CONTENTS. John Codman Ropes PREFACE CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 1 The general military situation 2 Reasons for taking the offensive 2, 3 Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and BlÜcher 3 Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies 3, 4 Napoleon’s plan 4 As stated in Gourgaud’s Narrative 4 And in the “Memoirs” 5 The other plans which were open to him 6 His expectation that BlÜcher would accept battle single-handed 7,8 NOTE TO CHAPTER I 9 Napoleon’s plan distinguished from certain other plans attributed to him 9 Alison’s view that he threw himself between the two allied armies 10 Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz 10 But adopted by Hooper and Quinet 11 Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day 12 Jomini’s belief, that he did have this intention 12 Adopted by La Tour d’Auvergne 13 And by Charras 13 Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Wellington and Clausewitz 13 Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the Prussians 14,15 CHAPTER II: THE FRENCH ARMY 16 The army as affected by Napoleon’s return from Elba 16 Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon 17 Lack of confidence in the high officers 17 Napoleon’s choice of Soult to take Berthier’s place 17 Soult’s unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff 18 The five corps-commanders 18 Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras 19 Probability of the truth of their views 19 What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants 20 Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment 20 Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to the command of the right wing 21 Napoleon’s error in not taking Marshal Davout with him 22 Estimate of Napoleon’s own bodily and mental vigor at this period 23-24 Portrait of Napoleon by General Foy 23 Estimate of the French Army 24 It was not the best army which Napoleon had ever led 24 But it was a better army than either that of Wellington or of BlÜcher 25 Its strength and composition 25-28 NOTE TO CHAPTER II 29 Napoleon’s health—Gardner—SÉgur 29 The Gudin story 30 Napoleon more or less a sufferer; but on the whole possessed of good health and strength 30, 31 CHAPTER III: THE ALLIED ARMIES 32 Strength and composition of the Prussian army 32, 33 Location of the different corps 33 Temper and spirit of the army 34 Marshal BlÜcher 34 The Duke of Wellington’s army 34 Its strength and composition 35-38 Location of the various divisions 38 Merits and defects of the several parts of the army 39 The generals: the Prince of Orange 40 Lord Hill,—Sir T. Picton 40 The Duke of Wellington 40 The internal economy of the three armies 41, 42 That of the French army 41 That of the English army 42 That of the Prussian army 42 NOTE TO CHAPTER III 43 Defects peculiar to the inexperienced English regiments 43 CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 44 Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi 44, 45 He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th 45 His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout confirm the view above given of his plan of campaign 45 The general order of movement issued on the evening of the 14th of June 45, 46 Accident in the transmission of his orders to General Vandamme on the 15th 46 Desertion of General Bourmont 47 The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediate supervision 47 Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and 16th 48 Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney 48, 49 He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and PirÉ to Frasnes 49 And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies 49 Backwardness of the 1st Corps 50-52 At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 51 D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness 52 Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on the evening of the 15th 53 He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe 53 He expected BlÜcher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wellington 53 He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of the 15th 54 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55 1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff 56 2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 et seq. Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and unsatisfactory 56 A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61 Rogniat’s criticism 57 Napoleon’s answer 57 Charras and Jomini 58, 59 Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations 59 The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon 60 B. The question as regards the non-occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63 (1.) Reasons why the effect on BlÜcher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61 (2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62 3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63 4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64 The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs 64 The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th 65 The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th 65, n. 122 The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value 66-67 The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69 That no mention is made in the written orders of the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69 CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 70 BlÜcher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate at Sombreffe 70 And without consulting Wellington 70 The nature of the understanding between them 70 et seq. MÜffling’s statement generally misunderstood 71 There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details 72 BÜlow’s disobedience of orders 73 Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full information of the situation 73 Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels 74 He retained his headquarters at Brussels 74 He thought it probable that the French would advance by way of Mons 74 Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75 The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance 76 And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P.M. of the 15th 77 Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and 7 P.M. 77 They were simply for the concentration of the various divisions of his army 78 But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78 Information that BlÜcher is concentrating at Sombreffe arrives in the evening at Brussels 78 And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After Orders” which direct a general movement towards the east 79 Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequent orders of the Duke 79 The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 80 MÜffling’s statement 80 The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond 81, n. 170 The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey have been lost 81 The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th 82 They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83 This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton’s division at Waterloo 83 It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M. of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. 182 But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal BlÜcher and the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition 85 Character and meaning of the “Disposition” 86 The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of the Letter to BlÜcher 87-88 Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 88 But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton 88 His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89 NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90 1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo” 90 Its surprising statements 90 2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington and BlÜcher in the event of a French invasion 91 3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness in deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras 92 4. Wellington’s original intention of concentrating at Nivelles considered 93 It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93 A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of BlÜcher at Sombreffe he could run no great risk in concentrating at Quatre Bras 94 B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so 94 If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny 95 C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition 95, 96 5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied armies criticized 96 Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy 96 Opinions of Charras and Napoleon 97, 98 6. Napoleon’s criticism on BlÜcher for fixing Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98 But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at Quatre Bras undeserved 99 Because this decision of Wellington’s was based on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100 CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS 101 Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies Quatre Bras in the afternoon of the 15th 101 And is attacked by Reille’s advance between 5 and 6 P.M. 101 The other brigade of Perponcher’s division, Bylandt’s, ordered there also 102 The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6 A.M. of the 16th 102 NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 103 Maurice’s criticism on the occupation of Quatre Bras by the Dutch-Belgian generals 103 But the fact that they knew of the concentration of the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe fully justifies their course 103,104 CHAPTER VII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON 105 The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A.M. of the 16th 105 And rides at