14.htm.html#Page_402" class="pginternal">402-406

Compassion, 262, 371

Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7

Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256, 255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1

Conscience, popular view of, 99;

jural view of, 100-101

Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the relation between, 86, 86 note 2;

and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200, 200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366

Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form of morality, 455-457

Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125

Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97;

may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97

Contract, claims arising from, 269;

and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1

Courage, 332-334;

defined, 332;

Greek view of, 456;

and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333;

Moral, 333 note 3;

Virtue of, 313, 333, 334;

and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations, 334, 355

Courtesy, 253

Cudworth, 103 Note

Culture, 157, etc.

Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104;

and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1

Custom, alterations in, 247

Decision, 236, 237

Deductive Hedonism, 176-195

Descartes, 338, 339

Desert—Good, how determined, 284-290;

Ill, how determined, 291-292;

requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349;

and 46743-h@46743-h-7.htm.html#Page_177" class="pginternal">177 note 1;

and geometry, analogy between, 18-19;

and astronomy, analogy between, 19;

concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19;

aim of, 40, 77;

and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506;

mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509

Ethics and Politics (cf. Law), 15-22 passim, 266, 457;

distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2;

Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298);

in an ideal society, 18 seq.

?????????? (= Well-being = the Good attainable in human life), 91, 92;

misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, 92 note 2

Excellence (cf. Perfection)

‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ 10 note 3

Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493

Explanation essentially different from Justification, 2

Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1

Feeling—preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399;

qu feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128, 129, 398

Fidelity (cf. Good Faith), 258, 259

Firmness, 235, 236

Fitness and Desert, 350

‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1

Fortitude defined, 332

Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1

Freedom—sentiment of, 39;

as absolute end of ideal law, 274 seq., 293, 297, 350-351;

sphere of, must be limited, 275;

ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293;

and Contract, 276, 276 note 1;

and Property, 276, 277;

Civil and Constitutional, 103;

a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion ‘good,’ 105-107;

Æsthetic, 228, 392;

Jural or Rational, 228-229

‘Intuitive’ or ‘a priori’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102

Irrational choice—sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38, 41-42, 58, 59, 110;

Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of, 59 note 1

Jural method of Ethics, 100-101

Just claims—arising from contract, 269;

arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1

‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442

Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 passim, 349-352, 355, 440-448 passim;

or Equity, essence of, 496;

specially difficult to define, 264;

intuitional view of the definition of, 264;

involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271;

and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1;

distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265;

and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279, 285 note 1;

and taxation, 266, 266 note 1;

Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294;

Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445;

Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275;

Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279;

Corrective, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364;

(or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 seq.;

Sense, 34;

Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 seq., 102-103, 493-494;

Sentiment, 26-28, 77;

Sentiments, (a) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as motives, 365-367, (b) theory of their derivation from experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462;

and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174;

Motive, 77, 204 seq., 223;

Motive, varying forms of:—(a) Reverence for Authority, (b) Religious Sentiment, (c) Self-respect, (d) sentiment of Freedom, (e) Admiration or Aspiration, 39-40;

instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings—discrepancy between, 466, 467;

Intuitions, 211-216 passim;

Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337;

Intuitions, connexion between (a) Existence and Origin of, 211, 212, (b) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213, 212 note 2, 214;

Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216;

Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1;

Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229;

Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505;

Axioms, Kant’s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2;

Maxims, 337-361 passim;

Maxims which are, and which are not, directly self-evident, distinction between, 383;

Responsibility, 59-60;

Obligation, 217;

and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427

‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, 25-26

Moral Courage, 333 note 3

Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374

Morality—‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis between, 97-99;

a priori and a posteriori (or inductive and intuitive), 419;

of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419

Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 passim;

clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419;

addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498;

addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422

“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, 387, 388

Property and Right of Bequest, 277

Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391;

common sense view of, 327, 328;

Kant’s and Butler’s views of, 327 note 1;

self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381;

and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497

‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ 25-26

Psychological Hedonism, 40 seq.;

of Bentham, 85;

ethical import of, 41, 205

Public Opinion, Code of, 30

Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates of, 495

Punishment, 281, 290 seq., 290 note 1, 291 note 1;

preventive and retributory views of, 71-72

Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359

Quantitative Hedonism, 129

Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174

Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174

Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369;

conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366;

difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368

Rational action, not to be identified with (a) disinterested or (b) free action, 57;

Spinoza’s view of the principle of, 89-90

Rational Benevolence, 96;

may be self-limiting, 385;

Kant’s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390

Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)—and Conscience, 172, 200, 200 note 2, 366;

and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 seq.

Reason— ginternal">231, 231 note 1

Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 seq.;

judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly trustworthy, 158-160;

common sense estimates of (a) at best are only true for ordinary persons, (b) are vitiated by mal-observation, (c) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (d) mix moral and Æsthetic preferences with hedonistic, 153, (e) are found to be full of inconsistencies, 153-158

Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1

Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341

Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262

Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 seq., 194 note 1, 470, 471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473;

(Social Statics), 18 note 2, 194 note 1;

(Data of Ethics), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1

“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation, 477-479

Spinoza, 90

Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473;

(Science of Ethics), 42 note 1, 471

Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455;

(Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers), 92 note 2, 454 note 1

Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106;

ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377

Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1

Stoics, 92, 105, 129

Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186;

(Analytic Psychology), 182 note 1

Subjective, cf. Objective

Suggestio falsi, 317

Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356

Sully, <

THE END

Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.

---

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

Clyx.com