A.C. 414.

Syracuse was the most flourishing republic of Sicily. That powerful, rich, and populous city, situated on the eastern coast of the island, consisted of five quarters, inclosed within strong walls, and fortified with towers; they formed so many places, and presented nearly the figure of a triangle. Towards the sea, the island of Ortygia contained the citadel, and commanded the two ports: it communicated by a bridge with Achradina, the handsomest and the best fortified of all the quarters. Above Achradina was the quarter of Tyche, and that of Neapolis, separated one from the other by a wall, which, advancing in a point towards the west, terminated at a height named EpipolÆ. A vast belt of walls inclosed all these quarters: this wall was defended by two forts,—Euryalus and Labdalon.

In the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war, the Segestians, oppressed by the Selenartians, came to implore the assistance of Athens. Never had that republic been so powerful. In accordance with the advice of Alcibiades, the people lent a favourable ear to the prayers of the deputies. They equipped a fleet of a hundred and fifty ships, and gave the command of it to Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus. They set sail for Syracuse, entered the principal port during the night, and landed near Olympia without being perceived. The Syracusans, full of confidence and courage, had resolved to defend themselves to the last. The unexpected appearance of the enemy disconcerted them a little, but they soon threw off this first terror, and drew up in battle array beneath their walls. The signal being given, and each party equally in earnest, the conflict was long and obstinate. A storm intimidated the Syracusans; they gave way, and retired into the city, after a spirited resistance. This check seemed only to reanimate their ardour. They repaired and augmented the fortifications, and confided the whole military authority to Hermocrates, a man equally illustrious by his valour and his experience.

The Athenians obtained possession of EpipolÆ, in spite of the frequent sorties of the besieged, and surrounded the city with a wall of circumvallation. Nicias, by the recall of Alcibiades and the death of Lamachus, who was killed in an action, found himself without colleagues, and sole master of all the operations. Casting aside his habitual tardiness, he brought his fleet into both the ports, and pressed the siege on with energy by sea and land. Syracuse, thus blockaded, was reduced to the last extremity. The despairing citizens were already thinking of surrendering, when Gylippus, a LacedÆmonian captain, sent to their relief with a good body of troops, made his appearance. Hope was again revived, and, in anticipation, they proclaimed the Spartan the father and liberator of Syracuse. This general did not disappoint the expectations of his allies. He sent word to the Athenians that he allowed them five days to evacuate Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make any reply to such a message, but some of his soldiers asked the herald whether the appearance of a LacedÆmonian cloak and a miserable stick could change the fortunes of armies. Preparations for battle were made on both sides. Port Labdalon was carried by assault, and all the Athenians who defended it were put to the sword. Every day some skirmish or more serious action occurred, in which Gylippus had always the advantage. Nicias was forced to go into cantonments towards Plemmyrium, in order to protect his baggage and to support his fleet. The LacedÆmonians attacked and carried his forts, and took possession of his baggage, at the same time that the Syracusans obtained a serious advantage over his fleet. Nicias was in a state of perfect consternation; he had informed the Athenians of the miserable state of his army since the landing of the Spartans, and they had promised him succours, but they did not arrive, and his situation became alarming. He was on the point of succumbing to his fate, when an Athenian fleet of seventy-three galleys, commanded by Demosthenes, sailed proudly into port. This general immediately planned and attempted some attacks, but his temerity cost him dear. He lost a great number of soldiers, and quickly destroyed all the hopes his arrival had created; the Athenians were reduced to greater extremities than ever, and they resolved to raise the siege after risking another naval engagement. Victory still was favourable to the besieged, who deprived their enemies of the means of flight even, by blockading their ships in the greater port. They then turned their thoughts to escape by land; but Hermocrates, being informed of their intention, barred every passage: the unfortunate fugitives, having set out on their march in the night-time, fell into ambuscades laid for them in all directions. They defended themselves in a manner worthy of their name, but, overpowered by numbers, fatigue, and hunger, they were forced to surrender at discretion. They were thrown into the public prisons.