once to Quatre Bras 106 His letter to BlÜcher 106 Comparison of the statements in the Letter with those in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey 107-108 He evidently accepted the “Disposition” as conclusive 108 He rides over to Brye to confer with BlÜcher 108 And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P.M. 109 No doubt expecting to find a large part of his army there 109 DelbrÜck’s theory, that the Duke deliberately misrepresented the situation of his army, entirely unsupported 109, 110 NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 111 1. Actual positions of Wellington’s divisions at 7 A.M. of the 16th 111-113 2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he would have stayed at Quatre Bras,—quÆre 114 3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in the matter of the transmission of intelligence from the front 114-115 CHAPTER VIII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NEY 116 Ney returns from Charleroi to Gosselies at 2 A.M. 116 And at first orders Reille to set out at once for Frasnes 116 But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille, with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to remain in Gosselies 117 He ought to have sent them to Frasnes at once 117 And to have filled their places at Gosselies with the divisions of the 1st Corps 118 He does nothing to bring up the 1st Corps till late in the forenoon 119 Soult’s first order to him on the 16th 120 Received about 6 A.M., and answered before 7 A.M. 120 Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gosselies, with instructions to march to the front at once on receipt of orders from army headquarters 120 About 9 A.M. Reille receives word from Girard that the Prussians are massing at Fleurus 121 And at 10 A.M. he reads the Emperor’s letter to Ney, brought by Flahaut 121 But defers his march to Frasnes till he gets further orders from Ney 122 He gets further orders, and leaves Gosselies at 11.45 A.M. 122 Soult’s second order directs Ney to march on Quatre Bras 122 The Emperor’s letter to Ney 123 The 1st and 2d Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry are all put at Ney’s disposal 123 The third order to Ney from Soult that morning 123, 124 Its peremptory character 124 Ney refuses fully to obey his orders 124 His unwillingness to take the risks which they involve 124 He proposes to keep half his force in reserve 125 NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 126 1. Summary of Ney’s conduct on the morning of the 16th 126 2. He evidently did not intend to obey his orders strictly 127 3. The light his conduct on the 16th throws on his failure to seize Quatre Bras the day before 127 4. No criticism can be made on Napoleon and Soult 128 5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier order to seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX 128 CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 129 Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of the 15th and 16th 129 Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130 The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney’s report of the state of his command had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M. 131 The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left 131, 132 Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness of Ney’s command 132, 133 Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal BlÜcher 134, 135 He seems to have thought this probable 136 But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre Bras 137 The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole army 138 NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139 1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the 16th not deserved 139 Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz 139,n.310 2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night 140 3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies 140 4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution on the part of Napoleon 140 5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies—Chesney and Clinton 141 His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as to this 141, 142 His object was to destroy the allied armies in succession—Jomini 142 CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY: BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT 143 BlÜcher concentrated his army without receiving any assurance of support from Wellington 143 He got Wellington’s letter about noon of the 16th 144 Wellington arrived at Brye at 1 P.M. 144 Their conversation 144 Wellington gave no unconditional promise 145 BlÜcher’s decision to fight was arrived at before he heard from or saw Wellington 146 And on entirely independent grounds 147 NOTE TO CHAPTER X 148 BlÜcher’s reasons for deciding to accept battle at Ligny as given by Damitz 148 He was unwilling to retreat 148 Suggestions of Ollech and DelbrÜck not of any value here 149 BlÜcher expected to concentrate his whole army of 120,000 men 149 And was unwilling to change his decision when he found he could not count upon BÜlow’s arrival 150 CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 151 Position of the Prussian army at Ligny 151 Napoleon examines the position 152 The most obvious plan of battle was to turn the Prussian right 152 But Napoleon decides to attack the centre 153 Positions taken by the French 153, 154 The 2 P.M. order sent to Ney to coÖperate with the main army 154 The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny and St. Amand 154 The 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 155 Napoleon determines about half-past five o’clock to put in the Guard 156 The unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps causes a delay of nearly two hours 157 The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre 158 The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe 159 Losses of the Prussians and French 159 The non-employment of the 6th Corps 159, 160 Extent of the victory 160, 161 It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it had disposed of the Prussians for a time 161, 162 NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 163 1. Napoleon’s delay in beginning the battle 163 His reasons considered 164 2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat and others 164 Napoleon’s reply to Rogniat 165 His reasons for taking the course he did 165 The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered 166 3. Clausewitz’s doubts as to the decisive result of Ney’s movement 167 The question fully stated and Napoleon’s expectations justified 167 4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney 168 5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, considering that he could not absolutely rely on Ney’s coÖperation 169 6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remain and take part in the battle 170 He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come upon the field for this purpose 170 And there was not time to send him orders 170 7. Napoleon’s skill well displayed at Ligny 171 Clausewitz’s review of the battle 171-173 He points out that Napoleon was more economical in the use of his troops than BlÜcher 171 Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davout on Napoleon’s tactics 173 Napoleon not responsible for the error which brought d’Erlon on the field 174 8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the progress of the battle on the appearance of the strange corps (d’Erlon’s),—QuÆre 174-175 9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made use of the 6th Corps 175 CHAPTER XII: THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS 176 RÉsumÉ of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoon of the 16th 176 He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosselies in the early morning 177 He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as he was ordered to do 177 He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions of Bachelu, Foy and PirÉ 178 Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M. 178 Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M. 178 Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M. 178 Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M. 179 At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field 179 Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps 179 Its delay in starting 180 Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St. Amand 180 The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about 5 P.M. 180 It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at Frasnes about 4.30 P.M. 181 This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division had passed through Frasnes 181 Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinary state of things 181 Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon to Quatre Bras 181 It was probably the staff-officer who carried the 2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from the turnpike 182 For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Ney alone was responsible 182 He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and Liberchies 182, 183 In this he deliberately disobeyed orders 183 He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade of Kellermann’s Corps 183 Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven back with loss 184 The French retire to Frasnes 184 The casualties on both sides 184 If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is probable that Wellington would have been badly beaten 184, 185 If Ney had concentrated his whole command between 12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would probably have been evacuated 185, 186 In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist Napoleon 186 Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management 186 Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops	187, 188
