Frederick the Great and the American Colonies.—Because Frederick the Great was a Hohenzollern and a Prussian, it became the fashion early in the course of the war to frown upon all mention of his connection with the revolutionary struggle of our American forefathers, and his statue before the military college, which was unveiled with so much ceremony during President Roosevelt’s term, was discreetly taken from its pediment and consigned to the obscurity of a cellar as soon as we entered the war. Yet Frederick was the sincere friend of the Colonies and contributed largely if not vitally to the success of the struggle for American independence. The evidence rests upon something better than tradition. A more just opinion of his interest in the success of the Colonies than has been expressed of late by his detractors is contained in the works of English and American writers of history having access to the facts, who were not under the spell of active belligerency and the influence of a propaganda that has magically transformed GeorgeIII into a “German king.”

Had Russia in1778 formed an alliance with England, Russian troops would have swelled the forces arrayed against the American patriots to such proportions that the result of the struggle presumably would have been different. The influence of Prussia in that relation is a chapter of history practically closed to most students. But for immense bribes to Count Panin, Catherine the Great’s premier, paid by Frederick the Great, as testified by British authorities, Russia would have extended aid to England in her struggle with the Colonies which might have proved decisive.

It was England’s interest to secure, if possible, the alliance of Russia, and, as in the Seven Years War, to involve France in continental complications. In1778 there seemed every reason to expect the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The continuance of the war gave an increased importance to an alliance with Russia, and while the Dutch appealed to Catherine on the ground that Great Britain had broken with Holland solely on account of the armed neutrality, the English government offered to hand over Minorca as the price of a convention.

In 1778 Catherine was approached by the English government through Sir James Harris and invited to make a defensive and offensive alliance. But the opposition of the Premier, Nikolai Ivanovich, Count Panin, influenced by Frederick the Great, prevented any rapprochement between England and Russia, and Catherine declared her inability to join England against France unless the English government bound itself to support her against the Turks.

“The Prussian party, headed by Panin at St. Petersburg,” writes Arthur Hassall, M.A., in “The Balance of Power, 1715-1789,” p.338; (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), “had won its last triumph, and all chance for an Anglo-Russian alliance had for the moment disappeared.... Since 1764 Count Panin had been the head of the Prussian party at the Russian capital, and the Prussian alliance had been the keystone of Catherine’s policy.... Frederick the Great, partly by immense bribes to Panin, had kept Catherine true to the existing political system, and had contributed to prevent Russian assistance from being given to England during the American struggle.” (P.361.)

Writing to his minister in Paris, Goltz, in August and September, 1777, Frederick said: “You can assure M.de Maurepas that I have no connection whatever with England, nor do I grudge France any advantage she may gain in the war with the Colonies.... Her first interest requires the enfeeblement of Great Britain, and the way to do this is to make it lose its colonies in America.... The present opportunity is more favorable than ever before existed, and more favorable than is likely to occur in three centuries.... The independence of the colonies will be worth to France all which the war will cost.”

Bancroft writes: “While Frederick was encouraging France to strike a decisive blow in favor of the United States, their cause found an efficient advocate in Marie Antoinette.” On April7, 1777, Frederick wrote: “France knows perfectly well that it has absolutely nothing to apprehend from me in case of war with England.... If it (the English crown) would give me all the millions possible I would not furnish it two small files of my troops to serve against the colonies. Neither can it expect from me a guaranty of its electorate of Hanover.”

Bancroft comments: “The people of England cherished the fame of the Prussian king as in some measure their own. Not aware how basely Bute had betrayed him, they unanimously desired the renewal of his alliance; and the ministry sought to open the way for it through his envoy in France.” Frederick replied, “No man is further removed than myself from having connections with England. We will remain on the same footing on which we are with her.” Bancroft says: “Frederick expressed more freely his sympathy with the United States.”

The port of Emden could not receive their cruisers for want of a fleet or a fort to defend them from insult; but he offered them an asylum in the Baltic at Danzig. He attempted, though in vain, to dissuade the Prince of Anspach from furnishing troops to England, and he forbade the subsidiary troops both of Anspach and Hesse to pass through his domains. The prohibition which was made as public as possible, and just as the news arrived of the surrender of Burgoyne, resounded through Europe; and he announced to the Americans that it was given him “to testify his good will to them.”

Every facility was afforded to the American commissioners to purchase and ship arms from Prussia. Before the end of 1777 he promised not to be the last to recognize the independence of the United States, and in January, 1778, his minister, Schulenburg, wrote officially to one of the commissioners in Paris: “The king desires that your generous efforts may be crowned with complete success. He will not hesitate to recognize your independency when France, which is more directly interested in the event of the contest, shall have given the example.”

“I have no wish to dissemble,” Frederick wrote in answer to the suggestion of an English alliance; “whatever pains may be taken, I will never lend myself to an alliance with England. I am not like so many German princes, to be gained for money.” Of the Landgrave of Hesse, he said: “Do not attribute his education to me. Were he a graduate of my school he would never have sold his subjects to the English as they drive cattle to the shambles. He a preceptor of sovereigns? The sordid passion for gain is the only motive of his vile procedure.”

Foerster, in “Friederich der Grosse” (1871, viii) quotes the great King as follows: “This subject leads me to speak of princes who conduct a dishonorable traffic in the blood of their people. Their troops belong to the highest bidder. It is a sort of auction at which those paying the highest subsidies lead the soldiers of these unworthy rulers to the shambles. Such princes ought to blush at their baseness in selling the lives of people whom, as fathers of their countries, they ought to protect. These little tyrants should hear the opinion of mankind, which is one of contempt for the misuse of their power.”