Meanwhile disquieting rumours with regard to Gordon had reached Cairo, and Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Lord Wolseley on November 3rd, asking him whether he had any reason to believe that there was any foundation for the reports which had been current in Cairo for the last few days, that Khartoum had been taken, and that Gordon was a prisoner.
Lord Wolseley telegraphed from Dongola the same day to the following effect:—
"Major Kitchener telegraphs to Sir C. Wilson that he has seen a man named Ibrahim Wad-Beel, who recently came from the Arabs some distance south. He said all was quiet, and when Gordon received our messenger, he fired a salute, and held a parade of troops. A second telegram from Major Kitchener, dated November 3, announces that Haji Abdallah had arrived, and stated that a man from Shendy reported that the Mahdi came with a strong force to Omdurman and asked General Gordon to surrender. General Gordon replied that he would hold Khartoum for years."
The information as to the position of Khartoum up to this date was as follows:—
On the 8th October a letter had reached Cairo from M. Herbin, the French Consular Agent at Khartoum. It was as follows:—
"Khartoum, July 29, 1884.
"We are in a strong position at Khartoum. No need for alarm, unless it be the want of provisions (in two months our provisions will be exhausted). There is abundance of ammunition. The least assistance would enable us to relieve the town. If at the moment of eating our last biscuit we were to attempt to retire in a body northwards, the retreat could only be effected at the cost of immense exertions and dangers (the means of transport are wanting). Besides this, the people would rise to a man to pillage the convoy. A few determined men might attempt to escape southwards to the Equator, but it would be necessary to abandon most of our soldiers, and all the women and children. Gordon Pasha has decided that he will share the fate of the town, and I think it my duty to share that of the few Frenchmen shut up here. Except for unforeseen circumstances, you can even now foresee what will happen."
On October 31st Sir E. Baring had received a telegram stating that an Arab of the Kababish tribe had brought the news that the Mahdi's troops had attacked Gordon's force at Omdurman opposite Khartoum, a few days before, but the attack was repulsed. In a telegram dated Debbeh, November 2nd, a correspondent gave the following additional news:—
"Gordon attacked the rebels at Omdurman with a flotilla of twelve vessels, including steamers. For eight hours the engagement lasted. There were 25,000 rebels, and they had four Krupp guns. One gun burst. They retreated, leaving enormous numbers of dead behind them. The fugitives retired to Markeat, but were returning with an additional force."
On the 1st November, Sir E. Baring had received communications from Gordon to the effect that on the date they were sent off, viz., 13th July, Khartoum was "all right and could hold out for four months."
The next letter received from Gordon appears to have been the following. Though dated in August, it was not received till the 23rd November.
It was as follows:—
"General Gordon to Sir E. Baring.
"Khartoum, August 5, 1884.
"We are sending up steamers to Senaar, on Blue Nile, to open route. Arabs have left our vicinity in nearly all directions. When steamers come back we hope to recapture Berber by surprise, to place garrison in it, and Stewart and Power will descend Nile to Dongola and communicate with you. The garrison of Berber (to which I shall give provisions for three months) will be the Egyptian troops from this place; and I also shall make the foreign Consuls go down to Berber. I can look after security of Berber for two months, after which time I cannot be longer responsible for it, and you must relieve it from Dongola, or let the garrison perish and Berber be again taken by Arabs. You will dislike this arrangement, perhaps, but I have no option; and it would entail no risks to you, seeing that Berber will be held during your advance.
"All well here, and troops elated at the result of their recent victories."
Notwithstanding every effort to get the troops up the river as rapidly as possible, so many difficulties intervened that the task occupied much longer than had been anticipated. Early in November Wolseley telegraphed that, owing to steamers breaking down, difficult coaling, and scarcity of native labour, he did not expect to concentrate his force at Ambukol, on the Nile just above Old Dongola, until the end of the year.
The necessity for pushing forward with all possible despatch was made clear to Wolseley by a letter of much later date, received from Gordon on the 17th November, saying that he could hold out for forty days with ease, but that after that time it would be difficult. The following is an extract:—
"Khartoum, 4th November, 1884.
"Post came in yesterday from Debbeh, Kitchener, dated 14th October, cypher letter from Lord Wolseley, 20th September last, which I cannot decipher, for Colonel Stewart took the cypher with him. No other communications have been received here since 31st, letter which arrived a week after Stewart's steamer left this.
"At Metammeh, waiting your orders, are five steamers with nine guns. We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult. Terrible about loss of steamer. I sent Stewart, Power, and Herbin down, telling them to give you all information. With Stewart was the journal of all events from 1st March to the 10th September. The steamer carried a gun and had a good force on board.
"Since 10th March we have had up to date, exclusive of Kitchener's 14th October, only two despatches; one, Dongola, with no date; one from Souakim, 5th May; one of same import, 27th April. I have sent out a crowd of messengers in all directions during eight months. I should take the road from Ambukol to Metammeh, where my steamers wait for you. Leontides, Greek Consul-General, Hanswell, Austrian Consul, all right. Stewart, Power, and Herbin went down in the Abbas. Your expedition is for relief of garrison, which I failed to accomplish. I decline to agree that it is for me personally. You may not know what has passed here. The Arabs camped outside Khartoum on the 12th March; we attacked them on the 16th March, got defeated and lost heavily, also a gun. We then from that date had continual skirmishes with Arabs.