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII		189
1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry		189
2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of the matter in his Memoirs		190
But his principal censure on Ney for not having got his command together and used it as a whole, is fully borne out		191
3. Curious error of Siborne’s		191
4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march to Frasnes		192
It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in any event, and therefore cannot be accepted		193
5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order from Soult to d’Erlon		193
Reasons for thinking that this order must have been directed to Ney		194
Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15 P.M. order to Ney		195
The evidence on certain minor points conflicting		196
CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON		197
RÉsumÉ of the campaign up to date		197
Napoleon had no reason for delay		197
He had a disposable army composed almost entirely of fresh troops		197
Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon recover from the defeat of Ligny		198
Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming that part of Wellington’s army which was at Quatre Bras		199
Napoleon’s inactivity on this morning		200
Probably the result of fatigue		200
Ney sends no report to the Emperor		200
Soult’s first order to him to move on Quatre Bras		201
Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long since fallen back		201
Napoleon’s lack of energy and activity this morning		202
Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guard are ordered to Marbais		203
Second order to Ney at noon		203
Girard’s division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny		203
Napoleon’s reasons for supposing that BlÜcher had retired on Namur		203, 204
Of which the principal was that he had on the day before employed so large a part of his army in holding the Namur road		204
Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on the road to Namur		205
Napoleon’s neglect to send out cavalry to explore the country to the north		205
Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians		206
His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy’s remonstrances		207
Grouchy’s points not well taken		207
Grouchy’s denial that he ever received on that day a written order		208
Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux		209
The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictates to Bertrand an order to Grouchy		209
Full text of this order		209,210
This order changes entirely the task assigned to Grouchy		210
He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to separate from the English or to unite with them to cover Brussels or LiÉge in trying the fate of another battle		211
And is left full discretion as to his course in either event		211
Strength and composition of his command		212
He reaches Gembloux that evening		212
And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington		212, 213
Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras		214
At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the pursuit of the English		214
His remark to d’Erlon		215
Interesting picture of the march by the author of “NapolÉon À Waterloo”		215
Skirmish at Genappe		216
The English take up positions south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean		216
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII		217
1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz’s opinion		217
2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre		218
3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—e. g., on Clausewitz		218
4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light		219
On Chesney		219
On Maurice		219
On Hamley		221
On Hooper		222
5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently explicit. Charras’ opinion		222
6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gembloux considered		223
7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur		223
8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities, when so much was at stake		224, 225
CHAPTER XIV: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON		226
Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre		226
Renunciation of the line of Namur		226
But a general concentration at Wavre not necessarily implied		226
Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau’s action		227
Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of union with the English		228
Although he recognized the difficulties attending it		228
And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington		229
BlÜcher carried off the field to Mellery		229
Hardinge’s story of the discussion between BlÜcher and Gneisenau		230
The Prussian generals decide to march to join Wellington		230
Movements of Thielemann and BÜlow		231
Admirable conduct of the Prussian corps-commanders		231
The Prussians fall back on Wavre		232
Leaving a detachment at Mont St. Guibert		232
The artillery trains arrive at Wavre at 5 P.M.		232
Wellington at Quatre Bras on the morning of the 17th		233
His message to BlÜcher sent through Lieut. Massow		233
BlÜcher replies about midnight, promising support		234
Wellington’s uncertainty during the day and evening of the 17th		234
The risk which he ran		235, 236
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV		237
1. Maurice’s correction of Siborne		237
2. The story of the Duke’s ride to Wavre on the evening of the 17th		238-242
Lockhart’s brief statement		239
Lord Ellesmere’s denial of Lockhart’s statement		239
The story as told by the Rev. Julian Charles Young		239-241
Mr. Coltman’s recollection of his father’s statement about it		241
Reasons for rejecting the story		242
3. Napoleon’s criticism on the course of Wellington and BlÜcher after the battle of Ligny		243
Clausewitz denies that Wellington ran any risk		243
His view not tenable		244
The question of the advisability of running the risk stated		244
CHAPTER XV: THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE: GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER		245
Grouchy’s letter from Gembloux of 10 P.M. not really satisfactory		245
But Napoleon and Soult do not give him further instructions or any information		246
Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him		247
Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order		248
Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining the intentions of the Prussians		249
And then left him entire liberty of action		249
Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point		249, 250
Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his orders for the next day to move on Sart-À-Walhain at 6 and 8 A.M.		250
But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussians had retired on Brussels		251
Yet he does not change his orders		252
He should have marched for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak		253
Opinion of Jomini		253
Opinion of Clausewitz		253
Opinion of Charras		253
Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left		254
He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of M. Hollert, a notary		255
He writes a despatch to the Emperor		255
Analysis of this despatch		255, 256
The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard		256
Grouchy’s plain duty		256
GÉrard’s advice		256
Grouchy refuses to follow it		257
And resumes his march on Wavre		257
Condition of the roads and bridges		258
Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after having arrived at La Baraque		259
Three general misconceptions		259
1. As to the place where the sound of the cannon was heard		259
2. As to the necessity of marching by way of Mont St. Guibert		259
3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges		260
Grouchy might have been across by 4 P.M.		260
Positions of the IVth and IId Prussian Corps at that moment		261
And of the Ist Corps		261
Probability that Grouchy would have arrested the march of BÜlow and Pirch I.		261
Zieten’s march, however, would not have been interfered with		261
BÜlow reaches St. Lambert at noon		262
Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearly noon		262
Tardiness of these movements		263
Accounted for by Gneisenau’s distrust of Wellington		263
His postscript to the letter to MÜffling		263
His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelled by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo		264
The combat at Wavre		264, 265
The bridge of Limale carried by the French between 6 and 7 P.M.		265
Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy		265
Analysis of this order		266
Its main object		266
It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course		267
Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructions given to Marbot		268-270
The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon		270
The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy		270, 271
Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on Grouchy		272
The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor had become alarmed		272
NOTES TO CHAPTER XV		273
1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000 men considered		273
This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur		273
For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch army		274
But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that BlÜcher might have undertaken to join Wellington		274
In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move		275
Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct warning		276
Risks incurred by this course		276
It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army		277
2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment of Grouchy		277
But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off BlÜcher		278
3. Importance of treating independently of the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy		279