The Syracusan people were brutally elated with victory, and sullied their triumph by the cruelty exercised upon the two Athenian leaders, Nicias and Demosthenes. They were sentenced to be flogged with rods, and then to be executed. The wiser and more prudent Syracusans exceedingly disapproved of this severity, and Hermocrates, the general whose prudence, skill, and valour had brought about the happy issue of the contest, remonstrated strongly with the people; but they were too much excited to listen to him, and would not allow him even to finish his speech. And here we meet with one of those incidents which, removed from common occurrence, render the histories of the two great nations of antiquity so delightful. Just as the noisy crowd silenced their victorious general, an ancient Syracusan, venerable for his great age and his respected character, who in the siege had lost two sons, the only heirs of his name and estate, was borne by his servants to the tribunal, and by his appearance at once procured a profound silence. “You here behold,” said he, “an unfortunate father, who has felt, more than any other Syracusan, the fatal effects of this war by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation and were the only support of my old age. I cannot, indeed, forbear admiring their courage, and rejoicing at their felicity, in sacrificing to their country’s welfare a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature; but then I cannot but be strongly affected by the wound which their death has made in my heart, nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But, however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction than to the honour of my country; and I see it ready to expose itself to eternal infamy by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians, indeed, merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that can be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and avenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms and surrendered, did they not do this in the confidence of having their lives spared? And if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach of having violated the laws of nations, and dishonoured our triumph by the most barbarous cruelty? What! will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world, and have it said that a nation who first dedicated a temple in their city to Clemency, found not any in yours? Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exercising of mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using of moderation in the greatest prosperity, and, fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You, doubtless, have not forgotten that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians, and employed all his credit and the whole power of his eloquence to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you, therefore, pronounce sentence of death upon this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me than the sight of so horrid an injustice committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens.”

The people seemed moved to compassion by this speech, especially as when the venerable old man first ascended the tribunal, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated with vehemence upon the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised upon several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have subjected it to had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of numberless Syracusans who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose names could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers: on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes delivered up to him, especially as he had taken them, in order to carry them to LacedÆmon. But his demand was rejected with haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death. Shameful cruelties were likewise inflicted upon the meaner prisoners.

Such was the issue of this improvident war, set on foot by the influence of the restless ambitious Alcibiades. It lasted two years; and Athens had been led to form great hopes from the result of it. There are few characters young readers are more likely to be led astray in than that of Alcibiades. The instances of his spirit, generosity, personal beauty, and above all, his love for his master Socrates, make more impression upon plastic minds, than what is told of almost any other person in history. But, if he had shining qualities, he was deficient in all that were solid, virtuous, and serviceable to the state. He availed himself of his popularity to carry out his ambition; his apparent generosity was selfishness disguised; his courage was always ill-directed; and, whether we consider such a man as a public character or a private citizen, our young readers may depend upon it, it is one of the most dangerous.

SECOND SIEGE, A.C. 400.

Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, having declared war against the Carthaginians, obtained several victories over them. But this tyrant was soon punished by the siege which Himilco, the Carthaginian general, laid to Syracuse, with a fleet of two hundred vessels, and an army of a hundred thousand foot and three thousand horse. Dionysius was not in a condition to stop the torrent which threatened him with destruction; but pestilence served him more effectually than any number of troops could have done: this army and its generals faded away beneath the awful scourge, as it were instantaneously. The tyrant, taking advantage of the miserable state to which disease had reduced the Carthaginians, attacked them with spirit, defeated them without trouble, took or burnt most of their vessels, and made a vast booty.

THIRD SIEGE, A.C. 212.

