 
Appendix I The pacification of Mindanao by Ronquillo [Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico, 1609.]1 Shortly after Don Francisco Tello had taken over the governorship, news was brought of the death of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa in Mindanao by Brother Gaspar Gomez of the Society of Jesus. The latter brought the body for burial in the college of Manila, of which Don Esteban was patron. Juan de la Xara wrote that he had charge of affairs, that he had settled in Tampakan,2 that he intended to continue the pacification and conquest of the island as should seem most advisable, and that reËnforcements of men and other things should be sent him. It was learned that he intended to make an ill use of the government, and would not remain dependent on, and subordinate to, the governor of the Philippines; and that he was depriving the heirs of Esteban Rodriguez of what lawfully belonged to them. It was learned that, in order to make himself safer in this respect, he was sending his confidants to the town of ArÉvalo in Oton where Don Esteban had left his wife, DoÑa Ana de Osseguera, and his two small daughters, with his house and property, to persuade DoÑa Ana to marry him. This resolution appeared injurious in many respects, and the attempt was made to rectify matters. But in order not to disturb the affairs of Mindanao, the matter was left alone for the present, until time should show the course to be followed. And so it happened that when Juan de la Xara left the camp and settlements of Mindanao, and came hurriedly to Oton to negotiate his marriage in person—although the widow of Don Esteban had never been favorable to it—Don Francisco Tello sent men to arrest him. He was brought to Manila, where he died while his trial was being conducted. After the imprisonment of Juan de la Xara, Don Francisco Tello immediately sent Captain Toribio de Miranda to Mindanao, with orders to take command of the camp and to govern until some one should agree to continue the enterprise. When he arrived at Mindanao and the soldiers saw that Juan de la Xara’s schemes had been defeated, and that the latter was a prisoner in Manila, with no hope of returning, they obeyed Toribio de Miranda and the orders that he brought. In Manila the governor was considering carefully the necessary measures for continuing the war, since the island of Mindanao was so near the other pacified islands, and the island itself contained some provinces that professed peace and were apportioned as encomiendas and had Spanish magistrates, such as the rivers of Butuan, Dapitan, and Karaga, so that it was desirable to pacify the whole island and subject it to His Majesty. The royal treasury was spent and could not bear the expense; and Esteban Rodriguez had bound himself by a legal writ to carry the war to entire completion at his own expense, in accordance with the terms of his agreement. The guardian of his children and heirs brought the matter before the court, and refused to fulfill this obligation on account of Esteban Rodriguez’s death. In order not to lose time, for what had been commenced had to be continued in one way or another, the governor decided to prosecute it, drawing the necessary funds from the royal treasury, either on its own account or on the account of Esteban Rodriguez’s heirs, if such should be according to law. The governor then searched for a person to go to Mindanao, and selected Don Juan Ronquillo, general of the galleys. The latter was given the necessary reËnforcements of men and other things, with which he reached Mindanao. He took command of the Spanish camp and fleet which he found in Tampakan. He confirmed the peace and friendship with the chiefs and people of Tampakan and Lumagan, restored and set in better order the Spanish settlement and fort, and began to make preparation for the war against the people of Bwayan.3 He spent many days in making a few incursions into their land and attacks on their forts, but without any notable result, for the enemy were many and all good soldiers, with plenty of arquebuses and artillery, and had fortified themselves in a strong position. They had many other fortifications inland and went from one to the other with impunity, whenever they wished, and greatly harassed the Spaniards, who were little used to so swampy a country. The latter found themselves short of provisions without the possibility of getting them in the country on account of the war, inasmuch as the camp contained many men, both Spaniards and the native servants and boatmen, and it was not easy at all times to come and go from one part to another in order to provide necessities. Meanwhile Don Juan Ronquillo, seeing that the war was advancing very slowly and with little result, and that the camp was suffering, drew up a report of it, and sent letters in all haste to Governor Don Francisco Tello, informing him of the condition of affairs. He wrote that it would be better to withdraw the camp from Mindanao River, so that it might not perish; and that a presidio could be established on the same island in the port of La Caldera, which could be left fortified, in order not to abandon this enterprise entirely, and so that their friends of Tampakan and Lumagan might be kept hostile to the people of Bwayan. Meanwhile he and the rest of the camp and fleet would return to Manila, if permitted, for which he requested the governor to send him an order quickly. Upon the receipt of this dispatch, Governor Don Francisco Tello resolved to order Don Juan Ronquillo, since the above was so and the camp could not be maintained, nor the war continued advantageously, to withdraw with his whole camp from Mindanao River. He was first to make a great effort to chastise the enemy in Bwayan, and then to burn the Spanish settlement and fort and go to La Caldera, fortify it, and leave there a sufficient garrison with artillery, boats, and provisions for its maintenance and service. Then he was to return to Manila with the rest of his men, after telling their friends in Tampakan that the Spaniards would shortly return to the river better equipped and in great numbers. Silonga4 and other chiefs of Bwayan were not neglecting their defense, since, among other measures taken, they had sent a chief to Ternate to ask assistance against the Spaniards who had brought war into their homes. Thereupon the King of Ternate dispatched a numerous fleet of caracoas and other boats to Mindanao with cachils5 and valiant soldiers—more than 1,000 fighting men in all—and a quantity of small artillery, in order to force the Spaniards to break camp and depart, even could they do nothing else. When the news reached Bwayan that this fleet was coming to their defense and support, they made ready and prepared to attack the Spaniards, who also having heard the same news were not careless. Consequently the latter turned their attention more to the main fort, and reduced the number of men in the smaller forts on Butil6 River and other posts, mouths, and arms of the same river. These served to strengthen the garrison of the main fort and the armed galleys and other smaller craft, in order to use the latter to resist the expected attack of the enemy. The enemy having gallantly advanced to the very fort of the Spaniards with all their vessels and men, attacked and stormed it with great courage and resolution, in order to effect an entrance. The Spaniards within resisted valiantly, and those outside in the galleys on the river assisted them so effectively that together, with artillery and arquebuses, and at times in close combat with swords and kampilan, they made a great slaughter and havoc among the men of Ternate and those of Bwayan, who were aiding the former. They killed and wounded a great number of them and captured almost all the caracoas and vessels of the enemy, so that very few boats escaped, and they were pursued and burned by the Spaniards, who made many prisoners and seized immense booty and many weapons from the enemy. As soon as possible after this, the Spaniards turned against the settlements and forts of Bwayan where some of their results were of so great moment that the enemy, seeing themselves hard pressed and without anyone to help them, sent messages and proposals of peace to Don Juan Ronquillo, which were ended by their rendering recognition and homage, and the renewal of friendship with the people of Tampakan, their ancient enemy. In order to strengthen the friendship, they sealed it by the marriage of the greatest chief and lord of Bwayan with the daughter of another chief of Tampakan, called Dungunlibur. Thereupon the war was apparently completely ended, provisions were now to be had, and the Spaniards with little precaution crossed and went about the country wherever they wished. The people of Bwayan promised to dismantle all their forts immediately, for that was one of the conditions of peace. Then the Spaniards returned to their fort and settlements at Tampakan, whence Don Juan Ronquillo immediately sent dispatches to Governor Don Francisco Tello, informing him of the different turn that the enterprise had taken. In view of the present condition he requested the governor to issue new instructions as to his procedure, saying that he would wait without making any change, notwithstanding the arrival of the answer which he expected to his first report, for conditions had now become so much better than before that the governor’s decision would be different. The governor had already answered Don Juan Ronquillo’s first dispatch, as we have said above, when the second dispatch arrived with news of the successes in Mindanao. Suspicious of the men in the camp who had constantly shown a desire to return to Manila, and little relish for the hardships of war, and fearing lest they would return at the arrival of the first order, executing that order and abandoning the enterprise which had reached such a satisfactory stage; and thinking that it would be unwise to abandon the river, the governor made haste to send a second dispatch immediately by various roads, ordering them to pay no attention to his first orders, but to remain in Mindanao, and that he would soon send them what was necessary for further operations. It seems that this message traveled slowly; for, the first having arrived, they obeyed it without any further delay, and camp was raised and the country abandoned. To their former enemy of Bwayan they gave as a reason that the governor of Manila had summoned them; and to their friends of Tampakan they said that they would leave men in La Caldera for their security, and that assistance would be sent them from Manila. This news caused as much sorrow and sadness to the latter as joy to the people of Bwayan. Then, after burning their fort and settlement, the Spaniards embarked all their forces as soon as possible, left the river, and went to La Caldera, 24 leagues farther down in the direction of Manila. Having entered port, they built a fortress and left there a garrison of 100 Spaniards, with some artillery, provisions, and boats for their use. At this juncture the governor’s second message to General Don Juan Ronquillo arrived, to which the latter replied that he was already in La Caldera, and could not return to the river. Then, without any further delay, Don Juan Ronquillo went to Manila with the balance of his fleet, by way of the Provinces of Oton and Panay. The governor, having heard of his coming, sent to arrest him on the road before he entered the city, and proceeded against him by law for having withdrawn the camp and army from Mindanao River, without awaiting the orders he should have expected after the favorable turn that affairs had taken. Don Juan Ronquillo was set at liberty on showing a private letter from the governor, which the latter had sent him separately with the first instructions, to the effect that he should return to Manila with his troops in any event, for they were needed in the Islands for other purposes; and because of this letter Don Juan had determined not to await the second order. Appendix II The pacification of Mindanao7 [Concerning the pacification of the Island of Mindanao in the year 1600.]8 In the relation of the last year you will have learned how occurred the death, in the pacification of the Island of Mindanao, of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, who offered to carry out this pacification under the conditions which he stipulated with Gomez Perez DasmariÑas, formerly governor of these islands, copies of which were sent to His Majesty and to Master-of-Camp Juan de Lajara, formerly of the said expedition, who succeeded to his place when the camp was abandoned, and came to Manila. Don Francisco Tello, Governor and Captain-General of the said Philippine Islands, who at that time had taken possession of the government, was considering how to aid and stimulate the said pacification at the expense of the heirs of Esteban Rodriguez, and with the agreement of the captains and persons who were long resident and experienced in war in the said islands. Don Juan Ronquillo was appointed commander of the galleys to prosecute the said pacification, and in the meantime, in order to be present and continue the expedition, Capt. Toribio de Miranda was sent forward to encourage and animate the troops, under orders to keep them in his charge; and in case the post should be abandoned, and a retreat made to Manila, he should detain the troops and return to Mindanao. The said Capt. Toribio de Miranda having arrived at the Island9 of La Caldera, which lies 40 leagues from the river of Mindanao, there found the whole camp, which was returning from the said islands. Conformably to the orders which he had, he turned back and fortified the site where they had first been, which was on the river, 4 leagues from the forts of the enemy. Juan Ronquillo, having been dispatched to Mindanao, had taken the camp in his charge, and begun to achieve some success. He achieved a victory in the battle which he fought with the Ternatans, who had entered with 800 men to give aid to the people of Mindanao. Before these successes, he had written a letter in disparagement of that country (a copy of which was sent to His Majesty), on account of which, in a council of war which had been held, the General Don Ronquillo had been ordered to make a last effort against the Mindanaos, doing them all possible damage. He was then to come to the Island10 of La Caldera and there build a fort, to be garrisoned with a hundred Spanish soldiers, with artillery, arms, and munitions, and leave them there as a check upon Ternate and Mindanao, in charge of a good soldier, one of the captains of the camp, and with the rest return to Manila. Although Don Juan Ronquillo received this order, after having won considerable victories, he again wrote that he would not abandon that place, even if such were the order, because it would not be expedient to retire from the camp and comply with what had been ordered, when he was leaving the Island of Mindanao already pacified, the chiefs, with whom he had used gentle means, that they might all be more contented, having again rendered submission to His Majesty, and likewise as the King of Sulu again rendered obedience and submission. Confiding in this, Capt. Cristobal Villagra, whom Don Juan Ronquillo had appointed commander of the garrison of La Caldera, had sent 30 soldiers to the Island of Sulu for supplies. They found at this time in Jolo a Mindanao chief, an uncle of the King of Mindanao and a brother-in-law of the King of Sulu, who had been driven out of Mindanao because he was rebellious. He treacherously killed 13 Spanish soldiers. When news of this was brought, Juan Pacho was sent to take the troops of La Caldera in charge, and, when it should seem best to him, to try to inflict punishment with 600 Spaniards; the enemy unfortunately killed the said Juan Pacho and 29 Spaniards, the rest of them retiring without any success. This news having come to the governor, he sent in place of Juan Pacho, Capt. Toribio de Miranda, a person in whom he had entire confidence, with an order not to attempt any punishment until he had force enough for it. After this Capt. Toribio de Miranda arrived at La Caldera on the 26th of August, 1599. When the garrison was given into his charge he put the defensive works in order, and with the arms which he brought, and those which he found in the fort, he armed all the troops, amounting to 114 soldiers. As directed by an order of the governor, he sent a chief of the Pintados [Bisayans] to Mindanao with letters to the chiefs of the island, in which he informed them that they would be protected, favored, and upheld in justice, as vassals of His Majesty, and that with this object a garrison had been placed in La Caldera; and that to aid in maintaining it, and in covering the expenses which they had caused in the war by their disobedience, the largest possible quantity of tributes would be collected for His Majesty, and that he would send for them shortly, which had not been done earlier because the Mindanaos had been so spent and afflicted. Having arrived on the 2d of September at the river of Mindanao, and delivered his dispatch, this chief was well received, and found the people in the settled state in which Gen. Don Juan Ronquillo had left them. Raja Muda, the main chief of Mindanao, in the name of them all, sent him back on the 15th of the said month, offering to give to His Majesty all the tribute which they could collect. At this time news from the chief captain of Malacca having reached the governor, to the effect that in the Sunda,11 150 leagues from that port, there had been seen a number of English ships, whose designs were not known; and, a little later, word from the commander of the fort of Maluco that there were at Ternate, within the port, two English ships with 400 men and 50 pieces of artillery; a council of war was held as to what was best to do. The said council decided to withdraw the garrison from La Caldera to Cebu, so that the enemy should not take that place; and, if they should attempt to do damage to that province, they would find it in a state of defense. Accordingly an order was sent to Capt. Toribio de Miranda to withdraw with the troops, arms, artillery, and munitions, dismantling the fort; he was also told that he could return shortly to the island; with more troops and arms, in order to assist in its defense. On the 9th of September Capt. Toribio de Miranda arrived at Cebu, with all the troops, artillery, arms, and munitions; and at the same time Gen. Don Juan Tello arrived at Cebu with a hundred men, who came as reËnforcement from the city of Manila. Having spent six months there and commenced to build a fort of stone, the governor, as they had no more news of the English referred to, sent an order to the said Don Juan to come to the city of Manila—which he did with the hundred men. leaving the Province of Cebu in a prosperous condition, with the troops which are usually kept there, and those of the garrison of La Caldera, which in all amounted to 250 Spaniards. After all this, in June of 1600, the governor received news, by way of Malacca, that the ships which had passed to the South Sea belonged to Dutch merchants, who had come to load with spices in the Maluco Islands. Having transacted their business, they had returned to their own country by way of India, without doing any damage to the islands of the west; it therefore seems that we are safe, notwithstanding the news received of those enemies. Appendix III The Moro raids of 1599 and 1600 [Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico, 1609.]12 The Spanish garrison left in La Caldera, at the withdrawal of Don Ronquillo’s camp from the river of Mindanao, passed into command of Captain Villagra at the death of Capt. Juan Pacho in Jolo, and was suffering for lack of provisions; for neither the people of the river could give them to the Spaniards, nor would the Sulus furnish any on account of the war declared upon them. Therefore the garrison urgently requested Governor Don Francisco Tello either to aid their presidio with provisions, soldiers, and ammunition, or to allow them to retire to Manila—a thing of which they were most desirous—since there they gained no other special result than that of famine, and of incarceration in that fort, and of no place wherein to seek their sustenance. The governor, in view of their insistence in the matter, and having but little money in the royal exchequer, with which to provide for and maintain the said presidio and for the same reason the punishment that was to be inflicted upon the Sulus for their outrages upon the Spaniards, and their insurrection was deferred—and thinking that the return to Mindanao matters would be a long question, he was inclined to excuse the difficulty and anxiety of maintaining the presidio of La Caldera. In order to do it with a reasonable excuse he consulted the Audiencia and other intelligent persons, and requested them to give him their opinion. But he first communicated his wishes to them and gave them some reasons with which he tried to persuade them to give him the answer that he desired. The Audiencia advised him not to remove or raise the garrison of La Caldera, but to reËnforce and maintain it, and to attend to the affairs of Sulu and the river of Mindanao as soon as possible, even if what was necessary for those two places should be withdrawn from some other section. They said that this was the most urgent need, and the one which required the greatest attention in the islands, both in order to pacify those provinces and to keep them curbed; lest, seeing the Spaniards totally withdrawn, they should gain courage and boldly venture still farther and come down to make captures among the Pintados [Bisayans] and carry the war to the very doors of the Spaniards. Notwithstanding this reply the governor resolved to raise and withdraw the garrison, and sent orders to Captain Villagra immediately to burn the fort which had been built in La Caldera, to withdraw with all his men and ships, and return to Manila. This was quickly done, for the captain and the soldiers of the garrison waited for nothing more than to dismantle the fort and leave. When the Sulus saw the Spaniards abandoning the country, they were persuaded that the latter would return to Mindanao no more, and that they had not sufficient forces to do so. Thereupon they gained fresh resolution and courage, and united with the people of Bwayan on the river, and equipped a number of caracoas and other craft, in order to descend upon the coast of Pintados (Bisayas) to plunder them and make captives. The people of Tampakan, who lost hope of receiving further help from the Spaniards, and of the latter’s return to the river, since they had also abandoned the fort of La Caldera and left the country, came to terms with and joined the people of Bwayan, their neighbors, in order to avoid the war and injuries that they were suffering from the latter. Then all turned their arms against the Spaniards, promising themselves to make many incursions into their territory and gain much plunder. Accordingly they prepared their fleet and appointed as leaders and commanders of it two of the experienced chiefs of the river of Mindanao, called Sali and Silungan.13 They left the Mindanao River in the month of July of the year 1599, in the season of the vendabals,14 with 50 caracoas, containing more than 3,000 soldiers armed with arquebuses, kampilan, carasas,15 other weapons with handles, and many culverins, and steered toward the islands of Oton and Panay, and neighboring islands. They passed Negros Island and went to the river of Panay, which they ascended for 5 leagues to the chief settlement, where the alcalde-mayor and some Spaniards were living. They sacked the settlement, burned the houses and churches, captured many native Christians—men, women, and children—upon whom they committed many murders, cruelties, and outrages. They pursued these in boats more than 10 leagues up the river, and destroyed all the crops. For the alcalde-mayor, and those who could, fled inland among the mountains, and accordingly the enemy had a better opportunity to do what they pleased. After they had burned all the vessels in the river, they left the river of Panay with their boats laden with pillaged goods and captive Christians. They did the same in the other islands and towns which they passed. Then they returned to Mindanao, without any opposition being offered, with a quantity of gold and goods and more than 800 captives, besides the people whom they had killed. In Mindanao they divided the spoil, and agreed to get ready a larger fleet for the next year, and return to make war better prepared.16 This daring attack of the Mindanaos worked great injury to the Pintado Islands [Bisayas], both on account of their deeds there and also on account of the fear and terror with which they inspired the natives; because of the latter being in the power of the Spaniards, who kept them subject, tributary, and disarmed, and neither protected them from their enemies, nor left them the means to defend themselves, as they used to do when there were no Spaniards in the country. Therefore many towns of peaceful and subjected Indians revolted and withdrew to the tingues,17 and refused to descend to their houses, magistrates, and encomenderos.18 As was reported daily, they all had a great desire to revolt and rebel, but they were appeased and reduced again to subjection by a few promises and presents from their encomenderos and religious who showed great pity and sadness over their injuries. Although in Manila people regretted these injuries, and still more those which were expected in the future from the enemy, they did nothing but regret them—since the governor was ill provided with ships and other necessities for the defense—and reckon them with the loss which they had suffered for having raised the camp on the river of Mindanao and dismantled the presidio of La Caldera. As soon as the weather permitted, the Mindanaos and Sulus returned with a large fleet of more than 70 well-equipped ships and more than 4,000 fighting men, led by the same Silungan and Sali, and other Mindanao and Sulu chiefs, to the same Islands of Pintados [Bisayas], with the determination of taking and sacking the Spanish town of ArÉvalo, which is situated in Oton. Capt. Juan GarcÍa de Sierra, alcalde mayor of that province, having heard of this expedition and of the designs entertained by the enemy, took the most necessary precautions, and gathering into the town all the Spaniards who lived there and in its neighborhood, shut himself up in it with all of them. Then, having repaired, as well as possible, a wooden fort there, he gathered there the women and their possessions. He and the Spaniards—about 70 men—armed with arquebuses, awaited the enemy. The latter, who intended to attack the river of Panay again, passed Negros Island and made for the town of ArÉvalo, where they anchored close to the native settlement. Then they landed 1,500 men armed with arquebuses, kampilan, and carasas, and, without stopping on the way marched against the Spanish town which was the object of their attack. The Spaniards, divided into troops, sallied forth and opened fire with their arquebuses upon the enemy with such vehemence that they forced them to retreat and take refuge on board their caracoas. So great was the enemy’s confusion that many Mindanaos were killed before they could embark. Capt. Juan GarcÍa de Sierra, who was on horseback, pursued the enemy so closely to the water’s edge that the latter cut off the legs of his mount with their kampilan and brought him to the ground, where they killed him. The enemy embarked with a heavy loss of men, and halted at the Island of GimarÁs,19 in sight of ArÉvalo. There they counted their men, including the dead and the wounded, who were not a few, and among whom was one of the most noted chiefs and leaders. Then they sailed for Mindanao, making a great show of grief and sorrow, and sounding their bells20 and tifas.21 They made no further delay at Pintados [Bisayas], deriving little profit or gain from the expedition but much injury, and loss of men and reputation, which was felt more deeply upon their arrival in Sulu and Mindanao. In order to remedy this disaster, it was proposed to renew their expedition against the Pintados at the first monsoon with more ships and men, and it was so decided. Appendix IV Gallinato’s expedition to Jolo [Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico, 1609.]22 The daring and audacity of the Mindanaos and Sulus in making incursions with their fleets into the Islands of Pintados [Bisayas] had reached such a state that it was now expected that they would come as far as Manila, plundering and devastating. In order to check them, at the beginning of the year 1602, Governor Don Francisco Tello, deriving strength from weakness, determined that the expedition against Sulu should be made at once, without more delay, in order to punish and pacify it, with the forces and men whom Capt. and Sargento-mayor Juan Xuarez Gallinato held in Cebu and in the Pintados [Bisayas] together with more men, ships, and provisions, which were sent him, accompanied by the necessary documents and instructions for him to enter the island, chastise its king and inhabitants, and pacify and reduce it to the obedience of his Majesty. By this means, until there should be an opportunity to settle the affairs of Mindanao, which is quite near Sulu, the audacity of the enemy would be checked; and by bringing the war into his own country, he would not come out to commit depredations. Captain Gallinato set out on this expedition with 200 Spanish soldiers, ships, artillery, enough provisions for four months—the time which it was thought the expedition would last—and with Indians as rowers for the ships and for other services that might arise. When he arrived at Sulu, at the bar of the river of this island, which is 2 leagues from the principal town and dwellings of the king, he landed his men, artillery, and the necessary provisions and left his ships under a sufficient guard. The islanders were all in the town and dwellings of the king, which are situated on a very high hill above some cliffs, and have two roads of approach through paths and roads so narrow that they can be reached only in single file. They had fortified the whole place, intrenched it with palms and other woods and a number of culverins. They had also collected provisions and water for their sustenance, besides a supply of arquebuses and other weapons. They had neither women nor children with them, for they had taken them out of the island. They had requested aid from the people of Mindanao, Bruney, and Ternate, and were awaiting the same, since they had been informed of the fleet which was being prepared against them in the Pintados [Bisayas]. Gallinato determined to pitch his camp near the town before this aid should arrive, and to attack the fort. After he had quartered himself at a distance of one-half league, in a plain facing the ascent, he sent interpreters with messages to the king and chiefs of the island, calling on them to surrender, and telling them that good terms would be given them. While waiting for an answer, he fortified his quarters in that spot, intrenching himself wherever necessary. He mounted the artillery in the best position for use, and kept his men ready for any emergency. A false and deceptive answer was returned, making excuses for the excesses that had been committed, and for not complying just then with what had been asked of them, and making loud promises to do so later. All this was with the object of detaining the captain in that place, which is very unhealthy, until the rains should set in, his provisions run short, and the arrival of the expected aid. After this answer had been received the Sulus, thinking that the Spaniards had become more careless on account of it, swarmed down quickly from the said fort in a large body of probably somewhat over one thousand; and armed with arquebuses and other weapons with handles, kampilan, and caraÇas, attacked and assaulted the quarters and camp of the Spaniards. This could not be done so secretly as not to be seen by the Spaniards and allow them opportunity to prepare to receive the Sulus before their arrival. This the Spaniards did, and having permitted the natives to come all together in a body to the very inside of the quarters and trenches, as soon as the Sulus had discharged their arquebuses the Spaniards opened fire upon them, first with their artillery, and then with their arquebuses, killing