4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper course given and commented on		280
5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched for Moustier at daybreak		281
It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his march		281
Charras, however, is of a different opinion		282
Examination of his views		282
Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M.		283
And that BÜlow would have stopped to concentrate his corps and fight		283
And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have reinforced BÜlow		284
Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might have continued his march		284
6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’s effecting a crossing after he had arrived at La Baraque		284
His statements as to the Prussian force in the vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported		285
7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart-À-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo		286
Statements of the different narratives		286, 287
He was, however, at Walhain, at the Chateau Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the Notary of Nil St. Vincent		287, 288
CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO		289
Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M.		289
Early in the morning he again goes to the front to see if the English are there		290
His expectation of victory		290
The rÔle which he expected Grouchy to play		290
He does not seem to have drawn the very natural inference that Wellington was expecting BlÜcher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act upon it		291
The rain ceased about 8 A.M.		291
The original intention was to begin the battle at 9 o’clock		292
But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced		292
Napoleon forms the army in three lines		292
His delay in beginning the action criticised		293
And his neglect to send word to Grouchy		294
Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington		294
Whose army was unequal to the shock without the assistance of the Prussians		294
Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course		295
Risks that Wellington took		295
Wellington had had the field surveyed		296
Description of the English position		297
Composition and strength of Wellington’s army		298
Positions of the various troops		299
Hougomont and La Haye Sainte		300
Strength and composition of the French army		301
Positions of the corps		301
Napoleon’s plan of battle		302
Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi turnpike		302
It has been universally commended		303
The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted		303, 304
The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps		304-307
Formation of the troops		305
No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldy formation		305
The attack is made and repulsed		307
Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St. Lambert		307
Capture of La Haye Sainte		307
The great cavalry attacks on the English centre		308
They were made against troops in good condition to stand them		308
Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge of the resistance to the Prussians		308
Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and Planchenoit against their assaults		309
Napoleon’s personal supervision needed		309
The great cavalry charges		309
They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined		310
French batteries placed to the south of La Haye Sainte enfilade the English line west of the turnpike		310
But this was only done to a limited extent		310
The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard		311
Napoleon succeeds in repulsing BÜlow		311
The battle against the English not actively carried on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks		312
But the English line at this period becomes from various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description of it		312
What Napoleon might have accomplished against the English had he not been fighting the Prussians at this time		313
The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon returns to the front		314
Wellington has made every effort to restore his line; its condition to the west of the pike		314
Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack to be made by the Imperial Guard		315
Disposition at this time of the various battalions of the Guard		315, 316
Strength and composition of the attacking force		316
The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs		317
They are formed in columns of battalions and march in Échelon, the right in advance		317
Premature attack of a body of French horse on the left of the Guard		317
No support furnished by Reille		318
Admirable conduct of d’Erlon		318
The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s brigade of guards		319
Captain Powell’s account		319
The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten		320
General Maitland’s account		321
Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett		322
The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue to advance		323
But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment		324
And are completely overthrown		324
The failure of the attack largely due to the absence of supports		324
Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field		324
The French right wing retires in confusion		325
Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur		325
Exertions of Napoleon to restore order		325
He is finally forced to retire		326
The French retreat blocked at Genappe		326
The result of the battle due to the intervention of the Prussians		327
Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained BÜlow and Pirch I.		328
Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat		328
NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI		329
1. The French tactics generally censured		329
Napoleon and Ney both to blame		329
Injurious effect on the French chances of success of Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit		330
The attack on Hougomont criticised		330
The defence of Planchenoit praised		331
2. The English tactics exceedingly good		331
3. The attack of the Imperial Guard		331
A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns		332
B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered		333
The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses		334
The great credit due to Colborne		335
4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered		336
Zieten’s intervention not anticipated		336
The English reported as growing weaker		337
Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left		337
Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both respects		337
The charge of the Guard might have been properly supported		338
Contrast between Ney and Wellington		338
Note on Ney’s state of mind		338, n. 777
5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended		339
6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance of Grouchy’s force marching from the Dyle		339
7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption of Zieten’s Corps		340
The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch army at the close of the action		341
8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy for the intervention of the Prussians		341
Both are responsible for it		342
CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS		343
The principal points treated of in this book		343-350
Appendix A.
On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs		351
Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others		351
Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory		352
He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the orders which he gave		352
Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the 16th		352
The same thing probably true as to the order sent to Grouchy		353
The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probably never sent		354
And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten		354
Appendix B.
On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order		355
Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published in Philadelphia that he received on the 17th any written order		355
He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand order was among the major-general’s papers		356
Publication of the order in 1842		357
It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs		357
Original text of the Bertrand Order		358
Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 10 P.M., June 17, given in full		359
It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order		360
Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of this report		360
Object of the change		360
No doubt as to the correct reading		361
Appendix C.
I.	Napoleon’s Address to his army, June 14, 1815	362
II.	Order of movement, June 14, 1815	363
III.	Order to the Count Reille, 8.30 A.M., June 15, 1815	366
IV.	Order to the Count d’Erlon, 10 A.M., June 1815	367
V.	Order to the Count d’Erlon, 3 P.M., June 15, 1815	367
VI.	Subsequent Order to the Count d’Erlon, June 15, 1815	367
VII.	Order to Gen. NoguÈs, 3 A.M., June 16, 1815	368
VIII.	Bulletin of the army, June 15, 1815, evening	369
IX.	Wellington’s first Memorandum of Orders, June 15, 1815	370
X.	Wellington’s letter to the Duc de Feltre, 10 P.M., June 15, 1815	371
XI.	Wellington’s “After Orders,” 10 P.M., June 15, 1815	371
XII.	Extract from Wellington’s Report of the Operations, June 19, 1815	372
XIII.	Wellington’s Conversation with the Duke of Richmond, June 16, 1815	373
XIV.	Wellington’s Orders to Lord Hill, June 16, 1815	374
XV.	Extract from Wellington’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo”	374
XVI.	Wellington’s Letter to BlÜcher, 10.30 A.M., June 16, 1815	376
XVII.	Soult’s first order to Ney, June 16, 1815	377
XVIII.	The Emperor’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815	377
XIX.	Count Reille’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815	379