In the year 212 before Christ, the Syracusans, excited by seditious magistrates, declared war against Rome, breaking the treaties entered into by Hiero II. and the great republic. The consul Marcellus, being in Sicily, advanced towards Syracuse. When near the city, he sent deputies to inform the inhabitants that he came to restore liberty to Syracuse, and not to make war upon it; but he was refused admission to the city. Hippocrates and Epicydes went out to meet him, and having heard his proposals, replied haughtily, that if the Romans intended to besiege their city, they should soon learn the difference between Syracuse and Leontium. Marcellus then determined to besiege the place,—by land on the side of Hexapylum, and by sea on that of the AchradinÆ, the walls of which were washed by the waves. He gave Appius the command of the land forces, and reserved that of the fleet for himself. The fleet consisted of sixty galleys of five benches of oars, filled with soldiers, armed with bows, slings, and darts, to scour the walls. There were a great number of other vessels, laden with all sorts of machines usually employed in the sieges of fortified places. The Romans, carrying on their attacks at two different places, the Syracusans were at first in great consternation, apprehensive that nothing could oppose so terrible a power and such mighty efforts. And it had, indeed, been impossible to resist them, but for the assistance of one single man, whose wonderful genius was everything to the Syracusans: this was Archimedes. He had taken care to supply the walls with all things necessary for a good defence. As soon as his machines began to play on the land side, they discharged upon the infantry all sorts of darts, with stones of enormous weight, which flew with so much noise, force, and rapidity, that nothing could withstand their shock. They beat down and dashed to pieces all before them, and occasioned terrible disorder in the ranks of the besiegers. Marcellus succeeded no better on the side of the sea: Archimedes had disposed his machines in such a manner as to throw darts to any distance. Though the enemy lay far from the city, he reached them by means of his larger and more formidable balistÆ and catapultÆ. When these overshot their mark, he had smaller, proportioned to the distance, which put the Romans into such confusion as almost paralyzed their efforts. This was not the greatest danger. Archimedes had placed lofty and strong machines behind the walls, which suddenly letting fall vast beams with an immense weight at the end of them upon a ship, sunk it to the bottom. Besides this, he caused an iron grapple to be let out by a chain, and having caught hold of the head of a ship with this hook, by means of a weight let down within the walls, it was lifted up, set upon the stern, and held so for some time; then, by letting go the chain, either by a wheel or a pulley, it was let fall again with its whole weight either on its head or its side, and thus sunk. At other times, the machines, dragging the ship towards the shore, by cordage and hooks, after having made it whirl about a great while, dashed it to pieces against the points of the rocks which projected under the walls. Galleys, frequently seized and suspended in the air, were whirled about with rapidity, exhibiting a dreadful sight to the spectators, after which, they were let fall into the sea, and sunk to the bottom with their crews.

Marcellus had prepared, at great expense, machines called sambucÆ, from their resemblance to a musical instrument of that name. He appointed eight galleys of five benches for that purpose, from which the oars were removed, half on the right side and half on the left; these were joined together two-and-two on the sides without oars. This machine consisted of a ladder of the breadth of four feet, which, when erect, was of equal height with the walls. It was laid at length upon the sides of the two galleys joined together, and extended considerably beyond their beaks: upon the masts of these vessels were affixed pulleys and cords. When set to work, the cords were made fast to the extremity of the machine, and men upon the stern drew it up by pulleys; others at the head assisting in raising it with levers. The galleys afterwards being brought forward to the foot of the walls, the machines were applied to them. The bridge of the sambuca was then let down, no doubt after the manner of a drawbridge, upon which the besiegers passed to the walls of the place besieged. This machine had not the expected effect. Whilst it was at a considerable distance from the walls, Archimedes discharged a vast stone upon it, weighing ten quintals,5 then a second, and immediately after a third, all of which, striking against it with dreadful force and noise, beat down and broke its supports, and gave the galleys upon which it stood such a shock, that they parted from each other. Marcellus, almost discouraged and at a loss what to do, retired as fast as possible with his galleys, and sent orders to the land forces to do the same. He called also a council of war, in which it was resolved, the next day before dawn, to endeavour to approach close to the walls. They were in hopes, by this means, to shelter themselves from the machines, which, for want of a distance proportioned to their force, would be rendered ineffectual. But Archimedes had provided against all contingencies. He had prepared machines long before, that carried to all distances a proportionate number of darts and ends of beams, which being very short, required less time for preparing them, and in consequence, were more frequently discharged. He had besides made small chasms or loopholes in the walls, at little distances, where he had placed scorpions,6 which, not carrying far, wounded those who approached, without being perceived but by their effect. When the Romans had gained the foot of the walls, and thought themselves very well covered, they found they were exposed to an infinite number of darts, or overwhelmed with stones, which fell directly upon their heads, there being no part of the wall which did not continually pour that mortal hail upon them. This obliged them to retire. But they were no sooner removed to some distance, than a new discharge of darts overtook them in their retreat, so that they lost great numbers of men, and almost all their galleys were disabled or beaten to pieces, without being able to revenge their loss upon their enemies, for Archimedes had placed most of his machines in security behind the walls; so that the Romans, says Plutarch, repulsed by an infinity of wounds, without seeing the place or hand from which they came, seemed to fight in reality against the gods.

