Thanksgiving day in the North, November 26th, should be remembered as the beginning of the famous Mine Run affair, one of the greatest of the battles that were never fought. Judging from results in former years, when campaigning was undertaken at this season of the year, it would seem that winter quarters would be a better proposition for the army than another forward movement, but General Meade, feeling that the Northern public demanded some aggressive movement on his part, determined to avail himself of the withdrawal of Longstreets' Corps and the remoteness of Lee's remaining Corps, Ewell's and Hill's, from each other, and to take the offensive. Ewell's men, under the command of General Jubal A. Early, Ewell being ill, held the Confederate right, the same resting on the Rapidan Nov. 26, '63 at Morton's Ford, while Hill's forces in their dispersion extended fully twenty miles to the southwest. Meade could lead 70,000 men into the assault, while Lee's troops were rated at 50,000; the lower fords of the Rapidan were quite uncovered, Lee depending for defence on a line of fortifications extending along the left bank of Mine Run, an insignificant stream, tributary to the Rapidan and entering the same near Morton's Ford. The words of Robert Burns concerning the plans of mice and men never had better application than in the events of the following days. Had army corps crossed and attacked as projected, considering the detached, not to say scattered, condition of the enemy, it seems as though he would have been beaten in detail.

Had General French and his Third Corps started at the early hour named in the orders; had not the engineer miscalculated the width of the stream and so provided too few pontoons for the bridge which had to be pieced out with a trestle; had not the banks of the river proved too precipitous for the artillery which had to go down to Germanna Ford and even then, if the Corps had not taken a wrong road and so fallen foul of Confederate General Edward Johnson and his forces, the entire story of the war might have been very different from what is written. In brief, the expedition was scheduled to begin early in the morning of the 23rd, but was delayed by the severe rain of that and subsequent days. The orders under which the start of the 27th was made were that the Third Corps, General French, followed by the Sixth, General Sedgwick, should cross the Rapidan at Jacob's Mills; the Fifth, General Sykes, followed by the First, General Newton, was to cross at Culpeper Mine, while the Second, General Warren, was to cross by the Germanna Ford, between the other fords named. With ten days' rations carried by the men, General Meade was justifiable "in cutting loose from his base of supplies, and undertaking the feat in three columns of seizing the plank road and turnpike and, by advancing rapidly towards Orange Court House, of turning the enemy's works and compelling him to give battle on ground not previously selected or prepared."

That the expedition failed is history, its outlines have often been told in many places; our interest rests principally in what the First Corps and Thirty-ninth Regiment were doing during these days of stroke and counter stroke. General John Newton, commanding the First Corps, in his report to the Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, tersely narrates the doings of each day from Thursday, Nov. 26th, to Thursday, Dec. 3rd, both dates inclusive. Leaving the Third Division of the Corps guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Rappahannock Station to Manassas, he advanced the other two divisions to the Culpeper Mine Ford, getting only one of them across by seven o'clock; starting at 3.30 a. m. of the 27th, he reached the rear of Robertson's Tavern a little after 7 p. m.; the Corps was roused at 3 a. m. of the 28th and put in position at the left of the Second Corps and Robertson's Tavern; about seven o'clock the corps was ordered to advance, still keeping to the left of the Second Corps; advancing in two lines through the woods to near Mine Run, the enemy was discovered in line of battle to receive us. Establishing a picket line, with a little firing of the enemy, the corps remained in position for the remainder of the day. November 29th, an attack on the enemy being contemplated on the right and left, General Newton, in the centre, commanded his own troops and some of the Fifth and Sixth Corps; at 8 a. m., agreeably to orders, cannonading began along his front, continuing a short time only; skirmishers were sent across Mine Run who performed their duties gallantly, losing in killed and wounded about forty men; under cover of the picket lodgement, four bridges were built, for later use if necessary; under advice from headquarters the pickets were withdrawn to the Federal or east bank of the Run at 3 a. m. of the 30th and an hour later fell back to Germanna Ford to cover the crossing of Nov. 26, '63 the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Dec. 1st all of the army recrosses; Dec. 2d, under orders, leaving a single brigade at Germanna, proceeded to Stevensburg with the remainder of the Corps; Dec. 3rd reached Paoli's Mills about noon and sent a brigade to Kelly's Ford.

Returning to the 26th of November and confining ourselves to the work of the Thirty-ninth we find the same awakened at an early hour and starting out before four o'clock. The Rappahannock was again crossed at the station of the same name as the river. During a brief halt on the south side of the stream, Colonel Leonard, commanding the brigade, read a telegram from headquarters, announcing the great victory of General Grant at Chattanooga and at least one soldier remarked, "That's good news to march on." With hourly halts, the extended march was not so tiresome as certain shorter though more rapid ones had proved. About 6 p. m. the Rapidan was crossed at Culpeper Mine, and ascending an elevation south of the river, a mile further along, camp was pitched for the night. Not a few commented on the change from Thanksgiving Day the year before, and still more remarked on the difference between the day at home and that passed in active campaigning; no cases of insomnia were heard of during the night, for all were tired and sleepy and "taps," if sounded, found very few waiting to obey. Eighteen miles were put down as the distance marched.