Ney’s Orders to Reille and d’Erlon, June 16, 1815

Soult’s formal Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815

Soult’s second Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815

Flahaut’s Letter to the Duke of Elchingen

Napoleon’s Letter to Grouchy, June 16, 1815

The 2 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney

The 3.15 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney

Soult’s Letter to Ney, June 17, 1815

Soult’s Order to Ney, 12 M., June 17, 1815

Capt Bowles’ story of Wellington at Quatre Bras, June 17, 1815

Grouchy’s report to Napoleon from Sart-À-Walhain, 11 A.M., June 18, 1815

General Order of preparation for the Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815

Order for the attack to begin at 1 P.M., June 18, 1815

The 10 A.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy

The 1 P.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy

A PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN.1

ALISON:

History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, LL. D. New Edition with Portraits. Vols. XIII and XIV. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, MDCCCL.

BATTY:

An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre-Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. By Captain Batty, of the First or Grenadier Guards. 2d Edition, Considerably Enlarged. London, 1820.

BAUDUS:

Études sur NapolÉon. Par le lieutenant-colonel de Baudus, ancien aide-de-camp des MarÉchaux BessiÈres et Soult. 2 Vols. Paris: DebÉcourt: 1841.

BERTON:

PrÉcis, historique, militaire et critique, des batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo. Avec une Carte. Par le MarÉchal-de-Camp Berton. Paris: Delaunay. 1818.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CAMPAIGN:

Prepared, with critical estimates, in October, 1875, by Justin Winsor, now Librarian of Harvard College, in Bulletin No. 35 of the Public Library of the City of Boston, of which Mr. Winsor was then Librarian. It includes a notice of Maps and Plans.

Colonel Chesney gives a list of works cited by himself just after the Table of Contents in his Waterloo Lectures.

Colonel Maurice in his book entitled “War,”—London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1891,—gives in the Appendix, pp. 128 et seq., a list of books relating to the campaign of Waterloo,—with comments and estimates.

BROWNE:

Wellington: or Public and Private Life of Arthur, first Duke of Wellington. By G. Lathom Browne. London, W. H. Allen & Co. 1888.

BULLOCK’S DIARY:

Journal of R. H. Bullock, 11th Light Dragoons. English Historical Magazine. July, 1888.