Marcellus, though at a loss what to do, and not knowing how to oppose the machines of Archimedes, could not forbear, however, jesting upon them. “Shall we persist,” said he, to his workmen and engineers, “in making war with this Briareus of a geometrician, who treats my galleys and sambucÆ so rudely? He infinitely exceeds the fabled giants with their hundred hands, in his perpetual and surprising discharge upon us.” Marcellus had reason for complaining of Archimedes alone; for the Syracusans were really no more than members of the engines and machines of that great geometrician, who was himself the soul of all their powers and operations. All other arms were unemployed; for the city at that time made use of none, either offensive or defensive, but those of Archimedes. Marcellus, at length observing the Romans to be so much intimidated, that if they saw upon the walls a small cord only or the least piece of wood, they would immediately fly, crying out that Archimedes was going to discharge some dreadful machine upon them, renounced his hopes of being able to make a breach in the walls, gave over his attacks, and turned the siege into a blockade. The Romans perceived that they had no other resource but to reduce the great number of people in the city by famine, and that they must stop every supply, both by sea and land. During the eight months in which they besieged the city, there was no kind of stratagem they did not invent, nor any act of valour they left untried, except, indeed, the assault, which they never ventured to attempt again. So much power has sometimes a single man, or a single science, when rightly applied. Deprive Syracuse of only one old man,—the great strength of the Roman arms must inevitably take the city: his sole presence checks and disconcerts all their designs. We here see what cannot be repeated too often,—how much interest princes have in protecting arts, favouring the learned, or encouraging science by honourable distinctions and actual rewards, which never ruin or impoverish a state. We say nothing in this place of the birth or nobility of Archimedes; he was not indebted to them for the happiness of his genius and profound knowledge; we consider him only as a learned man, and an excellent geometrician. What a loss would Syracuse have sustained, if, to have saved a small expense and pension, such a man had been abandoned to inaction and obscurity! Hiero was careful not to act in this manner. He knew all the value of our geometrician; and it is no vulgar merit in a prince to understand that of other men. He paid it due honour; he made it useful, and did not stay till occasion or necessity obliged him to do so: it would then have been too late. By a wise foresight, the true character of a great prince and a great minister, in the very arms of peace he provided all that was necessary for supporting a siege, and making war with success, though at that time there was no appearance of anything to be apprehended from the Romans, with whom Syracuse was allied in the strictest friendship. Hence were seen to arise in an instant, as out of the earth, an incredible number of machines of every kind and size, the very sight of which was sufficient to strike armies with terror and confusion. There are amongst those machines some of which we can scarcely conceive the effects, and the reality of which we might be tempted to call in question, if it were allowable to doubt the evidence of writers, such, for instance, as Polybius, an almost contemporary author, who treated of facts entirely recent, and such as were well known to all the world. But how can we refuse to give credit to the uniform consent of Greek and Roman historians, whether friends or enemies, with regard to circumstances of which whole armies were witnesses and experienced the effects, and which had so great an influence on the events of the war? What passed in this siege of Syracuse shows how far the ancients had carried their genius and art in besieging and in supporting sieges. Our artillery, which so perfectly imitates thunder, has not more effect than the machines of Archimedes had, if indeed it has so much. A burning glass is spoken of, by the means of which Archimedes is said to have burnt part of the Roman fleet. That must have been an extraordinary invention; but, as no ancient author mentions it, it is no doubt a modern tradition without foundation. Burning-glasses were known to antiquity, but not of that kind.7

After Marcellus had resolved to confine himself to the blockade of Syracuse, he left Appius before the place with two-thirds of his army, advanced with the other into the island, and brought over some cities to the Roman interest. At the same time, Himilco, general of the Carthaginians, arrived in Sicily with a great army, in hopes of reconquering it, and expelling the Romans. Hippocrates left Syracuse with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse to join him, and carry on the war in concert against Marcellus; Epicydes remained in the city, to command there during the blockade. The fleets of the two states appeared at the same time on the coasts of Sicily; but that of the Carthaginians, seeing: itself weaker than the other, was afraid to venture a battle, and soon sailed back to Carthage. Marcellus had continued eight months before Syracuse with Appius, according to Polybius, when the year of his consulship expired.