Certain men were detailed as pickets, and it was their duty to see to it that no harm befell their sleeping comrades; going on duty at ten o'clock last night, they came off at two this morning (27th) and an hour later the camp was alert with preparations to depart. Starting a little before daylight, we marched southward, passing through a part of the country very near the Chancellorsville battlefield of the preceding May and of the Wilderness, yet to be. After striking the Orange and Fredericksburg pike at eight o'clock in the morning, a halt was called and the men rested while the wagon and ambulance trains passed. The march continued till after dark, ending at Robertson's Tavern with a total distance covered of about thirty miles, from the starting point of yesterday.

The 28th of November, Saturday, brought a part of the Regiment under fire. Before daylight an advance of a mile or so was made, followed by breakfast and the use of pick and shovel in entrenching and then a still further, though brief, advance. The sound of the skirmishing comes from front and battle line is formed; Companies C and E being detailed as skirmishers, they went forward some 300 yards, the regiment remaining behind the crest of the hill. As a Company C participant wrote, "It commenced to rain very soon and we lay on our bellies and watched the Rebs.; their sharpshooters watched us closely and some were wounded. Benj. Dow of our company was shot through the leg,[G] but the boys were cool and stood their first fire like veterans; after lying thus all day, cold and wet through to the skin, we were relieved about eight o'clock and rejoined the Regiment, tired and hungry; the Rebs. are in good position and I doubt whether Meade will attack first."

The night that followed, though quiet, brought very little comfort to the men, thoroughly chilled by the rain of yesterday and, at 3 a. m. of the 29th, some of them were stirring to prepare the soldiers' solace, a cup of hot coffee. Everybody expected to storm the enemy's works at some time on this day; knapsacks were piled up that full use of all the muscles might be had. Old campaigners were writing their names and regiments on bits of paper and pinning them on their garments for identification since it seemed sure that the works could not be assailed without a terrible loss of life. A brigade of the Fifth Corps formed the first line of battle and our brigade came next; skirmishing between the rival lines prevailed all day. Shells Nov. 29, '64 even came over from the Confederates, but they drew no reply from our lines. The rebels having withdrawn across the Run, the same wider than usual through having been dammed, formed the line of separation between the blue and the gray. At nightfall, to shield themselves from the cold wind, trees were cut down for a shelter, and to the mercies of the night the soldiers again commended themselves.

Sunday was the last day of the month, and it seemed impossible that the day should pass without the long impending assault; three days' rations were distributed and the men were told that they must make them last five, a pretty severe exaction from an army which we have been told moves on its stomach. The attack did not take place, but there was a deal of activity in arranging the forces for the projected advance. It was understood by the leading officers that in the early morn of the 1st of December there should be a simultaneous cannonading along the entire line to be followed by an assault by Warren and his massed forces, to be succeeded on the right by like action on the part of Sedgwick and his loyal Sixth Corps followers. The morning of the first day of winter came, but Warren did not order the assault as expected. To his practiced eye, the works erected and defended by the enemy were too strong for the attack and to his judgment Meade, himself, deferred when he had ridden to the extreme left and there saw their magnitude and strength. His messenger, who happened to be his own son, rode with breathless speed to countermand the orders of the day before and the Battle of Mine Run was not fought. At nightfall the backward movement began and at or near midnight, the Thirty-ninth with many other regiments was at the Rapidan once more.

During the last of these Mine Run days, our Lieut. Colonel Peirson was in command of the division line of pickets, being officer of the day, and his experience was interesting for, entering upon his duties, he rode a white horse, furnished him at Division Headquarters, riding just in rear of the picket line until the plentitude of the enemy's bullets compelled him to alight and to walk or crawl the rest of the way. Desiring to cross a little elevation, he took the precaution, before exposing himself, of raising his cap upon his sword and, as it was the immediate target of several rebel bullets, he concluded that a more circuitous route would be preferable. So cold was it that men, in their falsely named "shelters" were frozen to death, as they held on to their posts to which the relief did not come. On reaching the desired point and, after driving the enemy across a small stream which he later learned was not Mine Run but a tributary, with the assistance of a few pioneers he successfully bridged it for the passage of troops. In this labor he had the misfortune to fall into the water and, in a few minutes, was completely clad in icicles. Colonel Peirson was still advancing his line before reporting upon the situation, having discovered another branch of the stream which he was about to bridge, when the orders to fall back were received.

The retreat is made across the river at Germanna Ford and to the Thirty-ninth is committed the task of seeing all safely over. We see the Fifth and Sixth Corps safely across, then our own troops, including our brigade; finally the Regiment goes across, all save Companies C and F and then C is left alone; stragglers have passed over; apparently the last cavalryman is riding on the further side when the pontoons are taken up and, in the last boat, the Medford Company crosses over to join its fellows on the northern bank. The expected dash by Confederate horsemen did not take place and, chilled to the bone, the Union army after a rest of an hour proceeded to Stevensburg or near that point. Later, finding a suitable camping place, rationless and wearied, the men sought what comfort sleep might afford. Some of the soldiers find time to moralize on the outcome and they secure some satisfaction from the fact that if they did not assail the enemy, neither did the Rebels attack the Federals. Years afterward, General Early, in Dec., '63 command in the immediate front of the line held by the First and Fifth Corps, wrote of the situation, "A direct attack from either side would have been attended with great difficulties, on account of the necessity of having to descend the slopes of Mine Run and then, after crossing that stream, to ascend the opposite slopes under the fire of artillery as well as infantry." Very few soldiers have ever been heard to criticise the wisdom of Warren's judgment or of Meade's acquiescence.