many, and forcing the rest to retire in flight to the fort. The Spaniards pursued them, wounding and killing to the middle of the hill. But seeing that farther on the paths were so narrow and rough, they retreated before the heavy artillery fire from the heights and the large stones hurled down upon them and returned to their quarters. Upon many other days efforts were made to reach the fort, but without any result. Thereupon Gallinato, in consideration of the war being prolonged beyond what had been expected, built two forts, one where he kept his ships in order to defend them and the port; and the other one-half league farther on in a suitable place where they could take refuge and communicate with the camp. The forts were built of wood and fascines and fortified with the artillery from the ships. The Spaniards shut themselves up in these forts, whence from time to time they sallied, making incursions as far as the enemy’s fort. The latter always remained shut up in their fort without ever choosing to come down or to yield; for he was convinced that the Spaniards could not remain long in the island. When Gallinato saw that the rains were fast setting in, that his men were becoming ill, and that his provisions were failing without his having accomplished the desired task, and that it could not be accomplished with his remaining resources, and that the enemy from Mindanao with other allies of theirs were boasting that they were gathering a large fleet in order to drive the Spaniards from Jolo, he sent news of all that had occurred to the governor of Manila, with a plan of the island and fort and a relation of the difficulties which the enterprise presented. He sent this in a vessel, by Capt. and Sargento-mayor Pedro Cotelo de Morales, toward the end of May of the year 1602, in order to obtain instructions as to his procedure, and the necessary reËnforcement of men and provisions. The captain was charged to return quickly with the answer. *** At the same time that Governor Don Pedro de AcuÑa entered upon his administration, the captain and sargento-mayor, Pedro Cotelo de Morales, arrived from Jolo with the advices and report of Juan Xuarez Gallinato concerning the state of affairs in that island, whither he had gone with the fleet at the beginning of that same year. The governor, on account of the importance of the matter, wished to make every effort possible, and determined to send him supplies and a reËnforcement of some men, which he did as soon as possible. He was ordered to at least make an effort to punish that enemy, even if he could do nothing more, and whenever the opportunity presented itself, to go to do the same thing in the river of Mindanao, and return to the Pintados [Bisayas]. When this commission reached Jolo Gallinato was already so worn out, and his men so ill, that the reËnforcements only made it possible for him to get away from there; accordingly without seeing to another thing, he broke camp, burned the forts which he had built, embarked, and went to Pintados, leaving the people of that Island of Sulu and their neighbors, those of Mindanao, emboldened more than ever to make raids against the Pintados, and the islands within, which they did. The governor, without delaying any longer in Manila, hastily started for the Island of Panay and the town of ArÉvalo, in a galliot and other small vessels, to see their needs with his own eyes, in order to provide for them. He left war matters in Manila, during his absence, in charge of Licentiate Don Antonio de Ribera, auditor of the Audiencia. As soon as the governor left Manila, the auditor had plenty to look after, because a squadron of 20 caracoas and other vessels from Mindanao entered the islands as far as the Island of Luzon and its coasts, making captures. Having taken some ships bound from Cebu to Manila, they captured 10 Spaniards in them, among them a woman and a priest and Capt. Martin de Mandia, and they took them off with them. They entered Calilaya, burned the church and all the town, and captured many persons of all classes among the natives. Thence they passed to the town of Balayan to do the same, but the auditor, having received news of the enemy in Manila, had it already in a state of defense with 50 Spaniards and a captain and some vessels. Consequently, they did not dare to enter the town or its bay, but crossed over to Mindoro, where, in the principal town, they captured many men, women, and children among the natives, seizing their gold and possessions, and burning their houses and church, where they captured the prebendary Corral, curate of that doctrina. They filled their own ships, and others which they seized there, with captives, gold, and property, staying in the port of Mindoro as leisurely as though in their own land, notwithstanding that it is but 24 leagues from Manila. Capt. Martin de Mendia, prisoner of these pirates, offered, for himself and the other Spanish captives that, if they would let him go to Manila, he would get the ransom for all, and would take it, or would send it within six months, to the river of Mindanao, or otherwise he would return to their power. The chief in command of the fleet agreed thereto, with certain provisions and conditions, and caused the other captives to write to the effect that what had been agreed upon might be fulfilled, and then he allowed the captain to leave the fleet. The latter came to the city, and upon receiving his report, the auditor sent munitions, ships, and more men to Balayan than there were there already, with orders to go in pursuit of the enemy without delay, saying that they would find him in Mindoro. Capt. Gaspar Perez, who had charge of this in Balayan, did not start so quickly as he should have done in order to find the enemy in Mindoro, for when he arrived he found that he had left that port six days before, laden with ships and booty, to return to Mindanao. Then he went in pursuit of him, although somewhat slowly. The enemy put into the river of a little uninhabited island to get water and wood. Just at that time Governor Don Pedro de AcuÑa, who was hastily returning to Manila, from the town of Arevalo, where he had learned of the incursion of those pirates, passed. He passed so near the mouth of the river, in two small champanes23 and a virrey,23 with very few men, that it was a wonder that he was not seen and captured by the enemy. He learned that the enemy was there, from a boat of natives which was escaping therefrom, and then he met Gaspar Perez going in search of the enemy with twelve vessels—caracoas and virreys and some large champanes. The governor made him make more haste and gave him some of his own men to guide him to where he had left the pirates the day before, whereupon they went to attack them. But the latter espied the fleet through their sentinels whom they had already stationed in the sea, outside the river. Accordingly they left the river in haste, and took to flight, throwing into the sea goods and slaves in order to flee more lightly. Their flagship and almiranta caracoas protected the ships which were dropping behind and made them throw overboard what they could and work with all the strength of their paddles, assisted by their sails. The Spanish fleet, the vessels of which were not so light, could not put forth enough strength to overtake all of them, because, furthermore, they went into the open without fear of the heavy seas which were running, inasmuch as they were fleeing. Yet some of the ships of Capt. Gaspar Perez, being lighter, got the enemy’s fleet, sunk some caracoas, and captured two, but the rest escaped, although with great danger of being lost. Without accomplishing anything else, the fleet returned to Manila where the governor had already entered, very much disturbed that things should have come to such a pass that these enemies, who had never dared to leave their houses, should have been so daring and bold as to come to the very gates of the city, doing great damage and making captures. Appendix V Olaso’s expedition in 162924 [Relation of events in the Philippine Islands and other surrounding regions, from the month of July, 1629, until that of 1630.]25 I shall commence the affairs of these islands with the expedition to Jolo. It is an island of the Archipelago, rebellious for years past, and its natives, who are Mohammedans, have made a thousand incursions against us in these islands, pillaging whenever opportunity arises, burning villages and churches, and capturing numerous people. In order to remedy all these evils, Governor Don Juan NiÑo de Tabora determined to equip a powerful fleet in order to destroy that enemy and conquer a stronghold which nature has made in their island so lofty and so difficult of approach that there is no better stone castle, for the approach to it is by one path, and it has some artillery which defends it. The people are courageous and warlike. For our fleet were collected 1 galley, 3 brigantines, 12 freight champanes (which are like small pataches)26 and about 50 caracoas. The last named are the usual craft of these islands, and generally have thirty or forty oars on a side. All these vessels together carried about 400 Spaniards and 2,500 Indians, and they had considerable apparatus and war supplies. It was quite sufficient for another conquest of greater importance than the one on which they were going. All that fleet departed, then, from the port of Dapitan on March 17. Dapitan is the port nearest to the enemy, and the Island of Sulu was reached in [blank space in the Ventura del Arco MS.] days. At dawn our men were landed, and began the ascent to the stronghold. The master-of-camp, Don Lorenzo de Olaso, who was commander in chief of the fleet, preceded the men. The Sulus defended their stronghold with valor. They killed some of our men and wounded eight, among them the master-of-camp himself. He was overthrown, as if dead, and went rolling down the hill. However, he was not dead, but only wounded, nothing more. Our men retired on the run, and to speak plainly, such terror entered into them that they did not dare to attack again. They skirted the island in their craft, entered the villages, burned, wrecked, destroyed them, and killed a few people. They brought back some captives with them whom the Sulus had taken from us. A violent storm overtook them, which compelled them to weigh anchor, and they retired stealthily. Thus so powerful a fleet as that was lost. It was such a fleet that never has one like it been made for the Indies in these islands. The Sulu enemy were left triumphant, and so insolent that we fear that they will make an end of the Islands of the Pintados [Bisayas] which are the nearest ones to them, and which they infest and pillage with great facility. In my last letter I wrote to your Reverence of the result of the first attack, which was unfortunate, because the Moros repulsed us, as I told your Reverence. Not less unfortunate will be the news that I shall now relate,28 which it is yet necessary for me to tell, in order to fulfil my duty and to remove the clouds arising from rumors and letters that will go there. I am here and see everything; and there is never a lack of those who tell many new things and exaggerate matters that are not so great as they will relate and descant there, where no one can report and declare what has happened. It is as follows: Since that attack, we have made two others. The first was with five mines which we had made, with which we expected to blow up a great part of those walls. All of the mines were fired, and thinking that they would cause the same effects as the others our men retired farther than they ought to have done. Four of the mines exploded, and did not a little damage among the enemy. They, full of fear, fled down from their position; but, as the mines did not make the noise that we expected, we did not, accordingly, get there in time, as we were quite distant because of our fear lest the mines do us harm. The Moros retook their position, so that we were repulsed this time, as we had been the other, with the death of a captain, while some men were wounded. The fifth mine was left, and did not explode that time. Hence its mouth was looked for, and having found it, we tried two days after that to make another assault. The assault was made after the mine had exploded. That mine was larger than the others had been, and caused much damage. But the Moros fortified themselves again, with greater strength than they had the last two times, and defended themselves in their trenches, which had been fortified with many stockades and terrepleins, so that we could not enter. We lost some soldiers on that occasion, who tried to show that they were bold and valiant. Among them was the sargento-mayor, Melon, who was struck by a ball which passed through him and carried him off in two days. May God rest his soul! Thereupon, we retired to our posts and endeavored to collect our men and carry away the wounded, who were many. We have lost four captains of renown in these three assaults—namely, Captain Pimienta, Captain Juan Nicolas, Captain Don Pedro de Mena, and Sargento-mayor Gonzales de Caseres Melon. Besides these three assaults, another misfortune happened to us on St. Matthew’s day, which was as follows: Captain Rafael Ome, going with forty-six men and two hundred Indians to make a garo29 (as we say here), and having taken up quarters in a field, where there was a fortified house, arranged his posts at intervals and ordered his men to be on their guard. But since man proposes and God disposes, the posts were either careless, or God ordained it thus; for suddenly the enemy rushed upon our men, who could not unite, as they were by that time scattered through the forest. The enemy, having caught them off their guard, made a pastime of it, killing twenty-six men, and carrying off arms, powder, balls and fuses. I regard that event as the greatest of all our losses. Among those of our men killed there by the enemy was Captain Lopez Suarez, a fine soldier. Our men were not disheartened by these reverses, except such and such men. The governor well sustains the undertaking with [all his powers of] mind and body. He has surrounded the entire hill with a stockade and a ditch, and has sown the ground with sharp stakes so that the enemy may neither receive aid nor sally out from it. At intervals there are sentry-posts and towers, so close that they almost touch. There were six barracks along it, so that if any tower should be in need the soldiers in them could go to its defense. Some of them have six men, others four, and those which have least three men, as a guard. The enclosure is one league long and surrounds the hill. I do not know which causes the more wonder, the fort of the Moros or the enclosure of the Spaniards which restrains the Moros, so that they issue but seldom, and then at their peril. We are day by day making gradual advances. Today a rampart was completed which is just even with their stockades, so that we shall command the hill equally [with the enemy]. God helping, I hope that we shall reduce their trenches, and then we shall advance from better to better. May God aid us; and si Dominus a custodierit civitatem frustra vigilat qui custodit eam.30 Father, prayers and many of them are needed. Will your Reverence have them said in your holy college, and excuse me and all of us for what we can not do. I forward this letter, [hoping] for its good fortune in the holy sacrifices of your Reverence, etc. Jolo, March 31, 1638. To the father-prior of Manila. PAX CHRISTI, ETC. I would like to be the bearer of this letter, and to fulfil my desires of seeing your Reverence and all the fathers and brothers of your Reverence’s holy college. That is a proposition for which credit may be given me, but the time gives space only to suffer; and thus do we have to accommodate ourselves to it, and to check our desires, drawing strength from weakness. I must content myself with writing, which would be a pleasant task, if I could do it at my leisure, and not so hastily as I have made known in certain letters that I have sent to your Reverence—not losing or neglecting any occasion at which I could write. And so that this opportunity should not pass without a letter from me, I have hastened my pen beyond my usual custom, and have written very concisely and briefly—although I could write at greater length, and give account of many things which I leave for a better occasion. That will be when it is the Lord’s pleasure for us to see each other. Moreover, I have no pleasant news to write, since that which I could write would all be to the effect that we have not gained this enchanted hill; and that, at the times when we have tempted fortune, we have retired with loss of some men and many wounded. Continuing, then, in the same style as the last letter, I declare that since the first assault, in which we were driven back with the loss of Captain Don Pedro Mena Pando, Adjutant Oliva, and AlfÉrez Trigita, we have made two other assaults. One was on the twenty-fourth of March, the eve of our Lady of the Assumption. The second was on the twenty-eighth of the same month. In the first, we trusted to the mines that had been made, by means of which we expected to make a safe entrance. We would have made it had our fear of receiving harm from them matched the little fear of the enemy—who, as barbarians, did not prepare for flight, although they knew our designs. Of the five mines, four blew up; and as was seen, and as we afterward learned here from some captives, there was a great loss to the enemy. As soon as they saw the fire, they took to flight; but our men, being at a distance, could not come up to seize the posts that the enemy abandoned, until very late. That gave the Moros time to take precautions, so that when we had come up, it was impossible to gain a single thing which the mines had given us. On that occasion both sides fought very valiantly. The wounded on our side were not many, and our dead even fewer; among the later was Captain Pimienta. We were forced to return to our posts without having gained more than the damage wrought by the mines. The loss of those people was considerable, while not few of them perished because of the severity of our fire. But with the opportunity of the fifth mine which remained (which could not have its effect, because the fire-channel of the others choked it), the third attack was made inside of two days, by first setting fire to that mine, and by arranging the men better than on the day of the previous assault. They were set in array by the governor, who in person came up to these quarters on that occasion. They set fire to the mine, and more was accomplished than on the preceding days. Many of the enemy were killed; but, as the entrance was so deeply recessed, it could not be forced so freely by us, for the Moros were able to defend it from us, with so great valor that we could not take it. Our men fought with so great spirit and courage that it was necessary for the leaders to use force with them in order to get the men to retire, when they saw the so superior force of the enemy. On that occasion they killed seven of our men, besides wounding many. Among the latter was Sargento-mayor Melon, who was shot through the lung by a ball. He died on the second day, to the grief of all this army. Thereupon his Lordship made his men retire to their quarters, and commanded that the fort should not be attacked, but that they should proceed to gain it by the complete blockade of the enemy, as we are doing. By this method, I think that we shall make an entrance into the fort. Already we have one bulwark, which we have made level with their entrenchments; and we are raising our works one and one-half varas31 above them, so that we are dislodging them with our artillery. They are retiring to the interior of their fort. By this means we hope to gain entrance into all their forts; and, once masters of them, I trust by God’s help that we shall conquer their stronghold, and that they will humble themselves to obey God and the king. Before those assaults, on St. Matthew’s day, Captain Raphael Ome went out to make a garo, as they say here, and to overrun the country. In this island the level country is heavily wooded as nearly all of it is mountainous. He took in his company about fifty men (i.e., Spaniards) and two hundred Karaga Indians. The captain reached a field, and having lodged in a fortified house, such as nearly all those houses are (for those Indians of the mountain, who are called Guimennos,32 build them for their defense), he placed his sentries and seized the positions that he judged most dangerous. But since non est volentis neque currentis, etc., either because of the great multitude and the wiliness of the enemy, or (as is more certain) because the sentries were careless, and the other men asleep, the enemy came suddenly and attacked our soldiers—with so great fury that they killed twenty-six men, among whom was Captain Lopez Suarez, a brave soldier. The leader and captain, Ome, was in great danger. He fought in person with so great valor that, although run through with a spear, he attacked and defeated his opponent, laying him dead at his feet. Few of our men aided him, and many of them retreated immediately, thus allowing the enemy to capture from us twenty firearms, with fuses, powder, and balls. That was a great loss, and it is certain that we have not hitherto had a greater. And if any loss has occurred, it has been due to the neglect and confidence of the Spaniard. Today two Basilan Indians came down from the hill to ask for mercy, and for passage to their own country. They say that they are sent by the datus in the stronghold who came from that island of Basilan or Tagima; and that, if permission and pardon were given to them by the pari [i.e., Corcuera], one hundred and thirty of them would come down in the morning. We regard this as a trick of that Moro; and, although it may be as they say, we are taking precautions, and are watching for whatever may happen. If they should come, they will be well received; and that will not be a bad beginning to induce others to come from the hill. I shall advise your Reverence of such event on the first occasion. What we know that they are suffering within [the fort] is the disease of smallpox and discharges of blood, together with great famine; because we have surrounded the entire hill with ditches and stockades, set with sharp stakes, which run around it for more than one and one-half leagues, and within musket-shot [of their fort] is a sentry-post [garita] or tower in which three men and three Bantayas are staying. By that means the enemy cannot enter or go out without being seen; and, when they do that, they are given such a bombardment that scarcely does any one dare to go outside of their walls. The hill is a beautiful sight, and if it were enjoying holy peace instead of war, it would be no small matter of entertainment and recreation to survey the landscape at times. The Moro does not like to see us, and is looking at us continually from his stronghold and yelling and scoffing at us—as they say sometimes that the Spaniards are chickens; again, that they are sibabuyes,33 and again, that they will come to set fire to us all, and kill us. The Moro is a great rascal and buffoon. I trust in God that in a little while He will be ready for our thanksgivings [for the defeat of the Moros]. Will your Reverence urge His servants to aid us with their sacrifices and prayers. Those, I believe, it will be that must give us the victory, and that must humble the arrogance of this Mohammedan. His Lordship is displaying great firmness and patience, as he is so great a soldier. Already has he almost raised a stone fort on the beach, for he intends to leave a presidio here, and I think that it will be almost finished before he leaves. Nothing else occurs to me. Of whatever else may happen, your Reverence will be advised on the first occasion. If I have gone to considerable length in this letter, it is because I have known, one day ahead, of the departure of this champan. I commend myself many times to the holy sacrifices of your Reverence. This letter will also serve for our father provincial, etc. Jolo, April 5, one thousand six hundred and thirty-eight. The Moro has returned today with a letter from the queen and all the stronghold, in which they beg pardon and humiliate themselves. May God grant it, and bring them to His knowledge. I shall advise you of the result. I hear that Datu Ache is dead. If that is so, then the end has come. Today, the sixth of the above month. PAX CHRISTI. Deo gratias qui dedit nobis victoriam per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum.34 I have written your Reverence another letter, by way of Oton, telling you that it was our Lord’s pleasure to give us a joyous Easter-tide, the beginning of what has happened. His Divine Majesty has chosen to bestow upon us an overflowing blessing, by the reduction of these Moros so that they should come, abased and humiliated, to beg His governor for mercy; for, whether it was the latter’s plan to go to treat for peace at Basilan for their men, or whether they should send them all, that they might see how the governor viewed their petition, the following day they came with letters from the queen35 for Father Pedro Gutierrez and his Lordship. Therein she begged the father to protect her, for she wished to come to throw herself at the feet of the hari of Manila, and to beg his pardon for the obstinacy that they had shown hitherto. The father answered for his Lordship, in regard to the pardon, that if they agreed to do what was right, they would be very gladly pardoned; but that in regard to their coming it was not time, until they would humbly give up the arms which they had taken from us, and the captives, vessels, and holy ornaments; and that, even though the queen had so great authority, so long as the king did not come, he must declare and show his willingness to accept what the queen had written. Accordingly, the king wrote to the same father and to his Lordship next day, begging the same thing and more earnestly. But he was not allowed to come—which he urgently entreated—until they should have given up the arms and other things of which they robbed us. Difficulties arose over this point, as to which of the two things was to be done first. The Moro declared that he wished to treat first of the peace, and the points on which they were to agree; and therefore it was necessary to see the hari of Manila first of all. But Don Sebastian, as he was so experienced in these matters of war (in which God has inspired him with so wise resolutions, and given him even better results) held firm to his proposals. Two days passed, but at last the king agreed to the terms, by giving up the pieces of artillery which he had captured from us. There were four iron pieces; and, in place of one which had burst, one of bronze was requested, which many mines had buried. Afterward we found the broken piece, by opening the mouth of one of the mines: and he gave it to us willingly—saying that he had thus brought the broken piece, and that he ought not for that reason to give another in its place; and that which had been asked from him had been bought for forty basines of gold at Makassar. In order that the Spaniards might see what an earnest desire for a permanent peace was in his heart, and that he was greatly inclined to it, he sent also some muskets, although few and poor ones. In what pertained to the captives, he said that he would surrender those that he had, but that he could not persuade his datus to give up theirs; still he would ask them to give their captives. At most, he sent eleven Christian captives, counting men, women, and children. He had already spent the holy vessels, for, since it was so long a time since they had been brought, he had sold them to the king of Makassar; but he said that he and all his property were there, to satisfy the Spaniards for any injury that they had received. The king petitioned his Lordship to allow him to visit him; and his Lordship granted such permission for Quasimodo Sunday. The datus [sic] were very angry that the king was so liberal, and because he humbled himself so deeply; accordingly, they opposed his leaving the hill to talk with the governor. They tried to prevent it, but the king overruled by the reasons which he gave to the datus, and which father Gregorio Belin gave to him. His Lordship gave hostages for the king, and ordered Captain Marquez and Captain Raphael Ome to remain as such. They asked for Admiral Don Pedro de Almonte and two fathers, but that was not granted to them. Finally they were satisfied with the two said captains, persons of great esteem and worth; and the king came down to talk with his Lordship, accompanied by many chief men. His Lordship received him with such display as he could arrange at short notice, under a canopy of damask, and seated on a velvet chair, with a cushion of the same at his feet. Another cushion was placed at his side upon a rug. As the king entered the hall, his Lordship rose from his seat, and advancing two steps, embraced the Moro king; then he made him sit down on the cushion that had been prepared. Then his Lordship also seated himself beside the king in his chair, while at his right side was his confessor, and at his left stood a captain of the guard and the sargento-mayor. Grouped behind the confessor were the fathers who were in the quarters on that occasion. There were two Augustinian Recollects, and one Franciscan Recollect, and a secular priest. Then came Father Gutierrez, and Father Gregorio Belin. The king requested permission to rest a little first, for he came, one of his servants fanning him (haciendole paypay), lifting up from time to time the chinina which he wore—open in front, in order to catch the breeze, and to enable him to shelter himself from the heat, or to get rid of the fears with which he had come. His chief men seated themselves after him on that open floor, a seat very suitable for such nobility, who esteemed it as a great favor. Then when the king was rested, or reassured from his fears, they began their discourses or bicharas, talking, after the manner of these people, by the medium of interpreters—namely, Father Juan de Sant Joseph, an Augustinian Recollect, and AlfÉrez Mathias de Marmolejo, both good interpreters. The governor set forth his conditions. The agreement made was: first, that the banners of the king, our sovereign, were to be hoisted on the stronghold; second, that the men from Basilan were to be permitted to leave the stronghold and go to their country; third, that the Macassars and Malays were also to leave and return to their own lands; and fourth, in order that the first condition might be fulfilled without the rattle of arms and the shedding of blood, all the enemy were to come down to our quarters, while the king and queen and their family could come to that of the governor. The Moro king did not like this last point; but, as he saw that matters were ill disposed for his defense, he had to assent to everything. But, before its execution, he begged his Lordship to communicate the terms with his men and datus, saying that he would endeavor to get them all to agree to the fulfilment of what his Lordship ordered; and that in a day and a half he would reply and, in what pertained to the other conditions, they would be immediately executed. This happened, for the Basilans descended in two days with all their men and families—in all, one hundred and forty-seven. Some fifty or sixty did not then descend, as they were unable to do so. The Macassars refused to descend until they received pardon from his Lordship, and a passport to their own country. Therefore their captain came to talk with his Lordship, who discussed with him what was to be done with him and his men. The latter are very humble and compliant to whatever his Lordship should order. His Lordship answered that he would pardon their insolent and evil actions, and they could descend with security of life; and that he would give them boats, so that they could go away. Thereupon the captain, giving a kris as security that they would come, returned, and immediately began to bring down his property and men. The Malays came with them, for all those peoples had united against the Castilians. They are the ones who have done us most harm with their firearms, and have furnished quantities of ammunition for all the firearms of the Sulus. At the end of the time assigned to the king for answering his Lordship in regard to the matters which he had discussed with him, he was summoned, in order