Marcellus employed a part of the second year of the siege in several expeditions in Sicily. On his return from Agrigentum, upon which he had made an ineffectual attempt, he came up with the army of Hippocrates, which he defeated, killing above eight thousand men. This advantage kept those on their duty who had entertained thoughts of going over to the Carthaginians. After this victory, he turned his attention again towards Syracuse; and having sent off Appius to Rome, who went thither to demand the consulship, he put Q. Crispinus in his place.

In the beginning of the third campaign, Marcellus, almost absolutely despairing of being able to take Syracuse by force, because Archimedes continually opposed him with invincible obstacles, or by famine, because the Carthaginian fleet, which was returned more numerous than before, easily threw in convoys, deliberated whether he should remain before Syracuse, or direct his endeavours against Agrigentum. But before he came to a final determination, he thought it proper to try whether he could not make himself master of Syracuse by some secret intelligence. There were many Syracusans in his camp, who had taken refuge there in the beginning of the troubles. A slave of one of these secretly carried on an intrigue in which four score of the principal persons were concerned, who came in companies to consult with him in the camp, concealed in barks, under the nets of fishermen. The conspiracy was on the point of taking effect, when a person named Attalus, through resentment for not having been admitted into it, discovered the whole to Epicydes, who put all the conspirators to death.

This enterprise having thus miscarried, Marcellus found himself in new difficulties. He was filled with grief and shame at the idea of raising a siege which had consumed so much time, and cost the republic so many men and ships. An accident, however, supplied him with a resource, and gave a new life to his hopes. Some Roman vessels had taken one DÆmippus, whom Epicydes had sent to negotiate with Philip, king of Macedon. The Syracusans expressed a great desire to ransom this man, and Marcellus was not averse to it. A place near the port of Trozilus was fixed upon for the conference regarding the amount. As the deputies went thither several times, it came into the mind of a Roman soldier who accompanied them to consider the wall with great attention. After having counted the stones, and examined the measure of each of them, upon a calculation of the height of the wall, he found it to be much lower than it was accounted, and concluded that with ladders of a moderate length it might be easily scaled. Without loss of time, he communicated this to Marcellus, who knew that the general is not always the only shrewd man in an army, and, taking his advice, assured himself, with his own eyes, of the fact. Having caused ladders to be prepared, he took the opportunity of a festival that the Syracusans celebrated for three days in honour of Diana, during which the inhabitants gave themselves up entirely to rejoicings and banquets. At the time of night when he conceived they would be heavy and sleepy after their debauch, he ordered a thousand chosen troops to advance with their ladders towards the wall. When the first had got to the top without disturbing the watch, others followed, encouraged by the boldness and success of their leaders. The Syracusans proved to be either drunk or asleep, and the thousand soldiers soon scaled the wall. Having thrown down the gate of the Hexapylum, they took possession of the quarter of the city called EpipolÆ. It then became no longer time to deceive but to terrify the people. The Syracusans, awakened by the noise, began to rouse themselves and prepare for action. Marcellus ordered all his trumpets to be sounded at once, which so alarmed them that the inhabitants took to flight, believing every quarter of the city to be in the hands of the enemy. The strongest and the best part, however, called Achradina, was not yet taken, being separated by its walls from the rest of the city. Marcellus, at daybreak, entered the new city by the quarter called Tyche. Epicydes, having hastily drawn up some troops, which he had in the isle adjoining Achradina, marched against Marcellus; but finding him stronger than he expected, after a slight skirmish, he fell back, and shut himself up in Achradina. All the Roman captains and officers crowded around Marcellus, to congratulate him upon his success. As to himself, when he had, from an eminence, considered the loftiness, beauty, and extent of the city, he is said to have shed tears, and to have deplored the unhappy condition it was about to experience. He called to mind the two powerful Athenian fleets which had formerly been sunk before this city, and the two numerous armies cut to pieces with the illustrious generals who commanded them: the many wars sustained with so much valour against the Carthaginians; the many tyrants and potent kings, Hiero particularly, whose memory was still recent, who had signalized himself by so many royal virtues, and, still more, by the important services he had rendered the Roman people, whose interests had always been as dear to him as his own. Moved by that reflection, he deemed it incumbent upon him, before he attacked Achradina, to send to the besieged to exhort them to surrender voluntarily, and prevent the ruin of their city. His remonstrances and exhortations had no effect.

