The paucity of war experience since the introduction of the steam-driven armoured ship invests the battle of Tsu-shima with supreme importance. Between Trafalgar and the 27th May 1905, there had been only two fleet actions on a large scale—those of Lissa and of the Yalu—and the first was fought before the wooden vessel had disappeared and the rifled gun had become universal. The various minor engagements which occurred during this long period were either destitute of teaching, or failed to provide an adequate basis for conclusions capable of serving as guides to a rational system of tactics or to a scientific shipbuilding policy.

It has, therefore, followed, in this country especially, that the evolution of the warship has been frequently capricious, indicating the absence of any clear principles, and entailing an immense total expenditure upon vessels unsuited to our national requirements, but happily not forced to demonstrate their inutility.

In all wars, whether by sea or land, some few general lessons stand out unmistakably; but the difficulty of arriving at a just estimate of the relative significance of the causes which have led to victory or to defeat is always extreme. Genius, which may be defined as an unerring sense of proportion, is necessarily rare, and the person with an idÉe fixe in favour of some particular method or weapon will generally discover, in every conflict, evidence in support of his faith. This tendency will be most marked when national experience of war is lacking, and we are, therefore, compelled to draw our inspirations from fighting carried on by other peoples.

In the long series of wars which culminated in the Nelson era, broad principles had been evolved and had been grasped by the leaders of naval thought. More than ninety years have elapsed since the British Navy was called upon to fight a great fleet action, and meanwhile technical progress of all kinds, advancing by giant strides, has opened out new possibilities tending to bewilder the imagination and to invite mistakes and impolicy.

Even when, as now, valuable war experience is available, there is always a risk of false deductions. Conditions differ so greatly that generalisations based upon special episodes may be misleading and even dangerous. Thus the American Navy and our own have unquestionably suffered from shallow reasoning derived from the peculiar operations of the Civil War. Similarly, the action off Lissa led to a cult of the ram which has left a deep impress upon shipbuilding, while a few isolated successes obtained by torpedoes, in exceptional circumstances, have given rise to exaggerated claims on behalf of this weapon which can only end in disappointment.

Instances could be multiplied, and the obvious moral is the vital necessity for the most careful study by the clearest available brains before translating any so-called lesson of war into national policy. In a single year a navy of the magnitude of our own may be committed to many millions of expenditure, the result of which will affect its fighting efficiency for nearly a quarter of a century. The vital need for caution and for profound study of all such experience as is forthcoming is, therefore, evident.

The battle of Tsu-shima is by far the greatest and the most important naval event since Trafalgar, and the navy which is able to draw the most accurate conclusions, technical as well as tactical, from its experiences and to apply them in terms of policy and of training will secure marked advantage in the future.

At the battle of the Yalu the Japanese and Chinese fleets were numerically equal—twelve ships—but the former had only three vessels (all under 3000 tons) carrying side armour, and eight were protected cruisers.1 The Chinese, on the other hand, had five vessels with side armour, including two battleships, and six protected cruisers.1 In heavy armament the Chinese had a great superiority, the Japanese having the advantage in quick-firing guns, as shown below:

GUNS.	JAPAN.	CHINA.
12-inch and over	3	8
Over 8-inch and under 12-inch	8	17
Intermediate	27	15
Q.F. 6-inch and 4.7 inch	67	2

At Tsu-shima the classification of armoured ships engaged was as follows:

CLASS.	JAPAN.	RUSSIA.
Battleships	4	8
Coast-defence Armour-clad	...	3
Armoured Cruisers	8	3
Total,	12	14

The respective armaments were:

GUNS.	12-IN.	10-IN.	9-IN.	8-IN.	Q.F.
					6-IN.	4.7 IN.
Japan	16	1	...	30	160	...
Russia	26	15	4	8	102	30

In heavy guns (9-inch and over) the Russians had the large preponderance of 28, the proportion being 45 to 17. In the smaller types, 4.7-inch to 8-inch, on the other hand, the Japanese superiority was 50, and in the 6-inch Q.F. type alone it was 58. A fair inference seems to be that the Japanese secondary armaments played the most important part in the first and practically decisive period of the battle.

In both actions the Japanese had the highest average speed—about 2 knots at the battle of the Yalu and much more at Tsu-shima, where the three Russian coast-defence ships, the older battleships, and the three armoured cruisers were poor steamers. Excluding, on the Russian side, the Sissoy-Veliki, Navarin, and Nicolay I., the difference of average battleship speed was only 0.6 knots; but the condition of the Russian vessels was such that they could not approach their theoretical maximum.

