by the Austrians, under the direction of Baron von Ebner, but as in '59 no opportunity was afforded of proving their practical worth, though morally they were of great value, the Austrian harbours so defended being considered impregnable by the enemy, and therefore no attempt was made to force them.

Franco-German War (1870-71).

Little or nothing in the matter of torpedo operations was attempted by the Germans, and on the part of the French nothing whatever.

Germans employed Submarine Mines.—Electrical and mechanical mines were placed in several of the German harbours, the former containing about 200 lbs. of dualine, the latter some 80 lbs. of gunpowder. The only attempt to destroy French ships by means of offensive torpedoes was made by the German vessel the Grille, off RÜgen, which resulted in failure.

In laying down and in picking up after the war was over their mechanical mines, several exploded, killing some ten to fifteen men.

Boats necessary.—Towards the end of the war, the Germans were constructing special torpedo boats, believing that such were necessary for the complete defence of harbours. This war added another proof of the moral worth of submarine mines; the French fleet not daring to approach German waters supposed to be defended by such means.

Russo-Turkish War (1877-78).

Superiority of Turkey to Russia in the matter of Ships.—On the Danube, in the Black Sea, and Mediterranean, where the principal naval portion of the war was carried out, Turkey was possessed of a fleet of ships infinitely superior to Russia, both in point of numbers and strength, and therefore, to enable her to hold her own against this vast superiority of the Turks, the Russians resorted to an extensive employment of torpedoes, for both offensive and defensive purposes.

Russian Torpedoes.—For many years previous to the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1877, the Russians had been studying the subject of torpedo warfare in all its branches, a certain number of their naval and military officers and men having every year passed through a regular course of torpedo study, at a school specially formed for such a purpose; they had also laid in large stores of submarine mines, spar torpedoes, and were in possession of the Whitehead and towing torpedoes, and also several electric lights, and a few months after war was declared they obtained a fast Thornycroft torpedo boat.

Turkish Torpedoes.—On the other hand, the Turks were only in possession of a number of those huge, unwieldy 500 lbs. buoyant mines, and one electric light; circuit closers, contact mines, boats (steam or otherwise) fitted for use with torpedo, or offensive torpedoes, being conspicuous by their absence.

Thus it will be seen that in the matter of submarine offence and defence, the Russians were as superior to the Turks as the latter were to the former in the matter of ships.

Turkish Defensive Torpedo Operations.—The defensive torpedo operations carried out by the Ottoman naval officers and men were as follows:—

The harbour of Batoum in the Black Sea was protected by a few 500 lbs. buoyant mines, arranged to be fired by observation.

The mouth of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were similarly defended. For this work great praise is due to those who executed the work, for the very strong current and great depth met with in those waters would render such a service a work of great difficulty, even when properly constructed mooring boats, and men trained to such, were employed, both of which in this particular instance were absent.

Soulina, one of the mouths of the Danube, and Suda Bay (Candia) were also protected by similar means.

Russian Defensive Torpedo Operations.—The Russian defensive torpedo operations were very extensive, their principal harbours in the Baltic, as well as those in the Black Sea, were carefully defended by electro-contact mines of the latest type; so also they protected their numerous bridges across the Danube, double and sometimes treble rows of such mines being moored on either side, and in addition they also placed several mines in the Danube, on the chance of destroying the Turkish Danube flotilla.

Destruction of Turkish Gunboat "Suna" by a Russian Submarine Mine.—The only instance that occurred during this war of a vessel being sunk by a stationary submarine mine was that of the Turkish gunboat Suna, at Soulina, in October, 1877, on the occasion of the unsuccessful attack on that place made by the combined Russian and Roumanian flotilla.

About 6 A.M. on the morning of the attack, a "loftcha" containing two of the enemy's electro-contact mines, fitted for laying down, was captured by the Turks, from which it was evident that the Russians had been employed during the night in torpedoing the reach immediately above the Turkish defences. However, not heeding this very practical warning, the Pacha in command of the Soulina squadron ordered the Kartal (a paddle-wheel tug vessel) and the Suna (an old wooden gunboat) to reconnoitre up the river; they accordingly started, the Kartal leading the way. At 8.5 A.M., about fifteen minutes after the two vessels had left their moorings, an explosion was heard, and almost at the same instant the unfortunate gunboat Suna was observed to go down head foremost, her masts only remaining above water. The Kartal, which at the time of the catastrophe was some distance in advance, at once turned back to the assistance of her consort, and managed to save a number of the gunboat's crew, this work having to be performed under a galling fire from the allied flotilla. Owing to this day being the "Feast of Bairam," the unfortunate gunboat was dressed with masthead flags, thus four Turkish ensigns fell into the hands of the enemy, the Pacha refusing permission for any attempt to be made to save them. The reason that the Kartal escaped the fate of her consort was due to her only drawing some 5 feet of water, while the Suna drew at least 8 feet.