To prevent being harassed in his rear, he first attacked a fort called Euryclus, which lay at the bottom of the new town, and commanded the whole country on the land side. After having carried it, and placed therein a strong garrison, he gave all his attention to Achradina. During these proceedings, Hippocrates and Himilco arrived. The first, with the Sicilians, having placed and fortified his camp near the great harbour, and given the signal to those who were in Achradina, attacked the old Roman camp, in which Crispinus commanded; Epicydes at the same time made a sally upon the posts of Marcellus. Neither of these enterprises was successful. Hippocrates was vigorously repulsed by Crispinus, who pursued him to his intrenchments, and Marcellus obliged Epicydes to shut himself up in Achradina. Being autumn, a plague incidental to the season killed a great many of the inhabitants of the city, and was even more destructive in the Roman and Carthaginian camps. The distemper was not severe at first, but the communication with the infected, and even the care taken of them, served to spread the contagion. Death, and the spectacle of interment, continually presented mournful objects to the eyes of the living: nothing was heard, night or day, but groans and lamentations. At length, the being accustomed to the evil had hardened their hearts to such a degree, that they not only ceased to grieve for the dead, but even neglected to bury them. Nothing was to be seen but dead bodies, by the eyes of those who hourly expected to be the same. The Carthaginians suffered more than either the Romans or Syracusans. Having no place to retire to, their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, both perished, with almost all their troops. Marcellus, from the first breaking out of the disease, brought his troops into the city, where the roofs and shade were of great service to them; but, notwithstanding, he lost no inconsiderable number of his men.

In the mean time, Bomilcar, who commanded the Carthaginian fleet, and had made a second voyage to Carthage, to bring a new supply, returned with a hundred and thirty ships and seven hundred transports. He was prevented by contrary winds from doubling the Cape of Pachynus. Epicydes, who was afraid that if these winds continued, this fleet might be discouraged, and return to Africa, left Achradina to the care of the generals of the mercenary troops, and went to Bomilcar, whom he persuaded to try the event of a naval battle, as soon as the weather would permit. Marcellus, seeing that the troops of the Sicilians increased every day, and that if he stayed and suffered himself to be shut up in Syracuse, he should be pressed by sea and land, resolved, though not so strong in ships, to oppose the passage of the Carthaginian fleet. As soon as the high winds abated, Bomilcar stood out to sea, in order to double the cape; but when he saw the Roman ships advancing in good order, on a sudden, on what account is not known, he took to flight, sent orders to the transports to return to Africa, and sought refuge himself in Tarentum. Epicydes, completely disappointed in his great hopes, and apprehensive of returning into a city already half-taken, made all sail for Agrigentum, rather with the design of awaiting the event of the siege than of making any new attempt from that point. When it became known in the camp of the Sicilians that Epicydes had quitted Syracuse, and the Carthaginians Sicily, they sent deputies to Marcellus, after having sounded the disposition of the besieged, to treat upon the conditions on which Syracuse should surrender. It was agreed with unanimity enough on both sides, that what had appertained to the kings should belong to the Romans, and that the Sicilians should retain all the rest, with their laws and liberty. After these preliminaries, they demanded a conference with those to whom Epicydes had intrusted the government in his absence. They told them they had been sent by the army to Marcellus and the inhabitants of Syracuse, in order that all the Sicilians, as well within as without the city, might have the same fate, and that no separate convention might be made. Having been permitted to enter the city and confer with their friends and relations, after having informed them of what they had already agreed with Marcellus, and giving them assurances that their lives would be safe, they persuaded them to begin by removing the three governors Epicydes had left in his place, which was immediately put in execution. After this, having assembled the people, they represented that if the Romans had undertaken the siege of Syracuse, it was out of affection, not enmity, to the Syracusans; that it was not till after they had been apprised of the oppression they suffered from Hippocrates and Epicydes, those ambitious agents of Hannibal, and afterwards of Hieronymus, that they had taken arms, and begun the siege of the city, not to ruin it, but to destroy its tyrants; that, as Hippocrates was dead, Epicydes no longer in Syracuse, his lieutenants were slain, and the Carthaginians dispossessed of Sicily, both by sea and land, what reason could the Romans now have for not inclining as much to preserve Syracuse, as if Hiero, the sole example of fidelity towards them, were still alive? That neither the city nor the inhabitants had anything to fear but from themselves, if they let slip the occasion for renewing their amity with the Romans; that they never had so favourable an opportunity as the present, when they were just delivered from the violent government of their tyrants; and that the first use they ought to make of their liberty was to return to their duty.

