A.D. 1812.

This is a small fortress, but an important siege, filled with incident and instruction.

On the morning of the 18th of September, the army was in front of Burgos, and may be said to have commenced a siege, in which the historians of the different nations, without any just imputation upon their truth, may each claim for their country the palm of active courage and patient firmness. The town was as bravely defended as it was bravely assailed, and the ardent and persevering enterprise of the attack was met by corresponding vigour and vigilance in the defence.

Burgos is the capital of Old Castile, and was the cradle of the Castilian kings and monarchy. It is memorable for the noble stand which it repeatedly made against the Saracens. After the retreat of Massena, it was considered a critical and dangerous point, and its fortifications were repaired. The ruins of the castle were very strong, being stone, and of deep foundation, situated, besides, on the brow of a hill, commanding the river Arlanzon, on which the town stands, and the roads on both sides of it. These ruins were repaired, and strengthened by additional earthworks. Beyond the hill on which the castle is situated is another eminence, called St. Michael’s Hill, on which a hornwork was erected. Adjoining the castle was a church, which was converted into a fort. The above works were included within three distinct lines of circumvallation, which were so carried and connected as to form an oblong square, and each to defend and support without endangering (in the event of being itself lost) the others. The garrison consisted of more than two thousand men.

As Burgos is on the north side of the Arlanzon, whilst the allied army was on the south, and as the castle commanded both the river and the roads, Wellington had some difficulty in preparing the passage, and the remainder of the day of the 18th was employed in making the necessary arrangements. On the following day this operation was effected. The outworks of the hill of St. Michael were immediately seized, and the troops posted close to the hornwork. At night the hornwork was itself attacked and carried, and thus the whole of St. Michael’s Hill was obtained. This hill was, however, a mere outwork to the main fortress, inasmuch as the possession of it only brought the allies in front of the outermost of the three lines, behind which were the castle and body of the work.

The possession of this eminence afforded the allies a better knowledge of the defences of the fort, with a commanding view of some of the works. The besieged evinced neither tardiness nor want of skill; they had demolished, in an incredibly short time, the houses which interfered with their line of defence. They had raised ramparts of earth and biscuit-barrels, and constructed fleches and redans to cover the batteries and sally-gates. These works, considering the materials and the pressure of the time, were so solid and accurate as to command the general praise of the British engineers, whilst the Portuguese regarded them with astonishment: a proof of the value of the knowledge of field-work, as it then existed in the French army, when almost every soldier could assist the artillery, and take his share in the work of attack and defence in sieges. It is observed by a writer of the time, “We must confess that the patience of the English privates was more exemplary than their dexterity.”

From the 19th to the 22nd of September, the allies were employed in raising their own works upon St. Michael’s Hill, in front of the exterior line of the enemy, and more particularly in fortifying and completing the hornwork, of which they had possessed themselves. Everything being ready on the evening of the 22nd, it was resolved to give the first regular assault. Accordingly, at the hour of eleven at night, the storming body was moved forward in two columns: the one, consisting of Portuguese, to the south-west flank of the castle; and the other of British, under Major Laurie, to the front. The plan of the attack was, that the Portuguese should engage and occupy the eminence on the above-mentioned flank, while Major Laurie’s party should escalade the parapet in front.

The Portuguese, who were to begin the attack, commenced with much spirit. They were opposed to a deep ditch and a lofty parapet on the opposite side, and therefore had to descend into the one and fight their way up the other. It may be necessary to state to the uninitiated, that the shelving side of the ditch which adjoins the parapet is technically termed the scarp, and the opposite side of the ditch (the side nearest an advancing enemy) the counterscarp. They were stopped at the very edge of the descent into this ditch; their attack, therefore, as a diversion, became nugatory, and failed in the first instance.

In the meanwhile, the party in front, under Major Laurie, having seen the Portuguese commence, advanced with the most determined bravery to the escalade, and having the same works in opposition to them as the Portuguese, in an instant reached the head of the counterscarp, and in another instant descended it, cleared the palisades at the bottom, and planted their ladders to the parapet. The first assailants penetrated to the top of the parapet, and a fierce contest took place both there and in the bottom of the ditch. The assault was repelled with as much spirit as it was made and the ditch and scarp were covered with dead of both parties. Amongst these was the gallant leader himself, Major Laurie.

This gallantry, however, was rendered useless by the total failure of the Portuguese division. After much severe fighting, therefore, and a great consequent loss, the party was withdrawn,—an affair in itself of great peril and difficulty, as their ardour had carried them nearly into the lines. It was a matter of congratulation that the whole party had escaped being made prisoners. The total British and Portuguese loss on this occasion was not short of four hundred killed and wounded.

It would be of little professional instruction, and of less general interest, to follow the details of an irregular, and therefore inartificial siege, from day to day; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the attacks. Of those, during the whole siege, there were five; two we have already described.

After the failure of the storm on the 22nd, a mine was directed under the same exterior line. It was exploded in the midnight of the 29th, and a breach, erroneously deemed practicable, effected in the parapet. A storming party was immediately advanced, and at the same moment, for the purpose of diversion, a strong column was directed in front of the town. The storming party unluckily missed its way, and thereby the affair failed.

Between the following day and the 4th of October, another mine was conducted near to the same point, and the former breach was improved by fire from the batteries. This mine was exploded in the afternoon of the 4th, and the result was a second practicable breach. These two breaches were immediately stormed by the second battalion of the twenty-fourth, divided into two parties, under Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants Holmes and Fraser. This assault was completely successful, and the allies were thus established within the exterior line of the castle. The loss was severe, but not beyond the value of the service.