The gunboat struck the mine that sunk her on her port bow, the effect of the explosion being to completely smash in that side of her bow, dismount her foremost guns, and carry away her foremast just above the deck (the mast remained standing, though inclined forward); the second lieutenant of the Suna, who was at the time of the explosion standing on her fore bridge, was thrown off and killed, and some twelve of the crew were killed and wounded. To complete the destruction of the Suna, another torpedo was exploded under her port quarter by the Russians. The torpedo that was used on this occasion is detailed at page 68.

Offensive Torpedo Operations.—The numerous boat torpedo attacks made by the Russians against the Turkish fleet will now be considered. The following accounts have been carefully compiled from two sources, viz. an article written by Captain Chardonneau, which appeared in the 'Revue Maritime et Coloniale,' 1878, and which has been recently translated for the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution by Lieutenant J. Meryon, R.N., and notes taken by the author during his service with the Imperial Ottoman Navy (1877-78).

1st Affair.

The Batoum Attack.—The first torpedo boat attack occurred on the night of the 12th-13th of May at Batoum.[R]

On the night of the attack there were lying in the harbour several vessels of the Ottoman fleet, including ironclads, transports, despatch-boats, &c. These vessels were totally unprotected by guard boats, booms, electric lights, &c., and only the usual number of sentries were posted, the Turks at that time not quite believing in such boat attacks, thus offering peculiar advantages for a torpedo attack.

Four torpedo boats formed the attacking force, viz. the Tchesme, Sinope, Navarino, and the Soukoum KalÉ.

These boats were carried by a ship of the Maritime Company of Odessa, named Grand Duke Constantine. She was an iron screw steamer, able to steam about 10 knots per hour, and fitted to hoist up the above-mentioned torpedo boats. She was armed with four 4-pounders, and torpedoes.

Early in the evening of the 12th the Constantine left Poti, and proceeded off the harbour of Batoum, her captain (Lieutenant de Vaisseau Makaroff) deeming it advisable to lay to seven miles from the harbour, the supposition that the Turks had placed submarine mines off the entrance being the cause of his so doing.

About 11 P.M. the four torpedo boats started to the attack, Makaroff being in command of one of them. They were all painted sea green, and possessed a high speed. The night being dark, and having been despatched some distance off, they reached the entrance in somewhat straggling order. The Tchesme, commanded by Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, and armed with a towing torpedo, was the first to enter the harbour, and, without waiting for her consorts, dashed at the Ottoman fleet, and succeeded in getting close to a large Turkish paddle-wheel transport, and her commander dipping his torpedo, struck the ship under her quarter; but that little something which so often causes a failure in this mode of warfare occurred, and no explosion followed the pressing down of the firing key, much to the chagrin and disgust of Zatzarennyi. As might be supposed, by this time an alarm had been raised, and guns, rifles, &c., were fired in and from every direction, causing the torpedo boats to beat a precipitate and hasty retreat. Fortunately the Turks were not possessed of any steamboats, nor were any of their ships ready to dash out, or the defeat would have been a far more disastrous one than was the case. Neither of the boats were damaged, nor any of the crews injured.

The failure of this first attempt was due in a great measure to the mode of attack, no system or unanimity of action on the part of the four commanders being observable; and also to the somewhat half-hearted support given to the Tchesme, for had her three consorts only dashed at the Turkish ships as boldly, one at least of the Ottoman fleet would have been sunk, the only defence resorted to being their guns and small arms.

The moral effect of torpedoes was displayed here, causing the Constantine to lay too far off the entrance to the harbour, thus decreasing the chance of her boats making a successful attack.

The Russian version finishes up by saying, "although this first endeavour was unsuccessful, the authors of it were received at Sebastopol with enthusiasm."

2nd Affair.

The Matchin Attack.—The second attempt was made on the 25th-26th of May on two Turkish monitors, the Fettu Islam and the Duba Saife, and a small river steamer, the Kilidj Ali, lying at anchor off Matchin.[S]

Four Russian torpedo boats were sent to the attack, viz. the Czarowitch, Lieutenant Doubasoff; the XÉnie, Lieutenant Chestakoff; the Djiquite, Midshipman Persine; and the Czarevna, Midshipman Bali. The total number of officers and men carried by these boats on this occasion was forty-six.

