Any history of the military operations in Egypt, during the period comprised in the accompanying chapters, would be incomplete without a notice of the events which were in the meantime taking place in the Eastern Soudan.

In May, 1885, when Graham's force withdrew from Souakim, General Hudson took over the command. The troops left to protect the town consisted of 930 Europeans, 2,405 Indians, and the Egyptians forming the regular garrison.

Osman Digna, with the greater part of his followers, was again at Tamaai, and had also a small force at Hasheen. The fall of Kassala soon after, by setting free the besieging force, enabled Osman still further to strengthen his position in the neighbourhood of Souakim.142 Under these circumstances, General Hudson was compelled to remain strictly on the defensive.

It would be both long and wearisome to attempt to describe the various incidents which occurred during many of the succeeding months.

Day after day the Dervish scouts approached the forts, and cavalry patrols went out and fired upon them; night after night parties of the enemy took up positions from which they fired on the town, and remained until dislodged by the shell fired from the forts and from the man-of-war stationed in the harbour. Thus Souakim continued to be besieged, the enemy refraining from any serious attack, and devoting themselves principally to raiding the friendly tribes in the adjoining territory.

On 11th May, 1886, the remainder of the British and Indian troops left, and Major Watson took command as Governor-General of the Eastern Soudan. The garrison at this time consisted of 2,500 Egyptians.

In June, the prospect began to brighten. The Dervishes withdrew their patrols round Souakim, and evacuated Hasheen and Handoub. The friendlies then began to take courage, and made advances upon Tamaai, which they blockaded, and eventually occupied on 11th September, the Soudanese garrison retiring with loss into a fort near the village.

On the 7th October the friendlies scored a further success. After being twice repulsed, they assaulted and took the fort after an hour's fighting, killing some 200 of the defenders and capturing eighteen guns.

The redoubtable Osman Digna, being wanted at Omdurman, had previously withdrawn, and no hostile force now remained in the Eastern Soudan. Two thousand pounds was paid to the friendlies by way of subsidy, and trade with the interior was opened.

In November, Colonel Kitchener, who had succeeded Major Watson, reported "the collapse of Osman Digna's power," and a season of greater tranquillity than Souakim had known for years was experienced.

In January, 1887, affairs at Souakim had even further settled down, and many of the hostile tribes expressed a desire to come to terms, but, in June, news arrived that from 2,000 to 3,000 Dervishes, mostly Baggaras, were advancing from Kassala to relieve Tokar, at that time besieged by the friendlies. The arrival of the Baggaras at Tokar tended to revive the fanatical spirit at that place, but had not much influence on the surrounding tribes, who refused to present themselves there when summoned by Osman Digna.

In July, Osman was again called to Omdurman, and in his absence nothing particular was done in the neighbourhood of Souakim. During the autumn, things looked so peaceful that the garrison was reduced by the withdrawal of two battalions, and news of this circumstance reaching Osman, who had then returned to Kassala, he at once collected some 5,000 men and marched to Handoub. By 18th December he was again master of the whole country up to the walls of Souakim, which once more was in a state of siege. On 17th December, an attack was made on the Water Forts, and repulsed. A deserter reported that at Handoub and Tamaai a fighting force of 5,000 men was preparing to capture Souakim by a rush, and that the scheme would be carried out at daybreak very shortly.

In January, 1888, frequent night attacks were made; but they were invariably repulsed by the fire from the men-of-war in the harbour. On the 17th, a party of friendlies attacked the Dervish camp at daybreak. Mounted troops from Souakim went in support. The friendlies surprised and captured the enemy's camp. Then the Dervishes scattered in the pursuit re-entered the position from the rear, and drove off the friendlies with considerable loss. The whole Egyptian force then retreated to Souakim, pursued for four or five miles by the victorious Dervishes. In this engagement Kitchener and Lieutenant McMurdo were wounded, and eleven soldiers and friendlies were killed. As a result of the engagement, Kitchener was warned that in future he should not take part in similar operations with British officers or Egyptian regulars.

The intention was to capture Osman Digna, but although seen in the distance, he succeeded in escaping at the moment when the fortune of war appeared to be going against him.

Emboldened by this success, the Dervishes began to display increased activity round Souakim, the neighbourhood of which was infested with marauding bands. On the 3rd March, a large party established themselves by night at a disused position called Fort Hudson, and kept up a continuous fire on the town. On the morning of the 4th, numbers of the enemy were seen advancing, and H.M.S. Dolphin opened fire at 10 a.m. The Egyptian forces, to the number of 450 men, advanced to endeavour to drive the enemy from Fort Hudson, the friendly Amarar tribe assisting. The position, however, was too strong, and they were repulsed. To make matters worse, just at the moment when a reinforcement of the enemy necessitated the retirement a shell from the man-of-war, aimed at the Dervishes, burst among the friendlies, who, suddenly scared, fell back in disorder upon the regulars, who had nothing left to do but retreat with all possible speed. The Dervish force maintained its position during the remainder of the day under a heavy cross-fire. At nightfall the Dervishes drew off and made no further attempt to reoccupy the position. The Egyptian loss in this highly unsuccessful sortie was Colonel Tapp and eight men killed and seventeen wounded, without counting the poor friendlies.

After the affair of the 4th March things resumed a comparatively quiet condition for some months. The enemy's cavalry from time to time came within range, and a few shots were exchanged, but nothing serious was attempted on either side. The inaction of the blockading force was doubtless due in great measure to the dissensions which at this period broke out amongst the hostile tribes, some of whom were anxious to take Souakim by assault, whilst others deemed it useless to make the attempt. The result was a series of quarrels, which nearly led to actual fighting.