CAMPAGNE DE LA BELGIQUE:

Contenant

1. L’Ode sur la Bataille de Waterloo ou de Mont St. Jean:

2. Relation Belge sur la Bataille de Waterloo, et de la part qu’y a prise la troisiÈme division militaire du Royaume des Pays Bas:

3. Relation FranÇaise, par un tÉmoin oculaire:

4. Campagne de Walcheren et d’Anvers; 1809:

5. Relation Anglaise, traduite sur le texte, publiÉe À Londres en Septembre dernier.

Bruxelles, 1816. (With a portrait of the Prince of Orange, and maps.)

CHARRAS:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Waterloo: Par le Lt-Colonel Charras. 5me Édition, revue et augmentÉe. Avec un Atlas nouveau. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. (No date.)

CHESNEY:

Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815. By Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E., late Professor of Military Art and History in the Staff College. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

CHURCHILL’S LETTER:

Letter to his father written by Major Chatham Horace Churchill, of the 1st Foot Guards, Aide to General Lord Hill. (Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 2, 14, 92, and Appendix.) The letter was first printed in the Life of Sir William Napier, pp. 175 et seq. It was reprinted, with some omissions and some additions, in an English magazine called Atalanta, in November, 1887, where it erroneously said to have been “hitherto unpublished.” The writer’s name is not given. Mr. Dalton, the compiler of the Waterloo Roll Call, states in the Appendix (p. 235) that a copy of the letter is in his possession. It would be well worth while to republish it textually with notes.

CLAUSEWITZ:

Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz.

Zweite Auflage. Berlin: Ferd. DÜmmler’s Verlagsbuchhandlung: 1862.

CLINTON:

The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington’s Campaigns in France and Belgium. With original maps and plans. By H. R. Clinton. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1878.

CORRESPONDANCE de NapolÉon 1er, publiÉe par ordre de l’Empereur NapolÉon III.

Tome XXVIII.

Tome XXXL Œuvres de NapolÉon 1er À St. HÉlÈne. Paris: Imprimerie ImpÉriale. 1869.

COTTON:

A Voice from Waterloo: a history of the battle, &c. By Sergeant-major Edward Cotton, late 7th Hussars.

Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged. Printed for the author. London. R. Green. 1854.

CRAAN, W. B.:

Plan du Champ de Bataille de Waterloo. Bruxelles: 1816.

DAMITZ:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Par le major de Damitz, officier prussien, d’aprÈs les documents du GÉnÉral Grolman, Quartier-MaÎtre-GÉnÉral de l’armÉe prussienne en 1815.

Traduite de l’Allemand par LÉon Griffon. Avec Plans. 2 Volumes. Paris. Correard. 1840.

D’AUVERGNE:

See La Tour d’Auvergne.

DAVOUT:

Histoire de la Vie Militaire, Politique, et Administrative du MarÉchal Davout, Duc de Auerstaedt, Prince d’EckmÜhl. D’aprÈs les documents officiels. Par L. J. Gabriel de Chenier. Paris: Gosse, Marchal & Cie: 1866.

DOCUMENTS INÉDITS:

Documents inÉdits sur la campagne de 1815, publiÉs par le Duc d’Elchingen. Paris. 1840.

DRAME DE WATERLOO:

Le Drame de Waterloo: Grande Restitution Historique. Avec un plan. 3me edition. Paris: Au Bureau de la Revue Spiritualiste. 1868.

DROUET:

Le MarÉchal Drouet, Comte d’Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire, Écrite par lui-mÊme et dediÉe À ses amis. PubliÉe par sa famille. Avec portrait. Paris: Gustave Barba: Libraire Éditeur. 34 Rue Mazarine. 1844.

ELLESMERE:

Essays on History, Biography, Geography, Engineering, &c. Contributed to the Quarterly Review: By the late Earl of Ellesmere. London: John Murray. 1858.

FRAGMENTS HISTORIQUES:

See Grouchy.

FRASER: Letters written during the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns. By Sir A. S. Fraser. London: 1859.

FRASER:

Words on Wellington—the Duke-Waterloo—the Ball. By Sir Wm. Fraser, Baronet. London. John C. Nimmo: 1889.

GARDNER:

Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. A narrative of the campaign in Belgium in 1815. By Dorsey Gardner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1882.

GAWLER:

The Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo. By an Eyewitness. Dublin. Richard Milliken & Son: 104 Grafton Street. 1833.

GÉRARD:

1. Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, propres À Éclairer la question portÉe devant le public par M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le GÉnÉral GÉrard. Paris: Denain: Novembre, 1829. (With a Map.)

2. DerniÈres Observations sur les OpÉrations de l’aile droite de l’ArmÉe FranÇaise À la Bataille de Waterloo, en rÉponse À M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le GÉnÉral GÉrard. Paris: Denain: 1830. (With a Map.)

3. Lettre À MM. Germain Sarrut et B. Saint Edme, RÉdacteurs de la Biographie des Hommes du Jour. Paris: 12 Mars, 1840.

GIRAUD:

The Campaigns of Paris in 1814 and 1815, etc. Translated from the French of P. F. F. J. Giraud by Edmund Boyce. 2d Edition, enlarged. London. 1816.

GNEISENAU:

Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau. Vierter Band. 1814, 1815. Von Hans DelbrÜck. Fortfetzung des Gleichnamigen Werkes von G. H. Pertz. Berlin. 1880.

GOMM:

Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G. C. B. From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815. Edited by Francis Culling Carr-Gomm. London: John Murray. 1881.