The night of the attack was rainy, but not completely dark, since the moon was above the horizon during nearly the whole of the expedition.

The force left Brailoff at one o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and advanced in two columns up the river, finding great difficulty in stemming the strong current.

A boat from the Duba Saife, rowing guard some 500 yards in advance of the squadron, observed the approach of the Russian boats, but allowed them to pass on their voyage of destruction without attempting to stop them, or alarm the vessels. On reaching within 150 yards of the Duba Saife, Dubasoff in the Czarowitch was challenged, and failing to give the correct answer was immediately fired at; but, nothing daunted by the hail of shot and bullets, he dashed on, and succeeded in exploding one of his spar torpedoes on the port side of the Duba Saife, just under her quarter, a column of water and dÉbris being thrown up to a height of 120 feet, which partly filled his boat, but notwithstanding managed to get safely away. The monitor not sinking as soon as expected, Chestakoff in the XÉnie dashed in, and completed the work of destruction, the unfortunate ship sinking in a very few minutes after this last explosion. The Djiquite was struck in the stern, and had to be run ashore for repairs, but eventually all four boats reached Brailoff in safety. The Russians allowed to neither killed nor wounded, which, when the time they were exposed to the fire of the three Turkish ships (about twenty minutes), the number of men (forty-six) engaged, and their very close quarters, seems miraculous.

The Duba Saife, thus lost to the Turks, carried two 12 cm. Krupp guns, and a crew of some sixty officers and men, few of whom were saved. Lieutenants Dubasoff and Chestakoff were decorated with the 4th Class of the Cross of Saint George, and three seamen received the insignia of the Order of Military Merit.

This attack was conducted in a most gallant manner, and far more systematically than the Batoum affair. If instead of holding one of the boats in reserve, which was part of Dubasoff's plan, and the remaining three attacking one vessel, the force had divided itself into two parties, and had made a simultaneous attack on both the monitors, the probability is that the Fettu Islam would have shared the fate of her consort.

The officer of the Turkish guard boat was tried by court-martial, but what his ultimate fate was is not generally known. He certainly deserved nothing less than death.

3rd Affair.

The Soulina Attack.—The third attempt took place on the 9th-10th of June, 1877, on a Turkish squadron lying at anchor off Soulina.[T] This squadron consisted of the three ironclads Feteh Bulend, Moocardemikhair, and Idglalieh, and a tug, Kartal.

The Russian attacking force consisted of six torpedo boats, viz. the No. 1, Lieutenant Poutschin; the No. 2, Lieutenant Rojdestvenski; the Tchesme, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi; the Sinope, the Navarino, and the Soukoum KalÉ. The No. 2 was a specially constructed torpedo boat, 68 feet long, and very fast. All were armed with spar torpedoes, with the exception of the Tchesme, which carried a towing torpedo. The boats were convoyed from Odessa by the Constantine, some being carried, and some being towed; another steamer, the Vladimir, supported her. The Turkish squadron were anchored in quarter line, about one mile from the harbour; the Kartal, under weigh, being used as an advance guard, and a few boats rowing guard close to the ships being the only means of protection adopted by the Turks. Passive obstructions, such as booms, nets, crinolines, &c., were not thought of, much less used.

On arriving about five miles from Soulina, the boats were formed into two groups, the first consisting of the No. 1, the No. 2, and the Tchesme, and despatched on their way. The working of their engines was scarcely heard, and all lights were carefully hidden by tarpaulins.

The first casualty that happened was the disabling of the Tchesme, by the electric wire of her towing torpedo fouling the screw, this obliging her to return to the Constantine. Aided by good fortune, and by the darkness of the night, the No. 1 and the No. 2 succeeded in getting close to (30 yards) one of the Turkish vessels, the Idglalieh, before being discovered, when they were at once hailed, and, not answering, a tremendous fire of big guns and rifles was directed on them from the Idglalieh, which was promptly followed by that of the whole squadron, though from the other ships nothing of the boats could be seen.