that what had been recently concluded might not be hindered, as his Lordship had many matters to which to attend. If he would not come, his Lordship was resolved immediately to continue his bombardment and fortifications, saying that he would make slaves of all whom he captured. With this resolution, the queen determined to come to visit his Lordship; and, so saying and doing, she summoned her chair, and had herself carried down to the quarters of Don Pedro de Almonte, which is the one located on their hill, and which has given them so much to do. She sent a message to the governor, begging him to grant her permission, as she wished to see him. His Lordship sent a message to her, to the effect that he would be very glad to see her, and that she would be coming at a seasonable time. She came to the hall borne on the shoulders of her men, accompanied by some of her ladies and by her kasis, who was coming with pale face. She alighted at the door of his Lordship’s hall. He went out to receive her, and with marked indications of friendship and kindness led her to her seat, which was a cushion of purple velvet; and his Lordship, seated in his own chair, welcomed her through his interpreter, AlfÉrez Mathias de Marmolexo. She responded very courteously to the courtesies of the governor; for the Moro woman is very intelligent, and of great capacity. She did not speak directly to the interpreters, but through two of her men, one of whom was the kasis; and often he, without the queen speaking, answered to what was proposed. The queen petitioned and entreated the governor to desist from entering the stronghold, for the women, being timid creatures, feared the soldiers greatly. And if his Lordship was doing it to oblige her and the king her husband to descend, she said that they would descend immediately, with all their people. Thus did she entreat from him whom his Lordship represented; and I desired that she should obtain this favor. His Lordship answered her that he would do so very willingly; but that he had an express mandate for it [i.e., to gain the fort] from his king, and that, if he did not obey it, he would lose his head. “I do not wish,” said Tuan Baluka (for such is the name of the queen), “that the favor which I petition be at so great a price and danger to your Lordship. Consequently, will you kindly grant me three days? and in that time I, the king, and our people will descend without fail.” His Lordship thanked her anew, and added that with this she obliged him to fulfil strictly what he had promised her. “Indeed,” said the queen, “I have no doubt of it; for, being in the gaze of so many nations that your Lordship has to conquer, it is clear that you must fulfil what you have promised me; for your Lordship’s actions toward me would be understood by all to be those that you would have to perform toward all.” This terminated the discussion. His Lordship ordered a collation to be spread for the queen and her ladies; and then his Lordship retired, so that they might refresh themselves without any embarrassment. Then, having dined, the queen returned to her stronghold with the retinue that she had brought. Before she left the quarters she was saluted by the discharge of two large pieces of artillery, which had been made ready for that purpose. She was greatly pleased by that, and the next day began to carry out her promises, by sending down a portion of her possessions. The Makassars and Malays also brought down their property with her, and immediately embarked. I had written up to this point to this day, Saturday, the seventeenth of this month of April, hoping for the end of all these incipient results and expected events regarding this stronghold; the issue has been such as we could expect from Him who has also been pleased to arrange and bring it to pass. Last night the queen came down to sleep in our camp or quarters, with some of her ladies. In the morning she went to report her good treatment to her people; for she was received with a salute of musketry and large artillery, and a fine repast. All that has been done to oblige her to encourage her people, for they were very fearful, to descend immediately. More than two thousand have now descended, and our banners are flying on the hill, and our men are fortified on it. May God be praised, to whom be a thousand thanks given; for He, without our knowledge or our expectations, has disposed this matter thus—blinding this Moro and disheartening him, so that, having been defeated, he should surrender to our governor, and give himself up without more bloodshed. We are trying to secure Datu Ache; if we succeed in this, I shall advise you. Now there is nothing more to say, reverend Father, except to give God the thanks, for He is the one who has prepared and given this victory to us; and to beg all in your Reverence’s holy college to give thanks that the college has had (as I am very certain) so great a share in the achievements [here]. The governor is very much pleased and we all regard him in the proper light. The men are full of courage, and even what was carefully done is now improved. I am the humble servant of your Reverence whom I pray that God may preserve as I desire, and to whose sacrifices I earnestly commend myself. Jolo, April 17, 1638.—Juan de Barrios. All the Sulus descended, in number about four thousand six hundred, to the sea. Finding themselves down and outside the enclosure, they all fled, under cover of a very heavy shower of rain—leaving all their possessions, in order not to be hindered in their flight. Many mothers even abandoned their little children. One abandoned to us a little girl who had received a dagger-stroke, who received the waters of baptism and immediately died. There is much to say about this, and many thanks to give to God, of which we shall speak when it pleases God to let us see each other. Today, the nineteenth of this month of April, 1638.—Barrios. The governor sent messages to the king and queen by two kasis, asking why they had fled. They replied that since all their people had fled, they had gone after them for very shame, but that they would try to bring them back and to come, and this was the end of the matter. The result was exceedingly profitable for our soldiers and Indians; for the Sulus, fearful because they thought that, if they became scattered, they would all be killed, abandoned whatever they were carrying—quantities of goods, and chests of drawers—which our soldiers sacked. Above, in the stronghold, they found much plunder. It is believed that the king and queen will return, but not Datu Ache; but this is not considered certain. Letter from Sanboangan36 PAX CHRISTI I am not writing to anyone [else], for the lack of time does not allow me to do so. Therefore will your Reverence please communicate this to the father provincial, Father Hernandez Perez, Father Juan de Bueras, and the father rector of Cavite. When our men were most disheartened at seeing that the fortress on the hill was so extensive, and that it was becoming stronger daily; that the mines and artillery had seemingly made no impression on it; that we had been repulsed four times; and that our men were falling sick very rapidly: in order that it might be very evident that it was [all] the work of God, ambassadors came from the hill to beg his Lordship for mercy. He received them gladly, and asked them for the artillery that they had plundered from the Christians, etc. They brought down four pieces, which they had taken from the shipyard, and brought to us some Christians. Next day, more than one hundred and fifty people from Basilan descended, who surrendered their arms, and then about fifty Makassars, who did the same; and all were embarked in the patache. Next day the king and queen went down and slept in the camp of Don Sebastian. On the following day (which was the day agreed upon when all were to descend from the hill), seeing that it was already late, the king and queen said that they would go to get their people. The governor granted them permission, and went to a camp that was located opposite the gate of the stronghold. All the Sulus descended, carrying their goods, arms, etc., to the number of about four hundred soldiers, and more than one thousand five hundred women, children, old men, etc. They reached the governor’s camp and Don Pedro de Francia told the king that they must surrender their arms. The latter replied that he would surrender them to none other than to the governor. Thereupon, they went to summon his Lordship; but the Sulus, seeing that they were going to summon him, fled, under a heavy shower that was falling, and abandoned all their goods. A vast amount of riches, many pieces of artillery, and versos,37 falcons, muskets, arquebuses, etc., were found. The cause of the Moros fleeing was their great fear that they were to be killed. On our part, since Don Sebastian Hurtado held all their stronghold, and had left only thirty men in his quarters (in order that Datu Ache might not escape), and as that number could not resist so many people, the Sulus were, on the contrary, allowed to go without any firearms being discharged. More than two hundred and fifty of the Sulus have died, and they were perishing in great numbers from dysentery because the women and children were placed under ground for fear of the balls. That and the fear of the mines caused their surrender; for it was impossible to take their fort by assault. The interior strength of that stronghold is so great that the Spaniards were surprised; and all recognize that it has been totally the work of God, and [a result of] the perseverance of Don Sebastian, who ever said that all must die or capture the stronghold. Somewhat more than two hundred Christian and more than one hundred Moro women have come from the stronghold during this time. All the Moro women are fearful. Up to date eighty-three Spaniards have died from wounds, and many of them from disease. THE KILLED - Sargento-mayor Melon
- Captain Don Pedro de Mena
- Captain Don Juan Nicolas
- Captain Don Pimienta
- Captain Don Lope Suarez
DIED OF DYSENTERY - Captain Don Aregita Martin de Avila
- Adjutant Oliba
- Adjutant Calderon
- AlfÉrez Concha
- AlfÉrez Alonzo Gonzalez
I shall not name others, as they are not so well known, and it will be known later. Up to date about two hundred Bisayan Indians have died, most of them from diseases. Don Pedro Cotoan died while en route from Jolo to Samboanga, in order to take back the Bisayans, who are a most cowardly race. Those who have done deeds of valor are the Karagas, and the Sulus tremble at sight of them. Don Pedro Almonte remains as governor and lieutenant for the captain-general at Samboangan, with one hundred and fifty Spaniards, as has been reported. Captain Jines Ros is to stay as castellan in Jolo with one hundred and eighty men—Captain Sarria being fortified in the stronghold with eighty men, and Jines Ros on the beach in a stone tower that is already eight stones high, with one hundred men. Captain Marquez is going to Buaren with fifty Spaniards, although no succor had been sent to Don Sebastian from Manila. All that has been supplied to excess is truly wonderful, for the winds have brought (and it is incredible) many champanes, with more than twenty thousand baskets of rice, innumerable fowls, and pork, veal, beef, and cheeses from Cebu, which have made a very excellent provision. They ask for Father Martinez [and] Alexandro at Jolo [and] Father Carrion at Buiaon, but without an associate. I say that, following even to the end of the world, I do not know to what to compare these Moros of Samboangan. They have paid all their tributes. This is a brief relation. I pray your Reverence to pardon me and commend me to God, for indeed what I desire is necessary. Samboangan, April 23, 1638.38 Appendix VII Obando’s report on the preparations to be undertaken to return Alimud Din to Sulu, July 15, 175139 Sire: Your Majesty will find in the enclosed report the resolutions adopted by the Committees of the War and Treasury Departments for the purpose of reinstating the king of Sulu, Fernando the First, whom I found in this capital, baptized and protected by Royal briefs insuring him the continuation of the same Royal goodwill as long as he remained a Christian and a friend of the nation, which seems to be his intention hitherto, with the help of 3 galleys, 3 barges, 1 galiot, 2 large champanes and other craft for war and transportation, under the orders of the Master-of-camp of your Majesty’s infantry here, to whom I have given the instructions and orders contained in said report, to the effect that he should make port at Zamboanga, and from there try to subdue the rebel vassals, blockade the island of Sulu by sea, cut it off from all communication with its neighbors, prevent food from being introduced, prevent and punish all depredations, acts of piracy and insults on the part of that barbarous nation against the town and vassals of your Majesty of which I receive pitiful complaints every day, and see that the captives are returned and that due observance is given the treaties of peace and other agreements which were made by my predecessor but have not proved to be as satisfactory as might have been hoped, on account of the inconstancy which characterizes that nation. Before undertaking such an important operation, I decided to order the construction of three average sized galleys, and other small vessels, of which there were none in these Islands; and to arm them I ordered to be cast 100 perrier cannon of calibre 2, with three chambers each, ordering the transfer to the province of Iloilo of General Francisco Domingo Oscoti, as Lieutenant-Intendant-General, with instructions to prepare provisions at the smallest cost for the Treasury, and directing him to issue a proclamation (as he did) calling for volunteers, who would be rewarded according to their merits on the ships plying between Manila and Acapulco, and authorizing the natives to arm boats at their expense, exempting them of all taxes during the expedition. As I was in possession of a rescript of your Majesty addressed to his Field Marshal my predecessor Gaspar de la Torre, ordering him to reconnoiter the island of Balabak, and Ipolote Bay, and other places of Palawan Island for the purpose of building a fort for the protection of the inhabitants against the people of Sulu, Tiron and Borneo, and to build six galleys with which to fight the Moros, with a report on the same object presented by the Province of Saint Nicholas of these Islands,40 both of which have been communicated to said Committees of the War and Treasury Departments and to persons who had knowledge by experience of the said province and regions; also, in view of the poor condition of the Royal treasury which precluded the possibility of greater expenses it was decided, in accordance with the opinion of your Majesty’s Fiscal [Attorney General] in regard to the above mentioned instruments, to incorporate them to said report (or record),41 as they are of the same nature, to take, when there was a better opportunity, the proper measures for reconnoitering the most favorable position for the intended fort, and to await the result of the expedition for the reinstatement of the king of Sulu, so as to request him, if the result should be favorable, to withdraw his vassals from the fort of Ipolote, and, if not, to secure the safety of the people of the said island by driving them out; and having already ordered, as I have said, the construction of the galleys, which were necessary and made more so by your Royal order, to continue the work until the six were built, said work being carried on with the utmost care and economy, which I always bear in mind in my zeal for the service of your Majesty. I will send your Majesty full reports on the progress of these different undertakings, so that your Royal orders may let me know your Royal pleasure, which will always meet with my humble obedience. God give the Royal and Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years of life which are required by Christendom for the happiness of your vast dominions. Manila, July 15, 1751. Appendix VIII Obando’s report on the circumstances attending the attempt to return Alimud Din to Sulu, June 18, 175242 Sire: In a letter addressed to your Majesty last year, 1751, I forwarded a report and vouchers to the effect that I had sent, with the King of Sulu, Fernando the First, to the fortified station of Zamboanga, a fleet of 3 galleys, two feluccas, two galiots and two large champanes, with other craft, under the Master-of-camp43 of the Royal troops here, for the purpose of restoring said king to his throne and forcing his rebel vassals to submit, by means of a blockade of the island of Sulu, which would cut it off from all communication with its neighbors and prevent the importation of food to the island, other provisions being made for the purpose of protecting the Christian communities against any further harm on the part of the Sulu people and the Tirons.44 I have the honor to report now that the said Master-of-camp arrived at Zamboanga with most of the fleet, ahead of the Sultan of Sulu, who had been delayed by various accidents, and sailed at once, in order to avoid the monsoon, for the Bay of Jolo, where he anchored on the 26th of June of that year, at about one mile from the forts. He formed a line of battle, and, noticing two Chinese champanes without flags, that were stationed near the river mouth and were stretching two lines to go up stream, he ordered two long-boats to go and remove them from under the artillery of the enemy; the Jolo forts, four in number, displayed red banners and opened fire with cannon of calibre 8 to 18 on the boats towing the champanes; our fleet answered, and the fire was kept up some time on both sides, until the enemy hoisted the white flag in order to gain time for reËnforcing his trenches; the Master-of-camp sent a letter to Prince Asin, informing him that his only purpose was to restore the legitimate king of Sulu to his dominions, and to have the captives delivered; the prince answered that he had no captives to deliver; that he was waiting for the return of the king, who would do as he wished with them, that he was begging the Prophet to send back the king ***. Finding such an answer vain and impertinent, our ships opened fire again; a suburb was stormed and burned, and our men found out that the negotiations were a pretext to gain time to place artillery behind the palisades; the Moros accomplished this purpose and again requested a truce in order to hold a meeting of their leaders and to deliberate as to what should be done. This was granted, and in a second letter signed by the Datus Prince Asin insisted that the Master-of-camp should retire to Zamboanga, promising to bring over the captives; as the south-west monsoon was blowing hard and he was short of provisions, the latter decided to go back to Zamboanga; the Datus informed their king Fernando in a letter addressed to him at Zamboanga of what had been agreed; Prince Asin also stated verbally that he would bring to Zamboanga some captives whom he was going to seek in the woods, and asked the Master to leave the port, while he went after the wives and children of the followers of King Fernando, who had been frightened and scattered by the artillery. After a few more answers and objections which showed an utter lack of sincerity, the Master-of-camp sailed back to Zamboanga. The King of Sulu had arrived there on June 22, and as soon as he heard about the truce requested by his brother Asin, and other affairs of the fleet, he declared that the prince was his enemy. This statement was believed at the time, but soon afterwards good-sized boats began to arrive one after the other with many of his principal people on the pretext of Prince Asin’s visit to the King, until there were 180 persons, including 32 women between concubines and servants. When the Master-of-camp, Governor of Zamboanga, remarked that all these boats were full of firearms, powder, ball, coats of mail, helmets, and other warlike equipment, that the King of Sulu had secretly sent to his brother Asin, at Basilan, golden buckles and epaulets, and embroidered stockings to make a brilliant appearance at landing in Zamboanga, while he feigned to be his enemy; that Prince Asin had failed to keep his word, since he said that he had been unable to get hold of the captives he was to bring to Zamboanga, when it was known that he was keeping the said captives in a secret place, six of them, including a woman, having escaped by swimming over to the fleet when the latter was at Jolo, and reported that the Moros had many captives concealed in the woods; that Prince Asin had written to the King that all the captives seized during the latter’s stay in Manila were still in their power, not one having been sold while awaiting the royal commands; and finally, that the King and his brother were secretly dismissing the concubines only, telling them that the Master-of-camp was sending them away with contumely; he inferred that the King was preparing to surprise the fort. This surmise was strengthened by the face that armed men were steadily coming in each day, despite the Master-of-camp’s friendly admonition to the King that his followers enter the fort unarmed. The lying and disingenuousness of the King, which all these indications were making plainer every moment, were finally betrayed by a letter, written in Arabic characters, to the King of Mindanao, in which he stated that he had been compelled, by those in whose power he was, to write the letter he had previously sent him from Manila,—whereas he had enjoyed complete freedom in this capital, so complete, in fact, that he did not perform, during the voyage hence to Zamboanga, a single rite of the Christian religion, as far as known, while he was seen to perform various Moro religious acts, and took with him the Quran in his own language, instead of the numerous Catholic books which had been given him for his instruction. In view of all the foregoing evidence of bad faith, the Master-of-camp, Governor of Zamboanga, and the captains of the fleet decided to arrest at the same time the King, the datus and their men, to seize their boats, arms, and concealed ammunition, and to keep the whole under careful guard, the men being detained in decent quarters, pending the decision of the Captain-General. In reflecting on this important and critical change in the situation, I bore in mind that the said King of Sulu had been a false friend and a consummate Machiavellian, who had deceived your Majesty’s Governor Fernando Valdes Tamon with his feigned promises of peace, which he never kept, and that, instead of releasing the captives and preventing the cruel outrages of his vassals the Moros and Tirons, he had used the considerable supply of arms, which he received from the said Governor and Governor Gaspar de la Torre under the pretence of suppressing supposed rebellions of his vassals, to keep our forces busy in Sulu, so that his vassals the Tiron pirates might ravage the provinces, while our forces were engaged in the Sulu kingdom. He also deceived your Majesty’s Governor and Bishop when a fleet was sent against the Tirons; he went as an ally and a pilot for the fleet among the shallows, and the small islands belonging to the enemy, and prevented the destruction of the principal towns, by misrepresenting to the commander of the expedition that said towns belonged to peaceful people who were friends of his, and pledging himself to have the prisoners returned, so that the fleet retired after burning only nine villages without importance, thanks to the cunning of the king. The trouble caused by all these Moros, thanks to his influence, is really astounding, and has nearly drained the Royal treasury, as, since the last peace agreement made by Governor Tamon, 89,744 pesos have been spent from 1736 to 1740, and since then the war expenses have far exceeded that amount. All these criminal and astute antecedents fully justify my distrust in giving careful instructions to the Master-of-camp to avoid a surprise of the fort under the veil of feigned friendship; I really expected this new act of treason on account of what I already knew about the said King of Sulu, and was only held back by the fact that he had been baptized, and the information about him which my predecessor had given me in good faith. As it is, all the members of the Government were glad that the treachery of the King had been foreseen and that he had been arrested. *** In Zamboanga, after his arrest, 12 krises, each in six pieces, were found hidden in two cushions belonging to him. *** Urged by the members of the ministry, I proceeded at once to explain to the Real Acuerdo45 and the council of war all the difficulty of inflicting the condign punishment that was deserved, and, supported by a majority of votes, I decided to declare war on all the Sulus, Tirons and Kamukons, with the understanding that no capitulations or treaties of peace would be considered, but that they would be treated as rebels, in their persons, their property and their land, and put to the sword in case of resistance; that all their towns would be destroyed and burned; and that the mission of our fleet was not to make conquests, but to punish the rebellion and to blockade the island of Sulu so as to prevent any attempt to bring in food or any other help. I also directed that the King of Sulu, who was under arrest at Zamboanga, should be sent to Manila, there to be kept in confinement until the pleasure of your Majesty be known. The Datus and other Moros were declared to be slaves, and I ordered that they should be branded and marked, not so much for the purpose of guaranteeing the ownership of their masters or punishing their obstinacy, as for that of avoiding all confusion between them and the numerous Indians of these Islands, whom they resemble in color, bearing and language, of crushing their pride, their daring and their evil spirit, experience having shown that 8 Sulus suffice to subjugate a whole town, and principally of preventing the clandestine introduction of the sect of Mohammed, which would easily spread among the Indians, if the brand did not mark them as enemies from Sulu, it being known that the sect of Mohammed is daily extending its darkness over these regions. *** The declaration of war against the Moros was published in all the provinces, which were instructed to be constantly ready for attack or defense; to organize companies of militia, with their officers, in all the pueblos, and have them frequently drilled and reviewed, so as to become skilful in the use of their arms; to send a list of all the arms and ammunition on hand to the Captain-General, who will thus be able to supply them with all he may deem necessary. I furthermore ordered that no boat should leave Manila or any other port without being well provided with men and arms, and issued proclamations calling for privateers, several of whom have already been given letters of marque and have sailed with the hope of doing good service for your Majesty; I issued new instructions on every subject, to be followed in their respective parts according to circumstances; I reserved for my future action the disposal of our prisoners at the best terms, one fifth of the profits going to the Royal treasury; the right of plundering was declared to be free for all, all privateers from the Bisayas were exempted from tribute, and I promised them in the name of your Majesty 6 pesos for each Moro, as an encouragement to pursue and exterminate them. As soon as I heard the news from Zamboanga, I sent there a supply boat with plenty of food, arms and soldiers, in view of the next campaign; I took on myself the care of relieving from time to time the officers and soldiers *** and I can sincerely assure your Majesty that I have been so provoked and exasperated by the untamable fierceness and the bad faith of the Moros, that I am decided to spare neither work nor efforts in order to punish them thoroughly and to deliver from oppression the Christian communities, so that the glorious name of your Majesty may be feared and respected all through my Government, in compensation for the gross deceit practised by said Moros upon my predecessors. I trust, with the help of God, to punish them as they deserve, and will report to your Majesty the progress of the expedition. God keep the Catholic and Royal Person of your Majesty many years, as Christendom and the Monarchy have need. Manila, June 18, 1752. Sire: By letter forwarded to your Majesty through confidential channels under date of *** I reported that I had despatched an embassador to the King of Bruney, informing him of the arrest of the King of Sulu for his inveterate faithlessness, and pressing him to continue our long standing friendship and to form a new alliance against the said king as a usurper of part of his dominions, and against all his enemies, and to cede to your Majesty the Island of Balabak and the territory of Palawan, for the purpose of better waging war against the Sulus, Tirons and Kamukons; and that, the desired end having been obtained, I found it necessary to use the new rights acquired by the cession referred to. Consequently, with the view of best promoting your Majesty’s interests, I resolved to put into execution the idea of an armament composed of our galleys, a tender, three feluccas, and two champanes, supplied with two Spanish companies of one hundred men each, together with another company of Pampanga Indians, which, with the crews, the convicts and the military officers, number nearly a thousand persons, for the glorious object of taking possession of La Pampanga in the ceded part of Balabak and the other adjacent islands, forming this new district into a province called Trinidad, with a separate government from that of the Kalamians; for I have appointed a governor to take charge of nourishing this new plantation with the political regulations and Royal ordinances which the prudent zeal of your Majesty has provided for similar cases, and which, on my part, have been furnished him in the form of brief and clear instructions directed towards civilizing those barbarous natives, so as the better to facilitate the spread of the holy Gospel. With this in view I am sending two reverend Jesuit priests, persons distinguished in politics and mathematical learning, and the military engineer of this place, for the purpose of making an inspection of the capital of Palawan, as well as of the Island of Balabak, and its adjacent islands, and of examining their bays, ports, inlets, rivers, anchorages and depths, in order to construct a fort—which will be named after Our Lady of the Good End—in the most healthful location, secure by land as well as by sea, for the garrisoning of which an adequate force of artillery has been despatched. It will be kept guarded for the present by a small galley, two feluccas, a company of Spaniards, and another company of Pampanga Indians, besides the galley slaves47 and the suite of the governor, and officials—all rationed for one year—who will number three hundred, the rest being returned to this capital when possession is once established. And that the taking of possession may be unopposed, useful, and lasting, I have planned for the strengthening of the said fort, with the primary object of having our troops sally from its walls to pacify the Sulu rebels who have been dwelling in certain districts of Palawan, or to exterminate them completely by fire and sword, preventing by means of the new fortress and the little flying squadron, the Kamukons, Tirons, and others, from laying waste the province of the Kalamians, and the adjacent islands; for, there being access to the entire chain of places and all the islands, facilitating attacks, and our vessels being on a constant cruise through those regions, their expulsion will be secured. But the greatest gain of all will lie in becoming acquainted with their lands, rendezvous and places of refuge, in view of the fact that the greatest defense which they have had up to the present time has been our own ignorance and negligence in the premises, they scorning our arms without fear, in the belief that they are unconquerable because the places of their abode are unexplored; wherefore the King of Sulu, pretending to serve us as a pilot among the Tiron Islands laughed at our expedition under the command of your Majesty’s Reverend Bishop of Nueva Segovia, leading the Spaniards about with a halter wherever he wished, and wherever he thought they would suffer most fatigue. In view of all this, and of our present