GORE:

An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo; intended to elucidate the topographical plan executed by W. B. CraÄn, J. U. D. Translated from the French, with explanatory notes, by Captain Arthur Gore, 30th Regiment of Foot. With Plates. London. Printed for Samuel Leigh. 1817.

GOURGAUD (original):2

Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze: ou Relation des OpÉrations Miliaires qui ont eu lieu en France et en Belgique, pendant les Cent Jours. Écrite À Sainte HÉlÈne. Par le GÉnÉral Gourgaud. Paris: 1818.

GOURGAUD (translation):

The Campaign of 1815. Written at St. Helena by General Gourgaud. London: 1818.

GRENADIER GUARDS:

The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards. By Lieut. Gen. Sir F. W. Hamilton, K. C. B. In three volumes. London: John Murray. 1874.

GROUCHY:

1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiÉe par le GÉnÉral Gourgaud, et RÉfutation de quelques unes des Assertions d’autres Écrits relatifs À la bataille de Waterloo. Par le MarÉchal de Grouchy. Philadelphie. 1818.

2. The same, with omissions and changes. Philadelphia, 1819.

3. The same title except that the author’s name is given as “le Comte de Grouchy.” Reprinted, with many omissions and changes, from the Philadelphia edition of 1819. Paris: Chez Chaumerot Jeune, Libraire, Palais Royal. 1819.3

4. Doutes sur l’AuthenticitÉ des MÉmoires historiques attribuÉs À NapolÉon et premiÈre rÉfutation de quelques unes des assertions qu’ils renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy: Philadelphie: Avril, 1820.

5. Fragments Historiques relatifs À la Campagne de 1815 et À la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le GÉnÉral Grouchy.

Lettre À Messieurs MÉry et BarthÉlemy.

Paris: Firmin Didot FrÈres, 20 Novembre, 1829.

6. Fragments Historiques, &c.

De l’influence que peuvent avoir sur l’opinion les documents publiÉs par M. le Comte GÉrard.

Paris: Firmin Didot FrÈres, 20 Decembre, 1829.

7. Le MarÉchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815. Par le GÉnÉral de Division SÉnateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris. E. Dentu. 1864.

8. MÉmoires du MarÉchal de Grouchy. Par le Marquis de Grouchy, officier de l’État-major. vol. 4. Paris: E. Dentu. 1874.

GURWOOD:

The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Compiled from official and authentic documents, by Lieut.-Colonel Gurwood. Vol. XII. London: John Murray: 1838.

HAMLEY:

The Operations of War explained and illustrated. By Edward Bruce Hamley, Colonel in the Army, etc. Second Edition. William Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1869.

HILL:

The Life of Lord Hill, G. C. B. By the Rev. Edwin Sidney, A.M. Second edition. London: John Murray: 1845.

HISTOIRE DE L’EX-GARDE:

Depuis sa formation jusqu’À son licenciement. Paris: Delaunay: 1821.

HOOPER:

Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of 1815. By George Hooper: author of “The Italian Campaigns of General Bonaparte.” With Map and Plans. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1862.

IMPERIAL GUARD:

See Histoire de l’Ex-Garde.

See St. Hilaire.

JOMINI (original):

PrÉcis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815, pour servir de supplement et de rectification À la Vie Politique et Militaire de NapolÉon racontÉe par lui-mÊme. Par le GÉnÉral J. Paris: 1839.

JOMINI (translation):4

The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo. Translated from the French of General Baron de Jomini, by Capt. S. V. BenÉt, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. Second Edition. New York: D. Van Nostrand: 1862.

JONES:

The Battle of Waterloo, with those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, described by eye-witnesses, and by the series of official accounts published by authority. To which are added Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Wellington, F. M. Prince BlÜcher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., etc. Illustrated by Maps, Plans, and Views of the Field, and Thirty-four Etchings from Drawings. By George Jones, Esq., R. A. Eleventh Edition, enlarged and corrected. London: L. Booth: Duke Street. 1852.

KENNEDY:

Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By the late General Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, K. C. B., acting at the time of the battle on the Quarter-Master-General’s Staff of the Third Division of the Army. London: John Murray: 1865.

LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE:

Waterloo: Étude de la Campagne de 1815. Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Édouard de La Tour d’Auvergne. Avec Cartes et Plans. Paris: Henri Plon: 1870.

LEEKE:

The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (the 52d Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. By the Reverend William Leeke, M. A. 2 vols. London: Hatchard & Co. 1866.

LOBEN SELS:

See Van Loben Sels.

LOCKHART:

The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. Third edition. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1835.

The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. Reprinted from the Family Library. London: William Tegg. 1867.

MARÉCHAL DE GROUCHY EN 1815:

See Grouchy.

MAURICE: ARTICLES ON WATERLOO:

By Col. J. F. Maurice, R. A. From the United Service Magazine. Vol. 123. In the years 1890 and 1891.

MÉMOIRES (original):

MÉmoires pour servir À l’Histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la bataille de Mont St. Jean. Paris: 1820.

MEMOIRS (translation):

Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815. Translated from the original Manuscript by B. E. O’Meara. London: Printed for Sir Richard Phillips & Co. 1820.

MERCER:

Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. Kept throughout the Campaign of 1815. By the late General CavaliÉ Mercer, commanding the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery. In 2 vols. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London. 1870.