These were the antecedent technical conditions of a great battle which, in the startling decisiveness of its results, and in the fact that the victors lost no ship, challenges comparison with that of the Nile. The tangled chain of causation now requires to be unravelled by the coolest heads at our disposal, excluding all previous bias, and seeking only to apportion the true relative values of the various factors involved with the single object of securing the sound direction of future naval policy.

What part did superior speed play in carrying destruction to the Russian fleet? What guns established the initial superiority of fire and wrought the havoc, moral and material, which ensured victory? What purpose did armour serve, and how did its distribution conform to the needs of the battle? It is upon the answers to such questions as these that our naval policy must depend.

Underlying the experience of the battle of Tsu-shima there are undoubtedly principles of general application. It is for us to ascertain those principles, and to apply them as a test to all ship designs and tactical theories.

The merit of this little work is that it records the impressions of a naval officer who apparently had no official duties to absorb his attention. Captain Semenoff had also the advantage of being present on board the Cesarevitch at the action of the 10th August 1904, when it was vital to the Japanese to take no great risks. He significantly notes the difference of conditions. At Tsu-shima, Admiral Togo was determined to force a decisive action. Moreover, the Japanese had, meanwhile, improved their fuses. Thus, in the later action, “shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly.... It seemed as if these were mines, not shells.... They burst as soon as they touched anything.... No! It was different to the 10th August.”

Incidentally the author notes the “portmanteaus” (Japanese 12-inch shell) “curving awkwardly head over heels through the air and falling anyhow on the water.” This shows that some of the Japanese 12-inch guns—numbering only sixteen—were so much worn as to be unable to give adequate rotation to their projectiles, which consequently could only have hit the Russian ships by accident.

The Suvoroff, where Captain Semenoff’s experiences were gained, was a ship of 13,500 tons, with a continuous armour belt 12 feet broad, tapering in length at the water-line from 8 inches to 6 inches, and vertically from 6 inches to 4 inches above. Her heavy armament consisted of four 12-inch guns in 10-inch turrets, standing upon 10-inch barbettes built up from the armoured deck. The secondary armament of twelve 6-inch guns was mounted in 6-inch turrets standing upon 6-inch barbettes, all built up from the upper deck. Below the 6-inch barbettes were armoured ammunition hoists carried down to the belt level. A main armoured deck (3 to 2 inches) at the water-line level extended all over the ship.

Such was the Suvoroff, which was driven out of the line in less than forty minutes, and after being reduced to the hopeless state described by Captain Semenoff, was gratuitously torpedoed by the Japanese. Being the flag-ship of the Commander-in-Chief she was doubtless singled out as a target; but, of her three sister-ships, the Alexander III. was sunk by gun fire about five hours after the beginning of the action; the Borodino also sank in five hours, apparently as the result of the explosion of a magazine; and the Orel surrendered on the 28th with main turrets not seriously injured and thick armour not penetrated.

The general impression conveyed by Captain Semenoff, and confirmed from other sources, is that the Russian ships were overwhelmed by the volume of the Japanese fire, and that frequency of hitting rather than weight of shells should be the main object. If this conclusion is correct, the principle which guided the British Navy in the days of Nelson—to close to effective range and then deliver the most rapid fire possible—has been strikingly reaffirmed. Effective ranges have increased; but this principle remains unchanged and is probably unchangeable.

The trouble which arose from the outbreak of fire on board the Suvoroff and from the wreckage of the bridges and spar-deck, the men killed in the conning tower, the penetration of the armoured deck near the bow, the down-draught of smoke, the estimate of range (“a little more than 20 cables”) at a critical moment—all these points, which present themselves in the narrative, claim attention and careful comparison with other accounts.

Captain Semenoff’s impressions of the manoeuvring of the fleets may well be somewhat vague; but it is worth collating with other observations. Lastly, the graphic touches of the author show with painful distinctness the terrible strain imposed upon human endurance. Few who read his account of the heroic signalmen “standing silently and outwardly calm,” unwilling to go below the armoured deck, wishing only for orders, and feeling “themselves indispensable to the fight,” will be inclined to accept the recent theory that partly-trained and half-disciplined men are fit to find a place on board ship in modern naval war.

Upon a correct understanding of the lessons of Tsu-shima the expenditure of millions of public money and the efficiency of the Navy in the near future must mainly depend. If this simple narrative can, in however small a degree, help us to attain such an understanding, its publication will be abundantly justified.

G.S. CLARKE.

London, 10th November 1906.

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