experience of the unbridled audacity with which they ravage almost all the provinces, I felt compelled to project this campaign of reconnaissance so as to test, by the favorable results secured, the surest means of benefiting these Christian communities, for I am in hopes of establishing, through this new colony, an impregnable bulwark against the whole Moro power and a source of reciprocal assistance to the fortress at Zamboanga. And I likewise propose to introduce into those parts, by reason of their proximity, commerce with Borneo, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China, so that, through intercourse, the inhabitants of Palawan may become pacified and tractable and their towns become opulent; so that with the families which in due time will be drafted from the outskirts of this capital, a province of substantial usefulness may be formed, having greater respect for both Majesties; for, by erecting churches to God, a new gem will be added to the Royal crown, namely the glory of giving many souls to the Lord, while the savings of the Royal treasury will in time be appreciable. Although I intended to make this journey personally, the noble city48 and the majority of the committee on war opposed this course, and with the sanction of the Audiencia convened in executive session I decided to delegate my authority for this act, in view of the necessity of my remaining in the capital for the despatch of the urgent and arduous affairs which frequently present themselves. God guard the Royal Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years that Christendom needs him. Manila, April 30, 1753. Appendix X Brief report on the expedition to take possession of Palawan, July 17, 175349 Sire: When the galleon was on the point of sailing for New Spain, the Palawan expedition returned to the port of Cavite, from where the commander of the expedition informs me that he has made a careful and exact survey of the Islands of Palawan and Balabak, beginning on the outward coast, from 9 degrees to Labo. On all that coast he has only found mangrove swamps and reefs, the inhabitants being hostile to everyone and obeying no king; the land is miserably poor; there is no drinking water from Balabak to Ipolote; the climate is so bad that in two months and a half 116 men of the expedition died and 200 were sick, and he finds that all that has been said about Palawan is false. I have also been informed by the Alcalde Mayor of the Kalamians of the arrival there of one galley, and three feluccas, which had left the fleet since it sailed from Manila, as the Commander also now reports; after the galley had been careened and food provided, one felucca sailed on its course convoying the joanga50 of the father prior in charge of that district and two small vessels which had been sent by the Alcalde of Komboy and had suffered the misfortune of being captured by the Sulu Moros, most of the people, however, escaping, as explained in the enclosed letter from the Alcalde. The commander of the expedition has sent me from Cavite a report of the councils of war held by him for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, the most important of which was to take possession of Palawan and adjacent islands in the name of your Majesty, said islands having been ceded by the King of Bruney; accordingly, our fleet took possession of the land with due solemnity, with the express knowledge and consent of the inhabitants; I also received a log of the whole route which seems to have been well kept, with maps and a full explanation of the examination made of the said islands and the operations in connection therewith. A new map of the islands is being made, on account of the errors contained in the former one; as the log and the report of the commander refer to the new map, which is unfinished, and I cannot delay the departure of the galleon, I cannot forward a full report to your Majesty; I wish to make a serious and careful examination of all that has been done, so as to take such action as may be the best for the benefit of the Royal service, and to be able to send your Majesty a full report of the expedition, with my opinion based on a complete knowledge of the facts. This is all the information I can give your Majesty for the present. God keep the Catholic Royal Person, of your Majesty many years, as Christendom has need. Manila, July 17, 1753. Appendix XI Letter of the King of Spain to Sultan Israel, December 2, 177451 To the Captain-General of the Philippine Islands. Most illustrious Sir: In letters Nos. 322 and 325, your Excellency sets forth the ideas of the English settled in the island of Balambangan, who are displeased with the unhealthfulness of the country and petition that the Sultan of Sulu allow them to settle within his dominions. With No. 325, the letter of the Sultan was received, and the King, thus informed of the attempts of the Englishmen, and also of the favorable inclination of the Sulu Sultan to establish with our nation friendship and alliance, commands me to direct you to listen to his proposals, to accede to them whenever they are reasonable, and to grant him aid and favor as far as possible, assuring him of Royal protection, and delivering to him the enclosed communication in answer to his own, in which his Catholic Majesty declares his entire satisfaction with his reasonable conduct and promises to reciprocate his friendship as you may understand through the copy of that letter which I enclose. God preserve your Excellency many years. Madrid, December 5, 1774. Dr. Julian de Biriaga. [Copy of the communication referred to in the foregoing letter.] Most illustrious and excellent prince Mohammed Israel, Sultan of Sulu. Most gratifying has been to me the announcement, which you conveyed to me in your letter of January 20th, of your happy accession to the sovereignty of Sulu, on account of which I offer you many congratulations, wishing you happiness in all things. The disposition which inclines you to seek my friendship and assistance, as also the friendly relations which you maintain with my Governor of the Philippines, which you desire to establish and perpetuate by means of a mutual agreement, which may secure for the future firm peace and a perpetual alliance between your states and mine, increase my just gratification, especially as my Governor has informed me of the sublime natural gifts which are united in your person, with many and most expressive eulogies thereof. In view of this, and of the constant fidelity which you promise in your letter, I command my good vassal, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar, to listen to your proposals, to accede to them whenever reasonable, and to grant you all the favor and assistance which the forces and facilities to be found there may allow assuring you of my Royal protection, which I extend to you from now on, confiding in your reciprocal friendship, and noble conduct, and desirous of opportunities of favoring you and of proving the interest which I feel in your good fortunes and the earnestness with which I pray God to preserve you many years. Madrid, December 2, 1774. I, the King. Appendix XII Letter from the Captain-general of the Philippines forwarding a copy of the treaty of peace, protection, and commerce with Sulu, December 25, 183652 Superior Government of the Philippines Most Excellent Sir: After having reported to your Excellency in my three former communications, the opinion which I have formed with regard to the countries in the vicinity of our possessions in the southern part of the Philippines, of the relations which we ought to sustain with their governments and the policy we should follow until we shall obtain the immense advantages which our position offers us, I have the honor to deliver to your Excellency a copy of the Capitulations of the Treaty of Peace, Protection, and Commerce, which I have concluded through the captain of frigate, Don JosÉ MarÍa Halcon, with the Sultan and Datus of Sulu. The articles which need some explanation, are the 1st, 3rd and 4th. With reference to the 3rd and 4th, I mention them in my former communication and indicate their intent; and with respect to the 1st, I copy herewith what has been reported to me by the commissioner, D. JosÉ MarÍa Halcon, which is as follows: I must make clear an important point relating to the text of the Capitulations, in the wording of which your Excellency has noted perhaps some ambiguities and omissions in Article I, which while intended to make the Datus and Sultan of Sulu acknowledge and declare the extent of our rights, seems indefinite on certain points which many irresponsible writers have asserted with confidence. While considering the protection granted the Sultan, I recognized the inexpediency of making the same include the lands which he has lately acquired in Borneo, and of determining definitely the line of the boundary in Palawan, the title to which island, as also that to Balabak and Balambangan, is very disputable, though at present, the lands where we have not established our settlements of the province of Kalamians are included de facto in his possessions. Palawan was ceded to the Crown of Spain by the King of Bruney, and Balabak is likewise ceded by an instrument brought back by D. Antonio Fabean when he went there as Embassador under the administration of the Marquis of Obando, which should be in the archives of the Philippine Government; but since these cessions were made on an occasion when the Sultan of Sulu found himself in possession of the lands by virtue of a former cession made in his favor by another King of Bruney, such documentary testimony cannot serve as the basis of our arguments, especially since we did not proceed to found any settlements. This matter of the cession of Balabak occurred upon the occasion of a visit to Manila, of Sultan Mohammed Alimud Din (Fernando I) who, asserting his right to the island, executed and ratified upon his part the gift, at least in word, through D. Manuel Fernandez Toribio, afterward Governor of Zamboanga, and the Secretary of the Government. Our writers have misrepresented the subsequent conduct of the said Sultan, and concealed very important facts, but at any rate, the very concealment of the reasons for his fleeing from Manila betokens the lack of liberty in all of the instruments he granted during his stay in that place; moreover the facts in the case justify his later actions, which gave occasion for casting a doubt over the legitimacy of our title to the lands under consideration. The true reason for the actions of Mohammed Alimud Din, beginning with his flight from Manila, was the fact that he had purchased the secret in a copy of the confidential letter which the First Minister of the Monarchy, Marquis de la Ensenada, wrote to the Captain-General of the Philippines on August 28, 1751, discussing the states of Sulu; which document, when brought to his knowledge, could not fail to ruin all of our political moves, and to dispose him to take every defensive measure against our power, for Mohammed Alimud Din was a man of no mean understanding. This was the origin of the letters which, on September 17, 1763, the said Sultan wrote from Sulu to the King of England and to the English company,53 ratifying in favor of the latter the concession of the lands which form the strait of Balabak, in which is comprised the southern part of Palawan from Point Kanipaan to Point Bulilaruan, and this was the origin of their settlements in Balabak and Balambangan which have been abandoned since later events. Such are the antecedents which induced me to draw up the said article with such ambiguity that it may be construed to the advantage of the Crown without giving occasion to embarrassing objections. My aim throughout, most illustrious Sir, has been to promote the national welfare by carrying out the high designs of your Excellency, who by promoting this enterprise has attempted to open up one of the most abundant sources of wealth in the Philippines. I also deliver to your Excellency a copy of the Capitulations, in which, in consequence of Article 2nd, it has been agreed to determine the duties to be paid by the Sulu vessels in Zamboanga and Manila, and ours in Sulu. For the better understanding of these stipulations, I have thought it expedient to inclose a copy of the explanation with which the said commissioner forwarded them to me. The present tariff rates have served as a basis for the duties imposed upon the Sulu vessels, it being beyond my authority to alter them. With reference to those which shall be paid by our vessels in JolÓ, although they may appear to be excessive, it will be sufficient to inform your Excellency that all of the ship-owners who are accustomed to make voyages to JolÓ, have been satisfied with the very favorable terms we have secured in the agreement, not only because of the high valuation set on the articles in which payment will be made, but because of the regulation and reduction to fixed rules of the charges, that until now have been arbitrary and never less than the stipulated rates. It is true that they have desired not only a greater reduction but still more their complete abolition, as is natural, but it was necessary to conciliate the two parties, as the commissioner says. Above all, one of the advantages of importance which our merchants recognize in the relations now established, the benefits of which they have begun already to experience, is that the Sultan and Datus together guarantee the credits left in Sulu as a result of commercial operations, which advantage they have not heretofore enjoyed, but waited on the will and good faith of the debtor, who paid if he pleased and when he pleased, or perhaps never, and there existed no means of compelling him as there now is by recourse to the Government. Likewise through the preference they are now accorded, our merchants have gained greatly, as your Excellency will comprehend. In short, there is not one of them who is not well satisfied with the results of the negotiations, and all appreciate the skill and prudence with which Halcon has conducted himself upon a mission all the more delicate and difficult since he has had to treat with a Government whose lack of enlightenment and poorness of organization equal the barbarism of its people. Finally, in the answer given by the Chamber of Commerce of which I inclose a copy, your Excellency will perceive the appreciation which the Capitulations have brought him, by having settled the duties to be paid by our vessels in Sulu, as also by having established relations with the Government of that island. I trust that your Excellency will condescend to bring all this to the notice of her Majesty that she may grant her Royal approval. God preserve your Excellency many years. Manila, December 25, 1836. Most excellent Sir, (Sgd.) Pedro Antonio Salazar.—Rubricated. The most excellent the Secretary of State and of the Office of “GobernaciÓn” of the Kingdom. Appendix XIII Royal directions relative to a general policy and the regulation of commerce with Sulu, and the advisability of making Zamboanga a free port, June 23, 183754 Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration Most Excellent Sir: Your Excellency’s predecessor, Don Pedro Antonio Salazar, when he reported in detail, in letters of last December, all that he had done in the treaty of friendship and commerce entered into with the Sultan of Sulu, of the mercantile relations which it behooves us to maintain with the Mohammedan possessions to the south of the Philippines, of the opinion which he had formed concerning the war of enslavement, and other matters upon which your Excellency will receive due instructions under Royal order of this date, forwarded separately and privately, in a very secret manner, a communication dated the 17th of the same month, in which he set forth the policy, which, according to his belief, should be adopted toward the said Kingdom of Sulu in consequence of the said treaty. Her Majesty the Queen Regent, having been informed of all this, and having in mind the remark made in the said communication, that the Spanish possessions in the southern region are frequently oppressed by the alcaldes, on account of the present defective system of administration, has decided to direct your Excellency to suppress, with strong hand, these excesses of the alcaldes, that they may not disturb the peace happily established with Sulu; exhorting them to moderation and peaceableness, in order that the odium which the Moro race feels toward us may vanish. Noting also among his remarks, his conclusion that while the war of enslavement is undoubtedly an evil, it produces nevertheless the advantage that those provinces are united more closely to the Government because of their greater need of the same against their enemies; and that by becoming used to a life of freedom and license, those people become also inured to captivity, from which they could sometimes escape but do not, many preferring to turn to piracy, Her Majesty holds these views erroneous and harmful, since no just and paternal government should promote misfortunes among its subjects in order to make itself more necessary, and thus keep them dependent; and because, though there may be some who are content with slavery in Sulu because it affords them a life of unrestraint, it can not be ignored that their families and the Government suffer a great injury from their situation, nor that morality would be greatly outraged, if, for these reasons, countenance were given to slavery, which should be attacked and exterminated at all costs. The idea is advanced in the same communication, that in the countries of the southern part of the Philippines, the system of protection, carried to the point of establishing trading houses, will be almost equivalent to possession and control, when once commercial interests are held to be the chief interests, and there is set forth a plan to diminish or even cut off the trade55 with Mindanao, in order to confine the commerce to our channels. Her Majesty, on being informed of this policy of a protectorate, approves of the same, but desires that it be carried out frankly and faithfully with the Sultan of Sulu, in order that he be convinced, through experience, that the Spaniards are his loyal friends, our authorities keeping it in mind that the conquest of those countries is not to the interest of the nation, but rather the acquisition of isolated military and mercantile stations, which may control indirectly without the disadvantages of great expense and of arousing the hatred of the natives. This alliance or friendship with the Sultan should be such, that in whatever war he may be engaged with his rebellious subjects, he shall be aided in good faith, unless his adversary should be of such strength as to insure his triumph, for then the useless defense of the vanquished would subject us to the contempt of the conqueror and we should lose the benefits already acquired. In such cases we should remain neutral, under some plausible pretext of impracticableness or other honorable reason. In other wars, waged by the Sultan with other princes, we should attempt to mediate, with the purpose that, by settling new discords, we may obtain advantages from the two or more belligerents, as rewards for the services rendered them; but in the event of having to oppose some one of them, it should be that one who offers us the least advantages, and has the best chances of triumph, because with our ally victorious, the latter may in the treaty of peace execute articles favorable to our commerce,—trying always, above all things, so to act that the victor shall not become too strong nor the vanquished brought too low. With regard to the policy which it is best to adopt as a general rule in regard to commerce, your Excellency should remember that the best system consists in the greatest possible liberty for our merchandise, and in securing, directly or indirectly, for our own merchandise, or foreign goods carried by the national vessels, the enjoyment of greater privileges than those of any other country, in order that they may be preferred and produce greater profits on the markets. In the same letter he submits the opinion that the lack of communication of the countries to the south with the Philippines, is a most favorable political measure for Spanish commerce, and recommends that our relations with the Government of Sulu should be strengthened in order to include the same under our dependence at some future time, it being necessary to act with cunning in order to separate it completely from the piratical warfare. Her Majesty commands me to state to you concerning these matters, that the communication of Sulu with the Philippines being purely commercial, should not be restricted, but on the contrary, should be increased in every way possible, encouragement should be given to the establishment of traders and Spanish trading houses in Sulu, where our good conduct and benevolence toward the natives may bring us profit. But it is always to be borne in mind that the Government of Her Majesty does not desire the subjection of other states to itself, but a sincere friendship and a close and useful alliance, and that a just and discreet policy, not crafty nor artful, will accomplish most in withdrawing the Sultan from the interests of the leaders of the pirates. Your Excellency will note in the draft of the communication from your predecessor, to which I make answer, the proposal of various schemes for establishing ourselves securely in Sulu. Such would be the establishment of a trading house there, already agreed upon in the treaty, and posting there a garrison, under the pretext that it is for the safety and greater state of the person of the Sultan. Her Majesty deems indispensable the establishment of the trading house, but it should be done in such a manner as not to cause distrust, and fortified and protected from any sudden attack, using in this the greatest prudence, and remembering that a garrison there, though it might be acceptable to the Sultan, might wound the self-love of the people of the country, and so render odious both the Sultan and his protectors. The most essential thing for the Spaniards, in order to become firmly established, is to make themselves popular, to respect the customs of the people, even with veneration, not offending any one for any reason, treating all with courtesy and decorum; not showing themselves domineering nor covetous, not insulting any one, but being very respectful to women, the old and children, not scoffing at anything in their public amusements, nor religious affairs, nor in their meetings. It seems to her Majesty that through these means would be secured a consistent friendship between both countries, and that the most adequate plan for the support and defense of the trading house would be to maintain in the safest harbor a permanent maritime force, in which should be stored all arms and munitions, and sufficient soldiers, in case it should be necessary to defend the building, without arousing the suspicions that would be caused by placing these preparations, concealed or openly, in the house itself; and since for this purpose, for the defense of the country against the pirates, and for maintaining the respect of the people and Government of the protectorate, it is indispensable to keep a well organized sea force, her Majesty had determined that you decide the manner of organizing this maritime force, without losing sight of the great economy which it is necessary to observe on account of the embarrassed condition of the Peninsula, which needs now more than ever before the assistance of her colonial provinces. Finally, the predecessor of your Excellency further stated that he was attempting to extend his efforts to the establishing of the protectorate over the countries subject to the Sultan of Mindanao: her Majesty approves this policy on condition that in its execution the purposes and measures, which are mentioned above for Sulu, be adopted. Her Majesty, by whose Royal order I communicate to your Excellency the foregoing, trusts in your zeal to realize the importance of this matter, and, regarding the principles of justice and right which direct the resolutions of her Majesty, to direct all your efforts to the accomplishment of the results desired; carefully reporting your progress in the affair, for the information of her Majesty and further action. God preserve your Excellency many years. Madrid, June 23, 1837. Mendizabal.—Rubricated. The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines. Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration Most Excellent Sir: The predecessor of your Excellency, convinced of the important advantages to be derived by the Philippines, in making more intimate and more secure our few and doubtful relations with the island of Sulu, determined immediately upon assuming command, to negotiate with the Sultan of the said place, a treaty of peace and commerce which he considered, in every respect, not only useful but indispensable to the prosperity of the country. After having announced this project in various of his communications, he reported in December of last year, having accomplished the same, and furnished in several communications, an exact and detailed account of the history of his labors in the affair, the reasons which he had for undertaking the same, the benefits which he expects as results, and the measures whose adoption he deems necessary in order that these results may be more certain, and at the same time profitable. There were received from him seven letters, all marked with the letter “A,” numbered from 14 to 23, and dated from the 15th to the 29th of the said month; with so many points of analogy and similarity between them, that they should be considered as one only. The first, number 14, is intended to furnish information and data relative to Sulu, and the other Mohammedan islands of the south (without which it would be impossible to know their importance) and to detail the relations which we should have with them, considering them both in relation to commerce and with respect to the war of enslavement. In the second, of a confidential nature, he outlines the policy, which, in his opinion, should be adopted in order to obtain all the advantages which our position affords. In the third, number 16, he states the measures which should be adopted for the benefit of the national commerce in those countries. In the fourth, number 20, he transmits a copy of the treaty of peace, protection and commerce concluded with the Sultan of Sulu, and of the stipulations made for the determination of the duties which our vessels should pay in Sulu, and the Sulus in Manila and Zamboanga. In the fifth, number 21, he relates the motives which have led him to direct these matters as he has done, transmitting to her Majesty all the plans referring to it, through this Ministry only. In the sixth, number 22, he gives account of some of the advantages which have been derived from our expedition to Sulu, and amongst others, a treaty of peace concluded between the pueblo of Malusu and the Governor of Zamboanga. And finally, in the seventh, number 23, he sets forth the necessity of retaining at that station, the frigate-captain, Don JosÉ MarÍa Halcon, who performed the duty of commissioner for the negotiation of the treaty. I have informed her Majesty, the Queen Regent, of the contents of all these communications, and in this knowledge she has seen fit to approve, in a general manner, all the measures adopted by the aforementioned predecessor of your Excellency, giving suitable orders, that the proper Ministry provide the special approval which some of them deserve, on account of their weight and importance, concerning which your Excellency will soon be informed, and deigning to command me to submit in a separate and particular communication the following advice on the special subject of the letters referred to above. Her Majesty, feeling assured that conquests in themselves, and later their maintenance, absorb the profits which accrue from the countries already acquired, prefers to any conquest advantageous trade and commerce. Convinced, therefore, that the most profitable and lucrative policy is to conquer or secure such places as on account of their fortunate location may prove to be at the same time strong military and mercantile posts and so both promote and protect commerce, she cannot but approve the ideas your Excellency’s predecessor expresses in his communication numbered 14, and desires, that upon adopting the system in accordance with those ideas, you confine yourself solely, in all enterprises of conquest, to occupation of territory either abandoned or uninhabited, or to that which, notwithstanding its being settled, would cost little and would not give occasion for a costly war. In order to increase our commercial advantages in Sulu, and to raise up rivals to the Portuguese, it would be well to grant protection and reduction in duties to the Chinese junks56 under the specific condition that they do not sail under the flag of any other nation (without mentioning the Portuguese by name in order not to occasion the resentment of this power) and to secure in Sulu for those who adopt the Spanish flag, a reduction of duties although not as much as that which should be granted to Spanish vessels. Thus it is the will of her Majesty that you be directed, commanding, with the same purpose in view, that your predecessor state to you explicitly, which are the measures that he would have adopted, had he been authorized to do so, in order to avoid the blow to our commerce threatened by the Portuguese, depriving us with the double expedition from Macao and Singapore to Sulu, of the advantage over all other nations which still remained to us in this traffic; and that your Excellency obstruct, by all the means in your power, the association of interests between the commercial houses of Manila with those of Macao and Singapore, if the same were intended to secure special privileges in the island of Sulu to the products of the Philippines to the injury of the national commerce. With respect to the matter of the war against piracy, referred to also in letter number 14, her Majesty approves all the purposes expressed therein by the predecessor of your Excellency, and commands me to direct your Excellency that, without ever recurring to war or the interruption of traffic with Sulu as means of destroying or diminishing piracy and traffic in slaves, you exert yourself to suppress the same and remedy the evil which it inflicts on the Philippines, by the various means at hand, to-wit; 1st, through negotiations with the Sultan of Sulu; in which measures suitable for the accomplishment of the purpose may be concerted; 2d, securing the increase, by the Sultan, of import duties on slaves who are Spanish subjects, and the lowering of duties on slaves of other countries; 3d, requesting of him assistance in driving out the pirates from their haunts of Balangingi and other places; 4th, watching the rendezvous of these pirates in the Bisayas also, in order to destroy them. In this manner and with hard lessons, with the energetic and continuous warfare spoken of by the predecessor of your Excellency, the extermination of piracy will be accomplished without the evils which would follow upon an unwise and useless war against Sulu, and without the more serious result to which the same would expose us, and which her Majesty desires your Excellency to avoid at any cost, the result referred to being the removal of the Sultan to some other point, which removal England and Holland might turn to great advantage against our trade. As to the measures proposed in letter number 16, for the benefit of the national commerce, her Majesty will determine which is fit, notifying your Excellency in due season. Meanwhile you should keep in mind, that as long as the Sulus man their ships with slaves, your Excellency should prohibit them from trading in Zamboanga and all other places within the dominions of her Majesty, whenever the ships which they use shall be manned in whole or in part with slaves who are subjects of Spain. Concerning the treaty of peace, protection and commerce, a copy of which is inclosed in letter number 20, her Majesty has been pleased to resolve, after careful examination, that it be forwarded with favorable comment to the Ministry of State for the approval of the Cortes and the ratification of her Majesty, all of which will be communicated to your Excellency in due time, its policy being carried out and its intent carefully observed in the meanwhile, for the purpose of determining whether there is anything to amend or correct by means of further negotiation, which would be considered as an appendix to the treaty. In view of the explanations concerning the first article of the aforementioned treaty furnished by the commissioner of the negotiation, her Majesty commands me to repeat to your Excellency the necessity for carrying out the policy which is prescribed to your Excellency with regard to acquisition and conquest; in order to claim those lands referred to in the explanations, if perchance such claim should be advisable for the purpose of acquiring some point of military or mercantile value: or in order to set up the claim of the Kingdom of Spain to those countries, in order that by giving it up, we may secure other things which may be of real importance to us, such as reduction in duties, some exclusive privilege, or the possession of some isolated point of great importance. The predecessor of your Excellency by addressing to this Ministry all communications bearing on this matter, has merited the approbation of her Majesty, because he has avoided many unnecessary steps and useless delay, and thus your Excellency will continue to do, in the manner herein indicated. And finally, her Majesty having noted with satisfaction the favorable results produced already by the expedition to Sulu, and approving the idea of not using the fifteen hundred dollars sent by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia for the redemption of slaves, she commands me to direct your Excellency to cultivate the friendship of all the chiefs who, like the Orankaya of Malusu, abandon the pursuit of piracy, and that suitable orders be issued by the Division of the Marine of this Ministry, not only that the captain of frigate, Don JosÉ MarÍa Halcon, who has so well discharged the duty of negotiating the treaty, be assigned to that station, but that he also be duly rewarded for his services as such commissioner; her Majesty not failing to express the gratitude with which she declares her appreciation to the predecessor of your Excellency, the aforementioned Don Pedro Antonio Salazar. All of which is communicated to your Excellency, by Royal order, for your due information and guidance, instructing you with regard to the confidential letter, that you carry out the directions forwarded you separately under this date. God preserve your Excellency. Madrid, June 23, 1837. Mendizabal.