National and Race Prejudices—The Triple Alliance—The Triple Entente—Teuton vs. Slav—Influence of Russian Diplomacy—Russia vs. Austria—Control of Balkan Seaports—England's Commercial Supremacy Challenged by Germany—Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria by a Serb.

Within the space of less than a week from August 1, 1914, five of the six "great powers" of Europe became involved in a war that quickly developed into the greatest and most sanguinary struggle of all time. The European conflagration, long foreseen by statesmen and diplomats, and dreaded of all alike, had broken out.

Beginning with the thunder of Austrian guns at Belgrade, the reverberations of war were heard in every capital of the Old World. Austria's declaration of war against Servia was followed by the alignment of Germany with its Teuton neighbor against the forces of Russia, France and England. Italy alone, of the six great powers, declined to align itself with its formal allies and made a determined effort at the outset to maintain its neutrality.

Soon the highways of Europe resounded with the hoof-beats and the tramp of marching hosts, with the rattle of arms and the rumble of artillery. Of such a war, once begun, no man could predict the end. But the world realized that it was a catastrophe of unparalleled proportions, a failure of civilization in its stronghold, a disaster to humanity.

For more than forty years the great powers of Europe had been at peace with one another. Though war had threatened now and then, diplomacy had avoided the actual outbreak. But that the dreaded conflict was inevitable had long been recognized. For its coming immense armaments had been prepared, until the burdens of taxation laid upon the people had become in themselves a source of danger. But behind it all lay the sinister influence of the "junker" element of Germany—the military party, swollen with pride in the development of the German army by more than forty years of preparation for conflict, and the naval party, eager for "der Tag" which should bring a trial of the new German navy against the battle fleets of an enemy. Fostering and encouraging these militaristic sentiments was the growing desire of Germany for "a place in the sun," which was translatable only as a desire for world domination. Greater and wider markets for German commerce were urgently demanded, and visions of Germany as mistress of the seas, with a great colonial empire, and of the Kaiser as the undisputed military overlord of Europe, already filled and fired the Teuton imagination.

The political alignment of the great powers prior to the war was as follows: On the one side was the Triple Alliance, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; while on the other was the Triple Entente, comprising Great Britain, France and Russia. As the event proved, the uncertain element in this line-up was Italy, which had a real grievance against Austria in the latter's possession of the former Italian territory known as the Trentino, and which was not consulted by Germany and Austria prior to the outbreak of hostilities. She therefore declined to enter the war as a member of the Triple Alliance, but was later found in the field against Austria, and thenceforth rendered powerful aid to the cause of "the Allies," as the members of the Triple Entente and their supporters soon came to be known.

It was in the Balkans, long regarded as the zone of danger to European peace, that the war-clouds gathered and darkened rapidly. For generations Austria and Russia had struggled diplomatically for the control of Balkan seaports, with the Balkan states acting as buffers in the diplomatic strife. Servia acted as a bar to Austria's commercial route to the Ægean, by way of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to Saloniki, while Russia was Servia's great ally and stood stoutly behind the little Slav kingdom in its opposition to Austrian aggression.

AMBITIONS OF SERVIA

Then came the recent Balkan Wars, and their outcome was viewed with alarm. Austria uneasily watched the approach of Servia to the Adriatic and the Aegean. The formation of the new new autonomous state of Albania, between Servia and the Adriatic, was all that prevented Austria from attacking Servia during that crisis. The terms of peace left the situation, as it concerned Austria and Russia, practically as it had been. Austria made no further progress toward the sea, and Russia remained the ally of Servia. Bulgaria had failed in its efforts to reach Salonica.

At this stage another element exerted its influence. Servia awoke to the possibility of a Greater Servia. An Empire of the Slavs had long been dreamed of. In Austria-Hungary itself millions of Slavs were dreaming of it and awaiting the disruption of Austria-Hungary, held together now, as they argue, only by the indomitable will of the old Emperor, Franz Joseph. The hatred between the Slavs and the Teutonic Austrians is intense. The annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which Servians predominate, increased the Servian hatred and the indignation of the whole Slav world to the point of violence. A conflict was avoided with difficulty. These principalities had hoped to form part of a Greater Servia. Had not Russia been exhausted by the war with Japan, Servia would have called upon her ally and the crisis would have come then. As it was, the Balkans teemed with plots and counterplots against the Austrians, culminating in the assassination of the Arch-Duke and heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, Francis Ferdinand, known for his anti-Slav principles, and therefore feared and hated as the king to be. The assassination occurred at Serajevo in Bosnia, where Servian disaffection was seething. Austria immediately laid the crime on the Servian government.

AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR

Failing in her peremptory demands for satisfaction, Austria declared war, July 28, 1914, apparently for revenge, but behind her righteous indignation she still held in view her traditional ambition, a port on the Mediterranean, to be secured by the complete control of the Novi Bazar route to Salonica, a route which, besides its commercial importance, is of tremendous strategic value to the nation which commands it. The treaty of Berlin of 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War, had given Austria the military, political, and commercial control of the route within the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, then a part of Turkey.

But now, in the division of spoils following the Balkan Wars, Servia gained control of Novi Bazar, Pristina, Uskub, and Istip, or practically the entire route to a short distance north of Salonica, where the new boundaries of Greece had been extended. This meant that Austria saw herself shut out from the Sanjak, and only by the destruction and subsequent occupation of Servia could Austria regain her ascendancy over the route. Victory would mean a long step by Austria toward the sea.

PLOTS AND COUNTERPLOTS

The "balance of power" among European nations has hitherto been maintained because the formation of a single nation out of the Balkan States has not been possible. Although the people of these states have similar pursuits, and live much alike in all regions, they have preserved their original racial differences. A village of Albanians may be within a few miles of a village of Greeks. Yet through centuries both have remained racially distinct. Here and there the barriers have given way somewhat, but in general the races persist side by side, sometimes peaceably, more often in mutual distrust or open feud. Such division has been fostered by the great nations, and new states have been created, as recently Albania, since the formation of a great state in the Balkans by the union of all or the absorbing greatness of one, would overthrow the balance of power, and besides interpose an insurmountable obstacle between Austria and Russia, and the sea.

Thus the states have been played against each other. Sometimes the game has been one of diplomacy, or one of force, hurling the states at each other's throats.

HOW WAR WAS DECLARED

On Sunday, June 28, 1914, a Servian student named Prinzep shot and killed the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria-Hungary, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in the streets of Serajevo, a town in Bosnia which the royal couple were visiting.

Nearly four weeks later, on July 23, the Austro-Hungarian government, fixing responsibility for the assassination upon Servian intrigues, presented to Servia a number of demands which formed a very drastic ultimatum, requiring compliance within forty-eight hours, with the alternative of war. Servia was required to condemn "the propaganda directed against Austria" and to take proceedings against all accessories to the plot against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand who were in Servia. Austrian delegates were to supervise the proceedings, and Servia was also to arrest certain Servian officials whose guilt was alleged. These exorbitant conditions made it quite obvious that no concessions on Servians part would be accepted. It was a plain prelude to war.

Nevertheless, a virtual acceptance by Servia followed. Acting on the advice of Russia, Servia acceded to all that was required of her, making only two reservations of the most reasonable character. These reservations were found enough to serve as an excuse for war. Austria at once declared herself dissatisfied and though the actual declaration of war was delayed for a brief period, a state of war practically existed between the two countries from Saturday evening, July 25.

EFFORTS TO LOCALIZE THE WAR

Then began efforts on the part of Great Britain to localize the war. Sir Edward Grey, the able foreign secretary in Mr. Asquith's cabinet, repeated solemn warnings in every chancellery of Europe. According to the English "white book," the very day that he was notified of the violent tone of Austria's note to Servia—the day it was presented—he warned the Austrian Ambassador in London that if as many as four of the Great Powers of Europe were to engage in war, it would involve the expenditure of such a vast sum of money and such interference with trade, that a complete collapse of European credit and industry would follow. The reply of Russia to this warning was quite conciliatory. The Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, assured the British minister that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and would take no action unless forced. Austria's action, M. Sazonoff added, in reality aimed at over-throwing Russia's influence in the Balkans.

Thus, on Monday, July 27, Sir Edward Grey was able to state in the House of Commons that his suggestion of a joint conference, composed of the Ambassadors of Germany, France and Italy, and himself, with a view to mediation between Austria and Russia, had been accepted by all except Germany, which power had expressed its concurrence with the plan in principle, but opposed the details on the ground that there was a prospect of direct "conversations" (diplomatic exchanges) between Austria and Russia. This statement was believed in England to lack sincerity. On that Monday afternoon the Russian Ambassador at Vienna warned Austria that Russia would not give way and expressed his hope that some arrangement might be arrived at before Servia was invaded.