According to the Russians, the No. 2 succeeded in exploding her torpedo close to, if not in contact with, a Turkish vessel, but from eyewitnesses on board the squadron only one explosion was heard, viz. that of Lieutenant Poutschin's torpedo. Any way, no damage whatever was experienced by the Ottoman squadron. The No. 1 came down on the Idglalieh's starboard bow, fouled her cable, and swung alongside, exploding one of her torpedoes in so doing, but with no other result than a wetting to those of the ironclad's crew, who were on the forecastle. Alongside Poutschin remained for some minutes, but at last managed to get clear, and then was either sunk by the Idglalieh's fire, or, as he avers, on finding his screw foul, he sunk his boat, rather than let her fall into the hands of the Turks. Poutschin and four of his crew were picked up, after being some hours in the water, by the squadron's boats.

The No. 2 seems to have suffered severely, her funnel being bent, the axle of the steering wheel damaged, sixteen rivets were started, and the iron keel plate had dropped some 18 inches, and finally the lower part of her rudder broken, and one of the blades of her screw bent aft; part of this damage was no doubt the effect of the explosion of her torpedo, which was probably not in position, but unless she ran over some loose stones of the Soulina breakwater, the damage to her keel and rudder cannot be accounted for.

The second group of boats had followed up the first, but on hearing the noise of the explosions and roar of the guns and rifles they returned to the Constantine.

That ship, on observing the firing, endeavoured to close the land, but she grounded, and remained until daylight in a difficult position, but at last got afloat, and returned to Odessa with five out of her six torpedo boats.

Lieutenant Rojdestvenski, the Commander of the No. 2, received the 4th Class of the Cross of Saint George, and three seamen the insignia of the Order of Military Merit.

On the part of the No. 1 and No. 2, this was a most gallant affair, though unsuccessful, but as regards the remainder of the boats the less said the better.

Had the Turkish squadron slipped the instant the alarm was given, and steamed full speed in the direction of Odessa, the Constantine and her convoy might have been cut off. Both the Moorcademikhair and Feteh Bulend were 13 knot ships, and therefore considerably faster than the enemy. But, as usual, the Turks were far too dilatory to take advantage of the occasion.

4th Affair.

The Rustchuk Attack.—The fourth torpedo attack was made on the afternoon of the 20th of June, 1877, on a Turkish monitor off Rustchuk.

The only Russian torpedo boat sent to the attack on this occasion was a Thornycroft named the Choutka, commanded by Lieutenant Skrydloff, and accompanied by a celebrated Russian artist, Verechtckaguine by name. The instant the torpedo boat was observed, so well directed and steady a fire was kept up by the monitor that both the lieutenant and the artist were badly wounded, and the electric wires of the torpedo severed, thus obliging the Choutka to beat a retreat. According to the Russian account, the monitor was struck by the boat's torpedo spar, but the above seems the more likely version. This was certainly a most audacious attack, and had the Turks only succeeded in hitting the Choutka with her big gun, it would have ended fatally for the Russians; as it was, the boat was struck by several bullets, but none of the crew were wounded.

5th Affair.

The Aluta Attack.—The fifth attack was made on the 30th of June, 1877, on a Turkish monitor off the mouth of the Aluta, in the river Danube. This attempt, like the last, took place in broad daylight. Four Russian boats were sent forward, but in spite of the captain of the Turkish vessel doing all he could to run the boats down, none of them succeeded in getting sufficiently near the vessel to enable a torpedo to be placed in contact. The captain of the monitor took the precaution to rig his lower booms out, and so managed to keep the enemy's boats at a respectful distance, they imagining that mines were fixed to the ends of the booms. After two hours of this dodging about, the Russians, finding the case hopeless, abandoned the attack.

The Russian account states—1st, that the captain of the monitor was an Englishman; 2nd, that the vessel was protected by nets and torpedoes lashed to the extremities of her booms—both of which statements are radically wrong.

The torpedo boats forming the attack were the Choutka, Midshipman Niloff, and the Mina, Sub-Lieutenant Arens, both armed with the spar torpedo.

Unless indeed the Russians acted up to the old proverb which says "Discretion is the best part of valour," it is difficult to understand how four small easily handled boats could have been for one hour endeavouring to strike a ship (which ship was at the same time being manoeuvred with a view of running them down) without either effecting their object or being sunk or damaged in the attempt.

The Russians, though unsuccessful, behaved gallantly. Midshipman Niloff was severely wounded, but no mention is made as to the number of the crew that were killed and wounded, or of the damage received by the boats. Niloff received the 4th Class of the Cross of St. George, and Arens the Order of Military Merit.

The Turkish captain, Ali Bey, behaved most pluckily and skilfully. The only wonder is that both the boats were not sunk by the monitor's fire.