—Rubricated. The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines. Appendix XIV Camba’s report on the circumstances attending the treaty of 1836 and its bases, November 16, 183757 Superior Government of the Philippines Excellent Sir: In compliance with the provision of the Royal order of the 24th of April last, requesting, for the information of her Majesty the record of the correspondence exchanged in regard to the treaty of commerce made by my predecessor with the Sultan of Sulu, and the bases of said treaty, I forward the same to your Excellency, with a few personal observations suggested by a reading of the said papers. On the 31st of January, 1835, the Tribunal of Commerce forwarded to the Captain-General, approved by it, a report presented by several business men who traded with Sulu, setting forth the deceitful methods of the Datus, or principal people of the island, in their agreements and contracts, and requesting, in order to restrain and intimidate them, that the naval division of Zamboanga, or part of it, be stationed in the port of Jolo during the time the national merchant vessels remain there for the purpose of making their sales and purchases. A decree was issued on the 9th of March of the same year, concurring in the opinion of the Assessor, and declaring that the request could not be granted at that time, but that it would be taken into consideration as soon as the circumstances allowed. This is a brief of the document marked Number 1. On the 9th of February, 1836, JosÉ Dugiols, who had sold goods on credit to the amount of 8000 pesos to the Jolo people, and despaired of getting paid, presented a new petition, similar to that which had been sent 11 months before. The Chamber of Commerce approved it, and requested that a fleet of launches be stationed at Jolo during the business season, there to gather information which would allow the Government to take proper action in the matter; it also insisted that the commander of the fleet be a capable person, who, without compromising the flag, would know how to conciliate the purpose of the naval demonstration with the spirit of peace and concord which he ought to maintain between the crews of our ships and the people of Jolo. This suggestion, which had already been made in the petition presented the year before, was favorably endorsed one after the other by all who intervened in the papers in the case and resulted in the final resolution of May 31st, which contains 14 articles. The first provides that it shall be one of the duties of the commander of the naval division of Zamboanga to protect the Spanish ships while they are at Jolo, and instructions are given him to that effect. The second appoints captain of frigate JosÉ MarÍa Halcon to take charge, temporarily, of the command of the Division of Zamboanga, and establish relations of friendship and commerce with the Sulu people. The third directs him to inform the Sulu Sultan of his visit in the way he may deem most likely to convince him of the peaceful intentions of this Government. The fourth directs him to make himself recognized by the officers and men of our ships, as the commanding authority who shall maintain them in peace and good order. The fifth charges him not to allow his men to land, so as to avoid disorder. The sixth directs him to take action in regard to any excess, as provided by the Code. The seventh, to hold in check the crews of our ships, so as to give the Sulus neither reason nor pretence for showing their bad faith. The ninth forbids the commander of the division and all those under his orders to enter into any business speculation whatsoever. The tenth directs the commander to be ever careful to keep all his men within the bounds of duty. By the eleventh he is directed to see that all contracts are religiously fulfilled, and, if necessary, to complain energetically to the Sultan, and by the twelfth to see that our people fulfil their own. Articles thirteen and fourteen direct the commander to obtain information about the political and civil conditions of Sulu and its topographic situation. After acquainting himself with the foregoing, Captain JosÉ MarÍa Halcon inquired what would be the minimum importation duty in Manila for articles proceeding from Sulu, and asked for instructions in regard to the importation of arms and ammunition into Sulu by our ships. In answer to the first question, the Board of Tariffs fixed at 2 per cent the duty on all articles imported from Sulu to Manila in its own vessels,58 except wax and cacao, which would have to pay 14 per cent under a foreign flag and half that amount under the national flag; in regard to the second the importation of arms and ammunition into Sulu by our ships was prohibited. A letter to the Sultan of Sulu was furthermore given the commander, accrediting him and explaining his mission, the petition presented by Dugiols and endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce, requesting that our business relations with Sulu be granted a protection which experience made each day more necessary, being thus complied with. On April 15, 1836, Halcon forwarded the capitulations of peace and the commercial agreements made by him in the name of this Government with the Sultan of Sulu. The first consists of 6 articles, by which the Spanish Government grants the Sultan its protection, which is accepted by the latter, with a mutual assurance of coÖperation between them against any nation not European. Spanish boats are to be admitted freely in Sulu, and Sulu boats in Zamboanga and Manila. It is agreed that a Spanish factory shall be established in Jolo, so as to avoid damages and delays to our commerce, the same right being given the Sulus in Manila. Certain rules are established in order to distinguish friendly from hostile boats. The Sultan is pledged to prevent piracy on the part of those who recognize his authority; and it is furthermore agreed that in case of any doubt as to the meaning of any article, the literal Spanish text shall be followed. In accordance with the opinion of the Government assessor, these capitulations were approved by decree of January 20 of this year. The commercial agreements contain 9 articles. The first establishes a duty of 2½ per cent on all products brought by the Sulus. The second excepts wax and cacao, as recommended by the Board of Tariffs. The third provides a duty of 1 per cent for the importation in Zamboanga of products brought by the Sulus. The fourth provides that the payment of the duties shall be made in cash in silver. The fifth establishes the dues to be paid by our boats at Sulu. The sixth fixes the value, in products, of those dues. The seventh, in its first part, declares, that all Sulu boats trading without a license shall be treated as smugglers, under the law of the Kingdom; in its second part it also requires our boats to show a bill of lading in accordance with the cargo, on pain of a fine of ?500, two thirds to go to the Sultan and one third to our exchequer. The eighth provides that if the duties are reduced in Manila and Zamboanga on the articles coming from Sulu, the same shall be done in Sulu, and that if the Sultan reduces the dues on foreign ships, he shall do the same for ours. The ninth provides that in case of doubt the literal Spanish text shall be followed. After hearing the opinions of the Boards of Commerce and Tariffs, and in accordance with that of the assessor, the foregoing was approved by decree of the 20th of January of this year, with a small reduction of ½ per cent on the duties to be paid by the Sulus in Manila, and an explanation of the proceeding to be followed for the appraisement of their cargoes in Zamboanga and in Manila. Shortly before this ratification by the Government, it was decreed on the 13th of January, at the request of Commissioner Halcon, that in order to avoid trouble between this Government and that of Sulu, the captains and supercargoes of the Spanish ships should give no credit to the Sulus, except with the authorization of the Sultan, under the penalty of being barred from claiming his protection or that of the Spanish Government for the collection of such credits; and that all settlements of the pay of the crews of our ships should be so made as to avoid the abuse of paying them in kind, instead of currency. Such is the information which I have found, and am forwarding to your Excellency in regard to the treaties mentioned. The leading idea in said treaties is one of distrust towards the people of Sulu, on account of their treacherous, cruel and perfidious nature. As this is the only idea which prevails in all our relations with the island, as well as in the Royal order of August 28, 1751, and the documents attached thereto, without referring to older time, I can not be persuaded that the policy of peace and alliance adopted with the Sultan of Sulu can give our shipping and commerce any substantial and permanent advantage. Several Royal decrees find fault with such treaties and even order them to be revoked in case they have been made; and to justify departure from these sovereign instructions, given with a true knowledge of the facts, and in accordance with the opinion of the illustrious members of the Cabinet, there must now be some powerful political reason which I can not discover. If we take into consideration the very weak authority of the Sultan over his subjects, and the scarcity of his means in the midst of datus or chieftains who, with their families and slaves, constitute distinct communities which are haughty, ambitious and dangerous to him, we find that there is in Sulu no moral force on which to rely for the execution of a treaty, even should there be the best faith and good will on the part of the Sultan. Furthermore, Sulu and the small adjacent islands produce nothing; even the rice and fish which the people use for their food come from our neighboring possessions: what business reasons are there therefore, capable of calling our attention, or whose profits would pay the expenses of a fleet placed in observation there? All the produce of the islands consists of bÊche-de-mer and shell which are gathered by the slaves;59 the clothing and foodstuffs are furnished them, on credit, by our own ships; gold, wax and edible nests come from Mindanao. Hence commerce is confined to a season outside of which our ships never go near Sulu. There is therefore little advantage to be derived by our commerce from these treaties, and this is confirmed by the communication just received by me from the commander of the Zamboanga division, which I enclose as number 6. It betrays complete disappointment, and shows the wisdom of the instructions given in the above mentioned Royal decrees. The policy which we ought to follow with the Sulus is one of continual and perspicacious caution, with well conditioned, well situated and well commanded naval forces, ready to obtain at once satisfaction for any offense to our flag; and I believe that this could be done without much trouble, by using steamships, as the Dutch have done in their settlements in the Moluccas, where they suffered from the piracy of the Moros much as we do in the Philippines. The foregoing information covers, I believe, all the points mentioned in the Royal order of April 24th, last, and which are the object of the present communication and of the documents which I enclose therewith. May God keep your Excellency many years. Manila, November 16, 1837. AndrÉs G. Camba. His Excellency the Secretary of State and of the Department of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonies. Superior Government of the Philippines. Excellent Sir: I acknowledge to your Excellency the receipt of two Royal orders dated the 23d of June of last year, which, with reference to the treaties made with the Sultan of Sulu, have been transmitted by your ministry; one replying to the seven communications marked “A” which my predecessor made in connection with the same subject; the other confidential, and indicating the policy and measures that should be carried out with the said Sultan of Sulu and the Sultan of Mindanao. In communication numbered 5, and dated November 16th last, in compliance with one of the provisions of Royal order of last April, I made a minute report accompanied by documentary evidence, of the antecedents which I encountered relative to Sulu affairs, and at the same time, could not but intimate in this connection how little I expected as a result of our treaties, because experience had already caused me to be suspicious, and also because the various Royal orders toward the close of the past century confirmed me in this idea;61 and indeed the losses which all our commercial expeditions experienced during the first year of these treaties, the vexations they suffered and the risks to which the crews as well as the vessels and their cargoes were exposed during their stay in Jolo, have fully borne out this view. Many are the measures and documents which we have here, in which this same fact is laid down; many are the Royal decrees in which, in recognition of this fact, the Governors of the Philippines have even been authorized, by every means in their power and without counting cost or difficulty, to punish severely the intrepidity of those infidel barbarians. In order to arouse and interest the Royal conscience on that point, it was requisite that there should be repeatedly presented through various channels and at distinct times substantiated accounts, non-conflicting and extremely painful, of the various piracies, cruelties, and vexations, with which those barbarians have kept the Philippine Islands in the south in a state of fear and depression; and needful also was it that there should have been employed, in vain, on account of the religion and the policy of our ancestors, those gentle measures of peace and union which no civilized people could resist; but which are ineffectual with barbarous nations who know no other right than that of force. From the 14th of April, 1646, when we abandoned possession of Sulu, which our arms had so gloriously conquered, making a treaty of peace whereby the Sulus bound themselves to pay us annually, as tribute, three boatloads of unhulled rice, until the day the Government again entered into a treaty with them, neither have the Filipinos succeeded in freeing themselves from their harassments, nor has the Government reaped any fruit other than continual menace. The English have had the same experience with the perfidy and bad faith of those islanders. After having formed, in the island of Balambangan by a concession made by the Sulus, a settlement destined to be the emporium for the products of the East in connection with their China trade, for which this island offers two good ports, they were two years afterwards surprised by the Sulus themselves, who, knowing the English had despatched their vessels, took advantage of their absence by taking possession of the island and the fort constructed therein, also a great deal of booty, which cost the English East India Company a loss of more than three hundred thousand dollars. In narrating this event, Mr. J. H. Moor, who published last year a brief review of interesting events concerning the islands and lands bordering on the China Sea, agrees with the views I have expressed, namely, that these acts of treachery and cruelty on the part of the Sulus are the offspring of their innate love of robbery and their natural perfidy. All these facts then will convince your Excellency that the expectations based by my acting predecessor upon the latest treaties referred to are too sanguine. They would produce no illusions on my part, in view of the experience of the past, neither does it seem to me that their results, looked at with calmness and in the light of the most exact data, could be of any great advantage to our commerce. Allowing that the treaties should be religiously complied with, never would they be of any value, in themselves, to improve the brutal condition of those islanders. This condition will always constitute, not only for the Spaniards but also for all civilized nations, a great drawback to mercantile relations, which, although founded on principles of utility and mutual advantage, cannot continue nor be developed except under the most favorable guaranties. How would our merchants, or the foreign merchants of Sulu obtain them, where there is neither good faith nor justice, and where cunning fraud makes even the Chinese dangerous traders? Commerce is the movement and circulation of wealth. The latter results from production, and production from the full and unrestricted utilization of property. Moreover, when property is insecure, when the laws do not protect it, when the agents of the Government are the first to disregard it, the mercantile spirit is the first to become alarmed and, when defrauded, to flee as far as possible from the place where it does not find that safe haven it requires to expand and to pursue with skill and perseverance the objects of its calling. Thus it is that during the period elapsed since the year cited, 1646, up to the present time, no Spanish merchant has himself had direct dealings with the inhabitants of Sulu, the Chinese alone being engaged in this trade, they being the only charterers of our vessels, so that we do not obtain from said commerce more than interest on the capital invested, subject to great exposure and risk, which has made and always will make, this commerce uncertain and of little value. While lack of security still sets a limit to the extent of our speculation in commerce with Sulu, lack of advantageous reciprocity adds another factor no less appreciable. At the time the Spaniards came to the Philippines, Sulu seems to have been rich in her own natural and industrial products, and richer still through the large commerce which their exchange enabled her to carry on with the Chinese vessels which in large numbers frequented her coasts. Situated almost midway between the Philippines and the Moluccas, close to two rich islands so fertile and densely populated as Mindanao and Borneo, it seemed destined by nature to be the emporium of the commerce of the south. Converted to Islamism by the Arab Sayed Ali,62 who landed there from Mecca, how much ought this principle of civilization in the midst of barbarous nations have tended to their advancement! But times have changed greatly since then, and brought their always accompanying vicissitudes. As Spanish dominion was extended in the Philippines and the Portuguese penetrated into the Moluccas, they began attracting to their capitals the wealth and traffic that was accumulating in Sulu, and here begins a new era. War and desolation, which for a period of eighty years we inflicted on them, followed, and put in our power this island and its dependencies, and though independence was later restored, it could not divert this rich commerce from the trend it had taken. Meanwhile, their wars and internal dissensions resulted in corrupting their customs, and there only remained for them the habit of piracy, which ever since our appearance, they had embraced for the purpose of harassing us. Since then Sulu has been converted into a refuge for pirates allured by its favorable position, and these barbarians, being more solicitous of carrying on their devastations than of cultivating their land, have not ceased to be the greatest scourge of our inhabitants of the south. This explains the impossibility of obtaining from them by entreaty anything in the way of peace and tranquillity, which to them as well as to us would be so beneficial. For this reason, Sulu, which contains a population of pirates and slaves, is nothing more than a shipping point where certain products are collected from the other islands of the south. It is surrounded by islands and islets, which form the archipelago bearing its name, and has a length from east to west of about ten leagues, a width of four and a half, and a circumference of thirty-two. The total population credited to the Archipelago is from 149,000 to 150,000 souls, 6,800 of which inhabit Jolo, and in this number are included 800 Chinese. The houses, or rather huts, of the principal place, are estimated to number 3,500, and that of the petty king, called Sultan, cannot be distinguished from the rest except for its greater size; all of bamboo and nipa, weak and poor as their owners, but with cannons of various calibers which mark the residences of the datus, descendants of the petty kings, and who themselves constitute the oligarchy of their Government. I have already stated that the Sultan can do nothing, all matters being decreed by the convention, or Rum Bichara of the datus, where the owner of the greatest number of slaves always decides the questions.63 Wealth, influence and power, are measured among them solely by the number of slaves, and this is why they cannot but be pirates, in order to acquire this wealth, nor can they offer any guaranty, if it must be accompanied by the renunciation of this pursuit. By this picture, which is corroborated by the Englishman Moor in his description of Sulu, it will be seen that we can expect nothing from our present relations with Sulu in the way of securing the tranquillity and prosperity of our islands of the south. Neither is a system of continual hostility the best way of procuring these precious gifts, but the promotion and throwing open of avenues of commerce, directing it to one of our ports, which, in view of its position, ought to be Zamboanga; and in this I coincide with the views of my predecessor. Zamboanga, with a different organization, the concession of a free port for all the products from the south and those brought in champanes from China, and the free admission of the exiles who seek refuge there as well as the Chinese traders, aiding the former in establishing themselves, and exempting the latter from all taxes for the first ten years, would be, in all probability, the most suitable point to which to divert from Sulu the little transit business which remains, to guard, from a shorter distance, against the piracy of its inhabitants, and to bring them in the course of time, perhaps, to a more humane mode of living. But all this requires first the planning of a suitable and adequate system which, bringing nearer to the islands of the south the protection and vigilance of the Government of the capital by means of a subordinate Government embracing its chief characteristics, would relieve those precious islands from the calamities which up to the present time they have suffered by reason of their remoteness and possibly also because of our neglect. This plan, which I desire to combine with a forward movement in the great and rich island of Mindanao, a large part of whose coast is surrounded by the districts of the corregidors64 of Karaga and Misamis, will bring about without doubt a new and happy era for the Filipinos of the south, and place, without the sacrifice of people or money, a large number of faithful subjects under the illustrious Government of her Majesty, furnishing the same also with a greater abundance of resources. To this end I shall hold in view and faithfully observe the policy which her Majesty outlines in her confidential Royal order, to which I reply; its application will be the constant object of everything I decree and execute. And very happy shall I be thus to make suitable return for the many proofs of co-operation and esteem, which, for the past thirteen years I have received from the Filipinos; infinitely more so, because working at the same time for the better service of her Majesty in accordance with her Royal plans in which these people have always found their greatest and surest well-being. Your Excellency being convinced, then, that these are the sentiments which impel me and the plans I contemplate for the fulfillment of the important duties her Majesty has deigned to confer upon me, can from this reply assure her that as far as I am concerned, nothing shall be left undone to carry out to the letter the policy she has been pleased to outline to me, and to merit thereby her august confidence, which I so earnestly desire. May God preserve your Excellency many years. Manila, February 23, 1838. AndrÉs G. Camba. The most excellent, the Secretary, Office of Colonial Administration. Appendix XVI Communication from the Governor of Zamboanga to the Supreme Government of the Philippines relative to the treaty of Sir James Brooke with the Sultan of Sulu, together with other communications relating to the treaty, 184965 Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. Jolo, May 28th, 1849. Sr. Don Cayetano Figueroa,
Zamboanga. Dear Sir:—I think proper to inform you that yesterday, at three o’clock in the afternoon, the English war steamer “Nemesis” cast anchor at this port, coming from Singapore. She brought on board Sir James Brooke, commissioned to make a treaty of peace and friendship between Great Britain and the Sultan. This treaty was presented to the Sultan to-day in the presence of the Datus and a majority of the people, and after being read in a loud voice it was immediately approved and ratified. I do not think it necessary to inform you as to the tenor of said treaty, as Mr. Brooke has told me that he would go from here to your city for the purpose of communicating to you everything regarding this matter so that you will be thoroughly acquainted with all the details. I understand that they have hastened this matter in view of the recent advices concerning the destruction of Bali by the Dutch troops and their declared intention of taking possession of the entire coast of North Borneo, Sulu, and all its dependencies. In letters received from my partner at Singapore he tells me that it is certain they are coming, and with a large force, but it may be not for a month or two. The people here, in view of this news, have carried everything they have to the interior, and are ready, whenever the Dutch arrive, to leave the town. We shall see where these things will stop. Possibly we shall have another case like that of the French before you leave Zamboanga. Whatever you may decide to do when you receive this communication, you know that my services are always at your disposal, and in the event of your determining to come, there is a house here at your disposition; and I promise you a friendly reception on the part of the residents. It is my opinion they are in such a fright that they do not know what to do and business, of course, is entirely neglected. My brother-in-law, who is the bearer of this, will inform you in regard to what is going on. He goes to your town to purchase rice for our house, to provide against a siege; for rice is dear and scarce here. I remain, your obedient servant, who kisses your hand.—Guillermo Windham.
Batavia, March 20, 1849.—It appears that the expedition against Jolo is a matter fully determined upon. It is said that two steamers, two frigates, and a corvette, operating at the present time against Bali, are in readiness to set sail the first part of July. I expect that the publishers of the Singapore paper will publish an article entitled, “Labuan, Sarawak, the northeast coast of Borneo and the Sultan of Sulu,” by Baron Hoeveel, published in Holland in the first number of the “Journal for Netherlands India,” during the month of January last, in which he informs his compatriots that if the Government of Java had followed the counsels of Resident Gronovius of Sambas in 1831 or those of Resident Bloem of Sambas in 1838, they would long ago have had treaties with the Sultan of Bruney which would have closed Sarawak and the northern coast to all flags except the Dutch, and that the questions with the English Government would not have arisen, but that now it is not worth while to discuss it with the court of St. James. England is in possession, and she will stay in possession if she considers it to her advantage. He tells them to be on their guard, because if they do not have a care the English will make another move; and he indicates the point which calls for immediate and indispensable protection, namely, the northeast coast of Borneo: that is to say, from Sampan Manjee Point to the Cape of Kamongan (the Straits of Makassar), which he says are tributary to the Sultan of Sulu. He gives information concerning the different stations for the principal departments: Malsedu (or Kinabalu), Manjedore and Tiroen, designating the bay of Sandakan for the first establishment, as soon as they have taken possession of this side. He enumerates the products of this part of the world: the pearls, the diamonds, the iron and gold mines, the birds’-nests, the trepang, etc.; so that he has strongly influenced the minds of the Dutch. And he concludes by stating that in the next article of his paper he will discuss the Sultan’s possession in relation to the government of the Dutch Indies, offering some suggestions as to how his countrymen may avail themselves of the advantages of this rich territory. It is a truly interesting article and appears to me no less curious than reasonable. The editor of the Journal of the Eastern Archipelago will do a good service to his countrymen by making a translation of it, but it must be done very soon. I am too busy to write a paper of such length, otherwise it would have given me pleasure to send you one for your own use. I reiterate the necessity for despatch, for I really believe that the Dutch government will work for its own interests in accordance with the plans which the Baron has marked out. The English will not relish the idea of their oriental Government sleeping and permitting the Sultan to make, under coercion, a treaty such as must be made in order to forward the plans of Van Hoeveel. The vessels of the King of the Low Countries, the “Prince of Orange,” “Sambi,” and “Argo,” with five others, set sail on the 15th of this month, transporting 1,800 men in the direction of Bali. Afterwards they are to carry to Surabaya, on the 25th proximo, 5,000 men more, besides from 2,500 to 3,000 coolies, 12 cannon, 2 mortars, etc., etc. Receive, etc. These are notices taken from a letter to hand, from a trustworthy person in Singapore.—Figueroa.
