In May, 1898, preparations began for the advance on Omdurman. The Egyptian head-quarters were moved forward to Fort Atbara, where three months' provisions for 25,000 men were directed to be accumulated. Though every article had to be sent up from Lower Egypt, this was rendered less difficult by the recent completion of the railway (hitherto carried as far only as Luxor) connecting Cairo with Shellal, as well as by the prolongation of the military line to Abadieh, twelve miles north of Berber.

At Abadieh a naval arsenal, with workshops and factories, was established. Here the new screw gunboats Sultan, Melik, and Sheikh, which had arrived from England in sections, were put together and launched. Meanwhile, pending the advance, Gatacre's brigade, in their summer camp at Darmali, were being exercised in route marching and manoeuvring, to keep them in training. The men had by this time got accustomed to the heat, and suffered but little sickness.

Early in June, there being no immediate fighting in view, the Sirdar left for Cairo, and later on paid a flying visit to England. Several of the British officers also went on leave.

On the 22nd, the views of the British Government with regard to the impending advance were stated in the House of Commons by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in introducing the proposal to remit the loan contracted by Egypt in 1897 for the expenses of the Dongola Expedition. The Chancellor of the Exchequer declared that the Government did not contemplate the undertaking of any further military operations on a large scale, or involving any considerable expense, for the recovery of the great provinces to the south of Khartoum. "What we do anticipate," he went on to say, "is that expeditions may be made by the gunboat flotilla, which will be at the disposal of the Administration, to free the waterway of the Nile from any interference with the perfect freedom of commerce with the interior, so far as it can be carried on by that waterway."

In July the British Government decided to strengthen the Sirdar's force by additional troops, in the shape of another British brigade, together with cavalry and artillery. The British force which it was proposed to put in the field was a division consisting of two brigades, under General Gatacre. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General H. G. Wauchope, was formed of the battalions which had fought at the Atbara, viz., the Warwicks, Lincolns, Seaforths, and Camerons; the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General the Hon. A. G. Lyttelton, consisted of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards from Gibraltar, the 1st Battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the 2nd Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers from Cairo, and the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade from Malta. In addition, there were the 21st Lancers from Cairo, a Maxim battery manned by a detachment of the Royal Irish Fusiliers from Alexandria, two field batteries (32nd and 37th) of the Royal Artillery, and details of Royal Engineers, Army Service and Medical Corps, making a total strength of about 7,500 men.

The Egyptian force which was to co-operate was also increased by another brigade. The whole was to consist of a division, under the command of Major-General Hunter, composed of four brigades, viz., the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, under Macdonald, Maxwell, and Lewis respectively, and a 4th brigade under Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Collinson, composed of the 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Battalions. The cavalry were to be ten squadrons, besides eight companies of the Camel Corps. The artillery force was to consist of one horse and four field batteries, and one Maxim battery.

The total Egyptian force represented about 12,500 men.

Fort Atbara was the point upon which, early in August, the British and Egyptian troops began to concentrate. Lewis's (3rd) brigade had already gone on ahead to cut firewood for the steamers, and establish depÔts of stores at Nasri Island, ten miles below the Sixth Cataract. From there Lewis went on to Wad Habeshi, where the rapids commence.

The Egyptian troops were the earliest arrivals at Atbara, which soon became a scene of bustle and activity. The railway, by this time extended to within a short distance of the camp, lent important aid in bringing forward both men and supplies. The gunboats, increased by the new additions to ten in number, also materially assisted in the work of transport.

The Nile had risen superbly, and no difficulty was experienced in passing up the cataracts.

The next point of concentration was fixed at Wad Hamid, a short distance from Wad Habeshi, already mentioned, and but little time was lost in sending the troops forward.

