The preceding chapter brings the narrative down to the summer of 1885, at which period the First Edition of the present work was brought to a close.

In the final chapter the errors of British policy in Egypt were dealt with. It was pointed out how the dilatory fashion in which England intervened to suppress the Arabi revolt led to its indefinite prolongation; how when Alexandria had been destroyed, and massacres had taken place all over the country, a British army was sent too late to avert these disasters; how when the Arabi insurrection had been put down, and that of the Mahdi took its place, England reduced the Army of Occupation, and left Egypt to attempt to cope single-handed with the revolt; how in 1884, when Tokar and Sinkat were cut off, England sent an army to the relief of those places only in time to find that they had already fallen; how when many British lives had been sacrificed, and thousands of Soudanese had been slaughtered in the Eastern Soudan, England, instead of crushing Osman Digna and opening the route to Berber, withdrew her troops only to send another expedition in the following year, when too late to accomplish those very objects; finally, how, having sent Gordon to bring away the garrisons in the Soudan, England, again too late, despatched an expedition to his rescue.

The feeble manner in which the reform of Egyptian institutions had been taken in hand was also indicated, and it was pointed out how England, by declaring that her stay in the country was only to be short-lived, added to the difficulty of carrying any of such reforms into effect.

With regard to the Drummond-Wolff Convention of the 24th October, 1885, it was foretold that the inquiry provided for into Egyptian affairs would be illusory, and the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation, which the Convention was to effect, was one of those events which might safely be relegated to the remote future.

It was pointed out that, whatever the future of Egypt under British guidance might be, it was impossible that it could be marked by greater errors than had been witnessed in the past, and, in conclusion, advice was given in the words following:—

"Put the Administration really, instead of nominally and half-heartedly, under English control. Discard all idea of going away in two years, or twenty years, or two hundred years, if the country is not brought to order and prosperity by that time. Declare that as long as England remains she will be responsible for Egyptian finances, and for the safety and property of Europeans. Simplify as much as possible the official staff and system, and take proper steps for securing whatever point may be needed as the frontier."

It is satisfactory to be able to observe that since the above was written much has been done in the way of following the Author's recommendations. The firm attitude adopted with regard to Egypt by Lord Salisbury's Ministry on its accession to office in 1885 has been maintained by succeeding Governments, and with the happiest results. One Egyptian administration after another has been taken in hand, abuses have been suppressed, corruption reduced to a minimum, and order and regularity introduced. The finances have been placed on a sound footing; reforms have been everywhere inaugurated; and tranquillity reigns throughout the country, which has arrived at a pitch of prosperity such as in modern times it has never before attained. In addition, as a result of the improvements made in her military system, Egypt, with England's aid, has been enabled to suppress a formidable insurrection, and to regain the most valuable of her lost provinces.

The different steps by which all this has been brought about may be gleaned, partially at least, from the following pages.