Military and Civil Government, Plaza de Zamboanga.—No. 101.—Department of Government.—Excellent Sir:—Notwithstanding the fact that the lieutenant governor of this province informs me that he transcribed and forwarded to your Excellency, while he was in charge of the civil government during my absence in Malusu, the letter which Mr. William Windham, a merchant of Jolo, sent me under date of May 28th, it seems to me well to send the original to your Excellency, which I now do, retaining a copy of it for the purpose of reference at any time. As your Excellency may note if he will compare its contents with the text of the treaty of the 29th of the same month of May, made with the Sultan of Sulu by the English Consul-General to Borneo, Sir James Brooke, there is, between the terms of the former and the spirit of Article 7 of the latter, a notable lack of agreement; wherefore it has not seemed to me well to place entire confidence in the offer of Windham, who may be suspected of partiality, and I have concluded, therefore, to move in such a delicate matter with all possible tact and foresight and in accordance with developments, which may become extremely complicated. Considering the great interest which the agents of the English Government show in these questions concerning Sulu and the part of Borneo subject to the Sultan, I immediately suspected that the announcement of the imminent arrival of a considerable Dutch force in the archipelago was only a strategem to obtain, through surprise and fear, the realization of the agreement or treaty referred to; but it having been possible for me to secure fresh data through a different channel, confirming those which Windham furnished me,—which latter I obtained through Mr. Brooke and the captain of the “Nemesis,” and herewith transmit to your Excellency,—I am of the opinion now that the expedition of the Dutch to Jolo is an enterprise fully determined upon, although it may very well be delayed or postponed by fortuitous circumstances difficult to foresee. In the event of the appearance of the Dutch expedition, I shall never believe that it is with the object of confining its field of action to punishing the place of residence of the Sultan in a more thorough manner than was done in the attempt made in April of last year; but that they intend to conquer and occupy the Island and its dependencies. If this should be so, I am equally of the opinion that the Government of your Excellency, notwithstanding its conspicuous firmness and well-known energy, will not succeed in getting them to recede from their purpose, as everything goes to show they have determined to carry it out in the face—most assuredly—of our known and declared rights and claims to the rule of that land. I venture, therefore, to believe that the only way to prevent the serious detriment which would result to this colony, under the wise and worthy government of your Excellency, from the occupation of Sulu, avoiding at the same time a conflict between the Spanish and Dutch Governments, respectively, would be, by means of persuasion and by taking advantage of the state of extreme alarm now existing in Sulu, to anticipate them by a recognition of the sovereignty of Spain, floating our national flag under guaranties which would make impossible (without manifest violence) this proposed unprecedented aggression. I am convinced that besides flying the national flag and having the sovereignty of Spain recognized in a formal manner, the principal guaranty must be—and I shall require it unconditionally—that they shall agree to let us garrison with Spanish troops the principal fort of Sulu, the residence of the Sultan. To this end I have decided to embark in the pilot boat “Pasig” and make my way to Jolo without delay, where, if I do not obtain the results which I have here set forth, it will certainly not be through lack of zeal and activity, but through encountering obstacles beyond my control or influence, and owing to difficulties incident to the temperament of those people and the ancient prejudices which, owing to a series of events stretching through centuries, they feel towards us, as is only too well known to your Excellency. To aid me in these operations and to meet possible contingencies—since there will be needed there, in case of success, an expert and trustworthy officer—and to carry out reconnaissances and make plans which cannot fail to be always of the greatest usefulness to the government at Manila, I shall invite the chief of engineers of this place, Don Emilio Bernaldez, to accompany me, if the exigencies of the service do not demand his presence here and at Pasanhan. All of which I have the honor to lay before your Excellency in the hope that it may merit your entire approval. May God preserve your Excellency many years. Zamboanga, June 8, 1849. Cayetano Figueroa. His high Excellency the Governor and Captain-General of these Philippine Islands. Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. Zamboanga, June 5th, 1849.—Mr. Consul-General:—I have the honor to inform you that from notices received from Jolo, it has come to my knowledge that during your stay there with the steamer “Nemesis” you negotiated a commercial treaty with the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun; and as I am entirely ignorant of its essential clauses, and as my Government has for a long time past, and especially of late, been in possession or enjoyment through solemn treaties, the first made with the Malay chiefs, masters of the coasts of Sulu, of the right that our commercial flag be at least as privileged as any other; and in view of the indisputable rights which Spain has to the territory in question, rights not merely of prescription; I have the honor to request, in view of the close friendship which unites our respective Governments and which I honor myself in maintaining, that you have the kindness to give me, officially, knowledge of the said treaty and a copy thereof in order that I may forward it to the most excellent, the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands, without prejudice to my making before you, if the spirit of any of these articles so requires, the remonstrances that may be necessary to uphold the rights of Spain.—Receive, Mr. Consul-General, the assurance of my consideration, etc. C. de Figueroa. To Sir James Brooke,
Consul-General of her Britannic Majesty in Borneo and Governor of Labuan.
H. M. S. “Nemesis,” June 3rd, 1849.—Sir:—I have the honor to reply to your communication of this date; and as the quickest way to furnish your Excellency with the information desired, I enclose herewith a copy of the agreement recently made with the Government of Sulu. It would be unprofitable to discuss at this time the rights of Spain to which you make allusion, and the interests of Great Britain, which are involved, but as the best means of preserving the cordial relations which should always exist between the public servants of our respective governments, I propose to forward our present correspondence to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of her Britannic Majesty. Nevertheless, permit me to say that my opinion is that the interests of Spain and of Great Britain in these seas should be considered entirely harmonious and equally opposed to any system of oppression or of monopoly.—I have the honor to be, with the greatest consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant. Brooke,
Commissioner and Consul-General. To His Excellency
C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga. Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, desirous of encouraging commerce between her subjects and those of the independent princes in the Eastern seas, and of putting an end to the piracy which has up to this time hindered said commerce: and his Highness the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun who occupies the throne and governs the territories of Sulu, animated by like sentiments and desirous of co-operating in the measures which may be necessary for the achievement of the objects mentioned; have resolved to place on record their determination on these points by an agreement which contains the following articles: Article 1. From now on there shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and his Highness Mohammed Pulalun, Sultan of Sulu, and between their respective heirs and successors, and between their subjects. Article 2. The subjects of her Britannic Majesty shall have complete liberty to enter, reside, carry on business, and pass with their merchandise through all parts of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu, and they shall enjoy in them all the privileges and advantages with respect to commerce or in connection with any other matter whatever which are at this time enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to, the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation; and the subjects of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu shall likewise be free to enter, reside, carry on business, and pass with their merchandise to all parts of the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, in Europe as well as in Asia, as freely as the subjects of the most favored nation, and they shall enjoy in said dominions all the privileges and advantages with respect to commerce and in connection with other matters which are now enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to, the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation. Article 3. British subjects shall be permitted to buy, lease, or acquire in any lawful way whatever all kinds of property within the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Sulu; and his Highness extends, as far as lies within his power, to every British subject who establishes himself in his dominions, the enjoyment of entire and complete protection and security to person and to property—as well any property which in the future may be acquired, as that which has already been acquired prior to the date of this agreement. Article 4. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu offers to allow the war vessels of her Britannic Majesty and those of the India Company to enter freely the ports, rivers, and inlets situated within his dominions and to permit said vessels to supply themselves, at reasonable prices, with the goods and provisions which they may need from time to time. Article 5. If any English vessel should be lost on the coasts of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu the latter promises to lend every aid in his power for the recovery and delivery to the owners of everything than can be saved from said vessels; and his Highness also promises to give entire protection to the officers and crew and to every person who may be aboard the shipwrecked vessel, as well as to their property. Article 6. Therefore, her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Sultan of Sulu, bind themselves to adopt such measures as lie within their power to suppress piracy within the seas, islands, and rivers under their respective jurisdiction or influence, and his Highness the Sultan of Sulu binds himself not to harbor or protect any person or vessel engaged in enterprises of a piratical nature. Article 7. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu, for the purpose of avoiding in the future any occasion for disagreement, promises to make no cession of territory within his dominions to any other nation, nor to subjects or citizens thereof, nor to acknowledge vassalage or feudality to any other power without the consent of her Britannic Majesty. Article 8. This treaty must be ratified, and the ratifications will therefore be exchanged in Jolo within two years from date. Home Copy.—Brooke.—Approved, etc.—Signed and sealed May 29, 1849.
Zamboanga, June 5, 1849.—Mr. Consul-General:—I have received the letter which you have done me the honor to send under date of the day before yesterday in reply to mine, and I acknowledge receipt of copy of the treaty which you negotiated with his Highness the Sultan of Sulu on the 29th May last. I have no remarks to make, Mr. Consul-General, with respect to the first six articles of the treaty, for the clauses they contain are not of such an urgent character that my Government cannot postpone their discussion if it so deems advisable; but I might perhaps create in the future serious embarrassment to our respective Governments should I allow Article 7 to pass unnoticed. It establishes two principles of the most vital importance: (1st) His Highness the Sultan binds himself to recognize the sovereignty of no power without previously notifying her Britannic Majesty; and (2nd) to make, likewise, no cession of the least portion of the territory of his dominions to any State, person or corporation. With relation to the first point, and waiving for the moment the question whether, because the Sultan is in possession, with slight exceptions, of the coast of Sulu, this island must be regarded as his exclusive domain, it is my duty, Mr. Consul-General, to inform you that for a long time past the said Sultan of Sulu has admitted and acknowledged himself to be under the protection of her Catholic Majesty, recognizing the sovereignty of Spain in a public way and in official documents which his Excellency the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands will be able to produce at the proper time and place. As regards the second point: I find no objection to the pledge of his Highness having all the force of free right with respect to those parts of his dominions lying outside of the island of Sulu, namely, the north and northeast part of Borneo, now under the rule of the Sultan; but under no circumstances with respect to the said island of Sulu and its neighboring islands; for not only can Spain not recognize in any power the right to intervene in the matter of ceding or not ceding the island of Sulu and its surrounding islands, as it is claimed can be done according to the terms of Article 7 of the Treaty; but Spain does not recognize this right even in the Sultan and Datus of Sulu, because, as I have had the honor to inform you, Mr. Consul-General, these territories belong to Spain, by a right not prescribed, by a right in no way established by the conquest of this archipelago, but positively through the willing submission of the real natives, the Gimbahans, who do now, and who at the end of the 17th century did, constitute the most numerous portion of its population, whose oppressors were then and are now the Sultan and Datus, Malay Mussulmans. At this very time the chief of the Gimbahans, this unfortunate and enslaved race, cherishes with respect and veneration his loving remembrance of Spain and holds in his possession the proofs of what I assert. This fact established, Mr. Consul-General, I am forcibly constrained to protest, which I accordingly do, against every claim in its favor by your nation on the terms of the said Article 7 of the treaty referred to of May 29th of the present year, since it prejudices the incontestable and recognized rights of the crown of Spain to the sovereignty of the territory of the island of Sulu and its surrounding islands, and to its sovereignty over the present possessors of the coasts of this archipelago, begging that you will kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter in order to cover my responsibility to my Government. Receive, again, Mr. Consul-General, the assurances, etc. C. de Figueroa. To Sir James Brooke,
Consul-General for her Britannic Majesty in Borneo and Governor of Labuan.
H. M. S. “Nemesis,” June 5, 1849.—Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication; and as the matter in question will probably have to be discussed between our respective Governments, I think it better not to take up the objections raised by you in connection with Article 7 of the treaty recently negotiated with his Highness the Sultan of Sulu. I have the honor to be, with great consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant. Brooke,
Commissioner and Consul-General. To His Excellency,
Col. C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga.
Military and Civil Government, Town of Zamboanga, No. 100, Government Department.—Most Excellent Sir:—On reËmbarking at Malusu, March 31st last, returning from the operations which I had conducted against the same on that same day, following instructions received from your office in a communication of the 17th of the said month of May, the result of which I reported to the most Excellent the Captain-General in an official letter of the 2nd instant, No. 209, the war vessel of the English East India Company, the “Nemesis” was sighted and soon afterwards cast anchor in our vicinity. Aboard the vessel was Sir James Brooke, Consul-General for his country in Borneo and Governor of Labuan; and as a result of a long conference I had with the latter gentleman in regard to recent events in Sulu—which conference it was agreed to continue in this place immediately upon my arrival here—I gave him, successively, the two communications of which I attach copies; with them I send to your Excellency letters dated the 3rd and 5th instant replying to mine in terms that your Excellency will see embodied in the two original letters of corresponding dates, which I likewise enclose herewith, retaining copies of them, as also an authorized copy of the treaty or agreement of the 29th of last May, also enclosed; feeling confident that the indulgence of your Excellency will approve my action in this delicate matter. May God preserve your Excellency many years. Zamboanga, June 6th, 1849. Cayetano Figueroa. The most Excellent, The Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. Copies.—JosÉ MarÍa PeÑaranda: (his flourish). Appendix XVII Communication from the Supreme Government of the Philippines to the Secretary of State, relative to the treaty of Sir James Brooke with the Sultan of Sulu; August 16, 184966 Office of the Captain-General and Governor of the Philippines. To his Excellency, The Secretary of State and of the Office of GobernaciÓn of the Kingdom, I have the honor to state the following, on this date, and under No. 499. By the communications which I had the honor to send your Excellency from Zamboanga on the 23rd of June and 4th of July last, and that of the General second in command, No. 482, your Excellency must have been informed of the treaty which has been made in Jolo by the Englishman Sir James Brooke, of the answer of the Governor of Zamboanga to the latter and his negotiation with the Sultan and Datus to have the treaty left without effect, without obtaining the least satisfaction. It will therefore be necessary that the question be settled between the two Cabinets, and I believe that Holland will take our part, as she has an illfeeling against England on account of the latter’s usurpations in Borneo, contrary to the spirit of the treaty of March 17, 1824, between the two countries, and must fear to see her rich possessions surrounded by those of so powerful a rival. The communications of her Majesty’s Consul in Singapore and his confidential correspondence with the Governor-General of Java, which he has forwarded to the Secretary of State, show that the Dutch Government wishes to maintain the most friendly relations with Spain. Although the English press in Singapore and Hong-Kong are still speaking of a Dutch expedition against Jolo, nothing has been done hitherto, and the favorable season for such an expedition has passed. As the correspondence between Brooke and the Governor of Zamboanga will probably play an important part in the future correspondence with the British Government, I believe it is my duty to submit a few remarks in regard to the action taken by the said Governor. Notwithstanding that the objections, which he submitted to Brooke in regard to Article 7 of the treaty, were well founded, he ought not to have entered upon such a discussion, and much less to have particularized it in such a way: he ought to have protested against the treaty as a whole, and to have declared it null, as made without the consent of Spain, which holds not only a protectorate, but sovereignty or dominion over the territory. The second defect that I find in the same letter to Brooke, is his basing our right to the sovereignty over Sulu on the “free submission of the true natives of the Gimbahan race, who live in the interior of the island and are oppressed by the Sultan and the Datus.” Although there is some truth in that statement, and we might take advantage of this element in case of a war with the Sultan, I believe that it ought not to have been made under the present circumstances, as, on the same principle, we would invalidate the rights founded by us on the different treaties made by Spain with the Sultan and Datus of Sulu. The acknowledgment made by the latter of the sovereignty of Spain during over two centuries and more especially in the treaties of 1646, 1737 and 1836, by the first of which they pledge themselves to pay, as vassals, a tribute of three boatloads of rice, as recorded in the Archives, is a powerful argument in favor of our rights, which the Sultan has often confirmed in his communications to this Government and in the passports which he gives his subjects, on printed forms supplied by my predecessor;—I enclose herewith a copy of one of said passports. The British, who doubtless do not feel very certain about their rights, try to excuse their conduct through the press, as they did when they occupied Labuan by force. The Singapore Free Press of the 6th of July published an article in which it alleges, for the purpose of proving that Sulu has always been considered as a sovereign independent power, that we said nothing to England when she accepted the cession of the island of Balambangan, between Borneo and Palawan. Even supposing the fact to be true, there would be nothing astonishing about it, considering the distress and the lack of means of the Government at that time, after the war which, but a few years before, it had miraculously carried on against the English who held Manila and many other places in the islands, and the work it had to do in order to put down interior rebellions, to reorganize the administration and to reËstablish normal conditions in the provinces which had been left uncontrolled during four years and had suffered the consequences of circumstances so unfortunate. Furthermore, the cession of Balambangan cannot be considered as an act of free will on the part of the Sulus, since they took advantage of the first opportunity to drive the British off the island, when they had hardly started to firmly establish their trading posts. The newspaper also mentions the doctrine of Walter, which says that an agreement similar to that existing between the Spanish and Sulu Governments does not entirely derogate the sovereignty of the protected state, which can make treaties and contract alliances, except when it has expressly renounced its right to do so; and that if the first state fails to protect the other, the treaty is invalidated; the author of the article adds that this is our case, since we allowed the Dutch to attack Sulu without interfering, or, as far as known, requiring a reparation or the assurance that such an attack would not be renewed. With regard to the first point, the reference to Walter is correct, but Walter adds in the same paragraph that “the protected nation is bound forever by the treaty of protection, so that it can undertake no engagements which would be contrary to said treaty, that is to say, that would violate any of the express conditions of the protectorate, or be inconsistent with any treaty of the said class:” how then could Article 7 of the treaty made by Brooke be valid, when by said article the Sultan pledges himself to recognize the sovereignty of no power without the previous consent of her Britannic Majesty, and not to cede the smallest part of the territory of his dominions to any state, person or corporation, said Sultan having already recognized the sovereignty of Spain and the rights of the latter over the greater part of his territory, in which the island of Palawan, which was ceded to us in the last century by the kings of Bruney is included by mistake. In regard to the second point, the author of the article is also in the wrong: for this Government was neither aware of the intentions of the Dutch, nor was its assistance requested by the Sultan; and your Excellency knows in what terms I wrote to the Governor-General of Java about that matter.—If I have given so many details, despite their not being new to your Excellency it is because the article of the Singapore Free Press may have been inspired by the British Government, and deserves therefore not to be left unnoticed. In the event of which I am writing, your Excellency will see the fulfilment of my predictions, and it may perhaps be only the prelude of events of still greater importance. Thus I cannot but earnestly recommend to your Excellency’s notice the necessity that the Governor of the Philippines have very detailed instructions or very ample powers to proceed as regards the Southern regions in accordance with what he believes best suited to her Majesty’s interests and to the security of these rich possessions. In this connection I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency such action as our Sovereign the Queen may deem most wise on my communication (consulta) number 359 and others relative to the same subject. Perhaps, as I mentioned in my communication of the 4th of July last, the only advantageous issue for us would be to send a strong expedition and to occupy Jolo, our action being warranted by the piratical acts committed by several small boats of Bwal, Sulu; the Dutch may avail themselves of the same excuse and send an expedition before us, if, as is possible, other pancos67 [Moro boats] have gone south for the same purpose; but anyhow the behavior of the Sultan and Datus of Sulu would give us excellent reasons for taking action against them at any time. God keep your Excellency many years. Manila, August 16, 1849. The Count of Manila. His Excellency, the Secretary of State and “GobernaciÓn.” General Government of the Philippines,
Treasury Department,
Manila, February 24th, 1877. In view of the communications of the politico-military governor of Sulu of October 6th of last year, in which he suggests to this general government the concession of various exemptions in favor of the natives of these islands and of any Chinamen who shall establish themselves in the said place, to the end that by this means there may be promoted the immigration which the interests of that island demand: In view of the reports issued in the premises by the central administration of imposts, the office of the insular auditor,69 and the insular departments of civil administration and the treasury: and Deeming it expedient, for the realization of the high purposes that required the military occupation of Jolo and for the progressive and efficacious development of the moral and material interests of this young colony, that there should be granted certain exemptions for the encouragement of the immigration thereto of the greatest possible number of inhabitants: this office of the general government in conformity with the suggestions made by the treasury department, and in accordance with the statements made by the department of civil administration, disposes the following: 1. All immigrants to the island of Sulu, of whatever class, race, or nationality, who shall establish themselves definitively in the same, engaging in agricultural, industrial, or commercial pursuits, or in any art, trade, or occupation, shall be exempt during ten years from all the contributions or taxes imposed, or which in the future may be imposed, upon the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago. 2. The children of immigrants to Sulu, born in said island or who establish themselves there before becoming taxpayers in the pueblos of their birth, shall commence to pay taxes at the age of twenty-five years, but shall be exempt from military service so long as they reside in the said island. This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and communicated to the council of administration, the office of the captain-general, and the insular department of civil administration; and shall be returned to the treasury department for such further action as may be proper. Malcampo. General Government of the Philippines,
Treasury Department,
Manila, August 10, 1887. In view of the investigation conducted by the intendant-general of the treasury with the object of determining whether it would be expedient to prolong the term of exemption from all kinds of taxes and imposts in favor of natives and of immigrants of whatever race or nationality who are established, or who shall establish themselves, in Sulu for the purpose of engaging in any kind of industry, commerce, profession, art, or trade, or in agriculture: In view of the reports issued by the said directive bureau of the treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu: And considering that exemption from all burdens constitutes one of the most efficacious means of encouraging the immigration demanded by the interest of the archipelago in question; this general government, in conformity with the suggestions made by the office of the intendant of the treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu, disposes that the term of exemption granted by superior decree of this general government of February 24th, 1877, shall be understood as extended for another term of ten years, the said extension to be reckoned from the day following that on which the first term expires, that is, from the 25th day of February of the current year. This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette; the Government of his Majesty shall be informed thereof and a copy of the records transmitted; it shall be communicated to the council of administration, the tribunal of accounts, the office of the Captain-General, and the insular department of civil administration; and shall be returned to the office of the intendant of the treasury for any further action that may be proper. Terrero. Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines. Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: The politico-military governor of Sulu, in a communication dated the 9th instant, states as follows: Most excellent Sir: As the time expiration of the exemptions granted to Sulu and its port by decree of the general government under the able direction of your Excellency, dated February 24th, 1877, and extended by superior order issued from the same office for another term of ten years, on August 23rd, 1887, is drawing near, the person who has the honor to sign hereunder believes that the moment has come to call the attention of your Excellency to the matter, and he takes the liberty to set down some remarks in the premises, to the end that when your Excellency determines what is deemed most expedient, they may be taken under advisement. In the exemptions granted to Sulu, it must be borne in mind that they affect two distinct elements, which constitute the life and favor the development of this locality. Some have reference to the exemption from all taxes, tributes, and gabels imposed, or to be imposed, in favor of natives or foreigners taking up their abode in the Sulu archipelago. Others refer exclusively to the declaration of a free port, with exemption from all taxes and customs formalities in favor of the capital of the island. In treating this question and in considering what ought to be done in the future, when the moment arrives for determining whether a fresh extension is expedient, or whether, on the contrary, this territory must enter upon the normal administrative life general in other localities of the Philippine Archipelago, the subject must be dealt with under the two aspects above set forth. In regard to the declaration of freedom of the port granted to Jolo, it is undoubtedly expedient to continue it for the present without change. So long as the protocol entered into with the other nations who are parties thereto, continues in force—in which protocol our incontestable right of sovereignty over this archipelago, with the limitations therein stipulated, is declared—it would be highly impolitic to close the period of franchise granted to this port. Should there be established the embarrassing obstacles and difficulties to commerce entailed by the formalities of customs regulations, the English steamers which now carry on the trade with Singapore, would immediately cease to visit this port and would make their destination some other port of the island, where, under the provisions of the protocol above referred to, no one could lawfully obstruct them until after the effective occupation of the new port selected for trading operations, and until after having allowed to elapse the requisite time subsequent to publishing this resolution in the official papers of the Peninsula. The distinguished intelligence of your Excellency will perceive easily that after this had been repeated several times, we should find ourselves compelled either to occupy effectively all the islands of the Sulu archipelago where English steamers might attempt to establish their business, or, in the end, to allow them to carry on their commercial operations at any place that suited them, which, without doubt, would be much more prejudicial than what happens at the present time; for, at any rate, so long as steamers come exclusively to this port or to that of Siasi, as is the case at present, the trade can be watched easily and conveniently and without the commercial operations which are carried on giving rise to diplomatic questions; it is easy, also to prevent the traffic of arms and war supplies, which would not be the case if they touched at other points where our sphere of action is not so direct and effective. Furthermore, the advantages of the present situation must also be taken into account. So long as these steamers touch only at Jolo and Siasi, as happens now, these two points are the only markets, whither all the people of the archipelago must necessarily go to trade, not only to supply themselves with the effects which they import and are necessary to life, but also to sell all the products they gather in their fields and in the seas, which constitute the element of commerce that justifies English vessels in visiting these regions, making it possible to collect sufficient freight to maintain the two regular lines now established. It is obvious that, since we are masters of the towns of Jolo and Siasi—the only points of distribution for effects necessary to the life of the natives here—we can, when we consider it expedient, prevent the sale of these effects to the villages hostile to the city, a most momentous advantage resulting therefrom and a means of government of inestimable value. So long as the Moros have to supply themselves from these markets, our importance is incontestable; all their outbreaks are easily checked without appeal to violent methods; and the civilizing effect which results from the constant intercourse which is necessitated by their coming to the occupied ports, is extended, thereby modifying the sanguinary and turbulent habits of this race. If the revenues from the duties which would be imposed were of sufficient importance to cover the expenses entailed by the occupation of Sulu, the arguments supporting the opinion above expressed could easily be set aside. But unfortunately there can not be expected from the custom house of Jolo, in the event of its establishment, even the expenses necessary to cover the salaries of the personnel engaged therein. For, the foreign steamers which now visit this port would immediately discontinue their voyages, and even though it were possible to prevent them from making port at some other place for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile operations—a thing which would not be easy so long as the treaty is in force—what would happen? Why, that the trade would be continued by means of smaller boats which would come from Borneo, and it would not be feasible to prevent this except by the posting of a very large number of coastguards along the shores of the innumerable islands of Sulu, a method which it would be altogether impossible to adopt. It is, therefore, unquestionably expedient to maintain the present status, whether the matter be considered under its economic aspect or under that of the policy it is necessary to develop in this territory. A very different course must, in the opinion of the undersigned, be followed in the matter of the exemption from taxation granted to the inhabitants of Sulu. These exists here a numerous Chinese colony, which is the element that really enjoys the benefit of the advantages flowing from the present free-port conditions, and it is neither just nor equitable that, while the Chinese find in us the support and protection which enable them to carry on and develop the trade in which they alone engage, they should not contribute in any way towards the expenses of the Government which furnishes them so many advantages. It is, therefore, expedient to impose upon all Chinaman residing in the Sulu territory the obligation to pay the same taxes as are paid by those of the same race in other parts of the Philippines. The establishment of this system promises not only the profit of the sums which would be collected as a consequence thereof, but also the desideratum of introducing order into the anarchical manner of life obtaining among the Chinese here. As soon as the obligation to pay taxes is imposed upon all and the lists of tax-payers are made up, individual interest will see to it that all persons living in the country are included therein; for it is unquestionable that, since each desires to be placed under the same conditions as the other, the Chinamen themselves will be of very great assistance in discovering those who now are not included in the incomplete and untrustworthy census lists existing in the offices of the Government of Sulu. It is believed, then, that it is expedient and just to discontinue the franchise now enjoyed by the Chinese here, and that they should begin to contribute at once towards defraying the expenses of the treasury, paying at least as much as is paid by their countrymen in other parts of the Philippines. It would appear also equitable that the Indians residing here should also begin to pay the cÉdulas70 of the class to which they respectively belong; but there must be borne in mind the limited number of individuals of this race residing here; the expediency of encouraging by this means the immigration of fresh residents; and, above all, the services they render in any case of alarm, whether caused by juramentados or by more serious aggressions attempted against the city; all of which circumstances make it proper that they should continue enjoying the exemption from the payment of poll-tax which they now enjoy, as also exemption from all the other taxes upon the insignificant industries from which they gain a subsistence. The treasury could not hope for any happy results in this direction; and, on the other hand, if such a tax were imposed, the place would, in a very short time, be left entirely without any civilian population; for only with difficulty, and thanks to the franchises, can persons be found who will face the constant danger in which residents in Jolo are placed—especially those who engage in the cultivation of the soil in the outskirts of the town; of which class the civilian population is, in a very large majority, composed. It remains, only, most excellent Sir, to discuss the expediency, or otherwise, of establishing taxation upon commerce, industry, and property. All the urban property of Jolo is in the hands of the Chinese, with so few exceptions that there are not more than three property holders who do not belong to that race. In their hands is all the commerce, with the sole exception of two Spanish houses: every thing relating to business is in their power; so that any burden imposed in this direction would not be borne by them, but would be paid by the garrison of Jolo. For, united as the Chinamen are in every thing that relates to the avoidance of tax-paying, they would come to a perfect understanding to surtax every thing,—not in the same proportion as the contributions they would pay, but with a considerable increase, with the result that the only tax-payer to the treasury and for the Chinaman would be the unfortunate inhabitant of Jolo. And since the population here consists almost entirely of the garrison, which renders such arduous services at this place, I believe that it would not be just to add to the other disadvantages that the service here offers, the very serious one that would result from the imposition of taxes in this capital. Furthermore, one must not lose sight of what might happen or rather what would immediately happen, when, by taxing the commerce of the city, the majority of the Chinamen now established here would go to Maymbung, with a tendency to store their merchandise at other important points in the island, in which places our rule is, it may be said, nominal, and it is unnecessary to insist upon the undesirable consequences that would follow; for we should return to the condition in which Maymbung stood in April of the year 1887, when this town was a very important center of resistence to our rule, due to the facility afforded in that place for the purchase of unlimited arms and ammunition, a business carried on by the foreign steamers who anchored there at that time. And all this without taking into account the undesirability, from a political point of view, of affording the Moros the opportunity of purchasing their supplies at prices lower than those in this city; since, if the merchants in that town did not pay taxes they would be able to sell at lower prices than those in the capital. Summing up what I have stated above and recapitulating the questions herein treated, I will conclude by submitting to the distinguished intelligence of your Excellency that I consider necessary and of the highest political expediency the maintenance of the freedom of the port granted to Jolo; that this franchise should be extended to Siasi, which enjoys this privilege in fact though not by right; and that care should be taken to prevent the slightest obstacle from interfering with the trade at both points, to the end that foreign steamers may, in their own interest, touch only at these two points of the archipelago of Sulu; that the Chinamen should be formed into guilds or associations, after the pattern of the organizations prevailing in other parts of the Philippines, these being necessary, further, to the making up of the lists of tax-payers; that, as a consequence of the formation of these associations, they should be compelled to pay taxes to the same extent as all other Chinamen residing in the country, unless your Excellency is of the opinion that the quota should be increased in consideration of the other advantages they enjoy; that there should be imposed a tax upon smokers of opium and upon the importation thereof. This tax would be a source of revenue of some consideration if it were farmed, as was the intention four years ago, when sale to the highest bidder was desisted from in view of the decree of franchises which is the subject of this communication. Finally, that property, commerce, and industries should not be taxed, nor should the civilian population be burdened with the poll-tax, since the latter deserve consideration by reason of the arduous services they render in this place; and this applies to the garrison, as well as to the civilians who make up the town, who, in the end, would be the persons who alone would have to bear these burdens. Such, most excellent Sir, is the opinion, expressed as succinctly as possible, of the undersigned in regard to these matters, which, at no distant date, will present themselves for resolution and which your Excellency will determine with your well-known ability and good judgment. Which I have the pleasure to transmit to your most Illustrious Excellency, to the end that you may take note of the part relating to the economic side of this question. God preserve your most illustrious Excellency for many years. Manila, July 31st, 1896. Blanco. To the most excellent and most illustrious the Intendant-General of the Treasury. Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury Division of Direct Imposts Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: The just considerations set forth by the politico-military governor of Sulu in a communication addressed to his high Excellency the Governor-General of these islands on July 9th of last year, forwarded to your most illustrious Lordship on the 31st of the same month and year, reveal a close study of the questions treated, based upon practice and experience. The chief of the division of direct imposts, who signs hereunder, in presenting the report ordered by your most illustrious Lordship in your decree of the first day of the following August, must begin by expressing at once his conformity with the views given by the governor of Sulu, in the part relating to this division. Undoubtedly considerations of the highest political moment led the high authorities of the Archipelago, on August 23rd of 1887, to extend for another term of ten years the franchises granted to Sulu, and since these considerations have not ceased to be of moment, to judge from the enlightened views expressed by the said politico-military governor, it is to be presumed that it is expedient to grant a fresh concession of franchises; but not, at this time, for a period of time equal to that about to expire, though for a period that might well be half that of the previous term; for, regarding the matter prudently, it might happen that during this lapse of time the conditions in the places under discussion should alter in such a way as to counsel either the total suppression of the liberties in question or their partial modification. But if there are considerations in favor of this new concession, equity counsels that there be excluded therefrom the Chinese in so far as relates to the imposition of the poll-tax, since they control all the business and are the only persons who really exploit that region. Consequently, the chief of the division of direct imposts has the honor to report to your most illustrious Lordship: 1. That it be recommended to his high Excellency the Governor-General of these Islands, that, to take the place of the present franchises, there be granted again, at the proper time, to the ports of Jolo and Siasi, the exemption from the payment of all urban and industrial taxes in favor of the natives and of the Chinese established at those points. 2. That there be created at once the imposition of the poll-tax upon the Chinese. 3. That the natives and the civilian population be exempt from the payment of poll-tax. Your most illustrious Lordship will, however, determine whatever he deems most expedient. Manila, August 6th, 1897. Marcelino Pacheco. Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury Division of Indirect Imposts Most excellent and most illustrious Sir: In compliance with the decree which, under date of August 10 of the current year, your most illustrious Excellency saw fit to issue, to the effect that, in the shortest possible space of time the divisions of imposts should report upon the matters concerning each one in the proceedings set on foot by the politico-military governor of Sulu in regard to the expediency or the inexpediency of the renewal of the exemption from taxation enjoyed by the natives in that place, I have to state to your illustrious Excellency that: 1. The undersigned chief, fully agreeing with the enlightened views set forth by the governor of Sulu, believes that the maintenance of the declaration of freedom of the port granted to Jolo is of the highest political moment and that the franchise should be extended to Siasi. 2. That in regard to indirect imposts which are of such a nature that, while they are a source of profit to the state, they bring also no small benefit to the tax-payer, these should be made applicable to the Sulu archipelago, as undoubtedly has been the case, as a matter of fact, up to the present time in regard to the stamp and lottery revenues. 3. Both for the reasons set forth by the governor of Sulu as well as for these given by his predecessor on June 11, 1893, in favor of a tax upon opium smokers, the undersigned chief believes that it is not only just but a matter of the greatest necessity to continue the imposition of this tax. Your most illustrious Excellency will, however, order whatever he deems most expedient. Manila, September 10th, 1897. JosÉ GarcÉs de Marcilla. Office of the Intendant-General of the Treasury, Manila, December 28, 1897. Let the report of the Chamber of Commerce and of the administration of customs of Manila be heard, within one and the same period of five days. Dominguez. Appendix XIX The Protocol of Sulu, of 1877, between Spain, Germany, and Great Britain, May 30, 187771 General Government of the Philippines Royal Order Colonial office.—No. 281.—Excellent Sir: The Secretary of State sent the following communication to this office on the 26th of March last: By Royal order communicated by the Secretary of State and for such action as is indicated therein I deliver herewith to your Excellency a copy of the protocol signed on the 11th inst. by SeÑor Manuel Silvela, Secretary of State, and by the representatives of Great Britain and Germany, for the purpose of establishing the liberty of trade and commerce in the Sulu seas; said protocol takes effect on this date, as specified in Article 5 of the same.—Referred to your Excellency by Royal order with a copy of the protocol, for its execution.—God keep your Excellency many years. Madrid, April 2, 1877. Martin de Herrera.
The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. Manila, May 30, 1877.
The above order shall be executed, communicated and published.
Moriones. [Protocol referred to.] The Hon. Austin Henry Layard, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty; and Count Von Hatzfeldt, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, commissioned by their respective Governments to terminate the difficulties which have occurred in the Sulu seas and to establish for that purpose, in a final way, the liberty of commerce in those seas, acknowledged by the Secretary of State of Spain in the Notes which he sent on April 15, 1876, to the representatives of Great Britain and Germany; After having examined with due attention the preliminaries of the question and especially the negotiations formerly carried on between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany and that of Spain, have agreed to draw up the following Protocol: The Secretary of State of Spain, in the name of his Government, says: Considering the preliminary fact that the German ships “Marie Louise” and “Gazelle” were returned and an indemnity paid for their cargoes in 1873 and 1874, and that the German ship “Minna” was returned twice in 1875 and 1874; Duly appreciating the increasing requirements of navigation and commerce, and above all the legal status constituted by the Notes of the Spanish Secretary of State dated the 15th of April last and by the official publication of said Notes by the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, as also by the instructions given accordingly by said Governments to their consuls, agents and commanders of their naval forces; Therefore the Government of his Majesty the King of Spain recognizes that the merchant ships going to the Sulu archipelago can no longer be required to call first at Zamboanga, to pay the harbor dues there and to provide themselves with a navigation permit delivered at said port. It furthermore believes that it must acknowledge, as provided in the Notes of the 15th of April last, the complete liberty of direct trade and commerce for ships and subjects of Great Britain, the German Empire and the other powers, with the Sulu archipelago. Considering that the Governments of Great Britain and of Germany have maintained all their claims in regard to the liberty of navigation, commerce and direct trade with the Sulu archipelago and within the archipelago; that the Government of his Majesty the King of Spain admits that it cannot guarantee the security of commerce at unoccupied places of the archipelago in return for duties and dues paid, but will guarantee perfect security to the ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers at places occupied by said Government, and provide the establishments necessary for the protection of their trade, the Spanish Secretary of State remarks that there is no reason why said ships and subjects should be exempted, at places occupied by Spain, from the formalities, general regulations, and ordinary duties, whose nature will be explained in the present Protocol. The undersigned representatives of Great Britain and of Germany refer, on their part, to the Notes and official communications sent by them on this matter to the Spanish Government, and requesting the latter to acknowledge the absolute liberty of commerce and trade in all parts of the Sulu archipelago, said acknowledgment having been mentioned by the Spanish Government in the Notes of April 15, 1876. In consequence of what precedes and as the result of their conferences, the undersigned have agreed on the following declarations: I Commerce and direct trading by ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers are declared to be and shall be absolutely free with the Sulu archipelago and in all parts thereof, as well as the right of fishery, without prejudice to the rights recognized to Spain by the present Protocol, in conformity with the following declarations: II The Spanish authorities shall no longer require ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers, going freely to the archipelago of Sulu, or from one point to another within the Sulu waters, or from such a point to any other point in the world, to touch, before or after, at any specified place in the archipelago or elsewhere, to pay any duties whatsoever, or to get a permit from said authorities, which, on their side, shall refrain from obstructing or interfering in any way with the above mentioned trade. It is understood that the Spanish authorities shall in no way and under no pretense prevent the free importation and exportation of all sorts of goods, without exception, save at such places as are occupied, and in accordance with Declaration III, and that in all places not occupied effectively by Spain, neither the ships and subjects above mentioned nor their goods shall be liable to any tax, duty or payment whatsoever, or any sanitary or other regulation. III In the places occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu the Spanish Government shall be empowered to establish taxes and sanitary and other regulations, while said places are effectively occupied; but Spain pledges herself, on her part, to provide in such places the offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce and the application of said regulations. It is however expressly understood that the Spanish Government, while it is resolved to impose no restrictive regulations in the places occupied by it, pledges itself voluntarily not to establish in said places taxes or duties exceeding those provided in the Spanish tariffs or in the treaties or conventions between Spain and any other power. Neither shall it put into force in said places exceptional regulations applicable to the commerce and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers. In case Spain should occupy effectively other places in the archipelago of Sulu, and provide thereat the offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce, the Governments of Great Britain and Germany shall not object to the application of the rules already stipulated for places occupied at present. But, in order to avoid the possibility of new claims due to the uncertainty of business men in regard to the places which are occupied and subject to regulations and tariffs, the Spanish Government shall, whenever a place is occupied in the Sulu archipelago, communicate the fact to the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, and inform commerce at large by means of a notification which shall be published in the official journals of Madrid and Manila. In regard to the tariffs and regulations stipulated for places which are occupied at the present time, they shall only be applicable to the places which may be subsequently occupied by Spain six months after the date of publication in the Official Gazette of Madrid. It remains agreed that no ship or subject of Great Britain, Germany and other powers shall be required to call at one of the occupied places, when going to or from a place not occupied by Spain, and that they shall not be liable to suffer prejudice on that account or on account of any class of merchandise shipped to an unoccupied place in the archipelago. IV The three Governments represented by the undersigned pledge themselves respectively to publish the present declarations and to have them strictly respected by their representatives, consular agents and commanders of the naval forces in the seas of the Orient. V If the Governments of Great Britain and Germany do not refuse their adhesion to the present Protocol within 15 days from this date, or if they notify their acceptance before the expiration of said period, through their undersigned representatives, the present Declarations shall then come into force. Manuel Silva,
Secretary of State of His Majesty the King of Spain. Done at Madrid, the 11th of March, 1877. A true copy.—Madrid, April 2, 1877.—A true copy.—The Subsecretary,
Francisco Rubio. Appendix XX The Protocol of Sulu of 1885, between Spain, Germany, and Great Britain, March 7, 188572 General Government of the Philippines Royal Order Foreign Office.—No. 312.—Excellent Sir: The Secretary of State sends me the following communication on March 29th, 1885:—Excellent Sir: I have the honor to forward you a translated copy of the protocol between Spain, Germany and Great Britain, the latter two nations recognizing the sovereignty of the first over the archipelago of Sulu, signed in Madrid on the 7th of March, 1885.—I send you this communication by Royal order, and enclose a copy of the treaty referred to. God keep your Excellency many years.—Madrid, April 8, 1885.—Tejada. Manila, June 17, 1885.—To be executed and published in the Official Gazette. Terrero. A seal which says: Office of the Minister of State.—Translation.—The undersigned, his Excellency SeÑor JosÉ Elduayen, Marquis of Pazo de la Merced, Minister of State of his Majesty the King of Spain; His Excellency SeÑor Count Solms Sonnerwalds, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and His Excellency Sir Robert B. D. Morier, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty, authorized in due form to carry on the negotiations followed in London and Berlin during the years 1881 and 1882 by the representatives of his Majesty the King of Spain with the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, for the purpose of obtaining from these two powers the solemn recognition of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago of Sulu, have agreed on the following articles: I The Governments of Germany and Great Britain recognize the sovereignty of Spain over the parts which are effectively occupied as well as over those which are not yet occupied, of the archipelago of Sulu, whose limits are established in Article II. II As expressed in Article I of the treaty signed on September 23, 1836, between the Spanish Government and the Sultan of Sulu, the archipelago of Sulu includes all the islands between the western extremity of the island of Mindanao on one side and the mainland of Borneo and the island of Palawan on the other, except those mentioned in Article III. It is understood that the islands of Balabak and Kagayan Sulu belong to the archipelago. III The Spanish Government renounces, as far as regards the British Government, all claims of sovereignty over the territories of the mainland of Borneo which belong or may have belonged to the Sultan of Sulu, including the neighboring islands of Balambangan, Banguey, Malawati, and all those comprised within a zone of three maritime leagues from the coast, and which are part of the territories administered by the company known as “The British North Borneo Company.” IV The Spanish Government pledges itself to carry out in the archipelago of Sulu the stipulations contained in Articles I, II, and III of the protocol signed in Madrid on March 11, 1877, viz.: (1) Commerce and direct trading by ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers are declared to be and shall be absolutely free with the archipelago of Sulu and in all parts thereof, as well as the right of fishery, without prejudice to the rights recognized to Spain by the present Protocol, in conformity with the following declarations: (2) The Spanish authorities shall no longer require ships and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers, going freely to the archipelago of Sulu, or from one point to another point in the world, to touch, before or after, at any specified place in the archipelago or elsewhere, to pay any duties whatsoever, or to get a permit from said authorities, who, on their side, shall refrain from obstructing or interfering in any way with the above mentioned trade. It is understood that the Spanish authorities shall in no way and under no pretense prevent the free importation and exportation of all sorts of goods, without exception, save at such places as are occupied, and in accordance with Declaration 3, and that in all places not occupied effectively by Spain, neither the ships and subjects above mentioned nor their goods shall be subject to any tax, duty or payment whatsoever, or any sanitary or other regulation. (3) In the places occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu, the Spanish Government shall be empowered to establish taxes and sanitary and other regulations, while said places are effectively occupied; but Spain pledges herself, on her part, to provide in such places the offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce and the application of said regulations. It is however expressly understood that the Spanish Government, which is resolved to impose no restrictive regulations in the places occupied by it, pledges itself voluntarily not to establish in said places taxes or duties exceeding those provided in the Spanish tariffs or in the treaties or conventions between Spain and any other power. Neither shall it put into force in said places exceptional regulations applicable to the commerce and subjects of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers. In case Spain should occupy effectively other places in the archipelago of Sulu, and provide thereat the offices and employees necessary to meet the requirements of commerce, the Governments of Great Britain and Germany shall not object to the application of the rules already stipulated for places occupied at present. But in order to avoid the possibility of new claims due to the uncertainty of business men in regard to the places which are occupied and subject to regulations and tariffs, the Spanish Government shall, whenever a place is occupied in the Sulu archipelago, communicate the fact to the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, and inform commerce at large by means of a notification which shall be published in the Official Gazettes of Madrid and Manila. In regard to the tariffs and regulations stipulated for places which are occupied at the present time, they shall only be applicable to the places which may be subsequently occupied by Spain six months after the date of publication in the Official Gazette of Madrid. It remains agreed that no ship or subject of Great Britain, Germany and the other powers shall be required to call at one of the occupied places, when going to or coming from a place not occupied by Spain, and that they shall not be liable to suffer prejudice on that account or on account of any class of merchandise addressed to an unoccupied place in the archipelago. V The Government of her Britannic Majesty pledges itself to see that there is entire freedom of commerce and navigation, without distinction of flags, in the territory of North Borneo administered by the “British North Borneo Company.” If the Governments of Great Britain and Germany do not refuse their adhesion to the present protocol within fifteen days from this date, or if they notify their acceptance before the expiration of said period, through their undersigned representatives, the present declarations shall then come into force. Done at Madrid the 7th of March, 1885.—Seal.—(Signed) J. Elduayen.—Seal.—(Signed) C. Solms.—Seal.—(Signed) R. B. D. Morier. Appendix XXI Decree of the General Government in regard to payment of tribute by Sulus, March 1, 189473 Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
Manila, March 1, 1894. In view of the obligation incurred by the Sultan of Sulu by virtue of which the Moros of all the Sulu archipelago have to pay from the first day of January of next year, one real each, as a tribute of vassalage; and since it is necessary to organize this service in a regular manner and in harmony with the customs of the races living there, I decree the following: 1. The Sultan of Sulu shall direct at once all the Datus and Chiefs of the Moro rancherias74 to make up lists of the names of the inhabitants composing each aggregation, giving therein, besides the names, the status of each individual. 2. These partial lists shall be fused in one single general census which the Sultan of Sulu shall deliver to the politico-military governor of that archipelago before October 1, of the current year. 3. The interpreters of Jolo, Siasi, Tata’an, and Bangao shall assist the Sultan in the work of making up these lists and shall translate them into Spanish; and for this extra work they shall receive the allowances designated below, the amounts being deducted from the total proceeds of the liege-money above referred to. Allowances | To the interpreter of Jolo | ?20 | per month. | | To the junior linguist of Jolo | ? 6 | Do. | | To the interpreter of Siasi | ? 8 | Do. | | To the interpreter of Tata’an | ? 8 | Do. | | To the interpreter of Bangao | ? 8 | Do. | 4. As soon as the lists are completed and have been examined by the politico-military governor of Sulu, certified copies shall be sent to this office. 5. The collection of the tribute shall be made by means of certain special cedulas, which in due time will be furnished to the Sultan for distribution, who will collect the amounts paid in and deliver them over in specie at the office of the politico-military governor of Sulu. 6. The total proceeds from the said tribute, after deducting the amount of the allowances to the interpreters, shall be devoted for the present to the development of the establishments of Jolo, and especially to the construction of roads. To be communicated. Blanco. Appendix XXII Royal communication relative to the rights of foreigners on the pearl fisheries of Sulu75 Manila, December 25, 1895.