The enemy, however, did not leave the allies in tranquil possession of this position: they made two vigorous sallies to interrupt the works against the second line, and continued their operations for the same purpose with very little intermission. A breach was effected, and a mine was in progress; but from want of siege materials, particularly of a battering-train, the advances were slow, and it became obvious that success was doubtful. There were only three eighteen-pounders, and no materials or instruments but what were made upon the spot. We must in candour admit that no blame could be justly attached to any one, as these privations were necessary circumstances of the enterprise. The siege of Burgos was an expeditionary operation, and at no point, either of the march of the army towards it or during the time occupied in the siege, could the marquis of Wellington have taken a train with him, or have sent for it and waited for its arrival. There were in fact two trains on the Spanish frontier,—the one at Ciudad Rodrigo, and another at Badajos; but the nature of the operations, the distance, and the roads, rendered them totally immoveable. A question has here been put—why, then, did the marquis undertake this siege; and did not the result disappoint his calculations? To this there are several answers. First. Upon the forward march and assembling of the enemy on the Douro, it became necessary for him to repel them; and his march and pursuit for this purpose brought him in front of Burgos. Second. There was nothing in the external character of the castle and works of Burgos to justify the expectation of a long defence: the body of the castle, as reported by the engineers, was a repaired ruin, and the outworks were fieldworks of earth. If the apparatus of attack was incomplete, so likewise was that of defence. In a word, both the attack and defence were of the same expeditionary character and means. Third. The language of the private correspondence of the army was substantially as follows, and contains a full answer to this and all similar objections:—That the value of the place and the army being there, rendered it indispensable to make an effort to acquire it; that the marquis had hopes of effecting this acquisition, but certainly no assured expectation; that the event might therefore disappoint his wishes, but not deceive him; that the very character of the defence, gallant as it was, was such as to encourage the continuance of the attack; such advantage being so nearly gained and so narrowly eluded, as if gained, would have been necessarily followed by the capture of the place. The garrison, moreover, were without water, and suffered great severities by having to bivouac in narrow quarters.20

On the morning of the 18th of October, a breach having been effected and a mine having been prepared under the church of St. Roman, it was resolved that the mine should be exploded the same evening, and that upon such explosion, the breach should be stormed and the line (the second line) escaladed. Accordingly, at the appointed time in the evening, the attacking party was divided into three columns: the one under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, composed of Spanish and Portuguese, were to attack the church; the second party, composed of a detachment of the German legion, under Major Wurmb, were to storm the breach; whilst the third party, composed of the guards, were to escalade the line. At this moment the mine blew up, and, being the appointed signal, the parties at once rushed forward to their assigned points.

The explosion of the mine carried away the whole of the wall which defended that point, and Lieutenant-Colonel Browne succeeded in lodging his party on the ruins and outworks. The enemy retreated to a second parapet behind the church, over the heads of the advancing assailants. This occasioned much loss and confusion; and a flank fire of the enemy coming in aid, compelled the lieutenant-colonel to suffer the retreat of his men, and to content himself with saving them from disorder.

In the mean time, Major Wurmb had directed his party against the breach. The distinguished gallantry of this assault merited a more successful result. The breach was carried in an instant, and a considerable number of the party in the same moment got into the body of the place. But here began the conflict. The enemy opened upon them such a destructive fire, both from the third line and the body of the castle, and brought down upon them such superior numbers, that, after the loss of their gallant leader and a great proportion of their force, they were compelled to retire, and almost in the moment of victory to evacuate what they had so bravely gained.

The third party, the guards, experienced a similar success in the commencement, and a similar disappointment in the result. They succeeded in escalading the line, but were compelled to retire before the superiority of numbers and the fire of the enemy. In his official despatch, dated CabeÇon, 26th of October, 1812, the marquis of Wellington thus writes:—

“It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the guards and German legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and even one of them was killed in one of the embrasures of the parapet.”

The army of Portugal and the army of the North, for they were so near each other as to constitute one army, had not suffered this siege to go on without some attempts to interrupt it; they had now, however, attained a strength and importance that demand our attention.

These two armies were stationed on the high road from Burgos to Miranda on the Ebro, a continuance of the great French road from Madrid, through Burgos to Bayonne. From Burgos to Miranda on the Ebro is forty English miles. Above the village of Monasterio, on that side of it furthest from Burgos, was a range of hills, which was the position of the British outposts. The army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bribiesca; and the army of the North, under General Cafferilli, had its head-quarters at Pancorvo.

The principal attempts of these armies were on the 13th and 18th of October. On the former of these days, General Macune, who was in command of the French at Bribiesca, moved forward a considerable body of infantry and cavalry against the posts of the allies at Monasterio, but was repulsed as well by the posts themselves as by a detachment of the German legion.

On the 18th, the army of Portugal, having been previously strongly reinforced by the arrival of levies from France, re-advanced against the said posts, and possessed themselves of the hills and town. It now, therefore, became necessary to lead the array against them, and accordingly, with the exception of that portion of it required for the siege, the marquis assembled the troops, and placed the allied army on some heights between Burgos and Quentana. This movement was made on the 19th of October. The enemy assembled their army at Monasterio on the same day. On the following evening, the 20th, they moved a force of nearly ten thousand men to drive in the outposts at Quentana, and which, according to order, withdrew as they approached. The marquis had now recourse to a flank movement; the result gave him an advantage; upon seeing which, the enemy again fell back upon Monasterio.

And this manoeuvre, indeed, was the last operation of the siege of Burgos, for on the following day, the 21st, a letter from Sir R. Hill reported such a state of affairs upon the Tagus, that the marquis found it to be an act of necessity immediately to raise the siege, and to fall back upon the Douro. Accordingly, the siege was raised the same night, and the army was in march on the following morning.