MORRIS, O’CONNOR:

See O’Connor Morris.

MUDFORD:

An Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 1815 under his Grace the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Prince BlÜcher. By William Mudford. Illustrated. London. 1817.

MÜFFLING: PASSAGES:

Passages from my Life; together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814. By Baron von MÜffling. Edited with notes by Col. Philip Yorke, F. R. S. Second Edition, revised. London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street. 1853.

Part II., beginning with page 197, contains an account of the Waterloo Campaign.

MÜFFLING: SKETCH:

A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo, to which are added the Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal Prince BlÜcher, and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo. By General MÜffling. With CraÄn’s Map of the Field. Sixth Edition. Waterloo. H. GÉrard, Publisher. 1870.

MUQUARDT:

PrÉcis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Bruxelles. Libraire Militaire C. Muquardt: Merzbach and Falk, Éditeurs. 1887.

NAPIER:

Life of General Sir William Napier, K. C. B., Author of the “History of the Peninsular War.” Edited by H. O. Bruce, M. P. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1864.

NAPOLEON:

See Correspondance.

„ MÉmoires.

„ Memoirs.

NAPOLÉON À WATERLOO:

Souvenirs Militaires. NapolÉon À Waterloo, ou PrÉcis rectifiÉ de la Campagne de 1815. Avec des Documents nouveaux et des PiÉces inÉdites. Par un ancien officier de la Garde ImpÉriale, qui est restÉ prÈs de NapolÉon pendant toute la campagne. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1866.

NIEMAN’S DIARY:

The Journal of Henri Nieman of the 6th Prussian Black Hussars. From the English Historical Magazine for July, 1888.

O’CONNOR MORRIS:

Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815. By William O’Connor Morris. London: W. H. Allen & Co.: 1891.

OLDFIELD:

Letters on the Battle of Waterloo. MSS. By John Oldfield, Captain and Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers.

OLLECH:

Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen. Von Ollech, General der Infanterie. Berlin: 1876.

O’MEARA:

See Memoirs.

PAJOL:

Pajol, GÉnÉral en Chef. Par le gÉnÉral de division Comte Pajol—son fils ainÉ. 3 vols. Paris. Firmin Didot FrÈres. 1874.

PASCALLET:

Notice Biographique sur M. le MarÉchal Marquis de Grouchy, Pair de France, avec des Éclaircissements et des DÉtails historiques sur la Campagne de 1815 dans le midi de France, et sur la Bataille de Waterloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur and RÉdacteur en chef de la Revue GÉnÉrale, Biographique, Politique and LittÉraire. 2e Edition. Paris. 1842.

QUINET:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Par Edgar Quinet. Paris: Michel LÉvy FrÈres. 1862.

RELATION BELGE:

See Campagne de la Belgique.

ROGNIAT:

RÉponse aux notes critiques de NapolÉon sur l’ouvrage intitulÉ “ConsidÉrations sur l’Art de la Guerre.” Paris. 1823.

SIBORNE:

History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. Containing minute Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo. By Capt. W. Siborne; Secretary and Adjutant of the Royal Military Asylum Constructor of the “Waterloo Model.” 2d Edition. 2 vols. London T. & W. Boone: 1844. With an Atlas of Maps and Plans.

STANHOPE:

Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831-1851. By Philip Henry, 5th Earl Stanhope. New York, Longmans, Greene & Co. 1886.

ST. HILAIRE:

Histoire, anecdotique, politique et militaire, de la Garde ImpÉriale. Par Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire. Paris: EugÈne Penaud. 1847.

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES:

The Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. Edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K. G. Volume X. London: John Murray. 1863.

THIERS:

History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon. By M. A. Thiers. Vol. XX. London: Willis and Sotheran. 1861.

TREUENFELD:

Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance. Von v. Treuenfeld, Premier-Lieutenant im 2 Hessischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 82. Mit 11 Karten. Hanover, 1880. Helwing’sche Verlags-Buchhandlung: SchlÄgerstrasse 20.

VANDAMME:

Le GÉnÉral Vandamme et sa Correspondance. Par A. Du Casse. 2 Vols. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1870.

VAN LOBEN SELS:

PrÉcis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Par le major d’artillerie E. Van LÖben Sels, aide-de-camp de S. A. R. le Prince FrÉdÉric des Pays-Bas. Avec Plans. Traduit du Hollandais. La Haye: Chez les Heritiers Doorman: 1849.

VAUDONCOURT:

Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France. Par le GÉnÉral Guillaume de Vaudoncourt. Tome QuatriÈme. Paris. 1826.

VAULABELLE:

Campagne et Bataille de Waterloo. Par Achille de Vaulabelle. Bruxelles. 1853.

WATERLOO LETTERS:

Waterloo Letters. A selection from original and hitherto unpublished letters bearing on the operations of the 16th, 17th and 18th June, 1815, by officers who served in the campaign. Edited, with explanatory notes, by Major General H. T. Siborne, late Colonel R. E. Illustrated with numerous Maps and Plans. London: Cassell & Co. Limited. 1891.

WATERLOO ROLL CALL:

The Waterloo Roll Call. By Charles Dalton, F. R. G. S. London. Wm. Clowes & Sons, Limited. 13 Charing Cross, S. W. 1890.

WELLINGTON:

See Gurwood, and, also, Supplementary Despatches.