*****
"The soldiers are only half a-month in arrears. We issue paper money, and also all the cloth in magazines. All the captives with the Mahdi are well. The nuns, to avoid an Arab marriage, are ostensibly married to Greeks. Slatin is with Mahdi, and has all his property, and is well treated; but I hear to-day he is in chains.
"A mysterious Frenchman105 is with Mahdi, who came from Dongola. We have got a decoration made and distributed, with a grenade in the centre; three classes—gold, silver, pewter. Kitchener says he has sent letters and got none in reply. I have sent out during last month at least ten. Steamer with this leaves to-morrow for Metammeh. Do not let any Egyptian soldiers come up here; take command of steamers direct, and turn out Egyptian fellaheen. If capture of steamer with Stewart is corroborated, tell French Consul-General that Mahdi has the cypher he gave Herbin. Hassen Effendi, telegraph clerk, was with Stewart. You should send a party to the place to investigate affairs and take the steamer."
On the 15th November, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley to know how the information in Gordon's letter affected his plans. In reply, his Lordship, who had gone back to Wady Halfa, to hurry forward the expedition, stated that Gordon's letter made no change in his plans, but that it seemed to indicate the almost impossibility of Gordon's relief without fighting, adding that he, Wolseley, had sent Gordon the following message:—"Wady Halfa, November 17, 1884. Yours of 4th inst. received 17th; the first I have had from you. I shall be at Kasr Dongola in four days."
A few days later an Arab merchant who arrived at Dongola from Khartoum vi Shendy and Ambukol, and who had come by the desert route, stated that both water and fodder were plentiful. This news was confirmed by a messenger who returned to Dongola from Khartoum on the 19th November.
On the 28th a messenger sent by Gordon arrived at Dongola with a letter addressed to the Khedive, Nubar Pasha, and Baring, in cypher, and dated as far back as the 9th September. The letter began:—
"There is money and provisions in Khartoum for four months, after which we shall be embarrassed."
A telegram from Gordon to Sir E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, undated, but received 29th November, gave the following details:—
"Seeing now that the Nile is high, and steamers can go as far as Berber, I have formed an expedition of 2,000 men of the Khartoum garrison, which will proceed by steamers in order to rescue the Mudirieh of Berber from the hands of the rebels. After its recovery this force will remain at Berber with food for two months only, and if in that time the relieving army does not reach Berber in order to reinforce it, the Nile will have fallen and the islands will be dry, and the same result will ensue as before. Therefore it is to be hoped that the necessary troops will be sent to seize the Ghesireh of Berber while the Nile is high; and Stewart is going down in the small steamer, the Abbas, to proceed to Dongola by way of Berber, in order to communicate (with you) on the Soudan question."
On the 29th November a messenger who had been despatched with a letter to Gordon, but had been taken prisoner not far from Khartoum, and had subsequently made his escape, came into camp. He reported that the Mahdi's troops were suffering from disease, food was very dear, the Arabs were deserting, but the Kordofan men were faithful to him; that Gordon sent to the Mahdi, inviting him, if he were the real Mahdi, to dry up the Nile and cross over; that five hundred regulars recently went over to Gordon; that the regulars still with the Mahdi were discontented; that on the 14th he saw an attack made on Khartoum between the Blue and White Niles; that it was repulsed, and the Mahdi, who was looking on, was very angry because it had been made without his orders.
Aware that time was of paramount importance, Wolseley, in order to stimulate his men to exertion, offered a prize of £100 to the battalion which should make the quickest passage from Sarras to Debbeh, twenty miles further up the river, a measure which was much criticized by a portion of the British Press.106
Wolseley now gave orders for the formation of a small naval brigade, to be commanded by Lord Charles Beresford, his naval aide-de-camp.107
On the 23rd November, some cases of smallpox having occurred at Dongola, Sir Herbert Stewart started to select another camping-ground at Debbeh, a little further up the river.
All the remaining troops destined to take part in the expedition reached Wady Halfa by the end of November, with the exception of the 1st battalion of the Cameron Highlanders, which remained at Korosko.
The advance in force from Dongola commenced on the 2nd December, from which date the troops as they arrived were moved on beyond Debbeh to Ambukol, where a depÔt for supplies had been formed and placed in charge of Stewart. The head-quarters were established at the latter place on the 12th December. From Ambukol the force was moved a few miles further up the river to Korti, a much healthier spot.
Sir Herbert Stewart, with the Mounted Infantry and Guards' Camel Corps, reached Korti on the 15th December, after a march along the east bank of the Nile.
Wolseley's arrival at Korti on the 16th was followed by that of the South Staffordshire Regiment. The last companies of the South Staffordshire, with part of the Sussex Regiment, reached the front on the 22nd, and they were speedily followed by other detachments. The Light Camel Corps, under Colonel M'Calmont, arrived on the 24th, after a twenty days' march from Wady Halfa, and at the same time the Heavy Camel Corps came up from Debbeh. General Buller, the Chief of the Staff, reached the front soon afterwards.