6th Affair.

The Soukoum Kaleh Attack.—The sixth attempt was made on the 23rd-24th of August, 1877, on a Turkish ironclad, the Assari Shefket, at the time lying at anchor off Soukoum Kaleh.[U] Four torpedo boats composed the attacking force, viz. the Sinope, Lieutenant Pisarefski; the Torpedoist, Midshipman Nelson Hirst; the Navarino, Lieutenant Vichnevetski; and the Tchesme, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, the latter officer being in command. These boats had been brought to the entrance of the harbour by the Constantine, and were despatched on their mission of destruction about half past ten.

An eclipse of the moon occurred on this night, and, taking advantage of this fact, the four Russian torpedo boats dashed into the harbour at full speed and made for the Turkish vessel.

Fortunately for the safety of his ship and lives of his crew, the captain of the Turkish ironclad had several boats rowing guard round his ship, and otherwise everything on board in readiness for immediate action. On the attacking flotilla nearing the guard boats, blue lights were burnt, rifles fired, &c., and the alarm given to those on the look-out in the Assari Shefket. The moment the enemy were within range, such a well-directed and heavy fire was poured on them that the attack was completely foiled. One of the Russian torpedoes was exploded, but failed to do more than throw a quantity of water up. The next morning a pole with torpedo fixed on it was found by the Turks, and on the strength of this and the numerous fragments of wood similarly found, one if not more of the enemy's boats it was supposed must have been sunk, or much knocked about.

This was a much better planned and executed attack, but was unsuccessful owing to the extreme vigilance of the Turks.

This attempt will always be remembered by the Turks, on account of the general order that appeared in the papers on the part of the Russians, in which "the brilliant exploit and successful destruction of the Turkish ironclad Assari Shefket" was set forth at great length; she at the time that this appeared being quietly at anchor off the dockyard at Stamboul, not having received any damage whatever.

7th Affair.

The Second Batoum Attack.—The seventh attempt was made on the night of the 27th-28th of December, 1877, on several Turkish men-of-war anchored in the harbour of Batoum (the scene of the first Russian torpedo attempt and failure). Four boats composed the attacking force, viz. the Tchesme, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, in command, armed with a Whitehead fish torpedo, containing 32 kilog. of gun-cotton, fitted to fire from a tube under the boat's keel; the Sinope, Lieutenant Stchelinski, armed with a similarly charged fish torpedo, fitted to fire from a raft, which was towed by the boat, and two other boats, armed with spar and towing torpedoes.

The means employed at Batoum for the safeguard of the Ottoman fleet there against such an attack was that of guard boats and a barrier formed of logs of wood, with planks secured to them, so arranged by means of weights that the planks remained perpendicular to the surface of the water when in position.

Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the Russians managed to evade the guard boats, and when, as they imagined, some 60 to 65 yards from a Turkish ironclad, the Tchesme and Sinope's Whitehead fish torpedoes were started on their deadly mission; but, owing most probably to the want of practice of manipulating these somewhat delicate instruments, also to the darkness, and the slight swell there was on at the time, both missed their mark, and were landed high and dry on the beach astern of the ship.

One of these weapons was perfect, the other minus her fore compartment, this having been knocked off by the torpedo colliding with some hard object. No explosion was heard or seen by the Turks.

This was the second time that the fish torpedo had been employed on actual service, and, as in the previous instance, failed.

The guard boats and barrier of the Turks seem to have been of little avail.

8th Affair.

The Final Attack.—The eighth and last attempt was made on the night of the 25th-26th of January, 1878.

This was originally intended to be an attack on the Turkish fleet at Batoum, but on entering that harbour the two Russian torpedo boats, the Tchesme, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, and the Sinope, Lieutenant Stchelinski, were met by a Turkish revenue steamer, against which the boats discharged their Whitehead torpedoes, resulting in her complete destruction, at the same time arousing the squadron, and causing the boats to beat a retreat.

Though the vessel destroyed was not a frigate, yet the expedition was successful in so far as proving that it is possible to project Whitehead fish torpedoes from boats at a distance of 70 to 90 yards from an enemy's ship, on a dark night, and strike her with them.

This concludes the whole of the offensive torpedo operations that were carried out during the war, of which two out of eight attempts were successful, which is without doubt a fair percentage.

There seems every probability that the present struggle between Chili and Peru, in the Pacific, will afford torpedoists further experience of the various offensive torpedoes, when subjected to the test of active service.