The republican character of the constitutional convention, the qualifications of the delegates, and the extent to which they trusted to the wisdom of the people.

The Constitutional Convention was a republican body, and not a mass meeting. George Washington presided. He was a delegate from Virginia. James Madison was another representative from the same state, and he wrote the greater part of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson was in France, and had nothing whatever to do with drafting the great document, or in securing its adoption. Benjamin Franklin was a delegate from Pennsylvania. Roger Sherman was a representative of Connecticut. New York sent no delegate, but Alexander Hamilton, who with George Washington had early recognized that the League of Nations, or League of Sovereign States, which means the same, and which the old Articles of Confederation created, was proving an utter failure in practice, and had, therefore, urged from the beginning “a more perfect union,” attended and he was seated as a delegate from New York. His matchless vision led him to seek the incorporation of additional safeguards against bolshevism, as it is now called, and though his advice was not heeded it was Hamilton, more than any other man, with John Jay and James Madison his able supporters, who secured the ratification of the Constitution as drafted.

These, and the other delegates, representing the people of the several states, after much deliberation formulated the historic document beginning, “We the people.” It provides among other things that its ratification by delegated conventions in nine of the thirteen states shall make it binding upon the states so ratifying the same. It also provides that it can be amended in a similar delegated convention called at the request of chosen representatives in the legislatures of two-thirds of all the states, or by joint resolutions passed by two-thirds of the representatives of the people, in Congress assembled, when ratified by representatives of the people in three-fourths of the states, in their respective legislatures assembled.

Those who talk about “taking the government back to the people” would do well to remember that the American people have never voted upon any provision of the National Constitution, and there is no way provided by which they can, in any direct way, express their approval or disapproval. I repeat, the Fathers created a republic, and not a democracy. Washington speaks of “the delegated will of the nation”—never of the popular wish of the people.

The members of the Constitutional Convention were worthy of their seats. They were men of both learning and experience. They had read history. They knew that many attempts at representative government had been made and that all had failed. They also knew the path all these republics had taken on their way to oblivion. They were fully alive to the fact that the first step had always been from representative government to direct government; from direct government to chaos, from chaos to the man on horseback—the dictator; thence to monarchy. The discussion in the convention makes it abundantly clear that the Fathers sought to save America from the monarch, and to protect her from the mass. They chose the middle ground between two extremes, both fraught with danger.

They even went so far as to guarantee that no state should be cursed with a democratic form of government, or a monarchial form of government or any other kindred system. The provision is in this language: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government.” That excludes every other form.

The members of the Constitutional Convention, having been selected because of their aptitude for public matters, their knowledge of public questions and their experience in public affairs, very naturally had confidence that men of like caliber and character would always be selected for important representative positions. They believed the people would choose legislators, executives and judges of aptitude, at least, and would retain them in office until they attained efficiency through experience.

Presumably these delegates anticipated that men would be born with no aptitude for public positions, but they confidently believed even these would be able to select men of aptitude. They may have realized that some men would be unfit for Congress, who, nevertheless, would be competent to select able congressmen. For these, as well as for other reasons, they provided no way by which those whom no one would think of sending to Congress, and who naturally give no attention to public affairs, could instruct their congressmen, who alone must bear the responsibility of legislation. Had such a thing as legislating by referendum been thought of at that time, the Fathers certainly would have expressly prohibited it. Legislation by representatives was considered and express and detailed provision therefor was made.

The preceding differentiation between republic and democracy has no reference, of course, to political parties. Long before the republican party, as now constituted, had an existence, democratic orators grew eloquent over “republican institutions,” meaning thereby representative institutions.

Every protestant church in America is a republic. Its affairs are managed by representatives—by boards. Otherwise there would be no churches. Every bank and every corporation is a republic, managed by boards and officers selected by stockholders. The United States Steel Corporation, for instance, is analogous to a republic, the stockholders being the electors, but if the stockholders were to take charge of that corporation, and direct its management by initiative or referendum, it would be in the hands of a receiver within ninety days.

The United States of America is a great Corporation, in which the Stockholder is the Elector. Stockholders of financial and industrial corporations desire dividends, which are paid in cash. Not desiring office, the stockholders are satisfied to have the corporation managed by representatives of aptitude and experience. The dividends paid by political corporations like the United States and the several states are “liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” “equality before the law,” an army and navy for national defense, and courts of justice for the enforcement of rights and the redress of wrongs. But stockholders in political corporations are not always satisfied with these returns. Some prefer office to dividends payable only in blessings.

In banks and other business corporations, stockholders are apt to insist that representatives and officers who show aptitude and efficiency shall be continued in office so long as dividends are satisfactory. In political corporations the people have recently been pursuing a very different course. They have been changing their representatives so frequently that efficiency, which results only from experience, is impossible.

While stockholders of a corporation would certainly wreck the institution if they attempted to manage its affairs directly or by referendum, it is very appropriate for stockholders, acting on the recommendation of their representatives—the board of directors—to determine an important measure like an issue of bonds, or whether the scope and purpose of the concern shall be enlarged or its capital increased. Analogous to this is the determination of governmental policies at regular elections where the people choose between the programs of different political parties as set forth in their platforms. Thus the people sometimes ratify the policy of protection, and sometimes the policy of free trade, demonstrating that they do not always act wisely by frequently reversing themselves.

Political parties usually omit from their platforms the details of legislation. The only exception that occurs to me was when every detail of a financial policy was incorporated in the platform submitted for ratification. The coinage was to be “free,” it was to be “unlimited,” and at the “ratio of 16 to 1.” If the people had approved this at the polls their representatives would have had no discretion. There would have been no room for compromise. While the people are presumably competent to choose between policies recommended in the platforms of political parties, it is a far stretch of the imagination to suppose that the average citizen is better prepared to determine the details of a policy than the man he selects to represent him in the halls of Congress. The congressman who concedes that his average constituent is better prepared to pass upon a proposition than he is necessarily admits in the same breath that his district committed a serious blunder in sending him. It ought to have selected a man at least of average intelligence.

The fact that neither stockholders en masse, nor employees en masse are able to manage a business enterprise does not imply that the principle of a republic may not be advantageously applied to industrial concerns. This question is again referred to in Chapter XXX, and the possible safe, middle course between the industrial autocracy demanded by capital, and the industrial democracy demanded by labor, is suggested and briefly discussed.