This discourse was perfectly well received by everybody. It was, however, judged proper to create new magistrates before the nomination of deputies; the latter of whom were chosen from the former. The deputy who spoke in their name, and was instructed solely to use the utmost endeavours that Syracuse might not be destroyed, addressed himself to Marcellus, in a long but sensible speech, laying the whole blame of the war upon Hippocrates and Epicydes. “For the rest,” said he, still continuing to address Marcellus, “your interest is as much concerned as ours. The gods have granted you the glory of having taken the finest and most illustrious city possessed by the Greeks. All we have ever achieved worthy of being recorded, either by sea or land, augments and adorns your triumph. Fame is not a sufficiently faithful chronicler to make known the greatness and strength of the city you have taken; posterity can only judge of these by its own eyes. It is necessary that we should be able to show to all travellers, from whatever part of the universe they come, sometimes the trophies we have obtained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, and sometimes those you have acquired from us; and that Syracuse, thus placed for ever under the protection of Marcellus, may be a lasting and an eternal monument of the valour and clemency of him who took and preserved it. It is unjust that the remembrance of Hieronymus should have more weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was much longer your friend than the former your enemy. Permit me to say, you have experienced the good effects of the amity of Hiero, but the senseless enterprises of Hieronymus have fallen solely upon his own head.” The difficulty was not to obtain what they demanded from Marcellus, but to preserve tranquillity and union amongst those in the city. The deserters, convinced that they should be delivered up to the Romans, inspired the foreign soldiers with the same fear. Both the one and the other having, therefore, taken arms whilst the deputies were still in the camp of Marcellus, they began by cutting the throats of the newly-elected magistrates, and, dispersing themselves on all sides, they put to the sword all they met, and plundered whatever fell in their way. That they might not be without leaders, they appointed six officers; three to command in Achradina and three in the Isle. The tumult being at length appeased, the foreign troops were informed, from all hands, that it was concluded with the Romans that their cause should be entirely distinct from that of the deserters. At the same instant, the deputies who had been sent to Marcellus arrived, and fully undeceived them. Amongst those who commanded in the Isle, there was a Spaniard, named Mericus. Means were found to corrupt him: he gave up the gate near the fountain Arethusa, to soldiers sent by Marcellus in the night to take possession of it. At daybreak the next morning, Marcellus made a false attack on the Achradina, to draw all the forces of the citadel, and the Isle adjoining to it, to that side, and to enable some vessels he had prepared to throw troops into the Isle, which would be unguarded. Everything succeeded according to his plan. The soldiers whom those vessels had landed in the Isle, finding almost all the posts abandoned, and the gates by which the garrison of the citadel had marched out against Marcellus still open, they took possession of them after a slight encounter. Marcellus having received advice that he was master of the Isle, and of part of Achradina, and that Mericus, with the body under his command, had joined his troops, ordered a retreat to be sounded, that the treasures of the kings might not be plundered. These did not prove so valuable as was expected.

