Translation of Prince Gortschakoff’s Circular to the Great Powers, dated St. Petersburg, 21st November 1864.

“The Russian newspapers have described the military operations which have been carried out by a detachment of our troops in the regions of Central Asia, with remarkable success and vast results. It was inevitable that these events should excite attention in foreign countries, and the more so because their theatre lies in regions which are hardly known.

“Our august Master has directed me to explain succinctly, but with clearness and precision, our position in Central Asia, the interests which prompt our action in that part of the world, and the aims which we pursue. The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised states which come into contact with half-savage, wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organisation.

“It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilised state to exercise a certain ascendency over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with. First, we have incursions and pillage to repress. In order to stop these we are compelled to reduce the tribes on our frontier to a more or less complete submission. Once this result is attained they become less troublesome, but in their turn they are exposed to the aggression of more distant tribes. The state is obliged to defend them against these depredations, and chastise those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant and costly expeditions, repeated at frequent intervals, against an enemy whose social organisation enables him to elude pursuit. If we content ourselves with chastising the freebooters and then retire, the lesson is soon forgotten. Retreat is ascribed to weakness, for Asiatics respect only visible and palpable force; that arising from the exercise of reason and a regard for the interests of civilisation has as yet no hold on them. The task has therefore to be performed over again.

“In order to cut short these perpetual disorders we established strong places in the midst of a hostile population, and thus we obtained an ascendency which shortly but surely reduced them to a more or less willing submission. But beyond this line there are other tribes which soon provoke the same dangers, the same repression. The state then finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. It must abandon the incessant struggle and deliver its frontier over to disorder, which renders property, security, and civilisation impossible; or it must plunge into the depths of savage countries, where the difficulties and sacrifices to which it is exposed increase with each step in advance. Such has been the lot of all countries placed in the same conditions. The United States in America, France in Algiers, Holland in her colonies, England in India,—all have been inevitably drawn into a course wherein ambition plays a smaller part than imperious necessity, and where the greatest difficulty is in knowing where to stop.

“Such are the reasons which have induced the Imperial Government to establish itself, on the one side, on the Sir Darya, and, on the other, on the Lake of Issik-Kul, and to consolidate the two lines by advanced forts which, little by little, have penetrated the heart of these distant regions, but have not sufficed to secure tranquillity on the frontier. The cause of this instability lies, firstly, in the existence between the extremities of this double line of forts, of a vast unoccupied tract where the incursions of robber tribes continue to neutralise our attempts at colonisation and our caravan traffic. It is, in the second place, due to perpetual changes in the political aspect of the countries to the south of our border. Turkestan and Kokand are sometimes united, sometimes separated, but are always at war, either with each other or with Bokhara, and offer no probability of settled relations or regular transactions with them.

“Thus, in its own despite, the Imperial Government finds itself reduced to the dilemma already stated: it must allow an anarchy to become chronic which paralyses all security and all progress, and involve distant and expensive expeditions at frequent intervals; or, on the other hand, it must enter on a career of conquest and annexation such as gave England her Indian Empire, in view of dominating in succession the petty independent states whose turbulent habits and perpetual revolts leave their neighbour neither truce nor repose. Neither of these alternatives is in consonance with the object of my august Master’s policy, which aims at restricting the extent of the countries subject to his sceptre within reasonable limits, while it places his rule thereon on firm foundations, guarantees their security, and develops their social organisation, their commerce, well-being, and civilisation.

“Our task, therefore, has been to seek a system fitted to attain the triple object. In this view the following principles have been formulated:—

“(1.) It has been considered indispensable that the two fortified frontier lines, the one stretching from China to Lake Issik-Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral along the lower course of the Sir Darya, should be linked together by a chain of strongholds, so that each fort should be in a position to afford mutual support and leave no space open to the incursions of nomad tribes.

“(2.) It was essential that the line of forts thus completed should be placed in a fertile country, not only in order to assure supplies, but to facilitate regular colonisation, which alone can give an occupied country a future of stability and prosperity, or attract neighbouring tribes to civilised life.