His high Excellency the Minister of Colonial Affairs. Excellent Sir: In compliance with the Royal order communicated under date of the 23rd of October last, I have the honor to send to your Excellency a copy of the previous record of investigations transmitted by the office of this General Government, together with the report of the office of the secretary, the remittance of which your Excellency requests. The inquiry formulated by the politico-military governor of Sulu, arising out of a resolution of the fishery board of the naval station relative to the order prohibiting foreign subjects from engaging in the pearl fisheries in the waters of the Sulu archipelago, did not call for a speedy resolution nor a close study, it being sufficient to bring the matter to the knowledge of your Excellency without entering deeply into the question involved, in order not to prejudice the resolution of the same, leaving to the supreme judgment of his Majesty’s Government the entire appreciation of its reach and consequences, as the only authority acquainted with the demands of our international relations and the influence thereon of a decision in regard to a matter of such recognized importance as is that of the interpretation to be given to Declaration I of the Sulu Protocol of May 11th of 1877, contained in Article IV of the Protocol between Spain, Germany, and Great Britain, signed in Madrid on March 7th, 1885:—hence the brevity of the data contained in the communications above referred to and even the forbearance of this office from expressing a concrete opinion (in any case, not called for) in regard to a question as vital as it is complex. But circumstances, which are always superior to every will and every calculation, now make prompt action necessary, and not only forbid any delay, but impose upon this General Government the duty of emitting an opinion which shall complement the data furnished by the office of the secretary of the same, which data were less extensive and explicit than they would certainly have been had not a respect for the free initiative of the Supreme Government acted as a restraining influence. The incident arising out of the presence in the city of Jolo of the British subject Mr. H. W. Dalton, from Sandakan, awaiting the arrival of a fleet of boats of light tonnage belonging to the English concern, The Pearling and Trading Co. Ltd.,76 of which he is the representative for the purpose of using the same in the mother-of-pearl shell fishery, which fact I communicated to your Excellency by cablegram on the 3rd of the current month, makes more urgent the sovereign decision in regard to the concrete point as to whether foreign subjects are allowed to engage in the pearl fishery in the archipelago of Sulu. In the judgment of this office (which has, on various occasions, inspired only by a regard for the best interests of the nation, expressed the opinion that the Sulu Protocol is too prejudicial to the said interests to permit of the points of doubtful interpretation in the same being interpreted liberally), the point in regard to the right of fishery which foreigners lay claim to exercise freely in waters under the jurisdiction of our sovereignty, is not a doubtful one at all, but is entirely contrary to their pretensions. The claims are founded, according to the statements of those who agree with the views which they involve, in Declaration I of the said Protocol of 1877, reproduced in the Protocol of 1885 and in that signed in Rome in the same year, relating to the Caroline and Pelew Archipelagoes. This declaration runs as follows—ratified by Article IV of the second of these important diplomatic documents: The direct commerce and trade of boats and subjects of Great Britain, of Germany, and of the other powers, is declared, and shall be, absolutely free in the archipelago of Sulu and in all its parts, as also the right of fishery, without prejudice to the rights recognized as belonging to Spain in the present Protocol, in conformity with the following declarations ***. III. At points occupied by Spain in the archipelago of Sulu, the Spanish Government may establish imposts, and sanitary and other regulations of whatever kind, during the effective occupation of the said points ***. From the transcript it is evident that Spain may regulate the exercise of the right of traffic and commerce, not with the purpose of restricting, and much less of denying, the principle of commercial liberty recognized in Declaration I, but with that of conditioning the exercise of that right in such a way that her own rights as a sovereign nation shall not be infringed. And what she may do in regard to mercantile trade, with greater reason she may and should do in everything referring to the right of fishery, a right which is declared only in general terms, and one of which the protocol does not treat except in making the affirmation of the principle itself, whereas in regard to commerce, it descends to minute details. And this could not be otherwise, for anything else would be equivalent to impairing the sovereignty of Spain; and this, in an agreement in which this sovereignty is openly recognized and proclaimed, would pre-suppose a contradiction so palpable and absurd that it is not worth while even to discuss it. Spain, as a sovereign and independent state, holds and exercises her sovereignty not only in her territories and on the coasts of the same, but in her jurisdictional waters, and can, therefore, regulate the exercise therein of any right granted to foreign subjects, and may, even, in the exercise of her sovereignty, prohibit the enjoyment of such right altogether; this is an indisputable principle of international law, though there is nothing to prevent a state from limiting the same in favor of another or other states; but it is a sine qua non condition to this that there shall be an express and clear declaration of her will on this point, and no one can reasonably affirm that Spain has made in the Sulu Protocols, neither in that of 1877, nor in that of 1885, a total or partial surrender of this right in regard to that of fishery; there is, it is true, a declaration in general terms that the fisheries are absolutely free in the archipelago of Sulu; but this absoluteness of the principle is immediately qualified by the condition that it shall be without prejudice to the rights recognized as belonging to Spain in the protocol, and it has already been pointed out that one of these rights—the principal one and that which contains all the others, the right of sovereignty—is proclaimed and recognized at the head of the agreement. Outside this declaration in general terms, there will not be found in all the protocol a provision or regulation referring to the exercise of the right of fishery and much less a concrete and express declaration on the part of Spain that she will permit the exercise thereof freely on her coasts and in her territorial waters. To permit of this a concrete, clear, and definite declaration would be necessary, such as is to be found in the Morocco Treaty, signed on November 30, 1861, Article 57 of which establishes qualifiedly “That Spanish subjects shall have a right to fish along the coasts of the Moroccan Empire;” and even so, in Article 60 of the same treaty, it is stipulated that, in order to facilitate the coral fishery, in which the Spaniards engage on the coast of Morocco, fishers shall pay the sum of 150 Spanish dollars for each coral fishing boat, and that through the representative of Spain they shall request permission from the minister of foreign affairs of His Majesty the Sultan who shall issue the necessary authorization. From which it may be seen that even in the case of declarations in regard to the right of fishery which are concrete, clear and definite, there is needed, for the free exercise of the same, something more than a declaration in general terms, such as is that contained in the Sulu Protocol of 1877. Furthermore, it is always customary in international agreements which refer to fishery rights to lay down regulations and provisions which shall regulate the exercise of such rights, as is proved by a multitude of agreements, among which are: that already cited of Morocco, that of February 18th, 1886, between Spain and France regarding the fishery and navigation of the Bidasoa, in which the right of oyster fishing is restricted, its absolute prohibition being made possible; as also that of 1889 ratifying the preceding one, the Portuguese convention of March 27th of 1893 and the coast police and fishery regulations; as well as that of August 22nd of 1894, in regard to the fisheries in the waters of the Algarbes, etc.; all of which is well known by the illustrious Government of His Majesty, and attention is called to it here only in support of the opinion maintained, namely, that the right to authorize, condition, restrict, and even prohibit the engagement in fishery on its coast and in its jurisdictional waters is inherent in the sovereignty of an independent state; and if it has this right in regard to fisheries in general, with greater reason must it preserve and exercise the same in regard to oyster fisheries, by reason of the changes which may be produced in the sea bed, and even for the purpose of preserving the breeding grounds of the precious pearl-shell mollusk, the Avicula Margaritifera, the banks being the property of the nation, and like all its territory, inalienable and non-prescriptible; both so that they shall not be exhausted and that their exploitation may be reserved for the national industry. From the preceding, written with less detail than would have been the case had the pressure of time permitted, it may easily be inferred that, in the opinion of this General Government, Spain in spite of Declaration I of the Sulu Protocol—perhaps it would be more correct to say, by virtue of that very declaration, the terms of which really determine the meaning of Declaration III and Article I of the Treaty—preserves intact her right as a sovereign nation to restrict, condition, and even prohibit engagement in the oyster fishery on her coasts and in her jurisdictional waters, without further limitations than those which she may deem expedient to self-impose. Admitting her rights as a sovereign state, there arises a question of a political nature, which the circumstances above indicated convert into a problem demanding an early resolution. To what extent should Spain exercise this right? On this point, the views of the General Government will be expressed as concisely as possible and with the soberness demanded both by the respect due to the high prerogatives of the public authorities and by an ignorance of many of the elements which enter into the question, without a knowledge of which it is difficult to determine to what extent it is expedient to restrict the exercise of the right to engage in the oyster fisheries which foreign subjects claim to exercise freely in the Sulu archipelago, a pretension which this General Government regards as entirely opposed to the rights of Spain and her moral and material interests in the Far East. Our prestige with the Malay races here, our moral influence over these semi-civilized Mohammedan people, who recognize no right or supremacy but that of might, demand that Spain, as a colonizing nation, shall maintain the integrity of her sovereignty and shall not seem to be subjugated to the will of other Powers, as would appear if, in her territories and on her coasts, with the knowledge and permission of her authorities and of her war ships, and without even heeding them, foreigners should perform acts which, like that of engaging in the mother-of-pearl fishery, being contrary to our material interests, cannot be carried out without paying tribute to the Moro sultans and chieftains themselves. There is no doubt that the need for preserving cordial relations with Germany and England and for maintaining the most perfect understanding between the European powers in anticipation of some concerted action in regard to the Empires of China and of Japan, which will render necessary in the future the expansive policy of the latter towards the south, as well as the hegemony claimed by the latter in the Orient, counsel a circumspect international policy and a moderate exercise of our sovereign rights in the archipelago of Sulu; and for this reason, perhaps it would be inexpedient to forbid the right of fishery to foreign subjects, as such action would certainly give rise to diplomatic questions and remonstrances, which should be avoided at any cost; but this General Government deems it indispensable to condition and regulate the exercise of this fishery right, especially in so far as it relates to the pearl-producing oyster, the exploitation of which should be governed by considerations of our prestige and of the advantage and benefit of our material interests. Supported therefore by our right of sovereignty, by international practice, and by the terms of Declarations I and III of the Protocol of 1877 and of Articles I and IV of that of 1885, there should be issued certain coast police and fishery regulations for the Sulu archipelago, laying down clearly the relations which are to exist between the Spanish Government and foreign subjects engaging in the fishery industries along our coasts and in our jurisdictional waters; which industries should not be engaged in, especially in the case of the oyster, without the necessary authorization of the Spanish authorities, and after the payment of the corresponding industrial patent or license, or of the dues which it may be deemed expedient to exact. Much more might be said in regard to this important question, as unexpectedly presented as it is urgent of resolution, given the conditions created by the claim of the British subject Mr. H. W. Dalton; and this General Government appreciates fully the deficiency of its suggestions, which will be advantageously supplemented by the great wisdom of his Majesty’s Government, its exalted patriotism, and the solicitous care that it gives to everything touching the high interests of the nation, by which elevated sentiments they are inspired. Colonial Office Excellent Sir: Examined by this office of the government the papers transmitted by your Excellency with the official communication No. 1967, of September 16th last, in the question raised by the politico-military governor of Sulu, by reason of a communication addressed to the same by the office of the commander-general of the naval station at Manila, directing the prohibition of the mother-of-pearl fishery in the waters of Sulu and the Carolines; studied also the report of the General Government, and that of the council of administration of the Philippines, and heard also the illustrious opinion of the Department of State, to secure which the papers were sent there, accompanied by the Royal order of the 7th of January last; bearing in mind that our prestige among the natives in those islands would perforce suffer seriously if foreigners were to perform, without any intervention on the part of our authorities, acts, which, like that of engaging in the mother-of-pearl shell fishery, they cannot carry on without paying tribute to the Moro Sultans and chieftains; though it is not less true that the absolute prohibition of the right of fishery to foreigners would arouse, as wisely foreseen by your Excellency, diplomatic remonstrances based upon the Protocol of Sulu of March 7th, 1886; his Majesty the King (whom God protect), the Queen Regent of the Kingdom acting in his name, has seen fit to direct that your Excellency be informed that he has seen with pleasure the tact and prudence with which this question has been dealt with, in the first place by your Excellency, and afterwards by all the authorities who have intervened in the same; that so long as the representative of the English Pearling and Trading Company, the captains of their boats, or other foreigners, do not urge with importunity the right to carry on the industry of the mother-of-pearl shell fishery within the zone of jurisdictional waters and at occupied places, an endeavor must be made to prevent their doing so, in order, if possible, to set a precedent favorable to our interests; and that in the event of their insisting, it will be necessary to permit them to engage in the industry of the mother-of-pearl fishery, with the obligation to submit in so doing to the rules and regulations now in force or which may be put into force hereafter. It is also the wish of his Majesty that your Excellency be apprised of the expediency of formulating, with the greatest possible despatch, coast police and fishery regulations for the archipelagoes of Sulu and the Carolines; in which regulations care must be taken not to make special mention of the Protocols, nor to recognize expressly the rights of foreigners, and, on the other hand, not to depart from the terms of the provisions of these international agreements, so that in the event of any foreigners claiming the right in question, they shall not be able to elude compliance with the regulations by basing their pretensions on the terms of the said Protocols; for all of which your Excellency will place yourself in harmony with the competent authorities whose duty it is to take cognizance of this matter, submitting afterwards for the approbation of this office drafts of the coast police and fishery regulations above referred to. By Royal order I communicate the above to you for proper action. God protect your Excellency many years. Madrid, March 23rd, 1896. Tomas Castellano: rubricated. To the Honorable
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. Appendix XXIV La Torre’s views on the policy that should be adopted in Mindanao and Sulu, January 11, 189378 Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines A seal with the inscription: “Office of the Captain-General of the Philippines. Headquarters.” Excellent Sir: At all times the condition of the unsubdued regions of the island of Mindanao and, in general, of the whole archipelago, has occupied the close attention of the Governors-General of these Islands, and they have studied, according to their respective views, the best methods for the complete subjection of the same. For my part, I have meditated deeply upon every thing relating to this important matter, and judging both from past experience and from observations that I have been able to make personally, as I apprised your Excellency after my return from a visit to the aforementioned island on May 29th last, I believe it is evident that the adoption of the same system for the subjection of different races will not be productive of good results. In the island of Luzon, a properly understood policy of conciliation, accompanied by slight displays of force, will be successful in conciliating and subduing the people sooner or later; for it may be observed at once that here there does not exist that great racial antagonism which nearly always makes compromise impossible. Such a policy, linked with prudence and particularly with justice on the part of the delegates of authority, will always be productive of great results, aside from the fact that there are here many villages whose inhabitants are not warlike, but, on the contrary, are docile, and await only some slight indication on our part to regard us as protectors and allies against their enemies. Much has already been done in this direction, as is shown by the many politico-military provinces existing in this island; but we should not stop in this island of progress; and in order to carry forward and consummate the complete subjugation of the extensive districts not yet subdued, troops must be detailed,—not in very large numbers, but still in numbers sufficiently large to affect appreciably the service, equally necessary in other regions of the archipelago. This is one of the reasons which make requisite an increase in the army force stationed here; further, if the number of the comandancias79 is to be increased, it is obvious that, in order to garrison them, more troops are needed. I have pointed out the need there is for employing different methods for the subjection of the different races; and in fact, in regard to the races inhabiting Mindanao, I believe that it is obvious and unquestionable that favorable results will never be secured without employing methods other than those of attraction. The Moro race is completely antithetic to the Spanish, whether the latter be peninsular or indigenous, and will ever be our eternal enemy. The past proves clearly that those ostensible and ephemeral submissions, apparently guaranteed by oaths and agreements, do not bind the Moros in the slightest degree; for, knowing nothing of the first principles of good-faith and loyalty, they do not hesitate to break their promises whenever a favorable opportunity offers and they think it possible to defeat our troops. They make a pretense of being trusting and attentive even to our smallest suggestions, but they are always watching for a good chance to open up hostilities, and will resort to treason and cunning. For these reasons it is well that they should know that we are the stronger; that our friendship suits their interests because we are backed by force—which is the only argument they can understand; that their friendship is of no moment to us; and that the instant they antagonize us, they will be promptly and severely punished. Having taken up this point of view, the policy that we should adopt may be inferred. It is not necessary to undertake operations on a large scale, or to open what might be termed a regular campaign, as has been done every two or three years in the past; but, with our troops established at a number of fortified places, it may be seen at once from what has been said above, that we ought to maintain them there at any cost, and that, abandoning an attitude entirely passive, we should advance little by little in our conquest, always establishing ourselves firmly on the territory conquered. In this way we shall, step by step, bring under our dominion a large area of territory, at the same time extending our sphere of influence towards the interior. Given the conditions above described, it will be understood at once how much we should lose in importance in the eyes of such an enemy if, in response to their frequent attacks, we confined ourselves entirely to a defensive policy, for they would interpret such an attitude as an indication of weakness; consequently it is impossible for us to maintain an attitude of inactivity: rather, taking advantage of the treacherous conduct of the enemy, we should castigate them by means of rapid and unexpected excursions lasting a few days, and for this purpose it is indispensable that small columns of troops be stationed at two or three well chosen points. That the Moros are not disposed to be our friends is evident: and while frequent examples in the history of these islands, in addition to what has been said above, are sufficient to prove this assertion, it is further corroborated by the many despatches I have addressed to your Excellency, apprising you of the attacks made by the Moros upon our troops and especially of the incidents which have taken place during the last months of the year 1892. These I will recapitulate succinctly, as they show that, far from breaking the rebels, the events have only increased their strength. On the morning of October 28th, while a reconnaissance was being made at the post of Baras, the detachment making the same was attacked by some fifty or sixty Moros, who were awaiting them in ambush. The latter were, however, repulsed, and our troops being reËnforced by a detachment from the fort, the enemy fled, leaving five dead on the field, besides two spears, three krises, three kampilan, and two daggers, the losses on our side being one dead and five wounded. On the morning of November 9th, again at the time of making a reconnaissance, at the post of Malabang, our men were attacked by some sixty Moros, who, being repulsed, fled, leaving six dead on the field—three others dying later, according to reports received—besides four kampilan, three krises, one tabas, one lance, and four daggers; the losses of our side being one soldier killed and six wounded. These two posts being afterwards visited by the military commander of Illana Bay and the politico-military governor of Mindanao, by reason of reports having been received that some thousand Moros had banded together for the purpose of attacking these two places, they informed me that excellent discipline prevailed among the troops of the said garrisons, and that the Moros must have beaten a retreat, since they had not been seen in that country. On my part I have directed that the greatest possible vigilance, care, and watchfulness be exercised at all the posts, never losing sight of the fact that they are always in the presence of the enemy, as is proved by the frequency with which they have been attacked. I have ordered, further, that, when making reconnaissances or upon any other occasion when it is necessary to separate a detachment from the main body, the greatest number of soldiers that the circumstances permit be employed, so as to prevent a surprise or ambuscade, which aside from the direct loss that it entails, might have the effect of demoralizing the troops, and so of increasing the boldness and temerity of the enemy; I have given special instructions, too, that the officers display in the field the greatest possible energy, so as to keep up the spirits and confidence of the men. In the northern portion of Mindanao, between Iligan and Mumungan the Moros have also been active in making attacks, and although beaten in every case, thanks to the good discipline prevailing among the men and the judgment shown by the officers, who inspire the former with confidence and afford them a good example at all times, they still hope to have better luck in their future raids, as is proved by the despatches received from the politico-military commander of Mumungan. These despatches show that our soldiers no longer fear the Moro race, nor even the Juramentados; and that our men always await the attack of the enemy with great calmness and bravery, as is shown by the accounts of the frequent ambuscades laid and surprises attempted by the Moros. Already at the beginning of 1892 the attitude of the sultans and datus in the neighborhood of Mumungan was so questionable that Captain Abad, then commander of the fort there, having attempted to go up the river Agus, accompanied by only one officer and four men—thus in the guise of absolute peace—Datu Ala, of Balud, who is now our friend, stopped him when he approached his territory, telling him that although he wished to live at peace with us, he could not allow him to advance further, nor any part of our troops to do so. In spite of this, two months after this incident, General Castilla, following closely my instructions, and taking advantage of the circumstance foreseen by me—that upon his arrival at Mumungan he was visited by the neighboring datus and sultans, including the Sultan of Pantar, he announced to the latter, acting under instructions from me, his intention of returning the friendly visit. Leaving Mumungan early, in spite of a continuous heavy rain storm, he reached Pantar at about eleven in the morning without making any stop, accompanied by Ala and another datu, and while he was holding an affectionate interview with the Sultan of Pantar and the troops were resting, the captain of engineers, Navarro, made a clandestine inspection of the ground and took a rough sketch of the best site for the future fort, close to a bridge that can be built across the river Agus, with a turret or rough defensive fortification on the opposite bank; this done, General Castilla returned that same afternoon to Mumungan, which he reached before night, without having fired a shot, in spite of the predictions of the datus that he might easily meet with resistance on the road. Later, all the datus living in the region lying between Pantar and Iligan reiterated to me, personally, in May last, at Mumungan, and later to the military commander, their protestations of adhesion to Spain. Afterwards there came the visit that a goodly number of datus, among them the Datu of Pantar, made me in Manila, where they remained and were entertained during fifteen days; and with the consistent approval of these, the road from Iligan to Mumungan was built, in consequence of which work the weekly attendance of Moros at the market of Iligan increased, and the Datu of Bukamar and another from Marawi presented themselves in that place. Thither also the Datu Amay-Pakpak, now an old man, promised to send his son. The concurrence of Moros at that place was further increased by the assistance that was given to a wounded Moro; until, at last, a solemn oath of allegiance was secured, being taken, in the presence of the aforementioned military commander, by a great number of datus and sultans, in accordance with their ritual. On November 8th, the military commander of Mumungan, under the pretext of a wedding to which the Datu of Pantar had invited him and which he attended, made an inspection of the country in the neighborhood of the said rancheria80 of Pantar, lying to the south of Mumungan, and had an opportunity of seeing that, in conformity with the reports I had received, Pantar possessed advantageous conditions for the establishment there of another advance fort, the construction of which could be commenced upon the continuation and completion up to that point of the new road built from Iligan to Mumungan. But in spite of the good intentions of the military commander not to break into hostilities except in the last resort, in accordance with the positive instructions I had given him, he was unable to prevent his troops being attacked upon the return journey, and therefore they opened fire upon the enemy; which proves once again the difficulty of following the path of conciliation and attraction with an enemy who pays absolutely no heed to reason; in spite of the fact that with this method there had been joined that of warning the neighboring Moros who profess to be so friendly, that the only genuine proof of adhesion to which I should give credit would be that of the moral and collective support of all of them against any act of aggression within their territory committed by Moros from other rancherias, whether in large or in small numbers. On November 25th I was informed by the same military commander that, while the convoy was transferring supplies from Mumungan to Iligan, there appeared a juramentado, who attempted to wound a soldier; but the latter, waiting for him with great calmness, defended himself valiantly, and the Moro was despatched with the assistance of some other soldiers who came upon the scene. On the 10th of December I was informed that a detachment of the troops stationed at Mumungan, while on its way to the market of Iligan was attacked by a body of fourteen juramentados who, however, were repulsed with a loss of two killed, while, on our side, one man was lost. At Baras, also, while making the reconnaissance on December 10th there appeared a band of Moros in an attitude of hostility; but they were compelled to retire at the first volley from our troops. Nevertheless, two juramentados separated themselves from the main body and attacked an equal number of our men; the latter awaited them firmly and killed them with bayonet thrusts. Another Moro was also slain while attempting a precipitate flight. Recently, on the 15th of December, the military commander of Mumungan, hearing of the intentions of the enemy, which were far from peaceable, determined, in order to guard against all contingencies, to continue the extension of the road and to complete and close the palisade around the new inclosure at the fort, made so as to accommodate the increased number of troops. For the first of these two purposes, he left the fort at half past five in the morning, well-armed and ready to punish the Moros if they presented themselves, setting out with one hundred and fifty men of the 73rd regiment and sixteen convicts, besides a corporal and eight persons of the 73rd in charge of a company of engineers, another company of the 73rd and sixty convicts, who marched without arms and equipped for work. At ten o’clock in the morning the advance guard reached the entrance to the wood, and as the intention was to collect lumber that had already been cut and dragged to the road, the troops advanced. At this moment there appeared in the middle of the road some eight hundred Moros brandishing their arms and uttering war-cries, who immediately retired to some defensive works which they had constructed out of the very logs above referred to. In view of this, our troops continued their march, opening fire at about one hundred yards from the defensive works of the enemy, and in a little while, captured the same, routing the defenders, as well as some more of the enemy who appeared on the two flanks of the column, causing some eighty deaths; on our side we had one killed and two wounded convicts. After this incident, the said military commander made his way to Iligan without suffering any attack, in spite of the fact that the Moros had constructed other defensive works on the road, which latter were destroyed without any casualties. The conduct of the troops on this march was brilliant, and I wish to recommend to the consideration of your Excellency those who especially distinguished themselves; but I have again directed the military commander of Mumungan to avoid as far as possible all necessity for fresh combats, extending, but without any compromise of dignity, the policy of conciliation which I have so strongly recommended to him. From all the above your Excellency will understand with how much foresight I requested from the Government of his Majesty, on the 24th of April last, permission to place on a war footing as many of the seven regiments which make up the infantry in these Islands as had not yet been placed on this footing, setting forth the estimated cost of the same in the plans which I sent for approval, and if the increase was necessary then, it is evident that at the present time it is much more necessary; for, as your Excellency will see from what I have communicated to you in this extensive document, the condition of the Moros, justifying the predictions made by me at that time, has become steadily more hostile as they never rest nor miss any opportunity of causing us the greatest possible harm, endeavoring to obstruct all the work we plan to carry out for the improvement of the means of communication between our present possessions; and while it is true that they are not successful in their attempts, still we must put a stop to their increasing audacity. I take the liberty again to call the attention of your Excellency to the absolute necessity of placing on a war footing the three regiments now on a footing of peace, in accordance with the permission already granted by the Department—without waiting until next July. In this way, without undertaking a regular campaign, as I have already stated, and without expense to the Government, it will be possible to improve the present condition of things, which is gradually becoming somewhat discreditable to the honor of the flag. I do not doubt that your Excellency will so understand it, and I thank you in advance, in the name of this suffering army, for the immediate concession of the credit necessary for the reËnforcement above mentioned. God protect your Excellency many years. Manila, January 11th, 1893. Most Excellent Sir:—Eulogio Despojol.—Followed by a rubric. The most Excellent the Minister of War.—A copy.—The Acting Colonel in Command of Headquarters.—Pedro de Bascaran.—A seal with the inscription: “Office of the Captain-General of the Philippines.—Headquarters.” A copy.—Luis de la Torre: rubricated.
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