The justification for this book on the well-worn subject of the campaign of Waterloo is to be found, if at all, in its treatment of certain topics to which we now propose very briefly to advert.

1. First among them is Napoleon’s plan of campaign.782 In regard to this we have followed his own account, and have pointed out the difference between it and the plan which it has been claimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained.

2. In regard to the much-vexed question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light, it is submitted, has been thrown.783 The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin, and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818, make it very difficult to disbelieve Napoleon’s account of this matter.

3. The true cause of the delay on the morning of the 16th of June has been, we submit, pointed out.784 The fact that d’Erlon’s Corps was so far in the rear seems to have been the chief reason for delaying the forward movement both of the left wing and of the main army.

4. It has been shown by Marshal Ney’s orders to his command, and from other evidence furnished by his defenders, that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the 16th were extremely defective, and, in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his orders.785 It has also been shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received would in all probability have changed the issue of the campaign.786

5. In regard to the movements of d’Erlon’s Corps on the 16th, it has been shown that its leading division was two hours and a half behind the rear divisions of the 2d Corps on the road to Quatre Bras; and that if d’Erlon’s Corps had closely followed the rear division of the 2d Corps, it could not have been turned aside by the staff-officer’s blunder.787

6. Attention has been called to Napoleon’s plan of battle at Ligny, and to the criticisms which it has met with.788

7. The view of those writers who regard it as great negligence on the part of Napoleon that on the morning of the 17th he did not take adequate measures to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, is fully adopted.789

8. It is also maintained that Napoleon should on that morning at daybreak have marched with the 6th Corps and the Guard to attack the English at Quatre Bras in conjunction with Ney’s forces,—a point on which most writers strongly insist.790

9. The connection between the injunction contained in the Bertrand order and the new idea as to the projects of Marshal BlÜcher, which Berton’s discovery of a Prussian corps at Gembloux had started in Napoleon’s mind, is brought out;791 and Napoleon is censured for having on the afternoon of the 17th detached so large a force from his army when he had reason to apprehend that a movement by BlÜcher with the intention of coÖperating with Wellington had been in operation since the previous evening.792

10. The warning contained in the Bertrand order is given its due prominence; and the fact that Marshal Grouchy was acting under that order, and therefore had entire liberty to take any steps which his own judgment might approve to frustrate the attempt of the Prussians to act in conjunction with the English, is strongly insisted on.793

11. It is shown that Grouchy was at Walhain, and not at Sart-À-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo and rejected the counsel of GÉrard.794

12. That Napoleon expected Grouchy to arrive on the left bank of the Dyle by crossing it at the bridge of Moustier is shown by Marbot’s testimony; and attention is called to the inference which this fact warrants, that Napoleon was not cognizant of the language used in the 10 A.M. order to Marshal Grouchy, which seemed to imply that Grouchy was expected to reach Wavre first.795

13. It is pointed out that from about four o’clock in the afternoon of the 18th of June to about half-past six, Napoleon’s attention was absorbed by the attack of BÜlow’s Corps upon the right and rear of the French army; and that, for the mistakes committed during this period in the assaults on the English army, Ney is mainly responsible.796 It is furthermore shown that by reason of this distraction of the Emperor’s attention from the operations in his front, valuable opportunities for success against Wellington’s army were lost.797

14. Marshal Ney is censured for having done so little in the way of preparation for the successful charge of the Imperial Guard.798

15. The questions relating to the formation of the Imperial Guard in its charge against the English, and of its repulse and defeat by the English guards and the light brigade, have received particular attention. It is believed that the view here presented will be found to harmonize nearly all the conflicting statements.799

16. It is maintained that Marshal Grouchy, if he had started for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak,800 or had followed the advice of GÉrard at noon,801 would probably have stopped BÜlow and Pirch I. by engaging them, and that Zieten, in all probability, would not have proceeded further than Ohain;802 in which case Napoleon would have been able to employ his whole army against that of Wellington, and would have defeated it.

Coming now to the Allies:—

17. It is contended that the definite understanding as to the steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion, which has generally been attributed to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal BlÜcher, did not exist.803

18. That the Duke, in the early morning hours of the 16th, ordered a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras, as he says in his Report he did, is shown by an examination of his letter to Marshal BlÜcher, and a comparison of that letter with the statement as to the situation and destination at 7 A.M. of the 16th of the different divisions of his army, known as “The Disposition,” drawn up by Sir William De Lancey, the Deputy Quartermaster General, before the Duke left Brussels.804

19. That the Duke, in issuing the order for concentrating at Quatre Bras after he had become satisfied that Napoleon was concentrating in front of BlÜcher, was acting in strict accordance with the demands of the situation, is maintained:805 but it is shown that it was several hours after Wellington received this information as to BlÜcher and Napoleon before he issued the order, and that this delay was not only uncalled for, but that it gravely imperilled the success of the allies.806

20. It is shown that it is not true that BlÜchers decision to fight at Ligny was based on a promise of support from Wellington.807

21. Attention is called to the now generally admitted fact that it was not until the early morning hours of the 18th that BlÜcher was able to give Wellington definite assurance of his support in the battle of Waterloo.808

22. The evidence in regard to the story that the Duke rode over to Wavre on the evening of the 17th is given,809 and, on that evidence, the story is rejected.