“(3.) It was a matter of urgency to fix this line in a definite manner, in order to escape the danger of being drawn on from repression to reprisals, which might end in a limitless extension of our empire.

“With this object it was necessary to lay the foundations of a system founded not merely on considerations of expediency, but on geographical and political data which are fixed and permanent.

“This system was disclosed to us by a very simple fact, the result of long experience, namely, that nomad tribes which cannot be overtaken, punished, or kept in hand are the worst neighbours possible; while agricultural and commercial populations, wedded to the soil, and given a more highly developed social organisation, afford for us a basis for friendly relations which may become all that can be wished.

“Our frontier-line then should include the first, and stop at the boundaries of the second.

“These three principles afford a clear, natural, and logical explanation of the recent military operations accomplished in Central Asia.

“Moreover, our old frontier, stretching along the Sir Darya to Fort Perovski on one side, and, on the other, as far as Lake Issik-Kul, had the disadvantage of being almost at the edge of the desert. It was interrupted by an immense gap between the farthest points on the east and west. It offered very insufficient supplies to our troops, and left beyond it unsettled tribes with which we could not maintain stable relations.

“In spite of our repugnance to give a wider scope to our dominion, these conditions were powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish a frontier between Lake Issik-Kul and the Sir Darya by fortifying the town of Chimkent, recently occupied by us. In adopting this line we obtain a twofold result. First, the country which it includes is fertile, well-wooded, and watered by numerous streams; it is inhabited in part by Kirghiz tribes which have already acknowledged our supremacy, and therefore offers conditions favourable to colonisation and the supply of our garrisons. Then, it gives us the agricultural and commercial population of Kokand as our neighbours.

“Thus we find ourselves confronted by a more solid and compact social organisation,—one less shifting and better arranged. This consideration marks with geographical precision the limit where interest and reason command us to stop. On the one hand, attempts to extend our rule will no longer encounter such unstable entities as nomad tribes, but more regularly organised states, and will therefore be carried out at the cost of great effort, leading us from annexation to annexation into difficulties the end of which can not be foreseen. On the other hand, as we have as our neighbours states of that description, in spite of their low civilisation and nebulous political development, we hope that regular relations may one day, in our common interest, replace the chronic disorders which have hitherto hampered their progress.

“Such are the principles which are the mainspring of our august Master’s policy in Central Asia; such the final goal which His Imperial Majesty has prescribed as that of his Cabinet’s action.

“There is no necessity to insist on the palpable interest of Russia in restricting the growth of her territory and preventing the advent of complications in distant provinces which may retard and paralyse our domestic development.

“The programme which I have just traced is in strict accord with this policy.

“People of late years have been pleased to credit us with a mission to civilise neighbouring countries on the continent of Asia. The progress of civilisation has no more efficacious ally than commercial relations. These require, in all countries, order and stability as conditions essential to their growth; but in Asia their existence implies a revolution in the manners of the people. Asiatics must, before all things, be made to understand that it is more advantageous to favour and assure trade by caravans than to pillage them. These elementary principles can penetrate the public conscience only when there is a public; that is to say, a social organisation and a government which directs and represents it. We are accomplishing the first portion of this task in extending our frontier to points where these indispensable conditions are to be met with. We accomplish the second when we undertake the duty of proving to neighbouring states, by a policy of firmness as regards the repression of their misdeeds, but of moderation and justice in the employment of armed strength and of respect for their independence, that Russia is not their foe, that she cherishes no designs of conquest, and that peaceful and commercial relations with her are more profitable than disorder, pillage, reprisals, and chronic warfare. In devoting itself to this task the Russian Cabinet has the interests of the empire in view; but we believe that its accomplishment will also serve those of civilisation and humanity at large. We have a right to count upon an equitable and loyal appreciation of the policy which we follow, and the principles on which it is framed.

“Gortschakoff.”