  There is no longer doubt that space exploration holds genuine significance for the security and well-being of the United States as a nation. It does so in at least three ways. One results from the uses which our Armed Forces can make of the knowledge gained from space exploration. A second results from the influence and prestige which America can exert within the world community because of her prowess in space exploration. A third results from the possibility that space exploration, eventually, may prove so immense and important a challenge that it will channel the prime energies of powerful nations toward its own end and thus reduce the current emphasis on developing means of destruction. The first two values definitely exist. The third seems to be a reasonable hope. THE MILITARY USESFrom the beginning it has been recognized that space exploration, the research connected therewith, and the ability to operate therein is of more than passing interest to the military. Congress recognized the fact when it passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and directed that "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States * * * shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense." It is possible to argue, and indeed it has been argued, that ballistic missiles such as IRBM's and ICBM's are not really "space" weapons, that they are simply an extension of the traditional art of artillery. For the purposes of this report, however, the argument appears to be largely a semantic one. Such missiles do traverse space, they are guided through space, and they employ the same engines and principles which are presently used for purposes of scientific space exploration. While more advanced "space" weapons may evolve in the future, the missile as we know it today cannot very well be divorced from our thinking about space and its practical uses. Going on this assumption, and casting an eye in the direction of the Iron Curtain, it is obvious that the Soviet Union is going all-out to exploit space for military purposes. Military men have known for years that the tremendously powerful booster which the Soviets have been using to launch their massive sputniks was originally designed to carry the primitive heavy version of the A-bomb across continents. If there was ever doubt of the extent to which the Soviets intend to make space a selected medium for military purposes it was erased when Premier Khrushchev made his address to the Supreme Soviet early in 1960. He commented in part: Our state has at its disposal powerful rocket equipment. The military air force and navy have lost their previous importance in view of the modern development of military equipment. This type of armament is not being reduced but replaced. Almost the entire military air force is being replaced by rocket equipment. We have by now sharply cut, and it seems will continue sharply to cut and even discontinue the manufacture of bombers and other obsolete equipment. In the navy, the submarine fleet assumes great importance, while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did. In our country the armed forces have been to a considerable extent transferred to rocket and nuclear arms. These arms are being perfected and will continue to be perfected until they are banned. While it is difficult to assess the actual extent of the Soviet preoccupation with missiles, it has been reported that the Russians are building upward of 100 IRBM and ICBM bases to be manned by about 200,000 men. Most of these, at least the intermediate range bases, are said to be along Russia's Baltic coast, in East Germany, in the southern Ukraine and in the Carpathian Mountains. In any event, the space age is clearly "here" so far as the military are concerned, and U.S. forces—particularly since the development of the much lighter atomic warheads—have been likewise diligent in their space efforts. This is because many military minds are now agreed that: We are moving inevitably into a time of astropower. We face a threat beyond imagination, should events ever lead to open conflict in a world of hypersonic velocities and a raging atom chained as our slave. We must be strong, we must be able to change to meet change. What may come against our beloved America will not be signaled by one light from the North Church steeple, if they come by land, or two, if they come by sea. Never again. They will come through space, and their light of warning will be the blinding terror of a thermonuclear fireball. It is important to note, in connection with military matters, that pure rocket power, is not the only avenue to success in space use. The American Atlas missile, for example, which can carry a nuclear warhead and which operates on considerably less thrust than the powerful Soviet boosters thus far demonstrated, has nevertheless shown the capability of negotiating a 9,000-mile trek and landing in the target area. This is about 1,500 miles farther than any Soviet shots revealed to the public in the 2½-year period following the first sputnik. It is also a sufficient range to permit reaching almost any likely target on the globe. From the military point of view, the meaning thus brought out is that sophistication of missiles together with reliability and ease of handling is more important than pure power. When we begin to consider both the civil and military aspects of space use in the decades ahead, however, rocket power acquires fresh importance. It is, as one expert says, "the key to space supremacy." This suggests the possibilities of weapons which today are considered to be "way out" or "blue sky"—in short, farfetched. Yet they include the ideas of men with solid scientific training as well as vision. For example, Germany's great rocket pioneer, Prof. Hermann Oberth, "has proposed that a giant mirror in space (some 60 miles in diameter) could be used militarily to burn an enemy country on Earth. For peaceful purposes, however, such a space mirror could be used to melt icebergs and alter temperatures." Still another proposal, one made to the Congress, involves use of the Moon as a military base. "It could, at some future date, be used as a secure base to deter aggression. Lunar launching sites, perhaps located on the far side of the Moon, which could never be viewed directly from the Earth, could launch missiles earthward. They could be guided accurately during flight and to impact, and thus might serve peaceful ends by deterring any would-be aggressor." In spite of the fact that ideas such as these are being sponsored by competent and responsible scientists, other scientists equally competent and responsible sometimes cry them down as impractical, impossible or even childish. One engineer, for instance, describes maneuverable manned space vehicles as having "no military value," bases on the Moon as having no military or communications use, and the idea of high velocity photon-power for space travel as "a fantasy strictly for immature science fiction." He also characterizes the reconnaissance satellite, which U.S. military authorities have long since programmed and even launched, as being "definitely submarginal * * *. A fraction of the cost of a reconnaissance satellite could accomplish wonders in conventional information gathering." Controversies such as these are difficult for the person who is neither a scientist nor a military expert to judge. One is inclined to recall, though, the treatment received by General Billy Mitchell for his devotion to nonconventional bombing concepts; the fact that the utility of the rocket as developed by America's pioneer, Dr. Robert H. Goddard, was generally ignored during World War II; the fact that it Yet today the bomber, the missile, and the nuclear weapon form the backbone of our military posture. In other words, history seems to support the proposition that no matter how remote or unlikely new discoveries and approaches may first appear, the military eventually finds a way to use them. Will it be any different with space exploration? OUR POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITYLike the military values of space research, the practical value of space exploration in terms of world prestige has also been acknowledged almost from the beginning of the satellite era. The White House, in its initial statement on the national space program, declared: It is useful to distinguish among (the) factors which give importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology (one of which) is the factor of national prestige. To be strong and bold in space technology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world and create added confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and military strength. Only recently, however, has the full impact and meaning of this phase of our national space program come to be widely recognized. It has been stated, perhaps in its most forceful and succinct form, by an American official in a unique position to know. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency, part of whose job is to keep track of the esteem in which America is held abroad, has told Congress: Our space program may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability to compete with a formidable rival and as a criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy of emulation by other peoples. This element of space exploration takes on particular significance in light of the current international struggle to influence the minds of men, in light of the rising tide of nationalism throughout the world, and in light of the intensification of the cold war as demonstrated by the now-famous U-2 incident and the hardening attitude of oriental communism. In the words of an influential newspaper: Wholly apart from the intellectual compulsions that now drive man to move higher and higher into the high heavens, it seems clear that our country can be niggardly in this field only at the risk of being completely and forever outclassed by Russia—a gamble that could have the most fearful political, economic, and military consequences. Incidentally, there is another prestige factor to be considered. This is what might be called the chain-reaction factor: the likelihood that technological preeminence in the space field will attract top talent Here again, as with the military situation, the Soviets are making every effort to exploit their dexterity in space. They are pursuing the prestige gambit directly and indirectly. In the first category, for example, they give top priority to space exhibits in important public forums—as their duplicate sputniks strategically placed at the world's fair and the United Nations attest. Premier Khrushchev's delight in making gifts to foreigners of miniature Soviet pennants similar to that carried in Lunik II—which hit the Moon—is another instance. The indirect drive for prestige via space technology is far more important. It has been described by a congressional committee as follows: It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union in the last several years has demonstrated a great skill in coordinating its progress in missilery, its success in space missions, and its foreign policy and world image. Shots seem to have been timed to maximize the effects of visits of Soviet leaders and to punctuate Soviet statements and positions in international negotiations. This is not to equate their space activities with hollow propaganda. Empty claims do not have a positive effect for long. Nor is there any firm evidence that it has been possible for political policymakers to call their shots at times inconsistent with good scientific and technical needs. The conclusion is rather that the many elements of scientific, technical, military, political, and psychological policy are all weighed, and tests which make a full contribution to such a combined strategy are carried out and supported with appropriate publicity. There is also evidence that scientific endeavor by the Russians for prestige purposes is having repercussions on internal policy. Great emphasis is currently being placed on the demonstrable usefulness of scientific effort—to the extent that Soviet colleges, research institutions, examining boards, and academies of science have been directed to be more exacting in conferring scientific degrees and titles. Newness and usefulness are requisite, but, at the same time, degrees may now be awarded for other than dissertations; inventions and textbooks of major importance may also earn a degree for their authors. Within the prestige context, it is true that the United States must labor under certain handicaps because of the nature of its democratic system. No effort is made in the American space program to hide the failures which result from its highly complex character. Our burnups, misfires, explosions, fizzles, and lost or wayward vehicles are well publicized. Those of the Soviet Union rarely are. Even though most nations are well aware that the Russians must be having their troubles, Figure 4.
Still, the United States has not done badly from the prestige angle. So far as the world's scientific fraternity is concerned, it may even be well in the lead. In the first 30 or so months following the opening of the space age, as signaled by the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957, the United States put 21 satellites into orbit out of 42 attempts. Two out of five deep-space probes were successful. The degree of success for all major launchings ran better than 50 percent. The American effort has been based on a broad scope of inquiry and includes long-range communications, weather reporting, navigation and surveillance vehicles, as well as information-gathering satellites. During the same period the Soviets launched four Earth satellites, one deep-space probe, one lunar-impact probe and one satellite into a much elongated Earth orbit which circled and photographed the Moon. Most of their vehicles have been substantially heavier than those launched by the United States, although complete information on their scientific purposes and the result obtained has never been disclosed. The world political value of such programs cannot be discounted. To the extent that the welfare of the United States depends upon its stature in the eyes of the rest of the world (which is believed considerable) and to the extent that the scientific capability of the United States influences such stature (which is also believed considerable) our space venture has very marked practical utility. It may even mean the difference between freedom and dictatorship, between survival and oblivion. SPACE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR WARA natural outgrowth of the military and prestige facets of space exploration is the question of whether this activity, in time, will replace the forces which have historically driven nations into armed conflict. Any number of social scientists and historians have speculated that this might occur. The theory is that the conquest of space may prove to be the moral equivalent of war by substituting for certain material and psychological needs usually supplied through war; that the absorption of energies, resources, imagination, and aggressiveness in pursuit of the space adventure may become an effective way of maintaining peace. Put another way, nations might become "extroverted" to the point where their urge to overcome the unknown would dwarf their historic desires for power, wealth, and recognition—attributes which have so often led to war in the past. The fact that the United Nations, late in 1959, agreed to set up a permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space attests to the hopes and potential of such a development. Of course, whether this condition will actually develop is anybody's guess. But in a world where brute force is becoming increasingly dangerous and catastrophic, the bare possibility of such a result should not be ignored by those who may be contemplating the values of space exploration. It could be the highest value of them all. Figure 5.
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