On the night of the 17th September, however, the aspect of things changed, and without any previous warning a force of some 500 men of the Jaalin and Baggara tribes intrenched themselves at a distance of 1,000 yards from the Water Forts, with the intention of cutting off the water supply, and commenced firing on the town. This was kept up continuously for some time by day and night, and frequent casualties occurred. On the 22nd the enemy placed a gun on the ridge between the Water Forts, and shelled the town until compelled by the fire from the lines to withdraw.

It was now evident that at any moment a determined attempt might be made to capture the town, and reinforcements were urgently called for. In response to the appeal, an additional vessel of war and another battalion were sent to Souakim.

Meanwhile, the besiegers still continued active in the trenches, which they pushed forward to within 600 yards of the defensive works. Their fire began to get exceedingly accurate, though but little harm was done.

Early in November General Grenfell arrived with two divisions of Horse Artillery and six mortars, which it was hoped would make the enemy's position in the trenches untenable. After taking a survey of the situation, Grenfell decided that it was necessary to drive the Arabs from their trenches as soon as a sufficient force should be assembled to make the operation practicable.

Two more Egyptian battalions, marching viÁ Keneh and Kosseir, reached Souakim in the beginning of December. In addition to this reinforcement, and in consequence of doubts being entertained at home as to how far the Egyptian troops could be relied on to face the Soudanese alone and unsupported, the 2nd Battalion of the Scottish Borderers and 100 of the British Mounted Infantry were sent from Cairo. This brought the entire force up to 750 British troops, 2,000 Egyptians, and 2,000 Soudanese.

A reconnaissance made by the cavalry on the 9th December having been forced to retire before a strong body of the enemy's horsemen, it was recognized that the cavalry force ought to be strengthened. In consequence of this, a squadron of the 20th Hussars was sent from Cairo.

Apprehension being still expressed as to the sufficiency of Grenfell's force, half of the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Regiment was also despatched.

By the 18th, the additional troops had all arrived, and everything was prepared for the impending attack.143 The enemy's trenches were situated between 800 and 900 yards south-west of the two Water Forts, Ghemaiza and Shaata, and extended in a long irregular line. The ground to the west of the northern flank was clear and practicable for cavalry, while to the north of the northern flank was a depression which would enable the troops to form up for attack before coming under fire. This circumstance decided General Grenfell to attack on the north flank, whilst at the same time making a feint on the south flank.

It was arranged to make the attack a surprise, and with this object a naval demonstration was prepared at Mersa Kuwai, eight miles to the north of Souakim, and visible from Osman Digna's camp at Handoub. It was also decided that, previous to the actual attack, the trenches were to be vigorously cannonaded by the guns from the lines, and H.M.S. Racer.

At 6 a.m. on the 20th, the artillery fire commenced along the whole line of defence, and the troops marched out to the attack. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Kitchener, was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 12th Soudanese Battalions; the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Holled-Smith, consisted of the 4th Egyptian Battalion and the 11th Soudanese. The Scottish Borderers and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion marched out independently, and took up a position in the rear of the Water Forts at 6.30 a.m.

The two brigades now advanced to a position parallel to the extreme north flank of the enemy's trenches, where they formed front and moved steadily towards the works. When within 600 yards the troops came under fire. The advance was continued without replying until within 200 yards, when the brigades, advancing by quick rushes and opening a heavy fusillade, reached the trenches and captured them at the point of the bayonet. Here the greatest slaughter took place, and the survivors, attempting to rally on their right flank, were dispersed by the 11th Soudanese, who, in their eagerness to fight, had broken their square and deployed. During the attack on the trenches, the cavalry remained on the right of the infantry, guarding their flank. The Horse Artillery Battery at this period came up and shelled the redoubt on the south flank of the intrenchments, which had also been exposed to a heavy infantry fire from the Welsh Regiment and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion, which had advanced from their position behind the Water Forts. The two Egyptian brigades now cleared the whole line of intrenchments from north to south, and, with the Mounted Infantry on the north flank, poured steady volleys upon the Dervishes, by this time in full retreat upon Handoub.

An attempt made by the enemy's horsemen to work round the right flank of the attacking line at an earlier stage of the action was defeated by the 20th Hussars, who charged and drove them in disorder in the direction of Hasheen.

By 8 a.m. the whole thing was over, the position was taken, and the bugles sounded "Cease firing." The cavalry, however, continued to pursue the retreating enemy, whilst the rest of the troops intrenched themselves in zeribas on the captured position.

The defeat of Osman Digna's followers was most complete. Out of a force of a little over 1,500 men, they had 500 killed either in the fight or during the pursuit. On the other side the loss was insignificant, being only six killed and forty-six wounded. It must be admitted that the Dervish force was vastly inferior in point of numbers to their opponents,144 who also possessed the advantages of superior skill and discipline. Even making every allowance for these circumstances, it is difficult to account for the trifling loss sustained by the Anglo-Egyptian troops, except on the hypothesis that they never, in point of fact, encountered any real resistance. Another circumstance was that the Dervish force was left to defend their position against greatly superior numbers without being reinforced. This may perhaps be explained by the diversion caused by the naval demonstration made at Mersa Kuwai, and which no doubt caused Osman Digna to imagine that a serious attack at that point was also contemplated.

The effect of Grenfell's victory on the local tribes must have been very great, and the idea naturally was that an immediate advance of the Egyptian troops would be made. This, however, formed no part of the General's instructions, which were simply to drive the enemy from their trenches, and on no account to advance against Osman Digna at Handoub.

Before leaving, Grenfell approved plans made for the construction of additional forts and redoubts, so as to prevent the enemy being able in future to intrench themselves within range of the town, and his mission being accomplished, he then returned to Cairo.

The British troops were next withdrawn, and Colonel Kitchener, who was left in command of the garrison of 2,000 men, maintained a purely defensive attitude.