The deserters having escaped,—a passage being purposely left free for them,—the Syracusans opened all the gates of Achradina to Marcellus, and sent deputies to him with instructions to demand nothing further from him than the preservation of the lives of themselves and their children. Marcellus having assembled his council and some Syracusans who were in his camp, gave his answer to the deputies in their presence: “That Hiero, for fifty years, had not done the Roman people more good than those who had been masters of Syracuse some years past had intended to do them harm; but that their ill-will had fallen upon their own heads, and they had punished themselves for their violation of treaties in a more severe manner than the Romans could have desired; that he had besieged Syracuse during three years, not that the Roman people might reduce it into slavery, but to prevent the chiefs of the revolters from continuing to hold it under oppression; that he had undergone many fatigues and dangers in so long a siege, but that he thought he had made himself ample amends by the glory of having taken that city, and the satisfaction of having saved it from the entire ruin it seemed to deserve.” After having placed a body of troops to secure the treasury, and safeguards in the houses of the Syracusans who had withdrawn to the camp, he abandoned the city to be plundered. It is reported that the riches that were pillaged in Syracuse at this time exceeded all that could have been expected at the taking of Carthage itself. An unhappy accident interrupted the joy of Marcellus, and gave him a very sensible affliction. Archimedes, at a time when all things were in this confusion in Syracuse, shut up in his closet like a man of another world, who has no interest in what is passing in this, was intent upon the study of some geometrical figure, and not only his eyes, but the whole faculties of his soul, were so engaged in this contemplation, that he had neither heard the tumult of the Romans, universally busy in plundering, nor the report of the city’s being taken. A soldier suddenly came in upon him, and bade him follow him to Marcellus. Archimedes desired him to stay a minute till he had solved his problem, and finished the demonstration of it. The soldier, who cared for neither the problem nor the demonstration, and was vexed at the delay, which, perhaps, kept him from plunder, drew his sword and killed him. Marcellus was exceedingly afflicted when he heard the news of his death. Not being able to restore him to life, he paid all the honours in his power to his memory. He made a diligent research after all his relations, treated them with great distinction, and granted them peculiar privileges. He caused the funeral of Archimedes to be performed in the most solemn manner, and ordered a monument to be erected to him among those of the great persons who had most distinguished themselves in Syracuse. There are other accounts of the manner of his death, but all agree that it was accidental, contrary to the wish of Marcellus, and took place immediately after the capture of the city.

Archimedes by his will had desired his relations and friends to put no other epitaph on his tomb, after his death, than a cylinder circumscribed by a sphere; that is to say, a globe, or spherical figure, and to set down at the bottom the proportions which these two solids, the containing and the contained, have to each other. He might have filled up the bases of the columns of his tomb with relievos, whereon the whole history of the siege of Syracuse might have been carved, and himself appeared like another Jupiter, thundering upon the Romans. But he set an infinitely higher value upon the discovery of a geometrical demonstration, than upon all the so much celebrated machines he had invented. Hence he chose rather to do himself honour in the eyes of posterity, by the discovery he had made of the relation of a sphere to a cylinder of the same base and height; which is as two to three.

The Syracusans, who had been in former times so fond of the sciences, did not long retain the esteem and gratitude they owed a man who had done so much honour to their city. Less than a hundred and forty years after, Archimedes was so perfectly forgotten by the citizens, notwithstanding the great services he had done them, that they denied his having been buried at Syracuse. It is Cicero who informs us of this circumstance. At the time he was quÆstor in Sicily, his curiosity induced him to make a search after the tomb of Archimedes, a curiosity worthy of a man of Cicero’s genius. The Syracusans assured him that his search would be to no purpose, and that there was no such monument amongst them. Cicero pitied their ignorance, which only served to increase his desire of making the discovery. At length, after several fruitless attempts, he perceived, without the gate of the city, facing Agrigentum, amongst a great number of tombs, a pillar, almost entirety concealed by thorns and brambles, through which he could discern the figure of a sphere and a cylinder. Those who have any taste for antiquities may easily imagine the joy of Cicero upon this occasion. Adopting the words of Archimedes, he exclaimed—“I have found what I looked for.” The place was immediately ordered to be cleared, and a passage opened to the column, on which was found the inscription, still legible, though some of the lines were obliterated by time. So that, says Cicero, on finishing this account, the greatest city of Greece, and the most flourishing of old in the study of the sciences, would not have known the treasure it possessed, if a man, born in a country which it considered almost as barbarous, a man of Aspinum, had not discovered for it the tomb of its citizen, so highly distinguished by the force and penetration of his mind. We trust our readers will excuse our having gone into more details in our account of this siege than of most others, but we consider it one of the most interesting of antiquity. We do not often meet with the genius of an Archimedes, or the virtues of a Marcellus, to mitigate the horrors of a siege.