A few words in conclusion.

1. It does not seem to us that Napoleon can be charged with any lack of activity or decision of character, except on the morning after the battle of Ligny, when he was, as we imagine, pretty well tired out. But his energy speedily returned, and we find him conducting the pursuit of the English during the afternoon, and making an examination of their position in the mud and rain in the middle of the night.

2. Nor was there any defect in his plan of campaign. Had Ney executed his orders with promptness and without hesitation, the campaign would have been finished on the 16th of June, either by Ney’s furnishing the needed force to take the Prussians in rear at Brye and WagnelÉe, or by his defeating Wellington badly by the help of the 1st Corps. If either of these things had happened, there could not possibly have been any battle of Waterloo; the Prussian and English armies would have been definitely separated; one, and perhaps both, would have been beaten; and never, in all probability, would they have acted together again. For this failure to achieve success on the second day of the campaign, Ney and not Napoleon was responsible.

3. But for not overwhelming at Quatre Bras on the early morning of the 17th the two-thirds of his army which Wellington had collected there, no one but Napoleon was responsible; and his failure to do this must be attributed to his excessive fatigue.

4. Then, for his neglect to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat on the same morning, Napoleon is responsible; and although Soult ought to have attended to this, in his capacity of chief-of-staff, yet, as the Emperor does not appear to have blamed him for not having reconnoitred in the direction of Wavre, we must consider Napoleon as open to this censure. It is true, it was not likely that BlÜcher had retired in the direction of Wavre; but it was of vital importance to know whether he had or not. Hence it was a great neglect not to find out.

5. Napoleon is also solely responsible for having persisted in his original design of detaching Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussians after he had reason to believe that they were intending to unite with the English, and to suspect, in fact, that they had been approaching the English during the previous night and morning; and for contenting himself with merely giving Grouchy a warning that this might be their intention. He laid upon Grouchy, in fact, a burden which to that officer, as Napoleon was well aware, was entirely new; hence, the Emperor was not warranted in risking so much on the chance of Grouchy’s being able to sustain it. It is this that Napoleon is to blame for in this connection; for having, when he saw that the Prussians might (as the Bertrand order expresses it) be “intending to unite with the English to cover Brussels in trying the fate of another battle,” persisted in adhering to his original plan,—devised when he and Grouchy and everybody else supposed that the Prussians had gone to Namur,—of sending Grouchy in pursuit of them with two corps d’armÉe. Many writers will have it that “Napoleon did not in the least foresee the flank march of the Prussians.”810 This,—if to foresee be equivalent to expect,—may be true. But Napoleon certainly did, at 1 P.M. of the 17th, recognize the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the English; and the true criticism on him is, as it seems to us, that, having this in mind, as a possibility, he should have detached Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men from the main army, and have been content to rely on Grouchy’s being able to prevent this project of the Prussians from being carried out. It must be added to this, that his neglect to send Grouchy any information of his own situation, and any orders as to what he expected him to do if he found the Prussians were marching to join Wellington or to attack the main French army, showed an unjustifiable reliance on the favors of fortune.

6. To Marshal Grouchy belongs the blame of having entirely failed to apprehend his mission, as indicated to him by the express warning contained in the Bertrand order. Had he acted intelligently in accordance with the information which he acquired in the night of the 17th and 18th, he could have prevented the Emperor from being overwhelmed by both the allied armies. At daybreak, as appears from his letter to Pajol, he knew that the Prussians had retired towards Wavre and Brussels. But the meaning of this fact he utterly failed to grasp. He made no change in his previously ordered dispositions, which this news should have shown him were wholly unsuited to the situation as now ascertained. Nor did the sound of the cannon of Waterloo produce on him a greater effect. He would not accept the suggestion of GÉrard. He persisted in a course which completely isolated his command, and prevented it from playing any part in the events of that memorable day. Napoleon, as we have pointed out, made a great mistake in trusting so much to Grouchy’s good judgment; he took a wholly unnecessary risk; he might, as well as not, have taken Grouchy, with far the larger part of his command, with the main army; had he done so, the catastrophe of Waterloo could not, so far as we can judge, have happened. But had Grouchy acted up to the demands of the situation in which he found himself, he also would have averted the ruin which the unhindered union of the allies brought upon Napoleon and his army.