On one day, viz., the 3rd August, no less than six Soudanese battalions left Atbara. The cavalry and transport animals went forward along the western bank of the Nile. As the black soldiers left, the white ones began to arrive. Even before the last of the steamers conveying the six Egyptian battalions had started, the first half of the Rifle Brigade appeared, the remainder turning up on the following day. The regiment had left Cairo on the 27th and 28th July, proceeding by rail to Shellal, above the First Cataract, thence by steamer to Wady Halfa, and then by rail vi Abu Hamid to Atbara. General Wauchope and his staff came up on the 5th, closely followed by the artillery, the Grenadier Guards, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the 21st Lancers, and the rest of the 2nd British brigade.

It is worthy of observation that, notwithstanding the railway connection established between Cairo and Assouan, recourse had once more to be had to the steamers of Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son for the transport of the horses belonging to the British brigade from Khizan, on the river just below Luxor, to Assouan.167

On the 13th steamers with the 1st (British) Brigade (Gatacre's) from Darmali passed Atbara, going direct to Wad Hamid. The same day, whilst many of the troops were still waiting for the means of transport, the Sirdar took his departure for the front. After he left, and up to the 21st, more Egyptian troops continued to arrive. Some of them had marched all the way from Souakim, and others had toiled up against the stream from Merawi.

All were hurried forward from Atbara as fast as the means of transport would allow. No sooner did a steamer return from the front than she was refilled and sent off again packed to overflowing with a fresh batch of men.

By the 23rd August all but the last boat-load of soldiers had arrived at Wad Hamid. The Camel Corps, following the route taken by the Desert Column under Stewart in 1885, had marched across the Bayuda desert to Metammeh, and thence to the front. Abu Klea was found still white with Dervish bones. Metammeh, the scene of the slaughter of the Jaalins in 1897, presented an aspect of utter desolation. When first visited by Englishmen after the Jaalin massacre, human remains lay about the town in heaps, but the tribe had since removed and buried these. One ghastly souvenir still existed in the shape of a gallows, with portions of eight men suspended thereon.

Meanwhile from Wad Hamid reconnaissances had been pushed on as far as Shabluka, at the southern end of the Sixth Cataract, which place, as well as the gorge leading to it, was found to be evacuated. The entrance to the Shabluka gorge, where the river is only 300 yards wide, was defended by four forts with embrasures, and might have formed a strong position against any force approaching by the river. It had, however, the disadvantage of being liable to be easily turned by troops operating on land, and probably for this reason the Khalifa, instead of making a stand at Shabluka, as had been expected, had left the place to take care of itself.

The reconnaissance was continued to the island of Jebel Royan, about thirty-four miles from Khartoum, whence, from an elevated position, a distant view of Omdurman and the white tomb of the Mahdi was obtained. The first person to set eyes on the spot which formed the object of the expedition was Major Staveley Gordon, the nephew of Gordon Pasha. An advance post was established at Jebel Royan, and thither the stores which had been accumulated at Nasri Island were now transferred.

On the 23rd, preparatory to the further advance, the Sirdar held a review of the assembled forces, British and Egyptian, and the next day the troops began moving off in successive divisions. The cavalry and Camel Corps were the first to start, closely followed by General Hunter and the whole of the Egyptian division. On the 25th the British division marched out, and Wad Hamid was evacuated. The heat that day is described as most oppressive, and the march over the loose sand told severely on the men, and especially on those of the newly-arrived 2nd Brigade, who fell out in numbers. The steamers, most of them towing long trains of lighters, accompanied the force, whilst others scouted ahead. There being plenty of water in the cataract, the flotilla passed up without trouble.

After halting by the way the whole force, on the 27th, was assembled at El Hajir, opposite Jebel Royan. Whilst there news arrived of a disaster which had occurred to the gunboat Hafir. The vessel, when near Shendy, sprang a leak, and suddenly sank within a few yards of the shore. Fortunately no lives or stores had been lost.

The troops rested at El Hajir till 5 p.m. on the 28th, and then marched to Wady Abid, where a zeriba was made. The whole of the next day was spent at Wady Abid, where, on the night of the 29th, a terrific storm broke over the camp, deluging everything, and causing considerable discomfort. At 3 a.m. on the 30th the reveille was sounded, and soon after the men, drenched to the skin, set out for Sayal. On the 31st Sayal was evacuated, and the troops moved on to Suruab. The same day the gunboats shelled the Dervish advance camp at Kerreri.