Austria's reply came next day in the shape of a formal declaration of war against Servia.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE PRO-AUSTRIAN

On July 30 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, made the following statement to Sir Edward Grey regarding the attitude of Germany in the crisis: "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

Naturally enough the Russian foreign minister complained that "conversations" with Austria were useless in the face of such facts. Russia then declared that her forces would be mobilized the day that Austria crossed the Servian frontier. The attitude of Germany at once stiffened and it became evident that Germany meant to regard even the partial mobilization of Russia as a ground for war, not only against Russia, but also against the latter's ally, France.

In vain Russia protested that her partial mobilization was merely a precaution. In vain did the Czar himself offer to give his word that no use would be made of any of his forces. Germany was aware, as subsequent facts have proved, that her own state of mobilization was very much further advanced than that of Russia.

GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA

By Friday, July 31, Germany was ready for the fray and a final ultimatum to St. Petersburg was launched. On the same day Russia declared war against Austria. By six o'clock on Saturday evening, August 1, war between Germany and Russia began, when Germany dismissed the Russian Ambassador, and by Sunday morning Germany was invading France. The next day, August 3, the German Ambassador left Paris and the French Ambassador at Berlin was ordered to demand his passports.

At this point Great Britain passed from the position of general peacemaker to that of a principal. In the House of Commons on Monday, August 3, Sir Edward Grey stated that the question whether Austria or Russia should dominate the Southern Slav races was no concern of England, nor was she bound by any secret alliance to France. She was absolutely free to choose her course with regard to the crisis which had overtaken her. But there were two cardinal points in the situation which had arisen which ultimately concerned Great Britain. The first essential feature of British diplomacy, said Sir Edward, was that France should not be brought into such a condition in Europe that she became a species of vassal state to Germany. On the morning of July 31, therefore, he had informed the German Ambassador that if the efforts to maintain peace failed and France became involved Great Britain would be drawn into the conflict.

In his speech of August 3 the British foreign minister also stated that he had given France on the previous day the written assurance that if the German fleet came into the English Channel or through the North Sea to assail her, the British fleet would protect her to the uttermost.

TO PROTECT BELGIAN AUTONOMY

On the same afternoon, in the same place, Sir Edward Grey reiterated the other dominant principle of British foreign policy—that England can never look with indifference on the seizure by a great continental power of any portion of Belgium and Holland. More than a hundred years ago it was declared by Napoleon, who was a master of political geography, that Antwerp was "a pistol leveled at the head of London."

When on July 31 the British foreign minister inquired by telegraph both at Paris and Berlin whether the two governments would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, France replied with an assurance that she was resolved to do so unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of the violation of Belgium's neutrality at the hands of another power. The German secretary of state, Herr von Jagow, replied that he could give no such assurance until he had consulted the Emperor and Chancellor, and doubted whether he could give any answer without revealing the German plan of campaign. He furthermore alleged the commission of hostile acts by Belgium.

Developments quickly followed. The German government proposed that Belgium should grant its armies free passage through Belgian territory. The proposal was accompanied by an intimation that Belgium would be crushed out of existence if it refused to comply. In fact, it was an ultimatum presented at 7 o'clock on Sunday evening, August 2, to expire within twelve hours.

Then came Sir Edward Grey's speech in parliament on August 3, when it was fully realized that Germany and England were on the verge of war. What followed was related in the House of Commons next day.

SCENES IN PARLIAMENT

Germany's reply to the speech by Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, indicating the attitude of Great Britain in regard to the contemplated violation of Belgian territory by Germany was a second ultimatum from Berlin to Brussels, saying Germany was prepared to carry through her plans by force of arms if necessary.

The British government was officially informed by Belgium on August that German troops had invaded Belgium and that the violation of that country's neutrality, which the British, foreign secretary had intimated must be followed by action on the part of the British, had become an accomplished fact.

Definite announcement of Great Britain's intentions under these circumstances was expected in the house of commons that afternoon.

TELEGRAM SENT TO BERLIN

On the assembly of the house the premier, Mr. Asquith, said that a telegram had been sent early in the morning to Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin, to the following effect:

"The king of the Belgians has appealed to His Britannic Majesty's government for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. The British government is also informed that the German government has delivered to the Belgian government a note proposing friendly neutrality pending a free passage of German troops through Belgium and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions on the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy." Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, had requested an answer within twelve hours.

Premier Asquith then read a telegram from the German foreign minister, which the German ambassador in London had sent to Sir Edward Grey. It was as follows:

The reading of this telegram was greeted with derisive laughter by the members of the house.

Premier Asquith continued:

ENGLAND AND GERMANY AT WAR

By 11 o'clock that evening England and Germany were at war. Their respective ambassadors were handed their passports and Great Britain braced herself for a conflict that was felt to threaten her very existence as a nation.