Of the Nile journey Wolseley reported to Lord Hartington, "The English boats have up to this point fulfilled all my expectations. The men are in excellent health, fit for any trial of strength, as the result of constant manual labour."
As a commentary on the above, it may be mentioned that nine out of sixteen boats which brought up some of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment were lost, and the remainder, owing to the slightness of their build, had to be patched with tin to prevent their sinking—over fifty boats in all were lost. There can be no doubt as to the "constant manual labour" mentioned by Lord Wolseley. The men arrived in a deplorable plight, many of them without either boots or trousers. A more ragged set of soldiers never arrived at the seat of war. According to one account there was literally not a sound garment in the whole column, and the men resembled Falstaff's ragged regiment rather than a body of British troops.
By Christmas Day, a great part of the expeditionary force was concentrated at Korti.108
It now became necessary to decide upon the route to be adopted by the expeditionary force in order to reach Khartoum. The one important question to consider was that of time; already the journey up the river had taken much longer than was expected. The season during which military operations could be carried on was limited, and if, as had been intended, the expedition was to return before the hot weather there was not a day to spare. Moreover, Gordon's latest communications showed that he was rapidly running short of provisions, and if not speedily relieved Khartoum must fall.
As a military operation, the route by the Nile offered many advantages, and had time permitted there is no doubt that Wolseley's whole force would have gone that way. But the distance to be traversed requiring months for its accomplishment, rendered it imperative to adopt some other expedient if Gordon was to be relieved at all. Under these circumstances, it was determined to divide the expeditionary force into two columns, one to proceed across the desert to Metammeh, a distance of 185 miles, and thence to Khartoum, and the other to proceed by the river up the Nile Valley.
Shortly stated, Wolseley's plans for the campaign were as follows:—
1st. By despatching a column across the desert to Metammeh to secure the shortest passage to Khartoum, and at the same time to hold the wells at Gakdul and Abu Klea, and to occupy Metammeh whilst communications were maintained with Gordon.
2nd. By despatching a second column along the Nile Valley to disperse the rebels around Hamdab, fifty-two miles distant from Korti, to punish the Monassir tribes for the murder of Colonel Stewart, to leave Berti in safety, to rid Abu Hamid of the enemy, and to open up the desert route from thence to Korosko, whence stores and ammunition for an attack on Berber would be forwarded. Thus covering a great bend of the Nile, the column would operate on Berber, dislodge the rebels there, and join hands with the other column on the banks of the Nile at Metammeh.
In a letter to the Secretary at War, Wolseley gives the reasons for adopting the above plan of operations in the following words:—
"I had always thought it possible that upon arrival here I might find it necessary to operate beyond this point in two columns—one continuing up the river in our English-built boats, while the other pushed rapidly across the desert to Metammeh, and it was with the view of securing to myself the power of moving across this desert that I proposed the formation of a Camel Brigade.
"Any march across this desert with a small column, as an isolated operation, would be hazardous, and for the purpose of my mission a most useless undertaking. Such a column would most probably be able to fight its way into Khartoum; possibly it might fight its way out again; but it could never bring away General Gordon and his garrison in safety. Undertaken, however, under present circumstances, the march of a small force across this desert presents a very different aspect. The so-called Mahdi and his supporters are well aware that they have to deal not only with it, but also with the English army, which they know is advancing up the Nile on Khartoum by Abu Hamid and Berber. Upon arrival here I had to decide whether I should keep all my force together and follow the Nile Valley to Khartoum, or to divide it into two columns—one following the river, while the other was pushed rapidly across to Metammeh.
"If I were not restricted by time, the first course would be by far the most satisfactory, the safest, and would insure the best results; but I know that General Gordon is pressed by want of food, and the hot season is not far off, when military operations in this country are trying to the health of European soldiers. I therefore decided upon the last-mentioned course."
The first, or Desert column, was placed under the command of Sir Herbert Stewart, and consisted of men mainly belonging to different sections of the Camel Corps; a company of the Royal Engineers, part of the 19th Hussars, and detachments of the Commissariat and Medical Corps. The force was to be accompanied by 2,000 camels for the purposes of transport. Sir Charles Wilson was to proceed with Stewart, and to the former was allotted the task of opening up communication with Gordon when once the Nile should be struck at Metammeh.
Lord Charles Beresford and a small body of seamen were told off to accompany the force, to take possession of any of Gordon's steamers which might be found at Metammeh. A detachment of infantry was to proceed to Khartoum by the steamers, and Sir Charles Wilson was empowered on entering Khartoum to march his men through the city to show the people that British troops were at hand, but he was directed only to stay long enough to confer with Gordon.
The Nile column was placed under Major-General Earle, and consisted of the Staffordshire and Duke of Cornwall's Regiments, the Black Watch, the Gordon Highlanders, a squadron of the 19th Hussars, a battery of Egyptian Artillery, an Egyptian Camel Corps, and the auxiliary native troops of the Mudir of Dongola. The whole, with transport, numbered about 3,000 men.