On the night of the 31st another storm of wind and rain was experienced, which destroyed the field telegraph in places, and interrupted the telegraph communication for some days.

On the 1st September, the final advance was made to Egeiga, a village only six miles north of Omdurman. The troops started early, amid heavy rain. Several deserted villages were passed, and a little after midday a short halt for refreshments was made, at a place called El Gubeih, not far from Egeiga, which was reached an hour later. Patrols of Dervish horsemen had been frequently seen during the march, falling back before the cavalry, and their outposts were driven in beyond Egeiga.

Some time before the main body of the army had reached Egeiga, the cavalry, striking off in a south-westerly direction, reached the slopes of Jebel Surgham, nearly a mile beyond. From this point, at noon, the entire Dervish army was seen drawn up in battle array in the desert outside the city. They were in five divisions, and their numbers were estimated at 35,000 men.168

It soon became evident that this huge force had not come out for the mere purpose of being looked at. It began steadily to advance, with a line in front extending over three miles. At one time the enemy halted, and then again moved forward.

The cavalry then proceeded to fall back on Egeiga, where the main body of the army, receiving news that the Dervishes were advancing to the attack, had hurriedly moved out and formed up in position.

After following the retiring troops for some time, the vedettes at 2 p.m. reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. So rapid was the Dervish advance that they all but came into action with the rear squadrons of the reconnoitring force.

Beyond a few shots exchanged between the Lancers and the enemy's scouts nothing further happened, and the Sirdar's troops, after remaining in position all the afternoon, retired at nightfall to their camp.

Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, had proceeded at daylight on the 1st towing the 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery in barges. Steaming up the east bank, with the aid of a party of friendlies, they cleared that side of the river. Several villages were found occupied, but these the friendlies took one after another.

On the steamers approaching Halfiyeh three forts opened on them. The gunboats returned the fire and soon silenced the works, which were then occupied by the friendlies. As the steamers, proceeding in line ahead, rounded Tuti Island, at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, they were fired on by the forts, both at Khartoum and at Omdurman. The fire, though fairly heavy, was ill directed, and did no harm. A suitable spot having been found on the east bank, the howitzer battery was landed and at once brought into action.169 After a few rounds at a range of 3,000 yards, the dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially destroyed. The superior weight and accuracy of the steamers' guns ended the naval part of the fight almost as soon as it was begun, and the flotilla, leaving the Tamaai and Nazir to guard the battery, returned down stream to rejoin the army at Egeiga.

The night of the 1st September was an anxious one for everybody in the Sirdar's camp. Less than five miles separated the opposing armies. Information had been received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack upon the position, and preparations to repel it were made. The men all lay down fully dressed on the sand with their arms and accoutrements beside them. Though the moon was at its full only twenty-four hours before, the night being cloudy, there was not much light. The gunboats from time to time flashed their electric rays on Jebel Surgham and the surrounding country with a view to discovering any signs of a Dervish advance. At the same time, natives from the village of Egeiga were sent out in the direction of the enemy's camp to obtain information, so as to give the idea that the Sirdar intended to make a night attack, and in the expectation that this, coming to the Khalifa's knowledge, would decide him to remain in his position. As a result the ruse succeeded perfectly, and, with the exception of two false alarms which occurred, the night passed away tranquilly enough.

In not making a night attack the Khalifa lost a grand opportunity. Had he taken advantage of the comparative obscurity to hurl his enormous force upon the Sirdar's position there is no saying what might have been the result. The rifle fire of the British and Egyptian troops, which was the thing the Dervish leader had most to fear, would have been far less effective than by daylight, and might not have been successful in stopping at all points the Dervish rushes. Had the enemy once succeeded in breaking the line of troops and engaging hand to hand with, say, the Egyptian divisions, the difficulty of coming to their aid in the darkness and confusion would have been considerable, and though the ultimate result might have been favourable, it could only have been attained by an enormous loss of life.