| INTRODUCTION. |
| OUR PROBLEM DEFINED BY ITS RELATIONS TO LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS. | |
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1. | The problem first received a modern form through Kant, who connected the À priori with the subjective | 1 |
2. | A mental state is subjective, for Psychology, when its immediate cause does not lie in the outer world | 2 |
3. | A piece of knowledge is À priori, for Epistemology, when without it knowledge would be impossible | 2 |
4. | The subjective and the À priori belong respectively to Psychology and to Epistemology. The latter alone will be investigated in this essay | 3 |
5. | My test of the À priori will be purely logical: what knowledge is necessary for experience? | 3 |
6. | But since the necessary is hypothetical, we must include, in the À priori, the ground of necessity | 4 |
7. | This may be the essential postulate of our science, or the element, in the subject-matter, which is necessary to experience; | 4 |
8. | Which, however, are both at bottom the same ground | 5 |
9. | Forecast of the work | 5 |
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| CHAPTER I. |
| A SHORT HISTORY OF METAGEOMETRY. |
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10. | Metageometry began by rejecting the axiom of parallels | 7 |
11. | Its history may be divided into three periods: the synthetic, the metrical and the projective | 7 |
12. | The first period was inaugurated by Gauss, | 10 |
13. | Whose suggestions were developed independently by Lobatchewsky | 10 |
14. | And Bolyai | 11 |
15. | The purpose of all three was to show that the axiom of parallels could not be deduced from the others, since its denial did not lead to contradictions | 12 |
16. | The second period had a more philosophical aim, and was inspired chiefly by Gauss and Herbart | 13 |
17. | The first work of this period, that of Riemann, invented two new conceptions: | 14 |
18. | The first, that of a manifold, is a class-conception, containing space as a species, | 14 |
19. | And defined as such that its determinations form a collection of magnitudes | 15 |
20. | The second, the measure of curvature of a manifold, grew out of curvature in curves and surfaces | 16 |
21. | By means of Gauss's analytical formula for the curvature of surfaces, | 19 |
22. | Which enables us to define a constant measure of curvature of a three-dimensional space without reference to a fourth dimension | 20 |
23. | The main result of Riemann's mathematical work was to show that, if magnitudes are independent of place, the measure of curvature of space must be constant | 21 |
24. | Helmholtz, who was more of a philosopher than a mathematician, | 22 |
25. | Gave a new but incorrect formulation of the essential axioms, | 23 |
26. | And deduced the quadratic formula for the infinitesimal arc, which Riemann had assumed | 24 |
27. | Beltrami gave Lobatchewsky's planimetry a Euclidean interpretation, | 25 |
28. | Which is analogous to Cayley's theory of distance; | 26 |
29. | And dealt with n-dimensional spaces of constant negative curvature | 27 |
30. | The third period abandons the metrical methods of the second, and extrudes the notion of spatial quantity | 27 |
114. | By the general principle of projective transformation | 126 |
115. | The principle of duality is the mathematical form of a philosophical circle, | 127 |
116. | Which is an inevitable consequence of the relativity of space, and makes any definition of the point contradictory | 128 |
117. | We define the point as that which is spatial, but contains no space, whence other definitions follow | 128 |
118. | What is meant by qualitative equivalence in Geometry? | 129 |
119. | Two pairs of points on one straight line, or two pairs of straight lines through one point, are qualitatively equivalent | 129 |
120. | This explains why four collinear points are needed, to give an intrinsic relation by which the fourth can be descriptively defined when the first three are given | 130 |
121. | Any two projectively related figures are qualitatively equivalent, i.e. differ in no non-quantitative conceptual property | 131 |
122. | Three axioms are used by projective Geometry, | 132 |
123. | And are required for qualitative spatial comparison, | 132 |
124. | Which involves the homogeneity, relativity and passivity of space | 133 |
125. | The conception of a form of externality, | 134 |
126. | Being a creature of the intellect, can be dealt with by pure mathematics | 134 |
127. | The resulting doctrine of extension will be, for the moment, hypothetical | 135 |
128. | But is rendered assertorical by the necessity, for experience, of some form of externality | 136 |
129. | Any such form must be relational | 136 |
130. | And homogeneous | 137 |
131. | And the relations constituting it must appear infinitely divisible | 137 |
132. | It must have a finite integral number of dimensions, | 139 |
133. | Owing to its passivity and homogeneity | 140 |
134. | And to the systematic unity of the world | 140 |
135. | A one-dimensional form alone would not suffice for experience | 141 |
136. | Since its elements would be immovably fixed in a series | 142 |
137. | Two positions have a relation independent of other positions, | 143 |
138. | Since positions are wholly defined by mutually independent relations | 143 |
139. | Hence projective Geometry is wholly À priori, | 146 |
140. | Though metrical Geometry contains an empirical element | 146 |
| Section B. the axioms of metrical geometry. |
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141. | Metrical Geometry is distinct from projective, but has the same fundamental postulate | 147 |
142. | It introduces the new idea of motion, and has three À priori axioms | 148 |
| I. The Axiom of Free Mobility. |
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143. | Measurement requires a criterion of spatial equality | 149 |
144. | Which is given by superposition, and involves the axiom of Free Mobility | 150 |
145. | The denial of this axiom involves an action of empty space on things | 151 |
146. | There is a mathematically possible alternative to the axiom, | 152 |
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